Common Methodological Fundaments of the Analytic Procedures in Phenomenological and Psychoanalytic Research

Fred J. Wertz
Fordham University

Follow this and additional works at: http://fordham.bepress.com/psych_facultypubs

Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
http://fordham.bepress.com/psych_facultypubs/25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact jwatson9@fordham.edu.
Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought

Common Methodological Fundamentals of the Analytic Procedures in Phenomenological and Psychoanalytic Research

Frederick J. Wertz

There is increasing evidence that psychology is undergoing a change with far-reaching methodological implications. In the nineteenth century, psychology attempted to establish itself as a scientific discipline by employing methods that had proven successful in the natural sciences. Within this tradition, quantitative analysis has become synonymous with scientific analysis, and the experiment has become the preferred mode of securing psychological knowledge. Critics of this approach, however, consistently vocal (Giorgi, 1970), have remained fragmented and lacking in any strongly institutionalized replacement for these procedures. Their strength is now heightening to the extent that textbook authors are called to justify a continuing adherence to the experimental approach. For instance, Carlsmith, Ellsworth, and Aronson (1976), liken the experimental method to “a faltering dictator who had extended himself beyond the range of his competence … increasingly subject to vituperative attacks by some who were once staunch supporters, but who now speak with the revolutionary rhetoric of a new convert” (p. vii).

Drawing upon the radical developments in the philosophy of science over the past thirty years, the authors of works on research methodology for the human sciences are questioning the alternatives. For instance, Polkinghorne (1983) has distinguished the Anglo-Saxon from the Continental schools of metascience. The former, developed in the study of physical nature, have dominated human science with their hypotheticodeductive model of experimentation. The latter, developed particularly for studying humans, and characterized by description, understanding, and interpretation, are exemplified by the hermeneutic and phenomenological schools. Psychology is becoming aware of the limits of methods borrowed from the natural sciences and attentive to the ever more articulate alternative proposals. In cognitive psychology, Ericsson and Simon (1984) have reintroduced first-person description as a mode of data whose reliability and validity have been misunderstood, and Aanstoos (1983) has justified this “think aloud” method phenomenologically. In social psychology, mainstream textbooks are reporting a global “crisis” and raising basic questions about psychology's approach to research. For instance, Goldstein (1980) interviews Kenneth Gergen, who notes the emergence of diverse schools set against the traditional, positivistic assumptions of the field. He believes that as these independent groups join forces, an opposing paradigm will become strong enough to make social psychology a very different discipline.

Psychoanalysis and Research Methodology

The place of psychoanalysis in the crisis of psychological research methodology is most interesting. Critics both within

(Trumpet, 1971) and without (Apel, 1965; Ricoeur, 1970) agree that Freud utilized both natural scientific concepts such as instinct and the intrapsychic energy model, as well as ones pertaining peculiarly to the human order, such as desire, meaning, intention, and purpose. Methodologically, he certainly inferred causal relations, hypothesized, built theoretical models, speculated, and attempted verification with observations (Anglo-Saxon procedures); but he also attempted to describe, understand, and interpret human phenomena in their biographical and cultural contexts (Continental procedures). This ambiguity of psychoanalysis on the one hand has allowed experimental psychologists to treat Freudian thought as hypotheses in need of more controlled verification, and on the other hand has permitted third-force psychologists to incorporate Freudian thought in humanistic frameworks. It has also left Freud vulnerable to critiques from both sides. However, in standard textbooks on research methodology, to date, there is seldom even a mention of psychoanalysis, except to criticize its lack of rigorous reliability and validity in spite of the fact that its contribution to our knowledge of humanity dwarfs that of experimental psychology.

The debate over the scientific status of psychoanalysis continues within the Anglo-Saxon schools of metascience. Grünbaum
(1982, 1984) has answered Popper's (1962, 1974) severe claim that psychoanalysis does not meet the falsifiability criteria essential to any properly scientific theory. After attempting to establish its falsifiability, Grünbaum goes on to negatively evaluate the adequacy of clinical data and procedures of verification and to propose, at least in its formal contours, an epistemologically sound approach to testing independent of the clinic. This intent has of course been underway since Freud's time, when Freud himself devalued the American psychologist Rosenzweig's attempt at independent experimental validation under the belief that clinical practices were themselves sufficient (MacKinnon and Dukes, 1964). Edelson (1984) has countered Grünbaum and attempted to show how causal and general hypotheses

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

- 565 -

can be cogently tested in the clinic. What is new in these works is the sharp and sophisticated clarification of foundational methodology, though the empirical fruits to which these works would open the way remain largely promissory, even in relation to the limited Anglo-Saxon aims.

Regardless of the potential success of these various Anglo-Saxon approaches, contemporary philosophy and psychoanalysis continue to assert that these are not the only or even the most appropriate ways to establish the scientific value of psychoanalysis. The philosopher Politzer, as early as 1929, saw in psychoanalysis, in contrast to the other schools of human science of his day, the essential constituents of a genuine psychology, though in his view its virtuous concreteness was compromised by dogmatic positivistic presuppositions at the theoretical level. Politzer's echo is heard in contemporary psychoanalysis itself, where there is a strong movement to discard Freud's natural scientific metapsychology along with traditional research methodologies, which are viewed as having hindered psychoanalysis, and to reconceptualize the field in purely psychological terms. While Freud saw no harm in the Anglo-Saxon appropriation of his work, recent analysts have been more antagonistic to that attempt, with the belief that Freud's work itself is in need of being excorized of its positivistic spirit if psychoanalysis is to attain its true calling. This theme admits of different variations in the work of Lacan (1958), Guftrip (1967), Klein (1976), Schafer (1976), Lifton (1976), Kohut (1977), and Spence (1982). Fosshage (1983) as well as Atwood and Stolorow (1984) have assumed a similar position and recognized the need for a rigorous phenomenological methodology and conceptuality in this purified psychoanalysis. These authors, along with Boss (1963), have emphasized the relative preponderance of positivistic concepts in the theoretical sphere, and of phenomenological concepts in the clinical sphere, and have called for a centered regrounding of conceptuality in the latter. Kvale (1986) has gone so far as to consider psychoanalytic therapy itself as a profoundly appropriate research methodology for the emerging qualitative human science, showing how the very characteristics which lead experimental methodologists to reject it (e.g., its focus on single pathological cases, the personal involvement of the researcher with subjects) are actually great virtues and required foundations of human science, even though they have not yet been asserted as such. What is most interesting about these attempts is their refusal to do what Kvale calls “identifying with the aggressor.” In other words, rather than seizing upon a method of verification external to psychoanalysis, these authors recognize within psychoanalysis legitimate methods whose value has been obscured by the hitherto pervasive Anglo-Saxon orientations within and outside psychoanalysis. The success of these approaches would be most favorable to psychoanalysis to the extent that it would place on solid ground the authentic scientific status of at least some psychoanalytic procedures, rather than totally subordinating them under a methodology sharing little in common with actual, everyday psychoanalytic practice.

A Convergence of Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis

The present work is an attempt to contribute to the growing convergence of phenomenological and psychoanalytic psychology on an alternative research methodology. Our thesis is that many qualitative analytic procedures formally articulated within phenomenological psychology have been employed throughout psychoanalytic practice from Freud's time. While traditional methodology has not recognized the existence, let alone the value of such operations, their reliability and validity can be established from a phenomenological point of view. Though it cannot be expected that the Anglo-Saxon oriented will accept this methodology on account of its divergent metascientific foundations, it can no longer be held that there exists no alternative to validation of psychoanalytic notions other than purported clinical efficacy, which is admittedly too narrow and

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

- 567 -

potentially naïve to support a general, epistemologically sound empirical science. Thus we will attempt to uncover a convergence of specific constituents of psychological reflection in order to show an implicit unity between these different approaches. Since these analytic maneuvers have been elaborated in the context of phenomenological research elsewhere (Wertz, 1983a, 1983b, 1984), here we will discuss and illustrate their presence in the work of classical psychoanalysts such as Freud, as well as neo-Freudians, ego
psychologists, object-relations theorists, and self psychologists.

It is important to note that our “convergence” thesis is limited and does not imply a minimization of differences, and even contradictions, which a broader comparison of phenomenological and psychoanalytic psychologies would show, especially at the level of data collection and theory. Close scrutiny of even the most recent attempts of psychoanalysts to proceed phenomenologically has found them seriously deficient (Wertz, 1985). In fact, our present thesis does not even imply that the psychoanalytic work used below to illustrate analytic procedures is flawless, let alone sufficient in itself to establish an unquestionable validity. We fully expect the reader to have questions and find insufficiencies, but hope our limited focus on this phase of methodology (i.e., how the attempt at analysis is occurring) will be kept in view. Of course, we have ourselves found these illustrations interesting if not positively insightful, but each is meant primarily to evidence a particular operation which is there and generally valuable, independent of whether the operation alone is adequate in a given case or whether the specific results it yields are agreeable. This sort of reservation pertains not solely to psychoanalytic work, for much psychological research including the purportedly phenomenological (e.g., see Laing's [1982] critique of Binswanger) is lacking in a complete enactment of methodological rigor, which entails not only sufficient data collection but a utilization of all relevant analytic procedures on all relevant data. It is partly to call attention to the very multiplicity of constituents of the analytic phase of research that we present a systematic account of the many operations it entails.

It should also be noted that inasmuch as the present work focuses on the analysis phase of research, it presupposes the possibility of relevant and valid protocol data. We are therefore not addressing the important challenges from both psychologists (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and philosophers (Grübaum, 1984) concerning the credibility of verbal description, which in the case of psychoanalysis has been accused of contamination by suggestion. Phenomenological psychologists have addressed the procedures and principles of validity in the area of data constitution in general (Aanstoos, 1983; Kvale, 1983; Giorgi 1984b and 1986; Shapiro, 1986; Wertz, 1986), but these considerations have yet to be explicitly related to psychoanalysis and particularly to the powerful practical aims of the analyst with his patient. It is likely that the phenomenological approach to data, not born in the clinic, contains divergences but also significant commonalities with psychoanalysis. While it is unlikely that phenomenological psychologists would accept psychoanalytic data any less critically than they have psychoanalytic theory, we may nonetheless proceed with our limited present focus on methods of analysis by abstaining from judgment as to the veracity and completeness of the data at hand and concentrating instead on what is being done with them.

The procedures discussed below require a special attitude on the part of the researcher, variously described as wonder (Fink), love (Laing), unprejudiced openness (Giorgi), and evenly hovering attention (Freud), within which the researcher moves back and forth from the whole to the part of the phenomenon. These procedures are mutually dependent and syn-critically interwoven in reflection so that an illustration of one moment of analysis could often serve to exemplify (even all) others. After taking up twelve of the reflective moves we have detected in phenomenological research, we will turn the tables and comment on three procedures we have noted in psychoanalytic reflection that contribute in their own right to the emerging qualitative methodology.

Phenomenological Reflection in Psychoanalysis

Empathic Immersion in the Described World

Phenomenological and psychoanalytic researchers are both presented with descriptions pertaining to the matters under investigation, whether these take the form of associations, verbal responses to questions, or external observations by others including the researcher (which are at least potentially describable). The most fundamental operation is the utilization of these descriptions for entering the subject's world as a whole, indeed as comprehensively as is relevant in order to fulfill the research interest. The researcher must not remain a spectator, external to what she is investigating, but take advantage of the human ability to share another's world as one's own. This appropriation of the subject's lived reality is the necessary grounding of all further reflection if it is to be rooted internally in the matter under investigation. Greenson (1967) provides an explicit example. His woman patient speaks of the previous night, when in the midst of a sexual encounter with her affectionate husband, she became disturbed and her excitement vanished for no apparent reason. Her associations drift to a recent dinner party, and she becomes sadder, falling silent. Greenson doesn't understand, so he asks her to go back to the sexual experience and let her thoughts wander. Nothing new comes except the recollection that her husband was clean shaven, which comes with a smile. The patient then sighs and weeps profusely, puzzling

I change the way I am listening to her ... I have to let a part of me become the patient, and I have to go through her experiences as if I were the patient ... I let myself experience the different events the patient has described and I also let myself experience the analytic hour, her associations, and her affects.... I go back over the patient's utterances and transform her words into pictures and feelings
in accordance with her personality. I let myself associate to these pictures with her life experiences, her memories, her fantasies. Her husband has “showered” her with kisses. A scene from childhood comes to mind—of taking a shower with her father. This has been one of the few joyous memories she has had with her ordinarily gruff father. Her father was so hairy. This made him seem sensuous but also frightening. When he kissed her, she remembered most vividly his bristly beard. Now the patient’s last remark comes back to me: the smoothly shaven, loving, considerate husband has stirred up the contrasting picture of her repressed longing for her sensuous and sadistic father. As these thoughts come to mind, the patient has begun to talk of the dinner party again and how her partner chewed his food with his lips open—a characteristic she had loathed in her father [pp. 367-368].

This act of empathy is the propaedeutic ground for the more sophisticated operations we find in Greenson’s work—the apprehension of meaning, distinguishing and relating constituents of the person’s world, and verifying connections—which we will discuss below.

**Dwelling and Magnifying**

Once in the subject’s world, the researcher slows down and allows what shows itself to loom large and shine brightly. What might be quickly passed over as insignificant by the participant or a casual onlooker is allowed time and space in the researcher’s purview to give forth its full sense. Freud (1924) recognized that “big things can show themselves by small indications” (p. 88). Just as phenomenology has consistently stressed the importance of wondrous fascination in the face of the taken-for-granted moments of everyday life, Freud says of psychoanalysis:

*The material for its observations is usually provided by inconsiderable events which have been put aside by other sciences as being too unimportant—the dregs, one might say, of the world of phenomena. Are there not very important things which can only reveal themselves, under certain conditions and at certain times, by quite feeble indications? I should find no difficulty in giving you several examples of such situations. If you are a young man, for instance, will it not be from small pointers that you will conclude that you have won a girl’s favor? Would you wait for an express declaration of love or a passionate embrace? Or would not a glance, scarcely noticed by other people, be enough? A slight movement, the lengthening by a second of the pressure of a hand? And if you were a detective engaged in tracing a murder, would you expect to find that the murderer had left his photograph behind at the scene of the crime, with his address attached? Or would you not necessarily have to be satisfied with comparatively slight and obscure traces of the person you were in search of? So do not let us underestimate small indications; by their help we may succeed in getting on the track of something bigger. (Pg. 27)*

Psychoanalysts have never ceased to see existentially profound meaning in small phenomenal realms. Atwood and Stolorow (1984) report on a girl who:

[get]azed at her reflection in ponds and pools of rainwater ... becoming fascinated by how her face would disappear and then magically reappear when she disturbed the water’s reflecting surface. One meaning of this activity pertained again to her need for mastery over passively experienced traumata—by actively being the cause of the disappearance of her image, she was seeking to overcome the shattering of her sense of self-hood of her whole earlier history of victimization and abuse. In addition, in eliminating her reflected image, she thought of herself as actually ceasing to exist and becoming nothing, which provided a feeling of safety because what does not exist cannot be made a target by a persecuting world. The water also seemed to ... give reassurance that while her sense of self ... might be made to vanish on a temporary basis, it could not be annihilated permanently [p. 109].

**Turning from Objects to Meaning**

Since all experiences that show themselves in the empathically magnified field are bodily and often aim at objects with which the subject is concerned, it is possible for the researcher to view the subject's body and situation from an objective—physical standpoint. Phenomenologists have consistently called upon the psychologist to abstain from both natural science and everyday considerations of this “objective reality” so that attention may be devoted strictly to the situation's meaning-for-the-subject, for the latter constitutes the psychological realm proper. The subject's body and surrounding objects are not to be ignored but rather viewed in a peculiar way—precisely in terms of their intention, purpose, sense, and meaning. Freud (1924) clearly recognized this in his actual
interpretable work, even if not in theory:

If it turned out ... that not only a few instances of slips of the tongue and parapraxes in general have a sense ... (it) would inevitably become their most interesting feature and would push every other consideration to the background. We should then be able to leave all physiological and psycho-physiological factors on one side and devote ourselves to purely psychological investigations into the sense—that is, the meaning or purpose of parapraxes. (p. 36).

In Sullivan's (1953) analysis of the infant-mother relationship, he is not concerned with the “mothering one's” physical objectivity but her meaning—value for the nursling as he distinguishes

the “good” nipple, “bad” nipple, and “wrong” nipple. Similarly in Erikson's (1980) analysis of the developing person's body, he views each body part not as a physical structure but as a particular mode of meaningful intention toward the world. The mouth “incorporates” and “rejects,” the anus “eliminates” and “retains,” the phallus “intrudes,” and indeed these intentional modalities are not strictly constituted by local organs but are characteristic of the body as an animated whole and transposable such that, for instance, the hands and eyes may actualize any of these modes. For Guntrip (1971) it is not the physical dimension of exercise and eating that is of interest but its meaning: “Physical exercise can be endowed with a personal-relational significance, as when it is turned into competitive athletic sports where physical prowess is a tremendous ego booster in relation to other people ... eating and drinking are endowed with a personal relations significance as friendship and sharing” (pp. 35-36).

Suspending Belief and Investigating Psychological Origins

Once worldly meanings have been thus brought to the fore, the researcher does not remain straightforwardly committed to them as the subject is or as a naive empathizer might be. Rather than taking them for granted as brute givens, or judging them to be true or false, the researcher disengages himself in order to reflect on how these meanings are achieved through the flow of intentional (that is, directed, though not necessarily deliberate) processes. Freud (1924) recognized early on that his role as researcher was first off neither to believe nor to disbelieve reports of childhood experience of parental intercourse, seduction, and castration threats. He took these meanings as constitutive not of a material reality but rather of a psychological reality correlative to such intentions as curiosities, wishes, and fears.

It will be a long time before (the patient) can take in our

proposal that we should equate phantasy and reality and not bother to begin with whether or not the childhood experiences under examination are the one or the other. Yet this is clearly the only correct attitude to adopt towards these mental productions. They too possess a reality of a sort. It remains a fact that the patient has created these phantasies for himself, and this fact is of scarcely less importance for his neurosis than if he had really experienced what the phantasies contain. The phantasies possess a psychical as contrasted with material reality, and we gradually learn to understand that in the world of neurosis it is a psychical reality which is the decisive thing. (p. 368, parentheses mine).

Sullivan (1953) does not take the “noxiousness” of feces for granted but traces it to cultural notions of germs, infection, cleanliness, and sexual purity, the mothering one's sense of responsibility for and anxiety about public decorum and community standing, and the child's sense of selfhood as it emerges through bodily explorations in the face of the forbidding other (pp. 143-145). In analyzing the phenomenon of “after-life,” Jung (1933) does not concern himself with its proof or disproof but with its provision of a goal, a promise of and direction toward a future that is indispensable for the safety, comfort, and productivity of the aging person. In his analysis of the way a paranoid's belief that his boss dislikes him comes about, Shapiro (1965) discloses a complex psychical process involving expectation and clue hunting:

A furtive man who has made a small mistake on the job will search his boss' face and words with a certain expectation. He is looking for a sign of dislike, say, or disapproval, although he, himself, is not likely to be aware that he is looking for it. When he finds that sign, the projectively distorted, quasi-empathic cognition is complete, and an uncrystalized bias or expectancy is transformed into a conviction: “He dislikes me!” [p. 72].

Distinguishing Constituents

As is clearly evident from above examples, the psychological reality to which description gives access is not simple or elementary but a complex manifold however unitary. Accurate knowledge must therefore reflect its different constituents. This distinguishing is
Exercised on the described reality so that the meaning of each constituent emerges according to its own peculiarity. In analyzing a dream, Fosshage (1983) distinguishes three moments: (1) his female patient's discussion with her boyfriend as to whether to have sex, the decision to proceed, and the sexual act itself; (2) the boyfriend becomes psychotic during sex and the patient becomes terrified; and (3) the patient leaves her boyfriend and goes on to enjoy being with her mother and brother. This forms the basis of his subsequent articulation of three constituent meanings of the dream's psychological structure: (1) desirable genital relations; (2) a primitive disintegration anxiety; and (3) a defensive return to pregenital safety. Once a given constituent is singled out in the subject's world for analysis, it may itself admit of several meanings to be distinguished. In Freud's (1905) analysis of Dora's illness, he not only distinguishes its goal directedness, but finds in the latter the intentions of (1) detaching her father from his mistress Frau K.; (2) frightening and awakening pity in her father; and (3) seeking revenge on this father whose eyes would begin to tear as he inquired about his daughter's health. Similarly, in Kohut's (1979) analysis of Mr. Z.'s dream involving a dark-haired man with an umbrella, handkerchief, gloves, and ring in a rural landscape, the unified meaning of a strong confidence-inspiring male is further differentiated by means of constituents pertaining to his father (the hair), Kohut (the objects), and a camp counselor (the landscape). Although the differentiation of the psychological constituents of a phenomenon always begins with individual cases, this operation is also employed in the achievement of general knowledge. For instance, Horney (1950) distinguishes such general constituents of neurosis as “basic anxiety,” “the search for glory,” “claims,” “a tyranny of shoulds,” “the pride system,” “self hatred,” and “self-alienation.”

**Explication of the Relational Whole**

Phenomenological explication that meaning is not all at once clearly determined or actually given; much always remains implicit. Since implicit or what phenomenologists call “horizontal” aspects of meaning are nonetheless positively lived through, they are potentially clarifiable, determinable, and explicable. Much of the work of psychological analysis consists in the bringing to actual intuitive (in Husserl's [1912, 1952] sense, i.e., directly apprehended) givenness those aspects which are inanimate parts of the psychological order but which remain “in its shadows.” This is how the relational manifold of psychological meanings, much of which is originally apparent only in “hints,” becomes fully and comprehensively conceptualized. Each phenomenon or constituent of a phenomenon is a unity, a whole, but it is composed of an inner depth and outer contextual expanse. These are respectively called, in phenomenological parlance, the phenomenon's internal and external horizons. The analysis of a phenomenon entails gradually making its various profiles explicit until their relations within the whole are evident. The part of the subject's life which actually and clearly appears in a given apprehension by the participant, and also by the researcher, is only, as Merleau-Ponty (1964) says, “a node in the woof of the simultaneous and the successive” (p. 132). Each constituent of psychic life must therefore be apprehended in this manifold relational nexus. A given manifestation of psychic life admits of internal complexities as well as relations to other matters external to it. In connection with these two horizons, its meaning is found and the relational network under consideration is illuminated. Thus, the researcher must look at the diversity of aspects lying within the unity under consideration by actively looking it over, turning it around to see its far side, prying it open as it were. Then he must look at its relation to its surrounding psychological territory—its relation to other constituent unities, to its context(s) (spatial, temporal, and interpersonal)—until the research-guiding interest is fulfilled. Freud (1905), who was a smoker himself, was fond of telling his patients “where there's smoke, there's fire.” Psychoanalysis has always been aware of the depth and expanse characteristic of psychic life and has prepared the ground for these analytic procedures through the call for associative data. Jung's (1933) technique of “amplification,” in which the patient stays with each dream image itself and describes its features in ever greater detail, provides formal access to some internal horizons. Freud's (1912) more unrestricted instructions for free association evoke expressions through which external horizons may be brought to light. Indeed, he asserts, “When we take up an obscure dream, the first task is not to understand or interpret it but to establish its context with minute care” (Freud, 1924, p. 11).

Let us consider a few examples of the psychoanalytic penetration of internal horizons or inner profiles of meaning. Sullivan (1956) discusses a woman who strikes people on the surface as amazingly genial and never malicious, yet if one considers not how she acts but what she does, for instance driving down main street at 60 m.p.h., waved to the traffic cop, one realizes that her blithe violation of standards contains the underside of hostility. Atwood and Stolorow (1984) consider the meaning of trivial, inexpensive gifts which are nonetheless cherished by a patient. In her relation to these gifts from newly acquired friends, they find a consolidation of a still fragile sense of the positive value and richness of her relationships with these people (who as part of the external horizon also participate in this meaning). Such meanings can be particularly difficult to explicate when they are partially constituted by forbiddenness and anxious affect. For instance, Sullivan's woman above might laughingly dismiss his observation of her hostility. Kohut (1979) analyzes Mr. Z.'s dream of a starkly outlined image of his mother with her back turned toward him and which he experienced with deep anxiety. Mr. Z. was in the process of breaking.
the bond with his mother that had controlled his life to this point, and beginning to turn toward his father in the development of a
masculine self independent of his mother. Kohut sees the image as entailing abandonment—his mother is turning her back on him as he
attempts independence. The deeper meaning is contained in the internal horizon of the image, the mother’s invisible face. Indeed, her
face is so unapproachable for Mr. Z. as to be inexplicable and impossible to verbalize. Kohut suggests to him mutilation, castration,
and so on, to which Mr. Z. can only shrug with limited assent. Kohut realizes that in essence the face contains his psychotic mother’s
distorted personality and pathological outlook on life, the recognition of which would endanger and undermine the structure of Mr. Z.’s
self as he knew it. The dream therefore expresses his anxiously growing conviction that his mother’s strength and power, on which his
self was based, was itself a faulty, destructive delusion. But here, with the past, the future, and the relation to the self, Kohut has
already illuminated the external horizons which constitute the mother image.

Investigating the relation of a matter under analysis to others, those surrounding it, and indeed the total biography—the moment’s
external horizon—occupies much psychoanalytic reflection. Freud (1924), who says “everything is related to everything, including
small things to great …” (p. 27), finds the losing of a gift to be intrinsically related to a quarrel with the giver, as a punctuation in the
succession of moments in the relationship. Freud (1905) understands Dora’s aphasias by its relation to its surrounding events. The
attacks last six weeks and in perfect accordance with Herr K.’s absences. They mimic in reverse his estranged wife’s illnesses that
occur in Herr K’s presence: “When the man she loved was away, she gave up speaking; speech had lost its value since she could not
speak to him. On the other hand writing gained in importance as the only way of communication with him in his absence” (p. 40). Freud
relates Dora’s termination of therapy to her previous difficulties with Herr K.: “because of the unknown quantity in

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

me which reminded Dora of Herr K., she took revenge on me as she wanted to take revenge on him, and deserted me as she believed
herself to have been deceived and deserted by him” (p. 119). Freud (1924) plays a game with another patient that demonstrates his
conviction in the inextricability of meaning from its circumstances. He asks his patient to pick a female name at random; the patient says
“Albine,” and knowing no one by that name, he provides no associations. Freud himself points out the contexts which illuminate the
name’s meaning: the man is fair in coloring; Freud used to jokingly call him “Albino”; and they were just in the midst of tracing the
feminine in his personality; “So it was he himself who was this ‘Albine’, the woman who was most interesting to him at the moment”
(p. 108). The same strategy is evident in Fosshage’s (1983) contemporary analysis of a dream in which his patient finds herself “ready
for bed” in a hotel with Ann and Joan. She sees a beautiful gold necklace with Poseidon and sea horses on it, very valuable and pretty.
It belongs to Ann and she picks it up. The context emerges in her associations. Ann is a superfeminist, attractive, and the patient feels
connected to her. Susan is overly compliant and sexually inhibited. The patient, Fosshage observes, is in the process of recognizing,
appreciating, and integrating her sexuality, femininity, and assertiveness, which is seen in her relations with men and the analysis. The
meaning of the dream is evident in light of that: an appropriation of the positive value of sexuality and assertiveness, which she does
not yet possess herself. In human science, circumstantial evidence is not “second best” but is primary since here meaning is internal to
its nexus and only to be discovered therein.

Identification of Recurrent Meanings

Just as we may find many different meanings in the structure of a given moment of psychic life, we also find that a unitary, selfsame
meaning may reside in different moments of psychic life. The meanings thereby discovered may be said to be general,

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

and this is one of the ways in which relative importance or priority is established in the multiplicity of meanings. Psychoanalysts have
been very sensitive to these aspects of lived reality which are recurrent, present more or less identically in diverse lived experiences,
as well as to relative variations within these general themes. This is why Jung (1933) asserts “we are better able, in a series of
dreams, to recognize important contents and basic themes” (p. 14). For instance, in the two dreams of the woman patient analyzed by
Fosshage (1983), the general theme of the appropriation of genital sexual pleasure shows itself as it also did in relation to men in her
waking life and with Fosshage himself. Within this series he is also concerned with changes or variations in the process that manifest
relative integration and disintegration of the patient’s new possibility. Freud provides many such examples, which he generalizes in the
notion of “complex.” For instance, in Freud’s (1909) case of the Rat man, he finds a complex meaning relation in which the Rat man’s
father has the sense of “interference with sexual enjoyment.” This is first implied when the Rat man says he was very close to his father
and able to talk to him about everything except “a few subjects fathers and sons usually hold aloof from each other.” As a child the Rat
Man had the idea that he could arouse sympathetic affection in a little girl if he told her his father was dead. The meaning becomes even
clearer in his report on the thought after his first copulation: “This is glorious, one could murder one’s father for this!” His father
actively opposed his passionate attachment to his lady, whom he hesitated to marry, and the Rat man masturbated impulsively after his
father’s death. This complex is, of course, related to one of the Rat man’s presenting problems—his obsession with the thought of his
father's being tortured by having rats gnaw into his anal orifice. Kohut (1979) uses the same operation in thematizing the mother's "lack of empathy, intrusive observation, and unrelenting control" of Mr. Z., whose self-consistency was rooted in submission. He finds this constellation in the mother's inspection of the boy's skin and removal of any blemishes,

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

in her inspection of his feces and control of bowel functions, and in her bursting into his room unexpectedly and interrupting his developing relations with friends. While it might seem that this mother's various expressions of love for Mr. Z. were divergences from this theme, deeper analysis shows that this "love" was conditionally directed to those aspects of Mr. Z. which she approved and hence these are further variations on the same theme. Atwood and Stolorow (1984) report a patient who dreams of being burned to the ground, diminished to two eyes attempting to coordinate with each other; she becomes fascinated with broken glass; she throws a pebble into a pond and watches her reflection scatter and come back together; she scratches and rubs at cracks in walls; she sews her fingers together with needle and thread. What recurs in all these diverse moments of her psychic life spanning dreams, perception, and behavior is an attempt to unify a fragmented self (and, we would add, the material ground of existence), to repair its dissolution. Countless psychoanalytic concepts, like the notion of "transference" and Freud's assertion that "one is condemned to repeat that which he cannot master," grow out of this operation.

Comparison of Various Real Cases

As is evident above, the meanings that are discovered, including all their complex relations, are not necessarily limited to a single instance. It often serves the interest of the investigator not only to differentiate general themes with their variations in a given case, but to do the same between two or among more individual cases. Two sorts of discoveries follow from this procedure—those of differences and similarities between cases. These respectively reveal the unique, typical, and general features of psychic lives. For instance, in comparing the above cases of Freud, Kohut, and Atwood and Stolorow, it is easy to see the inhibition of sexual intentions in all three; we also find parental interferences in all three, particularly the father in the first, the mother in the second, and in the third, parental abuse led to such deep injury to overall self-structure that genital sexuality is only a most remote possibility. Kohut (1977) compares Mrs. X. and Miss F.; he finds such common themes as demands for attention and reassuring praise, which were never given in childhood, leading to the conviction that these hopes will never be fulfilled, the attempt to give up hope, becoming depressed, and periodically bursting out with rage toward other people. Such comparisons lead Kohut and Wolf (1978) to articulate the typical structure of the "mirror-hungry personality," as well as to differentiate this from other types like the "ideal-hungry personality." Such comparisons may be undertaken with regard to a particular psychological interest. Sullivan (1956) compares different manic and depressive patients, including the amiable one mentioned above, as well as ones given to outbreaks of violence, verbal jibing, rule-breaking, and expansion of lust; he even cites psychoanalysts who went back into therapy with a colleague just prior to committing suicide, and he finds the common intention of hurtfulness toward others. Guntrip (1971), taking aggression itself as a general theme of interest, claims that he has never found a case of aggression which did not originally arise in a situation of experienced threat, however implicit or obscure the latter might be.

Comparison Involving Imaginative Variations and Examples

Since Husserl (1912), phenomenologists have stressed the benefits and even necessity of the investigator's "free fancy" in the process of analysis, which enables the researcher to intuit what is essential to the phenomenon under consideration. This procedure can be utilized for diverse interests regarding both the focus of the investigation and its intended level of generality. It can be used to discover the essential meaning of a particular dream, a particular behavior, a single subject's sexuality, a recurrent pattern in any of these areas, or dreaming, behaving.

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

and personality in general—from typicalities to universalities. In contrast to induction, one gains insight into the essence of the phenomenon of interest by beginning with a specific example of it and imaginatively transforming it in every possible respect in order to distinguish its essential from unessential characteristics. To discern the essence of the unimaged frontal view of Mr. Z.'s mother in his dream, Kohut (1972) imagines the horror of castration, the sight of missing external genitals, fantasies of blood and mutilation, and finally no face at all. Kohut uses these imaginative variations of the image to penetrate its essential meaning, which is the dangerously destructive aspect of Mr. Z.'s mother, so injurious to his self. These imagined variations remain rigorously consistent with what is actually given to Mr. Z., his mother's back turned toward him, which excludes as essentially incompatible a loving smile or an intention to embrace. The researcher's imagination thereby gets at eidetic law more powerfully than any other activity. Transgressing the
boundary of the essential in free imagination can also illuminate essential contours. In analyzing the situation in which certain of the Rat Man's obsessions were rooted, Freud (1909) begins with what actually happened: the Rat Man's cruel superior, the captain, mistakenly asks him to repay Lieutenant A. 3.80 crowns when he really owes the money to a girl he is attracted to. Then Freud varies imaginatively a series of possible responses: “It might easily have occurred to him to think of some derisive reply, such as ‘Will I, thought?’ “pay him back the money!”—answers which would have been subject to no compulsive force” (p. 218). Freud's point is not that the Rat Man did not in fact respond in these ways, but rather that these normal responses are essentially incompatible with his psychological processes, in which inhibited, guilt-ridden rage at cruel authority interfering with sexual pleasure is not merely a general feature but the eidetic rule. Thus the Rat Man's psychic life varies through a series of possibilities which can be freely imagined but must exemplify the essential pattern of indirectly expressed and unreflected

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever. 

anger (overwhelmed by guilt) at the other's interference with erotic intention, which is not merely factually different but essentially different from normal responses. Kohut (1979), in his analysis of Mr. Z.'s relation with his father, varies the phenomenon, and thereby distinguishes it essentially from an oedipal relation and insightfully intuits its significance as the offering of missing strength and independence to which Mr. Z. is attracted.

Unlike the feeling tone ... of the oedipal experience in structural neuroses, Mr. Z.'s memories were not accompanied by a sense of hopeless rivalry with his father, but a feeling of pride in him. There was no depression and sense of inferiority, outgrowths of the child's feeling defeated by the adult male, but a glow of joy and the invigorating sense of having found an image of masculine strength [p. 22].

Thus intrinsic relations of image and affect are discriminated from imagined variants that are eidetically incompatible.

Examples of the use of imaginative variation and generation of counterinstances of phenomena in the discovery of general essential structures are also common. It often begins with comparison of real cases, with imagination leaping forward to target their essence. Sullivan (1956) notices that men on the street occasionally look at his fly and then raise their eyes to meet his. Some blush and become disturbed while others seem numb, indifferent, and oblivious to their previous act. In differentiating the essence of the latter case as examples of “automatism,” he imagines that if he asked them about their previous behavior, they would completely deny it. In all probability, Sullivan never actually asked, nor does it matter what in fact would occur if he did; the point is that he used his imagination to shadow forth the essence of the automatism as a behavior which is dissociated from reflective awareness and not integrated or owned in communication. Any instance that

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever. 

lacks this essential feature is not an automatism. Guntrip (1971) distinguishes, beyond all factual instances of aggression which he has analyzed, its essence: “Aggression is a personal meaningful reaction to bad-object relations, to a threat to the ego, initially aroused by fear. If there is nothing to fear, there is nothing to fight. Aggression is a defensive anger whose menace is not too great to cope with. Otherwise aggression turns to frustration, hate, fear, or flight...” (p. 37).

Freud (1905) similarly uses imagination, varying the critical features to distinguish, from counterinstances, a certain kind of illness: “They are as a rule leveled at a particular person, and consequently vanish with that person's departure ... the paralyzed and bedridden person would spring to her feet if a fire were to break out in her room, and the spoiled wife would forget all her sufferings if her child were to fall dangerously ill...” (p. 45).

Psychological Speaking

While quantitative analysis utilizes a mathematical language with meanings and norms of formal exactitude, the qualitative analysis of psychological realities is most accurately expressed in modifications of everyday discourse. This is not to be taken as a deficiency, for as Husserl (1952) says, “in the sphere of psychological realities it is essentially different than in that of the physical realities. To the essence of mind, of mental states and qualities, belongs not mathematical determinability; there is not any definite mathematical manifold as ideal scaffolding to be attached to mental actuality. Psychic acts and states, like phantasies, rememberings, judgements, wishes, hopes, willings are not measurable, not ‘exactly’ determinable as approximations to ideal mathematical formulations.’ (p. 125). Psychology therefore appropriates ordinary language or neologizes in an attempt to achieve a rigorous, precise expression of the meanings, relations, and themes immanently constitutive of psychic life. Phenomenology requires that such language must refer to

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever. 

these phenomena in their direct intuitive giveness, that is, it must describe the matter just as it is lived. Far from introducing any arbitrary “subjectivity”, ordinary language is used in the service of the most faithful and direct apprehension of the data. The concepts
we use for their determination can only be taken from themselves…. If we find here something flowing, then we simply must use the term ‘flow’; if we find something vague, the term ‘vagueness’, if we are able in certain sphere to find only typical differences, then we must form the concepts of type (Husserl, 1951, pp. 126-7). Psychological speaking is thus the original expression of what one encounters through the above operations. Psychoanalysts have contributed extensively to the development of this kind of discourse, for example with words like as-if performance (Sullivan, 1956), orgastic and non-orgastic experiences (Winnicott, 1967), expansive and self-effacing solutions (Horney, 1950), identity crisis (Erikson, 1980), and animal animus (Jung, 1933). This language of intentions, meanings, purposes, and their complex relations transcends its contexts of origination and admits of a wide realm of application, thereby guiding further analyses. Freud's (1924) speaking of errors brings hitherto implicit meanings into view for the first time. One can find the two intentions of which he speaks, the deliberate and its interfering (or disturbing) intention. One can investigate the origin of the interfering intention, how it was itself interfered with previously, debarred expression, and forced back. Psychological life, mutely lived, thereby becomes known. Kohut and Wolfs (1978) definition of self object as an object which is experienced as a part of our self, intimate as our own body, and containing two typical dimensions—mirroring (confirming my vigor, greatness, and power) and idealized (attractive to merge with in its omnipotence, infallibility, and calmness)—points to a wide and profound domain of human reality that we may now understand for ourselves.

Verification

While the contexts of discovery and verification (Reichenbach) may be sharply distinguished in the hypothetico-deductive/inductive approach of Anglo-Saxon metascience, Continental approaches which strive for knowledge that describes intuitive gives hardly need to distinguish the acquisition of insight from that of evidence. The moments of the discovery process which we have outlined and exemplified above, if enacted with their proper rigor, never depart from that which is self-evident in the data, and therefore need no further verification (where else could one even turn?). This does not mean that validity may be taken for granted or is guaranteed in any particular case. Here as everywhere the investigation may be wrong or not completely adequate. However, what is required to determine the truthfulness or falsity is nothing other than a reenactment or a fuller, more rigorous enactment of the very procedures we have already discussed. Just as there are better and worse manipulations, controls, measuring instruments, comparison groups, and statistical procedures in experiments, there are better and worse descriptions, empathic immersions, magnifications, discriminations of meaning, explications of the horizon, empirical comparisons, imaginative variations, and psychological speaking. Psychoanalysts since Freud have of course been aware of this. For instance, newer descriptive data has often give psychoanalysts the opportunity to see the validity of a previously acquired understanding. Freud (1905) was convinced that Dora was in love with Herr K., despite her protests to the contrary, long before he discovered that her “appendicitis-like” ailment occurred precisely nine months following Herr K.’s attempted seduction of her at the lake, which Freud took as a confirmation of her unowned sexual desire. This “confirmation” is such only on the basis of Freud's recognition of the new information as containing a meaning-theme common to many other expressions of her mental life in which it was already recognized. Of course it could be argued that Freud is still wrong about Dora, but even the argument would have to rest on precisely the same operation used by Freud, namely the comparative analysis of material from relatively independent contexts, to find its meaning. Fosshage interprets the gold necklace in his patient's dream as meaning her not-yet-owned sense of sexual attractiveness, which later recurs in her comment to him “I feel like you're seeing beauty in me.” “Confirmation” is in this case based on an extension of the identification of a recurrent meaning.

Disconfirmation also shows not the import of alien procedures (e.g., deduction, experimentation, quantification, induction), but the extension and more rigorous application of the above operations. Here again, more complete data may lead the way. If Freud had received new medical information about Dora's "illness," he might have had to abandon his pseudo-pregnancy interpretation. However, in order to be disconfirmatory, new data must be analyzed according to the procedures we have outlined, and indeed a more rigorous enactment of these analytic procedures on the same data may also disconfirm previous interpretations. For instance, Kohut's (1979) second analysis of Mr. Z. achieves extremely different results from and discloses the fallacies of the first analysis. It is clear that Kohut has considerably extended his empathic immersion in Mr. Z.'s world beyond previous limits, distinguished and related constituents of meaning which he had failed to grasp previously, and abandoned a rigid, preconstructed theoretical framework in favor of a freshly intuitive contact with Mr. Z.'s actual presence. Guntrip's (1971) rejection of Freud's conceptualization of aggression as an instinct is based on his grasping of its implicit internal horizon of fear and external horizon of situational threat, which he finds in every actual case and finally clinches in eidetic necessity by imaginative variation. The truth of such analyses is therefore not to be evaluated by recourse to experimental and quantitative methodology but rather precisely in the operations peculiar to qualitative psychological analysis.

In treating the issue of validity in this way, we are admittedly diverging from Freud's most explicit principle of verification,
naturally the criteria that the true insight cures, which Grunbaum (1984) has rightly criticized under the name of the “Tally Principle.” But it is our contention that Freud's operative

**WARNING!** This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

- 589 -

procedures far exceeded his explicit methodological formalizations. It is therefore all the more significant to find in the practice of clinical psychoanalysis procedures which have been developed and formalized in the context of pure science, one supported by a strong philosophical tradition complete with a rigorous metascientific vision. Truth value is thus not grounded in practical value. And yet one implication of finding genuine scientific methods within the operative workings of psychoanalysis, despite their lack of formalization and systematization, is that psychoanalysis contains the resources necessary for scientific self-sufficiency. The distinction of practical value and truth value is also exceedingly important if we are to sort out, in the domain of what is ambiguously called “clinical wisdom,” that which amounts to imposing theoretical suggestion from veridical apprehension.

**Additional Maneuvers Noted in Psychoanalysis**

**Reflecting on One's Own Experience**

There are several ways in which psychoanalysts use reflection on their own experience of the subject and/or the subject's situation in order to secure a fuller understanding. Although this has doubtless been done implicitly by phenomenologists and can be rigorously grounded by its philosophical anthropology, these procedures have not been formally specified due to phenomenology's characteristic emphasis on the intuition of the subject matter alone. However, inasmuch as the subject matter is essentially related to the investigator in a variety of ways, the latter may potentially be used as a key to the former. For instance, one of the ways in which Sullivan (1956) seems to come upon his discovery of the hostility in manic and depressive patients is his sensitivity to the disturbance they induce in him and their relatives whom he observed. In other words, the investigator's own responses, including frustration, anxiety, sexual arousal, nurturing, and so on, may be closely related to the

**WARNING!** This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

- 590 -

intentions of the subject and therefore facilitate understanding, even though they themselves are distinctly responses of the investigator and not necessarily those of the subject.

A second group of illuminating responses on the part of the researcher involve living the subject's situation in a way that is different from or in contrast with the subject's situation, by virtue of its rootedness in the investigator's existence. For instance, Shapiro (1965), in analyzing a paranoid patient's belief that his boss is out to get him, brings into view his own sense of the work situation which includes the boss's burdensome responsibilities. He then contrasts this more widely contextual experience, devoid of any clue-searching or expectation of disparagement, with the patient's, which is narrowly negative-expectation-fulfilling without any concern for context. Here the investigator comes to understand the subject's experience by contrasting it with his own alternative possibilities for experiencing the "same" situation.

Finally, psychoanalysts often make use of their own experience in its convergence with implicit dimensions of the subject's on the basis of an empathic fusion of their common humanity, modified by the analyst's expert reflectiveness. Sullivan (1953) says, "incidentally, it's quite essential ... that you realize that anything that seems to you to be very remarkable indeed in the content of a psychosis is just something that you haven't placed in your own developmental history" (p. 223). Greenson (1967) analyzes a patient's complaints about the toilet habits of his sister, who leaves the crack of the door open so that he can accidentally see her "ugly breasts" and whose hair in the tub makes him feel like vomiting. Greenson asserts that the patient is angry at her for not being ugly but for being boyhood's joys ... one feels like vomiting only if something repellent is felt to be in one's mouth.... Inappropriate disgust indicates a repressed wish to touch or put something considered consciously “dirty” in one's mouth, [pp. 365-66]

A person who has reflected upon his own life themes is thereby able to focus upon common implications. Needless to say, all procedures of this type must be carefully related to the subject's experience.

**Explication Using an Analogue Model**

The phenomenological approach to conceptualization has generally attempted to abstain from guidance by anything other than the
self-presence of the matter under investigation, and hence the use of models has either been abandoned or activated in an implicit, informal way in connection with intuition. The posture of complete abstention is recommended of course when it is a question of theoretically explaining lived experience with a model that is alien to its intuitively given structure. The use of constructs in this way can only shortcircuit the concrete explication of psychological reality and provide a mere pretense of understanding. But there is another use of analogical models to be found in psychoanalytic research, in which something other than the subject matter is transposed to what is being investigated in order to promote further descriptive investigation which would otherwise not be achieved. For instance, Dora angrily lodges several complaints about her father. In studying the psychological structure implicit in these beliefs about her father, Freud (1905) uncovers “projection” with the aid of a simple model. “There is something undeniably automatic about this method of defending oneself against a self-reproach by making the same reproach against someone else. A model of it is to be found in the tu quoque arguments of children; if one

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

- 592 -

of them is accused of being a liar, he will reply without an instant's hesitation: “You're a liar too!” (p. 35). Freud uses this model not to explain Dora's psychic life but rather to investigate it more fully by looking at her life in its capacity to intuitively fulfill the sense of the accusations. For instance, he found that both Dora and her father had ignored the sexual meanings of Herr K.’s behavior toward her and had used illness for manipulating others. It is thereby evident that her criticisms of her father have a “lining” or “backing” of self-reproach, and Freud gains great insight into these implicit self-relations by viewing her complaints this way. Freud used the oedipus myth in similar fashion. A patient of Jung's (1933) describes his anxiety, insecurity, dizziness, nausea, and heavyheadness, which suggests to Jung mountain sickness. Although this man has not been to the mountains, Jung looks to his life for a sense analogous to this model and finds in his dreams and associations much evidence of his “climbing too high too fast in his career.” Jung concludes that the neurosis is a warning for him to slow down and remember his roots. This may be partly why, following Freud, Jung (1933) said, “it is of special importance for me to know as much as possible about primitive psychology, mythology, archaeology, and comparative religion for the reason that they afford me priceless analogies with which I can enrich the associations of my patients” (p. 65). We find many instances in psychoanalytic interpretations where realities apart from the immediate subject matter, however seemingly farfetched, have an analogous meaning which may be brought to light in the phenomenon itself, and to the extent that the latter is accomplished, the research operation is valid. Jung (1933) goes so far as to use the image of the sun's course during the day to illuminate the human life cycle. An identity of sense in the realm of different human and natural phenomena grounds the validity of this hermeneutic transposition, which must of course be performed in the context of the above operations without ever becoming a groundless imposition of sense.

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

- 593 -

Utilizing Subjects' Responses to Insight

Since the psychoanalytic research situation often includes the communication of findings to subjects, it affords a rich perspective on the frequently raised issue of the value of the subjects' verbal and nonverbal responses to the analysis. In phenomenological research (except, for instance, the work of C. Fischer [1970] and von Eckartberg [1976] who consider their subjects “co-researchers”), subjects' participation has been characteristically limited to the offering of prepsychological life expression. Most phenomenologists do not take subjects' assent as a required verification of psychological conceptualizations inasmuch as this would presume the subject's expertise as a researcher, which alone would justify any priority over any other researcher. Where, with their great opportunity to observe patients' responses, do psychoanalysts stand on this? Psychoanalysts are concerned about the meaning and proper utilization of subjects' responses to interpretation, in essence regarding them, as phenomenologists do, simply as more data for analysis prior to its validation. Freud (1937) says: “We are not at all inclined to neglect the indications that can be inferred from the patient's reaction when we have offered him one of our constructions…. It is true that we do not accept the No of a person under analysis at face value; but neither do we allow his Yes to pass” (p. 262). Freud goes on to point out that a “Yes” may either be correct or hypocritically resistant, and it is only to be considered confirmative when it is followed by new associations that extend the completeness of the interpretation. A “No” is, he says, of even less value, for besides being legitimate dissent it may be resistance, either to the interpretation or some other aspect of the analytic situation. And further, it may point not to the incorrectness but rather the temporary incompleteness of an interpretation. All in all these responses must themselves be analyzed in order to assess their significance.

More useful, according to Freud (1937), are indirect responses to interpretation, which also must be analyzed. For instance, protesting Freud's assertion that his patient resented the fee, one patient committed the parapraxis, “Ten cents means nothing to me,” which he quickly corrected as “Ten dollars.” When Freud (1905) tells Dora she is in love with her father, she denies it and goes on to say that her cousin, whom she had described as “like herself as a child,” told her as a girl that she wanted to marry her father after
her mother's death. That the veridicality of an interpretation becomes clear only in subsequent expressions attests to the fact that it is up to the analyst to relate it to newly emerging material, which may be done in a naive or sophisticated way. In the case of the Rat man, the rat delirium disappeared after it was fully interpreted. When Kohut (1979) shifts his interpretation of Mr. Z's curiosity about Kohut's marital relationship from a revival of childhood sexual voyeurism to a need for a strong father and a concern as to whether Kohut is worthy, Mr. Z's depression lessens dramatically as he drops his prying demands. After Greenson's (1967) patient produces a series of associations in which idealized figures turn out to be disappointing, Greenson says, "And what are you afraid to find out about me?" After some feeble protests, the patient describes how he dreaded hearing my name ever mentioned outside the hour for fear he would hear something disillusioning" (p. 292). All these cases must be taken as more or less enigmatic and subject to analysis, just as any other expression would be.

**Conclusion**

Near the end of his career, Freud (1937) remarked on the apparent strangeness of how little attention had been paid to the "universally known, even self-evident" fact that psychoanalysis necessarily involves two people with two distinct tasks. Of the two, it was the analysand's attempt to become conscious of repressed portions of his life that received most of the attention. "The dynamic determinants of this process are so interesting that the other portion of the work, the task performed

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

by the analyst, has been pushed to the background" (p. 258). So it has been with phenomenological psychology (Wertz, 1983a) and indeed with science in general (Giorgi, 1984a), that the exciting illumination of the object of study originally commanded more attention than the methods used by the investigator. Indeed, it is characteristic of all consciousness to target an object prior to any self-reflective movement, whose rigorous enactment is unrequired and unprecedented in traditional science (Husserl, 1954). At first groping in the dark, methods are developed spontaneously as they are needed and become exhausted in the finding, much as the lighting is on a dramatic performance. In the case of psychoanalysis, however, we suggest, in accordance with Kvale's (1983) thesis, that not only the ecstatic momentum of these activities toward their targets but a traditional metascientific schooling has delayed the reflective recognition and assertion of important constituents of the methods involved. This metascientific naivete has also opened the way for self-misunderstandings and even the use of operations of dubious value for human science. Phenomenological psychology, freed from this metascientific framework, has recognized procedures missing from traditional methodological discourse and argued for their fundamental necessity in rigorous human scientific research. In the present work, we have found among these neglected methods analytic procedures that have been operative informally in psychoanalysis from its beginning to the present.

Much of the divisive debate between different psychoanalytic schools, as well as that between psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychology, has centered in their respective positive assertions, both empirical and theoretical, without ever touching on the question of methodology. In the present work, we have tried to show that these diverse schools have common methods, and this may be a crucial foundation on which the dialogue and eventual unity of these schools could be established. Inasmuch as these procedures of analysis are phenomenological, and therefore strictly adherent to the contours of

the phenomena themselves, they involve no inference, hypothesizing, or theory of construction and concentrate on descriptive understanding. We would argue that part of clinical wisdom, and indeed the wisest part of clinical practice, has nothing to do with testing theory or hypotheses but rather amounts to a direct presence to a recognition of the concretely manifest person. It is the recognition of and adherence to this possibility that probably most distinguishes the phenomenological psychologist from all others, including those guided by such continental approaches as structuralism and hermeneutics, which often have only artifacts and written texts rather than real, flesh and blood people in their research encounter. Even many of the most recent attempts of psychoanalysts to proceed phenomenologically has not succeeded in removing the idealistic aspects of positivistic epistemology (Wertz, 1985). The phenomenological epoché, developed by Husserl (1912, 1954), is the means of methodically abstaining from the imposition of previously held theoretical and commonsense suppositions or hypotheses in the research process. While this procedure has been critically evaluated by Husserl's followers, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, these thinkers have retained the most radical essence of phenomenological investigation, namely the fresh and direct contact with "the matters themselves," and all would agree that phenomenological meditation is to be sharply distinguished from any manner of mere theorizing or hypothesis testing.

Being theoretically uncommitted, phenomenologists work below theoretical antinomies and, through their open presence to prescientific reality, transcend the limits of any particular theory. We saw above how Guntrip and Kohut were able to surpass and critically integrate Freudian findings with a more rigorous employment of these procedures. We contend that much of the fragmentation and controversy in psychology is a consequence of the rigidification of nonintuitive modes of knowledge (so favored in the natural sciences) which seek to explain psychic life by postulating universal, abstract principles.

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.
These at best capture only a part of the whole and at worst amount to alien fabrications; in any case they lose sight of the concrete whole and thereby open themselves to conflicts with other equally abstract principles. It is also possible, of course, that diverse findings are due to the complexity and ambiguity of the subject matter itself. Inasmuch as these are genuine findings rather than extrapolations, the extension of the descriptive methods on which they are based can make evident their complementarity in a fuller comprehension.

It is possible that critical methodological reflection, such as that attempted here, could contribute to a movement from blind practice to a theoretically purified praxis, capable of achieving a resolution of different viewpoints in human science at large. But for a unity of this sort, a methodology far more complete than that sketched above is necessary. For instance, phenomenological reflection has found that the temptation to infer and hypothesize, that is, to substitute construction for genuine understanding, frequently arises when the investigator is plagued with incomplete descriptive data (for a number of reasons, one of which is that people are “loathe to think and speak” [Freud] of the matters under consideration) at a crucial point in the research process. In this case the genuine solution is to be found not in construction or even by recourse to analytic procedures, but rather in the securing of fuller description, which entails procedures we have presupposed and not elaborated here. That the fundamental role of phenomenal description (so necessary to psychoanalysis) has also been overlooked by a psychology seeking to base itself on natural scientific methodology (wherein its importance is negligible) also lies at the root of psychology's continuing pseudoscientific status (Husserl, 1952). Therefore an intensive study of all aspects of methodology including the formation of research interests, the choice of construction of research situations, descriptive data generation, analysis, and the interpretive application of findings is called for in the contemporary quest to unify a fragmented and often ungrounded human science on a rigorous foundation of

Addendum: Reflective Analysis as Emancipatory Praxis

Since, as we have indicated above, psychoanalysis is essentially an interpersonal work, it provides a unique context for the consideration of the emancipatory practical horizon of the analytic procedures we have discussed. While we have consistently argued for the differentiation of the conceptual and practical aspects and aims of the psychologist's activity, we would not disagree with Freud's observation that they are intertwined and profoundly related. While there may undoubtedly be both therapeutic change without adequate conceptual understanding and genuinely illuminating knowledge without change, psychoanalysis shows a rich mutual involvement of knowledge and transformation in the human order. Guntrip (1971) demonstrates how a poor conceptualization may thrive on paper but create profound problems in the therapeutic encounter. The exigencies of the practical interest of psychoanalytic research are reflected in his statement that “to care for people is more important than to care for ideas” (p. 27). Perhaps within genuine human science, the verity and application of ideas need not be opposed, for here ideas are nothing other than a care for people. We would by no means confuse the transformative presence of the therapist to analytic operations alone nor would we wholly identify the theoretical and practical aspirations of the psychologist. However, it may be valuable to consider these procedures not merely as means of attaining knowledge but as ways of treating people.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate at least some convergence of theoretical and practical value that could be worked out in detail for each analytic procedure. For instance, both Kohut (1971) and Atwood and Stolorow (1984) show how an unempathic posture on the part of the therapist may reinstate the very interpersonal traumas that originally led to the patient's difficulties and actually produce “negative therapeutic reactions.” They provide abundant evidence for the role of deep and complete empathy in the process of integrating develop-mentally arrested and conflicting aspects of the self. Atwood and Stolorow (1984) also show how a therapist's failure to suspend belief in meanings expressed by the patient prevents important therapeutic progress. One patient complained incessantly about the dehumanizing aspects of modern society, and the therapist, absorbed in naive agreement on the basis of an un-analyzed personal viewpoint, did not recognize or address the patient's difficulties in an atmosphere of interpersonal intimacy which played a constitutive role in the formation of those beliefs. Freud (1905) asserts that if he had seen the implicit horizons and identified a recurrent theme in Dora's flight from therapy, namely that “unknown quantity in me which reminded Dora of Herr K.” (p. 119), he would have been able to help her to master her feeling that Freud deceived her, instead of which she fled in fear and revenge. Guntrip (1971) relates a patient's silent withdrawal to the context of her going away on holiday: “You're frightened because you're going to be out of reach of me for two weeks. You feel you've got to do without me and you've started to do that already before you need” (p. 153). In response to this understanding, her withdrawal immediately disappears. Also hinted here is the therapist's imagination of possibility, namely that of remaining in contact. Counter to the essence of the pathological style, Guntrip's imagined possibility calls the patient into
an essentially new mode of existence, that of an embodied self-other working relation that persists through her holiday separation. Kohut (1979) believes his imaginative variations of Mr. Z.'s mother enabled him to extricate himself from her destructive enslavement.

**WARNING!** This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

Each analytic procedure appears to be a potentially emancipatory praxis.

**References**


Fischer, C. T., (1970), The testee as co-evaluator.


**WARNING!** This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.


Kohut, H. (1979), The two analyses of Mr. Z. *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 60: 3-27. [↩]


**WARNING!** This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.


Shapiro, K. (1986), Verification: Validity or understanding. *J. Phenomenolog. Psychol.*, 17 2:


**WARNING!** This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.

**Article Citation**


Copyright © 2009, Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing. Help | About | Report a Problem

**WARNING!** This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.