The Ineffectiveness of Peacekeeping and the Absence of Crucial Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Kashmiri and Northern Irish Conflicts

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The Ineffectiveness of Peacekeeping and the Absence of Crucial Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Kashmiri and Northern Irish Conflicts

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Abstract

The presence of peacekeepers, whether they are mandated by the international community or used internally by a sovereign nation, has a limited effect on the ability to achieve a lasting peace and may even function as an obstacle, as seen through a comparative study of the conflicts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland. Because of this, they are of limited utility as the final step towards a society that has reconciled with its past conflict due to the fact that the peacekeepers (efforts work towards short-term peace) do not act as peacebuilders (efforts work towards long-term peace). The regions of Kashmir and Northern Ireland will be analyzed in detail in reference to the notion that peacekeeping is ineffective because, although the manner in which they were handled was completely different, they have still yet to reach the post-conflict society status. Kashmir was sent United Nations (UN) peacekeepers while Northern Ireland was sent British troops to serve as peacekeepers. Neither of these case studies were extreme in how peacekeeping was ineffective (such as Rwanda), yet they demonstrate the lack of success within the approach.
**Table of Contents**

I. Introduction .................................................. 4

II. Methodology and Limitations ................................. 7
   a. Methodology ............................................. 7
   b. Limitations ............................................. 8

III. Theoretical Framework ....................................... 8

IV. Literature Review ............................................ 10
   a. How Peacekeeping is Effective ...................... 10
   b. How Peacekeeping is Ineffective .................. 13
   c. Contributions to Existing Scholarship ............ 16

V. Case Study: Kashmir ........................................... 17
   a. Historical Overview of the Conflict .............. 17
   b. Kashmir in the 21st Century ....................... 20

VI. Case Study: Northern Ireland ............................. 22
   a. Historical Overview of the Conflict .............. 22
   b. Northern Ireland in the 21st Century ............ 25

VII. Analysis .................................................... 27

VIII. Conclusion .................................................. 34

IX. Works Cited .................................................. 36
Introduction

For a handful of conflicts around the world, the international community’s solution is the deployment of United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping officers to transition the region from its current state of violence to negotiation and ultimately, to a post-conflict society. Peacekeeping forces can also be supplied by the state in which the conflict is occurring in order to accomplish the same tasks. It is important to note that the use of the term ‘peacekeeping’ in this thesis does not align directly with the definition of peacekeepers supplied by the UN. Rather, the term ‘peacekeeping’ will be used in reference to the definition of Johan Galtung, who states that peacekeeping is a “balance of power” and that, “the antagonists are kept away from each other under mutual threats of considerable punishment if they transgress, particularly if they transgress into each other’s territory” (Galtung 282). Additionally, it is important to keep in mind the way peacekeeping is described by the UN: “UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace” (“United Nations Peacekeeping”) as it differs from the definition I will be using from Galtung.

Peacekeeping will be viewed in the international sense by analyzing continued UN peacekeeper presence along the Line of Control between Indian-controlled Kashmir and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, and it will also be viewed in the domestic sense by analyzing Operation Banner, or the presence of British Troops in Northern Ireland during the Troubles and post-Good Friday Agreement. The peacekeeping efforts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland have done little to move the regions past the transitional stage. I contend that both conflicts keep Kashmir and Northern Ireland from transitioning to a post-conflict society. The status of peacekeeping efforts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland suggests that peacekeepers – whether they
are international or state in nature – are limited in their ability to bring about a post-conflict state as they struggle to solve the societal and structural aspects of the conflict. Because of this, their actions only achieve a portion of the final step towards a society that has reconciled with its past conflict due to the fact that the peacekeepers do not act as peacebuilders.

For the section entitled “Literature Review,” academic writings that discuss peacekeeping versus peacebuilding and the effectiveness of peacekeeping debate whether peacekeeping forces are successful in their missions. There was a number of scholars who argued that peacekeeping, though not without its flaws, is effective and another group who argued that peacekeeping is ineffective as it either does little to reach a post-conflict society and remains in the transitional stage or even that peacekeeping makes the situation worse rather than better. While each academic piece has their own way of measuring success (some measure it by the end of violent conflict while others measure it by the transition into a post-conflict society), the groups were separated by their thoughts on the effectiveness of peacekeeping, not by their standards of success for a peacekeeping mission. The two sides have been split, as it is important for those reading this thesis to see that the opinion expressed by myself is not exactly what the majority believe.

Galtung’s theories of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding along with negative peace versus positive peace will be explored through the context of the peacekeeping missions in Kashmir and Northern Ireland in the “Theoretical Framework” section. Additionally, Galtung’s definition of peacekeeping will be compared to the UN’s definition of peacekeeping. Throughout the paper, the idea of what the UN considers to be peacekeeping and what Galtung considers to be peacekeeping will be analyzed.
A closer look at the histories of the Kashmir and Northern Ireland and the current situations of the case studies will be explored in the “Case Studies” section. When looking at Kashmir’s history, the portion will mainly be focusing on the conflict starting with the partition in 1949 and finishing with the push for peace in the 1990s. It will highlight the main events that are most famous from the long-term conflict with the reminder that peacekeepers were present since the partition. This will lead into the case study section on Kashmir, which discusses peace efforts that have been made in the 2000s as well as the collapse of this renewed hope in peace. This is the result of a high number of ceasefire violations along the Line of Control, even with peacekeepers present. In Northern Ireland’s “Historical Overview,” there is a brief detailing of the creation of Northern Ireland and an overview of the period called the Troubles, which was an intense period of conflict in the region that spanned 30 years (1968-1998). The case study portion will look at the end of the peacekeeping mission in Northern Ireland and analyze whether it can be viewed as a post-conflict society based off of a number of current situations in Northern Ireland (the peace walls, Brexit) that question the success of Operation Banner (deployment of British troops).

Based on the information presented above, the “improvements” caused by the peacekeepers in the regions of the case studies are short-term because the most that peacekeepers can do is achieve short-term peace. The way that Kashmiri and Northern Irish society functions demonstrates that they have not moved away from the conflict. There are continuous violations of the ceasefire on the border of Pakistani and Indian Kashmir and Northern Ireland still has active paramilitary groups on both sides that keep the conflict alive through fear and intimidation tactics.
Methodology and Limitations

Methodology

For the historical overview and case studies sections, I was able to use a number of books, peace documents such as the Good Friday Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, and government/UN online resources in order to give a rounded view of Kashmir and Northern Ireland. I utilized academic journals and writings for the rest of my research as the topic of the effectiveness of peacekeeping is highly debated. Many of the academic journals that I have found that debate the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of peacekeeping focus on other case studies such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone. I felt that this adds to my thesis because it demonstrates that I am contributing a different view on the scholarly conversation of this topic by using two regions that are not typically used when examining the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Additionally, it serves as further evidence to my claim that peacekeeping is ineffective as I provide a number of other sources that list the method of peacekeeping as ineffective in their case studies. The academic journals that I utilize as a counterpoint to my thesis acknowledge that the main form of peace that peacekeeping achieves is short-term, but they assert that this type of peace is necessary as other types of long-term peace can build off of it. My other articles that agree with my statement also note the short-term (occasional) successes of peacekeeping, but highlight how this is a problem as it only does part of what is required for a full solution.

Opinions surrounding the effectiveness of peacekeepers and the state of the conflicts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland are not unanimous; there is disagreement within the academic community on these topics. Therefore, much of the research relied on academic journals debating these topics, the historical background of the two conflicts and how peacekeeping
affected the conflicts (whether it was ineffective, or even negative). Additionally, peace
documents such as The Good Friday Agreement\(^1\) and the Lahore Declaration\(^2\) were important to
the methodology. Analyzing the linguistics of these documents helps gain a greater look at what
peacekeepers felt constitutes as ‘keeping the peace’.

**Limitations**

Some limitations that I encountered during the writing process were that because the
conflicts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland are not considered to be ‘contemporary’, it was
difficult to find recent articles and documents pertaining to the states of the conflicts. There were
many important articles about the topics written before 2011\(^3\). I have decided to incorporate them
into my “Case Study” portion. Additionally, the situation in either of the case studies could
change at any point during or after this thesis was written. The finalized Brexit plan could have
serious and consequential outcomes for the continuation of a fragile peace in Northern Ireland.

**Theoretical Framework**

One of the main theories that will be used throughout the entirety of the paper is Johan
Galtung’s “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding”. He
gives three separate definitions that detail what stage of the conflict each is used at and what they
are able to accomplish if implemented correctly. Peacemaking is the initial call to stop the
violence; it is a short-term form of peace. Peacekeeping is the transitional period where violence
has stopped and negotiations are in the works – the purpose is to maintain the negative peace

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\(^1\) Northern Irish peace agreement.
\(^2\) Pakistani and Indian peace agreement regarding Kashmir.
\(^3\) The earliest year that I would consider ‘recent’.
while a more formal set of rules can instruct people how to successfully transition from a state of conflict to a state of peace; it is a short-term form of peace. Lastly, peacebuilding is a renewal process where the root causes of the violent conflict are evaluated and (hopefully) eradicated from the society. This portion is very difficult as it requires a transformation of thought and strongly held beliefs that pertain to the local society in order to achieve long-term peace.

Conversely, the UN definition of peacekeepers varies from what Galtung wrote, as it appears that the UN peacekeeping definition is a combination of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The UN claims that peacekeepers “…provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace” (“United Nations Peacekeeping”). For the UN, their use of peacebuilding differs from Galtung’s as he writes about the longevity of the peacebuilding process, yet the UN includes the phrase “peacebuilding” with “early transition from conflict to peace”. The Charter of the United Nations explains the different uses for peacekeepers, depending on the mission. Chapter VI focuses on negotiating peace during conflict and how the peacekeeping forces can aid in that, while Chapter VII outlines the process of approval for use of physical action on the part of the peacekeepers. The Charter gives a more detailed view into the responsibilities of UN peacekeeping forces, showing how they are far more focused on acquiring negative peace for the sake of continuing the peace process (“Charter of the United Nations”). However, the language used in the UN’s description of the role of peacekeepers, specifically the word “peacebuilding” and “early transition,” makes the purpose of their presence confusing in places like Kashmir, where the mission has been in place for decades. For Galtung, the early transition period better aligns with peacemaking and peacekeeping, rather than peacebuilding.
The terms “negative peace” and “positive peace,” another set of phrases coined by Galtung, are frequently used and important to the main thesis. Negative peace is a period where violence has ended, but the conflict itself is still ongoing in a political sense. Positive peace is the peace that is the ultimate goal of something like peacebuilding; it is a complete resolution of the issue at hand. In the thesis, the idea of negative peace will be associated with the outcomes of successful peacemaking and peacekeeping, while positive peace will be viewed as an outcome of successful peacebuilding.

**Literature Review**

**How Peacekeeping is Effective**

Many within the academic community regard peacekeeping missions as success and effective in resolving conflicts. Han Dorussen describes how different approaches to peacekeeping can vary the effectiveness of the peacekeeping process. Looking at the case study of Timor Leste, Dorussen suggests that the bottom-up or local peacekeeping approach is one that produces results. In this sense, the author is arguing that the presence of peacekeepers does control the outcome of a region emerging from a conflict. Although the author recognizes that Timor Leste has not been without issue, the overall consensus is that the UN peacekeeping mission was a success as they have been relatively stable since 2012.

It is interesting that this argument does believe in the work of peacekeepers as a sizable amount of the text is aimed at criticizing the current approach to most peacekeeping missions, citing Liberia as an example. However, the author does concede to the notion that, although peacekeeping has not always been locally focused, it has had local impacts. He starts by saying, “…a modest deployment of peacekeepers shortens the duration of conflict episodes in a
particular locality,” (Dorussen 4) and continues with the statement that the presence of peacekeepers, “…makes attacks against civilians by armed factions less likely…‘Blue Helmets’ provide a basic level of security in situations where insecurity is the norm rather than the exception” (Dorussen 4). These statements solidify his belief that the presence of peacekeeping does create some sort of effect on the conflict. On whether or not this effect does more than create a negative peace, the author writes, “The need for peacebuilding, rather than peacekeeping…seems evident, and the value of local peacekeeping may well be that it recognizes the importance of harnessing the local capacity to build peace” (Dorussen 4). Here, he argues that the type of localized peacekeeping he is advocating for could continue past the peacekeeping process into peacebuilding, creating a more long-term, positive peace.

Like Dorussen, Gözde Kaya calls for a change in the way peacekeeping is carried out in her article. Unlike Dorussen, however, she argues that this change is not necessarily a localized one, but rather that it combines the action of peacekeeping and peacemaking. She states, “…the UN peacekeeping and observer forces go further than trying to keep the parties apart or monitoring a ceasefire,” (Kaya 47). Kaya later writes:

“…the objectives of the new peacekeeping include conflict prevention, guarantee and denial of movement, protection and upholding of human rights, delivery of humanitarian relief under fire, supervision of a comprehensive peace settlement, running elections and overseeing land reform, military assistance to civil structures in a failed state and rebuilding failed states” (Kaya 51)

This is different than Dorussen’s idea that for peacekeeping to be successful, local approaches must be taken. Nonetheless, Kaya upholds the notion that while the “old” peacekeeping was more thought of as maintaining a negative peace, the “new” peacekeeping is more of an active force in building up institutions and initiatives that encourage and create peace after a settlement has been reached in the conflict.
Both Dorussen’s and Kaya’s arguments are necessary to look at in the context of the main thesis as they, like many other arguments, only focus on what can create a short-term peace. Even the reorganizing of state and local institutions will have no effect if the root of the problem is not properly addressed by the state and the outside forces that are facilitating the peace process. Dorussen believes that peacekeepers can take on this peacebuilding role, but for it to be successful would take a major reworking of the way peacekeepers are trained, specifically at the UN. Additionally, it would be a long process as changing the societal outlook about the roots of the conflicts which are ingrained in the members of the community involves a lot of “undoing” on the part of the peacebuilders. While these arguments provide challenges to the proposed thesis, they do not adequately address the problems of undoing the root causes of conflict and creating an environment for the growth of long-term peace.

Authors Hultman, Kathman and Shannon write in support of the idea that peacekeepers can affect the outcomes of conflicts, yet they recognize that this may not lead to long-term peace, stating, “Our findings show that peace operations produce a positive short-term effect of reducing hostilities between belligerents. Yet, a question remains with regard to whether this is necessarily a desired outcome from a policy perspective.” (Hultman, Kathman, Shannon 751). They are briefly conceding to the notion that short-term peace is rarely true peace, as the roots of the original conflicts always lurk beneath the surface. These authors may not base the success of peacekeeping missions on the long-term effects, but for the way in which I measure success in peacekeeping, positive long-term effects are the only way to ensure a concrete resolution.
**How Peacekeeping is Ineffective**

Todd Sandler uses three separate studies to support the notion that the presence of peacekeepers either does nothing in terms of advancing the peace process for a conflict or worsens the conflict. He cites Patrick Regan’s study that found the following evidence:

“… third-party interventions extend the length of intrastate war, unless the intervention is biased to one of the adversaries. Neutral interventions, orchestrated by international organizations, tend to prolong this conflict” (Sandler 1890).

The first study that he looks at was done by Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel in 1996, which looked at 147 interstate crises that had UN interventions. Their standard of effectiveness, or what they judged as a successful intervention, required “no militarized conflict within ten years of the UN intervention” (Sandler 1890). Their results produced their belief that “UN intervention of any kind was no better than no intervention in heading off a militarized interstate crisis” (Sandler 1890). While Sandler attributes this conclusion to their standard of effectiveness, it is telling that out of 147 crises over a period of 42 years, they concluded that the presence of peacekeepers or the lack of presence of peacekeepers had no effect on the overall conflict.

Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild completed a similar study in 2001, but their standard of effectiveness was that the region remained at peace for five years. While a study like this would support the idea that peacekeeping is effective, it ignores the possibility of a return to conflict in the subsequent years. The third study, done by Doyle and Sambanis and analyzed by Sandler, looks at the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in areas two to five years after the intervention there began, judging the success of it on a lenient and strict scale. The result of this study was that short-term peace was better maintained if the intervention began after the drafting of a peace treaty. Based off of these three studies, the most in-depth study (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel) produced results that align with my thesis. The second and third studies still support the
idea that peacekeepers do make a change in conflict zones, but they acknowledge that these successes are short-term. However, it is important to note that UN peacekeeping forces are restricted by the UN’s mandates, which determines how they can respond to their given conflict.

Similarly, author Marício Vieira uses the case study of Sierra Leone to illustrate how the peacekeeping mission there failed to create a long-term peace. Vieira comes to the conclusion that if peacekeepers do evoke change in a particular region, the peace that is there is a negative peace; the violence may have stopped, but that doesn’t mean that the conflict in other spheres of society has ended. He claims that the creation of negative peace “…pose[s] unaccountable challenges in providing peace before, during, and after an armed conflict” (Vieira 90). This means that negative peace is not a step forward but a step backward; it creates more problems than it solves. Although he uses a different approach to analyzing the effectiveness of peacekeeping than Sandler, Vieira comes to the same conclusion that either its goals are not successful or its intentions are channeled into the wrong focuses of peacekeeping.

While other articles in support of peacekeeping call for a more localized approach, author Stefano Costalli writes in his article, “Bosnia shows that peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts can often have little impact on the level of violence.” He continues by discussing how institutions like the UN fail to adequately organize and localize their missions. They have relatively no impact on the creation of a negative or positive peace in the chosen case study, Bosnia. The author discusses the ineffectiveness of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia by claiming that, because of the nature of the conflict (civil war), peacekeepers are not properly equipped because it is a local conflict and what drew the troops to the region originally has probably evolved into something else since their arrival. He explains how examining a conflict at the local level could offer more in-depth explanations of the roots of the conflict. However,
Costalli notes that it is not common to utilize micro-level information in peacekeeping missions (1).

This argument can be used for both Kashmir and Northern Ireland, as their conflicts are local and very particular to the histories of the regions. Northern Ireland was treated as a domestic case while Kashmir was treated and is continually treated as a peacekeeping mission. The lack of understanding of the ever-changing conflict could have an impact on their ineffectiveness. The author points out other issues with peacekeeping missions, claiming they don’t know how to handle particular conflicts when they arrive. He states, “In addition, peacekeeping missions are often undermined by problems such as unclear mandates; fragmented command chains leading to contrasts and delays, and incapacity to develop a wide strategic plan” (1). This article suggests that not only is the notion of peacekeeping not enough to achieve a successful, long-term peace, but that the ways in which these missions were unorganized which led to confusion and inaction on the part of the troops.

Peacekeepers, whether state or international, have other interests that may alter the way that they approach their involvement in the mission. As author Maja Garb states in her article, most peacekeeping missions are at least expected to put an end to armed conflict. However, she claims that “…peacekeepers are often influenced by narrower national interests of contributing countries and…a fear of casualties among the peacekeepers” (Garb 59). This could mean that peacekeepers are unwilling to get involved because they fear they will lose troops to a conflict that they have no real interest in, or that they are only willing to get involved to protect particular interests that they have in the conflict. Either way, this behavior on the part of the home country of the peacekeepers prevents the forces from completing the bare minimum requirement of negative peace.
Contributions to Existing Scholarship

The proposed thesis will bring a new component to the conversation of effectiveness of peacekeeping because this paper will use a UN peacekeeping case study and a state peacekeeping case study. Many current conversations about the effectiveness of case studies only focus on the UN missions, which is why a number of the supplementary sources deal with UN intervention cases. Through an analysis of the continued peacekeeping mission in Kashmir and the seemingly finished peacekeeping operation in Northern Ireland, the information presented by the comparative study produces the notion that the presence of peacekeepers does not make lasting efforts towards a resolution, as both are ongoing. Although the nature of the case studies is different, it is imperative that both state and UN peacekeeping examples are used as they demonstrate that one does not work better than the other. They both have similar approaches to what they consider “peace,” which is what this thesis argues is their flaw. While one of Sandler’s studies discusses the idea that the resolution of a conflict is not contingent on the presence of peacekeepers, their “case studies” were all based on UN missions.

Additionally, if the peacekeepers can be attributed to creating something, it would be the presence of a short-term peace, which cannot be considered a success because a lasting peace involves mediating the root of the conflict in the community, not a ceasefire. The given thesis shares this idea with a number of authors, many which support the idea that a short-term peace should not be the criterion for success for peacekeepers, yet many still believe in considering it

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4 Northern Ireland’s peacekeepers were not seen as neutral and trusted by a portion of the population while the UN peacekeepers were seen as a neutral force on both sides in Kashmir.
to be somewhat effective because of this, which is where the thesis diverges from the typical argument.

**Case Study: Kashmir**

**Historical Overview of the Conflict**

The beginning of the “Kashmir Problem” can be attributed to the independence of India and Pakistan from the British Empire in 1947. With newfound independence, a partition was conceived on the basis of religious majorities in certain regions. What is now known as India was the Hindu majority and what is now known as Pakistan was the Muslim majority. However, the lines were blurred in the state of Kashmir. The British-installed ruler of the region, Maharaja Hari Singh, believed that if he withheld from making a decision quickly, he could maintain a state of independence in Kashmir. This proved to be ineffective because riots and protests, mainly on the part of Muslim and Pakistani citizens, created an uncertain atmosphere which
ultimately pushed the Maharaja to accede to India. As per the accession agreement, the Kashmiri state would remain relatively autonomous except for responsibilities relating to defense, communication and foreign affairs, which would be controlled by India. Indian forces entered the region of Kashmir to enforce the accession while Pakistani forces entered the region as they felt that the state belonged to Pakistan (Blahnik). This caused the first Indo-Pakistani War which began in October 1947, when the Maharaja acceded to India and the Pakistani citizens invaded and ended in January 1, 1949, when the UN organized a ceasefire. The ceasefire line, or the Line of Control, has remained the imposed internal border of the two territories: Pakistan controls the northern and western parts of the state while India controls Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir Valley. The UN organized the ceasefire so that a referendum might be held to determine the state of the region (whether it would remain a part of Pakistan, India, or independent). However, this referendum has never been held due to decades of continued ceasefire violations, paramilitary violence on both sides, and political stubbornness on the part of those negotiating (“UNMOGIP Background”).

The presence of UN peacekeepers in Kashmir officially began with the establishment of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (“UNCIP”) in 1948 to act as a mediator between to the two countries during Indo-Pakistani War; they observed the ceasefire of 1949 but were “based on strict principles of impartiality and non-interference” (“National Defense and the Canadian Forces”) and consisted of representatives from five countries outside of India and Pakistan. Because of this, they were viewed as a neutral force in the conflict. However, this mission soon expanded into the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) whose original responsibility was to observe the ceasefire. The Karachi Agreement of July 1949 decided the ceasefire line would be managed by the UNMOGIP and that if local citizens on the
border had any issues, they could bring it up with the UN military officials (mainly consisting of Canadian forces) who were to remain impartial and not involve themselves in any physical disputes. The UNCIP was officially disbanded in 1951, which resulted in the expansion of responsibilities for the UNMOGIP. Renewed violence occurred along the border in 1971 due to clashes from the East Pakistani (modern-day Bangladesh) independence movement against both Pakistani and Indian forces, putting an end to the mandated ceasefire. The Simla Agreement of 1972 was meant to create another ceasefire, to uphold the Line of Control, and to not get involved in each other’s internal affairs. Since this agreement, both India and Pakistan have continued the conflict, through multiple ceasefire violations.

The conflict had steadily worsened: in the early 1990s, a number of paramilitary groups emerged in the Kashmir Valley with many supporting a merge with Pakistan, which reflected the Muslim majority region. After years of fighting on the border, the two countries celebrated the 50th anniversary of their respective independences with the meeting of Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers in 1997. While not much was accomplished on a larger scale, the two nations agreed to revisit the peace talks. Throughout the 90s, nuclear tensions between the two countries heightened as well; both Pakistan and India had successfully constructed and tested nuclear weapons. Due to a rise in conflict between the two regions coming to a head in Kashmir and Jammu, the international community ostracized the nations until they pledged to end the arms race. In February of 1999, the Lahore Declaration was signed by both nations, agreeing to direct efforts towards the fighting, the nuclear weapons, and the border in Kashmir and Jammu. However, this did not last long as India attacked Pakistani forces in the mountains in Indian-Kashmir with air strikes in May of 1999. Any peace that was achieved with the Lahore
Declaration was lost within the next few years as fighting continued at the border and in the regions, with most of it occurring in Kashmir (“CNN Kashmir”).

**Kashmir in the 21st Century**

After a tumultuous 20th century in the region of Kashmir, the situation seemed to be improving with the acceptance, on the part of India, of a Pakistani offer of a ceasefire along the border of Kashmir in 2003. This was the first successful agreement of a ceasefire in 14 years. The agreement led to a number of meetings at the highest level between government officials of India and Pakistan, including between the Prime Minister and the President respectively in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008.

However, the peace faced in the early 21st century soon became mixed with renewed violence and uncertainty along the Line of Control and within the region of Kashmir. This is demonstrated when, in the summer of 2010, clashes in Kashmir caused the deaths of more than 100 people. The death toll and violence was the worst the region had seen in years. Peace meetings and visits continued during this time but the escalation of violence and violations of the ceasefire represented a region still in great conflict. Within the past two years, there have been numerous deaths (Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri), violations of the ceasefire, and violent protests (“Council on Foreign Relations”). Specifically, the ceasefire that was agreed upon by both sides has been violated along the Line of Control many times throughout the 21st century; there were over 400 ceasefire violations along the border within the first two months of 2018 (“Times of India”).

The fact of the matter is that in present day Kashmir, the ceasefire is less of a hardened rule and more of a suggestion. A 30-day ceasefire was enacted during the month of Ramadan in
May/June of 2018, but at the end of the observance period, the Indian military resumed its fighting with rebels in their section of Jammu and Kashmir. During the month period, the militant groups did not stop their violent actions, state chief spokesperson for Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) in India, Sunil Sethi, stated to Al Jazeera, “The ceasefire became meaningless. It became difficult for the government to continue. We could not continue at the cost of so much blood on the streets” (Fareed). The UN conducted research and released a report that details the numerous human rights violations that have occurred in Kashmir at the hands of both the Indian and Pakistani militaries and paramilitaries along the Line of Control. The violations range from unlawful killings to the Armed Forces Special Power Act of 1990 (AFSPA, which states that it is unlawful to prosecute members of the military unless given prior allowance by the Indian government), to sexual violence such as soldiers responsible for gang rape to broad anti-terrorism laws that restrict dissidence. In the report, the UN urges India to repeal the AFSPA so that unlawful crimes such as killings and sexual violence can be properly prosecuted without bias. In Pakistan, the UN calls for an end to the abuse of the anti-terrorism legislation that is used against those who engage in peaceful protest, requesting the release of all those who have been jailed for such crimes.

This report, released in June, along with the Ramadan ceasefire, would make it seem like the UN has made great strides in the past couple of months in Kashmir. However, the violence across the Line of Control did not end with the ceasefire; it continued after the 30 days of Ramadan ended. Additionally, the human rights report created by the UN has no real legislative importance in the crimes that have occurred in Kashmir. The Indian Government even went so far as to call the report, “fallacious, tendentious, and motivated” (“Human Rights Watch”). This disregard for the attempts at a successful ceasefire and for justice in a conflict zone are what fuel
the questions about the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers along the Line of Control. Out of the seven decades that they have been present in that region, daily violence along the border exists, destroying the lives of those who call the region home. The peacekeepers’ ability to enact concrete change can be affected by the level at which they can get involved (they are restricted from acting partially or by becoming directly involved in the conflict). While this is understandable, the UN defines peacekeeping as an “early transition from conflict to peace;” The time for an early transition has long passed – the peacekeepers that are a part of the UNMOGIP have been engaged in the conflict with little ability to act in the conflict. Since the 2003 ceasefire, the opinions surrounding the ultimate identity of Kashmir and Jammu are fierce and have not budged since the problem first arose in the 20th century (“CNN Kashmir”).

**Case Study: Northern Ireland**

**Historical Overview of the Conflict**

![Map of Northern Ireland](image)
The main conflict in Northern Ireland is between nationalists, who believe the region should be a part of the (mostly Catholic) Republic of Ireland again, and the unionists, who believe that the region should remain a part of the (mostly Protestant) United Kingdom. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants is not new to the island of Ireland itself, but the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland was decided with the partitioning of Ireland in 1921. Southern Ireland and the northern counties of Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal became the Irish Free State and later the Republic of Ireland. Despite the Partition, the unionist majority in the remaining six counties in Northern Ireland chose to remain in the United Kingdom, even though a growing minority of nationalists wanted to be reunited with the rest of Ireland (“BBC”).

In Northern Ireland, religious tensions had existed between the two groups for centuries before, but the period called the “Troubles,” from 1968 to 1998, was the 30-year period of heightened protests, violence, and terrorism on the part of paramilitary groups. The event that is said to have marked the beginning of the Troubles was a civil rights march in Londonderry/Derry on October 5, 1968. While other marches had occurred before, this was different due to the suppression of Irish Catholics by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), who charged the crowd with batons and left many protestors injured, including some members of Parliament. This event along with rioting that occurred in Londonderry/Derry the days following attracted international attention to the conflict.

The Troubles continued with an over four-year internment period led by the British Army and Northern Irish police, where 1,981 people were detained (1,874 Catholic/Republican and 107 Protestant/Loyalist). It began with Operation Demetrius on August 9th, 1971, when 342 people were taken in raids across Northern Ireland and placed in camps. While this was meant to curb the violence, it only heightened it, causing more protests and riots. One of the most famous
protests in response to the internment was nicknamed, “Bloody Sunday”. This march, organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), was intended to be a peaceful demonstration. Nationalist youth and British soldiers engaged in physical conflict at one point during the march and the Army’s response led by opening fire on the crowd, shooting 28 civilians and killing 14 people (Melaugh).

The Nationalists were not without fault, as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) functioned as a paramilitary group that wreaked havoc on Northern Ireland and England with a number of random bombings throughout the 30-year period. The most infamous of the bombings took place on July 21, 1972. Nicknamed “Bloody Friday,” the PIRA planted 22 bombs across Belfast and detonated each one within an hour and a half period, killing 9 and injuring 130 people (“BBC”). Other bombings that occurred throughout England brought the issue of Northern Ireland to the forefront of English press and put pressure on English politicians.

In the case of the conflict in Northern Ireland, British troops served as peacekeepers during and after the Troubles through Operation Banner, from 1969 to 2007. Leaders of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland called on the UN to send peacekeepers at the beginning of the Troubles, but the United Kingdom denied this request and sent British troops instead. While they were initially welcomed by the populace (both Protestant and Catholic), it soon became apparent that they supported the loyalist viewpoint and some were even working with the unionist paramilitary groups. Additionally, the perceived bias on behalf of the Irish Catholics of the unionist allegiance on the part of British troops and the RUC aided in the decades of distrust of their peacekeepers. The amount of over-policing and corruption that occurred in Northern Ireland during the Troubles greatly exacerbated the problem at hand, as the peacekeepers that were sent as “non-partisan members” supported a side (Melaugh).
The violence, militant activity, and corruption continued until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which was drafted by the British and Irish governments as well as the majority of political parties in Northern Ireland. It created a “nationalist and unionist power-sharing government in Northern Ireland” (NIA). Furthermore, it calls for a new government that is supportive and recognizes both the unionist side and the nationalist side, and please both by remaining in the United Kingdom but allowing for a loose border between Northern Ireland and Ireland and for Northern Irish citizens to obtain dual British and Irish citizenship. Additionally, it acknowledges the need to recognize the diversity of the region and to uplift the mixture of cultures that exist in Northern Ireland. This marked the end of the 30-year conflict known as the Troubles, although Operation Banner did not end until 2007 (“The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement”).

**Northern Ireland in the 21st Century**

The end of Operation Banner in 2007 marked the end of the peacemaking phase in Northern Ireland. It was deemed a post-conflict region as the Good Friday Agreement seemed to mainly have stopped paramilitary activity on both sides and violent uprisings between both groups. Groups like the PIRA, Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) have stepped down or ceased to function. However, to say that paramilitary groups are not a part of Northern Irish “post-conflict” life would be a lie. Four new dissident republican (nationalist) paramilitary groups have emerged since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement: the new IRA, the Continuity IRA (CIRA), Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH), and Arm na Poblacht (ANP). Three new loyalist (unionist) groups emerged from the paramilitaries of the Troubles as well: The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), the Red Hand Defenders, and the Orange Volunteers. The paramilitary groups on both sides continue to carry out murders of those on the other side as
well as members of their own groups that have “betrayed” or “abandoned” them. A total of 158 people have died in relation to “security-related killings,” as the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) calls them, from 1998 to 2017 (Nolan). Some theorize that because they are not killing multiple people at a time, it is considered an “acceptable level of violence” (Nolan). Also, they are responsible for shootings, beatings, and intimidation in their communities, continually trying to undermine the power of the PSNI and often hold a position of power in their communities due to fear tactics.

Another aspect of “post-conflict” life in Northern Ireland is the renewal of tensions during “marching season,” which takes place during the months of April to September but heightens around July with parades that commemorate the Battle of the Boyne, which was the victory of Protestant King William of Orange over Catholic King James II. Around July 12th, Protestant groups march in celebration, yet when they go near Catholic neighborhoods, tensions arise and violence can erupt. To separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods from violence that stems during this time and around the year, peace walls were built during the Troubles between the rivaling neighborhoods that remain in cities like Belfast and Londonderry/Derry today, closing at either 9 p.m. or 10 p.m. every night.

Recently, the question of Northern Ireland in relation to Brexit has renewed old tensions as well. With the announcement of the United Kingdom’s plan to leave the European Union (EU), one of the first issues with the results of the referendum was the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which will remain in the EU. The Good Friday Agreement guaranteed that there would be a soft border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and that Northern Irish citizens could have dual British and Irish citizenship, appealing to the nationalists. It also allowed for a referendum to decide whether to rejoin with the Republic of
Ireland, which is one of the proposed solutions if the United Kingdom actually leaves the EU, as the majority of Northern Irish citizens voted to remain the EU in 2016. The main issue is that if the United Kingdom wants to protect its borders so that it can control who enters the country, the nature of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland comes into question. If a hard border is created between the two regions, it will heavily affect trade and the citizenship promised to nationalists in the Good Friday Agreement. Prime Minister Theresa May has stated that she does not want to create a hard border between the two, yet she also said that she intends to enforce the borders of the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland. The border conflict has created a major impediment to the negotiated Brexit process.

**Analysis**

The thesis states that the presence of peacekeepers and peacekeeping achievements are not representative of the state of the conflict. Furthermore, it claims that because they do not solve the social and structural causes of the conflict, they cannot be considered the last step towards achieving post-conflict status. Through the literature review, it is evident that this statement is not fully supported nor fully denied by scholars. However, the description of the case studies demonstrates the longevity of the conflicts and how the conflicts have continued well into the 20th century and how, if not dealt with properly, the conflict can emerge again. Therefore, when analyzing the effectiveness of peacekeepers (whether they hurt or help the situations), the case studies of Kashmir and Northern Ireland prove that due to the failure to follow peacekeeping efforts with peacebuilding efforts, the conflict continues even with the absence of some or all violence because negative peace is only short-term.
The conflicts viewed in the case studies are not the same; one is a conflict of land and religion that resulted from decolonization, and another is a conflict of national identity that is based in religious prejudice. What is similar about them is that they are relatively recent in the sense that, although they derive from conflicts that have existed for centuries, revolutionary events of the 20th century exacerbated the violence. Both faced guerilla warfare and religious bias used as an oppressive tool. Their statuses in today’s world are what make the way they were handled interesting. In the case of Kashmir, the UN’s peacekeepers have been serving as border control since 1948 and as mentioned in the previous section, it would be eager to say that they have achieved negative peace. In the case of Northern Ireland, the British troops served as peacekeepers since 1968 and, although they were accused of partisanship and brutality against civilians, their operation ended in 2007 and was considered successful. It is interesting that the region that had state peacekeepers was further along in the peace process and not the region that had international peacekeepers.

There are a multitude of variables that could have caused such a disparity between the achievements of the two missions. One such variable is the difference in nature of the peacekeepers; the UN mission was viewed as neutral while the British troops were viewed as biased. Nonetheless, whether they are state or international is not determinant of the ineffectiveness. The lack of peacebuilding initiatives is what allows the conflicts to continue. Therefore, the argument does not hinge on the distrust of peacekeeping forces.

One of the major connections between the Kashmiri conflict and the Northern Irish conflict is the longevity of the peacekeeping mission in Kashmir (over 70 years) and Operation Banner in Northern Ireland (39 years). Without a set, finite period of time for the missions, the longevity allows for the normalization of their presence and turns the missions away from the
purpose of political peace (getting people to sign a peace agreement) and turns the mission towards gaining a military peace (end of violence). In the case of Kashmir, their presence has nearly become an obstacle for furthering the peace process. They act as border control, but there are still ceasefire violations daily. Along with the UN study documenting the human rights violations on the part of both Pakistan and Indian forces while peacekeeping forces were on the ground, their effectiveness towards securing a political peace in the region is slight. While it can be argued that political peace was achieved in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday Agreement, the possibility of Brexit has demonstrated how fragile that peace is. Amanda Sloat recently wrote an article detailing this fragility claiming, “…the Good Friday Agreement provided an imperfect but workable solution for a war-weary population. Brexit has re-opened old wounds”. A reason why Northern Ireland was able to escape the stagnation of the conflict in Kashmir was because the violence occurred outside of the contained area (in England and Ireland), bringing outside actors into the conflict. However, violence in Kashmir has mainly occurred along the Line of Control.

What is essential to the thesis is the connection between Galtung’s two theories: the theory of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding and the theory of negative peace and positive peace. To reiterate, peacekeeping and peacemaking are the steps taken leading up to, during, and immediately after the peace negotiation process takes place in a conflict situation. Its main goal is to quell the violence so that it does not restart and keeping tensions low so that a peace agreement can be achieved and the society or community can return to some sort of normalcy. This may take a long period of time due to the tendency of rival sides of a conflict to draw out the peace process, but the intention of these steps is thought of as more short-term. Peacebuilding is the final, more drawn out step that aims to attack the root of the conflict and
therefore requires a change to the structural and social aspects of the society that have upheld the causes of the conflict.

The connection between this theory and negative and positive peace is what causes the mislabeling of a region as ‘post-conflict’. The notion of achieving peace, in any form, allows for the title ‘post-conflict’. However, the actions taken during the peacekeeping and peacemaking steps are only likely to achieve negative peace, which is the absence of violence from a conflict (typically a previously violent conflict), as they typically deal with the negotiation period. For the cases of Northern Ireland and Kashmir, the end of violence was greatly welcomed (or is greatly sought after in the case of Kashmir) and was not an easy feat. The creation of negative peace within a conflict is a necessary step towards a permanent peace, as are the steps of peacekeeping and peacemaking. However, this becomes an issue when those overseeing the peace process take the negative peace as a sign that the conflict has been resolved and that its traces in the community are no longer present. Now, those overseeing the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kashmir understand that just because the violence and ceased or decreased, it does not mean that the deeply-rooted conflicts in those regions are gone forever. Nevertheless, the state of negative peace is simply accepted as is; the conflicts are not thought of in terms of the need to reconcile the two communities but rather as the need for these communities to coexist with each other. This is in accordance with the idea that the absence of violence is peace.

However, Galtung’s notion of positive peace changes that narrative as it claims that only positive peace constitutes the complete resolution of the conflict. One might ask themselves, how does one achieve a complete resolution? This can be done through peacebuilding as it addresses the issues that are systematically and socially ingrained in a community. Peacebuilding is not a common step in the process of restoring a society after conflict because it requires a lot to
achieve. It requires money, as there need to be people who dedicate all of their time to facilitating reconciliation between the conflicting groups and advocating for the breaking down of the barriers. Money is also necessary for events and organizations that are aimed at changing the way the society functions at the moment. It requires time, as these conflicts are not going to dissipate after one day. They have become a part of the community and for prejudices or biases to be deconstructed, the entire way the people think and behave in the community has to be modified, which includes their daily routines, their social groups, their private conflict in relation to the larger conflict. It also requires the willingness to participate on both sides. They do not have to be eager or even the first to initiate the process of reconciliation; they simply need to be open towards the idea of meeting or talking to the other group. However, all three of these requirements are hard to come by in the peacekeeping/peacemaking steps. Therefore, negative peace is accepted even though the conflict continues to exist within the structures and social patterns of the society.

In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement, on paper, is a shining example of how to incorporate the social and structural aspects of the conflict into the peace negotiation process. What is interesting is that, despite the treaty being so progressive in the sense that it shows a real promise for peacebuilding, the region, especially city centers like Belfast or Londonderry/Derry, still grapple with the conflict. As mentioned before, peacebuilding is a long process, but the way in which the communities function is very much in a way that avoids the bringing together of both sides. A number of cultural and structural examples are the annual “marching season,” the peace walls that separate the Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods and close every night, and the paramilitary groups that still exist on both sides, who run entire neighborhoods and communities through fear and intimidation. The recent Brexit developments have only
exacerbated the issue in Northern Ireland, exposing many tensions that existed below the surface of the society. Therefore, the conflict cannot be viewed as resolved.

This begs the question of the role of the peacekeepers in this post-violent conflict society; the Operation Banner (or the deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland) ended in 2007, hinting that they had entered the post-conflict society and no longer needed monitoring. I argue that while their presence in Northern Ireland may have heightened the tensions even after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the conflict continues even after the termination of Operation Banner because it was not followed with peacebuilding efforts. This is not to say that grassroots movements cannot have success in the reconciliation of the two groups, as they can achieve incredible ground in the peace process. But because the peacekeeper’s responsibilities are commonly confused with that of peacebuilding, the end of Operation Banner can be viewed as the British government declaring Northern Ireland in a post-conflict state.

In the case of Kashmir, the peace agreements that were drafted by both the Pakistani and Indian governments have continually been broken. Because the UN peacekeepers are along the Line of Control, it is clear that their presence there has not stopped the blatant violations and the movement towards positive peace is not within the immediate future of Kashmir. However, because there is ongoing violence, even if it is localized to the Line of Control, I contend that the region has yet to reach a negative peace. UN peacekeepers have been present in Kashmir since 1948 and a peace agreement has not achieved long-term success yet. According to Galtung, the role of peacekeepers is to enter a conflict towards the end – when it is nearing peace negotiations. Even though the conflict in Kashmir has neared that point and even participated in the negotiations before, the failure of these agreements puts into question the roles of the peacekeepers that are currently there.
The continued presence of peacekeepers in Kashmir has not resulted in a successful movement towards positive peace let alone a period of negative peace. There are many forces that are working against the efforts of the peacekeepers, such as paramilitary groups, military groups and the continued structural and social conflict. If the purpose of the peacekeepers has not been achieved in 70 years, it is fair to claim that their approach of acting as border patrol is not working properly, especially since the majority of the violence and ceasefire violations are occurring at the border.

The absence of peacekeepers in Northern Ireland has not benefitted the movement towards positive peace, and the presence of peacekeepers in Kashmir has not helped the movement towards a positive or negative peace. Therefore, the general ineffectiveness of peacekeepers in their respective regions is reason for why their presence should not be indicative of the state of that particular conflict.

The results expected from the initial thesis were different than originally thought at the beginning of the research. One of the most important realizations was the near constant violence that continues to occur in Kashmir even though it is rarely discussed within the international community. It is not the most pressing issue, but there are frequent violations of a ceasefire that was and is supported by the UN. This negated the idea that both Kashmir and Northern Ireland are in a state of negative peace because the patterns of behavior in Kashmir do not align with a state that has put an end to violence and has allowed for the community to return to some normalcy.

Another important discovery was the details of the Good Friday Agreement. Upon reading it, the document does have sections where it advocates for certain changes to the society that are similar to, if not exactly the steps of peacebuilding. However, the result was not a
success as even though both cultures were represented as harmonious and naturally together in the agreement, the prejudices held by the citizens were not changed. This allowed the conflict to continue within the people, which is what can lead to rebirths of the conflict.

**Conclusion**

The presence or absence of peacekeepers, whether they are international or state in nature, has limited effect on the ability to achieve a resolved state, as seen through a comparative study of the conflicts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland. Because of this, they need to be followed by peacebuilding efforts addressing the root of the conflict and should not be viewed as both peacekeepers and peacebuilders.

The purpose of a peacekeeper, whether working under the United Nations or not, is supposed to maintain peace in conflict-ridden areas while negotiations are put into place. Additionally, peacekeepers typically stay even after a negotiation has been settled to ensure that the conflict does not arise again and that the government and society remain stable for a mandated period of time. Many parties to the conflict, however, view peacekeepers as the final step towards a recovered society, which is in fact the role of peacebuilders, which are rarely utilized in most modern-day peace processes. Peacebuilders address the root of the conflict, which takes a much longer time period but also produces a positive peace in place of the negative peace created by peacekeepers. Scholars who also study the peacekeeping process do not reach a consensus on the benefits and effectiveness of peacekeeping, some claiming that they fulfill the duty that they are called to and maintain a level of peace while those at the head of the conflict figure out how to proceed, others also claim that a third-party involvement can in fact prolong the conflict. Therefore, the thesis statement would be controversial within the scholarly
group as some would argue against it while others would support it. The case studies illustrate how the situations in Kashmir and Northern Ireland may be different, but neither are close to achieving the positive peace, which should be the only way to garner the title, ‘post conflict’.

Without peacebuilding, there is only peacekeeping, which fails to produce results of positive peace. The only way to change this narrative is to implement methods of peacebuilding within the peace negotiations process and follow through, highlighting it as the most important aspect. Additionally, the way that peacekeeping is viewed must change in order for the acceptance of peacebuilding as a separate step that is a part of the conflict.
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