Photo: Allan Johnston
Statue: “The Way of Wisdom, St. Vincent de Paul and Students,” DePaul University, Chicago
Sculptor: Sister Margaret Beaudette
The Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

Executive Board, 2018

David L. Mosley, Bellarmine University, President
Thomas M. Falk, University of Dayton, Vice-President; Acting Secretary
Marge Oliker, Chicago Public Library, Treasurer
Alexander Makedon, Arellano University, Webmaster

Board of Directors

Charles Blatz, University of Toledo (emeritus)
Jason Helfer, Knox College
Charles Howell, Youngstown State University
Allan Johnston, Columbia College and DePaul University
Guillemette Johnston, DePaul University
Alexander Makedon, Arellano University
Richard Pipan, Oakland University
Sam Rocha, University of British Columbia
Phil Smith, Ohio State University
Ronald Swartz, Oakland University (emeritus)
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Introduction**  
*Guillemette Johnston and Allan Johnston*

**Spirit and Grace, Letters and Voice**  
*Babette Babich*  
1

**Two Concepts of Educational Freedom**  
*Emily Wenneborg*  
28

**Teaching as Entertainment: An Examination of Effects**  
*Ross M. Miller and Steven J. Bourgeois*  
44

**Enantiodromia and Integrality: The Rhythm of the Cultural Continuum**  
*Robert Mitchell*  
59

**Humanity in the Womb of History**  
*Thomas M. Falk*  
76

**Elaborating Environmental Communication within “Posthuman” Theory**  
*Maria Kristina Börebäck and Elias Schwieler*  
103

**Epistemologies and the Formation of Modern Democratic Individuality**  
*Nathalie Bulle*  
128

**Politics, Education, and Understanding: Anglo-American Readings and Misreadings of Rousseau in the 19th to 21st Centuries**  
*Guillemette Johnston*  
152

**Teaching Magical Thinking: Notes towards a Burroughsian Pedagogy**  
*Allan Johnston*  
184
Introduction

Welcome to the third volume of the Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education (JPSE), a peer-reviewed journal put out by the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education (SPSE). We would like to thank Fordham University for giving us access to its digital research platform, and Professor Babette Babich of Fordham University, editor of New Nietzsche Studies and author of several books on Nietzsche and other topics, for her generosity, support, and participation in this project.

JSPE aims to publish papers that approach the field of education from a philosophical perspective, in the broadest sense of the term. Some of the papers considered for publication may be selected from works presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education by members of that organization, after these papers undergo blind peer review and revision if necessary. However, this journal does not limit its content to works pertaining to the annual conference; it strongly invites outside submissions from any interested party, provided that such submissions fit the guidelines of the journal. JPSE will consider papers, book reviews, interviews, and other documents with emphases in history, psychology, literature, politics, religion, pedagogy, and other areas if they portend to the general ideal of philosophical speculation on the meaning, purpose, and/or nature of education, both in the literal and in the broadest sense of the word. To encourage diffusion, we are posting abstracts of the contributions.

With regard to paper selection, JPSE has established the following guidelines for paper review, consideration, and publication: each paper is blind reviewed by two outside readers as well as reviewed by the chief editors. If deemed necessary by the editors, the paper may be sent to a third reader. Reviews are “value free” insofar as JPSE is not consciously pushing an educational agenda. If the argument makes logical sense, seems valid, and does not violate facts, it is treated with a certain amount of flexibility. Our desire is to ensure that all papers go through a “screening” process of blind review, whether or not the paper has undergone previous commentary during conference presentation. Unless other arrangements are made, we claim one-time publication rights for any submission that is accepted.

A paper that receives two positive reviews from outside readers and support from the journal editors will be accepted, with suggested revisions if necessary. Whenever possible, readers and/or editors will suggest appropriate revisions, stylistic or otherwise, or raise questions regarding the content, context, and argument of the essay submitted. These should help the author make revisions, if any are requested. Our goal is not to turn papers away, but rather to help authors develop their ideas. If the paper is returned and the suggested revisions have not been made to the satisfaction of the editors, the paper
Often in academia, peer editing is highly select, and frequently it follows strict ideological guidelines, thus discouraging innovative approaches to areas of study. Our intention is to provide a platform for scholarship and speculation that can permit the exploration of ideas that may not represent mainstream concerns of the academic community. For this reason a section of this journal may be dedicated to works in progress, including those on topics that are not currently fashionable in critical circles. The journal thus will consider finished works, reviews, and other forms of inquiry when these enrich the content of the review. Our approach aims to enable writers to receive constructive feedback, though without compromising the integrity of the writing as well as the contribution of accurate information and knowledge, which must remain the purpose of scholarship. Thus the journal will encourage original endeavors and perspectives in order to broaden fields of research and speculation, concentrating on the eclectic and Socratic purposes of pursuing inquiry and increasing thought about and reflection upon the educational landscape in the broad sense of the term. This format should allow for a safe exchange of feedback and foster the growth of scholarship, thus creating a supportive intellectual community.

—* * *—

“We don’t need no education,” Pink Floyd famously sings in the rock opera *The Wall*; “We don’t need no thought control.” The themes implied in these lines — issues concerning the role of the professor or teacher, the value of freedom in education, the importance of the concept of the individual, the treatment of education as a commodity — recur in the essays and articles collected in this volume. Thus we read of the representation of the authoritative voice in the fictional education of Harry Potter, the attempt to establish a language that allows inclusion of the non-human world in human communication, the evolution of the concept of the autonomous individual in representative democracies, and the search for the mythic, the magical, and the transcendent in educational systems. Discussions of the role of freedom and entertainment in education also come to the fore. Representations and misrepresentations and the political positions that underlie them are featured. These articles, then, explore a range of subjects, moving from the Age of Reason to concepts and beliefs of the New Age. If the mix seems eclectic, it is; yet throughout these essays the power of education to “educate,” in the sense both of bringing out the latent and of inferring, recurs.

As a guide, the educator does not provide information, but assists the student in finding his or her own knowledge and insight. Communication is key, no matter what the discipline. The educator, our writers continually stress, must lead students to discovery, to finding their own meanings, be it through the authority of the voice (as, Babich contends, is the case for the character Severus Snape of the *Harry Potter* movies, played by Alan Rickman), or through attention to the boundaries of freedom in the classroom, as
the papers by Wenneborg and by Miller and Bourgeois suggest. Or perhaps discovery occurs in the structural formation of the child in ways that encourages integration or integrality through the inclusion of the mythic and the magical as valid realms of experience, areas that are explored in the studies by Mitchell, Falk, and A. Johnston. Approaches that surpass direct focus on the anthropocentric are central to the critique of Humanism in the paper by Börebäck and Schwieler, while the papers by Bulle and G. Johnston look to the Enlightenment either to trace the evolution of the concept of the individual (Bulle) or to explore how the writings of one of the key figures of the Age of Reason, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, are understood, and too often misunderstood, in the context of a cultural matrix that tries to assert its dominant, politicized worldview. Thus in the movement from New Age or magical to hegemonic cultural forces, questions arise such as, ‘What role does the character of the teacher play in the child’s education?’ ‘What degree of educational freedom should be granted to the pupil?’ ‘How can we interact with the world in ways that do not automatically implicate us in anthropomorphism or focus exclusively on rationalism, excluding both nature and the underlying processes that define the realms of myth and magic?’ ‘Should these realms be re-examined?’ Such questions circulate in these works, and give us a “handle” on ways to approach education.

We hope that considering today’s extraverted, goal-oriented world, the essays presented here will lead you to reflect even more on the purpose, fate, and future of education, and on its need to foster in both the student and the educator a universal recognition of the basic skills that encourage communication and accuracy in learning and understanding, not solely as a means to or a goal of production, but as a way of encouraging constant discovery and recognition of the state of being of the individual and of the collective self as both work to enhance and inform each other. The variety of topics addressed in the essays included in this issue of *JPSE* reflects the quality and diversity of the approaches we would like to consider in future volumes. Should you have any questions or be interested in submitting material, please do not hesitate to contact the editors via email at ajohnst2@depaul.edu, ajohnston@colum.edu, or gjohnsto@depaul.edu.

Guillemette Johnston and Allan Johnston
CALL FOR PAPERS

*JPSE* is now actively seeking submissions of papers by members of SPSE and others. Priority will be given to papers delivered at the November meetings of SPSE in Chicago. However, other works, such as interviews, reviews, works in progress, and articles, will also be considered. See the introduction for an idea of the editorial strategy and scope of *JPSE*. Please submit materials as attachments to the editors, Allan Johnston and Guillemette Johnston, at the following email addresses:

ajohnst2@depaul.edu
ajohnston@colum.edu
gjohnsto@depaul.edu

Please indicate “*JPSE* submission” in the subject line of the email. Documents should be submitted in Microsoft Word doc or docx formats. Please include an abstract of about 100 words and a list of key search terms with your submission, along with a short bio.

A NOTE FOR READERS

If you are interested in reviewing papers submitted to *JPSE*, please let us know. Interested parties should submit a CV and a writing sample for consideration.

When reviewing a paper, readers are expected to exercise academic tolerance and provide constructive support with helpful suggestions, questions, and comments. Disparaging, egoistic, and dismissive feedback on behalf of the reader will not be accepted and will not be sent to the writer unless it is revised. This type of review, we feel, does not serve the purpose of helping to create a safe, respectful, and supportive academic community. We aim at opening minds, not closing them, and being helpful and productive.
ABSTRACTS

Spirit and Grace, Letters and Voice

Babette Babich

The role of the professor as actor is explored here through Alan Rickman’s portrayal of the character Severus Snape in the Harry Potter movie franchise. Rickman’s performance is linked to Ivan Illich’s discussion of monastic ambience and community to show how the quality of grace is related to the concept of gratuity, or the freely giving away of something for no reason and with no expectation of return (German Umsonstigkeit), and how this quality of giving relates to the performative qualities that underlie teaching. Additional themes include the significance of alchemical signature — particularly the daffodil (‘powdered root of asphodel’) — as well as rhythm and prayer in Milton, Goethe, and Nietzsche.

Key words:

Ivan Illich, Harry Potter, Alan Rickman, alchemy, rhythm

Two Concepts of Educational Freedom

Emily Wenneborg

Many contemporary educational debates that do not appear to be about freedom do in fact depend on an underlying concept of educational freedom. Accordingly, it is important to consider what conception of educational freedom brings greatest clarity to such discussions. In this article I challenge one widely held view of freedom, that freedom is the absence of constraints, and I advocate a contrasting view of freedom as the scope of action afforded by one’s social setting. I suggest that we judge the freedom offered by different educational structures not in terms of how many constraints are placed on students, but in terms of how much agency students possess within those structures.

Key words:

Ivan Illich, A. S. Neill, Summerhill, freedom, agency, structure

Teaching as Entertainment: An Examination of Effects

Ross M. Miller and Steven J. Bourgeois

In this article, we seek to identify the problems in common educational practice and the ideas that serve as their basis. We treat two contrasting approaches in the classroom: teaching as entertainment and the hard school. Through our analysis, we explore the purpose of education and discuss the long-term effects of viewing schooling through the
prism of entertainment. Though applicable throughout the curriculum, our discussion focuses on ideas and experiences relating to our classroom experience in the liberal arts, specifically within historical studies at the secondary level. While taking a critical approach, we also provide a possible solution in line with our argument.

Key words:
Educational philosophy, entertainment in education, technology in education

Enantiodromia and Integrality: The Rhythm of the Cultural Continuum
Robert Mitchell

We have arrived at a critical point in the cultural continuum and in the evolution of consciousness. This fact invites a re-visioning of the K-12 education curriculum to emphasize the continuum of culture and incorporate the concept of the evolution of consciousness via the processes of enantiodromia and integrality. Enantiodromia depicts a wave-like pattern that challenges the description of the cultural continuum as linear, historical and progressive, describing instead a dynamic, rhythmic process where things transform into their opposites. Integrality depicts a structure of consciousness defined by the cultural historian Jean Gebser as representing the next step in the evolution of consciousness. Each of Gebser’s unfolding structures of consciousness is significant in terms of ontological development. Integrality, the next phase in this development, describes an evolution in consciousness as well as a transformation in the cultural continuum. It can be equated to what Carl Jung described psychologically as the process of individuation. Together, individuation and integrality give form to the next phase in the evolution of consciousness.

Key words:
Jung, Neumann, Gebser, enantiodromia, integrality, individuation, transcendent function, collective consciousness, collective unconscious, mass psyche

Humanity in the Womb of History
Thomas M. Falk

From climate change to mass species extinction and the threat of nuclear war, history as we know it appears to be approaching a precipice. Using a phenomenological lens, the author describes ways in which our political economy, neurochemistry, and habits of digital communications technology usage contribute to these existential threats. Taking cues from ancient Athens to contemporary brain science, the essay next suggests directions for developing a curriculum of consciousness through which we might literally change our minds and thus envision a future, very different from the present, lying just beyond the horizon.
In this article, using a posthumanist and Deleuzian vocabulary, we problematize the anthropocentric approach within communication theory that at present is setting the theoretical ground for environmental communication. We argue that ‘anthropocentrism’ has caused humans to situate humanity at the top of an assumed environmental hierarchy. Consequently, humanity has given itself the right to interpret the world according to its own standard. This, in turn, has consequences for what is called the environment, including its marginalization and exploitation.

To address this issue, we maintain that environmental communication is in need of a posthuman theoretical elaboration that allows for a post-anthropocentric turn and enables an alternative radical approach to environmental communication theory. Our main argument is that the idea of processuality allows us to work with relationality as a concept within environmental communication theory. Relationality gives rise to the communicative actions that are put in motion by environmental communication theory.

In traditional environmental communication research, environmental issues are understood as expressions of discourses or systems. We suggest, in response, that environmental issues, as posthuman communicational processes, are crucial for understanding sustainable development as a set of practices. Posthuman or posthumanist theory, we argue, makes possible a turn from an androcentric ideal to a post-anthropocentric stance within environmental communication. This lets us develop the concept of “sustainable development” and its practices as relating to both material and ethical matters. Environmental communication thus becomes a function in which knowledge provides the necessary abstraction for engaging in posthuman and post-anthropocentric communicative actions.

Key words:
Post-humanism, environmental communication, processuality, relationality, sustainable development, Deleuze

In this paper we analyze the philosophical theories underlying models of democratic individuality that historically developed in western culture. We begin by defending the
idea that recognition of the human faculty for independent thinking lies at the foundation of democratic modernity. On this basis, using analyses made by the epistemologist Filmer Northrop for support, we study the impact of philosophical theories of knowledge on models of democratic individuality. We observe that the epistemic duality of sources of human knowledge lies at the heart of some of the major advances in modern epistemology. We then argue that this epistemic duality opens a path that is distinct from both the ontological dualism of classical rationalism and the radical empiricisms that are derived from classical empiricism, but that includes their main teachings. This path invites us to rethink the sources of free thinking in the knowing subject. It gives real meaning to the idea of a participatory democracy to which schools contribute through their cognitive role.

Key words:
Filmer Northrup, epistemology, individuality, democracy, empiricism

Politics, Education, and Understanding: Anglo-American Readings and Misreadings of Rousseau in the 19th to 21st Centuries
Guillemette Johnston

Anglo-American readings of the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau from the late 19th century to the present have been mixed, to say the least. If one looks at explorations of Rousseau’s political and educational texts, one notices that while scholars such as Roger D. Masters, Judith Shklar, and Patrick Riley have given valid and insightful readings of Rousseau’s works, many conservative Anglo-American critics and scholars project ideological perspectives onto Rousseau’s writings, seeing The Social Contract, Emile, and other texts as harbingers of totalitarianism or exemplifications of hypocritical manipulation. In this paper these latter readings (or misreadings) are criticized for their misunderstanding or misappropriation of Rousseau’s philosophical achievement under the form of a detailed commentary revisiting some of the more complex concepts in Rousseau’s writings. Rousseau can be seen as a constellating figure who has become an intellectual scapegoat for conservatives such as Irving Babbitt, J. L. Talmon, and Lester G. Crocker, and more recently for Jonathan Israel and Michael Coffman. This lack of ability to understand the nuances underlying Rousseau’s philosophy raises concerns about ideological tendencies within educational systems in which such misunderstandings are fostered by overemphasis on specific and limited perspectives linked to empiricism, pragmatism, political and historical slants, and other philosophical trends.

Key words:
Rousseau, Lester G. Crocker, J. L. Talmon, Irving Babbitt, Roger D. Masters, Patrick Riley, Leo Strauss, Judith Shklar, Jonathan Israel, Michael Coffman, politics, education, misreading
Teaching Magical Thinking: Notes towards a Burroughsian Pedagogy
Allan Johnston

This paper looks at the pedagogical practices of William S. Burroughs and their relationship to Burroughs’ concepts regarding the word virus, addictions to power, and magical thinking. It argues that Burroughs’ writing engages in a constant attack upon systems of social control, including those embodied in language and the processes of rational thinking language supports. Burroughs describes his own belief system as “magical thinking,” and pedagogical practices that he has suggested link to this system of belief, which situates the individual at the center of his or her own perceptual universe and therefore suggests causal links between perception and experience. Burroughs’ theories concerning “magical thinking” are compared to ideas presented in Scientology and in eastern belief systems such as yoga and Buddhism.

Key words:
William S. Burroughs, magical thinking, pedagogy, Scientology, word virus
ABOUT THE AUTHORS


Maria Kristina Börebäck is a lecturer in the Department of Education, Karlstad University, Sweden. She is a Ph. D. candidate at Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden. Her thesis focuses on environmental communication as a philosophical and pedagogical issue. She is an associate member of CEFO, the Center for Sustainable Development at Uppsala University, Sweden.

Steven J. Bourgeois, Ph.D., has served in various roles in the K-16 spectrum for the past 25 years, including German Teacher, Head Tennis Coach, Music Teacher, Instructional Coordinator, Campus Testing Coordinator, Vice Principal, Director of Research, and Executive Director of Research, Evaluation, and Instruction. He currently serves as Executive Director for Responsive Education Solutions, the largest charter organization in the state of Texas, with 23,000 students at 75 campuses. He has published empirical studies in the areas of student motivation and engagement, along with conceptual pieces on authentic engagement and intrinsic motivation in the educational setting.

Nathalie Bulle is a Director of Research at CNRS for the Groupe d’Étude des Méthodes de l’Analyse Sociologique at the Sorbonne. Her research has focused on educational policies, Western pedagogical development, inequality of opportunity, and epistemology in the social sciences. [http://nathaliebulle.com/](http://nathaliebulle.com/)

Emily Wenneborg is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership studies, with a concentration in Philosophy of Education, at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Her research interests include human agency, freedom, and will; language and literacy acquisition; pluralism and the “culture wars”; and the philosophy and history of homeschooling.

Thomas M. Falk is a Visiting Faculty in the Department of Teacher Education, University of Dayton. He currently serves as Vice President and Acting Secretary of the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education.

Allan Johnston is a Faculty adjunct at DePaul University and Columbia College. He has published scholarly articles on contemporary American literature in venues such as
Review of Contemporary Fiction Twentieth-Century Literature, College Literature, and ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and the Environment, as well as articles on education in McNeese Review, Radical Pedagogy and elsewhere. Additionally, he is the author of five collections of poetry, has published work in Poetry, Poetry East, and over 60 other journals, and is the recipient of an Illinois Arts Council Grant, Pushcart Press nominations, and other awards, including first place in the Outrider Press Poetry Competition.

Guillemette Johnston is a Professor of French at DePaul University, and a specialist on the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A member of CNRS, she is the author of Lectures poétiques: La Représentation poétique du discours théorique chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and has published articles and chapters in the MLA Approaches to Teaching series, Jung: Culture and Psyche, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, French Forum, Romanic Review, Etudes Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Pensee libre, and elsewhere. Her other areas of study include Jungian psychology, yoga, and Francophone literature.

Ross M. Miller, M. A., has taught history for over twenty years in various public high schools, as well as community colleges, in the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex. Over his career, he has taught every subject within the social studies discipline. He earned a master’s in history, writing a thesis focusing on the U.S. participation in the Boxer Rebellion. He currently applies his craft at Keller High School in Keller, Texas, teaching U.S. History and serving as the department chair.

Robert Mitchell is an independent scholar retired from a 27-year career as a secondary classroom teacher. He has long been a Jungian scholar and is on the board of the Jungian Society for Scholarly Studies. His books include a two-volume memoir about transforming the warrior spirit and reintegration after Vietnam, Journey to Myrtos and The Trials of the Initiate. He holds a B.Sc. in mathematics with post-graduate work in education. His doctoral thesis in the history of consciousness was published in 2005, Nurturing the Souls of Our Children: Education and the Culture of Democracy. He is currently working on a two-volume series on the teacher archetype and the secondary curriculum. amazon.com/author/mitchellrobert

Elias Schwieler: Dr. Elias Schwieler has a Ph.D. in English literature from Umeå University, Sweden, and holds a position as Associate Professor of Education at the Department of Education at Stockholm University, Sweden. His latest publication is the monograph Heidegger on Literature, Poetry, and Education After the “Turn”: At the Limits of Metaphysics (Routledge, 2017), co-authored with Dr. James M. Magrini.
1. Ivan Illich, C. S. Lewis, J. K. Rowling, and Gratuitous Grace

Ivan Illich was born in 1926, the same year as the priest, physicist, and philosopher Patrick Aidan Heelan, S. J. (1926-2015). I took a course in the philosophy of science with Heelan, who was also the first to introduce me to C. S. Lewis, and, almost in the same breath, to Ivan Illich’s personality (Heelan and Illich were friends) and to Illich’s work. It is perhaps no accident that Heelan (in what he intended as a spiritual context) would also tell me about Harry Potter by comparing me to Harry Potter. I had not yet read the novels, but given the comparison, I promptly read the first book, *Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone* as it is called in the American edition, and after that, of course, I never stopped reading them. Between the books and the films, I came to realize that if Heelan’s comparison was ultimately not particularly accurate, the enduring beauty of Harry Potter, given the workings of the culture industry as Adorno details this, together with Illich’s analysis of school as a schooling-in bourgeois society, is that everyone can be compared to (or take themselves to be) Harry Potter.

Now Ivan Illich was the Slavoj Žižek of the 60s and 70s, as a proponent of distinctly Catholic liberation theology, very radically, very broadly, conceived. And just as it is not a ‘good thing’, generally speaking, to be compared with Slavoj Žižek, it is similarly not a good thing to be part of liberation theology. An advocate of and for health contra what he named ‘medicalization’, a scholar of the word and the book against school, and a thinker about, and therefore a critic of, technology in our modern age, Illich would die, as he lived, among friends, in Bremen in 2002. In the intervals between writing lectures and books, Illich did the things that made him famous as one of our best candidates, apart from Dorothy Day, for sainthood (one does not always admire such exemplars: I met Dorothy Day when I was a kid, and found, as kids will, rather a lot to be desired in her style of austerity). Saints are meant to be ascetics and Illich surely shared that style, to such an extent that both his admirers and his detractors agree that his asceticism ultimately fell short, lamenting his appreciation for good food and wine, as if wine were not part of the heritage of the sacrament itself, and, indeed, of that other god, Dionysus.

2. ‘Umsonstigkeit’ – Gratuitous Grace

I read Ivan Illich’s *Deschooling Society* (1971) together with his reflections on *Medical Nemesis* (1974) but also in connection with a work that appeared some two decades later: *In the Vineyard of the Text* (1993). By and large, Illich criticized institutions as such, not because he disagreed with them in the ideal — no more than did John Cardinal Newman or Illich’s fellow Viennese compatriot, Ludwig Wittgenstein, or the British political theorist and philosopher of education, Michael Oakeshott — but precisely because he disagreed with them in practice.
Reflecting on institutions in one of his last texts, “The Cultivation of Conspiracy,” Illich reminded his listeners of the “kiss of peace” as legitimating intimacy and recognition, which Illich, using a tactic not unrelated to Heidegger’s more esoteric philosophical method, traced through a reflection on the meaning of words — tacking through atmosphere and its layers, the aura — to speak of smell and of suffering what one was forced to smell, the breath and breathing with, literally: con-spiracy, not as something to challenge, much less avoid, but and much rather to “cultivate” for the sake of an elusive “peace,” the peace a priest commemorates to, for, and with his conspirators, his concelebrants, his congregation. For Illich, who always remained a priest, his conspirators were his friends, and he meant this not in a loosening or casual sense but as a kind of informal but patent monasticism: “I have never doubted” he wrote — “and it’s even more true today — that a ‘monastic’ ambience is the prerequisite to the independence needed for a historically based indictment of society” (Illich, “Cultivation” 241). For Illich, “Community in our European tradition is … the consequence of a conspiracy, a deliberate, mutual, somatic, and gratuitous gift to one another” (“Cultivation” 235). In this way, a few years before his death, at a moment of celebration, Illich offered this comparative reflection, recalling a certain corporeal shock to the sensibilities imposed first by the sense of smell and the body and what this means for spirit, as well as the very language of the “kiss of peace,” where we, just in order not to have to pay attention to the kiss, focus on peace, pax; Illich called this focus a distraction, and thus we shake hands during mass today, politely, resisting conspiracy as we do.

Illich writes:

The Latin osculum is neither very old nor frequent. It is one of three words that can be translated by the English “kiss.” In comparison with the affectionate basium and the lascivious suavium, osculum was a latecomer into classical Latin, and was used in only one circumstance as a ritual gesture: In the second century, it became the sign given by a departing soldier to a woman, thereby recognizing her expected child as his offspring. (“Cultivation” 239-240)

Illich’s point would be that congregants had to be close enough to inhale one another’s breath, and the community involved would have to presuppose the same:

Eucharist. Conspiratio, the mouth-to-mouth kiss, became the solemn liturgical gesture by which participants in the cult-action shared their breath or spirit with one another. (“Cultivation” 240)

At stake for Illich was the intractability of the same spirit that blows where it will, that is not up to us, that is precisely not as we will.

From this reflection on spirit, Illich drew a striking set of observations that we ignore in thinking about the philosophy of education and school at our peril: institutions and
centers, even those founded by persons with the charisma, the grace and gifts, of an Ivan Illich, could not, so he argued, be maintained, sustained, or preserved.

Illich argued that it was of the essence of spirit — and its clear paradox — that atmosphere invites the institutionalization that will corrupt it. You never know what will nurture the spirit of philia, while you can be certain what will smother it. Spirit emerges by surprise, and it’s a miracle when it abides; it is stifled by every attempt to secure it; it’s debauched when you try to use it. (“Cultivation” 236)

Thus reflecting on the challenges of institutions as such, Illich’s reflections on education, medicine, and technology explore the art of living in terms of mortality, but also as open to — and this is where it gets hard — as generous to others in their mortality, their vulnerability. Here we note that Illich’s Umsonstigkeit is virtually untranslatable into English or, indeed, into German.

The standard English rendering in David Cayley’s impressions of his conversations with Illich, The Rivers North of the Future, opted for simple “gratuity.” I think it essential to hear the German: Umsonstigkeit, that is: something given for no good reason, no reason at all, for nothing at all, supererogatory beyond exchange and market price, apart from any expectation of any reciprocity, any quid pro quo, any aspiration to gain or advantage, utterly gratuitous. Umsonstigkeit is thus the unexpected, corresponding to no obligation, excess, beyond rule.

This kind of excess is akin to Nietzsche’s affirmation or “yes saying,” and, in this measure, Illich’s Umsonstigkeit has a Goethean aspect, as we may recall that Pierre Hadot celebrated Goethe’s view that “Only the present is our happiness” (Hadot, “Only” 217). Illich’s celebration is golden, or in Goethe’s words, „Herrlich wie am ersten tag“ („Faust“, ed. Beutler 149). But the allusion to gold already warns us to take care: as Nietzsche emphasizes at the beginning of The Gay Science, the challenge for most of us is to see the good of goodness just where there is no advantage, no purpose, no point. Seeing what might, in such a fashion, be what is ‘good’, i.e., that it is good, isn’t a matter of ‘value’ as Illich tries — not altogether successfully — to convey to Cayley, nor is it a matter of rule or calculation and also, ultimately, a matter of reasoning; it is hence inexplicable, irreducible to the good of the ideal of moral law, the categorical imperative.

3. On the Professor as ‘Acteur’ and the Culture Industry: Reflections on Alan Rickman

Popular books and movies are always manufactured in accordance with what Theodor Adorno named the ‘culture industry’; witness the recent flair and fade of Pokemon Go, Doctor Who and Doctor Strange, Wonder Woman too, the X-Men, Star Wars and Star Trek, and not least the Harry Potter formula, and its franchise and offshoots and prequels too, its Disney World-style theme park surely included. In what follows, I read the performance practice of the late Alan Rickman (1946-2016) as Severus Snape as an
indispensable guide, if only because Rickman was an actor who played evil brilliantly, rife with ambiguity, edged with surprise, contra our more automatic prejudices.\(^{11}\) As Rickman plays Snape’s aspect, ressentiment-laden, this aspect includes unrequited and therefore pure and unsullied love: it is just this lack of consummation, this virginity, that matches Snape with Harry’s mother, such that he can say “always,” and it is why we believe him, just as we believe his unwanted attentions to Lilly not as so much mooning harassment but transfigured or redeemed in the undying dedication of romantic love\(^{12}\) — and Rickman rather majored in this sort of romantic ideal. Indeed, if we were to count his roles, Rickman specialized in playing lovers, including a lover who is also a bad guy in Love Actually, or, more frequently, playing lovers of the risqué variety on stage in Les Liaisons Dangereuses or in Noel Coward’s Private Lives, or, a bit more esoterically, if one will count the love of the world, speaking on behalf of God as Megatron in Dogma; or dramatizing a father’s love, from incidental harassment become accidental perversion (An Awfully Big Adventure) to bereavement (Snow Cake), or as the ‘wounded lover’, in the already mentioned case of Snape or, else, classically romantically, in the case of Colonel Brandon in Sense and Sensibility; or, beyond death itself, as the lover who cares enough to return from the beyond for the sake of his bereaved partner in Truly Madly Deeply.

I am concerned to write about Rickman’s ‘acteurly’ characterization of Severus Snape not as lover, that is as having been in love with Harry Potter’s mother (think of the Oedipal fantasies that constellation can evoke, and has, in fact, evoked among a certain Harry Potter fan base) — a love utterly fantastic in every Lacanian sense, unconditionally loyal beyond the grave — but rather, and this is my focus in what follows, as a teacher at his most severe. True to the letter, Severus Snape’s name, like everything in J. K. Rowling’s books, tells us everything. And as the incarnation of the virtues of elocution, Rickman as actor justifies every syllable with every word he speaks, every pause, every eyebrow raised — only Leonard Nimoy’s Mr. Spock was better when it came to the eyebrows.\(^{13}\)

Note that I am mixing cultural references, combining high and low, as we do today without any particular trepidation. More critically it is worth asking what Illich, who has seen his time come and go, decades ago now, has to offer us today — especially with respect to philosophy of education, especially where Illich himself insisted on telling us to ban school, and who, as I have taken some care to illustrate, would further contend that the idea of the institution as such was bootless, as he argued spiritually, evocatively, at the end of his life. What can he say to us?

4. Latin and Letters

It is the letter, the alphabet, the text as such, that matters in Illich’s beautifully titled, beautifully articulated In the Vineyard of the Text.\(^{14}\) And it is Latin that holds the key to the Harry Potter films and books, with their portentous names and elaborate incantations. Illich, talking about Hugh of St. Victor, is talking about Latin inasmuch as this ‘dead’ language dominates our relation to language, that is, to reading, as it does with grammar and syntax to this day.
Though he was a trained historian, Illich’s point is not the tired notion of historical debt; much rather, he raises a hermeneutic question in a complex section entitled “The Latin Monopoly over Letters” (Vineyard 70-73), noting that history is nothing apart from the writing of empire: imperial expression, including imperial conflict and contest. To understand this, we need to reflect as Illich takes us back to the invention of phonetic writing, recalling that “[s]cholars increasingly recognize that truly phonetic writing was a one-time invention, made in Greece around 770 B.C.” (Vineyard 102-103). Illich reflects on this point at some length, here and elsewhere, but his concern is not the Greek as such, important as this is for the distinction between oral and written cultures, specifically as a tool for the recording of sound. Instead, Illich here focuses on the political use of Latin, not qua record of a spoken common language, but as a legacy of rule and the prescribed use of letters. We still follow this rule, as Nietzsche once winced regarding this utter submission, as we continue to submit to the rule of grammar. As Nietzsche teases us on just this rule in Twilight of the Idols, “‘Reason’ in language: oh what a deceitful old woman! I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (“‘Reason’” §5, 48). Illich’s point is a more esoteric one: historically, to use the Roman alphabet was to commit oneself to writing in Latin; for a very long time, the Roman alphabet was not an alphabet that was used for writing other languages. And this dedicated commitment to Latin endured for centuries:

When we think of the alphabet, we see in it a tool for recording speech sounds. For one and a half thousand years this simply was not so. The letters, which without any change in form and number have proven their capacity to encode hundreds of different languages, were for this long time used for one exclusive purpose: writing Latin. But not Latin as it was spoken; rather, as it was alphabetized during the last centuries B. C. During the 650 years when Rome governed the Mediterranean world, not one of the tongues of the conquered and governed peoples was ever recorded in Roman letters. (Vineyard 70-71. Emphasis added)

As Illich continues his observation of Latin letters, he notes:

The monopoly of Latin over the Roman alphabet was so absolute that it has never been viewed as the result of a ‘taboo’, and has never been considered as a surprising historical anomaly. This neglect of an available technology seems as impressive as the neglect of the wheel in pre-Columbian cultures, where only gods and playthings were ever put on a carriage. (Vineyard 71)

Only a speaker like Illich himself, born in Vienna, displaced for historical reasons by war (and crimes against humanity) to Italy, and thus a native speaker of German who at a very young age learned Italian and French, and undertook to learn Croatian at the age of seven (in order, he tells us, to be able to speak with his Dalmatian grandfather), might have made such observations concerning the symbolic forms of the alphabet and of sound:
The monopoly of Latin over the Roman letters, and equally of Greek over the Greek alphabet, was anchored in deep assumptions about the relation of shape and sound. When Cyril and Methodius, around 850, created “galagolic” as the appropriate language into which they could translate the Greek Bible for the Bulgarians, they also devised a new alphabet. They never thought of enlarging the Greek alphabet with a few signs needed to record Slavonic sounds. (Vineyard 71)

Illich makes things more esoteric by alluding to his compatriot, the theoretical linguist Uwe Pörksen, when talking about the efflorescence of interest in Provençal and German song and the role of Latin itself as a hinge between them. We could draw a similar set of distinctions in English (think of Mark Twain’s use of dialect in Huckleberry Finn). The discussion is inevitably subtle, and to follow it one will need to read Illich’s footnote reference to Peabody, after which one can add Parry and Lord and not less, so I have been arguing for some time, Nietzsche’s reflections on the “spirit of music.”

5. Alchemical Coding: Severus Snape on Compounding Asphodel with Wormwood

I have argued for a number of reasons, including its reflection on Nietzsche’s pathos of distance, that Rickman’s interpretation on screen proved indispensable to the character of Snape. And if it is said that Rickman was privy to Rowling’s secret concerning Snape, his background, his double agency, etc. and so on, what does not depend on author privilege is the (still-to-be-asked) question of Rickman’s influence on Rowling: this is the question of whether or not Rickman’s portrayal of that same secret as he articulated it throughout would have any influence on the figuring of that denouement at the time still and yet to be articulated by the author herself, who watched the very same films we watched.

In the context of Illich’s characterization of our own scopic era as “the age of the show” (“Guarding”), I have elsewhere argued that the Harry Potter phenomenon is less about reading than about film and video. Indeed, let us call this the Game of Thrones effect: today’s novelist — consider the Canadian fantasy writer R. Scott Bakker — does not consider himself or herself a success unless HBO comes calling.

But film or not, the connection with the text remains. Everything depends on the linguistic terms: the Latin of the spells, the names of the characters Potter, Dumbledore, Snape, including the almost Lacanian codification of Voldemort: “He-who-must-not-be-named,” as in the sibilance of the snake itself, the name of the house Slytherin, all along with the tones of Alan Rickman.

Alan Rickman, who played villains manifestly for the fun of staging villainy, also liked to insist on little things, from the first film to the last: the same costume, buttons buttoned down all over, points de capiton, as Lacan would say. The reason I speak of Rickman as acteur is here to emphasize the deliberate performance of improvisation. To this extent, adding elements of interest, sameness, precision, repression, Rickman played his
professor just a little differently than J. K. Rowling had initially written him into being (hence my wondering above if Rickman’s performative contribution made a difference in the end). 20

In the *Harry Potter* films, we meet an actor with all the gifts of the stage in a film of costumes and magic, including “foolish” wand waving, including — we have already mentioned the importance of the Latin spells — what Snape himself denounces, no better way to call attention to it, as so many “silly incantations.” 21

Costume and special effects are to be sure an everyday affair at Hogwarts — it is a magical school. But what is not par for the course is Snape’s language, as this surprises the viewer at the same time that it impresses his students; thus he dismisses the likelihood of their interest, a strategy that works to compound interest, especially as Snape simultaneously alludes to the promise of astonishing powers. The class in question, like chemistry (or alchemy), concerns magic potions, as he makes clear:

“There will be no foolish wand waving or silly incantations in this class. As such, I don’t expect many of you to appreciate the subtle science and exact art that is potion making. However, for those select few … who possess … the predisposition … I can teach you how to bewitch the mind and ensnare the senses. I can tell you how to bottle fame, brew glory and even put a stopper in death….”

Nevertheless: the whole point of Hogwarts turns on the use of wands. And what else are witchcraft and wizardry to be about, if not about those same incantations, however denigrated?

The fragmentary collimation here exemplifies what Derrida calls aposiopesis. Given standard movie coding, i.e., given that Snape is wearing black, it is not hard for us, even if everyone else is wearing black as well, to suppose ourselves to know which side he is on. And he doesn’t smile. And if that be insufficient, we can remember the sorting hat scenario at the outset of the film: Maggie Smith’s Professor McGonigal’s separating students into different houses, including Gryffindor, the good guys, and Slytherin, the bad. 22 Rickman’s Snape might surprise us, although we hardly pay this any mind, by failing in this first teacherly scene to focus on Malfoy or the other Slytherins, as might be expected of the director of their house. Nor does Snape, in setting a series of difficult questions on potions and being seemingly keen on answers, pay any attention to the eagerly clever Hermione Grainger, although her hand shoots up immediately in response to his questions, volunteering to answer the questions Snape sets to Harry. 23

The questions Rickman’s Snape puts to Harry are, it should be remembered, not wholly all about putting him on the spot, although that is our first impression. Rather, what is at stake is preparation, in two senses. To this end, Snape poses a question about the subject matter of the class, which is precisely magic potions: “Tell me,” he asks from a distance that highlights the impact of his question, “what would I get if I added powdered root of asphodel to an infusion of wormwood?” Here, in this context, ‘asphodel’ is a highly
poetic allusion, dating back to the very beginnings of poetry with Homer’s reference in the *Odyssey* to the fields of asphodel where the souls of the dead dwell in the underworld, with echoes of Elysium. Asphodel appears in this context in works by Milton, Tennyson, Longfellow, and even Oscar Wilde. More typically, it is pointed out that Snape’s question seems to recall a love poem written by William Carlos Williams, “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower.” At the very least, the simple range of poetic recollection suggests that this was for Rowling an anagram of ‘signatures’, and thus the reference to alchemy befits a course on magic potions and a professor who, as we are told, Rowling modeled on a severe (obviously) professor of chemistry.

But in the film version, things move quickly, and Harry, dismally unequal to every question Snape poses to him, inspires only his teacher’s sarcasm: “Pity. Clearly fame isn’t everything, is it, Mr. Potter?” which strikes us today as not a supportive thing to say, seemingly confirming all our suspicions about Snape’s sadism; and yet even there teacherly bullying doesn’t seem to be the whole of it, as Snape whirls to turn his annoyance against the entire class: “Well, why aren’t you all copying this down?”

I am spending this amount of time on a film series made for children, a film exporting a very English idea of school to other countries, including the US, France and Germany, to underline the force of language, which works because one can hear this in the Latin of the spells, as Rowling drew the magic of her book as a book about nothing so much as school, from nothing other than, or less academically linguistically significant than, Latin as such, and as a signifier.

Note the power of a word to conjure up the sense of important knowledge. This is the adept’s beginning — alchemy once again — in Goethe’s *Faust*, corresponding to both our aspiration to powers beyond our capacities and the limitations of our knowledge of those same limits. We recall Faust’s first incantation and its intimation: “Thou, Spirit of the Earth, art nearer / … / I glow, as drunk with new made wine” (Goethe, *Faust* 20). The very same Spirit invoked, implored — Faust cries “I feel thee draw my heart, absorb, exhaust me: / Thou must! thou must! And though my life it cost me!” (21) — does indeed respond, pointlessly as it turns out, simply to the extent that precisely as mortal beings we cannot hope to comprehend the metaphysical as such (this is one of the reasons theology needs philosophy, for the same reasons of analogy and proportionate knowledge), as the spirit rebukes Faust:

```plaintext
To view me is thine aspiration,
My voice to hear, my countenance to see;
Thy powerful yearning moveth me,
Here am I! — what mean perturbation
Thee, superhuman, shakes? Thy soul’s high calling, where?
Where is the breast, which from itself a world did bear,
And shaped and cherished — which with joy expanded,
To be our peer, with us, the Spirits, banded?
Where art thou Faust, whose voice has pierced to me,
Who towards me pressed with all thine energy?
```
He art thou, who, my presence breathing, seeing,
Trembles through all the depths of being,
A wrinkling worm, a terror-stricken form? (21-22)²⁸

Here, as in the case of the beginning invocation of the spirit of the earth, inspired, as the literary scholar Burdach tells us that Goethe was inspired by Herder’s poem „Das Kind der Sorge“ [“The Child of Care”],²⁹ while Herder himself was inspired by Hyginus — this also matters for Heidegger’s reflections, ethical, I argue,³⁰ on care in his Being and Time — what matters for the conjurer (or sorcerer in the case of Harry Potter) is the sense of the right word perfectly chosen, precisely articulated, in the right way, for the right reason, and above all perhaps at the right time.

As in the case of a religious rite, here we may think of the Greeks of antiquity as Nietzsche reminds us in his own reflections on poetic rhythm, or we may think of Buddhist monks today, or the formula for a prayer, or, perhaps especially in the case of casting a magic spell, the formula word Abracadabra: it is the right gesture, the right placement and poise, as well as the correct enunciation that makes all the difference.

As a phenomenological philologist, Nietzsche argued that the role of rhythm concerned not its capacity to entrain our own souls but its objective force beyond ourselves, to move the cosmos itself. When we get to science we may think we can dispense with rhythm, rhyme, and every element of style or rhetoric. Thus Harry Potter is valuable, as Goethe’s Faust is valuable, if only we can be led to pay attention to the importance of style and the signifiers of distinction, the way and the how of our speech, the role of subtleties.

6. Rhythm and Prayer: Towards a Phenomenological Philology

The focus has been on Ivan Illich, J. K. Rowling as author of children’s literature, and to play and thus to unlock this coding on screen, Alan Rickman as actor. I have also referred to Homer and Milton, and to William Carlos Williams’ “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower,” in addition to Goethe and Herder and Nietzsche. As a classical philologist, Nietzsche was an expert in Diogenes Laertius, and his particular research interest was Greek lyric, specifically quantitizing, quantitativational [quantitierenden] metric. Here we may recall that reflections on the lyric poet, including the lyric subject, were at the heart of Nietzsche’s book on tragedy — not reflections on the person himself, but on the poem as such. I have argued this point in several different variations, but it is an elusive one.³¹

We separate, as Nietzsche tells us that we ought not separate, music and word. To this extent, when scholars tell us what ancient music ‘sounded’ like, as mainstream scholars are wont to do, their claims and discoveries are founded upon what is taken to be expressly, exclusively, musical notation supervenient upon the words themselves, and this assumption is operative even where we have no such notation from historical eras relevant to ancient Greek musical drama.³² The assumption is that ancient Greek music had its own script and that we simply need to find it, or otherwise reconstruct what we today would call the score.³³
As Nietzsche puts it in his lecture on Greek music drama, “One knows that tragedy was originally nothing other than a choral song.” At issue is only the literality of this claim: “True Greek music is purely vocal: the natural link between the language of words is that of sound which had not yet been sundered.” (Nietzsche, “On Music and Word” 107). The problem is the origin of language, expressed as the origin of music and lyric poetry, qua oral poetry, and thereby the original function of writing as a means for recording musical pitch.

In his Basel lecture courses on Greek Lyric, Nietzsche lists several steps beginning with

1. the introduction of orchestric-chorestic music from popular life into the contest … 2. Adding to this pure instrumental music… 3. the system of tonal kinds develops out of Phyrgian music…. 4. Herewith begins the notation of music, the note system of the alphabet…. („Griechische Lyriker,“ Werke 403)

Emphasizing the musicality of the Greek word (contra the modern or emphatic stress-accent), Nietzsche argued that for the ancients the “rhythrical [stress] ictus is unattested, shows no effect, was, rather, completely excluded” („Zur Theorie“ 277). Per contra, Nietzsche differentiates a „ton-Iktus,“ reflecting that this cannot but be elusive for us, given our own modern linguistic sensibilities.

Phenomenological philology here illuminates Nietzsche’s point; it is the method that proves his case: “Why,” as he asks with reference to his own new innovation, “don’t we set the music near the word rather than in the word?” („Griechische Lyriker,“ Frühe 372. Emphasis added.) invoking the cult relevance of lyric poetry (hence the reflection above on Vergegenwärtigung), claiming that “the lyric is the oldest form of poesie” („Griechische Lyriker,“ Werke 379).

Thus when Nietzsche, as noted, cites a “4fold” („Griechische Lyriker,“ Werke 379) rhythmic efficacy in this text as inherent to the use of the rhythmic word, this means that the Greek deployed rhythm as means for influencing, or even “compelling,” their deities — and this fact survives in magical formulae, once again: in the abracadabra, and, in the Harry Potter novels, the linguistic and filmic use of (often enough literarily licensed) Latin.

But as in the case of the beginning invocation of ‘the spirit of the earth’ at the start of Goethe’s Faust, what is at issue for the magician is the sense of the mot juste of which I have been speaking with respect to Nietzsche, as indeed to Illich.

When Illich refers to Peabody’s The Winged Word, he is referring to just this compelling context: the context of prayer and celebration as well as of recollection. The point is not coincidental for Illich, who emphasizes here that

We sometimes forget that words are creatures of the alphabet. The Greek language originally had no word for ‘a word’ singly identified [Illich’s
reference is Erik Havelock — BB]. Greek had only various terms referring to sounds and other signals or expressions: utterances could be articulated by the lips, the tongue, or the mouth, but also by the heart when it spoke to the friend by the *thymos* (which we might call “gall”) which rose in Achilles and drove him into battle, or by the onrush of a wave of blood. (*Vineyard* 39)

Indeed, this is the rhythmic point that Nietzsche sought to bring out in his effort to articulate what he would come to call the “spirit of music,” and that is all about sound. As Illich helps to explain — reading Anne Carson’s *Eros, the Bittersweet* can also help us here, along with Illich’s earlier remark regarding the Greek as a one-off invention for the preservation of sound — in general

the alphabet is an elegant technology for the visualization of sounds. Its two dozen shapes trigger the memory of utterances that have been articulated by the mouth, the tongue, or the lips, and filter out what is said by gesture, mime, or the guts. Unlike other writing systems, it records sounds, not ideas. And in this it is foolproof: readers can be trained to voice things which they have never heard before. (*Vineyard* 39)

The elusive discussion in Illich of Marcel Jousse, and the emphasis on gesture and rhythm in memory, in communication, and in prayer, is all part of this.

In what follows, Illich quotes Aristotle on form and orientation with respect to what for the Greeks became “the metaphysical constitution of the universe”:

Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being: the full and solid being being, the empty non-being. One substance (for them) generates all things ... and does so by three modifications, which are these: shape order and position. They say that the real is differentiated only by “rhythm” and “inter-contact” and “turning”. Of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order and turning is position. A differs in shape from N. AN differs from NA in order. H differs from Ξ in position. (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 34, 985b, cited in Illich, *Vineyard* 40)

At stake is not simply a mnemonic technique; what is involved is the essence of prayer, the reaching of the gods, as per Nietzsche; the word "with wings," as Peabody’s title has it. Thus Illich writes:

When the child is rocked during a cradle song, when the reapers bow to the rhythm of a harvest song, when the rabbi shakes his head while he prays or searches for the right answer, or when the proverb comes to mind only upon tapping for a while — according to Jousse, these are just a few examples of a widespread linkage of utterance and gesture. (*Vineyard* 61)
Illich refers to Jousse with a gloss that has yet to be unpacked, explaining as it does a veritably performative physiology of prayer — the rabbi’s rhythmic bowing, shaking “his head while he prays,” is davening — noting that “Jousse was a French Jesuit stationed in Beirut, who spent his entire life in the study of the embodiment of Semitic sayings” (Vineyard 61, note 40). And the point for Illich has everything to do with the monastic tradition, and this has everything to do with school.

Illich writes of the perfect coordination of meaning and sense, of relief, words, and rites as these can be felt by the child in an order in Hugh of St. Victor’s day, in our day, and for Harry Potter too:

Within a few weeks the child would associate the rustling of cloak at the end of each prayer with the rising of the monks and the gloria Patri. The rhythmic repetition of the gesture of rising and bowing and its coincidence with a small canon of short formulas was easily associated with pious feelings and habits even before the novice was able to spell out the literal meaning of the Latin words. Deo gratias — thanks be to God — is felt as a response of relief at the end of a long Bible reading which takes place in the middle of the night. So also in the refectory at noontime, it is the anxiously awaited sign that mealtime prayers are over and dinner may begin. (Vineyard 68)

For Illich, even before learning begins, there is an incorporation, an embodiment, essential for any approach to Hugh of St. Victor’s Guide to the Arts:

The ceremonial celebration of the book, Latin, chant, and recitation thus form an acoustic phenomenon embedded in a complex architecture of rhythm, spaces, and gestures. All this could not but stick to the bones of the pupils when, after a short sleep before dawn and two more morning assemblies for Mass and the “little” hours, they finally sit cross-legged in front of a drill master for their dictatus, to give shape with their hands — inscribing the words on their wax tablets — to the Latin in whose melodic use they were already steeped. (Vineyard 70)

7. Harry Potter and the Secret Life of Professors

As always, Illich is telling tales out of school, tales out of the life of scholasticism, as this has all but perished in our day. And yet it lives on, as in the example of Rowling’s Harry Potter — in Snape’s clerical garb, expressed perhaps in all of Rickman’s concern to get the sleeves long enough, and Harry’s too (along with the concern of Ron and every other student at Hogwarts), as all of this serves to indicate a point that anyone can make if called upon to give a commencement speech. To this day: all of us dress like monks when it comes to graduation ceremonies at school.
Here, to illustrate Nietzsche’s rhythm, recall the dueling scene in *Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets*, featuring two British actors: the late Alan Rickman in his portrayal of Professor Snape in a scene counterpoised against Kenneth Branagh’s Professor Gilderoy Lockhart. The scene is articulated by way of a very choreographed, very rhythmic fencing standoff on a table that serves as the fencing piste, wands as weapons in place of foil, sabre, and épée. What is at stake is poise, balance, and articulation. Those who try and fail in the spell do so because they do not speak the words, but, as Shakespeare tells us, “mouth them.” The same holds for the wonderfully pompous, and once again note the name and its rhythms, Gilderoy Lockhart, such that after the appropriate bowing, and dueling back to back pacing off, the duel is settled not with wand flourishes but with a single word: Rickman’s *Expelliarmus!* The dramatic efficacy of Snape’s gesture and word renders Lockhart, flat on his back, out cold at the end of the table.

Secondly, and this is again the reference to Jousse as Illich emphasizes it, Nietzsche argues that the function of rhythm is to appease or to “purify” the feelings of the gods themselves (just as, as Nietzsche notes, music calls forth powerful human feelings), and Nietzsche argues that rhythm works, thirdly, as mnemonic aid for the deity (who would appear to have trouble remembering what is petitioned), in analogy with rhythm’s functioning for human beings, where we have already emphasized, via Peabody’s *Winged Word*, the fourth role of rhythm for Nietzsche: as a means to reach the distant heavens. In the same way, Nietzsche reprises these aspects of both rhythm and prayer in *The Gay Science*. To this same extent, it may be argued, all religious ritual, all magic, all prayer, is inevitably “sympathetic” magic. And here too Nietzsche’s analysis of the death of tragedy would correspond to the ascendance of insurgent rationalism, because, as the sensibility for a more “natural causality awakens in place of a more magical causality, in the same measure, rhythm makes its retreat” („Griechische Lyriker,“ *Werke* 380).48

By the time we have attained the advances of our modern era we believe in pure reason, and that also means that we are ill prepared to pay attention to the importance of language, the way and the how of our speech, the role of subtleties. Not because these things have ceased to be efficacious. Sociolinguists with an expertise in physiology have not analyzed the specific voice of an actor like Alan Rickman for nothing. It is claimed that it is due to a speech defect, that is to say, on Rickman’s own account of it that his voice had the qualities it had not because he was born gifted but because he learned to work with and around his certain limitations. Lots of people today mumble or fail to enunciate for reasons that also have to do with the structure of their mouths, teeth, jaws, and in *The Hallelujah Effect* I point to qualities of sound that depend on the room as a sounding board, and to Adorno’s argument that much of what we call the culture industry results from the translation of that resonance to radio sound (and the locative reduction to the loud speaker that subsequently entrains the mind), and what Adorno named “physiognomy.”49 By this phenomenological and carnal or embodied object-phrasing Adorno intended to refer to the literal acoustic, sonic translation in space, but also in time and above all in acoustic transformation, transposing an orchestra, a chamber quartet, a rock band from its original place-space, time-space into a little box (and it makes no difference here if we are referring to binaural earphones, per a single speaker, or a set of
boxes, high- or low-end, in our living rooms: we have yet to catch up to what Adorno meant when talking about the space-time continuum of music and sound).

8. Our Lives Are Measured Out by Teachers

Our teachers are sometimes thanked. More commonly they are forgotten, rather like the Suabian joke about a man, teetering home late at night, as drunk as can be imagined, coming to a narrow bridge to cross a stream, who in good piety stops to say a prayer to get safely across the bridge, only, attaining the half way point, to cry out jubilantly, declaring he could have managed very well on his own, which promptly lands him in the ditch. We tend to think we could have done everything without the particular teachers we happen to have had, even when we think to thank them, for appearances or politeness’s sake. We are as wrong as the Suabian tipped by his pride into the nighttime water, muttering to himself, Surely the Good Lord understands a joke? Our inattention to our teachers is like that. Yet there they are, even if we only catch sight of their value in retrospect, like William Carlos Williams’ singing of love (and disloyalty to his wife — that was the point of his poem “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower,” sung from the bottom of hell).

To my mind, Alan Rickman meant something like this replying to an interviewer’s question by saying, emphasizing that this can only be seen in retrospect, “Our lives are measured out by teachers.” Beyond flesh and blood encounters, some of our teachers are also those we meet in the books we read: fictions like Severus Snape; but also those for whom Machiavelli would take care to dress up when he read, encounters with teachers never known in our lifetimes, teachers still living in the books we read.
Notes

1. This essay grew out of a lecture originally presented in German in honor of Ivan Illich at a conference in Bremen. In its current version it was originally invited for presentation as a plenary lecture for the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, Columbia College, Chicago, Illinois, 4 November 2016. The author is grateful to the editors of the journal and especially for the words of two anonymous reviewers.

2. There is no definitive biography of Ivan Illich and, to date, most accounts of his thinking, including those that undertake to offer an account of his life as well as of his influence, differ in precision (not to mention their conflicting details) according to the orientation and concerns of the author in question. For the sake of hermeneutic reflection, it is best to read between accounts, and a good place to begin is with the different voices of the friends included in Hoinacki and Mitcham.

3. Patrick Heelan wrote on Werner Heisenberg’s philosophy of quantum mechanics, and for a very readable discussion of the debates surrounding quantum mechanics, including those involving Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein, see his posthumously published *The Observable: Heisenberg’s Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics*. And see, too, on the space of vision, including the art of Cezanne and van Gogh, Heelan’s *Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science*.


5. See, for example, Schrag. See too, for a reading that is not always commensurate with Illich’s life, Hartch. See, for a discussion, Babich, “Tools for Subversion: Illich and Žižek on Changing the World,” in Mazzini and Glyn-Williams.


7. On peace, here, Illich writes: “The European idea of peace that is synonymous with the somatic incorporation of equals into a community has no analogue elsewhere. Community in our European tradition is not the outcome of an act of authoritative foundation, nor a gift from nature or its gods, nor the result of management, planning, and design, but the consequence of a conspiracy, a deliberate, mutual, somatic, and gratuitous gift to one another. The prototype of that conspiracy lies in the celebration of the early Christian liturgy in which, no matter their origin, men and women, Greeks and Jews, slaves and citizens, engender a physical reality that transcends them. The shared breath, the *con-spiratio*, is peace, understood as the community that arises from it.” Illich, “Cultivation” 241.
Indeed, and this is connected to his notion of *Umsonstigkeit* or freely given, unearned, gracious, ‘gratuitous’ grace.

Note here that ‘gratuity’ is a poor choice in English as it means tip or emolument, and ‘gratuitousness’ is not much better. See Cayley’s book conveying what Cayley took from his conversations with Illich.

Hadot elsewhere translates this line, „Die Gegenwart allein ist unser Glück,“ as “The present alone is our joy,” and describes it as “the climax of part two of Goethe’s *Faust*.” Hadot, “Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse,” in his *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (69).

There is almost a parallel to Snape, I submit, in any case, though not since Goethe’s *Faust*, in the person of Mephisto (and there in performance, on stage as on screen, it is the actor who makes all the difference: think of Gustaf Gundgrens), and it will also help to recall that evil nearly always has a good conscience; thus Rickman in the UK television series *The Barchester Chronicles*, or as the mastermind Hans Gruber in the Hollywood film *Die Hard*, or as the Sheriff of Nottingham by contrast with the traditionally Jesus-like Robin Hood (not that this would have been Kevin Costner’s Robin Hood).

Arguably this is the key to his villain’s heart in Snape, expressed by a white doe, his ‘Patronus’, in Rowling’s subversive invention.

To be sure, Rickman himself gives the raised-eyebrow award to his fellow Hogwarts actor, Maggie Smith.

With its own bookish reference, it is a commentary, or scholarly guide, to a scholarly guide. Illich’s *In the Vineyard of the Text* illuminates or offers the reader an opportunity to experience what the author writes about. There are details to discovery, or perhaps even, to use Illich’s language, to ‘taste’, on every page; between every sentence, every word; ensconced in the footnotes, beyond what we ordinarily suppose about the things we read as about the art of reading as such. See too Illich and Sanders, and for a focus on Greek as well as Latin letters, see Carson.

As a tool for communication and control from its imperial outset, Latin letters were used to write Latin by those who knew and read Latin. When this began to change — that is, when Latin letters came to be used for the vulgate — the change corresponded to nothing less than an imperial appropriation. But to this day we speak of the Roman alphabet. Heidegger, and it is increasingly uncool to talk about Heidegger, makes this point as bluntly, and Illich is anything but ungenerous as he observes that scholars are increasingly coming to recognize the complexities of what follows from this dominion. Here, Illich’s example is a subtle one that can continue to elude us: thus we think and sometimes we even teach that the church somehow restricted the use of letters to Latin, ignoring a reflection on the relation between letters and language(s).
As Illich explains: “The alphabetic recording of Germanic or Provençal dialects did not immediately lead to the recognition that the alphabetization of speech had brought about the creation of other languages comparable to Latin. One of the best proofs for this comes from Uwe Pörksen. For the first two generations in which there was a heavy demand for Provençal texts in Germany, and vice versa, not one of the great songs was translated directly from one vernacular language into the other. In every instance, a Latin version of the song was made first, and only then a translation from the Latin language into recorded vernacular speech” (Vineyard 72-73). For a discussion of the oral tradition of the Provençal in its significance for Nietzsche as author of The Gay Science, subtitled in Provençal as “la gaya scienza,” see Babich, “Gay Science.”

I am grateful to Tracy B. Strong, who pointed out to me that Twain claimed, in order to testify to a non-British but American English, to use at least 7 dialects, and that others, according to Strong, count as many as 11.

See Babich, “Getting to Hogwarts,” and Babich, “Pedagogy and Other Defenses.”

See also Illich, La perte des sens, for his epochal history of vision, whereby the first optical regime of vision would later be characterized as the ‘agent intellect’ expressed in antiquity’s theoretical account of mind and optics: « Dans le régime antique, le regard rayonne depuis la pupille pour embrasser un objet, se fondre avec lui, au point que l’œil est teinté aux couleurs de l’objet. La fin de ce régime d’un regard qui embrasse tout commence dans l’Égypte des Fatimides, autour de l’an mil » (203). Illich goes on to articulate the second optical regime as that of the church, the monastery, and the university. This is the « régime scolastique [ou] le regard demeure actif », « mais la vision n’intervient plus où se trouve l’objet: l’œil a désormais le pouvoir d’extraire des universaux des formes que les choses émettent par leur rayonnement…. Un troisième régime naît de l’union du regard et de l’objet à l’aube de la Renaissance; de plus en plus l’œil est perçu comme un instrument sur le modèle d’une caméra, d’un appareil photographique, dont diverses techniques permettent d’étendre la portée … un quatrième âge est celui du show, un âge au cours duquel l’œil devient dépendant de l’interface (nos écrans) plutôt que de l’imagination » (197).

Thus, likewise qua performance practice, the impact of Rickman’s Snape as master of potions in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (2001) could scarcely have been more dramatic. Entering from the rear of the class, door slamming, striding to the front with black cape flaring, Snape declaims from the moment he enters the class, silencing pre-class murmurs. It is Snape’s manner, particularly his way of speaking, that impresses children and adult filmgoers alike, including those too young to care about Die Hard (1988), where Rickman played a “real villain” (as opposed to Snape) by contrast with the American-style, torn t-shirt, utterly unbuttoned hero Bruce Willis; or else, to have been seen in the genre of ideal or noble love, again recall the importance of distance, qua initially unacknowledged, as the essence of romantic love for Rickman’s Colonel Brandom, who married Kate Winslett and starred with Emma Thompson in her

21 Viewers familiar with Rickman recognize him despite his disguise (he wore a wig as the Sheriff of Nottingham in *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves*). Yet several commentators point out that even at the start of the ten-year film franchise, the actor was too old, by decades, to play a Snape who should have been in his thirties, old enough to have been Harry’s biological father but described in unappealing terms as extremely thin, greasy of complexion, complete with a barely kempt mane of black hair, head to toe in black, wearing a high topped vest, and with all those buttons that Rickman himself insisted upon.

22 Although a school of witchcraft and wizardry seems firmly located beyond good and evil, the dyadic division reflects our expectations of the good and the bad; and in the first class, the camera cuts to a knowing smile from the little Draco Malfoy, a lad to be groomed for negative things. Malfoy, as if his name didn’t tell us this already, is evil, and Draco is blond, like his father. The dyadic coding in Harry Potter gives us Harry himself, dark haired, like Hermoine. Ron, the red haired kid, is a ringer, simply underwriting the convention locating Malfoy on the side of evil, sure to be among the ‘select few’ ones, possessing the needed ‘predisposition’. The entire film-book series is a study of such race-codes or race elements and is thus invaluable for illuminating race studies and the Victorian, social Darwinist ideology that tells us that blood will out.

23 And not even Harry — who, if we read the book, starts out by assuming that Snape does not like him, only to draw even more dismal conclusions as the series proceeds.

24 See for a discussion, particularly of Milton and also concerning asphodel and snakes, as well as with reference to ancient authors and aphrodisiac effects, the eponymous essay in Graves. See more recently Phillips, who refers to Homer’s *Odyssey*, Book 24, with the tiniest of worries on the part of this reader, given Phillips’ assumption that some parts of Homer’s poem were, for example, by the poet’s hand, as he implies, and some not, begging the Homer question entirely. All is redeemed, however, by the sections “Daffodils and Ashes.” And see also Dweck, who refers to the invocation of “the daffodil as a potent of death” in Herrick’s *Hesperides*, “probably connecting the flower with the asphodel, which the ancient Greeks planted near tombs” (24). And the connection then with asphodel explicates the inclusion of the daffodil in the list of “every flower that sad imbroidrie wears” in Milton’s “Lycidas,” reading “Bid *Amaranthus* all his beauties shed, / And daffadillies fill their cups with tears, / To strew the laureate herse where *Lycid* lies” (ll. 148-151).

25 William Carlos Williams, “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower” (1955), begins as follows: “Of asphodel, that greeny flower, / like a buttercup / upon its branching stem — / save that it’s green and wooden — / I come, my sweet, / to sing to you. / We lived long together / a life filled, / if you will, / with flowers. So that / I was cheered / when I came first to know / that there were flowers also / in hell…” (ll. 1-14).
26 „Du, Geist der Erde, bist mir näher; / ... / Schon glüh ich wie von neuem Wein“ (Faust 158).


29 See Heidegger’s own reflection on Goethe (and Herder) in Being and Time for this reference.


32 Of course I have argued that this was otherwise for Nietzsche, and I read Carl Dahlhaus as in part supporting a similar claim. I have made this argument for some time, but see in addition the last three chapters of my The Hallelujah Effect and „Wort und Musik.“

33 This assumption that ancient music must be presented in a script holds even with respect to more recent work on ancient Greek music; it can be seen in the coffee-table sized sourcebook collection curated by Pöhlman and West.

34 Nietzsche, “Greek Music Drama.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Music and Word” [„Über Musik und Wort“], in Dahlhaus, 106-119, esp. 107. This modern presumption leads us astray when it comes to the ancients. As Nietzsche writes in “On Music and Word,” to speak of anything like a “necessary relation between poem and music ... makes no sense for the two worlds of tone and image are too remote from each other to enter more than an external relationship. The poem is only a symbol and related to the music like the Egyptian hieroglyph of courage to a courageous soldier” (Dahlhaus 112).
This is an older question, going back to Rousseau and earlier still. See, for a related discussion with respect to Nietzsche, Corbier.

Of course this goes back to Herder, to Rousseau, and to others. Nor is this claim dissimilar to points Claude Calame also makes, if Calame himself is not reading Nietzsche, and if his references are more mainstream or comparative, indeed concerned with gender in addition to his intriguing reflections on ethnophilology and ‘anthropoeisis’, as he traces his own reading to Friedrich Max Müller. Calame also follows Nagy. See Calame, « Chanter », esp. 72, and see too Calame, « Le chant choral ». I also recommend, in particular, Miller, as well as several contributions to Budelmann, especially Battezzato.

”1) Aus dem Volksleben tritt die orchestisch-chorische Musik in den Agon ein....  2) Es kommt die reine Instrumentalmusik hinzu....  3) Das System der Tonarten erweitert sich durch phryg. Musik....  4) Von hier an findet eine Notierung der Musik, Notensystem des Alphabets, statt....“

Koller names this a „Betönungsakzent.” See Amy M. Dale’s several studies. There are other traditions as well, including the French, complete with elaborate articulations of positions and figures, especially in Maurice Emmanuel on dance, in addition to the Italian. This is not to say that Koller, any more than Dale, cites Nietzsche’s inspiration. Nor indeed, when it comes to ancient Greek lyric poetry, the late Martin West. But the connection remains, via Lloyd-Jones (206f.) and Maas among others, such as Bornmann.

„Der Rhythm. Ictus ist nicht bezeugt, äußert keine Wirkungen, wird vielmehr geradezu ausgeschlossen.“

Thus Koller differs in his return to the 19th century schema antecedent to Nietzsche, corresponding less to ancient Greek music and word than to the relation between music and poetic word in German (or French or English or Italian), precisely where the word can be, as Nietzsche claimed that for the ancient Greeks it could not be, distinguished from the music. Koller evinces several differences from both Nietzsche and Dale, as he himself centers on the figurative aspect of the various muses as such, fairly romantically. Despite Koller’s (more modernistic) insistence on the notion of a separate musical melody imposed upon the melody that is inherent to the words (Koller 12), he agrees with both Nietzsche and Dale, underlining that the same musical melodies, be they supervenient or not, would have been constrained to follow (and there is no departure from the dicta of antiquity) the melody of the words themselves. For Koller, and still more for today’s readers, one comes to grief with modern sensibilities on the variations between poetic meter. Thus Koller invokes a certain poetic sovereignty (we speak, in English, of poetic license), entailing the frustrations of parsing this musicality via metric or quantity. Koller cites Howald on Humbolt’s Agamemnon as support for this assertion (cf. Koller 13). If Koller is subsequently absorbed with a rather literalizing apotheosis of dancing maidens and nymphs as the muses ‘themselves’ (15 and 17ff, 25ff, etc.), which he invokes as the best way to understand the meaning of mousikê technê, these
metaphorically incarnate muses do not quite correspond to, even as they represent, the breadth of ancient Greek mousiké. See Babich, Mousiké techné as well as the last three chapters in The Hallelujah Effect and, most recently, „Nietzsche’s Lyric. Archilocus, Musik, Metrik.“ For his part, Howald (whom Koller does quote) cites Georgiades who (as I show elsewhere) returns the argument to Nietzsche. The point here, as Howald makes it, is that we perhaps cannot have ears for this via „Akzent,” i.e. what Nietzsche called „Iktus“.

41 „Warum stellen wir die Musik nicht neben das Wort, sondern in das Wort?“

42 „Die Lyrik ist älteste Form der Poesie.“

43 „4fach.“

44 Illich writes that “Preliterate Greek speechmaking and epic singing were based not on visual memory but on the recollection of formulas uttered to the rhythm of a lyre” (Vineyard 38). In his notes he refers to Peabody.

45 Marcel Jousse, a Jesuit priest, was student of Marcel Mauss and an ethnographer in the spirit (today largely channeled by Bruno Latour) of the enterprise of turning the lens of anthropology (and sociology) on not only the other but also the observer: ourselves. See Jousse, Oral Style, and see too Meschonnic. With reference to Nietzsche, including a discussion of Jousse, see Kremer-Marietti.

46 The reference is to Jousse, L’Anthropologie du geste.

47 As Illich continues here, Jousse “first explored the connection between movement and memory (« Le Style oral rythmique et mnémotechnique chez les verbo-moteurs, » Archives de Philosophie, 2 [1924]: 1-240) and then the dissymmetric, bilateral nature of these movements corresponding to voice rhythms (« Le Bilatéralisme humain et l’anthropologie du langage, » Revue anthropologique, Aug.-Sept. 1940, p. 1-30). His influence on the young Milman Parry during the late 1920s led Parry to develop his theory on orality” (Vineyard 61, note 40).

48 „Je mehr Sinn für natürliche Causalität stat magischer Causalität erwacht, um so mehr tritt der Rhythmus zurück.“ Thus Nietzsche traces a poetic declination from “Empedocles,” who, as Nietzsche recounts, “is almost wholly a poet to Plato who is yet half a poet, in interim as prose comes to be rhythmic, Democritus with a metrical resonance whereby Aristotle shows the abstraction from the rhythmic and the growth of pure reason.” (“Empedokles, der noch fast ganz Dichter ist, Plato, der noch halb Dichter is u. bisweilen in Prosa rhythmische wird, Demokrit mit metrischem Anklang, Aristoteles zeigen das Abnehmen des Rhythmischen, Zunahme der reinen Vernunft“ („Griechische Lyriker,“ Werke 380).

49 See for discussion and further references, Babich, “Adorno’s Radio Phenomenology.”
References


Battezzato, Luigi. “Metre and Music,” in Budelmann. 130-146.


Hadot, Pierre. “Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy.” In Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 49-70.

---. “‘Only the Present is our Happiness’: The Value of the Present Instant in Goethe and Ancient Philosophy.” In Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 217-237.


Two Concepts of Educational Freedom

Emily Wenneborg

This article is intended to challenge one common conception of educational freedom, and to propose an alternative conception. Even if we rarely employ the terminology of freedom, the concepts of and concerns about educational freedom are highly relevant to the contemporary educational context; for example, debates regarding formal and informal education often portray informal learning contexts as inherently freer — and therefore better — than formal ones. Even without being explicitly stated, beliefs about freedom inform many policy debates, such as those regarding student-directed online learning, the increasing prevalence of the homeschooling movement, and the increasing dominance of rules and regulations both inside and beyond the classroom. Accordingly, it is important to carefully consider what conception of educational freedom may be most fruitful for those engaged in such discussions.

The view that I want to challenge sees educational freedom as the mere absence of constraints. This approach involves an unhelpful confusion regarding the concept of educational freedom and an inaccurate, binary view of the relationship between freedom and constraint. In contrast to the view that freedom and constraint are opposed to one another, so that one increases exactly as the other decreases, the view that I advocate in this article recognizes that freedom and constraint are in fact inseparably linked to one another. Freedom is not a simplistic absence of constraints, but rather is determined by the scope of action afforded by one’s social setting. My argument in this article is that, while the former approach to educational freedom dominates educational debates today, the latter approach leads to more nuanced and productive discussions in important areas of policy and practice.

In order to clarify the two approaches to educational freedom just mentioned, I first use the contrasting lenses of two educational theorists whose work was most widely read in the 1960s and ‘70s, a historical period deeply invested in promoting individual freedom and challenging traditional authority and institutions, both within education and in society more broadly. My purpose in discussing these two educators is not to evaluate them in themselves; that work has been done repeatedly. Rather, I use them to exemplify two contrasting conceptions of educational freedom. I then explain the concepts of “agency” and “structure,” which I borrow from Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory. With these concepts in mind, I develop my own agency-based conception of freedom. Finally, I demonstrate the usefulness of this alternative view of freedom by applying it to the educational debates mentioned in this introduction.
1. A. S. Neill and Educational Freedom

The first approach to educational freedom is exemplified by the work of A. S. Neill, who put into practice the principle of student freedom more thoroughly than any other educator during his many decades as founder and headmaster of Summerhill, a residential (i.e., boarding) school in Suffolk, England. Summerhill’s most frequently discussed features, and those most relevant to understanding Neill’s view of educational freedom, were self-government and non-compulsory lessons. Self-government was carried out via weekly meetings of the entire Summerhill community to discuss matters of communal concern. At these meetings, anyone could raise an issue for the community to discuss, and anyone could offer his or her view on the issue being discussed. When the time came to vote, each person had one vote, regardless of age or rank: as Neill said, “My [i.e., the headmaster’s] vote carries the same weight as that of a seven-year-old” (16). However, the school did not make all decisions by communal vote — only those concerning matters such as rules, inter-personal conflicts, and punishments. Neill or the staff decided about accepting new students and hiring new teachers, oversaw finances and purchases, and addressed food and safety concerns without consulting the children (18). As for lessons, students had “freedom to go to lessons or stay away, freedom to play for days or weeks or years if necessary” (3). Teachers were not allowed to compel students to attend lessons, nor were other students supposed to compel their fellows to stay away from lessons (though Neill admitted that this sometimes happened). Overall, Neill boasted that Summerhill School had “[s]elf-government for the pupils and staff, freedom to go to lessons or stay away, freedom to play for days or weeks or years if necessary, freedom from any indoctrination whether religious or moral or political, freedom from character moulding” (3).

To illustrate the kind of freedom found at Summerhill, consider Neill’s story of a young student, Winifred, who came to Summerhill at age thirteen. At first, she rejoiced when she found out she was no longer required to go to lessons or study any subject she did not want to. However, a few weeks later she grew bored and asked Neill to teach her something. He asked what she wanted to learn, but she said she didn’t know. Several months later she asked him to help her pass the college entrance exams. He concludes the anecdote with this self-satisfied report: “Every morning she worked with me and other teachers, and she worked well. She confided that the subjects did not interest her much, but the aim did interest her. Winifred found herself by being allowed to be herself” (Neill 126). Even in this brief anecdote, we can see the problem with Neill’s view of freedom as the absence of constraints: it seems just as likely that Winifred found, not herself, but the only conceivable alternative to boredom. Whether Neill’s goal was to help Winifred discover what she truly wanted to learn, or to push back against her over-reliance on adults to tell her what to do and to keep her entertained, his laissez faire approach failed in its intent. I return to the case of Winifred in a later section, and suggest how Neill might have acted differently toward her if he had had a more nuanced conception of educational freedom.

Neill exhibits the first conception of freedom, freedom as the absence of constraints, throughout his account of the Summerhill approach to education. In this view, children
are free when they can do what they want without being constrained by society. In Neill’s own words, “Freedom means doing what you like, so long as you don’t interfere with the freedom of others. The result is self-discipline” (44). Although Neill designed Summerhill in order to remove any and all societal constraints so that children could be truly free, he downplayed at least four key ways in which society necessarily does influence the individual.

First, caregivers limit children’s self-regulation for the sake of safety, not only for themselves and for the children under their care, but also for the safety of others (see Neill 36 and Barrett). Second, even at Summerhill, numerous decisions that affected the daily lives of the children were not resolved by the whole community (in accordance with Neill’s concept of self-government), but by Neill or another member of the staff — for example, the food to be served at meals, the hiring and firing of staff, bedroom arrangements, and textbooks. Neill dismisses these non-democratic decisions: “None of these factors comes into self-government. Nor do the pupils want them to. Self-government to them means dealing with situations that arise in their communal life” (18). Of course, one might wonder whether the children were really indifferent about these matters, or might have cared about them had they been given the chance to be involved in the decision. But the more important point is that Neill downplayed the extent to which such decisions shaped the children’s lives and choices. Third, even without explicit coercion, children are persuaded toward or away from certain actions by observing and interacting with both their peers and the adults in their community. For example, although the adults at Summerhill were not supposed to force children to attend lessons, children themselves could and did keep one another away from lessons (129). Neill bemoaned this occurrence, but in fact it was inevitable. And fourth, it is not only other individuals that exert influence over the individuals with whom they interact; societal structures do so, as well. A prime example of this is the General Meetings that enabled Summerhill to be a self-governing community. (I elaborate on the structural nature of self-government in a later section of this article.)

To summarize, Neill’s conception of freedom failed to recognize that ignorance of available options can significantly hamper students’ ability to choose what they truly want to learn, and that merely telling them to be independent is insufficient for helping them escape over-dependence on adult authority. Consequently, he did not see the need for either exposing students to a variety of areas of learning or guiding them in choosing what and how to learn. Moreover, his account of free education at Summerhill downplays the role of social structures and influences in shaping the choices of even those individuals who are relatively “free” by Neill’s own definition (that is, who are neither required to do things they do not want to do, nor prevented from doing whatever they do want to, except under certain special circumstances). For all these reasons, if our standard is the total absence of constraints, then educational freedom is completely unattainable.
2. Ivan Illich and Educational Freedom

We can begin to see the alternative approach that I propose, viewing educational freedom not as the absence of constraints but as the scope for action, in the work of Ivan Illich, a lapsed Catholic priest who was heavily involved throughout the 1970s in the influential Center for Intercultural Documentation (Centro Intercultural de Documentación) at Cuernavaca, Mexico. Like Neill, Illich also critiqued schooling, calling it “the age-specific, teacher-related process requiring full-time attendance at an obligatory curriculum” (26). Yet Illich’s conception of freedom is subtly but crucially different from Neill’s.

For Illich, the primary characteristic of unfree learners is dependency (2). Specifically, unfree learners are dependent on teachers for their learning (that is, they are unable to learn without being taught), and they are dependent on schools for access to instruction. It is important to note here that Illich does not believe anyone actually is incapable of untaught learning — on the contrary, he frequently emphasizes that most learning does not require direct, planned instruction. In fact, he writes, “learning is the human activity which least needs manipulation by others. Most learning is not the result of instruction. It is rather the result of unhampered participation in a meaningful setting” (39). Schools do not change the fundamental nature of human learning, but they do change learners’ views of human learning. “Most people learn best by being ‘with it’, yet school makes them identify their personal, cognitive growth with elaborate planning and manipulation” (39). Thus, unfree learners could learn on their own — but they don’t realize this. They expect to be unable to learn without teaching, and so they never attempt to do otherwise. Thus, their view of themselves as dependent learners becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

If unfree learners are dependent on institutions and teachers to package and deliver their learning, then free learners are the opposite: independent. This need not mean that they never make use of formal instruction and even institutions that look a lot like traditional schools. But when they do, they do so for their own purposes, not for those determined by others; in other words, they “take[e] control of their own learning” (Illich 8). Free, independent learners are characterized by “action, participation, and self-help” (64) as well as “autonomy [and] motivation” (104). If a free learner wants to learn something, she is able to set her own learning goals (perhaps with the help of a friend or teacher), to seek out the most effective means for herself (which may differ from what is most effective for a different learner), and to actively pursue her goals (again, possibly in conjunction with a role model or peers). She does not have to be constantly reminded to complete her learning tasks, nor must she be externally rewarded for doing so. She is motivated by purposes of her own.

The difference between Illich’s conception of free learners and Neill’s is subtle, but crucial. If freedom is simply the absence of constraints, then any societal constraint — even the gentlest suggestion or influence — means the end of freedom. But if freedom
means independence, then societal structures and even constraints do not destroy freedom. Rather, these structures raise questions such as ‘What do these structures enable students to do?’ and ‘How are students able to act by means of these structures, but not in total dependence on them?’ As these questions indicate, Illich is fully aware that even free learners need access to resources; they cannot pursue their own, self-generated learning goals in a vacuum. Illich identifies four types of resources that are necessary for learning:

Someone who wants to learn knows that he needs both information and critical response to its use from somebody else. Information can be stored in things and in persons.... Criticism can also come from two directions: from peers or from elders, that is, from fellow learners whose immediate interests match mine, or from those who will grant me a share in their superior experience. (78)

So learners need some way to access educational objects, role models and instructors, peers with mutual interests, and elders with wisdom to share. Despite this fairly thorough account of the positive resources needed for self-education, the problem of providing access to such resources remains. It is not sufficient for learners to stumble upon the necessary resources in a haphazard fashion (though even that would be better than being unable to access them at all). Rather, to facilitate learning, we need some sort of structure for connecting learners with these different types of resources for learning; in fact, we may even need institutions for doing so. But Illich believes that obligatory, age-graded, curriculum-oriented schools engender the exact opposite of independent, autonomous learning. Clearly, we need some vision of what a freedom-promoting institution would look like.

Illich provides a pair of terms for distinguishing between institutions that promote freedom and those that restrict or undermine it; freedom-promoting institutions are “convivial,” and freedom-restricting institutions are “manipulative” (53). Convivial institutions “exist to be used rather than to produce something” (55), while manipulative institutions are just the opposite. The “product” created by unfree institutions may be a physical object or a service such as schooling or healthcare (which Illich often calls “treatments”). But whatever they produce, these institutions exist to produce more of it, whether or not anyone actually desires those products. Then, in order to justify their existence, manipulative institutions have to create societal or psychological demand for their products; thus, “much of the elaboration and expense is concerned with convincing consumers that they cannot live without the product or the treatment offered by the institution” (55). Manipulative institutions may even generate rules that “call for unwilling consumption or participation” (55). In contrast, “[t]he rules which govern institutions for use [that is, convivial institutions] have mainly the purpose of avoiding abuses which would frustrate their general accessibility” (55). This regulation “sets limits to their use” (55); it never forces people to use the institution if they do not want to. Overall, the key distinction is that convivial (i.e., freedom-promoting) institutions are used willingly while manipulative (i.e., freedom-restricting) institutions are not.
Illich further distinguishes between institutions that are more like “funnels” and those that are more like “webs” (vii). A funnel corrals all learners into one predetermined learning path, regardless of individual learners’ needs and desires. A web, on the other hand, allows for a multitude of diverse learning moments — diverse both across different learners and within one learner’s lifetime. The goal of a web is “the autonomous assembly of resources under the personal control of each learner” (70); free, web-like institutions “develop … independence and learning” (77). In contrast, the goal of a funnel is to deliver “packages” of learning to its “clients” (i.e., students); thus, manipulative, funnel-like institutions develop “bureaucracy and teaching” (77). Even with these distinctions, however, a web is still a structure, and so it still places constraints on educational actions. But these constraints are qualitatively different from the constraints imposed by a funnel: a web opens up far more possibilities than a funnel does.

As we continue to extend Illich’s theory, we may find it useful to think of the structures of educational possibilities (such as funnels and webs) as lying on a spectrum rather than as being opposed to one another. At one end is the strictest form of funnel, a one-size-supposedly-fits-all “package” of educational “treatment.” A slightly more flexible structure offers a choice among a limited set of “packages,” such as between regular, vocational, or college-preparatory high school programs. Such a structure is less like a web, in Illich’s sense, and more like a set of funnels (i.e., there is only one choice to be made, and that choice is limited to a highly restricted number of options). Illich’s web probably lies even further along the spectrum, offering not few but many possible options and combinations of options. And at the furthest extreme from the single funnel (and pushing the physical metaphor to its limit), we might think of educators as inviting students to make their own way through an open terrain. Yet even this is not the kind of unconstrained “freedom” advocated by Neill; students are still influenced and constrained by the very nature of what they are learning, as well as by the very invitation to pursue exploration itself. Furthermore, the point along this spectrum that represents a truly freedom-promoting structure largely depends on the characteristics of individual students. Finally, we must remember that for Illich freedom-promoting structures are identified not only by whether they are more like funnels or more like webs, but also by whether the decision concerning which of many possible paths to take remains in the hands of the learner herself.

To summarize, Neill and Illich both criticize the traditional approach to schooling as detrimental to students’ freedom. However, their proposed solutions do differ, and those differences are significant for illuminating a crucial problem in contemporary discussions of freedom and constraint in education. Neill holds that the only way to preserve students’ freedom is to remove all societal constraints, letting each individual develop as she chooses. Yet this is neither sociologically feasible nor educationally desirable. Illich, on the other hand, recognizes that structure and constraint are unavoidable; moreover, certain structures are actually necessary for promoting true educational freedom. He offers two related markers of freedom-promoting structures: they keep control in the hands of the user, and they support many possible paths rather than only one. Illich’s conception of educational freedom as “independent use of web-like structures” (78)
redirects our focus toward a consideration of the kinds of structures that make free learning possible.

Yet the key difference between Illich’s view of educational freedom and Neill’s is still not clear. I therefore believe that we can and must go further than Illich did in moving away from thinking of educational freedom as the mere lack of constraints. In the next section, I use the terminology of structuration theory — in particular, the concepts of “agency” and “structure” — to develop a more useful conception of educational freedom in which freedom becomes the positive scope for action, action that is always necessarily dependent on structures and even constraints.

3. Freedom as Agency

Having illustrated two contrasting views of students’ freedom, I now propose a vocabulary that enables us to conceptualize the relationship between educational freedom and structural constraints in a non-dichotomous way. I suggest that, rather than framing the problem in terms of freedom versus constraint, we may more fruitfully conceive of agency within structure. But in order to make the case for this conceptual shift, I must explain what I mean by “agency” and “structure.” The explanation of these terms that I give here draws on the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens. Giddens developed structuration theory as a response to the dualism found in mid-twentieth-century social theory, in which human agency was pitted against rigid, quasi-deterministic social structures. Giddens sought to move beyond this dichotomy and present a unified theory in which agency and structure were each inseparable parts of the other.⁵

Despite the undeniable influence of Giddens’ theory of structuration on the social theory of the late twentieth and early twenty-first theory, structuration theory has had little impact on either the sociology or the philosophy of education. Chris Shilling calls for sociologists of education to give “serious attention” (84) to structuration theory, yet almost two decades later Laura Day Ashley notes that “[c]ompared with other fields ... Giddens’ structuration theory appears to be under-used in educational research” (338). If structuration theory is “under-used” in empirical research on education, it has had practically no impact on theoretical inquiries into education. Accordingly, I propose a new use of structuration theory: I use it not to inform the empirical study of educational situations, but to frame the philosophical conceptualization of educational freedom. Specifically, I suggest that we think of the agency-structure dualism found in structuration theory as analogous to the freedom-constraint dualism I have been discussing so far in this paper. Seen in this light, Giddens’ new conceptualizations of agency, structure, and the relationship between them point towards a more productive way of thinking about educational freedom.

In structuration theory, agency is the capability of individuals to do things, rather than to have things done to them — to act of and for themselves in the world. In Giddens’ words, “Agency refers to doing” (10). Someone who has agency — an agent — is not necessarily unconstrained; rather, she is the efficient cause of her own actions, whatever other influences, including constraints, may have contributed to those actions. The
contrast at the heart of talk about agency is not between constraint and lack of constraint, but between activity and passivity.

Agency is intimately related to power. Giddens expresses the relationship between the two as follows:

To be able to ‘act otherwise’ means being able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs. This presumes that to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. Action depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. (14)

Thus, power is simply the ability to act in the world. If someone has agency, she also has power, and vice versa. This applies even to those who are typically perceived as being “subordinate” or even “oppressed”:

We should not conceive of the structures of domination built into social institutions as in some way grinding out ‘docile bodies’ who behave like the automata suggested by objectivist social science.... [A]ll forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors. (16)

In other words, no human, group of humans, or social structure is able to render another human or group of humans completely powerless. Some structures do limit agency more than others, a point I elaborate on below. We do well to attend to the degree to which various structures, including schools and educational policies, curb the ability of particular humans to exercise their agency. But even the most limiting structure imaginable cannot turn a human being into a powerless non-agent.6

Once we grasp this conception of agency, i.e., not as total autonomy and independence from social influence, but as the ability to act of oneself in the world, we are well positioned to understand structure as well. Giddens defines structure as made up of “[r]ules and resources” (377). This broad definition includes not only the formalized institutions that are Illich’s focus but also cultural norms, patterns of behavior, ways of speaking, and so on. Structure is not an independent force that influences or even determines human behavior; rather, human action itself constantly reproduces or alters structure. At the same time, structure makes human acts what they are. As Giddens insists, “[s]tructure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (25). In other words, in the absence of structure, it would be impossible for humans to exercise agency.

It is relatively easy to see how resources can be enabling: wealth, prestige, political office, and other physical and social resources are resources precisely because they widen the scope of action for those who possess them. Rules, on the other hand, are often
thought of as constraints on the possibility of free action. Yet rules, which Giddens describes as “techniques or generalizable procedures applied to the enactment/reproduction of social practices” (21), show us how to carry out particular acts in the first place; they constitute those acts as meaningful within a given social setting. Thus, rules as well as resources are necessary for enabling humans to act with agency. The rules and resources of a particular social structure do not only set limits on the scope of human action; they also make it possible for that action to occur. Social structures are like train tracks: Trains have to go wherever the tracks go, but the tracks make it possible for trains to go anywhere in the first place. So train tracks enable the movement of the train by constraining it. Likewise, by constraining human action, structures enable agents’ actions.

Thinking in terms of agency and structure, as I have explained them here, leads us to view the matter of educational freedom in a more balanced, nuanced way. We can recognize the ways students have agentive control over their actions, even in the most restrictive educational settings — and the ways even the most restrictive educational settings provide students with rules and resources for action, even while significantly constraining that action. Yet the shift to the concepts of agency and structure that I propose does not preclude critical evaluation of educational rules and regulations; on the contrary, it offers a more coherent criterion for identifying overly constraining educational structures and policies.

All structures, as I have explained them here, both enable and constrain. Nevertheless, we can still evaluate different structures as relatively more agency-enabling or agency-constraining. Accordingly, we can judge different structures with respect to their relationship to human agency. Agency-friendly structures are particularly important for education, because agency must be developed: children learn how to exercise their agency through participation in educational structures that support their growing abilities to control their own learning.

I suggest that we reconceptualize educational freedom, not as the simple absence of constraints (and thus something that one either does or does not have), but as the relative scope for human agency provided by one’s social contexts. We could think of this in terms of the breadth and depth of agency: the range of different things one is able to do, and how meaningful or significant one perceives those things to be. Or, in keeping with the idea, explained above, that structural conditions are necessary for human action, we might look at both the flexibility of rules and access to resources: who decides the rules, who is able to change them, and how easily; who has certain resources, how easily they are obtained, and how easily they change hands. Undergirding such inquiries is the idea that it is not primarily the amount of constraint that matters, but rather its nature; in other words, the difference between freedom-promoting and freedom-restricting structures is qualitative, not quantitative.
4. Illustrations of Freedom-as-Agency

To demonstrate the usefulness of my proposed agency-based conception of freedom, I first revisit Neill’s account of Summerhill. Then briefly discuss the three contemporary educational debates mentioned in the introduction to this article (student-directed online learning, the increasing prevalence of homeschooling, and the increasing dominance of rules and regulations) in order to show how the conception of freedom-as-agency brings greater clarity to these debates and opens up new directions for discussion.

As I have already mentioned, Neill failed to recognize the structures that did exist at Summerhill. To illustrate this, I will look at two contrasting examples of structure and constraint at Summerhill: the issue of self-government and the General Meeting, and Neill’s interaction with Winifred. I argue that the structures of self-government were, in fact, necessary for promoting the genuine freedom experienced at Summerhill; in contrast, in the case of Winifred, it was not structure, but the lack of structure, that truly constrained her educational freedom.

The most obvious example of structure at Summerhill was the school’s policy of self-government, embodied in the weekly General Meeting. We can recognize the General Meeting as a structure — and a freedom-promoting one at that — by analyzing its rules and resources. The resources provided by the General Meeting included a time and place for the entire community to come together, the mechanisms for raising and addressing grievances or other matters of communal concern, and the policy of one vote per person. The rules of the General Meeting were both explicit (e.g., “each person gets exactly one vote, regardless of age or status”) and implicit (e.g., “it is better to persuade others by reasonable arguments than by force or authority”). These rules sanctioned certain types of behavior and not others (e.g., bringing up a bully at the meeting was a more accepted way of dealing with him than exacting personal vengeance); they also constituted the meanings of certain acts (e.g., the act of voting had no meaning if there was no meeting in which to vote, and the act of breaking someone else’s private property had no meaning if there was no government to back up the notion that property could be private and had value [see Neill 31]).

Clearly, self-government and the General Meeting were enabling: they allowed laws to be made, cases to be heard, and punishments for deviant behavior to be decided by the community itself. Less clearly, but just as certainly, this structure was also constraining. If one wanted to bring an issue before the community, one had to do it at the time and place of the General Meeting, not at some other time or place. This very constraint was what enabled all members of the community to come together and participate in decision-making. In addition, as Neill acknowledged, under self-government dissenting minorities are constrained to accept the majority decision (21). It is difficult to see how this constraint is also enabling, but the rule of the majority is inherent in the very nature of democracy. To do away with self-government in the interest of minority rights would be
even more constraining, as the children learned during the few occasions of total anarchy at Summerhill. The discussions and votes that took place at General Meetings lent such legitimacy to the community’s decisions that, in general, minorities usually accepted the will of the majority without protest. In these ways, then, Neill’s practice was better than his theory (as in many other instances as well): although he explicitly considered freedom to be opposed to all forms of societal constraint, he permitted, and even encouraged, self-government because he valued the opportunities for freedom — understood as agency — that it afforded.

The need for certain structures and even constraints in order to promote educational freedom can be seen most clearly in the story of Winifred, who asked Neill to “teach her something.” When she did not know what she wanted to learn, Neill refused to offer any guidance or suggestions at all. So she chose to study for the university entrance exams, not because she found the subjects interesting, but because she considered them better than the boredom she felt when she had nothing to study. As Neill tells it, this is a laudable example of the lack of constraint at Summerhill. Winifred was not required to take certain subjects, as she would have been at another school; in fact, she was not even constrained by the slightest suggestion from Neill of a possible course of action. But I would suggest that she was effectively limited to the choices she perceived to be available to her at Summerhill — boredom or the university entrance subjects. Although Neill’s refusal to guide her in discovering what she wanted to learn might appear to increase her freedom, in reality it constrained her to choose from the subjects of which she already had some awareness. A few thoughtful suggestions from Neill, while in one sense constraining her (by influencing her decision), would have also enabled her to choose from a wider range of possibilities than a thirteen-year-old could be expected to know about on her own.

Of course, it is possible that Neill’s true intent was not for Winifred to find something genuinely interesting to learn. Instead, he may have been trying to wean her from her over-dependence (as he perceived it) on adults for direction and entertainment. If this interpretation of Neill’s motives is correct, then the fact that Winifred made her choice without any input from Neill does indeed look like success. But in fact, Winifred was still almost entirely dependent on adult influences: she chose a highly conventional learning goal (again, most likely because she knew of few other options), and once she made her choice, there is every indication that she pursued it in a highly conventional way. Thus, whether Neill was trying to help her find what she truly wanted to learn or to make her less dependent on adult authority, his unyielding refusal to influence her in any way ultimately undermined his educational goal.

Furthermore, in coming to Neill, Winifred was already displaying her agency in seeking out an education for herself. Neill would not have harmed her agency by offering guidance; on the contrary, by refusing to give her the help she asked for, he further restricted her ability to act. As Winifred saw the situation, she had two educational options: she could either get Neill’s help in finding something interesting to learn, or pursue the only learning possibility she herself knew about (the university entrance subjects), which she admitted “did not interest her much” (Neill 126). Of these options,
she preferred the former; thus, when Neill refused to help her, he closed off the educational choice *she herself had made*. To be sure, Winifred’s agency was already curtailed by her limited knowledge about what and how she could learn — but that is precisely why she needed guidance from Neill. Such guidance would have extended, not restricted, her agency by offering her an even wider range of options from which to choose.⁸

The alternative conception of freedom that I advocate also sheds light on contemporary educational debates, such as discussions of formal and informal learning contexts. Understanding freedom as agency guards us against an overly simplistic association of formality with constraint and structure, and informality with freedom and lack of structure. Quite the contrary, both agency and structure can be found in dynamic interaction within *every* learning context, regardless of where that context falls on the formal-informal spectrum. More specifically, the agency-within-structure conception of educational freedom enables us to recognize *two* claims: first, that informal, implicit structures (such as those found in families) are indeed structures, composed of rules and resources that shape human action; and second, that formal structures (such as those found in classrooms) can still promote learners’ agency, often more effectively than informal structures can. The question is not, ‘*Which learning contexts provide structure, and which ones provide agency?*’ Rather, we should be asking, ‘*How does the interplay of structure and agency manifest itself in various learning contexts, and what structures (both formal and informal) best promote learners’ agency within those diverse contexts?*’ To illustrate these points, I use the agency-within-structure lens to briefly analyze four learning contexts: two relatively informal, and two relatively formal.

First, online learning. In many ways, resources like Kahn Academy and MIT OpenCourseWare are the latest iteration of the same student-directed learning movement that Illich, Neill, and even John Dewey have been part of. The advocates of online learning frequently point out that these resources enable students to exercise educational agency. Online learning resources do give students more control in certain areas than traditional schools do. However, these resources are still quite structured; they present students with a highly organized array of learning materials, often fairly linear in progression, precisely in order to allow students to learn without constant direction from a teacher. Thus, the freedom that these resources offer students is agency-within-structure. At the same time, online learning resources do also constrain students’ access to other important types of learning, such as face-to-face interaction and open-ended feedback. As with all structures, the trade-off in enabling certain actions is constraining others.

Similar types of constraints and possibilities are evident in a second area of debate, homeschooling. A key characteristic of present-day homeschooling is the apparent tension between parents’ rights to educate their children as they choose, free from state interference, and children’s rights to a decent education, whatever their parents’ means and desires. An adequate treatment of how the conception of freedom-as-agency provides greater clarity to this thorny issue will have to wait for future work. For now, I merely wish to point out that being educated at home — rather than at school — is itself a
particular structure. Homeschooling does limit students in certain ways, as opponents point out. For example, homeschooled students may have more limited opportunities to interact with other children from diverse backgrounds. At the same time, homeschooling also allows students to meet community members of all ages and backgrounds. Furthermore, much like student-directed online learning, homeschooling enables students to explore and find out how they learn best, rather than requiring them to follow the school schedule and teaching methods. In this respect, at least, the structure of homeschooling may be much more freedom-enabling than that of traditional schooling.

Both online learning and homeschooling are often seen as less formal learning contexts than classroom-based instruction. But the dynamic of agency-within-structure also manifests itself in traditional classrooms. Consider the portion of the classroom day given to reading instruction and practice. It might seem that the literacy period is necessarily formal, structured, and constraining; how else can teachers ensure that all their students learn to read? But in fact it is possible to deliberately build student choice and agency into the very process of learning to read, even in a traditional classroom setting. For example, the Daily 5, a well-known way of structuring literacy periods in the elementary grades, seeks to give students greater choice and independence (i.e., agency) in how they spend their literacy time, while maintaining high expectations regarding appropriate behavior during that time. In order to achieve these goals, the Daily 5 presents students with highly structured choices regarding what, when, where, and how they complete the required literacy tasks. In particular, students choose the order in which they complete five literacy tasks: Read to Self, Work on Writing, Read to Someone, Listen to Reading, and Word Work (i.e., spelling practice). The creators of the Daily 5 report,

Even though [the literacy tasks] are non-negotiable, students enjoy the freedom to choose the order in which they will participate in each activity.... Choice is one of the key reasons that students love the Daily 5, develop the habits of readers, and greatly improve their reading. (Boushey and Moser 16)

It would be a mistake, both theoretically and pedagogically, to see this methodology as exhibiting structure (and hence lack of choice) in some areas, and freedom (and hence lack of structure) in others. Rather, the structure itself — the clearly specified options for what to do and how to do it — makes it possible for students to make meaningful choices regarding how they spend their literacy time. The absence of the Daily 5 structure would lead to less freedom, not more. By giving students structured agency, the Daily 5 methodology ensures both that they have ample opportunities to develop as readers and writers and that they can exercise their agency in doing so.

Finally, although this article has focused on students, my proposed conception of freedom-as-agency also applies to teachers. One of the biggest educational policy debates today has to do with regulation. The rhetoric of this debate often displays the dichotomy between freedom and constraint, particularly in arguments made by opponents of regulation. But shifting perspective to focus on agency-within-structure opens up new
possibilities for debating both the costs and the benefits of regulation. We can still
critique certain regulations as overly constraining by pointing to the ways they limit
teachers’ agency in making pedagogical choices that are appropriate for their own
students. At the same time, we can also recognize what regulations enable teachers to do.
For example, increased standardization allows teachers to coordinate their instruction
with teachers in other grades and even other districts.

One final note in passing: the conception of freedom-as-agency that I advocate here has
no inherent predisposition toward either libertarian or interventionist policies and
practices. In each of the debates outlined above, and in countless others, the exact same
educational structure might be freedom-promoting in one situation or for one student or
group of students, and freedom-restricting for another. As just one example, consider
Lisa Delpit’s critique of “child-centered, whole language, and process approaches” to
teaching writing that fail to give children from non-White, non-middle class backgrounds
the tools needed to succeed in a society that will inevitably judge them on the basis of
their “product” and their mastery of the codes of power (Delpit 31). In such a context,
more explicit instruction is in fact more empowering — though, as Delpit makes sure to
point out, it must not undermine respect for the students’ own knowledge and agency, nor
divorce their writing practice from “real audiences and real purposes” (33). By directing
our focus to what educational structures enable particular students to do, the conception
of freedom-as-agency highlights the merits of Delpit’s critique and of her proposed
solutions.

5. Conclusion

In this article I have contrasted two approaches to educational freedom. One views
freedom as the mere absence of constraints, such that any increase in constraints
necessarily entails a decrease in freedom (and vice versa); I argue that this view of
freedom, while widespread in educational debates today, is overly simplistic. The second
approach views freedom as the scope for personal action, which is always supported by
social structures and even constraints. I suggest that attention to agency and the
structures that promote it brings greater clarity to contemporary discussions of
educational freedom, such as student-directed online learning, homeschooling, and
increasing regulation.

In each of these examples, I have tried to shift our thinking from freedom versus
constraint to agency within structure. Once we make this conceptual shift, an entirely
new type of question opens up: since all structures enable certain actions and constrain
others, which actions should be enabled by educational structures? In other words, what
kinds of actions do we want to make sure we enable, even if we do so at the expense of
others? It is my contention that conceiving of freedom as agency helps to direct our
attention toward precisely these all-important questions.
Notes

1 I would like to thank those who read and commented on earlier versions of this paper, including Nicholas Burbules, Anne Haas Dyson, Helga Varden, Chris Higgins, and Elizabeth Hoiem. I would also like to thank the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign’s Philosophy of Education Discussion Group and the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, as well as the reviewers and editors of the Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education, for their valuable feedback.

2 I use the past tense in this discussion because my focus is on Neill’s own description of how Summerhill worked; however, it is worth noting that Summerhill is still in operation today.

3 Illich does not develop an institutional theory in Deschooling Society, and so I do not attempt to offer one here. Later in this article I introduce the concept of ‘structure’, which I take to be broader than ‘institution’ (i.e., an institution is a particularly formalized manifestation of structure).

4 Note that Illich is not opposed to teaching as such; rather, he protests the dependence of the learner on institutionally determined learning goals and teacher-packaged instruction.

5 For an excellent overview of the roots of structuration theory in earlier debates concerning structure and agency, see Shilling.

6 Giddens’ account of power clearly reflects the influence of Foucault in arguing that power is not “an inherently noxious phenomenon,” a unidirectional relation of dominance that social structures could potentially transcend, but rather a multidirectional dynamic enacted by agents in all structures (31-32).

7 To be sure, there are many other good criteria besides this one for evaluating educational institutions and regulations. My focus here is on the criterion of students’ agency.

8 The analysis in this paragraph applies equally to all ‘dependent learners’ as described by Illich, insofar as they deliberately choose — on the basis of their limited awareness of or access to opportunities for self-teaching — to learn through official schools and teachers.
References


Teaching as Entertainment: An Examination of Effects

Ross M. Miller

Steven J. Bourgeois

In 1969, wrapped in good intentions, *Sesame Street* debuted on public television. It was revolutionary and served as preschool for many American children who, at the time, could not attend a real school for financial reasons. Operating as the televisual manifestation of President Lyndon Johnson’s Head Start program, *Sesame Street* was designed to confront some of the challenges being addressed by the president’s War on Poverty. Today, not only is *Sesame Street* still going strong, but it has morphed into various international incarnations, from Mexico and Sweden to Saudi Arabia and Germany. It is a cultural phenomenon and beloved by its millions of viewers. It is also deeply valued by educators, and its influence is felt throughout all levels of public schooling.

We want to be clear about the nature of our objections to the program. In a television landscape full of “reality” programming, 24-hour everything, and specials that dig into the worst excesses of human nature, it can be said that *Sesame Street* is one of the more worthwhile television endeavors. However, as social commentator and philosopher Neil Postman said in “Five Things We Need to Know About Technological Change,” every advancement or technological development has an idea that lies at its center. This idea may be counter-productive or beneficial, but it is seldom ambivalent. What is the idea behind *Sesame Street*, and what subtle impact has this program had on the education landscape? Our contention is that *Sesame Street* has led to an increasing perception of education through the prism of entertainment, and that profound effects ensue from this perception.

In the annals of education, among the works of the great educators and the thinkers who have written about education, one generally discovers that in writings about what it means to be educated, to acquire knowledge, *entertainment* or *fun* is not mentioned. This is not a critique of the use of humor in education; humor can enhance student memorization. However, when we speak of such concepts as *entertainment* or *fun*, we are talking about the idea of *entertainment* for its own sake, without an academic tie-in. We are speaking of tools that are utilized in place of (either purposefully or de facto) more meaningful and impactful, more authentic methods. What should be taught and emphasized is anything that draws out the natural interest inherent in a subject to appeal to the natural curiosity inherent in the student. We see this phenomenon of conflating education with entertainment as a form of false engagement for two reasons: one, entertainment as teaching is counter-intuitive to the educational process in general; two,
entertainment as teaching infers that teaching and the acquisition of knowledge are, in and of themselves, not enough. The prevailing thought behind this assumption is that school and learning are boring, dry, and in desperate need of revitalization.

As a result of the technological and televisual changes brought about by *Sesame Street* and other factors, over the last several decades, a tide of entertainment-centered technological innovation has swept through the education system within the United States, and in doing so, it has revolutionized the profession. In its wake have been left questionable practices, a diluting of knowledge, and a perversion of purpose. With each frantic attempt to attract student attention, the student becomes further disconnected from and disenchanted with the knowledge being presented. With every effort to cater to how students operate outside of school via entertainment and technology, the worth of the knowledge presented inside of schools is further cheapened.

In this paper, we seek to identify the problems adherent in common educational practice and the ideas that serve as their basis. Though applicable throughout the curriculum, our narrative focuses on ideas and experiences that relate to our own classroom experiences in the liberal arts, specifically within the area of historical studies at the secondary level. While taking a critical approach in this commentary, we recognize that teaching is an art form, requiring a nuanced approach. This view in fact informs part of our critique of the conflation of education and entertainment.

1. Teaching as Entertainment

The infiltration of entertainment into education is pervasive, and teachers would be hard pressed to spend a day — even an hour — without encountering it. So where does the impact of *Sesame Street* fit in? Education and knowledge acquisition are given a very light treatment in elementary school. Within the realm of historical education we ourselves can recall at the core of elementary school experiences memories of the Thanksgiving play or of the history teacher who dressed up as George Washington. We could almost concede to this method in elementary schools, which conflates history with play-acting, were it not for the fact that the *games* and other *fun* activities carry on into the higher grades.

In the late elementary and middle school years, high-stakes testing requirements become intensified; the child must confront aspects of learning that, at least on the surface, are not fun. In fact, the confrontation between entertainment and achievement represents the central controversy for teachers during the middle years. Over the course of these years, students develop and change in many ways, filling various roles within the school and taking various approaches to their studies. However, there are two major directions students might go: one, they might swallow the testing paradigm, and constantly fret about their grades; or two, they might progressively lose interest in school and education altogether. Between these two bookends, we perceive a continuum; however, we would like to address these two major categories separately.
The former type of student comes across as frenetic and anxious. Not all of the “best” students are like this, but enough are to generalize about them. In middle school, these students become the overachievers, told by parents and teachers alike that their entire livelihood hinges on each and every day, each and every quiz and test. The worst part about it is that some of these kids — our “best” students — hate school. They are punching a clock and ticking boxes towards graduation, passage through a good university, and a job where they will earn six figures. These students are the product of one of the most cynical and destructive trends in our society: the monetization of education. Education is no longer about opening doors, but about feeding a specialization. There is no authentic engagement; the focus of the student is to meet the minimum requirements for graduation and (usually) to begin college. This is the pursuit of knowledge in its most base form.

The latter group also consists of victims of a lack of authentic engagement, but in a different way. One might think that the infusion of entertainment would enhance this group’s engagement. However, evidence from our own classrooms seems to indicate that entertainment-oriented lessons and approaches have an inverse relationship with academic interest and cognitive development. While the day-to-day endeavor of teaching this group of students centers on ensuring success on standardized tests, exposure to new ideas is rare because new ideas and concepts do not appear on tests.

The matriculation into high school only exacerbates the problems encountered by both groups of students. To be sure, students change, and the cauldron that is the middle school years has an impact on how the student approaches studies. However, the high school years represent the ossification of attitudes towards education that first materialize at the end of the elementary and middle school periods.

Therefore, it is in the last half of public schooling that entertainment as an educational tool becomes most impactful. Instead of intensifying as the students grow presumably more capable of increased demands, the learning experience becomes shallower. What does entertainment look like at the high school level? We have seen at least one teacher within each of the many schools where we have taught who conducts class as if it consisted of screenings of Masterpiece Theater. To be fair, there are many schools seeking to do away with movie watching in class — or at least watching the entire movie — but this prohibition has more to do with the length of the films rather than with the medium itself.

Proponents of increased technology in schools suggest that, in part, we are using resources to which the students most gravitate. It is often said that students today are visual learners, and such tools as films — as a part of our educators’ toolbox — are key to getting the students ‘into’ the material. The problem is that such strategies, devices, or tools are created within an entertainment paradigm, not an educational one. Perhaps a video snippet could give the students a taste of a topic, but certainly it cannot serve as a substitute for reading, studying, and seeking to understand. We support John Dewey’s warning that it is not a teacher’s task “to make things interesting” (23). Instead, the teacher should begin with the student’s intrinsic interest, and “carry forward,” bringing
that interest into new domains (34). What would ‘making something interesting’ look like anyway? Some history teachers tend to expound upon student questioning to connect student ideas to events that occur at a later date or that occurred at an earlier time, or else to link student ideas to current events. Even if the questioning does not connect with the timeline being discussed, a thoughtful teacher can still address a query while maintaining the lesson for the day.

Students in Advanced Placement history classes are perhaps very smart and capable, but many of these students are unwilling to break out of their surface-oriented approach to the class. For these students, various “funny” online U.S. history videos teach the basics. However, this approach, in lieu of their reading the text, only helps them address some multiple choice questions. When students are asked to demonstrate their knowledge by way of an essay, many struggle mightily to accomplish the task. The average AP student in history has only taken in the course content at an informational level. As a result, the student cannot demonstrate substantial evidence of his or her knowledge of the subject through providing context, nuance, and interpretation, as often occurs in writing an essay.

And then, there is the History Channel. The issue with the History Channel is not unlike the issue pertaining to Sesame Street. Where the latter created a gross misinterpretation of how to approach education in general, the History Channel has done the same specifically for the subject of history. Like Sesame Street, it is not the fault of the creators of the History Channel how it is used and valued. Still, the viewer is expected to sit there and absorb, and nothing more is required. Then, the child is expected to treat history as the science it is.

Failing grades in history come as a bit of a shock — both to the student and to the parent. History is always a given. Nothing is pressed within this subject, which is considered fun and easy — so much so that the advanced students stop studying. Students in regular classes expect the same middle-school approach to continue in high school. However, when faced with even a scintilla of the discipline of history, some students struggle and fail. Parents email, saying, “I don’t know why little Johnny is failing. He always loved history — never made anything less than an ‘A’. He watches the History Channel all the time.”

While the above comments might seem irreverent in tone, we feel that entertainment in education has serious implications. Beyond history, entertainment has crept into every subject found in your local high school. In short, there is nothing wrong with the History Channel, or Bill Nye the Science Guy, or any of the myriad programming examples out there, except for their impact on scholarship and on the student’s ability to accept or understand the purpose of scholarship. The drive to find the easiest path has corrupted the learning process to the point that it will be difficult to reverse the trend.

Many teachers use such tools; but again, the assumption (or the fervent, cock-eyed, optimistic hope) is that the students are also reading. The students are not completely at fault, either, having been taught that the course grade, in the end, is the only thing that matters. Standardized tests have shown that knowledge is not what is important, but
rather that a narrow strip of skill sets and snippets of information suffices. Students are not ‘in the moment’ because they are not required to be — they are not authentically engaged because it is not necessary to be engaged in order to score the right grade or get into the right school.

Some of the questions that teachers often confront include, ‘Will this be on the test?’ ‘How will it be graded?’ ‘What impact will this have on my overall grade or grade point average?’ Not unlike a well-trained lawyer, the students are taking in the information as possible test fodder while the teacher is striving to underscore the authentic, interesting worth of the material. In a concept related to authentic engagement, the Buddha emphasized the importance of right mindfulness. Respected Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh writes in his book The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching that mindfulness is about being in the moment. In moments of what Buddhists call mere recognition, “When we sit, we know we are sitting. When we stand, walk or lie down, we know we are standing, walking or lying down” (Hanh 69). In writing about his first travels through Yosemite Valley, famed naturalist John Muir noted his focus on every rock, every flower and every tree. He declared that while in a city, “I am a captive, I am bound” (qtd. in Badè 110). Yet walking through one of the natural wonders of North America, his mindfulness of the moment set him free. He was no longer restrained and blinded by the din of city life but set free by being able to fully focus on the here and now. While Hanh and Muir articulate a deep involvement in the moment, our students appear to be jumping ahead — always already leveraging the extrinsic value of their academic endeavor without considering its intrinsic worth.

2. The Opposite End of the Spectrum: The Hard School

In the 1973 film The Paper Chase, based upon the 1971 book by John Jay Osborn, Jr., first-year Harvard law student James Hart encounters the legendary Professor Kingsfield, a formidable educator and practitioner of the Socratic Method. He is the embodiment of what can be termed the hard school. The film opens with Dr. Kingsfield randomly calling on Hart to state the facts of the assigned case — a case that Hart has not yet read, since he was expecting a mere overview of the course. Rejecting Hart’s initial excuses, Dr. Kingsfield follows up relentlessly as the first-year law student flounders in front of his peers. Showing no pity, Professor Kingsfield presses Hart with questions that go beyond the details of the case, asking him to respond to a hypothetical example to draw out a fundamental point of law.

After this painful public emasculation during his first class in law school, and after Hart races to the bathroom to lose his lunch, the plot of the film takes an interesting turn. While the fellow students gossip about how Kingsfield took down another first-year law student, Hart gathers himself and systematically rebuilds his confidence. He later joins a study group, preparing relentlessly, extending lessons to include independent research, with special attention to archival writings by Kingsfield himself. Joining the “upper echelon” of students in Kingsfield’s contract law class, Hart volunteers to answer questions, engaging publicly with the famed professor, while others cower in the back of the lecture hall.
Worth noting is the closing scene of the film, where Hart receives his final grade for Kingsfield’s contract law course. The viewer sees the professor placing a 93 on Hart’s final examination, indicating a resounding success and his most meaningful academic accomplishment. However, in a twist of dramatic irony, the viewer sees Hart on the beach receiving his report card from a friend. Instead of opening the sealed envelope, Hart turns it into a paper airplane and throws it out over the ocean, never viewing its contents. While this perplexing response may cause discomfort in the audience of today, the director’s intention was most likely to show that Hart had no interest in the numerical grade at all. For him, learning the fundamentals of contract law, overcoming his fear of public failure, and to some extent overcoming his fear of Dr. Kingsfield, transcended the value of any report card. For Hart, whose last name stems from the German word for “hard,” the actual grade was irrelevant.

This example of the hard school approach may seem a little out of place in today’s educational culture. In the present-day high school classroom, a student who is not prepared for a class discussion can typically downplay the oversight, make an excuse, or just admit to a lack of preparation. In most cases, the teacher will take pity, move on, and call on the usual suspects — students who do prepare — and this will provide the teacher with an easy transition, avoiding prolongation of an uncomfortable moment. However, based upon our time in the classroom, we wonder if avoiding public embarrassment actually benefits a student in the long run. We wonder if there is a time in a student’s life when students require a hard school, a line in the sand that requires force of will to overcome a genuine challenge.

Cultivation of will would appear to be antithetical to current educational practice, particularly in the K-12 setting. While recognizing the irony of exemplifying educational rigor through a film designed primarily as entertainment, in the above discussion we draw out an educational contrast in terms of both style and substance. While we seek to highlight differences between education as entertainment and what we term the hard school, we recognize a continuum of approaches that resists categories. The best educators can move seamlessly along this continuum, providing students with humor, entertainment, structure, and challenge as appropriate. In keeping with the image of cultivation, one can think back to the German term Bildung, which resists translation. While representing education in general, Bildung has also been associated with the terms image [das Bild], development, transformation, and growth. Although Goethe’s elaboration of Bildung in the context of cultivation of plant life is often cited, a rarer, though no less appropriate, source, also from the Enlightenment, is Immanuel Kant’s On Education [Über Pädagogik], where Kant writes, using the auricula, a type of alpine primrose, as analogue:

\[
\text{when raised from a root this plant bears flowers of one colour only; when raised from seed, the flowers are of the most varied colours. Nature has placed these manifold germs in the plant, and their development is only a question of proper sowing and planting. Thus it is with man. (9)}
\]
While Kant’s analogy characterizes education as “only a question of proper sowing and planting,” he also implicitly recognizes a proper time for strict discipline — namely, while children are young and require “nurturing,” well before they are ready for scholarly pursuits.

Also implicit in Kant’s analogy is the need for different approaches to education at different periods of a child’s life. Particularly during the formative years, Kant indicates, nurturing may often, though not always, require discipline [Zucht] and will [Wille]. Nietzsche writes extensively on the cultivation of will, often within the context of education. Some of his posthumous writings detail his approach to schooling, including his observation that “The most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard discipline at the proper time, i.e., at that age at which it still makes one proud to see that much is demanded of one” (482).

While Nietzsche did not explicitly state when within a child’s educational journey the proper time would be to experience the hard school, we expect he had in mind a progression in which expectations and challenge increase as the child matures. Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as the ability to obey internal commands is enigmatic to the extent that it supports inner causation — a process that can be refined and hardened through suffering. In concrete terms, the individual “commands” to the extent that he or she forms internal goals, while paradoxically also serving as the being who “obeys” those internal commands. Nietzsche clarified this point:

this is what distinguishes the hard school as a good school from all others: that much is demanded; and sternly demanded; that the good, even the exceptional, is demanded as the norm; that praise is rare, that indulgence is nonexistent; that blame is apportioned sharply, objectively, without regard for talent or antecedents. (482)

Tying the theoretical in with the practical is exemplified by Leiden University in the Netherlands. One of the more famous sites within the school is het Zweetkamertje, or the “Sweat Room.” The room was used as a waiting area before students proclaimed and defended their knowledge in front of a panel of professors. Approaching the room, two charcoal drawings can be seen on either side of a single wooden door. On one side is a depiction of a nervous student, worried about his future and sweating over the possibility of failing his exam. On the other side of the door is a depiction of an exuberant graduate skipping out of the room. Above the door is Dante’s warning from his Divine Comedy, “Lasciate ogni speranza; voi ch’entrate [Abandon hope all ye who enter here].”

Inside, where only a single desk sits at the center of the room, are walls covered by signatures of graduates who managed to pass their examinations and then signed their names to mark their time spent in this otherwise small, unremarkable room. Among the more noted luminaries whose signatures adorn the walls are those of Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, Dutch resistance fighter Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Sir Winston Churchill, and Nelson Mandela. While a recent restoration has highlighted the more famous signatures, the room and the experience associated with it were great equalizers. It was
not *whose name* was on the wall, but rather *what had been endured* and accomplished to justify the signature, that mattered.

The bareness of the room focuses the attention, in a way reminiscent of the Spartan room within Wartburg Castle where Luther translated the New Testament into German. There is nothing for the waiting student to think about or be distracted by. To stand in the middle of this room, to see the thousands upon thousands of signatures of graduates, the famous and not so famous, but who each sought to make a mark after such a shared tribulation, is indeed an awe-inspiring experience. However, the imagery conjured up by the room’s name, considering the standards of today’s public high school experience, presents a terrifying notion — in two key ways. One, we do not levy such assessments; and two, even if we did, we do not demand from students the ability to explain their knowledge, i.e., to contextualize it, to interpret it, to pursue it in depth. Ironically, the name *Leiden* is a derivative of the Dutch and German verb “to suffer.” But the suffering experienced in Leiden University’s Sweat Room is not the type of suffering that leaves us, at the end of the day, covered in boils and considering our own mortality. Rather, suffering in this context provides the means to achieve a purposeful life, and stands at the opposite end of the easy and the trivial.

Students often look back on their high school career and harken back to that single teacher who made strict demands, who pushed them beyond their preconceived limits. The teacher’s lack of pity could be described as generosity to the extent that he or she is investing in the student’s ability to overcome and persist, often through strict adherence to rigorous academic standards. This is an issue that extends beyond our classrooms or any one discipline or grade. What we are discussing is a system-wide re-examination of how we educate our students. We are proposing a system that, from the beginning, does not apologize for content learned, but highlights the importance and the inherent interest of every subject and endeavor. Methodology will vary depending upon the age of the student, but the progression will ensure an increase of *intellectual stamina*. Throughout the public education experience, there must be an increasing demand placed on the student — not the fabricated demands of test scores and AP exams, but rather a demand that focuses on skills that supersede the capricious nature of current industrial and *real world* requirements. The student must be capable of a greater amount of sustained and productive study and learning.

3. Practical Implications: Operationalizing the Hard School

What we suggest is not easy for either the student or the teacher. We may attempt to run our class in the way it should be run, but we are working in isolation. From the onset, students must see school and the classroom as a gateway to understanding the world. A natural curiosity exists within each person, as is evidenced by a two-year-old’s obsession with grass in all of its manifestations. We are born inquisitive people, and education must be a vehicle through which this curiosity is magnified and nurtured, not suppressed and destroyed.
In the book *The Once and Future King* by T.H. White, the magician Merlyn gives advice to a young Arthur about the importance of learning:

“The best thing for being sad,” replied Merlyn, beginning to puff and blow, “is to learn something. That is the only thing that never fails. You may grow old and trembling in your anatomies, you may lie awake at night listening to the disorder of your veins, you may miss your only love, you may see the world about you devastated by evil lunatics, or know your honour trampled in the sewers of baser minds. There is only one thing for it then — to learn. Learn why the world wags and what wags it. That is the only thing which the mind can never exhaust, never alienate, never be tortured by, never fear or distrust, and never dream of regretting. Learning is the thing for you.” (185-186)

Historically, places of worship have been sanctuaries, in an ecclesiastical sense as well as a practical one. Our classrooms should also be sanctuaries, indeed the sanctum sanctorum. Currently, cell phones, tablets, laptops, online surveys, online responses shown on a screen, online quizzes and tests, online textbooks and the like create a din that hampers attention and focus on the part of the students. In their 2009 commentary on experimental studies of deep reading, Maryanne Wolf and Mirit Barzillai found that, while online reading can offer a litany of information that greatly enhances reading, often it serves as a distraction and creates a skimming that prevents authentic, internalized comprehension. To use Heideggerian language, the classroom should be a place of refuge or a clearing where students can escape the hectic and superficial world outside the walls of the school to focus on the essence of that world with which few are in contact. Throughout history, voices in the wilderness have called upon us to focus on the nature of learning. In 19th-century America, transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau suggested that society in general, and technology in particular, was corrupting. On this topic, Thoreau stated with regard to “modern improvements,”

there is an illusion about them; there is not always a positive advance.... Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention from serious things. They are but improved means to an unimproved end, an end which it was already but too easy to arrive at.... (67)

While we are not ascetics, we believe there is value in putting aside the distractions and the noise in order to focus attention and attempt to understand the world.

At the center of the learning experience are three vital and integrated components: reading, discussion, and questioning. All societies built on learning hold the acquisition of knowledge, and discussion about and questioning of what is known and what is not known, as key tenets. Any reform of the modern American education system must include these three ideas as fundamental building blocks of the classroom. The 20th-century Austrian philosopher Otto Neurath narrowed this even further, saying that the essential building blocks of education are discussion and argument, to allow the student to differentiate in the process of argumentation the fundamentals and the ancillaries (Cat).
The form this focus will take will look different depending on the discipline, but these traits are at the core.

Still, this is not the easiest path. In many ways, people are wired to seek the easiest, simplest path — the shortest distance between point A and point B. It is our nature. But as with many other things that come to individuals naturally, education can allow us to take a path that is more rewarding and stimulating. In education, as American theologian and philosopher Abraham Heschel originally posited with regards to religion, what is rational and what is appropriate must bend the will — which always seeks the easier road. Educators must ask, as Herschel does, “what is the power that will make me love to do what I ought to do” (260)? Educators must lead their students to this question, as they also have the responsibility to try to answer it themselves and to stand against what is simple and (sometimes consequently) degrading. Historically, and contrary to any earlier assertion, we as a people are also capable of excelling when we toil in the shadows, and not in the light. The history of the United States is replete with examples of how Americans have risen to new heights through adversity: the war of independence against the British, the Civil War, the Great Depression, and World War II, as well as the fight for equality through various civil rights movements, to name a few examples. This is not only an American trait, but a human one, and one that should be applied within the classroom as well.

As teachers, we embrace the necessity of engaging the student, but the method typically employed is not authentic. Many students today have been weaned on an ethos that values finding the short-cuts, the tricks, the tips, the angles in being educated. While in pursuit of these approaches, students may expend a tremendous amount of energy, time and effort; however, they do so under false pretense. To confuse such an expenditure of energy with the true pursuit of learning undermines the value of that effort. Simply stated, the students’ effort is misplaced. The difference lies years down the road. Such an approach offers only the illusion of knowledge; what we are here discussing is simply the acquisition of information. Despite the current dogma uttered like mantras in public schools today, the acquisition of knowledge and the gathering of information are not the same.

Proponents of the use of entertainment or of other like educational methods do not value knowledge for its own sake but promote a debasement of knowledge to something as banal as information gathering. In our devotion to the gods of technology and entertainment, we are sacrificing the basis of what should be the pursuit of knowledge. We also monetize, and in the process, devalue what it means to be educated. Worst of all, the adults who are created by this method are less than what they could be. In Plato’s *Phaedrus*, in the context of the written word, Socrates criticizes the use of “external written characters” in the learning process, suggesting that such use creates a “semblance of truth” rather than true knowledge. Plato’s voice can be heard bemoaning the infiltration of technology into palaces of learning when he suggests that “[students] will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.”
From our experience, teachers who employ the severe approach of Professor Kingsfield are conspicuous for their absence. We have seen rampant grade inflation and coddling of students by our well-intentioned colleagues throughout our teaching careers. Most teachers are well aware of the perfect storm of complaint they will receive when they award a student an 89\% rather than following the standard practice of kicking it up to a 90\% at the end of a grading period. Complaints come from all directions, including the student, parent, counselor, vice principal, coach, and often fellow teachers. Only the most self-possessed teacher can hold up against such opposition.

Following Postman’s contentions in *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, we support the conserving and criticizing function of education: education’s “aim at all times is to make visible the prevailing biases of a culture and then, by employing whatever philosophies of education are available, to oppose them” (*Teaching* 20). To embody this concept, we need to take steps toward the hard school model. By acquiescing to the frivolous and counter-productive inclinations of modern educational thinking, we, as Aesop warned, provide the means of our own destruction. We recognize that our argument could be characterized as a step backward, particularly by those who seek to draw students into academic content by means of entertainment. It is our point that the “fun” is a product of the work — that when a student is tasked with investigating and reading about a subject, interest will build.

Nietzsche wrote that only the discipline of suffering is responsible for the achievements of man thus far. Thus we propose to interject into the classroom the creation of not some medieval torture chamber, but an oasis for study, reflection, conversation, and knowledge. In doing so, not only will we create an educated, confident individual, but we will also create a person who is increasingly capable of dealing with the challenges that lie ahead. With respect to the long-term education of our children, and in contrast to educational policy that champions something one day and discards it a couple of years later, Martin Buber declared that our primary concern should always be “the person as a whole, both in the actuality in which he lives before you now and in his possibilities, what he can become” (123). The future is where our motivation and duty as educators lie.

The idea behind Buber’s words looms large in the modern education system — again, though, because it is made conspicuous by its absence. Parents and teachers alike know their actions have long-lasting implications when they are raising and educating a child. To that point, what parents and teachers understand suggests a level of awareness that is not possessed by school districts. Much of what takes place in public schools today is designed to address or appeal to the “right now.” School, district, and state administrators seek immediate redress in situations where students’ high-stakes assessments are unsatisfactory and reflect badly on the administration’s ability to ensure education for all students. These evaluations are not just political, but ultimately economic in nature, affecting grants, programs, and general funding. The political sphere has never been a patient one, and the steps politicians and school administrators take show a haphazard and short-sighted approach.

1
That does not mean that such institutions do not recognize the importance of long-term considerations — in words if not in deeds. Nearly every school district (and school) has a mission statement, which invariably includes the empty concept of creating “lifelong learners.” There is very little in the messages of district administrators that promotes lifelong learning. The best hope for such a development lies with individual teachers who are able to establish genuine teacher-student relationships that build on the interest inherent in the subject. Yet from an administrative point of view, the focus is on the here and now.

Our industry sabotages the future in various ways. When we, as components in a system, focus on the end result — the grade on the test or on the report card — we undermine the importance of the process of learning. When one considers the overall approach toward education today, which holds that education is something achieved or accomplished, one realizes that we are teaching the idea that there is a conclusion to learning. If there is an idea more antithetical to the creation of lifelong learners, we are not sure where it exists. When we tie the school experience to what is obtained at university or in the workplace, we undermine the importance of knowledge for its own sake. When we focus our processes on technology and entertainment in order to make education more fun or easier, we undermine and trivialize what it means to become knowledgeable and wise.

Entertainment as a teaching tool, intentional or not, does not set the mind free to learn. It increases the noise and distraction; it erodes the attention. We have enabled a collective attention deficit disorder in our students, and made it worse by asking no questions about the impact of entertainment and technology within our sacred learning spaces. What the students need is authentic engagement — a real relationship with the knowledge we want them to seek and to hold dear.
Notes

1 The authors would like to clarify what could be interpreted as conflicting or mutually exclusive statements. Earlier, we argued that students are distracted and tend to dwell ahead of themselves with respect to their academic activities. Our impression is that students have become increasingly focused on the instrumental value of their schooling; that is, students engage in learning activities for the contingent reward (grade, recognition, scholarship, praise) that is so overtly connected. At the same time, we state here that “the future is where our motivation and duty lie.” Here we are speaking not about students, but about educators who need to take a long view toward the intellectual, social, and moral development of their students. Thus, we hold that it is the duty of a teacher to ensure the comprehension of curricular content here and now, but also to develop within students an intellectual foundation that will sustain them in college and beyond, when the trappings of elementary and high school, along with the contingent rewards, may not be present. To further clarify, we suggest a need for students to become immersed in learning activities on a daily basis, so as to provide cumulative validation that learning as an activity is intrinsically valuable. At the same time, we suggest a nuanced approach for teachers, who must dwell in the learning moment with students, but also project possibilities for a deeper meaning for the learning that may only become beneficial in the distant future, beyond the standardized assessments, beyond college entrance exams, beyond job applications. In this way, we suggest that teaching and learning are sacred tasks with profound implications.
References


1. Introduction

The human cultural continuum is in a critical phase of transformation. Over the next several generations, the evolution of consciousness along that continuum may well determine the future of humanity and, perhaps, the degree to which we will remain fully human. Rapid developments in computer technology, cybernetics and artificial intelligence now have some futurists predicting a cybernetic-human synthesis that could ultimately transform humanity into something other. Science fiction gives us a picture of this future as often alluring and inevitably frightening.

Emphasizing this infatuation with technology and the interface between human and artificial intelligence, the K-12 educational curriculum is focused on science, technology, engineering and math (STEM). This curriculum captivates the individual and collective imagination and subtly implies that the interface with technology is more important than our relationships with humanity, our community, our families, and our world. The more prominent this attitude becomes, the more important it is to find a balance that makes technology subservient to the preservation of our humanity.

For some 2,500 generations our humanity has been preserved because adults taught each successive generation to be carriers of the culture. While this fundamental concept should guide the development of a K-12 cultural curriculum, it is not enough just to study the cultural continuum; we must each traverse this pathway into the future. Re-visioning the K-12 curriculum to emphasize the humanities and embrace the evolution in consciousness teaches young people to be the carriers of the cultural continuum into the future. To better understand what this means to education, we can look at two concepts that shape the rhythm of the cultural continuum: enantiodromia and integrality.

2. Enantiodromia

Applied to the cultural continuum, enantiodromia describes a wave-like pattern — an ever-changing dynamic flow between poles — rather than an overcoming of cultural obstacles in a direct, linear progression.

The concept of enantiodromia originated with the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Heraclitus around 500 BC. “[All] Pre-Socratic thinkers were struck by the dominance of change in the world of our experience. Heraclitus … probably expressed the universality
of change more clearly and more dramatically than his predecessors; but for him it was the complementary idea of the measure inhering in change, the stability that persists through it and controls it, that was of vital importance” (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 186). In Carl Jung’s more psychological definition, enantiodromia is likened to a “play of opposites,” a dynamic flow in the course of events where “everything that exists turns into its opposite.” For example, day turns to night and night to day; life to death and death back into life. Jung says, “Just as all energy proceeds from opposition, so the psyche too possesses its inner polarity … as Heraclitus realized long ago” (Jung and Jaffe 346). This polarity in the psyche, says Jung, is an indispensable prerequisite to life.

Thus, psychologically, enantiodromia describes a dynamic intercourse between the inner poles that Jung defines as distinct psychological fields: the fields of the unconscious and of consciousness. These are complementary polarities in the psyche that communicate through the transcendent function: the stability that Heraclitus sought that persists through transformation. This important, defining element in the rhythm of the cultural continuum can be applied to pedagogical technique as well as to the curriculum.

The first application of Jungian psychology to education pertains to education’s first objective: to develop consciousness in the child. The field of thinking consciousness is not an a priori condition of the psyche but grows with the processes of psychological development and education. However, “The psyche of the child in its preconscious state is anything but a tabula rasa; it is already preformed in a recognizable individual way, and is moreover equipped with all specifically human instincts, as well as with the a priori foundations of the higher functions” (Jung and Jaffe 348). Thus, nurturing and developing the field of consciousness is an open-ended, two-sided process.

On the one hand, we gather information from the natural, cultural, and social environments of the external world. This process requires attention to factual details. As consciousness matures over time, the process will configure facts into cogent hypotheses about the nature of external reality. In formal education, the objective is not just to learn how to gather factual information and form hypotheses, but also to inculcate a critical reasoning capacity to apply to those hypotheses.

However, if this development of the field of consciousness remains one-sided — that is, if it is focused on the thinking function and the world of external reality — then it neglects the transcendent function that maintains the connection to inner reality. Critical reason, when not guided by the transcendent function, subtly incorporates into itself the cultural biases of collective consciousness, as for example distortions of history or the rigidity of cultural mores. These biases are used to construct a “mass psyche.” This biased, one-sided model — STEM — now dominates K-12 education in the United States, and perhaps in much of the rest of the industrial world (Mitchell).

In contrast, the open-ended, two-sided development of consciousness is evident in more holistic models of education. The drive behind holistic education is given meaning in a simple and succinct statement by Jung:
Reason sets the boundaries [of life] far too narrowly for us…. The more the critical reason dominates, the more impoverished life becomes; but the more of the unconscious, and the more of myth we are capable of making conscious, the more of life we integrate. Overvalued reason has this in common with political absolutism: under its dominion, the individual is pauperized. (Jung and Jaffe 302)

Thus, our culturally biased views of reality are tempered by making conscious the contents of the unconscious. Becoming conscious of psychic material that exists in the unconscious comes from the observation and interpretation of the non-rational intuitive, instinctive, imaginative and feeling-toned perceptions that emerge in symbolic form as dreams, premonitions, and synchronistic events.

Just as consciousness of external reality is developed in education by the rational acquisition and critical assessment of facts, consciousness of internal reality is developed in education by emphasizing the tools of interpretation. Primary among those tools — tools that can be taught at elementary and secondary education levels — is the symbolism inherent in fairy tales, mythology and the arts. These symbols manifest in expressions that give form to the spiritual forces of the archetypes in the culture and exist in the collective imagination rather than in collective consciousness.

A holistic model of education teaches interpretation, understanding, acceptance and assimilation of influences from the unconscious — that is, the influences of the instincts and archetypes. Jung says,

The archetypes, which are pre-existent to consciousness and condition it, appear in the part they actually play in reality: as a priori structural forms of the stuff of consciousness. They do not in any sense represent things as they are in themselves, but rather the forms in which things can be perceived and conceived…. They account only for the collective component of a perception. (Jung and Jaffe 347)

Thus, the acquisition of a repertoire of archetypal symbols is essential to developing consciousness. The goal of becoming conscious of one’s own true nature cannot be served by a one-sided development. Enantiodromia, which allows communication between the conscious and unconscious poles of the psyche, is a significant factor in shaping both pedagogical technique and the curriculum so that both can serve the educational objective of developing consciousness in the child.

The second principle of Jungian psychology that can be applied to the K-12 classroom involves the relationship between the child’s developing consciousness and the human cultural continuum. Jung says, “Consciousness is phylogenetically and ontogenetically a secondary phenomenon” (Jung and Jaffe 348). Therefore, “Attainment of consciousness is culture in the broadest sense, and self-knowledge is therefore the heart and essence of this process” (Jung and Jaffe 324-325). This concept justifies a redesigned cultural education curriculum (Mitchell).
For Jung, the principle *Ontogeny Recapitulates Phylogeny* implies that individual development carries forward the earlier psychical structures of human development. “If the unconscious is anything at all, it must consist of earlier evolutionary stages of our conscious psyche” (Jung and Jaffe 348). Jung describes these “evolutionary stages” in a psychological context that supports ontogenetic development, rather than in terms of phylogenic evolution. The instincts and archetypes that Jung describes psychologically as inherited qualities (Jung, *Structure* 133) are the contents of the collective unconscious that are brought to consciousness in symbolic form. The integration of unconscious content into mental ego-consciousness is what Jung describes as the transformative process of individuation. This psychological explanation is ontologically beneficial, but it does not provide a complete picture because it does not address the phylogenetic evolution of consciousness on which the ontological model is based.

To examine these “earlier evolutionary stages of our conscious psyche” (Jung and Jaffe 348) from the perspective of the cultural continuum and the evolution of consciousness, we can turn to one of Jung’s contemporaries, the German-Swiss cultural philosopher Jean Gebser. Born in Prussia in 1905, Gebser lived in Spain and Paris in the 1930s and entered Switzerland just before the border was closed in 1939. He lived the rest of his life in Bern. His opus, *The Ever-Present Origin*, was published in 1954. Gebser lectured in Zürich in the 1950s and ‘60s, and there is anecdotal evidence that Gebser and Jung knew each other, but no record of professional correspondence between them has yet surfaced. Nonetheless Gebser’s description of structures in the evolution of consciousness provides a cultural background for Jung’s transformative process of individuation.

Gebser describes four successive structures in the phylogenetic development of consciousness — the archaic, the magical, the mythic, and the mental — that have traced an enantiodromic pattern along the cultural continuum and form the pattern of our ontological development as well. The fifth structure of consciousness, the one we are currently engaged in discovering — integrality — defines a synergistic integration of the preceding four structures.

3. Integrality: The Structures of Consciousness and the Rhythm of the Cultural Continuum

Integrality is more than a simple integration of earlier consciousness structures. “[The] process, which makes the integral consciousness structure accessible, is a new capacity, and not a mere sum of the old” (Gebser 543). That is, its wholeness lies beyond the instinctive unity of archaic consciousness, beyond the emotional power of magical consciousness, beyond the imagery and complementarity of mythic consciousness, and beyond the division and synthesis of mental consciousness. Gebser’s concept of integrality describes culturally what Jung describes psychologically, drawing archaic, magical, and mythic consciousness out of the unconscious and into a new unity with mental consciousness. Individuation and integrality, together, describe the next level in the evolution of consciousness in the individual and in humanity, and offer another
possible outcome to humanity’s progression through the cultural continuum: to become most completely human.

Gebser’s four structures of consciousness that precede integrality are represented enantiodromically by both efficient and deficient modes. These opposing modes of the four sequential consciousness structures provide us with the phylogenetic pattern for ontological development, as follows.

3. 1. Archaic Consciousness

This structure of consciousness belongs to our distant past and is “[t]he structure closest to and presumably originally identical with the origin.” Gebser continues, “It is akin, if not identical, to the original state of biblical paradise: a time where the soul is yet dormant, a time of complete non-differentiation of man and the universe” (Gebser 43).

From an evolutionary perspective, it belongs to a period of human development that lacks a defined sense of self. Though connected to the world, one had no sense of being “in the world” because there was no central point of reference — no sense of self — from which to relate to space and time. Relationship to the world occurred through instinct, presentiment, and impulse. Living in small social groups, “humanity” existed in a passive relationship to the natural environment.

Though we may hold a vision of bipedal humanoids existing in the archaic past of our evolutionary biology, we are compelled to imagine the archaic structure of consciousness more symbolically. In its efficient mode, humanity existed in a balanced union between nature and divine consciousness — an idyllic existence; a Garden of Eden. The deficient mode of archaic consciousness is represented by the “fall”: expulsion from the garden; alienation from both nature and divine consciousness.

Ontologically, this archaic structure of consciousness is evident in the newborn child during the first year of life. In his book The Child, Erich Neumann calls it the extra-uterine embryonic phase in which the child remains in a “unitary reality” with the mother. He says, “In the pre-ego stage characteristic of earliest childhood … the child is still contained within its mother, though its body is already born” (Neumann, Child 11).

It is difficult to find a clear picture of this unitary reality in modern society. However, in her book The Continuum Concept, Jean Liedloff describes it very succinctly in terms of the nurturance instinct. Liedloff documented this complex physical-emotional bond between mother and child from her experience living with the Yequana, a South American Indian tribe, in the 1950s. She compares the nurturance instinct — leading to healthy, happy children — to the loss of that instinct in the childrearing techniques of modern culture, often leading to an over-stressed, unhappy childhood.

Liedloff describes the continuum concept as an instinctive “good sense” that guided human behavior for eons, but that in the past few thousand years has been brought into disrepute. “[O]ur innate sense of what is best for us is short-circuited by suspicion while
the intellect, which has never known much about our real needs, decides what to do.” She continues, “It is not, for example, the province of the reasoning faculty to decide how a baby ought to be treated. We have had exquisitely precise instincts, expert in every detail of child care, since long before we became anything resembling *Homo sapiens*” (Liedloff 21-22).

As noted above, Jung understood the instincts and archetypes that make up the collective unconscious as *a priori* conditions of the child’s pre-conscious psyche. He postulates five “basic instincts”: hunger, sexuality, activity, reflection, and creativity (Jung, *Structure* 118). The instincts generate physically perceived impulses, pressures, and desires. Jung uses a simile from physics, suggesting that when instincts are charged with enough energy (perhaps through the parents’ nurturance instinct) they jump valence and become archetypal (Jung, *Structure* 212). The archetypes are spiritual, and produce images, ideas, and intuition, the source of which the child is aware of only a-perceptively. That is, instinctual and archetypal forces exist in counterpoise to rational-mental consciousness that will become centered in the developing ego. Liedloff’s continuum concept acknowledges this charge differential and advocates developing a free flow of information between the continuum of innate awareness and developing consciousness. The axis of this free flow of information, in Jungian terms, is the transcendent function.

Liedloff presents a vivid example of how the *efficient* mode of the archaic structure of consciousness is fostered in the child through nurturing the child’s natural exploration and auto-discovery of its instincts. But modern society tends toward propagating the *deficient* mode — a fracturing of the individual’s unity with nature and divine consciousness through the disruption of the continuum concept.

It begins with traumatic separation of the baby and the mother at birth and the placement of the child in the nursery ward, physically isolated from the mother. At home, infants are separated from the mother in nurseries, cribs, strollers and baby carriages, rather than sleeping with and being carried by her. “The violent tearing apart of the mother-child continuum … may understandably result in depression for the mother, as well as agony for the infant” (Liedloff 36). This is equivalent to being alienated from the natural environment that, for the infant, is the mother’s body, and also alienated from proximity to “the ever-present origin.” This proximity is carried in what Neumann refers to as the “two-footedness” of the archetypal bond between mother and child:

> When two human beings are united by a powerful bond, their mutual appetency forms a bilateral connection between them, releasing corresponding archetypes in the psyches of each other. So it takes two individuals to effect or set in motion these transpersonal factors of archetypes…. Once we have grasped this interhuman reality and the ‘two footedness’ of the archetype, it will be clear to us that an archetype cannot be evoked by any spontaneous process within the psyche…. (Neumann, *Child* 85-86)
The concept of the two-footedness of the archetype implies that the Mother archetype, expressed as the mother’s nurturance instinct, stimulates the child’s auto-evocation of instinctual drives out of the Child archetype that resides in the Self: the child’s own “godhead”; the “ever-present origin.”

The deficient side to the archaic structure of consciousness in modern societies ignores the psychological significance of mother-child bonding. This alienates the child from the nurturance instinct and can result in the “wounded child syndrome.” Without grounding in the two-footedness of the archetype, the child’s survival depends not on nurtured instincts but on the premature and distorted development of a self-identity built on foundations of frustration, stress, and rage. This can manifest in personality disorders, some symptoms of which are lack of an ability to give and receive affection, self-destructive behaviors, cruelty to self and others, phoniness, extreme control problems, lack of friendships, and learning disorders (Magid and McKelvey 254-257). There are many such children in modern societies that, to varying degrees, come to exhibit socio-pathological personality disorders that are evident to every classroom teacher. This deficient mode of archaic consciousness lies at the root of some of our most significant individual, psychological, social, and cultural problems.

3. 2. Magical Consciousness

The magical structure of consciousness began to evolve in the timeless pre-historic past. Gebser attributes five characteristics to the magical structure of consciousness: 1) egolessness — there is no individual ego-self, but there is an emerging collective ego of the tribe or clan; 2) visible interchangeability of the real with the symbolic; 3) spacelessness and timelessness; 4) an active merging with nature in order to control it; and 5) a magic reaction to this merging, which gives mankind power (Gebser 48).

With this growing consciousness — which is not centered in the individual, but rather in the collective — there is a sense of freedom from the power of nature. Gebser says,

Man replies to the forces streaming toward him with his own corresponding forces: he stands up to Nature … then he begins to be conscious of his own will. Witchcraft and sorcery … are the natural means by which he seeks to free himself from the transcendent power of nature.... (Gebser 46)

Ontologically, the magical structure of consciousness appears in the domain of young children. In its efficient form, also depicted in Liedloff’s continuum concept, we find the child securely embedded in the group ego of the family, clan, or tribe. Another manifestation of magical consciousness is that of the imaginary friend, where the numinous, or spiritual, takes form in the child’s imagination and a visible interchangeability occurs between the real and the symbolic. It also is a fundamental characteristic of fairy tales. And it is evident in the way a small child senses his or her ability to merge with and have power over nature. Walt Whitman captured the efficient mode of magical consciousness most succinctly in a poem that begins:
There was a child went forth every day,  
And the first object he looked upon, that object he became,  
And that object became a part of him for the day or a certain part of the day,  
Or for many years or stretching cycles of years. (Whitman 108)

Of this efficient mode of magical consciousness, Gebser says, “Only where the magic structure in the individual still works through impulse and instinct [that is, without knowing; without consciousness] does it realize its eminent, life-dispensing value in our day and age” (Gebser 60). It is an emotional, somatic quality, evident in the mystical participation of the archetypal mother-child bond; in the empathetic identification evident in twins and in lovers; in the communication between humans and animals; in telepathy; and in Jung’s concept of synchronicity (Neville, “Towards Integralty”).

However, as with the archaic structure of consciousness, the dominant mode of magical consciousness today is deficient. The power structure in modern society is obsessed, not with actively merging with nature, but with controlling nature from the outside — attempting to decipher the “laws of nature” and apply technology to control it. That control over nature extends to controlling human nature, as well. Gebser says,

All magic … occurs in the natural-vital, egoless, spaceless and timeless sphere. This requires — as far as present-day man is concerned — a sacrifice of consciousness; it occurs in the state of trance, or when the consciousness dissolves as a result of mass reactions, slogans, or “isms.” (49)

There is great danger in this deficient mode of magical consciousness. Erich Neumann says, “The building up of the persona, and the adaptation to reality under the guidance of the superego [the collectivity] as the court of consciousness, [constellates] the mass man” (Origins 438-439). Additionally, Jung warns, “The collective attitude hinders the recognition and evaluation of a psychology different from the subject’s, because the mind that is collectively oriented is quite incapable of thinking and feeling in any other way than by projection” (Psychological Types 10).

The mass psyche, the deficient mode of magical consciousness, obstructs communication between the conscious and unconscious poles of the psyche and subverts the transcendent function. To the degree that the mass psyche directs the educational model of standardization, it becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to assess the instincts and archetypes and regain the momentum toward individuation and integrality.

3.3. Mythic Consciousness

The mythic structure of consciousness began to emerge with the Great Mother cults of the Neolithic Era, but it evolved in stages that overlapped the magical structure up to the rise of the great classic civilizations. Here we find the seeds of identity defined as soul. As the sense of soul developed, there was a growing temporal and spatial awareness.
Time was experienced rhythmically, through the cycles of the seasons. Space was experienced numinously, so that the emerging soul was connected spiritually to all things through the symbolic imagination. That connection was exemplified in mythology, conveyed through poetry and the visual arts, and taught to successive generations through an initiation/education process.

Gebser says, “the essential characteristic of the mythical structure is the emergent awareness of soul” (61). “The mythical structure … has an imaginary consciousness reflected in the imagistic nature of myth and responsive to the soul” (Gebser 67).

Today, we see an active mythological structure of consciousness in anthropological studies and in psychology. Dreams, visions, fantasies, and delusional ideas open up “a field of psychic phenomena which are themselves the matrix of all mythology” (Jung, Symbols 390).

In its efficient mode, mythological consciousness conveys the sense that humans have a role to play in the dynamic unfolding of a cosmic drama designed by the gods and told through mythologies. Thus, the cultural period when the efficient mode of mythological consciousness was most dominant was the Heroic Age. Heroes existed as personalities that took upon themselves the numinous, archetypal mythologem in order to bring some benefit to the community:

The hero himself appears as a being of more than human stature. He is distinguished from the very beginning by his godlike characteristics. Since he is psychologically an archetype of the self, his divinity only confirms that the self is numinous, a sort of god, or having some share in the divine nature..... The hero is the protagonist in God’s transformation of man. (Jung, Symbols 391-392)

Today, because of the modern ego’s involvement, we would call this psychological inflation. But the Heroic Age was pre-egoic in the sense that individual self-awareness emanated from the archetypal spiritual imagination rather than from the mental structure of consciousness. The heroes lived their myths by embodying personality patterns established by the gods. These myths evolved into re-enactments in ritual and in the arts.

Thus, the imaginative characteristic of the mythological structure of consciousness, and its manifestation in the arts and literature, provides the repertoire of symbols that lead directly to the acceptance, interpretation, understanding, and assimilation of the dreams, premonitions, and synchronistic events that emerge out of the unconscious and are drawn toward integration into consciousness.

Developmentally, the mythological structure lies in the natural domain of children. When the imagination is firmly grounded in the mythic structure of consciousness, it anchors the soul-end of a complementary polarity between the soul and the emerging ego. Jung, Neumann, Edinger, and others have called this polarity-link the ego-self axis. This axis — the transcendent function — maintains communication between the mythological,
imaginal soul-consciousness of the child and the emerging mental ego-consciousness of the adult.

The deficient mode of mythological consciousness is characterized by breaking communication through the depletion of the imaginative — symbolic — function of the psyche and a depletion of the individual’s ability to interpret and assimilate the symbolic language of the unconscious. Here, it would be overstating the obvious to enumerate all the ways in which the modern educational system and modern culture diminish the imagination of the child and produce the deficient mode of mythological consciousness. We no longer carry mythological narratives within us, though they are carried for us in books and in often-distorted forms of mass media and virtual reality. But the greater poverty lies in our growing inability to accept and understand the mythological symbolism as a defining part of our humanity, rather than a fantasy projection.

This assault on the imaginative faculty disrupts the enantiodromic intercourse between the ego and the archetypal self, causing the personality to become centered in the ego and its relationship to the collectivity. The seat of consciousness shifts to the cultural superego, and the ego becomes a servant of what Jung calls “the spirit of the age” (Jung, Structure 340). This is a definitive act of socialization that disrupts the continuity of the child’s holistic development. And this, in turn, results in the disrupted continuity of the cultural continuum as it is recapitulated in the development of the individual personality.

Some children are instinctively aware of being separated from an identity that has its origin as an a-perceptive archetypal image in the soul, but often they are incapable of articulating a response, though many suffer greatly for it. This may be one reason why so many young people turn away from education, with its single-minded emphasis on developing a dominating, standardized, culturally biased rational-mental structure of consciousness and identity. Yet without an education that teaches an alternative, young people still fall victim to the collectivity’s hold on the individual’s consciousness and personality through the mass psyche.

3.4. Mental Consciousness

Gebser equates the rise of the mental structure of consciousness with the rise of the “law giver.” Among the Israelites, this figure arises with Moses, around 1225 BC, about the same time that the patriarchal Greeks defeated the matriarchal Trojans to end the mythological Golden Age. But Gebser also sites as examples the Indian lawgiver Manu, the Cretan King Minos, and Menes, the pharaoh who united Upper and Lower Egypt:

Wherever the law giver appears, he upsets the old equilibrium (mythical polarity), and in order to re-establish it, laws must be fixed and established. Only a mental world requires laws; the mythical world, secure in the polarity, neither knows nor needs them. (Gebser 76)

The centering of the personality in the ego is the primary characteristic of the mental structure of consciousness. A cultural superego emerges out of a collective mentality
reminiscent of the magical, tribal structure of consciousness and vies with the mythological archetypes for dominance over the developing personality. This development does not unfold to reveal the soul, as in mythological consciousness, but unfolds to reveal the ego and its progressive capacity to express complex, abstract cognitive structures. The ego becomes the new subjective center from which to make temporal and spatial assessments about the natural, social, and cultural environments and the nature of reality. Time becomes linear, sequential and quantifiable. Space is perceived in three dimensions. Reality is increasingly divided through subject-object duality. Spirit is perceived increasingly in abstract, prosaic terms rather than in poetic images.

In its efficient mode the mental structure of consciousness is integrated with the efficient modes of both the mythic and magical structures. For example, in classical Athens or renaissance Florence, conceptual thinking was combined with a rich imaginative and symbolic life (Neville, “Towards Integrality”). Gebser points to the pre-Socratic Age, when all citizens were predisposed toward initiation into the mystery cults — which kept the collective spiritual imagination alive in them. Poetic language and proximity to myth distinguished early, pre-Socratic philosophy from later philosophical systems.

Coming to a similar conclusion about pre-Socratic Greece, Jung says, “The weird and wonderful nature of the gods was a self-evident fact in a hundred living myths and assumed a special significance in the no less credible philosophical refinements of those myths” (Jung, Aion 177). It is important to note that the 300 years of the pre-Socratic philosophers — when the mytho-magical and emerging mental structures of consciousness were in some degree of balance — was also a time when democratic consciousness flourished in the Greek polis.

Gebser goes on to say that the proliferation of philosophical systems — after about 300 B.C. — is accompanied by a proportional decrease of mythical elements (84). He says that mental consciousness began its decline toward the deficient aspect with Lao-Tse in China, the Buddha in India, and Socrates in Greece.

About Socrates, Nietzsche wrote, “Whereas in all truly productive men instinct is the strong, affirmative form and reason the dissuader and critic, in the case of Socrates the roles are reversed: instinct is the critic, consciousness the creator” (Nietzsche 84-85). This reversal characterizes the deficient mode of mental consciousness by emphasizing the power of mental abstraction. What Nietzsche emphasizes is the importance of the a-rational instincts as the driving creative force and the suggestion that mental consciousness should be the refining, critical element in the creative process.

Jung builds on this concept. Using a simile from modern physics, he says that when the instincts acquire a certain amount of energy, they jump valence to become archetypal. This is the foundation of creativity. The sequence from archaic creative instinct to the magical, emotional power to direct nature, to mythological imagination, to critical mental consciousness, can be read as a creative-consciousness continuum in its most efficient form.
The final stage in the deficient mode of mental consciousness — the rational-mental phase — began to blossom with the European Age of Enlightenment, which denigrated mysticism and systematized the abstract way of looking at reality. When the rational-mental phase dominates the psyche, the deficient modes of the archaic, magical, and mythic structures of consciousness all converge in the shadows of the unconscious. These deficient modes affect our perception of reality. Through education we emphasize the dominance of the rational-mental phase of consciousness, trapping the archaic, magical, and mythic modes in the unconscious.

Ontologically, the mental structure of consciousness begins to dominate the personality during the years of early adolescence. It results in an egoic-rationalistic way of looking at reality through the lens of what child psychologist Jean Piaget called formal operations, or abstract-conceptualization. One result of this is that many young people are fearful of expressing their singular uniqueness — the “true” nature of their soul. They are timid in expressing their instinctive creativity, and they are neurotically self-conscious about conforming to the collective behavioral norms of the peer group. Some of these characteristics are “normal” aspects of creating a strong ego-consciousness that will eventually strive toward integration and individuation. However, where the deficient mode of mental consciousness is most dominant they become symptomatic of a mass mentality that poses grave dangers because it breaks the link between the individual and the culture continuum. How did we go from the liberating promise of higher consciousness to being trapped in the mass psyche?

The post-Darwinian concept of the evolution of consciousness evolved into the widely accepted conclusion that *Ontogeny Recapitulates Phylogeny*. In a linear progression, rational-mental consciousness is necessarily considered superior to what the 19th century anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl called the *participation mystique* of “primitives.” It was believed that the child, like the “primitive,” existed in a state of mystical participation with reality (see Mousalimas 33, note 1). From the standpoint of consciousness development, the child’s psyche was a *tabula rasa* upon which consciousness, in its highly developed mental-rational form, could be written. Additionally, the theory of cultural evolution espouses the idea that Western culture — with over 400 years of Enlightenment — is superior to cultures still grounded in a more balanced perspective. Thus, the linear-historical view of the development of consciousness and the hierarchical view of Western cultural superiority remain deeply ingrained in our educational philosophy and curriculum.

The advent of depth psychology at the beginning of the 20th century is responsible for arguing that the mental structure of consciousness cannot be divorced from its foundational roots in archaic, magical and mythic consciousness and does not offer a sufficient finale to the question of the evolution of consciousness. It is only logical to assume that it is, therefore, not an adequate terminal to the problem of educating children. This brings us to the concept of integrality as the next step in consciousness’s evolution.
3. 5. Integrality

Integrality, which describes the next stage in the evolution of consciousness, has surfaced in both Eastern and Western philosophies. In the views of these philosophies, each of us carries within us the seed of Divine Consciousness. It could be called the spark of divinity at the core of the psyche, or could be equated to Jung’s concept of the Self. Gebser called it the “ever-present origin.”

The developmental objective is to transcend the state in which the ego dominates the personality — that is, to transcend the egoic-rationalistic mode of mental consciousness on which modern culture, with all of its technological advances, is based. Jung says that we have within us an inherent tendency called the transcendent function:

> The tendencies of the conscious and the unconscious are the two factors that together make up the transcendent function. It is called “transcendent” because it makes the transition from one attitude to another organically possible, without loss of the unconscious. (Jung, Structure 73)

This fundamental idea of the individuation process gives us the capacity to transcend the ego’s dominant position without dissolution, maintaining the integrity of the personality while expanding consciousness.

But transcendence on both the individual level and the level that transforms humanity takes place over generations and requires two adjustments to the way we educate our children: 1) it requires an education that teaches the acceptance, awareness and assimilation of archetypal images — that is, the significance of living a “symbolic life” relevant to one’s chosen vocation; and 2) it requires a curriculum that teaches the enantiodromic flow of the cultural continuum rather than a linear view of history. This enables the twin processes of individuation-integrality to progress toward the next stage in the evolution of consciousness.

Gebser is also clear on the need to re-visualize educational philosophy from a mentally oriented, utilitarian model to one that reintegrates the structures of consciousness that have been repressed into the unconscious:

> If our consciousness … cannot master the new reality and make possible its realization, then the prophets of doom will have been correct. Other alternatives are an illusion; consequently, great demands are placed on us, and each one of us have been given a grave responsibility, not merely to survey but to actually traverse the path opening before us. (Gebser 5)

Jung has stated the problem very succinctly. He contends that the spirit of the age will not let itself be trifled with: “It is the popular way of thinking, and therefore it is decent, reasonable, scientific, and normal” (Structure 340). Thus, the “spirit of the age” is the greatest impediment to the evolution of consciousness. What needs to change is the kind
of thinking that is perpetuated in our schools, and the realization that the new structure of consciousness correlates Gebser’s concept of Integrality with Jung’s concept of individuation.

4. Integrality and Individuation

Because individuation is a transformative adventure that takes place over a lifetime, the seeds of individuation must be nurtured from an early age in the home and in the school. Thus, to preserve the drive toward individuation and integrality requires a cultural educational curriculum that teaches the rhythm of the cultural continuum. Enantiodromia gives definition to the dynamic intercourse between the conscious and unconscious poles of the psyche, as opposed to a linear progression from participation mystique to mental consciousness. Integrality gives us a cultural objective to teach our children. And individuation is the psychological process that draws the conscious and unconscious fields together into a holistic personality. Together, these three processes inform the next level in individual and cultural evolution, based on an integrative model.

Why consider such drastic changes to education? Psychologically, the conflict between one’s true nature and the demands of the collectivity begins to emerge most prominently in early adolescence. But the child’s natural tendency toward separation-individuation from the family group is not greeted by a ritualized welcoming into the greater community (except, perhaps, in gang initiations). More often, the adolescent is absorbed into the mass psyche of the collective peer group. The narrow confines of the peer-group imagination, external factors in our social environment, new standardization policies in education, and peer-group bullying in schools repress the tendency toward individuation. These forces drive young people toward alienation and destructive behaviors, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, toward a mass psyche dominated by a superego of ideologies and ‘isms’.

Erich Neumann argues that “The super-ego is not, like the Self, an individual authority of the personality, it is a later introjected collective authority which endeavors to impose the demands of … the collectivity, on the individual by violence” (Neumann, Child 204). The violence is evident in the ways young people repress, or are forced by group pressure to repress, their own true nature — their soul identity — in order to conform to the collective ideal of ego development. Such behaviors can begin, at the ages of nine or ten, as bullying of anyone who acts differently from the peer group, and can become endemic by the time the student reaches junior high and high school. Gebser further illuminates this dichotomy within the personality:

The current situation manifests on the one hand an egocentric individualism exaggerated to extremes and desirous of possessing everything, while on the other it manifests an equally extreme collectivism that promises the total fulfillment of man’s being…. [As a result] the individual is being driven into isolation while the collective degenerates into a mere aggregation. (Gebser 3)
Since the spiritual foundations of both the culture and the self are expressed symbolically in the archetypes of the collective unconscious, our greatest challenge in raising and educating children is to nurture archetypal influences on the developing personality so that they can temper the introjected influences of the superego.

In many young adolescents there is a real conflict between individuation and satisfactory social adaptation — between development of the personality from within and adaptation to a place in the social economy that is defined from without. Young people are instinctively aware of this conflict, and there is a real struggle in many young people over the question of which authority is going to dominate the psyche. A cultural educational curriculum that gives young people the a-perceptive tools they need to interpret the archetypal symbols gives them a better foundation for answering that question for themselves. Thus to promote the goals of individuation-integrality requires a new cultural education curriculum that incorporates the history of the evolution of consciousness structures (Mitchell).

5. Conclusion

The objective of a re-visualized cultural curriculum is to take the young adolescent through these various emergent structures in the evolution of consciousness as they lead toward integrality — that is, toward “the unfolding and intensification of consciousness, [that] manifests itself as an increasingly intense luminescence of the spiritual in man” (Gebser 542). The objective of this curriculum is not to arrive at integrality any more than it is to arrive at individuation, but only to set the individual on a pathway that allows the process of individuation-integrality to unfold naturally and progress, undeterred by the demands of the collectivity. Thus, the educational objective is to transform the deficient modes of the archaic, magical, mythological, and mental structures of consciousness into efficient modes that work together. As Gebser puts it,

By returning to the very sources of human development as we observe the structures of consciousness … [unfold] … we can not only discover the past … but also gain a view into the future which reveals the traits of a new reality amidst the decline of our age. (Gebser 2)

Should this not be the primary goal of education?
References


Humanity in the Womb of History

Thomas M. Falk

What we do not understand can be frightening.... But when one is troubled by the reality of this world, it can be comforting to consider other possibilities, even if those possibilities disturb us, so strong is the desire to escape the tyranny of consciousness and the narrow boundaries of our perceptions, to unlock the prisons of thought in which we trap ourselves, all in hope that a better world, or a better version of ourselves, perhaps, may lie on the other side of the door.

Trade Minister Tagomi, The Man in the High Castle (Bucksey)

If one gauges a society’s future by the pronouncements of its artists, scientists, and intellectuals, then of late ours would appear bleak. Both Stephen Hawking and Noam Chomsky have recently warned that right now is the most dangerous time our species has ever faced, considering the hydra of existential threats that confront us, including climate change, soil depletion, epidemic disease, acidification of oceans, nuclear war, and mass species extinction (see for example Hawking). Citing among a number of other troubling developments the election of Donald J. Trump in the United States, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has moved the Doomsday Clock to two and a half minutes to midnight, the closest it has been since the first hydrogen bomb tests by the Americans and Soviets in 1953 (Bulletin). Writing in the Summer 2017 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Gerardo Ceballos, Paul Ehrlich, and Rodolfo Dirzo report that

Earth is experiencing a huge episode of population declines and extirpations, which will have negative cascading consequences on ecosystem functioning and services vital to sustaining civilization. We describe this as a “biological annihilation” to highlight the current magnitude of Earth’s ongoing sixth major extinction event … and the window for effective action is very short, probably two or three decades at most. All signs point to ever more powerful assaults on biodiversity in the next two decades, painting a dismal picture of the future of life, including human life.

Whatever the veracity of these prognostications, the new millennium appears to have ushered a script change in the collective mind of Western society. Few events have imprinted more powerfully upon the psyche of millennials than the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the global financial collapse of 2007-2008, the ensuing wreckage of which has fanned flames of neo-fascism across Europe and the Americas. It
has now become easier, Slavoj Žižek observed, to imagine apocalypse than a truly different and better future.

And yet, the new millennium simultaneously presents an alternate horizon in which humanity figures out how to work together as a species to eliminate poverty, restore the health of our ecosystem, and as one race set off to explore the reaches of inner and outer space. With the growth of the Internet, we appear to be in the incipient stages of developing a global neocortex, sharing more information and connecting more minds with each passing day. This spectacular tool, however, presents the potential for great evil as well as great good, and for dividing as well as uniting us. In any case, it requires that we bring the best of our humanity to the table.

In his 2016 encyclical *Laudato Si*, Pope Francis addressed the need to “care for our common home” by delving into “the heart of what it is to be human,” and by reference to Saint Francis of Assisi, who spoke to flowers and loved small creatures as brothers and sisters. Speaking to a joint session of the United States Congress that September, Francis called upon Americans to follow the example of Thomas Merton, the Trappist monk who, standing one day in downtown Louisville, awoke “from a dream of separateness. He looked at all the people on the street and said that there were no strangers” (Pope Francis, “Visit”; see also Ellsberg). These words forge a tenuous link between American culture and the *Unio Mystica*, an uncanny phenomenology attuned to the oneness of humanity and all life on earth, of which vestiges may be traced to the roots of the Western philosophical tradition.

Through their *skole* and annual rites at Eleusis, the ancient Athenians institutionalized pedagogies of consciousness change. While recognizing their society to be flawed, these forebears also believed their nature to be Promethean. The early *skole*, as Joseph Pieper argues, were not schools as we understand them today but religious cults devoted to the worship of *leisure*, a capacity considered to be at once both human and superhuman, allowing men and women to reach beyond themselves and achieve transcendence (Pieper 28). Beginning in fear and even terror, the Mysteries ultimately revealed this transcendental dimension. Featuring the word *digenes*, conveying the sense of “twice-born,” accounts tell of a world suddenly transformed from an inert pile of matter into a living, ethereal tissue binding all of humanity and nature (cf. Wasson, Hofmann and Ruck 26, 47; see also Huston Smith 18). Wrote Cicero:

> Though Athens brought forth numerous divine things, yet she never created anything nobler than those sublime Mysteries through which we became gentler and have advanced from a barbarous and rustic life to a more civilized one, so that we not only live more joyfully but also die with a better hope. (Qtd. in Wasson, Hofmann and Ruck 142)

Against the background of an evolutionary model of consciousness, contemporary forms of life — principally related to our economic system, neurochemistry, and habits of digital technology usage — constitute phenomenological curricula that nurture atavistic aspects of our humanity and contribute to the hydra of maladies now threatening most life
on earth. With reference to the traditions of ancient Greece, deliberately entertained curricula of consciousness might aid us in the work of self-transformation that appears necessary if humanity is to deliver itself through the gathering storms.

1. A Circuit Model of Consciousness

[O]ur normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question, for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality.

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience

All that we can know of self and the world must pass through the lens of consciousness. Human beings possess the most highly realized form of consciousness of which we are aware, our brains being capable of ten to the power of 2.7 million connections, more than the number of stars in the known universe (Wilson, Prometheus. See also Wilson, “Techniques”). Yet we share our most basic neurocircuitry with the first creatures to emerge from the oceans hundreds of millions of years ago. We are half animal and half spirit, Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde.

Although the mind has throughout history demonstrated a capacity to both perceive and exhibit the mystical, modern humanity is by and large conditioned to inhabit what may be called waking or rational consciousness. Because the immediate environment consistently bombards us with a superfluity of stimuli, this ordinary consciousness distills the humming, buzzing confusion around us down to that which serves our survival (Time-Life 106). Something as simple as crossing the street requires ignoring ninety-nine percent of the sights, sounds, and smells that surround us (Shulgin).

While awareness may be shifted so as to bring these ignored yet perhaps somehow useful stimuli to attention, our culture perpetuates a powerful and peculiar ideology in which the ordinary, waking state of consciousness is the only necessary and valid state. Thomas B. Roberts, of the University of Northern Illinois, refers to this as the “singlestate fallacy” and suggests that we instead consider states of consciousness as being to the mind what applications are to computers. Remaining forever in the waking state is like having access to a computer’s many applications but only ever using that computer to word process (Thomas Roberts 69-70).
Allowing that the map is not the terrain, the following evolutionary model of consciousness derives from Robert Anton Wilson, who drew from Sigmund Freud, C. G. Jung, Timothy Leary, and Carl Sagan (Wilson, *Prometheus*). Whereas Wilson’s model assumes that human beings are genetically equipped with eight neurocolloidal circuits, or layers of mind, I simplify by using only five.

The first layer, our reptilian survival circuit, is hundreds of millions of years old. Our most powerful program, distributed among the amygdala, hippocampus, and adrenal gland, this circuit hard-wires us for maternal attachment and fight-or-flight response. Very early in life and due largely to chance circumstance, the child imprints either infophilia or info-phobia. That is, we become powerfully predisposed to see either a world that is essentially safe and interesting or a world that is terrible and frightening, although most fall somewhere between the two ends of this spectrum. Some psychologists argue that autism, incidence of which has increased three-fold within the past twenty years, is a genetically predisposed and environmentally imprinted condition wherein the outside world appears so horrible that the individual retreats into the safety of the self (Centers for Disease Control; see also Wilson, “Techniques”).

We share our second circuit, centralized in the thalamus and cerebellum, with fellow mammals; this circuit wires in pack affiliation and ego-territoriality, emotion and the politics of submission and domination. With activation of this circuitry, the child begins to test his or her status in the family hierarchy. Those who take their heaviest imprinting on this circuit approach personal interactions as contests to be won or lost (cf. Schwartz). Freud called this layer the *anal stage*, averring to toddlers seeking pleasure through control of their bowel movements. According to Jamie Glowacki, an expert in the field of potty training, children over the past ten to fifteen years have experienced greater than ordinary problems in learning how to use the toilet, due, she argues, to our quickening pace of life and increasing levels of anxiety (Glowacki 146-150).

With the intersection of the first and second circuits, the bio-survival unit extends beyond the mother figure to the larger nexus of tribe, kin, or nation-state. Just as the feudal political economy linked the bio-survival of peasant to lord, the capitalist political economy links the bio-survival of the working class to an employing class wielding control over access to food, shelter, medical care, education, and all other things that money affords.

The third circuit, symbolic-verbal rationality, situated in the frontal cortex, is unique to humanity and thrusts us into history. The ancient Greeks spoke of this circuitry as the faculty of mind attuned to linear time that produces and possesses truth. Synonymous with instrumental reason, this circuitry, called the *ratio* in the Middle Ages, is the source of Newtonian science, a. k. a. the plumbing level of reality, and the modern idea of progress (Pieper 28). According to Wilson, the first-and-third-circuit binary constitutes the basis for the essential dialectic of history: over time, communication intensifies and information spreads, which threatens ruling elites who react with inquisitions and other varieties of repression (“Techniques”).
When activated, first-circuit consciousness and its attendant stress chemicals are notoriously capable of overpowering the rational mind. As Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky illustrated in *Manufacturing Consent*, advertisers and politicians regularly rely on fear to advance consumerism, war, and other logical absurdities. Fear, goes the Bene Gesserit litany from Frank Herbert’s *Dune*, is the mind-killer. Reason, declaimed Martin Luther, is a whore (Whitford).

Working in dialectic with the third circuit, the fourth circuit, associated with morality and tribal taboo, functions as an evolutionary brake by sanctioning thought and action. In particular, local cultural taboos define for us with whom it is permissible and impermissible to mate. Typically, by our early thirties, the worldview inherited from and suited to the circumstances of our local culture will harden and set for life, in effect dooming us to a certain blindness regarding the greatest portion of the surrounding ontological plenum. In this sense culture is both home and prison. Thus leaving one’s local reality, in one way or another, outwardly or inwardly, is indispensable to breaking its spell.3

Beyond reason and morality, there appear higher levels of consciousness notoriously resistant to language and yet indispensable to the progress of civilization. Throughout history, virtually all world cultures have recognized the powers of a few special, highly realized beings: Moses, Christ, Buddha, Mohammad, Theresa of Avila, and countless others — men and women able to see, intuit, and dream in uncanny ways. The ancient Greeks identified this circuitry, called the *intellectus* by Medieval scholars, with the faculty of mind attuned to the eternal present that receives and becomes possessed by truth, associated variously with intuition, wonder, grace, spiritual vision, *gestalt* perception, and the pineal gland (Pieper 28). Known as *dhyana* in the East, meaning “the trance of unity,” this state of consciousness brings ego dissolution, enhanced compassion and sensitivity to others, including plants, animals, and works of art (Mirante; see also Zigler 164).

While expressions of fifth-circuit consciousness would seem historically to emerge spontaneously and rarely, a vast majority of the world’s cultures appear to ritually occasion its rapture. In her 1973 study of 488 world cultures, Erika Bourguignon found that 437 practiced one or more ritual forms of consciousness-raising. Although her sample primarily included non-state societies, institutionalized elevation of consciousness appears to play a significant role in the foundation of Western culture.

Each autumn from roughly 1400 B.C. into the Christian era, thousands of pilgrims traveled to the temple of Demeter to be initiated into the central mystery of Greek civilization, considered to be the culminating experience of a lifetime. Following months of spiritual preparation and ingesting *kykeon* — a sacred potion likely featuring barley ergot — devotees would awaken to the rapture of the *intellectus*, revealing a world of beauty, terror, and wonder, and dissolving boundaries between self and other. Dedicating themselves to the cultivation of this faculty, members of the Athenian leisure class
established *skole*, which in the Greek, properly speaking, does not refer to “school,” but to *leisure* (Pieper 19).

Relieved from the daily struggle of earning one’s bread, these “founders of Western culture” — Pericles, Herodotus, Hippocrates, Aristotle, Euripides, Phidias, and many others — re-envisioned and re-created themselves through the arts of Politics, History, Medicine, Philosophy, Poetry, Comedy, Sculpture, etc (C. L. R. James; see also Wasson, Hofmann and Ruck). Pieper remarked upon the transcendental nature of their endeavors:

Because Wholeness is what man strives for, the power to achieve leisure is one of the fundamental powers of the human soul. Like the gift for contemplative absorption in the things that are, and like the capacity of the spirit to soar in festive celebration, the power to know leisure is the power to overstep the boundaries of the workaday world and reach out to superhuman, life-giving existential forces that refresh and renew us before we turn back to our daily work. Only in genuine leisure does a “gate to freedom” open. (50-51; see also 22-23 and 57)

Through the Middle Ages, cycles of rituals and feasts institutionalized a shifting of the window of consciousness from the corporeal to the cosmic, from harvest time to dream time, and from daily toil to divine worship. Inhabiting these “two minds” remained essential to achieving a fully human state of being, apprised of its divine nature and place in the larger order of existence. Over the past centuries, however, the world of work has infiltrated and eroded these sacred spaces “with such a velocity,” warns Pieper, that we may speak of it as a “demonic force in history” (53). “Construction of a civilization that knows little or nothing of these deeper realities can only make things worse” (Pieper 11).

**2. The Phenomenology of Capital**

*Settle the economic question and you settle all other questions. It is the Aaron’s rod which swallows up the rest.*

William Morris, *Factory Work as It Might Be 5*

*When economics is the dominant factor, once again we will bring down everything to the level of survival,... It is the laws of the jungle again — the survival of the fittest.*

Sadhguru Vasudev, “Allowing the Feminine to Flower”

Joseph Campbell once said that you can determine a society’s state of consciousness by looking at its urban skyline (Campbell and Moyers). Standing today in any major downtown, one sees financial institutions looming above church towers and state capitol buildings, an image indicative of the economic order overshadowing the religious and political. A peculiar form of economic consciousness lies deep within our cultural DNA.
An archaeological dig into the depths of the modern mind might take us to the records of early contacts between the conquistadors and indigenous Americans. Following his initial encounter with the native Arawaks, Columbus wrote in his journal:

They willingly traded everything they owned. They do not bear arms, and do not know them, for I showed them a sword, they took it by the edge and cut themselves out of ignorance.... They would make fine servants.... With fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them do whatever we want. (Qtd. in Zinn 1-2)

Welcoming him as their returning god, a Quetzalcoatl, the Arawaks offered Columbus gifts of gold, which he mistakenly assumed to be plentiful in the land. Massively indebted to Queen Isabella of Spain, the sailor demanded ten pounds of the precious metal from each native. As they returned to him empty-handed, he punished their non-compliance by chopping off hands and watching the victims bleed to death. Seizing the next-most valuable commodity available, the sailor loaded the Arawaks themselves onto his ships and hauled them across the Atlantic to be sold as slaves.

Had Columbus been receptive to those he encountered, he may have wished to learn and live among them. More sensitive observers of the New World recognized the natives’ humanity and lamented their demise: “Endless testimonies,” wrote Bartolome de Las Casas, “prove [their] mild and pacific temperament.... But our work was to exasperate, ravage, kill, mangle and destroy” (qtd. in Zinn 6).

Whereas the actions of the conquistadors and colonizers may be perceived as devilish and immoral, they are better understood as traumatic clashes of competing moral imperatives. These men were not simply cold-blooded psychopathic killers, but, as David Graeber contends, men caught in webs of greed and shame, driven by the frantic urgency of debt repayment on interest-bearing loans that was added to the righteous indignation of having to owe anything after enduring such a perilous journey (Graeber 317-318). Blinded to the Arawaks’ humanity by the morality of debt, Columbus and his men could see only commodities to be turned into money.

Five hundred years later, under and surrounding our urban skyscrapers, temples to money, roughly one hundred and fifty million fellow Americans, or half the population, live paycheck-to-paycheck while another hundred million enjoy less than six months of financial cushioning (Hazen). Considering the cosmic duality of mind and matter, widespread insecurity regarding basic needs — food, shelter, safety — ensures that general anxiety and first-circuit vigilance maintain a steady grip on the body social, significantly limiting neurological activity associated with receptive awareness.

As a 2013 study of poverty’s effect on IQ concluded, “the all-consuming fretting” that comes with poverty can cost a person as many as thirteen IQ points. Rather than suggesting that the poor are stupid, the British-American team determined that precarious living limits “mental bandwidth” in a way that is comparable to losing an entire night’s sleep. “The poor are often highly effective at focusing on and dealing with pressing problems,” remarked Eldar Shafir, professor of psychology and public affairs at
Princeton University. “But they don’t have leftover bandwidth to devote to other tasks” (qtd. in Kelland). “Poverty is bleak and cuts off your long-term brain,” wrote Linda Tirado in a 2014 essay. “It doesn’t leave you much room to think about what you are doing, only to attend to the next thing and the next. Planning isn’t in the mix.”

Economics is widely misunderstood in our society due to the enduring ontological framework of the Western Enlightenment. Whereas Newtonian philosophy draws us to see discrete objects and individuals, modes of production are better understood through a language of processes and relationships. Instead of seeing the economy as a way of producing things, we could look at it as a mode of producing forms of consciousness and modes of associated living.

During the Age of Enlightenment, the rise of capitalism coincided with the ascent of Reason. Voltaire beheld commercial societies and saw them as weaned from the fanaticism of religious war. According to Georg Hegel, markets brought together diverse cultures and oriented individuals to the needs and concerns of each other. Hegel concluded, as did Adam Smith, that the new economy fostered a calculative attitude that freed the human spirit by weakening the hold of tradition and making individualism possible in fantastic new ways (Muller 139-165).

Among these novel virtues, however, critics began to spot forms of psychic and cultural degradation. The rational being birthed by the market revealed itself to be part human, part monster. Observing the frenetic bustling of the French marketplaces, Friedrich Engels described “a horde of ravenous beasts (for what else are competitors?) who devour one another.”

Although the calculative mentality engendered by market societies appeared to weaken the stranglehold of ecclesiastical authority, critics charged that it threatened to subordinate all other attitudes and modes of thought. Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and György Lukács all cautioned that technical thinking and narrow focus upon means would obstruct the ends to which those means contribute (see Muller 240-241; 257; 263-271). Instrumental rationality, warned Martin Heidegger, might ultimately eradicate the “meditative thought” — those refined thoughts, perceptions, and emotions arising through contemplation and reflection — that is the very essence of our humanity (Carr 222).

In their 2011 publication *Lost in Transition*, Christian Smith and colleagues from Notre Dame University explained that millennials increasingly navigate ethical propositions based only on time, feeling, benefit, and desire. Concepts such as virtue, morality, and justice, prevalent throughout much of Western history, were non-considerations (Fleet; see also Lyon). One can see throughout contemporary society the ghastly consequences of calculative reason applied to situations where it does not righteously belong. Pharmaceutical companies suppress studies warning of their medicines’ lethal effects; automakers withhold vital safety features from cars and trucks; oil and gas companies hide research indicating that fossil fuel consumption is rending the biosphere (Dowie 18-32; Hyde 62-64; Goodman and Nissen; Carrington and Mommers). Although it might
tempt to label the actions of corporate executives in such cases as corrupt and immoral, it is more instructive to consider the actors as abiding to the peculiar laws and moralities of the institutions they serve. Nonetheless, these men and women, incapable of recognizing their connections with and responsibility to others, exhibit a careless, immature humanity.

3. The Neurochemistry of Capitalism

*We are so close to the world of work that we can’t see what it does to us. We have to rely on outside observers from other times or other cultures to appreciate the extremity and the pathology of our present position.*

Bob Black, “The Abolition of Work”

Mirroring its architecture, a society’s state of consciousness is reflected and shaped by its choice of drugs. Our language often misleads us to believe that the self possesses an essence independent of what it ingests; but we are not merely persons who “take” drugs; we are neurochemical organisms in which drugs become active parts, living through us as we live through them.

Writing in 1998, Marshall Sahlins illustrated caffeine’s indispensable contribution to the development of the industrial economy, which required workers to be productive for many hours a day beyond innate biorhythms. Beginning with only a small, two-hundred-pound-a-year sample of Chinese tea in the mid-1600s, the English were, a century later, importing two million pounds annually, and up to twenty million by the turn of the nineteenth century. Tea quickly became “an indispensable necessity of life” (J. L. Cranmer-Byng, qtd. in Sahlins 418) and “the god to which everything else was sacrificed” (E. T. Pritchard, qtd. in Sahlins 418).

According to Zygmunt Bauman, attention itself has become the principal limit to capital growth in the information age, as societies appear, consciously or not, to be seeking ways to push physiological boundaries. Franco Berardi goes so far as to argue that the “irrational exuberance” of the 1990s was due in large part to millions of workers in Silicon Valley “consuming tons of cocaine, amphetamines, and Prozac.” When the supply of these drugs was cut off and removed from the workers’ neurochemistry, the bubble burst. The years since have witnessed an explosion in the licit market for coffee, energy drinks, B12 shots, and other attention-preserving stimulants (sometimes explode).

Although attentional disorders have been recognized since at least the turn of the 20th century, it was not until the 1980s and 90s that doctors regularly prescribed children and adolescents powerful drugs — Ritalin and Adderall — to treat Attention Deficit Disorders. In an April 2015 edition of the *New York Times*, Alan Schwarz reported that the first generation of Americans to grow accustomed to taking amphetamines as study drugs in college had graduated and carried the habit into the workforce. Adults are using the drugs not to get high, writes Schwarz, but to get hired. One financial industry source told him, “Friends of mine in finance, on Wall Street, were traders and had to start at five
in the morning on top of their games — most of them were taking Adderall. You can’t be the one who is sluggish.” Asked about her own habit, the worker testified: 
I did my job faster than anybody. I was on a mission, and I was not going to stop until I succeeded and got what I wanted.... It’s like this at most of the companies I know with driven young people — there’s a certain expectation of performance.... And if you don’t meet it, and I’m not really worried how, someone else will. (Qtd. in Schwarz)

The proletarian, argues Bernard Stiegler, beyond simply a worker, is one who has been reduced to a functional unit of an economic system, denied agency and denuded of savoir-vivre, i.e., knowledge of how to live. Capital’s war to proletarianize consumers and producers, he writes, exerts powerful pressure upon technological and phenomenological becoming (States of Shock 128). Whilst increasing and intensifying work-focus capacity, caffeine and other stimulants may simultaneously arrest what Karl Polanyi referred to as subsidiary awareness. Polanyi argues that comprehension of certain phenomena, such as those dealt with in history, philosophy, and religion — essentially the Humanities — often requires one to de-focus the mind, allowing details and explicit parts to recede into the background so as to perceive larger patterns. “Unbridled lucidity,” he wrote, “can destroy our understanding of complex matters” (qtd. in Zigler 164). Our attentional bandwidth liquidated through daily economic warfare, we are left to consult outside observers as to the present condition of our being.

Hailing from the Amazon Rain Forest, mother of all the world’s forests, Davi Kopenawa, a Yanomami shaman, travels to the modern world to raise awareness about the destruction of his home at the hands of loggers, prospectors, and cattle ranchers. Versed in reconciling the local and the global, the infinitesimal and the infinite, Kopenawa draws firm connections between the despoiling of the Amazon and the lives of those he calls the “white people.” Visiting New York City, financial capital of the planet, he sees men and women entranced by a love of merchandise and deaf to the spirits who plead on behalf of the forest (Kopenawa and Albert 375-377).

Impressed by the ingenuity of their architecture, Kopenawa nonetheless observes that the white people, tormented by their work and money, “only see their wives, their children, and their merchandise when they sleep. They must anxiously think about their work and their trips. In the din of their cities,” he continues,

... multitudes of people moved very fast and in every direction, like ants. They started one way and turned around, then went the other way. They looked at the ground all the time and never saw the sky.... People there live piled up one on top of each other and squeezed side by side, as frenzied as wasps in their nest. It all makes you dizzy and obscures your thought. The endless noise and the smoke covering everything prevent you from thinking right. This is probably why the white people can’t hear us!... The lives of white people who hurry around all day like ants seem sad to me. They are always impatient and anxious not to get to their job late or be thrown away. They barely sleep and run all day in a daze. They
only talk about working and the money they lack.... [T]he babble of televisions and radios cover all the other voices. White people are always worried because of all this racket through which they hurry all day. Their hearts beat too fast, their thought is seized with dizziness, and their eyes are always on the alert. I think that this endless noise prevents their thoughts from joining together. It is so. In the end, their thoughts become scattered and fixed at their feet, and this is how you become stupid. (Kopenawa and Albert 349; 354-355).

Leaving the heart of nature for the epicenter of the global order, Kopenawa finds himself immersed in a toxic mental environment. Consumed by the struggle to survive and “make it” in this world, and suffering twin epidemics of stress and lack of sleep, thought reduces to reflex (Daily Mail Reporter). From the vantage point of the rain forest shaman, we appear something less than fully human.

4. The Net

Evil is that which makes for separateness; and that which makes for separateness is self-destructive.... Conversely, the qualities which have led to biological progress are the qualities which make it possible for individual beings to escape from their separateness — intelligence and the tendency to co-operate. Love and understanding are valuable even on the biological level. Hatred, unawareness, stupidity and all that makes for increase of separateness are the qualities that, as a matter of historical fact, have led either to the extinction of a species, or to its becoming a living fossil, incapable of making further biological progress.

Aldous Huxley, “Beliefs” 350

Save for the alphabet and the printing press, the Internet may be the single most powerful mind-altering technology that has ever come into general use.

Nicholas Carr 116

Two generations ago, Marshall McLuhan recognized that all tools are essentially prosthetic. In other words, human beings change themselves through the creation and incorporation of tools into their lives. Automobiles extend the powers of our legs; radios extend the reach of the voice and ear; clothing extends the protective functions of skin and hair. More than all other types, McLuhan insisted, communications technologies transform the human world (McLuhan, Understanding Media). Two and a half thousand years ago, spread of the phonetic alphabet spurred the rise of empires, along with the academic tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Five hundred years ago, the printing press gave rise to the Protestant Revolution, the nation state, the Western Enlightenment, Science, the Industrial Revolution, and the modern school. Once again, at the dawn of the 21st
century, we appear to be in the midst of seismic changes, both curative and toxic, resulting from a revolution in our communication technology.

With the advent of the digital age, McLuhan envisioned a global village in which physical distances ceased to serve as barriers to human connection. Such a new “electronic information environment,” he wrote, “compels commitment and participation. We have become irrevocably involved with, and responsible for, each other” (The Medium is the Massage 12). In only the past decade, folks around the world have utilized digital communications technologies to break through the de-facto censorship of corporate and state media to raise awareness of injustice (love translated to the public sphere) and spark political movements, from Black Lives Matter to Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring. In the wake of natural disasters, we have seen citizens organize relief efforts in the absence of aid from governmental agencies, autonomously directing food, shelter, and physicians to areas of greatest need (Smolan). And yet, we may ask whether our newfound connectedness has in fact brought humanity any closer together, and in so doing contributed to the love and understanding side of Huxley’s spectrum. One could argue that we have thus far, in the third millennium, moved farther apart from one another and closer to self-destruction.

Perhaps our problem is the same one that Neil Postman saw in Huxley’s Brave New World: “Huxley feared,” wrote Postman in Amusing Ourselves to Death, “those who would give us so much [information] that we would be reduced to passivity and egoism” (qtd. in Andrew Postman). As both Nicholas Carr and Bernard Stiegler argue, caring and critical consciousness — the combination of emotion and reason that we need in order to deal intelligently with the world — require focused, undistracted attention; but these are neither native to our species nor encouraged by our habits of digital media use (Stiegler, Taking Care).

Human beings evolved short, distractible attention spans through thousands of generations of life in environments where we survived by attuning ourselves to subtle changes of light and sound, a moving shadow or the snap of a twig alerting us to either predator or prey. What we today refer to as “thought” emerges from cultural traditions (and likely the mastery of fire) that train the mind away from its inherent distractibility (Carr). Most humans are “reason-able,” writes Stiegler, meaning that we are capable of acquiring the intellectual and attentional prowess requisite for both citizenship and mature personhood. Attainment of these faculties by the masses, Stiegler argues, has been the raison d’être of the modern school. However, this project has fallen under heavy assault by the consumer programming industries. Guided by experts in the field of psychology and informed of the intricacies and intimacies of our lives, these agencies seek to destroy reason in order to render us infantilized consumers, incapable of self-authorship (Stiegler, States of Shock).

Over the past decade, a growing weight of psychological and sociological research has found that our habits of digital technology usage are re-wiring the mind and altering the dynamics of our relationships. While digital media present us with unprecedented opportunities to cultivate socialized intelligence and critical consciousness, we appear to
be using them in ways that weaken the mental faculties that would allow us to seize these opportunities. Socialized intelligence and critical consciousness, writes Carr, “emerge from neural processes that are inherently slow” (220). Yet the more time that we spend with digital technology, the faster our internal clocks move.

Jonathan Sweller, an Australian educational psychologist, explains that the human capacity to wrestle with complexity, essentially “intellectual prowess,” is a function of “schemas” that develop out of long-term memory, which is not just a storehouse of information but also the seat of problem-solving and understanding (Carr 124-125). People become “more intelligent” when information initially perceived in short-term memory becomes incorporated into long-term memory, where it augments our schema. By ingesting information slowly and steadily, such as in undistracted book reading, this process transpires efficiently and effectively.

However, our tendencies while reading on screens are to do so not in steady, focused ways, but instead by scanning, skimming, and jumping from page to page. By bombarding ourselves with stimuli — hyperlinks, news-feeds, pop-ups, and message alerts — we overload working memory, so that new inputs continually push information out of the mind before it can be assimilated into our schema (Carr 139-143).

Mounting research demonstrates that increased demands upon working memory blunt our critical and empathic functions. For example, although we can instantaneously empathize with others whom we witness suffering physically, the mental operations required for appreciating the psychological and moral dimensions of emotional suffering unfold slowly. While smart phones and other digital devices extend our abilities to locate, categorize, and assess, they carry the danger of short-circuiting those processes that allow us to understand and care (Carr 220-221).

5. A Thought Experiment

*It is only necessary to ask a few questions as to the progress of the articles of commerce from the fields where they grow, to our houses, to become aware that we eat and drink and wear perjury and fraud in a hundred commodities.*

Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Man the Reformer,” qtd. in Warnick 95

*Here manual labor is drudgery and toil is slavery. The men cannot possibly find any satisfaction in their work. They simply work to make a living. Their sweat and dull pain are part of the price paid for the fine cars we all run. And most of us run the cars without knowing what price is being paid for them.*

Reinhold Niebuhr 65, after a visit to a Detroit auto factory (1929)
Three centuries ago, Enlightenment thinkers hoped that markets would bring together citizens of the world and orient each to the needs and concerns of others. Since that time, technological progress has re-made the planet not so much into a global village, but more accurately into a global marketplace. Yet my relations to others through the market remain largely invisible.

Commodity fetishism refers to the phenomenon whereby we endow inanimate objects with metaphysical properties to the effect of concealing human relationships, so that I see shoes and tomatoes as things and not as products of human labor. This, as Marx recognized, is the lynchpin of our economic system. Our entire mode of life, he believed, relied upon our failing to come to consciousness about the elemental facts of human interconnection.

It stands to reason that if I could see past the commodity form to the human relationships that it conceals, then the commodity might be de-mystified and lose its power over me. The Internet offers a substantially heightened capacity to peer behind the veil and bear witness to our interconnection, beautiful or ugly as it may be. Hypothetically, I could behold the conditions of food and garment workers at factory farms and sweatshops, revealing the suffering that is so often invested into the things I purchase. Theoretically, this could cause me to change my behaviors in such a way as to reduce injustice. Analogously, in the days following the 2015 Paris attacks, news networks depicted not only images of carnage, but also the names and faces of victims and their loved ones. We learned that they were college students, musicians, or fathers. We heard their stories and instinctively empathized (Lam and Alexandra). On some level, they were us and we were them, and we sent our prayers across the ocean.

However, as Jeremy Scahill highlights, there are daily massacres in the Middle East — at wedding parties, funerals, hospitals, etc. — in which we are complicit and yet of which we remain unaware. Each month, according to monitoring groups such as Airwars and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, American tax dollars contribute to the deaths of scores of innocent civilians, including women and children. We fund their killing and the weapons that kill them, and we never know their stories; they remain nameless and invisible (see Goodman, Gonzalez, Scahill, and Greenwald; see also Rachel Roberts and Goodman and Beckerle).

What difference might it make to know as much about “the others” as we know about “our own”? What if, as Amy Goodman wondered in her 2014 I. F. Stone Lifetime Achievement Award acceptance speech, our media served as “a huge kitchen table that stretches across the globe, [where] we all sit around and debate and discuss the most important issues of the day: war and peace, life and death? That, I believe,” concluded Goodman, “is what will save us” (Goodman). Still, the question remains whether or not our awareness would make any difference. Following Marx, Reinhold Niebuhr argued that personal, embodied contact is an indispensable ingredient of human ethics. We cannot, Niebuhr believed, treat others justly (lovingly) when we fail to connect on this basic, eye-to-eye level.
Writing about digital media since the 1980s, professor and psychoanalyst Sherry Turkle of M.I.T., for decades optimistic about the direction of communications technologies, observes a troubling correlation between digital connectivity and a coarsening of human relationships. Turkle contends that although our 21st-century media have allowed us to remain connected across vast geographical distances, they have also enabled us to sustain the kind of lifestyle in which typical Americans work longer hours, increasingly feel that they “have no time,” live away from family, belong to no religious or civic associations, and report feeling more insecure, isolated, and lonely than ever (Turkle 157).

Although we may treasure the efficiency that digital media afford, this efficiency can prove toxic when it encroaches upon personal relationships. Rapid communication over physical distance has, Turkle argues, supported a growing tendency in our culture toward psychoanalytic narcissism: not self-love, but “a personality so fragile that it ... cannot tolerate the complex demands of other people but tries to relate to them by distorting who they are and splitting off what it needs, what it can use” (177). Skyler Wang, a sociologist who uses and studies online dating services, describes what he sees as “relationshopping,” a turn toward objectification and commodification of potential mates, away from the thrilling and arduous journey of building a relationship (Roman). Depriving ourselves of the messiness that accompanies embodied affection, we risk losing what we need to become mature persons in touch with our human depths.

6. Toward a Curriculum of Consciousness

In Nekhlyudov, as in all people, there were two men; one the spiritual man, who sought his well-being in such matters only as could at the same time do other people some good, and the other the animal man, who was looking out only for his own well-being, ready for it to sacrifice the well-being of the whole world. During that period of his insanity of egotism, induced by his Petersburgian and military life, the animal man was ruling within him and had completely suppressed the spiritual man. But, upon seeing Katyusha and becoming actuated by the same feeling which he had had for her before, the spiritual man raised his head, and he began to assert his rights.

Leo Tolstoy, Resurrection 78

Suddenly you notice, that there aren’t these separations, that we’re not on these separate islands shouting across to someone else and trying to hear what they’re saying and misunderstanding. You know, you used the word yourself, ‘empathy’. This thing’s flowing underneath, we’re part of a single continent. It meets underneath the water. And with that goes such delight. The sober certainty of waking bliss.

Gerald Heard circa 1955
“The young,” said Helen Mirren in her May, 2017 commencement address to graduates at Tulane University, “carry intrinsically within them the energy and idealism that will regenerate human life on this planet as it hurtles through time and space.” Mirren shared that her own youthful search for meaning through the tumult of the 1970s led her to an ancient Mayan word now tattooed on her hand: Inlakesh, meaning “you are my other self; we are one; and we are all in this together.” These are the timeless truths of our common humanity, she concluded, that the rising generation must somehow realize and bring to bear upon the crises and opportunities of the 21st century (Mirren). Parallel to Huxley’s spectrum of good and evil, inlakesh offers a useful litmus for gauging the phenomenological quality of our society and imagining a curriculum that might assist the young in the work of self-transcendence.

The economic, neurochemical, and technological facets of life contribute to an ontological pharmacology of being and becoming. At present, we appear to inhabit a toxic phenomenological ecosystem that simultaneously reflects and contributes to the degradation of social and biological systems. Nonetheless, if these lenses prove useful in describing our circumstances, they may also reveal signposts toward a healthier curriculum of consciousness, a phenomenological pharmakon of political economy, neurochemistry, and digital technology.

For many centuries, alphabetic hypomnemata — writing, the study of scripture, the library of the Humanities, science, and the Republic of Letters, the free press and informed public opinion — have constituted a western grounds of savoir-vivre: systems of care, knowledge of right living, avenues to individuation, the forging of a unique self (Stiegler, States of Shock). Still in the morning hours of the digital revolution, we find that our educational embrace of our newfound tools has proven either minimally-discriminate or outright addictogenic. We remain in search of a pedagogy by which to inoculate ourselves against the behavioral control techniques of the consumer industry and re-arrange our inherited literary hypomnemata into more democratic digital forms.

Historically, American culture has surrounded major events of adolescents’ technological becoming with rituals and rites of passage. For example, we invest significant time in teaching young people about the practical and ethical dimensions of using a firearm, driving a car, or encountering drugs and alcohol. Such efforts promote what the Greeks called melete or epimeleia — discipline, solicitude, care. We can find similar practices related to digital technology in South Korea, for instance, where educators have wrestled with the travails of the digital age for perhaps a decade longer than have we here in the United States. South Korean elementary teachers counsel that the first lessons of Internet usage must be ethical. Hallways feature signs and students recite songs intended to instill conscientiousness regarding the humanity on the other side of the screen: “I am the Internet guardian angel. I will be the first to protect. I want to be the first to protect. Though faces are unknown, it's a warm neighborhood. Precious Internet friend. Friend! Netiquette!” (Dretzin).

In recent decades, interest has grown among American educators in “mindfulness,” a practice which, rightly interpreted, draws from Zen Buddhist practices to assist children
and adolescents in distilling attention, clearing the mind, and opening the heart (Rempel). Amidst rising levels of stress, anxiety, and depression among youth, studies have found that incorporation of yoga, meditation, breathing exercises, and Tai Chi into the school day can lead to increases in neurological activity associated with empathy, compassion, and self-awareness, enabling students to see beyond their own frame of reference (Hölzel et al.; see also McFadden, Sandler, and Fieldstadt, and also Meiklejohn et al.). Such healthier states of mind promise to enhance the benefits of digital connectivity and offer prophylaxis against its ills.

Pursued further, “mindfulness” and other spiritual practices issue variously from millennia-old traditions of training youth to recognize and tame first and second-circuit demons — the Mr. Hyde residing in us all. As the pupil progresses to higher levels, learning to exercise third and fourth-circuit control over first and second-circuit impulses, bandwidth is opened for expression of fifth-circuit awareness. For the entirety of its existence, our species has shaped and changed itself through the use of tools, organic and inorganic. Anthropologists and psychologists attest that psychedelics — which translates as “mind-manifesting” — have the capacity to assist in revealing aspects of reality erstwhile veiled by waking consciousness. Currently, and following a half-century inquisition, university laboratories are resurrecting investigations into psychoactive compounds — also known as entheogens, or “plant teachers” — such as psilocybin, ibogaine, ayahuasca, ketamine, and others, which have variously been found to assist men and women in the work of self-revision, including recovery from trauma or addiction, strengthening connection to nature, and preparation for death (Wilson, “Techniques”; see also Kupferschmidt, and also Heyes and Carlander). “There’s something at its core,” says Roland Griffiths of Johns Hopkins University, that has to do with the core of moral and ethical behavior, about the sense of interconnectedness of all people and things.... We’re talking about love and caretaking for other people and for the environment. And we have the opportunity to study that. I can’t imagine anything more important than that. (Qtd. in Shulgin)

Mystics such as Ram Dass, formerly Dr. Richard Alpert, who pioneered psychedelic studies at Harvard University along with Timothy Leary, claim that psychedelics are unnecessary and potentially detrimental shortcuts to what can be achieved through spiritual devotion and instruction from a competent practitioner. A problem with Ram Dass’ position might be that the traditional methods of enlightenment — Ram Dass himself traveled to the Himalayas and spent years studying with a yogi, drawing water, cooking rice, and meditating — are highly inaccessible to the beleaguered inhabitants of this toxic consumerscape.

Like any other tool, psychoactive drugs are pharmaka and can be used to either curative or poisoning effects; thus they require a healthy balance of positive and negative liberty: both the freedom and prudent wisdom to structure one’s own neurochemistry. It may on one hand be useful to recall that entheogens have played significant contributory roles in
a number of the 20th century’s great accomplishments: Francis Crick credited LSD with helping him discover the structure of DNA; Paul Erdos, perhaps the most prolific mathematician to have ever lived, insisted that amphetamines were indispensable to his process; Carl Sagan advocated marijuana as an aid to thinking (Gonzalez). At present, however, toxic economic and phenomenological circumstances appear to condition much drug use, giving rise to national and global health crises. Improving our chemical and digital pharmacology will go hand-in-hand with making basic security and leisure more widely available in society.

Since the late-18th century, philosophers and economists have argued that an income guaranteed to satisfy the fundamental needs of all could dramatically transform society. In a world lifted from a fear economy, every man and woman could entertain the question that Robert Anton Wilson attributes to Buckminster Fuller: “What was it that I was so interested in as a child before I was told that I had to earn a living?” The answer, Wilson suggests, coming from millions and then billions of souls liberated from drudgery, would make the Renaissance look like a Greenwich Village art show and the Enlightenment like a high school science fair (Wilson, “RICH” 148). This year, Finland began its first experiments providing citizens with an income guaranteed to meet their basic needs. Cities in the Netherlands, Italy, Scotland, and Ontario are also moving towards their own trials with the citizen’s wage, of which almost seventy percent of European Union residents now approve (Henley).

Currently tasked with sorting winners and losers, haves and have-nots, our schools remain in the business of proletarianizing the young. Relieved of this loathsome burden, one can imagine what a school or university might look like: a true institution of leisure, where none are crippled by the urgency of debt repayment or compelled to approach their education as preparation for a job, and all may feast on the treasures of our collective human heritage as artistic, intellectual, and spiritual beings.

Among other things, our Promethean labor entails mastery of our economy, neurochemistry, and digital technology. Regarding pedagogies of transcendence, Aldous Huxley suggests that nothing short of everything will really do: spiritual devotion and sacred mushrooms and meditation and study and leisure — no one thing alone — will all play vital roles in maintaining a healthy phenomenological ecosystem (Huxley, Island). Our educational tradition passes through the midwife Socrates, killed for attempting to push others through the labor pains of digenes. Although the horizon at the precipice of the end of history appears dark, perhaps it will prove to be the darkness not of the tomb but of the womb (Kaur).
Notes

1 These trends are corroborated in academic literature; cf. Farrell and Barrett.

2 As a contemporary example of the effect of this trend, federal prosecutions of whistleblowers have surged in the digital age. See Greenberg and Mian. Also, according to the watchdog group Mapping Media Freedom, the past decade has seen a spike in the incidence of intimidation and murder of journalists (McChrystal).

3 This was the advice of my undergraduate academic advisor, the late Steven Rubenstein. Programs of intercultural exchange and study abroad, which more students than ever are taking advantage of, often contribute to the opening of worldviews and expand appreciation for global humanity.
References


Daily Mail Reporter. “6 in 10 Children Don’t Get Enough Sleep: Warning Poor Parenting and Youngsters Being Glued to TVs or Other Devices Is Leading to a Crisis in Rest Habits.” *Daily Mail,* 29 May 2016, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/


Goodman, Amy, Juan Gonzalez, Jeremy Scahill, and Glenn Greenwald. “Jeremy Scahill & Glenn Greenwald: What if All Victims of War Received the Media Attention


Heyes, Doug, and Alesha Carlander. “The Ibogaine Experience: A Miracle Cure or a Bad Trip?” The Fix: Addiction and Recovery, Straight Up, 8 August 2014,


1. Introduction

The need to encourage affirming and sustainable ways of life, and also the courage to dare to critique destructive ways of life, is more than a vision; it is a pedagogical challenge which raises ideas of importance for environmental communication. We follow Richard A. Rogers’ argument that there is a need to take environmental theory seriously and articulate the implications of how these theoretical ideas can be put into practice when it comes to social formation and the natural world, not to mention the affiliations that need to be established to make these practices viable. Sometimes there is an urgent need not only to challenge normalized and allegedly taken-for-granted ideas, but more importantly to actively and radically problematize the anthropocentric teleology of theoretical stances that constitute the notion of ‘understanding’ in relation to environmental awareness in various ways. This text argues for a post-anthropocentric turn that can provide the space for elaborating ideas that can function as the foundation for a critical, posthumanist environmental communication theory.

Environmental communication as an academic field is relatively new, and research in this area has sprung out of activist engagement with ideas of justice, loss of biodiversity, environmental management, democracy, and various environmental crises, among other concerns, and how these issues intersect (see Cox; Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson; Monani). The field of environmental communication focuses on the actions connecting activists and academics to help them strive for “a just and healthy Earth” (Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson 83). This makes environmental communication a meta-field that cuts across disciplines, and ties research and theory together by providing a topical focus on communication and on human relations with and within the environment (Milstein, “Environmental Communication” 344). ‘Environmental education’ and ‘Education for sustainable development’ are examples of activities that develop learning and knowledge formulation within environmental communication as an academic field (see Jurin, Roush, and Danter; Kahn; Sriskandarajah and Wals; Wals).

Environmental communication thus contributes to an increased understanding of environmental matters by focusing on human relations with the environment. This, in turn, generates knowledge in, from, and about the world (Jurin, Roush, and Danter, 15). However, despite the ambition to learn with and from the nonhuman world, environmental communication often devolves into human-centered traditions that
advance the political agenda of changing human behavior. Thus the political agenda of environmental communication includes pedagogical objectives that aim to support a better understanding of the interaction between the human and the nonhuman world. Such an approach can be assumed to originate in a positivist worldview that separates the human cultural and social world from the natural world — a tendency constructivist theory shares, since constructivists actually separate the natural world from the scientifically constructed world through the notion that scientists look at the natural world and construct an idea of it (Braidotti, *Posthuman*; Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson). An issue underlying this concern is explicitly articulated in Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson: “Constructivist epistemologies not only endanger conservation by denying nonhumans citizenship, they cripple conservation initiatives by suggesting that truth is what the powerful believe” (76).

An alternative to the constructivist approach, in which nature and culture are separated, is formulated by Rosi Braidotti, who, following Deleuze among others, claims that nature and culture emerge in a continuum that evolves through variations or differentiations. Braidotti thus counters the constructivist idea of a more or less clear-cut separation between nature and culture (Braidotti, *Transpositions* 205).

Within environmental communication theory, this critique of both positivism and constructivism forms the basis for an alternative radical communication theory. In 1998, Rogers presented ideas stemming from such critiques in his essay “Overcoming the Objectification of Nature in Constitutive Theories: Toward a Transhuman, Materialist Theory of Communication.” Rogers argues for the necessary human immersion in the natural world, and for allowing the inclusion of non-essentialized nonhuman voices in discourse (244). In this radical assertion of communication theory, by arguing for the possibility of working with the notion of power (of which more later) through discursive and natural forces, the importance of avoiding determinism becomes central. To enable a deconstruction of the ideal/material distinction, Rogers highlights the following criteria:

(1) the resurrection of a place for natural forces, traits, and structures in communication theory while avoiding a return to natural determinism; (2) an affirmation that we humans are embodied creatures embedded in a world that is not entirely our own making; (3) a rehearsal of ways of listening to nondominant voices and nonhuman agents and their inclusion in the production of meaning, policy, and material conditions; (4) the deconstruction of common sense binaries such as subject/object, social/natural, and ideational/material, and a reconstruction of relationships as dialogic: recursive, interdependent, and fluid. Such a theoretical project could enrich the scope of communication theory and criticism while embracing the value and dynamism of the extrasocial world. Old tools tend to reproduce old structures. The reconstruction of a different relationship to the environment in which we live requires radically alternative conceptions of humans, nature, material condition and discourse. (268)
This perspective brings us to Braidotti. The idea of a posthuman nomadic subject as presented in her writing becomes useful when reflecting on how to bring Rogers’ criteria into practice. The idea of the nomadic refers to the differentiation and repetition that is understood as territorializing (Deleuze and Guattari 355). The nomadic explains physical as well as psychological changes such as those occurring through learning, joy, depression, love, aging, fears, broken bones, et cetera, together with constitutional materialities such as tools (both mechanical and digital), medicine, artificial hair colors, implants, et cetera, that ‘constitute’ posthuman nomadic subjects (singularities) (Bennett). Simultaneously the nomadic explains changes that occur through becoming, as the multiple merges with "the one" as (possible) alterations of emerging posthuman nomadic subjects, such as in reproduction or bodily decay when the dew transforms leaves or a human body returns to soil (Bennett; Haraway, *When Species Meet*). Further, the nomadic posthuman subject is political (Braidotti, *Posthuman*). In sum, the nomadic posthuman subject will never be; it is in a continuous process of *becoming* (Braidotti, *Posthuman* 188). The concept of the posthuman nomadic subject, we suggest, can provide the basis for profound arguments in support of a post-anthropocentric notion of environmental communication. As Braidotti states:

The posthuman subject is not postmodern, because it does not rely on any anti-foundationalist premises. Nor is it post-structuralist, because it does not function within the linguistic turn or other forms of deconstruction. Not being framed by the ineluctable powers of signification, it is consequently not condemned to seek adequate representation of its existence within a system that is constitutionally incapable of granting due recognition.... The posthuman nomadic subject is materialist and vitalist, embodied and embedded — it is firmly located somewhere, according to the radical immanence of the ‘politics of location’.... It is a multifaceted and relational subject, conceptualized within a monistic ontology, through the lenses of Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, plus feminist and post-colonial theories. It is a subject actualized by the relational vitality and elemental complexity that mark posthuman thought itself. (*Posthuman* 188)

This quote, which articulates a path of knowledge whereby material as well as political matters become significant, is key to a posthumanism that will enrich the idea of existence. A posthuman nomadic subject opens up possibilities to acknowledge actions while at the same time not compromising the necessity of thinking and writing critically. This process of becoming posthuman has, as Braidotti intimates, the potential to change the very idea of thinking:

Becoming-posthuman ... is a process of redefining one’s sense of attachment and connection to a shared world, a territorial space: urban, social, psychic, ecological, planetary as it may be. It expresses multiple ecologies of belonging, while it enacts the transformation of one’s sensorial and perceptual co-ordinates, in order to acknowledge the
collective nature and outward-bound direction of what we still call the self. (Posthuman 193)

What Braidotti wants to characterize here is a nomadic posthuman subject that becomes in multiplicity (Posthuman). The main point here is that the notion of processuality, i.e., of an attention to and study of processes, becomes of prime importance for a posthuman turn in environmental communication theory. We argue that this turn can empower post-anthropocentric, multiple nomadic expressions for a situation or event. Furthermore, we argue that posthuman/post-anthropocentric environmental communication theory has the potential to change how the knowledge of emerging earthly matters can be understood. Communication theory and practice, especially in environmental communication, need to consider more than anthropocentric history. A post-anthropocentric approach in environmental communication thus includes more than the human perspective, and so provides the possibility of warranting nonhuman citizenship in environmental milieux (Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson 76).

Communicative processes express a ‘machinic assemblage’, that is, communicative procedures of repetition and differentiation which express organizations in various ways. As Spoelstra explains: “‘We’ are equally part of ‘organizations’ as ‘organizations’ are part of ‘us’. ‘We’, as well as ‘organizations’, produce what it means to be a ‘we’ or ‘an organization’ in taking part of the primary processes of formation and deformation — in short: in organizing” (84). ‘Organizations’, moreover, offer up a multitude of expressions for communicational processes (Massumi). This means that in a certain space/time situation, the differentiation and repetition of movement and forces will affect the communicative flows in various directions and express various communicative practices.

To develop these thoughts, we will in the following parts of this essay problematize the two concepts that constitute ‘environmental communication’ — that is, environment and communication — for the purpose of challenging anthropocentrism. By elaborating on environmental communication within posthuman theory, we want to enable a radical approach to critically studying situations that express the notion of ‘sustainable development’ as a matter for environmental communication research. ‘Environment’ as a spatial concept and ‘communication’ as a temporal concept for interactions and exchange require location, or perhaps allocation, through a posthuman turn in environmental communication theory.

2. Communication

We argue that communication is a function of and site for relational actions; in other words, communicative actions create the space and time for meaning to emerge through relations. Etymologically, the Latin noun communicatio and the verb communicare imply that the concept of communication involves the action of sharing (Harper, Communication; Peters 6-7). This notion of sharing situates communication in a liminal space of actions and simultaneous becomings in actions as the act of communicating itself. Taken in this sense, communication is about relations and cannot be determined as
an essence (Hayles 91). The major theories within communication research deal with conversation and have mainly focused on linguistic or rhetorical concepts to explain meaning-making in actions (Littlejohn and Foss). Communication as a concept implies a community, which means that a communion of actions can be seen as relational (Jenlink and Banathy xi). This, moreover, implies that an action-space of some kind develops through communication, which, in turn, lets forces and affects emerge that empower the awareness of communicative actions. This implication follows Peters’ argument that communication is never an exclusively human transaction, but rather a border-crossing action: “Communication is perhaps the ultimate border crossing concept, traversing the bounds of species, machines, even divinity” (Peters 228). This challenges notions of communication as requiring communicative procedures with a presupposed interacting subject that is often presumed to be human (Peters 227).

Variations within communication theory and communicative actions can be seen in the use of concepts such as dialogue, discussion, and conversation. Discussion is a communicative concept with a pedagogical intent that presupposes the truth and accuracy of specific ideas in the meaning of a problem or a situation negotiated through different perspectives or subject positions (Hayles 73-74). Discussion defined in this way is thus never about learning, but about interpreting a certain negotiated meaning. Discussion implies the “arrangement” of action-spaces through various arguments that are taken to reflect what is true (Hayles 73-75). Moreover, discussion might presuppose the idea of dialogue, but dialogue is always, as Peters writes, “the dream of identical minds in concert” (241). Communicative dialogue demands a shared problem and often has the purpose of reaching a decision and so degrading one idea in relation to another (Dryzek). The dialogical design thus also disqualifies the concept of equality between the subject positions that contribute to the dialogue (Jenlink and Banathy). Dialogue, Catherine Ryther argues, involves a pedagogical orientation toward learning that presupposes a desire for unity (2-3). This type of desire suggests that truth will always be the truth of those who possess power. Conversations, on the other hand, Ryther argues, emerge in an orientation towards interruption, an interruption which … disrupts the stable order of the symbolic and opens up the possibility for symbolic freedom…. Learning … is not about learning a kind of content but about attending to the disruption that irreducible strangeness introduces. (3)

This means that conversation, as a concept, implies actions that enable learning, and thus becomes a way to provide possibilities for learning within communicative actions. Taking conversations as a mode of communication means that the concept of conversation becomes a first step in challenging communication theories grounded in anthropocentrism. Conversation, viewed in this way, involves the movements or interplay of actions of talking and listening, and this allows a becoming of materiality in conversation (Deleuze and Parnet 3). Deleuze and Guattari problematize communication as a concept by analyzing both its content and its expressive sides. In relation to analysis, Deleuze and Guattari hold that “forms of expression and forms of content communicate through a conjunction of their quanta of relative deterritorialization, each intervening,
operating in the other” (Deleuze and Guattari 97). Deleuze and Guattari here clarify their notion of communication as an event that can be explained as relating to two axes; one axis is the ‘machinic assemblage’ of bodies, which includes actions, passions, and intermingling bodies in reaction; the other axis is the ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’, that is, the acts of making statements and the incorporeal transformations that are attributed to bodies (Deleuze and Guattari 97-98). These axes are territorialized in a situation or an event, and stabilize the idea of becoming a machinic assemblage. Simultaneously, the assemblage also deterritorializes, destabilizes, and differentiates the becoming assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 98). Consequently, communication, in its process, denotes, at the same time, both its content and its expression.

To support these ideas regarding what could be called ‘material movements’ as communicative events, we would like to develop the idea of communication and the function of language within environmental communication, since environmental communication considers material actions and their abstractions as being intertwined with each other as well as mutually dependent on one another. For example, abstractions that are articulated rhetorically through various concepts inevitably become political, or as Claire Colebrook puts it, “Before an actualized language or law there is an affective response, a web of relations or an ecology from which something like the system of lived politics emerges” (Colebrook, “Calculus” 135). Seen in this way, language and law are concepts that develop from forces that affect bodies in transformation to repress the original system of lived politics. Bodies are both embedded in and embodied as an environment, and are thus forced into a politics and a culture that are governed by an anthropocentric discourse.

3. Environment

The concept of environment relates etymologically to a “‘state of being environed’...; ‘the aggregate of the conditions in which a person or thing lives’” (Harper, Environment). The etymology implicates that ‘environment’ is a subject-centered concept, since it always refers to a specific subject and its surroundings, its milieu. In striving for a just and healthy Earth, some critical questions continuously have to be asked: “Whose surroundings?” or “Why is one subject, necessarily, the principal one?” Anthropocentrism marks humans as the dominant subjects and situates humanity at the top of the bio-social hierarchy. ‘Environment’ as a subject-centered concept needs to be problematized and challenged, since anthropocentric hierarchies force us to believe that the environment consists solely of the surroundings of human beings, and so Earth becomes a property possessed by humans alone.

We will address this problem by paying attention to why a turn from subject-centrism is important to how we can come to understand environment as a concept. ‘Centrism’ is an idea that can be connected to the archaic belief that the earth was the center of the universe. This geo-centrism expresses the belief that all planets and stars, including the sun, were orbiting the earth. Geo-centrism was, as is well known, challenged by several scientists, for example Nicholas Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, and Johannes Kepler, whose discoveries turned Earth into just one planet among other planets orbiting the sun,
defining this relationship as heliocentric. Heliocentrism refers to the star ‘sun’ and the planets that orbit around it. This idea does not include other stars or galaxies of the universe. The earth, consequently, was decentered in this scientific turn, meaning that the place of observation (the earth) is no longer the center for what is observed, but the center for observations. A decentered understanding of the point of observation is one of the main arguments for a change from subject-centeredness to a post-anthropocentric perspective on and understanding of the world. This turn allows a radical change in our understanding of the environment as a system of relational actions.

This is what Braidotti implies when she says, “A post-anthropocentric approach allows for a non-binary way of positing the relationship between same and other, between life and death” (“Locating” 99). This approach, furthermore, does not entail ignoring humans or the human body, but provides a way to challenge anthropocentrism. Post-anthropocentrism constitutes a path to challenging the human subject-centeredness in anthropocentrism by turning the idea of being(s), seen as static and determined ‘product(s)’ or ‘thing(s)’, into the idea of becoming, that is, into the processuality of becoming, a processuality of continually becoming as change. In Erin Manning’s writing, this processuality is defined as a conjunction of forces and affects: “The becoming-body takes form only retrospectively in the biogrammatic conjunction of the series. What conjugates the series is the fact that a body will emerge” (Manning 125). In order to begin to think through and conceptualize the concept of ‘environment’, it is important to first recognize and acknowledge that a becoming environmental body is both human and nonhuman. The emergence of bodies is a political becoming, which is something that Colebrook analyzes in an attempt to define and clarify political forces:

The body is neither a brute and determining pre-political given, nor is it an effect of political or ideological representation. Rather, as an idea the body would be the political itself; the body is a relation to what is not itself, a movement or activity from a point of difference to other points of difference. And so difference is neither an imposed scheme on an otherwise uniform substance, nor is difference the relation between already differentiated self-identical entities. What something is, is given through its activity of differentiation. (“From Radical Representations” 87)

To develop the notion of ‘the singular body’ as well as what we call ‘relational affects’, the concept ‘relationscapes’, developed in Erin Manning’s thinking, is useful. ‘Relationscapes’ refers to a non-subject-oriented approach to understanding environment, a milieu, as a multidimensional spatiality, and its temporal situation as an event. By following forces and affects through actions, that is, by recognizing them as biograms, it is possible to recognize and acknowledge the relationality of becoming assemblages, and the emerging human and nonhuman bodies in relation. Relationscapes as a concept provides a possibility for understanding events as flows and movements that express actions of becoming (Kennedy). To recognize forces that affect emerging bodies means to acknowledge relationscapes as relational, that is, as expressing machinic assemblage.
‘Environment’ as a concept thus turns into the concept of ‘relationscapes’ in the shift from a product-centered representative perspective to the notion of processuality within various expressions. The concept ‘relationscapes’ expresses becoming as a machinic assemblage, giving rise to new perspectives on life (and death), and also explaining the flows and movements of forces and affects within an emerging non-subject-centered environment (Deleuze and Guattari; Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*; Braidotti, "Locating”; Kennedy).

4. Affects: A Pedagogical Turn from Anthropocentrism to Post-Anthropocentrism

Deleuze notes that each situation is an event, and that an event is an expression (*Foucault* 87), and based on Deleuze’s argument, we suggest that coming to understand an event through its movement provides the expression of actions from which meanings emerge. Active knowing involves a situation from which learning emerges, and through which understanding is communicated. This, we suggest, constitutes a pedagogical turn in environmental communication that relates to situations that can be understood post-anthropocentrically.

In Donna Haraway’s writing, the human body becomes a matter for post-anthropocentric or even non-anthropocentric relations in repetition that, precisely, challenges the embodiment of the human biological body as anthropocentric:

> [H]uman genomes can be found in only 10 percent of all the cells that occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play in a symphony necessary to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the rest of me, of us, no harm. (*When Species Meet* 3-4)

What Haraway expresses here is how the human body is articulated as an assemblage within what we call relational communication, or communication which shapes biological practice as the assemblage of the human body. This assemblage consists of a set of relationscapes that emerges through relational communication between genes and genomes in a flow of movements. The relationscapes, with inherent forces, affect the biological creature that is defined by the concept “human”; the human being is thus nothing other than materialization in action. Moreover, we argue that biological actions are always social actions that are relational and in relation. This relationality in process gives rise to the fusion of matter and meaning: “Matter and meaning are not separate elements. They are inextricably fused together, and no event, no matter how energetic, can tear them asunder” (*Barad, Meeting 3*). Matter and meaning are the expression and the content that meet in the becoming actions of and for emerging bodies. This can be conceptualized as relationscapes, with flows of forces that affect the various processes for understanding materialities as situations where meaning emerges. What the meaning of a human body can be, taking into account the forces and affects of the conceptual and material matters in communication, is what Deleuze asks about in the form of the following question:
The question is not that of the human compound, whether conceptual or real, perceptible or articulable. The question concerns the forces that make up man: with what other forces do they combine, and what is the compound that emerges? (Foucault 73)

To begin to address this question, we assume that the body is a political body, and we furthermore argue that the political is made up of forces within pedagogical actions that affect the emerging relationscapes. One example of these political forces is the androcentric idea that the male human separates from the female human in a hierarchical machinery. From a critical feminist perspective, we get the possibility of recognizing and acknowledging various relationscapes. To understand the potentials of a feminist critique, and to counter the problem inherent in any hierarchy, Colebrook suggests that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ should be seen as part of ‘human’ differentiations in which the significant action is to become woman and not man:

If the idea of “man” is that being who can give birth to himself, create himself anew and be in command of his own futurity, then the idea of “woman” is perhaps that of a being who recognizes that the self is not owner of itself, created through a past that can never be rendered fully self-present. (“Stratigraphic” 12)

By developing this argument, it is possible to propose a non-androcentric approach to the idea of relationscapes. A non-androcentric approach has the potential to express the political forces of feminist actions, since these feminist forces will enact the processuality of becoming, which should not be confused with the existence of a determined being. Colebrook develops a striated9 notion of time-space situations regarding man and woman, and also provides a new explanation for the idea of situated knowledge, a concept that Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway (“Situated”) had previously explored. However, we follow Braidotti’s argument concerning this concept, which makes the striated notion of space/time situations useful within environmental theory, in that a nomadic subject becomes political through forces that affect the formation of meaning:

The feminist practice of the politics of locations, later to become situated knowledge, provides the missing link between the theory and the practice of a non-unitary, relational and outward-bound definition of the subject. (Transpositions 250)

These actions, we argue, which take place in time/space situations, are the becoming of the political, and are, furthermore, inherently communicative. Thus, becoming, as communication, is a way of thinking that is always in process, through which knowledge becomes the abstraction of communication. Communication, seen as a concept in process, is always performative, and the abstraction of communication is the passage from expression into content. As Massumi notes:
The performative is a direct avenue for the passage of expression into content. Deleuze and Guattari argue that every use of language carries a certain performative force, if only because it presupposes a conventional context of intelligibility, and that conventional girding brings pressure to bear toward a certain manner of response. (19)

In other words, Massumi’s notion of the ‘lines of flight’ of performance (derived from Deleuze and Guattari) coincides with the idea of knowledge as the abstraction within communication. To pursue this idea opens up possibilities for writing performative maps within a liminal temporal and spatial realm of relationality, by writing lines of flight related to various actions. This action generates a situation where learning actions arrange understanding into meaning. Meanings differ within the actual articulation of understanding, and are significant for the differentiated nomadic subjects within the communicative acts. Knowledge is thus the abstraction within communication, and in consequence understanding, or what is known, becomes the content of both matter and meaning in communicative actions. This also relates to memory and to the remembering of various situations as relationscapes. The relationscapes have the possibility of articulating memories to relational members within the relationscapes. These memories are relational and remembered through various performative archives that take on materiality, which provides the possibility of understanding various situations and events.

5. Environmental Communication within Posthuman Theory

Barad’s thinking in “Posthuman Performativity” and Meeting the Universe Halfway gives us some keys for enabling a “posthuman” environmental communication theory. She questions the place of language in communication theory and highlights the significance of interaction. She challenges the strong emphasis on language in communication theory by focusing on the materiality of language (Meeting 132; 211). However, Barad centers on the communicative act, which differs from the notion of becoming that we want to develop in this essay. The focus on making or acting in Barad’s thinking turns communication into an apparatus for engagement through intra-actions. In order to understand communicative actions, Barad problematizes interaction as a key concept within communication theory, because interaction as a concept articulates a priori statements of communicators (Barad, Meeting; see also Parisi). To challenge the concept ‘interaction’ through the concept ‘intra-action’ enables us to understand becoming as processuality within communication theory. As Barad notes, “‘intra-action’ signifies the mutual constitution of relata within phenomena (in contrast to ‘interaction’, which assumes the prior existence of distinct entities)” (Meeting 429; emphasis in original).

Interaction emphasizes the process as product, and by exchanging this concept with intra-action, processuality is emphasized. Interaction as a concept is problematic because it presupposes entities a priori, that is, beings that might be confused with being, i.e., beings that are static and determined. Intra-action, Barad argues, is also useful since it contests the traditional fixation on words and things as representational instead of as expressing the relationality between materialities (Meeting 139). The discrepancy between Barad’s notion of intra-action and the way this concept is used in this text is significant, since
communication, seen as part of the process of becoming, and not only as an activity, relates to both content and actions. The concept of intra-action thus ties in to the idea of ‘becoming material’ (Barad, Meeting). This, in turn, challenges the hierarchy within communication theory that poses words as representations (Barad, Meeting 139). There are two diverging ideas in this reasoning (using Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts): 1) that of becoming communication as the collective assemblage of enunciation, and 2) that of becoming through and within communicative actions as the machinic assemblage of bodies. Keeping these two ideas in mind, we suggest that words are abstractions within communication, that is, that words are always more than simply representations of something. Words are shapes, configurations within the communication process that stress the assemblage of enunciation.

A posthuman/post-anthropocentric environmental communication theory becomes possible when thinking in terms of forces and affects is actualized. Posthuman environmental communication theory can be used as a method of analyzing ethical consequences in various projects and actions, and aims to reinvent the insistent urge in society to measure individuals against corporations and human survival against the usurpation of the planet, as, for example, in UNESCO’s “Man and Biosphere programme for sustainability.” This theory highlights the idea that human beings are incapable of reading forces or matters that are not those of bodies: “For man, as individual, is precisely defined as a figure of self-ownership, appropriation and survival, with the environment always being that which environs or surrounds a proper body” (Colebrook, ”Calculus” 152). Posthuman environmental communication theory thus becomes a function of and a tool for understanding relational actions between social machines and desiring machines; as Colebrook notes, social machines are “the productive relation between bodies.... Desiring machines are relations that are not yet organized according to named bodies” (“Legal” 18). Environmental communication in this way becomes political, and by being political, environmental communication enacts a posthuman ethical desire.

This ethical desire changes the anthropocentric philosophical discussion by modifying the questions “what am I?” and “why am I?” and instead opening up the capacity for infinite thought that is found in the question “what is love?” (MacCormack 148). The following words from MacCormack express the function of posthuman ethical thoughts quite well:

Posthuman Ethics asks not what the posthuman is, but how posthuman theory creates new, imaginative ways of understanding relations between lives. Ethics is a practice of activist, adaptive and creative interaction which avoids claims to overarching moral structures.... Posthuman Ethics examines certain kinds of bodies to think new relations that offer liberty and a contemplation of the practices of power which have been exerted upon bodies. (1)

This ethical shift articulates an ethical desire within environmental communication for a posthuman turn that allows meaning within communicative actions to be understood as forces and affects within sensible relations, in and for life.
An environmental communication that works from within posthuman theory has the potential to problematize the often-taken-for-granted concepts ‘environment’ and ‘communication’. Such a challenge enables a turn from anthropocentrism to post-anthropocentrism, and opens up ethical desires that focus on posthuman needs. By affirming the relational communication that becomes in repetition and deterritorialization, in life and with life, these actions come to be understood as relationscapes for “new” or becoming territorializations.13

Environmental communication, from a posthuman perspective, is a function that challenges the present, when seen as a determined self-presence, by offering an open invitation for change when it comes to content and expression. It suggests a present that is a becoming future in process. Environmental communication thus works through the articulation of affirmative becoming, in which various nomadic posthuman subjects come to understand relationscapes by acknowledging posthuman relations.

What posthuman theory adds to environmental communication as a field of research and as a practice is the development of a post-anthropocentric perspective that considers environmental issues as relational; that is, it offers a process of desires within studied posthuman relationscapes from which to elaborate concepts such as sustainability. From the perspective of posthuman environmental communications, the concept ‘sustainability’ reflects the desires that can allow the earth to become a healthy and equalized spatiality for life and about life through various temporal relationscapes.

6. A Post-Anthropocentric Turn and the Desire for Sustainability

Here is an example of how a post-anthropocentric position might inform environmental communication. In the United Nations document Our Common Future, we see an environmental communication that aims “to achieve a just and healthy Earth” through activities that promote ‘sustainable development’. However, sustainable development as a concept consists of a word combination that might be read as contradictory, namely through the tension that emerges on the one hand from the constraints of the word ‘sustain’, which infers a conserving, protecting, and preserving of socio-physical relationships to guard them against change, and on the other hand from an understanding of the word ‘development’ as implying some sort of process incorporating progress that can cause positive change. In the UN document, sustainable development is described as follows:

Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:

• the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and
• the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. *(Our Common Future)*

Here, sustainable development and sustainability are expressed in terms of a balancing of the world’s resources, grounded in the management of nature’s capacity to provide for the poor people of the world. This process comes to a start when a political body enters into relation with other bodies, such as, for example, in the so-called market *(Colebrook, “Calculus” 151)*. Within communicative activities in which relational environmental actions matter, the concept ‘sustainability’ becomes an assemblage that participates in an economic machinery. In this sense, the concept ‘development’, as used in the United Nations document, treats nature in terms of an exclusively human environment that provides necessary resources for human beings. Nature’s being seen as a resource for human beings to exploit indicates that it is being perceived through an anthropocentric worldview, in which ecological processes become economic issues for human society.

The human market system is an assemblage of human actors who define the activities that emerge through agents that are both nonhuman and human. Since economy is a matter of value, the economy becomes a method for evaluating ecological processes, and actions concerned with evaluating ecological processes involve environmental ethics, and are thus articulated as a moral effort. Issues involving environmental ethics are part of an ongoing discussion in which debates over where interest should be focused, along with notions of responsibility, are salient.\(^\text{14}\) Environmental ethics is of interest here, since the question of what needs there are and who the needy are involves ethical considerations within environmental communicative processes. MacCormack suggests the posthuman perspective in the following way: “a-human posthuman ethics offer[s] the possibility of threshold subjectivity” *(119)*.\(^\text{15}\) The matter of being in need and the matter of needs themselves are not necessarily only concerns for humans, a fact that is pointed out by scholars such as Kalof and Fitzgerald; Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson; Wolfe; Kahn; and Monani. Within anthropocentric environmental communication, the formation of knowledge often only considers human needs and humans as being in need. This anthropocentric idea has been articulated as ecosystem services, or nature services, where nonhumans’ actions are recognized as a valuable part of the economic market: “Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life” *(Daily 3)*. ‘Nature services’, or ‘Ecosystem services’, frame nature and biodiversity within the human economic society that designates ecological processes as resources *(Daily; Chapin, Kofinas, and Folke)*. In line with this, what is highly questionable is the apparatus by which ecological processes are represented as ecosystem services that articulate the actions of different agents as parts of a nonhuman assemblage, and thus as actors that are evaluated within the human labor market, which is equivalent to the human workforce. The apparatus is reduced to a function of machineries, which should not be confused with the machinery, that is, the becoming movement, the flow, and the actual actions in action *(Deleuze and Guattari 559-560)*. Nonhuman actions, viewed as labor, will, in consequence, never give nonhuman agents anything but an instrumental position *(Freeman)*, since labor is relational and has no value in itself *(Peterson, Hall,
FeldPauscher-Parker, and Peterson 116, following Marx 588). To formulate ecosystem services is to formulate an articulation of ecological processes that recognizes and acknowledges the agents’ actions as resources. Sometimes human actions are recognized as resources within society, and as such they are seen as resources without agency, and as a consequence some humans run the risk of being objectified (Taylor; Freeman). When people are turned into resources, it leads to a human-to-human interaction that, in turn, forms hierarchical divisions within and between human societies (Escobar, “Culture”; Escobar, “Ecology”; Jasanoff; Jahanbegloo and Shiva).

In “Culture Sits in Places” and “An Ecology of Difference,” Arturo Escobar pays close attention to the forces inherent in human societies that affect their plurality, and also to the importance of critically acknowledging and recognizing this plurality. Feminist scholars such as Sheila Jasanoff, Vandana Shiva, Rosi Braidotti, and Donna Haraway raise critical arguments against the way evaluation of social machineries is affirmed and recognized in relation to the idea of a hierarchical and androcentric ecological order. Many scholars have acknowledged how nonhumans as well as dehumanized humans are relegated into a position of slavery, and recognized as slaves by the monetary markets. This recognition, moreover, provides an example of how relationality as an assemblage of forces and affects becomes a political, ecological, and economic matter that questions the androcentric forces within these social machines. But if environmental communication subscribes to “generating and debating multiple legitimate answers to the question of how to achieve a just and healthy Earth” (Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson 83), then “sustainability emerges … as a central concept in social theory and it raises suitable complex questions of methodology” (Braidotti, Transpositions 206).

In line with these thoughts, sustainability becomes an anthropogenic matter for post- or non-anthropocentric articulations exploring human and nonhuman needs. Recognizing the needs of and behind the agents’ actions is only a first step; these needs should also be acknowledged and affirmed as relational communicative actions for both human and nonhuman assemblages. When this is achieved, human and nonhuman agents involved in relational actions as partners become nomadic posthuman subjects that produce a real post-anthropocentric possibility.

Analogous with the terms ‘ecosystem services’ and ‘nature services’, we suggest the term ‘biosphere services’, which is the articulation of biosphere processes and relational actions that are formed and formulated within a post-human market. Furthermore, labor, seen as consisting of intra-actions, is a function necessary for creating possible machinic assemblages for post-human livelihood, which makes it possible to understand such assemblages as relationscapes. The concept ‘biosphere services’ thus explores post- or non-anthropocentric relational actions, in which biosphere services, as a concept, articulates activities in which human and nonhuman intra-actions and biosphere processes become processes for intra-change, by raising the value of life and the conditions for life. Biosphere processes, articulated through biosphere services, recognize the living and non-living material in these processes, which can then become acknowledged as having relational communicative value within forces affecting relationscapes.
Evaluation, as related to value, takes place when needs are articulated and conceptualized through recognition and acknowledgement of various human and non-human assemblages. A deterritorialized social assemblage involves participating allies in relationscapes. The intra-actions determine the exchange value for a post-anthropocentric market. Still, as long as the market refers to a human monetary economy, the possible gains for nonhumans can only be realized as an anthropogenic knowledge-formulating activity, because money has no value in a post-anthropocentric market.

Environmental communication concerning sustainable development as a concept and a practice is a process where sustainability materializes and articulates. Processes for sustainability involve actions in a liminal time-space situation where environmental communication expresses desires for “a just and healthy Earth” that are significant for a specific time-space situation or event.

7. Desires for a Just and Healthy Earth

A posthuman/post-anthropocentric ethics expresses a relational desire within a social machinery simultaneously with other desires, such as desires relating to survival, greed, and pleasure, and so connects specific bodies with a collective body to coordinate a shared spatiality through actions. We argue that various ethical desires are transformed within abstract machines to work through ideas relating to desirable repetitive actions that aim toward sustainability. Various repetitive actions express communicative forces that qualify certain possibilities or opportunities that in turn affect the communicative practice. From this perspective, repetitive actions become the organizing forces, generating organizations that transform desires into forces capable of communicating different ethical expressions.

If we argue that Environmental Philosophy formulates various ideas that matter within environmental ethics, this would be incompatible with the post-anthropocentric ideas by which the environment becomes a matter for post-human actions. Ethics, as Massumi writes, is about processuality, since ethics “is not about applying a critical judgment to expression’s product. It is about evaluating where its processual self-conversions lead” (xxvi). Ethics, as such a processual evaluation, produces, we suggest, a critical mapping from the reading of performative archives, which means that ethics becomes the tie that binds in relations both for and in a life that matters.

Situations that can be characterized as practices for and about sustainable development become through and within intra- and inter-actions, and this is what we would like to call the liminal actions in environmental communication. Inter-actions as well as intra-actions shape organizations17 through the repetitive actions of communicative practices, and the processuality of these communicative practices is the vehicle from which understanding and meaning materialize and are verbalized. In communicative acts, humans and nonhumans are continuously evaluated through various communicative practices that are intended for all forms of actions. This evaluation becomes an ethical issue that is important for pedagogical processes. That is, posthuman/post-
anthropocentric ethics is important because it verbalizes relational actions in relation to political matters that formalize desire, having an impact on all forms of pedagogical processes, such as education, teaching, or learning actions.

8. Concluding Remarks

In posthuman/post-anthropocentric terms, this text describes and develops the idea of a research perspective concerned with processuality, in which every situation is an event that matters. Posthuman environmental communication theory provides an answer to Rogers’ desire to radically change the conceptions of humans, nature, material conditions, and discourse by enabling a “reconstruction of a different relationship to the environment in which we live” (268).

This perspective brings with it the recognition that a situation, an event, is an expression in which posthuman environmental communication theory provides an opportunity to understand the relational processes of life and in life. Moreover, the approach we have developed proposes a potential posthuman-postanthropocentric turn within environmental communication, which necessarily entails a consideration of a posthuman-postanthropocentric ethics.
Notes

1 Constructivist ideas are used to formulate various models for managing both humans and nature, such as, e.g., social-ecological systems analysis and resilience theory (Chapin, Kofinas, and Folke; Schultz, Folke, and Olsson; Cox), or environmental communication analysis and environmental communication, as described by Jurin, Roush, and Danter. Post-structuralist, post-colonialist, and feminist theorists such as, e.g., Mellor; Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson; Chen, Milstein, Anguino, Sandoval, and Knudsen; Milstein (“Nature Identification”); and Rogers have challenged these ideas.

2 As Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson write, for citizenship “to move beyond the division between speaking social subjects (humans), and silent objects (nonhumans), we must foreground the claim that humans and extrahumans interact by modifying each other’s experiences and consequences.... [S]ince extrahumans are real, in that they experience and are social, their citizenship and subjecthood hinges on their ability to participate in political discourse.... Extrahumans, however, cannot gain citizenship in political communities without spokespersons in the political process of decision-making” (78).

3 “Assemblage” denotes that things do not have a single, stable identity or essence; rather, “they affirm a view in which disparate ‘sub-elements’ of the world are combined/combinable in many different ways to constitute what we think of as things and processes: bodily organs and persons, valleys and nations. What exists is the more or less random and temporary collection or assemblage of affects and events, now combined one way, then another” (Mugerauer 188).

4 Differentiation opens “thinking to powers of difference beyond the concept” (Colebrook, Deleuze 10). “In a bifurcating world, a multiplicity is defined not by its center but by the limits and borders where it enters into relations with other multiplicities and changes nature, transforms itself” (Smith 203).

5 Repetition refers to the idea of ‘becoming body’, not as representational, but actually and materially; “each repetition and re-articulation is open to new determinations and senses” (Colebrook, Deleuze 80). “[T]rue repetition addresses something singular, unchangeable, and different, without ‘identity’. Instead of exchanging the similar and identifying the Same, it authenticates the different” (Deleuze, Logic 287).

6 Börebäck writes about the procedures of environmental communication in two biosphere reserves that express organizations through the notions of agonistic pluralism in one place and deliberative consensus in another.

7 Considering the whole universe, this is an idea that is relational rather than subject-centered. The notion of the universe is today post-heliocentric with various competing ideas regarding explanations, often connected to the Big Bang theory and Einstein’s relativity theory.
As Colman states, “Affect is the intensive power that propels extensive actions” (84). “The affection-image registers a process of interval that occurs in between perception and action; the juncture where something happens. This place, this domain, this juncture, this encounter, are all sites where the affection-image creates a change — this may be chemical, sensorial, structural, durational, intellectual, cognitive, perceptual — a relational affect” (Colman 84-85).

‘Striated space’, write Deleuze and Guattari, “is defined by the requirements of long-distance vision: constancy of orientation, invariance of distance through an interchange of inertial points of reference, interlinkage by immersion in an ambient milieu, constitution of central perspective” (545).

Deleuze and Guattari define ‘line of flight’ [ligne de fuite] in the following way: “Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions” (9-10).

As Parisi states, Barad “draws from Bohr’s distinction between the interaction of independent entities (or relata) and intra-action of relata-within-phenomena. For Bohr, relata are not prior to intra-active components. Rather, specific intra-actions make relata dependent on phenomena” (Parisi 78).

As Barad says, the “causal relationship between the apparatuses of bodily production and the phenomena produced is one of agential intra-action” (Meeting 139).

On ‘territorialization’ Deleuze and Guattari note the following: “[A] territorialized, assembled function acquires enough independence to constitute a new assemblage, one that is more or less deterritorialized, en route to deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari 357). And they also states, “[T]he territorial assemblage territorializes functions and forces (sexuality, aggressiveness, gregariousness, etc.), and in the process of territorializing them, transforms them. But these territorialized functions and forces can suddenly take on an autonomy that makes them swing over into other assemblages, compose other deterritorialized assemblages” (Deleuze and Guattari 358-359).

There are numerous scholars who write on environmental ethical thinking, such as Aldo Leopold, whose Sand County Almanac explores ideas regarding management as a relational action of thinking with nature. Similarly, Arne Næss argues for an ecosophy recognizing the inherent value of all living beings (Næss and Sessions). This particular form of ecosophy, called deep ecology, aims to shape environmental policies from
ecosophical tenets (Næss and Sessions). Mark Rowland developed a critical alternative to the idea of inherent value, and criticized, for example, evolution with his notion of affordances. Rosi Braidotti (*Posthuman*), Jane Bennett, and Patricia MacCormack have all developed the idea of a posthuman ethics and its consequences.

15 “Threshold(s) are the becoming that refuse the fathomless empty space between meaning and communication, living as legal status, subject communicating transcendentally to like subject, the space often filled by the bodies of women, animals, the queer, diffabled, the monstrous, for symbolic and actual exchange between subjects and their relationship with knowledge and consumption” (MacCormack 121).

16 Among these scholars can be mentioned, for example, Haraway, Benhabib, Jahanbegloo and Shiva, and Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson.

17 This follows how Spoelstra (84) and Massumi express organization, of which Börebäck gives an example, showing how inter- and intra-actions are significant for organizing environmental communication and the meaning-making process.

18 By “we” Rogers refers to humans, but the authors of this essay suggest that “we” involves both human and nonhumans.
References


Milstein, Tema. “Environmental Communication.” In Littlejohn and Foss, eds. 344-349.


Wals, Aarjen E. J. “Between Knowing What Is Right and Knowing That Is It Wrong to Tell Others What Is Right: On Relativism, Uncertainty and Democracy in

1. Introduction: The Philosophical Premises of Models of Democracy

The analyses that follow are based on the idea that the development of institutions in any given society is channeled through philosophical theories. These theories determine the way we think about humankind, knowledge and values, relationships between the individual and the collective, etc. Highlighting these philosophical premises allows us to understand not only democratic models that have historically developed, but also the models of humanity that are associated with them.

In this approach, two main theses are supported. The first thesis is that modern individuality has emerged based on the recognition that the faculty of independent thinking — or autonomy of judgment — founds humankind. From this recognition follows the moral necessity that political power be rooted in those who are governed.

The second thesis is freely based on the work of the American epistemologist Filmer Northrop (*Meeting*). Using analyses made by Northrop as support, we observe that an epistemic duality of sources of human knowledge lies at the heart of some of the major trends of modern epistemology. We contend that this epistemic duality opens a path that is distinct from both the ontological dualism of classical rationalism and the radical empiricisms derived from classical empiricism, though it includes their main teachings. This path invites us to rethink the sources of free thinking in the knowing subject; the epistemic duality that characterizes the major currents of modern epistemology gives real meaning to models of participatory democracy to which schools contribute through their cognitive role.

2. The Human Faculty for Independent Thinking and Modern Individuality

2.1. A Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason and a Quest for Accessing Certainty

Our analysis begins with the following questions: How has modern democratic individuality emerged historically? What is the point of rupture from the earlier period, and what is most essentially significant about this rupture as far as teaching is concerned? To approach the initial issues underlying the new comprehension of humankind that opened the way for modernity, we will refer to the texts of those great thinkers who were
the first to participate in its emergence — Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes and Jan Amos Comenius among others — and to the works of those who described this emergence while benefiting from its great historical proximity, as did Nicolas Condorcet in his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind [Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain].

The first thing we note is that the same idea occupied the thoughts of these philosophers and scientists at the dawn of modernity: they all hoped to define the yardstick by which human knowledge should be measured, and the way it should be built. They combated in this regard the error and superstition that had arisen from vague concepts, faulty premises, and archaic methods that automatically produced errors because they remained confined to a universe of postulations and logical deductions. Scholastic logic had developed a line of thought based on premises, notions, and concepts borrowed from authoritative books, not comparing the proposed theses with any criteria of certainty except for the credit granted to the authors studied. Thus, the major works that marked the emergence of this new era of human thought attacked beliefs and notions that had been accepted without examination. Scholasticism was targeted by the thinkers of this period because it had been unable to found human knowledge. It justified, through the Aristotelian system, a stable, hierarchical, and teleological social order. Moreover, it was able to accommodate religious beliefs and represented the official doctrine of the Church. In short, it led to a confinement of human thought within limited dominant forms of intellectual, political and religious authority, offering no external criteria of truth.

Condorcet designates Bacon, Galileo and Descartes as the three men who most marked the period from which modernity emerged — Bacon because he recommended the renunciation of all beliefs and concepts and a retention of only those ideas with a proven degree of certainty, without being able to offer a clear or acceptable method; Galileo for his discoveries and method, although these were limited to the mathematical and physical sciences; and Descartes for imprinting on minds their own movement to seek the truth.

Bacon explains that in syllogism, everything is based on the value of manipulated notions, and that these notions have no other foundation than the authority of the authors who use them. As a precursor of classical empiricism, his stance is in direct opposition to this position. Rather than taking books as the point of origin, Bacon argued, data drawn from experience should be used. Our only hope for establishing well-founded reasoning, he claimed, lies in “true and proper induction” (109).

The great educator of the 17th century, Comenius, also points out the scholastic tendency to rely on abstract, unproven concepts. In search of a new teaching method, he found in Bacon’s works a primary but incomplete source of inspiration, because, in his opinion, it lacked solid demonstrations. His conclusion was less radical than Bacon’s, and more inclusive. According to Comenius, a profound amendment of Aristotelian philosophy had to be carried out, with every investigation using the three major sources of knowledge: the senses, reason, and the Holy Scriptures.
The fall of the Aristotelian system due to the discoveries of modern physics, with Galileo’s and Newton's replacement of final causes with mechanic causality, made the shortcomings of the older system stand out even more. In his *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*, Galileo mocks the geocentric Aristotelian interpretation maintained by the Simplicio character. Under the impact of such attacks, the system of final causes that had formed the basis of the stable, hierarchical representation of society in medieval theories of government started collapsing. Filmer Northrop highlights the substantial links between Aristotle’s conception of nature as a hierarchical system governed by final causes and the medieval world’s philosophical representation of the universe and humankind. In the Aristotelian model, any individual thing or substance could be understood teleologically according to its final state or goal, and it participated via its form in a natural, hierarchical system in which species were included within the larger classes, the genera, so that “the formal and final causes of all individual things fit together organically into a hierarchic unity and pattern” (Northrop, *Meeting* 276). Human souls, for example, were the form of their material body with no metaphysical gulf. This representation was well reflected in the medieval organization of society and of power in the feudal system, within which the source of sovereignty lay not in the private opinion of the individual, but in the objective, organic, hierarchical principle joining individuals to each other in the community (see Northrop, *Meeting* 173).

With Galileo and Newton, however, nature became likened to a homogeneous space, and consequently, it could be calculated mathematically. The issue was to discover the laws governing the movement of bodies in that space. From then on, or in connection with these epistemological developments, conceptions of human existence could only be profoundly redefined, as there were now two sources of knowledge that could be distinguished — subjective sensed data on one hand, and public, physical objects in a mathematically defined space on the other hand.

In his *Sketch*, Condorcet argues that Descartes is the philosopher who first was able to convince all human beings that they possess within themselves the power of knowledge: Descartes had “stimulated men’s minds, and this all the wisdom of his rivals had never done. He commanded men to shake off the yoke of authority, to recognize none save that which was avowed by reason, and he was obeyed, because he won men by his boldness and led them by his enthusiasm. The human mind was not yet free but it knew that it was formed to be so” (*Sketch* 122). According to Condorcet, with regard to this era that was opening to democratic modernity, each man had learned that nature had not destined him to believe in the word of others, and so each man had discovered his right to employ his own reason to grasp the truth.

### 2.2. Human Faculties of Judgment and Democratic Modernity

Modern democratic individuality thus emerged from the recognition of the independent thinking faculties of the human mind, and, in parallel, from the rejection of all intellectual or moral authority, and of any belief imposed on the individual in a dogmatic way. There was no questioning of the idea of truth *per se*, which explains why neither relativism nor
subjectivism follows from this recognition. But truth could not be based on any authority or dogma, i.e., on anything that must be accepted without examination.

The recognition of this individual power to know and to judge involves the possibility of inferring human rights “from the single truth ... that man is a sentient being, capable of reasoning and of acquiring moral ideas” (Condorcet, *Sketch* 128). Such recognition opens up the moral impossibility of dividing humanity between those who govern and those who obey. Therefore, human faculties for independent thinking, or autonomy of judgment, appear historically as the *raisons d’être* of modern democracy. But this recognition is not just a proposed principle. Independent thinking must be real, or at least achieved; without this, democracy would not be a viable form of government, or it would be nothing more than autocracy in disguise.

In brief, the emergence of modernity appears to be characterized by a rejection of any dogma or belief imposed on individuals on the basis of faith. Negatively, this rejection expresses the profound feeling of a lack of method. Positively, it represents a striving toward truth, a call for certainty. This striving had to be assumed by each individual; otherwise any power over minds would be left to new dogmas and superstitions.

Alexis de Tocqueville notes that the French have generalized and highlighted the philosophical method that consists of submitting every idea to self-examination and that, in a very general way, this method forms part of the essence of democracy. Nevertheless, he puts this method into perspective based on the impossibility of proving to ourselves all the truths we make use of every day, and our inability, if need be, to conduct any thorough examination. Tocqueville also refers to the need for beliefs that are dogmatic, received, and therefore indisputable, so that “the minds of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas” (*Democracy* 493). These reflections reveal the problem, inherent in the foundation of a modern democratic order, of reconciliation between individuals’ independent thinking and collective agreement. Its resolution depends on the knowledge theories involved and is part of a historical development of philosophical theories that the second part of this analysis aims to bring to light.

3. Knowledge Theories and Democracies

3.1. Towards an Analysis of the Epistemological Premises of Models of Democracy

If human faculties for independent thinking are the basis of modern democratic individuality, knowledge theories developed by the various philosophical systems take on a substantial share of responsibility in the definitions of models of democracy. That is why we propose to continue our analysis of the philosophical premises underlying models of democracy by focusing on the evolution of epistemological ideas.

If every person has faculties of judgment — faculties that underpin the demands of democracy — we still must ascertain what lies behind the sources of truth in every person. Whatever the truth is, the means of accessing it should be cultivated in each
individual in order to ensure democracy’s survival. Let us keep in mind three possible paths offered by the history of modern ideas: the path of innate ideas, which refer, with Descartes, to a link to transcendence; the path of sensorial experience, which refers to the sensitivity of each individual; and a third path, according to which the theoretical constructs invented during the course of human history become individual tools used in any search for understanding of the world and of truth. What deserves further consideration is the specific character of these theoretical constructs, all of which represent artificial devices that cannot be reduced to empirical data.

On this subject, we will briefly introduce the theory of knowledge presented by the American epistemologist Filmer Northrop (Logic) and its links with advances in modern epistemology. We then will highlight a number of strong relationships that bring together knowledge theories and models of democracy, freely drawing support from the analyses developed by Northrop in his work *The Meeting of East and West*. Finally, we will deduce from the paths opened by modern epistemology a few important consequences for democratic individuality.

3. 2. Epistemic Duality and Advances in Modern Epistemology

We note from the outset that Northrop's views are consistent with the conceptions of other major epistemologists such as Emile Meyerson, Henry Margenau, Gaston Bachelard, Karl Popper, and more recently, Nancy Cartwright. What links these philosophers is the epistemic duality elaborated in their knowledge theories, which distinguish two irreducible dimensions of thought, one theoretical and the other empirical.

The title of a major work by Emile Meyerson, *Identity and Reality*, refers to this duality. According to Meyerson, human understanding nourishes a need that the things being manipulated by the mind conserve a stable identity over time. This need must be conciliated with the fact that elements of reality appear to be indefinitely changing. The aim of the mind is not to represent the world directly, but to account for interactions between elements in the world. Therefore, elements manipulated by the mind can remain the same — they are not directly induced by the observation of reality — while their arrangement changes. From this point, with the same formal, postulated elements, it is possible to make quite different sets appear, just as with the same alphabetic letters, to borrow with Meyerson an image from Aristotle, we can write both a tragedy and a comedy. The elements that remain stable over time are theoretical concepts or constructs — concepts “by postulation” in Northrop’s view, as we will see in the next section.

In accordance with Albert Einstein’s views, the duality of the ultimate sources of human knowledge accounts for the fact that humankind gains knowledge of an external, public world only by speculative means (see Northrop, *Philosophical Anthropology* 62, and Einstein 60). This duality justifies the notion of epistemological rupture put forward by Bachelard, and Popper’s proposal regarding the relative independence of a “third world” that lies at the edge of both the physical-chemical world and the world of subjectivity. This world of productions of the human mind is relatively autonomous and self-
developing. It also ultimately explains “how the laws of physics lie,” according to Cartwright. This duality lies at the very heart of the epistemology of Margenau — who proposes a conceptualization close to that of Northrop — just as, we can note, it also lies at the heart of the psychology of intellectual development provided by the father of the historical-cultural school of developmental psychology, Lev Vygotsky. In Vygotsky’s work, the structured, hierarchical organization of theoretical concept systems accounts for the potentialities of logical reflexive thought, just as in the works of Northrop, Margenau or Meyerson, as we will see, it accounts for the possibility of distinguishing causal reasoning from a mere record of repetitive temporal sequences.

These epistemologies conflict with older essentialist epistemologies which support a model based on a correspondence theory of truth. They also conflict with all the experiential theories of knowledge that are still anchored in classical empiricism. The meaning of theoretical concepts does not refer to anything pertaining to another reality or to anything given by the senses. This was seen by John Dewey, who emphasized the hypothetical status of these concepts as meeting the needs of a structure marked by formal relationships for making deductions possible (cf., for instance, Dewey, *Quest*, chap. vi). But Dewey did not provide a well-defined dual theory of concepts, more concerned as he was with assembling every concept under a whole functional or operational conception. In order to derive some consequences for modern democratic individuality from a dual conception of the ultimate sources of human knowledge, we turn to Northrop’s works.

### 3. 3. The Epistemology of Filmer Northrop

Northrop's epistemology is based on the existence of two sets of concepts that differ in nature. The concepts belonging to the first set get their meaning by denotative reference to something directly sensed or immediately experienced. These are concepts gained by intuition or by inspection. Here intuition does not mean a speculative hunch, but the immediate empirical act of apprehension that occurs in direct inspection or pure observation (Northrop, *Logic* 36). The concepts belonging to the second set — concepts by postulation (scientific concepts or theoretical concepts) — do not refer directly to the world. They are imageless concepts: they derive their meaning from entities and relations that exist by means of assumption rather than as a result of immediate apprehension. In other words, they are an integral part of systems of concepts, and their meaning depends on the other concepts to which they are linked. If the concept of blue, referring to the color blue as it is perceived, belongs, for example, to the first set — the set of concepts by intuition — the color blue as a wavelength belongs to the second set — the set of concepts by postulation. Postulated concepts are not *a priori*, that is, extant prior to experience and independent from it, like axioms that might lead to our vision of the world; nor are they discovered *a posteriori*, based on inductive processes essentially born of experience. These are human creations that cannot be reduced to experience and which present, moreover, no value in terms of obligation or categorical necessity. These concepts, which are defined by the relationships of concepts with other concepts, refer to virtual objects of thought; they have no direct concrete reference and, ultimately, are
independent of any relationship to an observer. They are part of a public space of knowledge that can be objectivized and therefore communicated and accumulated.

Finally, and this is a major point in Northrop's epistemology, scientific theories can only have explanatory and predictive scope if the virtual entities they are handling, based on what are known as postulated concepts, are appropriately linked to the directly observable data denoted by intuitive concepts, knowing that such links do not always exist. The relationships between concepts formed by postulation and concepts formed by intuition or by inspection are said to be “epistemic correlations” because they link entities in different worlds of discourse. Therefore, according to these views, truth is neither unique nor purely relative; it is a question of a good match between theoretical models and empirical observations.

3. 4. Ontological Dualism and the Birth of the Modern Democratic Subject

Modern knowledge theories did not immediately identify these two epistemic components of human knowledge. The first error in such theories was their attribution of these components to the properties of different substances, one mental and the other material. Theoretical concepts — and some specific intellectual faculty that their manipulation supposes — were associated with the human mind's link to the divine, while empirical concepts were associated with its relationship with phenomenal reality. But this error is the bearer of a major intuition, that of the irreducibility of the two ultimate sources of knowledge. It can therefore be considered that the dualism of substances finds a contemporary form in the duality of epistemic components, theoretical and sensible, that we find in the knowledge process. This dualism, Northrop shows, is of fundamental importance to our modern democracies.

The individual, defined as a mental substance, is basically free and equal to others. Therefore, it is not subject to the laws of the physical, material world. This conception led to freedom and equality becoming axioms that identify democratic individuality. It cannot be inferred from experience alone. Today, it is postulated as a founding principle of our democracies and rests on concepts that are theoretical in nature. These concepts are defined only by relationships between concepts, which allows a meaning that is independent of the variability of particular real-life situations to be conferred on both the idea of equal rights for all individuals in the eyes of the law, and the idea of universal human rights. The meanings extant in the founding proposals of liberal democracies thus refer to intellectual constructs applied to experience, but not directly deduced from it (Northrop, Meeting, chap. XVII).

The role of the dualism of substances, which, in a sense, is played by the duality of epistemic components of knowledge, is, according to Northrop, the foundation upon which our modern democracies are built. This foundation constitutes the early basis not only of continental rationalism, which is developed in the philosophy of Descartes, but also of British empiricism, which is developed in the philosophy of Locke.
Locke relies, like Descartes, on the idea of a dualism of substances, which not only accounts for human faculties of thought on the fringes of the natural laws that regulate relationships between objects of the physical world, but also introduces intrinsic equality between spiritual substances. This metaphysical condition is reflected by the normative postulates of our modern democracies. The two basic premises of Locke's theory of government and the American Declaration of Independence derive from the dualism of substances: first, that all men are created free and equal, and second, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

3. 5. From the Individualism of Classical Epistemology to the Positivist Premises of Modern Epistemology

We know, however, that Descartes and Locke developed knowledge theories that were radically opposed.

Descartes (Méditations) proposed to make progress in the discovery of truth through reasoning — deductive reasoning in the main — based on ideas called innate because they come from our faculty of thought itself, and this faculty, he assumed, comes from our link to God. This common link should therefore have ensured an agreement of minds by opening up access to the truth on the basis of rational inferences. Forms of education that can be traced back to the Cartesian doctrine of knowledge are necessarily centered on intellectual development leading to freedom and truth, and on the agreement of minds, as was the case, we could say, with intellectual education in Plato, whose curriculum is set forth in The Republic (Book VII). Belief in reminiscence in Plato can be compared, as far as human intellectual powers are concerned, to the assumed existence of “innate ideas.”

More specifically, Descartes (Discours) recognizes three sources of knowledge: sensation, imagination (which is comparable to reflection in Locke), and the soul’s capacity to find within itself ideas that are independent of sensation and reflection. These ideas, that is to say innate ideas, account for the existence of a faculty of thought that is capable of imagining and manipulating objects whose meaning cannot be “abstracted” from the data of sensory experience: the theoretical faculty. With Descartes, modern philosophy therefore distinguishes two irreducible sources of knowledge: the theoretical and the sensible. According to Descartes, the ultimate foundation of knowledge is not experience, because no certainty can be founded on that, but reason. Moreover, Descartes is radically skeptical of constituted knowledge. He aims to replace it with a science founded on reason and based on the model offered by mathematics. Hence, contrary to Locke, who centers his philosophy of knowledge on empirical sources, ignoring the sui generis nature of theoretical conceptualizations, Descartes centers his philosophy on the rational faculties. But he views culture as a distortion of human nature, and rejects what we today know represents the very source of human theoretical capacities of thought. In this respect, he was mistaken. His individualism paved the way for Locke’s error, which anchors all objects of thought in the individual’s experience, while Locke himself paved the way for sensualist reduction.
Locke’s theory of knowledge denies innatism and bases itself on processes that are essentially individual and subjective, rooting human ideas in sensory experience. This approach separates the mental faculties of the mind, which are associated with the soul, from knowledge content, which is derived from the impact of material objects on the mind and the development of ideas by reflection. For reasons linked to the dualism of substances, certain theoretical teaching programs — mathematics in particular — take on an intrinsic educational value that is associated with their impact in terms of mental discipline (even if Locke does not use this notion).

In fact, Locke’s hypothesis of an entrenchment of ideas in sensation condemned the dualism of substances to failure, just as it is incompatible with the modern duality of epistemic components of knowledge. This assumption led to radical empiricism, as the epistemologies of George Berkeley and David Hume (*Inquiry*) have each shown in their own way. The Lockean theory of ideas does not hold, and as such offers an incomplete interpretation of the philosophical consequences of Galileo’s and Newton’s physics. As Northrop (*Meeting* 113-114) notes, this inadequacy gave rise to the unsuccessful attempts of philosophical reconstruction by Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx and Dewey.

Berkeley notes that the being of things is to be perceived or known, and so the idea of material substance is useless: there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of ideas perceived by sense. There is no material substance but simply combinations of sensible qualities existing only for perceiving substances. Matter is a mere appearance for the mind. This point of view can also be turned around, as it is by Hume. For Hume, nothing exists apart from sense data and their associations, and so the mind is an association of sensory information. Hence the substitution of association psychology for the psychology of faculties, and the development of positivism in philosophy, which is based on the idea that nothing exists beyond the immediately apprehended (Northrop, *Meeting* 116).

The importance of the positivist premises of classical empiricism for modern theories of knowledge can be highlighted by a number of reflections by Ernst Cassirer concerning the Age of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, he tells us, was structured around two intellectual trends: the classical Cartesian form of analysis and a new philosophical synthesis, according to which the criterion of science is entirely contained within the method itself. The period thus made possible the transition from substantialist thinking to relational thinking, which establishes truth’s place as being not in the hidden essence of things, but in relationships with those things. Whereas for the major metaphysical systems of the 17th century, reason was the region of “eternal truths” — truths which are common to both the human mind and the divine spirit — in the 18th century truth was defined much less as a possession and more as a mode of acquisition. But the exclusion of all transcendent mediation in understanding the relationships between thought and its objects led the empiricist thinkers of the 18th century to neglect any other possible form of mediation and to hold human physiology as the starting point for knowledge and also as the key to knowledge of the natural world.
As Popper (184) explains, by relying on sensorial experience, the traditional epistemologies of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and even Russell, along with a substantial part of modern and contemporary epistemology, has systematically studied knowledge or thought through the involvement of an observer facing reality. This type of epistemology finds itself to be missing the point, because while aiming to study scientific knowledge — which is part of the third world of theories, problems and objective arguments — the epistemologists were in fact studying something else.

A theory of knowledge rooted in Lockean empiricism was therefore elaborated. It asserted that individuals are born with no innate ideas or dispositions. These individuals, born free of any predisposition, could be thought of as shaped by their environment. This idea found scientific justification in the biological model of evolution. From this follows a specific conception of humanity that anchors the formation of human reason in concrete experience.9

3. 6. Rationalist Versus Empiricist Individualisms and Education

Epistemologies derived from classical empiricism thus offer conceptions of knowledge and of the good that are rooted in individual experience. Following almost directly from sensualist empiricism is the concept of the immanence of moral values. Hobbes, as a forerunner to this concern, likened human life to a race in which each person always has to be ahead of his or her competitors from the moment when no objective conception of the good and no absolute set of rules is supposed to regulate it. The “market” that is fed by interpersonal comparisons represents the natural driving force behind the justification of values. Following from the subjectivism of these epistemological premises is the need for social forms that seek an agreement of minds through the imposition of an external norm, that is, through conformist pressures, a dictatorial regime, or some other means.

Nevertheless, the social and political consequences of Locke's dualist philosophy differ from those of his empiricist successors. In Locke's theory, the mind is substantially separated from the body, but ideas ultimately refer to sensory information. In other words, relationships between individuals concern their bodies and have no connection with any principle or relationship derived from the nature of mental substances. Hence, we have a democratic theory of social organization as a lesser evil, based essentially on the preservation of private property and the consent of the majority as determinants of right and good (Northrop, Meeting 95).

Among Locke's successors in Great Britain, the abandonment of the dualism of substances allowed the justification of a positive conception of government and of criteria for the good. As nothing exists outside of sensory information, the good is relative to the well-being of the individual. It is identified with pleasure, or the amount of pleasure, by Jeremy Bentham, and is extended to the possibilities of human perfection by John Stuart Mill.10 Because he identified individuals with their metaphysical being, Locke had placed emphasis on the equality of all individuals. He had no other criterion of the good for the individual than the freedom of the mental substance, and no criterion of good for the state but the “consent” of a majority. Because the orientations of the majority needed
to be under control, Locke’s conceptions tended to produce a democratic culture in which conformity and similarity between people were regarded as a good thing. But, Northrop explains, because Mill equated individuals with their sensitive being, identifying “the personal with the private, immediately sensed experiences and individual preferences” (*Meeting* 123), he located the good in the quantity of pleasure experienced by the individual, which could then be associated positively with a criterion of the good for the state. Therefore, Mill could place emphasis on how unique each person is, viewing individual differences as a good thing. This tended to produce a democratic culture in which singularity and the greatest amount of pleasurable content are the determinants of the good (Northrop, *Meeting* 122-123).

We can now outline the major axes that underpin modern models of democracy and the pedagogical ideas associated with them. According to our first thesis, modern democracies are morally justified by the recognition that human faculties for independent thought lie at the foundation of humanity, and thus must invest in the development of these faculties. From there, the question of sources of human knowledge that oppose rationalist philosophies and classical empiricist philosophies can account for two major and almost antithetical educational trends. Both these trends tend to confine the knowledge process to a single space that is accessed subjectively, one of which is theoretical, and the other of which is empirical. On the one hand, priority is given to access to the truth via knowledge that is best placed for mental discipline and reasoning. On the other hand, priority is given to education for practical life. On a moral level, the differences are just as pronounced. On the one hand, both the axiological development of individuals and the agreement of minds are ensured by the exercise of reason as based in common rational intuitions. On the other hand, taking into account the relativism that emerged from sensualist premises, axiological development and agreement of minds must be fostered by an educational program that — beyond individual singularities — specifically aims to develop shared values and practices.11

3. 7. Towards a Third Direction: The Kantian Solution and Its Limits

We have seen that, in order to develop, modern physics needed a space with virtual constructs that do not directly refer to the world of experience. The inadequate nature of classical empiricist epistemology in this respect was approached by Immanuel Kant after he awoke from his “dogmatic slumber” (*Prolegomena* 5) the day he read Hume. Purely inductive judgments proved unfit for establishing necessary connections between phenomena. Kant therefore committed himself to developing a theory of knowledge that was meant to account for the objectivity of human knowledge. He therefore attempted to synthesize the results of the British empiricists and those of the continental rationalists, admitting both the sensory foundations of knowledge and the more formal, rational and systematic type of knowledge found in mathematics and mathematical physics. In such a theory, the notion of causality would not be subjective and would not simply express a relationship of statistical co-occurrence, but would present a necessary connection between two systemic states. There was no other alternative, explains Northrop (*Meeting* 196), but to conclude that our knowledge, derived from both common sense and scientific objects, is composed of two parts, one empirically given through the senses, as Hume
states, and the other given theoretically, on the basis of postulated, unperceived elements. This is Kant's "great insight" (Northrop, Meeting 194). Kant states that it is because each one of us, by observing and knowing ourselves and the world, brings non-sensory meaning to sensory information, that beliefs accepted by common sense and theories verified by mathematical physics experiments are possible. But Kant saw this theoretical component of knowledge as categorical and necessary rather than, as is the case, simply hypothetical and confirmed indirectly by deductive consequences (Northrop, Meeting 194). In this regard, we know that the Kantian solution invokes two kinds of *a priori* categories of knowledge; the first, called “forms of sensibility” (Kant, Critique 121; see also Janiak), involves space and time; the second, called “categories [or] concepts of the understanding” (Kant, Critique 121; see also Thomasson), involves concepts of substance, relation, causality, etc.

These *a priori* and regulative tools of human thought are conceived by Kant as universal and necessary; they are the same for everybody. Given their *a priori* status, such uniformity is required; otherwise we would not all know the same public world. We will see, continuing with Northrop’s analysis, that, as a consequence, Kantian democratic individuality divorces itself from theoretical reason, and involves the concrete, individual moral agent. We should note, though, that with Kant we move on to a third major conception of democratic individuality. According to Descartes, and to a part of ancient philosophy that is derived from Plato, people have the foundations of what is true and good within themselves, and can develop these foundations through intellectual education and reflection. It is this prescience which, in fact, legitimates the Socratic method of bringing forth the truth from within, or maïeutics. But what is true and what is good are given *a priori* as absolutes that can be accessed by individuals, as long as these people are released from the illusions of the common world by adequate intellectual training. Through their power of knowing, individuals are therefore rendered active beings, but as discoverers rather than as inventors. According to Locke, and then Hume, individuals, as induction machines on the basis of their own sensory experiences, are also discoverers rather than inventors. They develop a kind of activity, but this activity is mechanical, the fruit of the accumulation of information received passively during life experiences and linked together by comparison and the association of ideas.

In the Kantian approach, however, individuals are no longer seen as passive receivers, because they apprehend information from experience with *a priori* tools of thinking. Kant gives meaning to the notion of objective knowledge within the limits of human faculties for thought, and this relative objectivity creates a public space of knowledge. Thanks to this public space, knowledge can be objectivized and accumulated. The human mind is, in a genuinely true human sense, creative; the sources of objective knowledge are in the knower rather than in the object known. But this creativity is limited to these general conditions of thought and do not refer to individual qualities. *A priori* forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding which represent the human contribution to the apprehension of information from experience are purely formal and functional, and they are the same for everyone. The horizon of human objectivity they open up leaves no room for individuality on the part of the knowing subject: Nature and knower are both governed by necessity. Besides, there is only one knowing subject, the
transcendental ego, a universal identity common to singular persons. Northrop (Meeting 200-219) explains that it is only through his moral philosophy that Kant can obtain meaning for the human self. The lack of freedom of the knowing subject led Kant to dissociate theoretical reason and practical reason. It is therefore to the field of practical reason, morals, and religion, each thought of as independent from theoretical reason, that Kant has confined human freedom.

Kantian democratic individuality divorces from theoretical reason, and involves the concrete, individual moral agent. But the undertaking does not lead very far. This is because, in order to account for the agreement of minds regarding moral or social life, Kant turns to moral law. But a morality that implies a free act can only be reconciled with a morality defined by the necessity of the law by identifying, as Kant and his followers did, positive freedom with obedience to the necessity of moral law.

In Fichte (Vocation), the freedom is made more radical, as it is rooted in pure, unconditional will, and the moral centers itself in the will itself, the “true final end” of the individual being obedience to the “law of conscience” (136). This fusion of free will and moral necessity sheds light on the apparent paradox of Fichtean education. The “new education,” according to Fichte (“Second Address” and “Third Address,” Addresses 19-51), combines the principles of pleasure and freedom — which place it on the side of so-called modern educational trends — with a highly standardizing finality: “you must fashion [the student], and fashion him in such a way that he simply cannot will otherwise than you wish him to will” (21).

These developments in German philosophy, placing all the weight of human freedom on the will as primary, found the agreement of minds within necessity itself. They opened up to the positioning of the foundation of the good within historical development, with freedom and determinism tending to come together. Hegelian philosophy brought the concept of development to the forefront and led, even before evolutionary doctrines, to thinking of everything in terms of temporal evolutionary processes. Northrop stresses that Hegel did not conceive of a set of two types of concepts of a differing nature, theoretical and empirical, epistemically correlated in the knowledge process, but only of one concept, “the concrete universal,” mixing two distinct worlds of discourse (Logic 259). He suggests that the development of philosophical thought through Fichte, Hegel and Marx, by ignoring the creative duality of theoretical reason and experience, may have sowed the seeds of the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century.

3.8. Theoretical Reason Reconciling Human Creativity with Objectivity

Kant thought that the basic structures of the knowing thought were posed a priori as the necessary conditions of human knowledge. This belief was developed in psychology by Piaget in particular, who tried to show that general “logico-mathematical structures” (305 ff.) were developed during childhood and exercised an a priori logical role in thought. But, as Vygotsky stressed in Thought and Language, our logical faculties depend on the conceptual structures we master in a specific domain, so we cannot dissociate the structure of thought from its content.
The problems caused by the Kantian solution’s imposing of purely formal and necessary theoretical reason have been overcome by modern epistemology. The epistemic duality of the modern knowledge theories mentioned previously offers a simple response to the problem of causality, which Kant thought he had resolved with an *a priori* category of understanding. This response allows us to understand the shortcoming of the Kantian solution when separating the form of thought from its content. Let us look into this a little further.

Margenau (esp. chap. 19) and Meyerson (34-36) evoke the distinction between partial causes and total cause. The slow watch appears to be the cause of missing the train. But in reality, the reasoning goes as follows: if the watch had not been slow, the train would not have been missed. Through such reasoning we move forward along the path of explanation, but we do not reach the entire or generative cause, which involves the totality of antecedents and, according to Meyerson, the identity over time of the elements in play. Besides, the search for a law, although it contributes to the explanation, does not fully satisfy the demands of causality. The solution to the problem of explanation, Margenau contends, lies in the creation of closed theoretical systems. These systems alone make it possible to offer a comprehensive theoretical model of the postulated antecedents; and, as we have seen, the specific composition of these antecedents makes it possible to account for different phenomena — not what things in nature “are,” but the way in which they interact with one another. Therefore, in order to be applied and to have genuine explanatory power, the principle of causality requires systems that are completely closed and finished. Such systems do not exist in nature. The systems upon which logical analysis can be developed are intellectual constructions — i.e., theoretical models. The systems constructed from theoretical concepts allow the simulation of causal mechanisms that aim to account for observable phenomena, whereas, as Hume noted, thought that refers directly to the empirical world can only establish relationships of concomitance between empirical facts. Causality is not a pure “*a priori* category” of understanding. It is made possible by a constructed theoretical space that maintains indirect relationships with the real world; theoretical concepts thus are not mere contents of thought but underlie its logical inferences. We, therefore, cannot separate the structure and the contents of thought, but must distinguish its theoretical and empirical dimensions, with no metaphysical precedence, so that the theoretical factors are hypothetical, rather than necessary.

4. Epistemic Duality and Democratic Individuality

4.1. The Social Origin of the Theoretical Dimension of Thought

The two major classical approaches to true knowledge tend to confine knowledge in one single — theoretical or empirical — space. Since Kant, a third perspective has emerged that views knowledge as the bringing into relation, by the knowing subject, of two irreducible types of components — the theoretical and the sensible. But Kant assumed that the theoretical components at the root of the relative objectivity of human knowledge
are essentially necessary and *a priori*, and a formal limit on the thinking of all human beings.

Note also the solution offered by Pragmatism, which, according to James, represents a method of renewing the old empiricist attitude in a “more radical and less objectionable form” (51). Pragmatism is characterized negatively by its rejection of static objects of thought — abstraction, verbal solutions, fixed principles, and closed systems — and positively by its call for “concreteness and adequacy,” “facts,” “action,” and “power” (James 51). That is why concepts in it appear to be meaningless verbalisms unless they have a functional or active role — i.e., that of being apprehended through the activity that is supposed to constitute them (cf. Dewey, “How Do Concepts Arise”; *Quest*). With philosophical pragmatism, and in conflict on this point with classical empiricism, knowing subjects are no longer passive receivers taking in impressions from outside and digesting them. They only create their knowledge by their own activity. They place themselves, as knowing subjects, ahead of experience in order to apprehend it and adjust to it. Objectivity and creativity are then part and parcel of the same process and are evaluated by what works. Thought and experience are inextricably linked in such a way that the concepts get meaning through their operational function. Following these views, instruction should be “a continuous reconstruction, moving from the child’s present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies” (Dewey, *Child* 11). Access to concepts elaborated by modern science demands, for instance, the reconstruction, through education, of the types of experience that led humankind to contemporary forms of knowledge.\(^{13}\)

What classical empiricism and a great part of modern epistemology ignored, by involving, as noticed by Popper, only an observer facing reality, is the new path of human development opened by the very particular capacities of the human mind. These capacities have allowed humankind to develop cognitive thinking tools and to build a public space for knowledge and exchange.\(^{14}\) Humankind thus appears to have emerged from the formation of social relationships and socially constituted tools of thought. The correlative question of communication allows us to go beyond the epistemological problematic that essentially brings subject and object into confrontation. Communication is dotted with concepts that do not generally refer to the immediately perceived and experienced world, but whose meaning depends on the relationships they maintain with one another. Science takes this logic further by creating theoretical systems with links to reality that are essentially indirect.

Human knowledge develops by bringing conceptual structures into contact with experience. In this respect, it represents a form of induction involving socially constituted cognitive tools, such as, for instance, language, the numerical system, conceptual and symbolic systems, etc. Rationalist individualisms and classical empiricisms remain unaware of this specific social dimension of the human capacities for knowledge, and the resulting epistemic duality was not understood by either post-Kantian German monisms or philosophies anchored in evolutionism.
4. 2. Epistemic Duality and Democratic Individuality

Acknowledging the genuine duality of the epistemic components of knowledge may help us to rethink the foundations of modern democratic individuality.

First, the theoretical and experiential duality of the epistemic sources of knowledge reveals a fundamentally active and creative knowing subject. The subject’s theoretical knowledge instigates actions by individuals upon their own mind (Vygotsky, Mind 39). In other words, the mind is a tool for thinking, that is, for manipulating objects of thought, and through the logical inferences it allows, it is a dispenser of meaning.

Secondly, we no longer have the conception, as derived from the Lockean mental substance, of a person as being independent from and having nothing in common with all other persons and things. Especially, the intrinsic equality between members of the political community is a basic postulate of our modern democracies which moves from the metaphysical plane to the theoretic plane. The theoretical dimension of thought underpins the participation of the members of society within the public space and is epistemically linked with the experienced dimension of their own life. Human individualities are thus no longer unconnected; the relationships between individuals are secured by collectively constructed and validated social and institutional principles.

Finally, this epistemic duality secures the compatibility of the knowing subject’s freedom with collective agreement. It refers problems of truth and the good to the links between postulated and referential forms of knowledge, so that they appear neither as absolute, nor as essentially relative to the subjective world of experience. They can be the object of rational reflection involving the public objectivity of theoretical constructs as well as the subjectivity and diversity of private experience. According to Northrop (Meeting 470), this reconciliation of theoretical with practical reason prevents us from making the same culturalist error as did the German Hegelian Idealists, the Russian Communists, and to a lesser degree the American Pragmatists. All of them identify the good of society with its present or future “is,” based on either a historical or a functional conception of social and historical evolution.15

Our conclusions move away somewhat from those of Northrop here. The appropriateness of normative beliefs is not only the result of their being tempered by scientific reason, as Northrop thinks — that is, by the moral use of our positive knowledge of the natural and human world. Northrop appears to underestimate the sui generis dimension of human morals. We would rather suggest that like science, but not only on the basis of science, morals bring into confrontation postulated meanings and experiential ones.16

4. 3. The Cognitive Role of Formal Education

The epistemic duality of knowledge sources leads to important consequences for formal education. The development of the theoretical dimension of thought is the basic function of school (see Vygotsky, Thought and Language). Knowledge can only serve the
individual and be developed if the latter appropriates the conceptual structures it is made of. These intellectual constructs draw their meaning from the relationships they maintain between themselves, so they can, for the most part, be objectivized and therefore passed on. Moreover, it is necessary that the teacher highlight their particular relationships in each field of study, paying attention to the structure of knowledge. These are tools for thinking, and as such, they do not develop any mechanical link with thought. Therefore, passing them on is not only possible, but is also not, in itself, dogmatic.

From this point, all the confusion surrounding quarrels about teaching that have been recurrent since the beginning of the 20th century, opposing individuals and knowledge, can be reabsorbed fairly simply if we understand that it is neither the importance given to knowledge nor the importance accorded to the individual that is at stake. Indeed, that which implicitly divides the points of view and standpoints is linked to the foundations of knowledge. When we assume that our concepts take on meaning in the course of concrete experience and not as abstract, mediating tools of thought, we in fact deny epistemic duality. By denying it — as Dewey (Child 11) did by unifying theoretical and empirical concepts under a functional conception centered on operational meanings (see Dewey, Quest; Logic) — we undermine the specific role of theoretical constructs in individual understanding and public participation.

On the contrary, if we accept that the specific capacities of human thought lie in the development of mediating tools for thinking and the linking up of these cognitive tools with elements drawn from experience, then epistemological duality is fully recognized and the conflict of knowledge versus the individual no longer stands. Instead of relying on the individual’s experience as linked to practical activity, the learning of complex forms of knowledge should rely on their intellectual reconstruction, knowledge being neither a content to learn nor a tool to act with, but a dynamic tool supporting understanding. Given the nature of theoretical concepts, such an intellectual reconstruction needs to rely on a progressive, reflective and structured development.

5. Conclusion: Epistemic Duality and Participatory Democracy

We have maintained that modern democratic individuality emerged from the recognition of human faculties of independent thinking and the correlative rejection of any intellectual or moral authority imposed on individuals. On these foundations, the epistemological conceptions that define humankind’s relationship to the truth shed light on the models of democracy that have developed historically. Northrop’s insights reveal the shortcomings of classical rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, as well as those of the Kantian solution and the false restoration of human freedom within German idealisms and evolutionist (historical or biological) types of thought. Neither theoretical reason alone, nor experience alone, nor any primacy of one over the other, could define the individual’s link to the idea of truth or account for human freedom.

The theoretical dimension of knowledge, which Kant reintroduced in a minimalist way, appears here in all its creative richness as linked to the social dimension of human existence. It appears to be the fruit of the human use of artificial signs for thinking and
the correlative development of a space of mediation that supports reflective thought and communication. Human cognitive constructs that individuals appropriate, especially through formal education, are the instruments by which they develop their independence of thought and exchange the ideas that can be objectivized within a public space for debate. The social construction of theoretical reason postulates (scientific, ethical, or moral) that are indirectly controlled by experience underpins a rational, creative evolution of positive and normative beliefs. Thus, this duality underpins collaborative reflection regarding the purpose of joint action and appears to be the conception of knowledge most suitable for founding the basis of agreement between members of a society on types of participatory democracy.

Political and social participation assume that education might allow the progressive construction by individuals of conceptual systems conceived of as symbolic mediatory tools for reflective thinking. This must be done by progressively shedding light on the links between theoretical concepts, on one hand, and their (indirect) links to experience on the other. From this perspective, education should not focus either on knowledge or on competencies as such that do not necessarily involve reflective thinking and, therefore, intellectual contribution. Education should aim, firstly and on these bases, at fostering understanding. Other consequences for education of the dual conception of knowledge sources that cannot be developed here include the development of human sensibility, through literary and artistic expression in particular, and the recognition that the diversity of personalities and experiences represents an asset for democracy.
Notes

1 Northrop calls them the “theoretic component,” or the component “designated by verified scientific theory” (Logic 199), and the “aesthetic component,” or “the immediately apprehended factor in knowledge and reality” (Logic 377).

2 Nevertheless, we note, truth belongs to the space of intelligible Forms — in Plato, for instance.

3 Plato’s curriculum, designed for a would-be philosopher-king, unites the studies of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music (see The Republic, Book VII). It aims at preparing the student to engage in dialectic, considered as the science of intelligible Forms and thus as a method of searching for truth, which in turn opens up access to knowledge of the Good.

4 Locke (Essay II, ch.1, § 2-5) distinguishes essentially two original sources of human knowledge: the objects of sensation — that is to say, external material things — and the objects of reflection, which he identifies as the operations of our own mind concerning the impressions rooted in sensorial experience.

5 Mathematics is here understood as a theoretical science; in the Discours de la méthode Descartes criticizes the teaching he knew, which was only applied to the resolution of practical problems posed by the mechanical arts.

6 Locke thought that “the Souls of Men” do not bring into the world with them any ideas, but rather “inherent Faculties” (Essay I, ch. 1, § 2: 49) that could be strengthened by education. Locke especially mentioned mathematics as “a way to settle in the mind the habit of reasoning closely and in train” (“Conduct” 198). See also Kolesnik, esp. ch. V.

7 Consequently, Hume (Treatise I, pt. 3, sect. 9: 80-81), we note, considers that the opinions and notions transmitted by education are transformed into beliefs by habits of the mind; education appears then as mere indoctrination, while Hume’s idea of truth involves a “harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas” (Inquiry V, ch. II, § 44: 54).

8 This was not the case, however, with Condillac, who understood the crucial role of the mediation of signs in human thought, and with the French intellectuals grouped under the banner “les idéologues,” who followed Condillac’s main ideas.

9 The impact of these developments on dominant educational models is studied in Bulle.

10 See in Donatelli (“Mill’s Perfectionism”) how Mill links his perfectionism to the utilitarian doctrine by considering the issue of inner experience.
The tension between freedom and control in Mill's thought is analyzed, for instance, in Carbone.

We observe that children’s and adults’ reasoning capacities vary according to whether they have acquired adequate conceptual structures in the areas of knowledge involved. Since every concept is in some way linked to others, the total body of concepts acquired during a lifetime influences the acquisition and use of other concepts, and this also explains why most children are unable to engage in general abstract reasoning before the age of eleven or twelve (Novak 122).

Cf. on this subject Alix. This article is an expanded version in French of “The Continuity of Experience Principle: a Deweyan Interpretation of the Recapitulation Theory,” a paper presented at the 2013 Meeting of the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, Chicago.

On this subject, see for instance Corballis for an evolutionary overview of the human mind’s development.

In the case of pragmatism, Northrop, as well as Max Horkheimer (chap. 1), emphasizes here the impossibility of having the instrumental conception of theoretical reason doubt a society’s basic principles: a situation only becomes problematic in a predefined cultural setting that is not called into question.

For instance, Northrop (Complexity) maintains that “ethical norms are empirically testable and therefore cognitive … through their epistemological, and other philosophical, antecedents with respect to nature” (203).

This is a consequence deduced by Jan Derry from Robert Brandom's philosophy, which is consistent with the theory of concepts upheld here.
References


Politics, Education, and Understanding: Anglo-American Readings and Misreadings of Rousseau in the 19th to 21st Centuries

Guillemette Johnston

In Anglo-American academia and culture generally, there is often a tendency to support and reflect extant ideological positions, to maintain a brand of conformism across the board. As might be expected in any ideological model that tries to justify the status quo, controversial figures and ideas are portrayed according to dominant ideological conceptions — conceptions that aim to support and promote the dominant social order. We can see a prime example of this happening with readings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau that appear in America in the late-19th through the 20th centuries, particularly in the post-World War Two era, as America emerged as a dominant world force standing in opposition to the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. After reviewing Rousseau’s reception in America in the 19th century, we will look at various twentieth-century Anglo-American readings of Rousseau, with much focus on the period following the Second World War. In doing so we will examine the reasons Rousseau’s philosophy came to be viewed as a source for the extinction of traditional Judeo-Christian moral values, leading to the creation of twentieth-century totalitarian regimes. To this end we will provide commentary on the misperception of key concepts in Rousseau’s writings in the ideological readings provided by Babbitt, Talmon, and Crocker. After this survey we will look at contemporary writers whose misconceptions regarding Rousseau’s philosophy demonstrate a limited understanding of Rousseau’s works, or whose comments point to propagandistic usurpations of Rousseau’s intentions, as for instance in the work of the contemporary Christian conservative Michael Coffman. We will thus show how Rousseau has been received in the Anglo-American world, and how his writings, particularly those concerning politics but also those that address the relationship of politics to education, have served as a lightning rod for ideological positions and causes. This approach will highlight deficiencies in academic readings of the period due to the hard-core political positions taken by some, but not all, of the scholars and academics of the time, and point to incapacities on behalf of some scholars and critics to read Rousseau with a genuine empathy for the stylistic flourishes and idiosyncrasies displayed by this idealistic autodidact. Thus we will demonstrate how for the academic reader and in academic circles in general, Rousseau’s texts often serve as a canvas or screen for the portrayal and projection of ideological fantasies. Let it be said that often, as a result of these projections, Rousseau is read not for what he says but for what the particular critic reading him wishes to prove with respect to Anglo-American or contemporary society, sometimes at the cost of accuracy. At base this study then questions systems of reading, pointing toward ways ideology impacts interpretation of
important philosophical thinkers and figures, a fact that in turn has a profound effect on the presentation of these philosophers and their ideas in culture and in the educational system.

Rousseau was held in relatively high esteem in 18th and 19th century America, according to Frederick William Dame.¹ Dame argues that Rousseau had a significant effect on American literature and thought, either directly (for example, the poet Philip Freneau, one of the Connecticut Wits of the late 18th century, translated Rousseau) or indirectly, through the German Idealism of Kant or other writers and philosophers whose work was influenced by Rousseau. Thus in much of American intellectual life before the twentieth century we find profound appreciation for and acceptance of Rousseauist ideas. As Dame points out, depictions of nature were essentially benevolent (Emerson and Thoreau stand out here), the «homme de la nature» was presented in idealized portraits like those of native Americans or frontiersmen found in the novels of James Fenimore Cooper, and general Romanticist tendencies led many to believe that humanity was inherently good. While it would be inaccurate to say that these perceptions dominated all of American cultural life, Dame at least sees behind them the philosophical possibilities raised by Rousseau’s works. Here are his comments regarding the importance of Rousseau as a force in American society:

The Romantic vision of Rousseau persevered not only in regard to the themes of literature, such as portrayals of the “noble savage” and man progressing and developing through his physical experiences and the senses, but also in the concept of the individual who must prove himself to himself before seeking to enter or re-enter the social state. He provided the foundation upon which the American Transcendentalists would build a philosophical as well as a literary movement. In the vision of man as innately good and reasonable, or man as morally right, Rousseau presented an optimistic view of humanity. This optimism in the human condition and the inner strength which it further implies provided American writers with a suitable subject with which to explore the concept of a tabula rasa of this new nation. If man in his primitive state is the raw material from which a morally good and just citizen might emerge, then a logical literary extension of this idea was the association of this new nation, the United States of America, with the same state.

The philosophy of Rousseau exhibits a social idealism which encourages man to actively regenerate society and renovate social institutions. Rather than accept the prevailing socio-political philosophy, Rousseau, who places man’s natural freedom at the core of his political philosophy, proposes that man retreat from entrenched ideology and turn, instead, toward the creation of a social system which will foster equality among all men.

Viewing the social system as composed of artificial convention which requires individual men to assume masks and to interact in ways which are

---

¹ Frederick William Dame, Rousseau and American Intellectual Life (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933), p. 126.
artificial to the true human nature, Rousseau calls for a return to natural action founded on reason of mind and heart. Instinct, feeling, subjectiveness, and imagination are of paramount importance to his thinking and they are to be employed to lead enlightened men from the state of nature to the social state, which is the appropriate state. (54)

With regard to developments in education during the 19th century, Rousseauist ideas came into the American educational system in much the same way that they were introduced throughout Europe during this time: via the influence of predominating European educational reformers such as the Swiss Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and the Germans Friedrich Fröbel and Johann Friedrich Herbart. The educational practices of Pestalozzi, whose impact was largely felt in the area of elementary education with his development of the idea of “organic” education, were brought to America through the work of William Maclure at New Harmony in Indiana and by Joseph Neef in Pennsylvania. Fröbel was responsible for the development of the concept of Kindergarten and the “self activity” or self development of the child; his student Margarethe Schurz established a German-speaking kindergarten in the United States in 1856 in Wisconsin, which inspired Elizabeth Peabody to create an English language kindergarten in Boston in 1860 (Wisconsin). The work of Herbart brought a psychological edge to the field of education, and his ideas spread through articles published in the 1880s in the Illinois School Journal (Somr and Hrušková) and later through meetings of the Philosophy Club and the National Herbart Society for the Scientific Study of Education (1895-1901). John Dewey criticized Herbart’s instructional methods and emphasis on the continuity of the educational process (English 105-106), but recent studies have tended to reconcile Herbart and Dewey with regard to discontinuity and rupture in education (English xix; xxiv). Particularly after 1860, then, Pestolezzi’s and Fröbel’s ideas and experiments “combined with widespread social-democratic influences on education and advances in psychologic thought to change schooling. This confluence, which was most noticeable in elementary education, resulted in the appearance of the kindergarten and in methods proceeding from the nature of the child and including content representing more of the present society.... [T]he ideas of preparing teachers to use techniques derived from the new concepts, including the greater systematization introduced by Herbart, and the necessity for teachers to learn specifically about the child would substantially augment teacher-training programs and lay the groundwork for immense institutional expansion in the first half of the 20th century” (Meyer and Lawson). Thus the impact of Rousseauist ideas on American education in the 19th century was significant.2

Rousseau’s reputation as a positive force, a harbinger of Romanticism, began to slide in the late 19th century, first as the Romantic values started to be called into doubt, then as the emergence of Socialist, Communist, and Fascist ideologies illustrated (to some) the dangers involved in such political concepts as the general will and the social contract.3 An early European example of this shift away from appreciation of Rousseau appears in Nietzsche’s critiques, which from some angles could be seen as almost expressions of vituperation toward the Rousseauist position. In America, on the other hand, extensive criticism of Rousseau and his impact on society appears at this time in the works of
Irving Babbitt, especially in his book *Rousseau and Romanticism*. By the end of World War Two and with the beginning of the Cold War, American studies on Rousseau had moved toward the problematic, particularly as regards the political sphere and Rousseauist ideas on education and the role of reason. On one hand, critics in this period found Rousseau’s writings polarized or contradictory at best, and sometimes even irrelevant to the contemporary world. On the other hand, some found in Rousseau’s writings foundations for political systems and beliefs about the individual that increasingly threatened Anglo-American democracy and the vision of democratic righteousness expressed in the concept of the “free world.” These latter, negative readings of Rousseau were supported in the 1960s with covert though then-stylish psychoanalytical incursions into the life of the Citizen of Geneva and counteracted by the more positive readings of Rousseau offered by countercultural figures such as Arnold Kaufman (Mattson 211-212) and Huey P. Newton (Jeffries). Since then, ideological attacks on Rousseau’s philosophy have continued in the critical commentaries of Jonathan Israel and (more crudely) in the manifestos of Christian conservative Michael Coffman.

An early Cold-War reading that emphasized the fundamental duality in Rousseau’s writings was Leo Strauss’ 1947 essay “On the Intentions of Rousseau,” a study of Rousseau’s *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (first *Discours*) that saw this work as key to understanding Rousseau’s philosophy. Strauss, whom J. David Hoeveler associates with Irving Babbitt (Hoeveler 182), begins his study by claiming that “The antiquarian controversy about the intention of Rousseau conceals a political controversy about the nature of democracy” (Strauss 455), and that Rousseau “considered himself the first theoretician of democracy” (455), “attack[ing] the Enlightenment as a pillar of despotism or of absolute monarchy” (457), largely because of its hostility to religion and because of the suggestion (derived from Montesquieu’s *De l’esprit des lois*) that modern societies substitute commerce for virtue. This attack did not prevent Rousseau from covertly acknowledging the value of Enlightenment; it in fact led him to emphasize the distinction between “society” and the intelligentsia, and to turn his argument in the first *Discours* regarding the dangers of science into a reading of how these dangers apply to the common man. As Strauss puts it, “[i]n opposition to the Enlightenment, [Rousseau] reasserts the crucial importance of the natural inequality of men with regard to intellectual gifts” (486). Thus Strauss argues that “when Rousseau rejects science as superfluous or harmful, he speaks in the character of a common man addressing common men, and when speaking in that character, he does not exaggerate at all by rejecting science absolutely. But far from being a common man, [Rousseau] is a philosopher who merely appears in the guise of a common man: as a philosopher addressing philosophers he naturally takes the side of science” (464). Therefore the *Discours* presents two Rousseaus, Rousseau the commoner and Rousseau the philosopher. It also aims at two audiences, the audience of commoners and the audience of philosophers, and provides different messages for each. The dangers of science exist for the commoner, not for the “great minds,” among whom Rousseau includes himself. As Strauss puts it, “science is permissible or salutary only in so far as it is not, as such, a social factor. Its social effect is necessarily disastrous: enlightenment paves the way for despotism….  [I]n rejecting popularized science Rousseau … expressed directly and adequately what he seriously
thought” (467). It is for this reason, Strauss maintains, that Rousseau finds his ideal classical model in Sparta instead of in Athens (467), and perhaps this sort of understanding lies behind his support of civil religion in the *Contrat social*.

One consequence of this dualistic perspective is that it questions the viability or value of comprehensive education for the masses, a point that could be supported (though Strauss does not do so) in light of the attention to individualized education that is highlighted in Rousseau’s *Emile*. Another consequence is that Strauss’ approach realigns the standpoint many critics take on Rousseau’s frankness or sincerity. For Strauss, Rousseau’s insistence on “the obligation to speak the truth is founded exclusively on the utility of truth…. [O]ne may not only suppress or disguise truths devoid of all possible utility, but may even be positively deceitful about them by asserting their contraries, without thus committing the sin of lying” (470). “The *Discours* is so far from siding with truth as such that it attacks science precisely because it is concerned with truth as such, regardless of its utility, and hence is not, by its intention, protected against the danger of leading to useless or even harmful truths” (471). Rousseau’s emphasis on a faith based on senses and feelings and his upholding of local social values (as opposed to universal scientific or philosophical truths) is explained by this sense of duality. Indeed, “one misunderstands Rousseau’s notion of natural goodness if one does not bear in mind the fact that it refers to two different types, who stand at the opposite poles of humanity (the primitive man and the wise) and who yet belong together as natural men, as self-sufficient beings, or ‘numerical units’, in contradistinction to ... the citizen or social man, that is, the man who is bound by duties or obligations and who is only a ‘fractionary unit’” (476-477).

“Society has to do everything possible to make the citizens oblivious of the very facts that are brought to the center of their attention, as the foundations of society, by political philosophy” (482). In educational terms, this pertains to Strauss’ assertion that “Modern democracy might seem to stand or fall by the claim that ‘the method of democracy’ and ‘the method of intelligence’ are the same” (455), an assertion that might be used to call into question the value of extensive intellectual emphasis in education, and that Timothy Fuller suggests might refer to positions on education advocated by John Dewey (Fuller 241, note 2).

Strauss’ reading implicates Rousseau in a sense of political duplicity that might have matched the expectations of some egregious Cold Warriors of his time in the way they would judge the enemy, but the connection is never spelled out, only implied in the suggestion that Rousseau supports a split between philosophy, science, or intelligentsia on the one hand, and the common man on the other. What is more reflective of other perspectives in this approach is the suggestion of some sort of contradictory force at work in Rousseau’s writings. Other critics also point to this sense, though not in ways that necessarily imply manipulation. Judith Shklar, for instance, studies Rousseau’s writings in their relation to the utopian dreams of Spartan society and the autonomous family found in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*. Reminding us that “Rousseau is not ‘rousseauisme’” (Men 216), and that the “the *Social Contract* was less a utopia than a book of warnings” (Men 211), Shklar suggests that the application of Rousseau’s writings to any political or social model is fraught with danger:
The combination of a psychology and a moral outlook exclusively concerned with the needs of the individual, an extreme hatred for inequality, and an intense dislike for change make it particularly useless to impose the conventional classifications of later political theory upon Rousseau. He was neither a traditionalist nor a revolutionary of any sort. So deep a hatred of inequality is a perpetual challenge to any known society. (*Men* 30)

The problem with the model lies in part in its pitting of the need for personal fulfillment (the Clarens model) against the needs of self-abnegation in the idealized classical Spartan model. We see the conflict explored, for example, in Rousseau’s concerns about happiness, a “public” good that is as deeply intimate and personal as any feeling can be. Shklar writes, “[s]ince happiness is the sole object of men’s striving, the legitimate society, like any other human enterprise must be judged in terms of its ability to satisfy the most universal aspiration. Rousseau did not forget it. The sovereign people must feel a ‘public happiness’. Like the general will it is a metaphor of personification. For happiness is the most individual and personal of feelings, as Rousseau realized very well. This evidently made it difficult to speak of it as something ‘public’, and after worrying the notion of ‘le bonheur publique’ in several fragments, he used it rather sparingly in his finished political writings” (*Men* 193). Behind these difficulties, Shklar suggests, lie Rousseau’s concerns with “his own inner life, the needs of his own self” (*Men* 121), and a bevy of conflicting forces that work behind the scenes of his political, literary, educational, and other writings: a hatred of inequality matched by an uneasiness with equality, and an ongoing conflict between “an urge for perfect freedom and a longing for submission” (*Men* 130). In this context, one could argue (though here Shklar does not) that *Emile* represents an exploration of educational strategies that direct the pupil toward self-sufficiency in an effort to approximate happiness by teaching the pupil to live according to his basic needs, qualities, and moral code, within realistic boundaries set by the human condition.

A position Shklar does maintain, though, is that if “[b]y nature men are free ... left to their own devices they will inevitably enslave each other” (“Rousseau’s Images” 919). This example of the “bipolarities” in Rousseau’s thought underlies Rousseau’s constant assertion of the need for a master, be it tutor or prince, to direct human behavior, since “amour-propre ... reinforces the actuality of weakness, though it hides it as each person comes to think of himself only in competitive comparison with others” (“Rousseau’s Images” 919). However, Rousseau knew too well that too often in society, “authority was exercised only to maintain a destructive and false order” (“Rousseau’s Images” 921), creating societies that are marked by “pride and cruelty at the top, servility and dishonesty at the bottom” (“Rousseau’s Images” 921). In light of these tendencies, at the individual level, Rousseau required “tutorial vigilance” (“Rousseau’s Images” 923) to protect the “God-given self which forms the core of ... character. This personal self is not inherently hostile to other selves, nor does it thrive in permanent solitude” (“Rousseau’s Images” 923). Because of the contrast between the requirements of the social order and the wish to free the individual from subservience to this unavoidable order, “[C]ivic education and the education of the individual have nothing in common” (“Rousseau’s
Images” 924). On the one hand, in *Emile*, the master’s goal is to “fulfill [a] task of prevention. The child is to be educated against society and he must be protected against parents, neighbors and servants who would press their false values upon him” (“Rousseau’s Images” 930). On the other hand, “The conflict between the ideals of personal authority and of impersonal law [is] resolved in Rousseau’s mind by making law ... subordinate” since “ultimately the rule of law also depends upon a single human voice and hand to give it life” (“Rousseau’s Images” 922). Systems of national encouragement of obedience to the law through education, such as Rousseau explores in “Political Economy” (20-23), require vigilance, but even more, they require the weight of the authoritative leader who can convince the public of the virtues of law:

The great problem of politics is to make governments the guardians, rather than the enemies of law. [But] law is psychologically ineffective. It can condition only external behavior. Public opinion and mores alone can touch the heart. To be truly effective public authority must penetrate to the very heart. To do this requires more than law, it depends on continuing education.... Law ultimately is what personal authority can give society for a while.... That was the way of those ancient political paragons Moses, Lycurgus, Numa and Solon. (“Rousseau’s Images” 922)

If education here “replaces not only the father, but the entire family” (929), it does so in order to ensure that the pupil become “a self-sufficient adult who lives at peace with himself” (“Rousseau’s Images” 930), removed from the forces of *amour-propre* that drive and, too often, destroy or corrupt society. Rousseau’s famous proposal of negative education comes into play here, since negative education “prevents the imposition of an artificial, socially devised and socially oriented self upon the child” (“Rousseau’s Images” 930). Beneath this freedom, or at least directing it, is the constant presence of “an educative, preventive, curative and ordering authority. Authentic authority liberates. It gives liberty to those who are incapable of creating it for themselves” (“Rousseau’s Images” 931).

As we have suggested above, Shklar’s Rousseau is confronted with conflicts internal and external that often seem to be only tenuously resolved. Patrick Riley’s Rousseau also confronts contradictions, but these contradictions concern his allegiances to the modern state and to the classical model of democracy. Riley’s interest in explaining the concept of the general will in Rousseau revolves around his insight that the general will “is an attempted (though not explicit) amalgam of two extremely important traditions of political thought, which may be called, roughly, ancient ‘cohesiveness’ and modern ‘voluntarism’” (“Possible Explanation” 86). The problem Rousseau faced in the concept of the general will, in other words, was to reconcile modern individualist and even commercialized models of society with the greater cohesiveness he perceived in ancient societies. By attempting to join an individual willingness to participate in society with an overall social good, Rousseau hoped to assure the legitimacy of power in society. But “while voluntarism took care of legitimacy, it could say nothing about the intrinsic goodness of what is willed” (“Possible Explanation” 87). In modern societies, as compared to classical societies, “imperfect socialization ... allowed private persons and
corporate interests to control other private persons, leading to extreme inequality” (“Possible Explanation” 88). The idea of the general will emerges from these conflicts: the “transformed society must be governed on the basis of common interest … only general laws, the creation of a general will (sovereignty), can govern the common interest” (“Possible Explanation” 92). The uniting of particular wills with the general will depends upon the efforts of a “great legislator” (“Possible Explanation” 94) who obliges individuals to conform their particular wills to reason. Riley sums up his argument as follows:

1) a perfect state (that is, a perfectly socialized, united, and communal state) would have perfectly general laws (that is, laws dealing only with Rousseau’s vision of a common good); 2) but laws, especially the most general laws, must be willed by everyone subject to those laws, in order to be obligatory — and they must be made obligatory, for society is merely conventional; 3) therefore, will must take the form of general laws; 4) but will tends to the particular, and law, though the creation of will, must somehow be general; 5) moreover, for particular wills to appreciate the necessity of general laws, effect would have to become cause; 6) therefore, a great legislator, whose instruction can supply the defect of a morality of the common good — the only morality which would naturally produce general laws — is necessary; 7) but this legislator is impossibly rare, and, in addition, he cannot create laws, however general and good, for sovereignty is inalienable; 8) thus the legislator must have recourse to religion, and use it to gain the consent of individuals to the general will; 9) but now “consent” is something less than real consent, since an irrational device has been used; 10) finally, the whole system is saved for individual will by the fact that “a people always has a right to change its laws, even the best,” that legislative will, rather than law itself, is supreme, and that the entire social system can be abolished by will, for “there is not, and cannot be, any sort of fundamental law binding on the body of the people, not even the social contract.” (“Possible Explanation” 95)

Riley would later describe the legislator as a “civic educator” who brings about a transformation of natural, egoistic individuals into a citizenry that freely conjoins with the general will. The linking of politics and education means that the function of education is to transform “naturally self-loving egoists animated only by their own ‘private wills’ into polis-loving citizens with a civic ‘general will’” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 573). This “radically transformative education” aims to make people “what they ought to be” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 573). At the same time, this “transformative” and “denaturing” education must “produce autonomous adults who can say to their teachers (with Emile), ‘What course have I chosen! To remain what you have made me’” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 574). The “rigorous civic education” Riley here describes Rousseau as presenting draws “natural beings out of their (equally natural) ego-centrism, bringing them to think of themselves (finally) as ‘parts of a greater whole’ — a whole less extensive, but more realisable, than a ‘Christian republic’ or a kingdom of ends” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 579). Rousseau’s aim, for Riley, is thus to “generalise”
will — either through civic education, as in the Social contract or the Considerations on the government of Poland, or through private education, as in Emile” (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 582). If there is paradox in this consideration of educational strategy, Riley suggests, this is inevitable, since Rousseau’s theories work via progression through paradox:

For Rousseau there are unavoidable stages in all education, whether private or public. The child, he says in Emile, must first learn necessity, then utility, and finally morality, in that inescapable order. If one says ‘ought’ to an infant he simply reveals his own ignorance and folly. The notion of necessary educational time, or becoming what one was not, is revealed perfectly in Emile’s utterance, when he chooses ‘to remain what you have made me’. That is deliberately paradoxical — many of Rousseau’s central moral / political beliefs are cast in the form of paradoxes. However, it does show that the capacity to ‘decide’ is indeed ‘made’. It is education that ‘forces one to be free’ — by slowly ‘generalising’ the will. Similarly, Rousseau’s ‘nations’ are at first ignorant.... [A]utonomy arrives at the end of a process, and the general will is at last as enlightened as it was (always) right. (“Rousseau’s Philosophy” 584)

Patrick Riley thus supplies us with a summation of Rousseau’s concept of the general will, and sees this force as ultimately enlightening and formative. Roger D. Masters, in The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, provides us with another view in what he describes as an exegesis of Rousseau’s political thought. Quoting Bertrand de Jouvenel, Masters suggests that “[a]ll social evolution of the past two centuries has been contrary to the preferences of Jean-Jacques” (420). He contrasts the laws of science with the laws of human society that Rousseau had linked together, and argues in his concluding chapter that this linkage is what makes Rousseau’s political philosophy challenging in modern society. Masters points to Leo Strauss’ discussion of the distinction between the teleological aspects of the human science of natural rights and the non-teleological aspects of the science of nature as problematic for Rousseau’s perspectives. As he puts it, “Rousseau was fully aware ... of the gap between scientific propositions and the assumptions or prejudices governing civil society. But his principles of right ... appear impotent as a means of inhibiting the most enormous social experiments conducted in the name of scientific or pseudo-scientific theories of human nature; the most obvious of these theories — that of Karl Marx — has produced totalitarian political systems that sharply contradict Rousseau’s own preferences, but could conceivably be justified in terms of the enlightened or true self-interest of a citizen body which has absolute sovereignty” (423). Considering this angle, Rousseau’s “principles are open to a subversion,” or in other words can be used in a way that makes them appear responsible for totalitarian impulses.

A part of this tendency in Rousseau for Masters pertains to the nature and processes of education as Rousseau sees them. Masters points out that Rousseau’s treatise on education, Emile, is “written on at least two levels: while Rousseau describes the proper
education for the ‘natural man’, he also analyzes the nature of man’’ (3). A problem with this approach, according to Masters, is that it must start from a level that exists before the human exists; “Rousseau ... defines education broadly as that which provides ‘everything that we do not have at our birth and which we need when grown’” (5). Education, that is, involves a “denaturing” of the human, which perhaps prepares the individual for the public education described in *Political Economy*, by which prescribed public education becomes central to popular and legitimate governance (384). Such an education should be at the hands of authorities such as “‘famous warriors’ and ‘upright judges’ who have ‘worthily fulfilled’ official functions” (384), lest public confidence in the belief that education is “the most important business of the state” (384) be eroded. Rousseau’s system would then, in this view, be designed to create the ideal citizen, one who is in agreement with the “popularly accepted moral standards” (385) that underlie the general will.

In his criticism of Rousseau’s political position, Masters suggests that Rousseau’s political philosophies and assumptions about human development are largely irrelevant in the modern world. For example, Rousseau’s beliefs regarding the solitary nature of early humans, the state of freedom enjoyed in nature, the lateness of the evolution of the social contract, and so on, seem disproved by contemporary research into human evolution and social development. From Masters’ perspective, then, the *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (first Discours) is the main work that continues to bear social relevance. As Masters puts it, “in some countries this epoch [at the time he was writing, the 1960s] has produced a despotism based on advanced technology, permitting total control and mobilization of huge populations to a degree apparently never before obtained” (440). “[A]n objective consideration of our own era confirms Rousseau’s claim that the pursuit of luxury and wealth based on scientific and technical progress coincided with grave social and moral problems” (441). Masters traces the significance of the *Discours* to the “general pattern of historical development in the mid-twentieth century”:

Rousseau reminded his readers of the conquest of wealthy empires by poorer rivals, and it requires particular obtuseness to fail to see, in the process of decolonization, the successful challenge to western democracies by underdeveloped or backward peoples with but a fraction of the economic and military power of their former colonial conquerors. Increasingly, present world affairs are being seen as a contest between the developed countries of the Northern hemisphere and the poorer peoples of the Southern hemisphere.... (442)

Thus, according to Masters, what Rousseau wrote regarding the general form of social organization, human development, the evolution of inequality, and so on bears little relevance in our modern world; it is only in the area of the challenge the developing world brings to the developed world, the conflict between north and south, that Rousseau’s writing has contemporary relevance. In this way, Rousseau’s œuvre seems entirely beside the point as regards such social issues of Masters’ time as the conflict between western societies and the Soviet bloc. More relevance might arguably be found in the evolving face-off between developed and developing countries, such as might be
expressed in the events following the Arab Spring. Even in education, Masters states, Rousseau is misguided, for he “attempted to determine the natural limits on human freedom in order that the end or good life for man, as an individual, could be defined without ambiguity” and “was therefore forced to ascertain certain natural characteristics or impulses which are not subject to modification or destruction within society” (425). In this process, Masters claims, Rousseau was forced to elevate conscience over reason. But for Masters, “As the experience of Nazi Germany graphically illustrates, Rousseau’s premise that the conscience of pity is a more fundamental human attribute than reason can — to say the least — be opened to scientific doubt” (426).

However, Masters raises a caveat in his discussion of readings of Rousseau: “all too often it is hard to know where Rousseau is being analyzed and where the commentator is introducing his own attitudes and ideas” (418). We can see this conflict in the perspectives on Rousseau introduced by Irving Babbitt, who played a crucial role in founding the conservative movement known as the New Humanism. Though this movement subsided in the 1930s, only to be reassessed in the 1980s (Hoeveler), Cold War academics such as J. L. Talmont and Lester G. Crocker provide a reading of Rousseau that demonstrates a perspective reminiscent of Babbitt’s cultural conservatism. These ideological readings perhaps offers grist to the mill of Rousseau criticism introduced by later writers such as Jonathan Israel and Michael Coffman.

Writing in the early twentieth century, Babbitt follows his own agenda by electing to place Rousseau at the core of his main argument regarding the negative side effects of what he calls “Romanticism.” In an attack on an aspect of Romanticism that he sees as causing the dissolution of reliable concepts and values, Babbitt endeavors to retrace the origin of the disintegration of classical values by looking closely at the Romantic movement as a whole. Though he acknowledges that the terms ‘Classic’ and ‘Romantic’ are hard to define, he believes it necessary to take the trouble to come up with definitions that throw light on what he singles out as a type of “[Romantic] movement that from Rousseau to Bergson has sought to discredit the analytical intellect” (1). Using a distinctly critical tone towards the writers he identifies as followers of Rousseau, Babbitt makes it clear that he is blatantly taking sides against Romanticism in support of what he considers ‘Classical’ values. He identifies Rousseau with an essentially ungrounded movement followed by “those who are with [Rousseau or Wordsworth] rather than with [Socrates]” (1). For Babbitt, this movement is ungrounded because it is based on abstract, imaginative, and metaphysical foundations, or in other words because it shows in its writings, according to Babbitt’s own pseudo-positivistic scientific perspective, unworthiness as regards its living up to the intellectual and ethical standards put forward by Socrates. Thus Babbitt focuses his attack on Romanticism, and on Rousseau in particular, because he establishes Rousseau as both the precursor to and the culprit behind the Romantic movement. Rousseau’s inclination, according to Babbitt, is towards the metaphysical and sentimental as opposed to the intellectual, and Babbitt declares that to “measure up to the Socratic standard, a definition must not be abstract and metaphysical, but experimental” (1). Paradoxically, this analysis even provides the key to an interpretation of educational practices that contrasts Babbitt’s ‘classical’ or ‘Socratic’ model of education with a Rousseauist ‘Romantic’ or ‘utilitarian’ approach, with a
decided favoring of the classical. One result is a collapse of practicality in any potential approach to education that follows Babbitt’s inclination; as Joseph Aldo Barney puts it, Babbitt saw in the confrontation between these educational models “a life and death struggle between the apostles of utility and the advocates of tradition” (150) and “held that the naturalistic education espoused by Rousseau ... was undermining the traditional liberal arts education in the schools.... [Babbitt] feared, therefore, that attempts at humanitarian education would eventuate ... ultimately in a decline of the civilized world” (153).^4

Reading Babbitt, it becomes clear that his approach to Rousseau and the so-called Romantic movement is deeply flawed, largely because it presumes to stem from a polarized analysis that favors a critical position based on science and experience. By interpreting Rousseau in a sweeping fashion, and by pretending that critical approaches that are founded on history and pseudo-scientific methods allow for accurate comprehension of texts, Babbitt reveals the lack of nuance inherent in his understanding of the mechanisms of the text and its various expressions. Indeed, one of Babbitt’s criticisms is that Romanticism relies on an irrelevant adoption of an 18th century ideal that bases its views on truth and the world on “the law for things” as opposed to the “laws for man” that have come into being through the development of civilization. This perspective presumably underlies the critique of utilitarian educational approaches that by nature must address themselves to aspects of physical reality. Another criticism Babbitt makes, this time expressly of Rousseau even though it extends to the 18th century at large, is that not only Romanticism, as he defines it, but also Deism, which enables man to find harmony not in the rules of Christian dogma but in oneself and in nature, has caused a break with the Christian tradition and led to a finding of the powers of virtue in “sense,” in an instinct that directs morality itself into “an aesthetic or sentimental morality” (44). Says Babbitt, “Man begins to discover harmonies instead of discords in himself and [in] outer nature. He not only sees virtue in instinct but inclines to turn virtue itself into a ‘sense’ or ‘instinct’. And this means in practice to put emotional expansion in the place of spiritual concentration at the basis of life and morals” (44).

It is true that Emile does seem to reject history and the subjective laws of Man, and that it relies essentially on the needs and necessities of nature as opposed to systematic ideologies. But it is also important to remember that Rousseau’s philosophy does not do away with the values of experience. It in fact advocates control of the imagination whenever imagination threatens to go astray at the expense of judgment, acknowledges history whenever it discloses the recognition of behaviors that are universally worthy of our morals as opposed to being the object of propaganda for any given regime, and above all incorporates into the educational process that has been developed for the child the use of reason, starting with the encouragement of common sense, or with the development in Emile of what Rousseau calls «la raison sensitive» before presenting to the child’s intellect the many complex aspects that interfere with the use of intellectual reason. Thus when Babbitt pretends not to reject a naturalism that serves a utilitarian and scientific purpose, but only to reject that type of naturalism that reflects the unsound aspects of a Rousseauistic philosophy of life — “if I am right in my conviction as to the unsoundness of a Rousseauistic philosophy of life, it follows that the total tendency of the occident at
present is away rather than towards civilization” (x) — we can only assume that he has misunderstood Rousseau’s intent as well as Rousseau’s writings. The misunderstanding is revealed by the fact that Babbitt identifies the Romanticism associated with Rousseau with an “emotional naturalism” that leads to excesses through the adoption of unreliable and relativistic values. As Babbitt puts it, “my argument on the positive side aims to reassert the ‘law for man’, and its special discipline against the various forms of naturalistic excess” (x). ‘Naturalistic excess’ for Babbitt is tantamount to using imagination to let sentiment prevail over intellect and reason, creating an ungrounded, utopian, unrealistic world that is reflected in the unleashing of the ethically questionable Romantic genius.

We see an example of this confusion when Babbitt accuses Schiller of looking for a driving power in emotion, not in “supersensuous reality, not [in] insight,” because Schiller chose as a motto for his “Aesthetic Letters from Rousseau” the phrase « Si c’est la raison qui fait l’homme, c’est le sentiment qui le conduit » (43). Babbitt here demonstrates just how much he misunderstands Rousseau’s use of the words ‘sentiment’ and ‘nature’. Far from referring to relative expressions in humanity that are subject to outside stimuli, these terms signify for Rousseau sensible, evaluative measures that represent universal components of human nature, both at large and in practice. The terms also point to subjective components, but in doing so they are not just indicating superficial adoptions of an anarchistic credo that will lead 20th century man, for lack of accepting the conventions that have been an unquestionable gift of civilization, to social chaos and political absolutism. Indeed, a focus on the contrast between convention and nature sums up what Babbitt sees as much of the legacy of Rousseauism:

In permitting his expansive impulses to be disciplined by either humanism or religion man has fallen away from nature much as in the old theology he has fallen from God, and the famous ‘return to nature’ means in practice the emancipation of the ordinary or temperamental self that had been thus artificially controlled. This throwing off of the yoke of both Christian and classical discipline in the name of temperament is the essential aspect of the movement in favor of the original genius. The genius does not look to any pattern that is set above his ordinary spontaneous ego and imitate it. On the contrary, he attains to the self expression that other men, intimidated by convention, weakly forego.

In thus taking a stand for self-expression, the original genius is in a sense on firm ground — at least so far as the mere rationalist or the late and degenerate classicist is concerned. No conventions are final, no rules can set arbitrary limits to creation. Reality cannot be locked up in any set of formulae [except] abysmal, unsearchable and infinite multiplicity. (45-46)

If Babbitt recognizes that what has happened to Rousseauism in the 19th and 20th centuries is no longer absolutely a reflection of Rousseau’s philosophy, one can say that he surely uses some of Rousseau’s terminology to establish Rousseau as the very initiator...
and cause of the forces that have created a series of social and political upheavals in the 19th and the 20th centuries.

One may wonder if Babbitt is victim of his own strong desire to see himself as a scientist of literature, as someone who has adopted the criteria of the author’s life and his work as an absolute mode of interpretation. Yet it goes without saying that this single-minded interpretation, narrowed down to a rejection of Classicism and Christianity, and his desire to depict Rousseau’s endeavor as essentially narcissistic, as reflecting a project that has led to an anarchic free-for-all in the adoption of values that infect other realms of human science via the bias of literature, paradoxically demonstrates the birth of deconstruction. In fact the position that Babbitt takes assumes the pretense that one can understand an author without acknowledging his voice, so that one feels perfectly legitimized in attaching all kinds of unforeseen interpretations to the text in the name of its syntactic and semantic distributions. But one cannot limit oneself solely to reading Rousseau in light of the idiosyncrasies of his style or his bewitching lyricism; one owes it to him to read him not only in light of his intentions as they are translated in the gesture of writing, but also in light of all his other texts, most written within a decade. An expanded reading such as this reveals how Rousseau’s views do not rely on an egocentric understanding of humanity, which he would have seen as based on an understanding of society anchored in amour-propre rather than one based in a community founded on amour de soi. This latter type of community would feature a concept of individuality that requires a recognition of the interweaving of the individual and his original, pure make-up (the source of humanity) with the a priori expression of a society in which conscience relies on a universal compassion that is demonstrated via humanity’s innate amour de soi and translated into the power of the general will. If one wishes to lend to Rousseau’s philosophy an egotistic slant, then, one can only do so on behalf of a reader who interprets Rousseau’s theories as duplicitous and dangerous, because this same reader is subject to an agenda and to some kind of projection.

Even though after the late 1930s Modernist, Progressivist, and other movements diminished some of the authority attributed to Babbitt’s New Humanism, it is hard not to see the influence Babbitt’s ideas had on the investigations of later academics. In a vein of interpretation that recalls aspects of Babbitt’s approach, for instance, J. L. Talmon identifies in Rousseau’s ideas part of an encapsulation of perspectives that led to the birth of democratic totalitarianism. According to Talmon, it is no longer a question of the relativistic interpretation of values that Babbitt saw as the cause of the collapse of good Classical teachings in mankind, but in fact a question of the pretentious absolutism of a bunch of so-called doctrinarian thinkers, “prophets of liberty and the rights of man” (4), who saw “the idea of man as an abstraction” and evaluated the condition of humanity no longer in relation to an established order, but independently from “the historic groups to which [persons] belong[ed],” relying on ideologies that were susceptible of becoming “a powerful vehicle of totalitarianism” (4). Talmon sees the most important change in the 18th century as one involving a “peculiar state of mind” that considered the human legacy as unnatural and unworthy: “Men were gripped by the idea that the conditions, a product of faith, time and custom, in which they and their forefathers had been living, were unnatural and had all to be replaced by deliberately planned uniform patterns, which
would be natural and rational” (3). According to Talmon, this new secular religion that usurped the rights of the Church promoted “social morality,” since it was now incumbent upon the State to supply or replace the religious ethics that used to exist. Liberty was hence to be achieved “only in the pursuit of a collective purpose” (4) that was rooted in social utility rather than in tradition, and that above all was guided by reason (3). These new thinkers, armed with the conviction that there was no other truth than an “exclusive truth in politics” (1),

refused to envisage the conflict between liberty and virtue as inevitable. On the contrary, the inevitable equation of liberty with virtue and reason was the most cherished article of their faith. When the 18th century secular religion came face to face with this conflict, the result was the great schism. Liberal democracy flinched from the spectre of force, and fell back upon the trial-and-error philosophy. Totalitarian Messianism hardened into an exclusive doctrine presented by a vanguard of the enlightened who justified themselves in the use of coercion against those who refused to be free and virtuous. (5)

Having defined the partisans of “the totalitarian school” as a bunch of doctrinarians who cherished what they perceived as an exclusive truth in politics because their ideology postulated “a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things, to which men [were] irresistibly driven and at which they [we]re bound to arrive” (2), and in addition having defined these thinkers as despotic re-enforcers of a dubious new secular ethic that served as justification of the right to coerce in the name of freedom and virtue, Talmon points to what he interprets as the shifting of the original credo from a mainly ethical stance into “a social and economic doctrine” that nevertheless still is “based on ethical premises,” and that is thereby added to the overall picture of a makeshift, opportunistic movement rather than to a grounded, sensible and humanitarian one:

[B]efore the eighteenth century had come to an end, the inner logic of political Messianism, precipitated by the Revolutionary upheaval, its hopes, its lessons and its disappointments, converted the secular religion of the eighteenth century from a mainly ethical into a social and economic doctrine, based on ethical premises. The postulate of salvation, implied in the idea of the natural order, came to signify to the masses stirred by the Revolution a message of social salvation before all. And so the objective ideal of social harmony gave place to the yearnings and strivings of a class; the principle of virtuous liberty to the passion for security. The possessing classes, surprised and frightened by the social dynamism of the idea of the natural order, hastened to shake off the philosophy which they had earlier so eagerly embraced as a weapon in their struggle against feudal privilege. The Fourth Estate seized it from their hands, and filled it with new meaning. And so the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie was transformed into that of the proletariat. (5-6)
If, in this formulation of the ideals perpetuated in the eighteenth century, one can recognize themes that are prevalent in Rousseau’s philosophy, such as notions of nature, freedom, and virtue, it is difficult nonetheless for a careful and sensible reader to point to them as the essential ingredients that brought into being a type of democracy that becomes a perfect model for totalitarianism. Yet Talmon ends his introduction by pointing out that “Modern totalitarian democracy is a dictatorship resting on popular enthusiasm ... [i]n so far as it is the outcome ... of the synthesis between the eighteenth-century idea of the natural order and the Rousseauist idea of popular fulfillment and self expression” (6). Talmon then continues by denouncing the misuse of reason as well as the notion of the general will as it is presented in Rousseau’s ideology, saying that “By means of this synthesis rationalism was made into a passionate faith. Rousseau’s ‘general will’, an ambiguous concept, sometimes conceived as valid a priori, sometimes as immanent in the will of man, exclusive and implying unanimity, became the driving force of totalitarian democracy, and the source of all its contradictions and antinomies” (6).

Any nuanced reader of Rousseau will have to question the accuracy of Talmon’s understanding of Rousseau’s general will, even if that reader might also agree that in Rousseau’s philosophy, the general will can seem like a shifting and ambiguous concept. Perhaps what may help the reader see the problem with Talmon’s perspective is Talmon’s own eagerness to split Rousseau’s concepts into oppositional categories, resulting in situations where the adoption of a principle automatically excludes the foundations on which it may have been established. When, for example, in his chapter on totalitarian democracy and Rousseau, Talmon writes about the implications involved in embracing the general will, he sees this embracing as connected to a dangerous tendency to persuade the individual that he or she is not being coerced into following the demands of an external standard that is being reinforced by an external authority that supposedly is answering to “man’s inner voice,” thus encouraging the person to submit and comply to a state of freedom that can only be achieved through discipline. Says Talmon, “even if constrained to obey the external standard, man cannot complain of being coerced, for in fact he is merely made to obey his own true self. He is thus free; indeed freer than before. For freedom is the triumph of the spirit over natural, elemental instinct. It is the acceptance of moral obligation and the disciplining of irrational and selfish urges by reason and duty” (40). In this interpretation “the whole aim of political life is to educate and prepare men to will the general will without any sense of constraint” (42), and the goal of the Legislator is “the re-education of the ... nation to will the general will” (49).

In this reading, for Talmon, the general will is something that Rousseau “conjures up” by “fiat” (19). But conversely to what Talmon seems to suggest by this characterization, the general will is not an opportunistically fuzzy concept, but rather becomes a fluid and clear expression of the best of humanity, both in its natural and in its socialized expressions. The general will in fact allows the community and the individual to question the purity of any and all intentions and of any disinterestedness in light of an attempt to achieve inner and outer harmony. The external standards it establishes are not arbitrary, but in fact reflect internal standards associated with the compulsions of conscience. Far from involving moralistic prescription, then, the general will is the
expression of the collective conscience at work. Also, far from acting as a Machiavellian stratagem devised to impose and perpetuate socialized moral constructs, the general will, through its flexibility, accommodates accurate uses of intuition and sensible knowledge that serve both the individual and the community. Thus freedom is not achieved through a split between instinct and spirit; it is achieved through the creation of an inner harmony that becomes the general will or the collective conscience.

According to Rousseau, selfish urges do not need to be disciplined by reason and duty if one undergoes an educational process similar to Emile’s, including an embracing of negative education and a cultivation of faculties that enable one to function properly. Instinct and intuition will be combined in a well-directed flow of energy, thus letting passions flow adequately in a way that does not go against one’s own well-being. In no way is the individual citizen/subject forced into obligation and acceptance, having his or her personality molded according to external political norms that have been designed to make it fit in and initiate the person into an artificial freedom. The general will is not based on notions of conformity, nor is it an external, egotistic force in relation to the individual. It enables the individual and the community to perform acts of conscience because it never goes against anyone’s compassionate natural or social make up, but instead reflects the workings of the uncorrupted individual’s \emph{amour de soi}.\footnote{Talmon tells us that the general will “has an objective existence of its own, whether perceived or not ... [and that it] has nevertheless to be discovered by the human mind” (41). What seems to lead Talmon to compartmentalize Rousseau’s ideas here is a profound misinterpretation of Rousseau’s understanding of reason. For Talmon, reason is a solely mental construct. But Rousseau, continuing in the tradition of Descartes, for whom reason stems from a capacity for common sense that is based in the expression of instinct, sees reason and reasoning not only as the articulation of a complex faculty that demands the use of a well-trained mind, but also as the manifestation of a basic faculty that starts its work before any other mental faculty develops. Before reaching maturity, the child relies mostly on what Rousseau calls «la raison sensitive», a basic faculty linked to the need for survival. The somewhat elusive concept of the general will is not connected for Rousseau to some externalized social abstraction like the one Talmon suggests; it exists within us as a manifestation of a potential derived from basic instinctual reasonableness. Above all, it does not have an existence of its own, outside of human reality, because it is a metaphorical concept that acknowledges a natural form of conscience that does not issue from the application of social morals, but from individuals themselves, before any exposure to ethics. It certainly does not exist solely as a mental construct; rather, it resides in the physical, anatomical, and spiritual weave of the natural man, as well as in the social man who is harmoniously tuned to nature. Thus conversely to Talmon’s idea that the human mind needs to be acquainted to the general will, the human mind of “the natural man made to inhabit the city,” such as Emile is, is fully engaged with the dynamic interplay of the instinctual and the mental, since from an early age this mind has been integrated with human reasoning processes via the universal language of the body that resides at all levels of any being, from bodily microcellular reactions to the tuning of a discerning mind via the intelligence of the heart.\footnoteref{7}
To see this process at work, one need only recall the early, non-verbal teaching of the infant via the stimulation of feelings, the use of simple images, and the introduction of simple thoughts (and later, as the child grows, more complex thoughts) that enable the individual, thanks to a sound and grounded intellect, to function in harmony with both himself and his surroundings. Rousseau’s philosophy does not rely on changing the core of human nature, but on directing the passions in such way that the integrity of the individual’s natural energy is protected and does not deviate. If the mind has learned to use its faculties properly, it is in tune with its own intuition and instinct. Thus, when Talmon asserts that an implication of Rousseau’s Social Contract is that “[i]ndividualism will have to give place to collectivism, egoism to virtue, which is the conformity of the personal to the general will” (42), one cannot help but note that this interpretation confuses the notion of individualism, “an ideology that privileges and celebrates individuals over the group,” with that of individuality, or “the recognition that individuals are different from one another” (Loo). To be sure, Rousseau’s philosophy does ask that one not act selfishly, but this request has nothing to do with the imposition of rules, or with discipline, or with the obliteration of the individual’s existence. Rather, it involves the reiteration of the recognition of natural compassion and pity that is born out of amour de soi.

The understanding that Talmon has of Rousseau’s individual relies exclusively on a definition of man that is associated with amour-propre and not with amour de soi. Above all, Talmon seems to mix up the concepts of the national will and the political will with the general will, turning the latter into a means for finding an efficient way to move masses. Yet Rousseau’s establishment of a social compact is not geared toward finding hypocritical ways to manipulate the mass so it will concur with the agenda of the state, but rather toward preserving the integrity of the individual through an agreement that respects each individual’s wholeness while enabling the wholeness of the newly established community and state to exist in accordance with primordial principles of human compassion. Far from being a coercive mechanism that forces unanimity, it ensures the development of a process for generating and remembering wholeness and cohesion. In addition, the general will is not designed to reinforce a political agenda and a system that imposes preordained rules that apply in society without ever being questioned. Rather than considering the political plane as the only plane of existence, it brings together the natural, the instinctual, the intuitive, the individual, and the social as well as the universal planes.

By not seeing in Rousseau’s definition of reason the crucial role played by instinct and common sense, Talmon falls into the same error as Babbitt did when he chooses to describe Rousseau’s philosophy as based exclusively on instinct and sentiment, rather than seeing it as a philosophy that comprehensively co-ordinates the senses and the intelligence of the mind as well as the intelligence of the heart — in short, as a philosophy that combines the multidimensional aspects of the person that contribute to the intelligent use of faculties when body, mind, and heart are united. When Talmon contrasts the “liberal type of democracy” with the “totalitarian democratic school” by pointing out that totalitarian democracy “is based upon the assumption of the sole and exclusive truth in politics,” while “the liberal approach assumes politics to be a matter of
trial and error” (1), one must wonder how he can present Rousseau as the precursor of such political ideologies. For one may ask if a structure with checks and balances like those found in the model of the citizen/subject in the Social Contract, reflecting as they do the active involvement of all that are included in the compact as well as offering a common, comprehensive, and universal understanding of what pertains to the “moral” core of humanness and humanity, precludes spontaneity and encourages doctrinal ideologies.

Looking at Lester G. Crocker’s analysis of Rousseau, written in the late 1960s and early 1970s, one encounters again a similar type of distortion in the interpretation of Rousseau’s system. Once more, Rousseau’s terminology comes under attack, as do his motivations in writing books such as Emile and The Social Contract — books that are meant to offer solutions to mankind. Instead of trying to read Rousseau contextually, which would imply attention to the autobiographical, historical, philosophical, and spiritual forces impacting his work, Crocker’s approach involves a desire to explain Rousseau’s philosophy as reflecting a hidden agenda, or better yet as exemplifying the work of a hypocrite who changes his views whenever it suits his argument. Hence, for instance, when he is reporting on Rousseau’s demonstrations in the passage known as the Profession de foi from Emile, Crocker accuses Rousseau of conveniently, under the guise of his semi-fictional character the Vicaire Savoyard, leaving reason aside in favor of the inner light when wanting to know what is true. In Crocker’s interpretation, Rousseau tries to mask the inconsistencies in his thoughts as well as his deceptive ideas by simply shifting perspectives and conveniently when need be denigrating reason, even when doing so apparently contradicts his previous acknowledgements of reason’s importance and supremacy. In this way Crocker sums up the second conclusion drawn by the Abbé during his spiritual quest as being aimed at consulting the inner light instead of at “philosophers [who] in their pride lead us only into the kingdom of confusion” (2:146). According to Crocker, Rousseau replaces Descartes’ reason with the word “heart,” the heart here representing the sensible means of reaching clarity in one’s convictions. Denouncing what he calls Rousseau’s dubious method, Crocker underlines what he sees as Rousseau’s lack of integrity and honesty

So much for the method. Only it is not really his method. In reality, Rousseau is a reasoner and a rationalist. He will reason as hard as he can. He is also a dogmatist. Knowing in advance what he wants to prove, he will abandon reason, mock and vilify it when it abandons him, and turn in triumph to the “inner light.” The “inner light” is infallible because it is an immediate intuition, preverbal in form, unfiltered by reason. He sees no contradiction in his attitude: reason, “properly” used, within its “proper” sphere, is man’s attribute. But he also decries reason, because he is hostile to its effects as men have used it in civilization. (2:146)

Crocker’s perception of Rousseau’s opportunistic use of reason here must seem completely inaccurate to anyone who has read Rousseau closely, and above all to anyone who has followed Rousseau’s multiple explanations of what the act of reasoning entails. As Rousseau points out, reason is an extremely complex faculty. To operate efficiently
and appropriately, reason requires the use not only of numerous mental faculties, but also of other physical and instinctive faculties. According to Rousseau, then, reason is not solely a mental faculty. In addition, it is not what exclusively constitutes human understanding. Seen in this light, it is certainly not the faculty of reasoning or reason in itself that Rousseau abandons, nor reason that has negative effects; rather, it is what results when men do not know how to use reason properly and comprehensively. Thus, Rousseau’s statements are not brought up randomly whenever convenient; rather, they point out, as far as the use of reason is concerned, the limits of this faculty when it does not rely on other judicious faculties and detached motivations, since reasoning itself cannot merely be a simple mental exercise designed to justify our ends, especially when only superficial interests are involved. In fact, the unity of Rousseau’s system and the role played by reason within it can only be understood if one recognizes the part played by conscience at the individual, instinctual, mental, spiritual, and social levels. Only then do such concepts as reason, or what Rousseau means when he deals with the notions of freedom and obedience, make sense. A more modern way of explaining where Rousseau is coming from would involve equating the notion of amour-propre to the ego and amour de soi to the self as detached entity. One wonders if Rousseau tends to be consistently misunderstood by critics such as Talmon and Babbitt because of the confusion that words such as ‘reason’, ‘instinct’, ‘sentiment’, ‘feeling’, ‘opinion’, ‘individuality’, and ‘freedom’ generate, or because of the meanings that these and other words convey to them. In addition, one might wonder if such critics do not project their own thoughts regarding morality onto Rousseau, due in part to their inability to understand what Rousseau really means by conscience and how it can manifest itself in a political body. As mentioned previously, Rousseau’s system, as it is presented in his writings, is not meant to be seen as a series of isolated fragments that enable the critic randomly to extract statements out of context so as to project one-dimensional interpretations that are more reflective of the critic’s agenda than of Rousseau’s actual intentions. The now-clichéd sentence that if man does not want to be free he will be forced to be free is certainly one of the most typically misunderstood passages in the *Social Contract*, as is what Rousseau meant by the general will, which is often interpreted as representing something similar to Orwell’s Big Brother.

Looking at the critics this paper has presented so far, it is incumbent to try to explain why, from the late 19th century to the contemporary period, so many Anglo-American readers of Rousseau have misunderstood his philosophy and made blatant, irrational accusations regarding his writings, especially in light of the compassionate message Rousseau was trying to put across. One might also try to explain what role historical events such as the Russian Revolution, World War Two, and the Cold War played in developing these unfounded views of Rousseau’s system, as for instance in the claims concerning the totalitarian intentions that are associated with it. After all, as Dame points out, in the early history of the United States, readings of Rousseau largely remained in tune with Rousseau’s intentions, including a “[call] for a return to natural action founded on reason of mind and heart” with “[i]nstill, feeling, subjectiveness, and imagination [being] of paramount importance [and] employed to lead enlightened men from the state of nature to the social state, which is the appropriate state” (54). Perhaps Shklar’s and Masters’ readings of Rousseau can help explain what in Rousseau’s writings triggers
fanaticism on behalf of conservative American critics, a fanaticism that can be traced to Babbitt’s writings of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Neither Shklar nor Masters are invested in pointing the finger at Rousseau’s system. They seem instead to want to explain or even dismiss assertions about Rousseau’s importance with regard to any actual political or other manifestations from World War One to today. At question is whether Rousseau is actually a political philosopher, not to mention a politician. In fact, for Masters, Rousseau’s first Discours is the only work that bears political relevance to modern life: “an objective consideration of our own era confirms Rousseau’s claim [in the Discours] that the pursuit of luxury and wealth based on scientific and technical progress coincided with grave social and moral problems” (441).

On the other hand, Shklar’s perspective can be seen as hinting at why hostile 20th and 21st century critics offer such compulsive misunderstandings of Rousseau; their interpretations derive from Rousseau’s efforts to reconcile his longing for a society that provides opportunities for personal fulfillment with the need for self-abnegation he found in classical social models. In light of this effort Rousseau’s prescriptive statements about society should not be taken literally. The concepts readers project onto his works stem from a profound misunderstanding of Rousseau’s intentions, which Shklar describes as combining an endeavor to find a model that fulfills a most universal aspiration, i. e., happiness, with metaphorical personifications (the sovereign people and the general will) that aim at fostering a public model of this happiness. Reminding us that “Rousseau is not ‘rousseauisme’” (216), and that the “the Social Contract was less a utopia than a book of warnings” (211), Shklar claims that Rousseau “was neither a traditionalist nor a revolutionary of any sort” and that his “deep ... hatred of inequality is a perpetual challenge to any known society” (30).

Riley’s interpretation of Rousseau supports Masters’ and Shklar’s claims that Rousseau’s models could represent a viable political system only with extreme difficulty. The conflict lies in Rousseau’s wish to combine ancient cohesiveness and modern voluntarism. As Riley puts it, “The problem Rousseau faced in the concept of the general will ... was to reconcile modern individualist and even commercialized models of society with the greater cohesiveness he perceived in ancient societies” (86). Rousseau uses the term ‘general will’ to encapsulate these two notions, bringing together past and present, the community and individual, and so forth in an abstraction.

When Shklar, Masters and Riley look at Rousseau, they attempt to understand the tensions in the text that may lead to misunderstanding. They recognize the quality of Rousseau’s gesture and do not try to read him literally, but rather to see what he tried to achieve. Things change when we read Rousseau from the perspectives of Babbitt, Strauss, Talmon, and Crocker. The problem these critics face is that they offer interpretations that generate ideological perspectives. Starting with Babbitt, we see an understanding of a type of Romanticism that is based on the abstract, the imaginative, the emotional, and the metaphysical, as well as on the sentimental and egocentric. Babbitt believes that this type of Romanticism aims to get rid of classical values — an interesting perspective, given Rousseau’s own tendency to support his political and educational visions with direct reference to classical society, though as Riley points out, Rousseau
leans more toward Sparta than toward Athens. Babbitt’s misunderstanding lies in his belief that Rousseau discredits the analytical intellect. Talmon falls into a similar error when he describes Rousseau’s philosophy as based on instinct and sentiment, without the multidimensional aspect that contributes to the intelligent use of human faculties when body, mind, and heart unite. For Talmon the 18th century rebels replaced traditional values with ‘natural’ and rational ones, making secular religion the promoter of social morality and placing virtue and freedom in the hands of the state, not the church. Rousseau’s philosophy, in Talmon’s view, contributed to this movement by interjecting ideas of popular fulfillment and self expression based on instinct and sentiment, as opposed to components such as the mind and heart that can contribute to the intelligent use of faculties.

Reason itself becomes a major theme for Crocker. Strauss and Crocker both present Rousseau as a Sophist, but Crocker is more judgmental in his reading of Rousseau than Strauss is. Both Crocker and Strauss read Rousseau narrowly, in a positivistic manner (i.e., by trying to understand the text through the life of the man and by analyzing the character of the man through the perceptions reflected by the work). This approach leads them both to suggest that Rousseau is a hypocrite and to find his arguments involving manipulation and lies designed to serve his own ends. One result is that their collective analyses become almost personal. Above all, Crocker shows how completely oblivious he is of Rousseau’s intentions, which involve trying to convey in his often metaphoric writing his visionary experience at Vincennes and his desire to foster ways to achieve the unity of man (see Rousseau, “To M. de Malesherbes”). None of Rousseau’s writings are meant to be dogmatic, despite what Crocker so adamantly suggests, perhaps forgetting that Rousseau was self-taught and so expressed himself in uncharacteristic ways. Actually, Rousseau’s writings attempt to capture a moment and transpose the revelation it involved into social, political, educational, and fictional visions. The great flaw of these conservative interpreters — Babbitt, Talmon, and Crocker — is that they read Rousseau out of context, either deliberately or unconsciously, seeing him as a manipulative, hypocritical sophist who will not hesitate to contradict himself in the name of being right. To the contrary, if Rousseau uses paradox, it is more with the intention of clarifying his vision, which he himself suggests was overwhelming, and which he acknowledges has been imperfectly relayed. As a result of their approach in reading Rousseau, then, critics such as Crocker and Strauss miss much. They do not understand Rousseau’s gesture and read him literally, without nuance. This tendency reaches its extreme in the vituperation Crocker shows toward Rousseau when the former characterizes “the natural man made to inhabit the city,” Emile:

Perhaps we get a more accurate view of what Emile really is, in his independence from “opinion,” when we learn that he will not accept an insult or a slap, with its stain of dishonor; but neither will he, in such a situation, endanger his life to remedy what the civil law is unable to avenge. Law being insufficient, he recovers his natural independence. He will simply murder the offender in some way, perhaps by shooting him in the back. (2:144)
The extremity of the characterization here suggests that Rousseau might function for some as what Carl Jung would call a constellating factor. Though Strauss, Talmon, and Crocker lived through the Second World War and under the shadow of the Cold War, we can still see this tendency toward constellation emerging in recent presentations of Rousseauist thought, just as one can say that the “constellated” concept of the Reaganist “evil empire” has re-emerged in symbolic post-Soviet manifestations such as Islamophobia, or in the reversal of this perception in the countervailing, euphoric post-Soviet vision of the “New World Order” proclaimed by the first President Bush in the early 1990s, or in the echo of evil that streams through the plague of invective that now polarizes American politics. The ghost of history remains in the American critical psyche, and plays its role in shaping sociopolitical perspectives and the readings fueled by them much as it did in the century before. In this light we see the negative Cold War readings of Strauss, Talmon and Crocker continued in the work of two contemporary commentators, Jonathan Israel and Michael Coffman.

Jonathan Israel’s overall project is to champion what he calls the “Radical Enlightenment,” a “system of ideas that [has] shaped the Western World’s most basic social and cultural values in the post-Christian age” (Revolution xi). He asserts that “Radical Enlightenment argues for overthrow of current systems, the basis of morality in reason, international consensus on progress, and equality.” This intellectual movement, spawned in the 17th and 18th centuries, supports belief in fundamental human equality, stresses the importance of democracy, upholds rights of individual liberty, and argues for freedom of speech and thought. Radical Enlightenment differs from the “mainstream thinking” (Revolution xii) of the past, and is challenged by postmodernism, which has “deemed all traditions and sets of values more or less equally valid” (Revolution xiii) and so dismissed “universal … higher values self-evident in reason and equity” (Revolution xiii). Israel distinguishes the Radical and Moderate Enlightenment from such “Anti-Enlightenment” figures as Rousseau.

In his systematic polarizing of perspectives, Israel connects Rousseau to authoritarianism in a way that ignores Rousseau’s support of equality. Rousseau is excluded from the Radical Enlightenment for several reasons, many of which demonstrate Israel’s ignorance of Rousseau’s positions on freedom, morality, and reason, and show how inaccurate, limited, and decontextualized his understanding of Rousseau is. Following are some of the reasons for Rousseau’s exclusion:

1. The Radical Enlightenment saw its political agenda as potentially international, arguing for “universal revolution driven by the active agent of la philosophie” (Revolution 57), and argued that human rights and equality are the same for everyone, so the revolution should be exported, while Rousseau argued against internationalism and felt that different societies would require different governmental institutions.

2. The Radical Enlightenment found the basis for morality in human reason, while Rousseau argued for its foundation in the “voice of nature.”
3. The Radical Enlightenment argued for freedom of thought and expression, while Rousseau favored censorship (“forcing people to be free”) (Revolution 63).

4. The Radical Enlightenment insisted on the social nature of its enterprise, while Rousseau leant increasingly towards isolation and introversion. (D’Holbach felt that the misorganization of society, which Radical Enlightenment meant to fix, was responsible for Rousseau’s contention that “life in society is ‘contrary to the nature of man’” [Revolution 57] and should be renounced.)

5. “Radical Enlightenment … is partly defined by an emphatic, anti-Rousseauist preference for representative democracy” (Revolution 64).

Regarding these, we can agree that Rousseau certainly did not believe in “universal revolution,” which could be equated with the “New World Order” proclaimed by the first President Bush around the time of the first Gulf War. A glance at the differences between Rousseau’s recommendations for the governments of Poland and Corsica demonstrates Rousseau’s belief that different societies require different forms of government, as opposed to a “one size fits all” type of model that may underlie some of the difficulties involved in the West’s attempts to export the values (and exploitations) of capitalist society. Regarding reason, Israel’s clichéd reference to the “voice of nature” demonstrates a total lack of understanding that is perhaps even more severe than the oversimplifications of Babbitt and others. Similar problems appear with concerns about censorship. While one can detect passages suggestive of censorship in the work of Rousseau, it is only addressed directly in chapters 6-7, Book IV, of the Social Contract. For Rousseau, censorship is a worst-case scenario because it can only be present when it is already too late. That is to say, censorship exists only when the essential morality of the human being has been compromised by opinion, and thus when the role of negative education, as it is described in Emile, has failed. With regard to isolation, though Rousseau did move away from his peers, this more reflects on personality than on philosophy. And finally, as concerns representative government, see again Rousseau’s beliefs about different types of government for different societies. In short, Israel's reading of Rousseau is filled with clichés and oversimplifications, perhaps because Israel reads Rousseau through other critics, perpetuating prejudices and distortions that lead him to miss the systematic unity in Rousseau’s thought. As an example, he concludes Radical Enlightenment with comments on Rousseau’s “Janus-headed mixing of elements from both the radical and mainstream Enlightenment,” proclaiming that Rousseau put “stress on the existence of a Creator and First Mover, on two substances [vs. the monadology of Israel's champion, Spinoza], on the immortality of the soul, and the absolute quality of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in ethics” (Radical 720). While some of these assertions might be supported by statements Rousseau made, the claim that Rousseau believes in an “absolute quality of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in ethics” is blatantly false — Emile, for example, is amoral until he learns morality. Rousseau’s system is not based on a prescriptive ethics founded on absolute good and evil but rather on a natural and individual predisposition that if well channeled will inevitably construct a sensible morality, as happens for example in the case of Emile.
Israel's massive output has been met with an impressive range of skepticism. As Johnson Kent Wright puts it, Israel's writings have engendered “a series of in-depth critiques, from leading practitioners of every stripe,” who reach a “strikingly unanimous verdict” that the work is an “academic juggernaut, careening destructively through the discipline, in the service of a false idol ... and an unsustainable principle — the idea of an umbilical connection between metaphysical monism and political radicalism.” But if Israel’s perspective is problematic, and his reading of Rousseau an amalgam of clichés, it is nothing compared with the crude ignorance displayed in the approach Michael Coffman offers in his manifesto Rescuing a Broken America. Coffman divides American social values into two categories that he identifies with the philosophies of John Locke and of Jean-Jacques Rousseau respectively. The Lockean model, Coffman claims, upholds the individual as the basis for any founding principle of rights and values, and so represents all “good” values of freedom and justice that underlie “true” American values as represented in the United States Constitution. The Rousseauist model, on the other hand, upholds the group or the state as determining rights and values, and so represents a movement toward evil, fascistic, and communistic values that Coffman identifies with the policies of Barack Obama. In Coffman’s lexicon, “Rousseau” becomes an adjective that replaces words such as evil, lazy, dictatorial, bureaucratic, and so on, as is shown in such phrases as “Rousseau progressive liberals have a very warped view of human nature; they refuse to accept responsibility” (30) or the chapter title “The High Cost of Rousseau Socialism” (57). As regards education, Coffman argues that as a result of the “shifting [of] the form of government from that based on the John Locke model to one based in the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau” (95), public education in America “has been totally corrupted” into “a system of mind control based on the psycho manipulation principles of Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Benjamin Bloom, and Alfred C. Kinsey” (96). The result of such an alteration is spelled out bleakly at the end of Coffman’s discussion of education:

Once a revisionist curriculum indoctrinates a full generation, its propaganda becomes truth. The general population will believe that socialism and world citizenship is the only truth, and will resist all efforts to expose how they have been dumbed down. It is happening before our eyes. (104)

Anti-freedom, communistic, fascistic, evil — such are the words, images, and ideas that one finds associated with Rousseau. One might ask if these projections onto the ideas Rousseau presents are signs of isolationism and compartmentalization, Manichean perceptions of evil and duplicity, blatant representations of hypocrisy and deceit that actually only express some of the undercurrents of American society, and are unfortunately passed on in the American educational system. Such are the interpretations of Rousseau's philosophy. One can ask why Rousseau has become such a polarizing figure in Anglo-American circles, why his philosophy — or rather, attacks on his philosophy — became important in the New Humanism or underscored the orchestration of the New World Order proposed in the image of Radical Enlightenment, or even echo today across the Radical Right. An answer might lie in the tradition of Anglo-American philosophical education, which can be characterized by its lack of study of philosophy, bolstered by undercurrents of utilitarianism, empiricism, and pragmatism that cannot
encompass the philosophical background of someone like Rousseau, and the avowedly self-taught traditions of classical philosophy and Cartesian rationalism that he brings to his work. It might also be pertinent to consider the dismissive attitude toward foreign languages and the meanings and cultures they represent in light of this tendency to diminish the philosophical.

However we approach the phenomenon of Rousseau’s denigration, what is clear is that Rousseau is a polarizing figure, an expression of contradiction and of complexity that allows critics of all stripes to see in him both what he means to say and all too often what they project. If Rousseau is a constellating figure in the Jungian sense, perhaps what the critics see in Rousseau is only a representation of themselves, or of the ideological perspectives they represent. If ideology is revealed by the contradictions it avoids, and if projection in psychological terms is the mechanism by which the analysand avoids seeing the neurotic forces driving these projections, what can we say about the characterizations of Rousseau’s philosophy that underlay the long ascension of America onto the world stage from the late 19th to the 21st centuries — the period when industrialization, destruction of nature, increasingly totalitarian states, both dictatorial and democratic, and crushing social organization have come to the fore — when the statement that “man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains” has in some ways become truer than ever?

Perhaps the effort is to kill the messenger, rather than hear the actual message, in which the disunities of individual and social freedoms might be addressed, or in which the possibilities of a new freedom lie buried in an unrealizable novel on the education of a child in which the child gets taught in such a way that his mind remains unclouded by ideology, operates mostly on common sense, and enjoys a harmonious use of mental faculties, allowing him to be able to think outside the box in an open fashion at all times. Either way, what you see is what you get — or what you are. These readings or misreadings of Rousseau may then tell us as much about our own society as they do about the citizen of Geneva.
Notes

1 For an assessment of Rousseau’s impact more particularly on American life in the 18th century, see Spurlin.

2 For a perhaps oversimplified view of Rousseau’s impact on American education, particularly at the primary levels and regarding the shift away from Puritanical educational practices toward the introduction of Kindergarten, see Cunningham.

3 Frank Thakur Das maintains that “the period roughly speaking between 1889 and 1930 ... found the critics, mostly academics, pre-occupied in examining the elusive, metaphysical, concept of the General Will,” but that “in the background of [the] rise and fall of Fascism in Europe [the] main concern was to probe into the overall political disposition of Rousseau’s thought in terms of two rather loosely defined categories Liberal or Totalitarian, either variant of this critical pre-occupation which held the attention of Rousseauite scholarship for more than a decade was like-wise in terms of two, somewhat vague, yet suggestive categories, i. e. Individualism and Collectivism” (552-553).

It should also be noted here that readings of Rousseau often approach the texts in isolation, or emphasize certain features at the expense of others. It is important to remember that Rousseau generated most of his works within a decade, and that the works are supposed to complement each other. Ideally they are not to be read exclusively, but judged in light of his whole œuvre. Nor are they to be seen as evidence of a pre-Romantic, Enlightenment, or other tendency, but must be read from multiple perspectives at once. Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse, for instance, is well known for its exploration of political and social views, and so goes well beyond being a simple love story. Rousseau himself explains his entire œuvre in relation to a moment of enlightenment he experienced when traveling to Vincennes, and locates the central tenets of his philosophy in his two Discours and in Emile.

4 Other critics who support Babbitt’s views on education in contrast to perspectives traced to Rousseau include Robert C. Koons, for whom Rousseau’s “admitted ... inveterate laziness” translates (via Harvard’s Charles William Eliot) into the “elective system” of the modern university, “in which the student is ‘compelled to be free’ by being denied the opportunity to undertake a coherent and well-ordered course of study” (Koons 203), and Glenn A. Davis, who suggests that Babbitt saw Rousseau’s “understanding of the imagination” as underlying “the deepest roots of educational decay,” since in the Rousseauist model, “Education ... did not mean training for ethical character or virtue, but rather it meant ‘letting go’ of all externally imposed standards” while also “limiting instruction to the utilitarian needs of its constituents” (Davis 53-54).

5 Lester G. Crocker illustrates this tendency when he tells us, “[a] major fallacy [Babbitt commits] is to regard Rousseau as an anarchist, whereas, quite to the contrary, [Rousseau]
is an authoritarian and puts the highest price on discipline and order” (“Professor Babbitt” 272). This interpretation equally reveals Crocker’s and Babbitt’s misreading of Rousseau.

According to Arie Dubnov, Talmon describes “the French Enlightenment thinkers, headed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as radicals who not only provided the philosophical justification for Jacobin terror but were in fact also forerunners of Bolshevism and Stalinism. Talmon considered Rousseau, more than anyone else, an anti-liberal democrat who made totalitarian democracy possible. Opposite to liberals, argued Talmon, Rousseau did not consider politics ‘to be a matter of trial and error’. Rousseauian vision of politics, based on the idea that ‘La volonté générale est toujours droite [the general will is always upright]’, offered a new ideal that became essential for totalitarian democracy — that there is a ‘sole and exclusive truth in politics’. Hence, Rousseau’s ‘lawgiver’ (legislateur) was interpreted by Talmon all too similar to George Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ and Stalin’s ‘engineers of the human soul’. It was the idea of volonté générale in particular, Talmon believed, that became ‘the driving force of totalitarian democracy’” (131). See also Das, who maintains that “Talmon traced the roots of modern totalitarianism to Rousseau” (555), and Seitschek, who writes that „Rousseau nimmt eine zentrale Rolle in Talmons Denken ein, da ihn Talmon — sehr eigenwillig — als direkten Vorläufer des Totalitiarianismus interpretiert“ (57).

This position can be thought of in relation to Jonathan Marks’ consideration of the role of “disharmony” in attempted resolutions of human consciousness. Marks points out that people are born without the “sentiment of existence,” since at birth we lack “self-consciousness,” which depends for its existence on memory. He suggests that Rousseau’s savage differs from the “sociable man” because the sociable man exists “always outside himself,” while the savage “lives in himself.” These tensions within the individual lead Marks to claim that “Rousseau views the human good not as a unity but as a set of disharmonious attributes or tendencies that must somehow be arranged in a life so as not to tear the human being apart” (86-87). Projected onto the political sphere, Marks suggests that “Rousseau was willing to preserve tension in order to give the plurality of human goods their due” and “made the savage nation, a nation characterized by struggle, a pattern for his visions of the good life” (88). Marks specifically contrasts this perspective with the one Talmon presents, in which (he claims) Rousseau’s “totalitarian” tendencies are linked directly to Rousseau’s (perceived) neurotic character. As Marks puts it, “to call someone who [like Rousseau] favored civic education and civil religion a totalitarian is to empty that term of its moral seriousness” (87).

These definitions come from a 2 December 2013 blogpost by Dennis Loo, author of Globalization and the Demolition of Society, on a site dedicated to discussion of this book. Similar insights into the distinction of individuality from individualism can be found at the Emerson Post blogsite, dedicated to discussion of the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, where on 9 December 2009 “Mr. Morris” commented, “Individuality as I see it is about the expression of self; an expression of mind and spirit; an expression of your thoughts and those things that make you a unique being worthy of notoriety. Individualism is the spirit that sees the world and life (to use an economic term) as a zero
sum game. The idea that one person’s win is another person’s lost [sic] or that one’s happiness may require another’s grief. The idea that someone necessarily has to get the short end of the stick in the ‘game’ of life....” See finally John Horvat’s comments in Return to Order, a book dedicated to the establishment of an organic Christian community, in which Horvat states, “We make a distinction between individuality and individualism. Man manifests his individuality when he fully develops his personality and talents by which he is different from others. At the same time, individuality encourages man to develop his intensely social character by participating in life together in community, acknowledging a moral law, and promoting the common good. The more specific, richer, and stronger this personal life, the more intense the social life. Thus, individuality results in stronger community.” Meanwhile, for Horvat, “Individualism is a deformation of individuality by which man makes himself the center of an enclosed world of personal self-interest that tends to disregard the social character of man and his role in community” (74). One might ask if these tendencies to establish an opposition between individuality and individualism are supplanting the earlier emphasis on the opposition between individualism and conformism that prevailed during the Cold War period.
References


Teaching Magical Thinking: Notes towards a Burroughsian Pedagogy

Allan Johnston

It might seem odd that one would write about the pedagogical practices or educational philosophy of William S. Burroughs, the Beat novelist who is best known as the author of *Naked Lunch* and pioneer of the cut-up method. After all, Burroughs was a writer rather than a teacher, and his experiences as a teacher, not to mention his comments on those experiences, are limited. Of his two stints in the classroom described in *Literary Outlaw*, Ted Morgan’s biography of Burroughs, one, his tenure at a school in Switzerland, appears to have been part of a scam, while the other gave him only a short experience of teaching. He lectured at the Naropa Institute, but lecturing is not necessarily teaching. Also, he apparently found that teaching drained his creative energy to such an extent that after teaching one creative writing class he asked, “am I being punished by the Muses for impiety and gross indiscretion in revealing the secrets [of writing] to a totally unreceptive audience — like you start giving away hundred-dollar bills and nobody wants them” (*Adding Machine* 28)?

But behind the drug-crazed, homoerotic violence of Burroughs’ experimental novels, recordings, and films lies a peculiar metaphysics and a system of thought that underscores a vision of the world which we can view from an educative angle. In fact, Burroughs does describe pedagogical practices he used in writing classes, and these exemplify some of the ideas, often unusual but coherent in their own strange way, that underlie his vision of the world, and particularly of the word, and stress how the forces of thought, perception, education, and existence shape our approach to daily life. These pedagogical approaches toward teaching writing perhaps parallel or supplement what Joseph Vecchio calls the “pedagogical ... sense” (vii) underlying much of Burroughs’ experimentation with film and prose (the “cut-up” technique), through which, Vecchio claims, Burroughs often “is purposefully putting himself in the role of teacher whose curriculum is the destruction of control mechanisms” and whose purpose is “to demonstrate ways in which one could free oneself from control” (4). From the few examples of strategies he describes having developed to teach writing students, we can reach some conclusions about his intentions and techniques, including some that Burroughs himself presents. We will examine these after reviewing some of the predominant ideas Burroughs develops through his writings, interviews, and other works, showing how his persistent effort is to invoke means of countering social control.

At the core of Burroughs’ approach is an attack on rationality and ego-centeredness as bulwarks of social order. This rational order is upheld by dominating addictions to
power, which Burroughs sees as more addictive than the heroin to which he was hooked for much of his life. He identifies this addiction early on in his famous calculation of the “algebra of need,” which for him demonstrates among other things that selling is more addictive than buying. Closely related to this concept is Burroughs’ “focus on the anti-social, anti-life forces which [are] a fundamental expression of the parasitic nature of living [and which] construct his world of parasitism and symbiosis” (Johnston, “Burroughs Biopathy” 108). He expresses the formula of need in *Naked Lunch* through a simple set of rules that he sees as providing the model of monopoly:

1.—Never give anything away for nothing
2.—Never give more than you have to give (always catch the buyer hungry and make him wait).
3.—Always take everything back if you possibly can. (*Naked Lunch* 200)

We see one of the central characters in *Naked Lunch*, Dr. Benway, exploring a corollary to these values when he states, “The subject must not realize that his mistreatment is a deliberate attack of an anti-human enemy on his personal identity. He must be made to feel that he deserves any treatment he receives because there is something (never specified) horribly wrong with him. The naked need of the control addicts must be decently covered by an arbitrary and intricate bureaucracy so that the subject cannot contact his enemy direct” (*Naked Lunch* 19). Bureaucracy operates on the “principle of inventing needs to justify its existence” (*Naked Lunch* 112), Benway states later.

Jennie Skerl argues that Burroughs’ algebra of need replaces the “economic theories of capitalism’s apologists” and also opposes the positions of “Marxist critics” (*William S. Burroughs* 38), in that in this model “[s]elling [becomes] more of a habit than using” (Burroughs, *Naked Lunch* 287). What this means, then, is that the Burroughsian “world of manipulated needs … serves mainly to keep those who satisfy [these needs] in power,” but it also means that “this power elite’s control is far from absolute, for its members are driven by their own need to control” (Dolan 535). The algebra of need thus offers “a cycle of diminishing returns [and] a degenerate capitalist economy headed for bankruptcy” (Lydenberg 146).

Later works by Burroughs suggest a movement toward a “next step” in which the human may leave the body altogether (Whitmer and VanWyngarden 106), though Burroughs elsewhere states, “I do not think of myself as a materialist but I do insist that anything that affects the human nervous system must have a point of reference that is a definite location in the human nervous system” (*Adding Machine* 90). David Ayers associates Burroughs’ move away from the body with Gnosticism (225), while Jones Irwin, following the lead of Daniel Belgrad, would probably associate this tendency more with a “Third Worldism … understood from a spiritual rather than an economic perspective” (272). It could also be that “Burroughs … aims to destroy society through fantasy” (Johnston, “Burroughs Biopathy” 119), and as a corollary to this destruction, tends to move away from the dominating presence of the body, its entrapment in the senses, and its material expression through language by transcending it through telekinesis, extrasensory perception, and other means. In this light the anarchic homosexual gangs
described in such novels as *The Wild Boys* and *Red Cities of the Night* represent an idealized form of anti-society based on decentralized, cooperative social structures that seem focused intently on homoerotic violence and sometimes ritualized death. These imagined communities attempt to supersede bourgeois social order by exiting from language, which Burroughs at some points suggests can itself be disembodied, even to the extent that voices in the air or voices in silence can be detected given the right circumstances (*Adding Machine* 53). Which brings us to the concept of the word virus.

Having posited addictions to power and to selling as primary forces in contemporary societies, Burroughs connects this supposition to an identification of language with endemic features that are expressed through the trope of the word virus. Burroughs apparently considers the word virus as literally extant, though one may question the extent to which Burroughs’ vision of the world is flatly materialistic. Put another way, a spiritualistic component appears in Burroughs’ presentations of the word and the societies that the word virus infects, but we cannot say that this is a religious view. Rather, it is “magic” in a sense that implies indirect and non-rationally knowable connections in a way that we will come back to later. But the word, in its endemic spread, its self-replication, its disembodied capabilities, and its ability to control thought through standardization of meanings via cliché, repetition, and other devices, achieves, in Burroughs’ cosmology, a viral quality that removes it from the usual arguments regarding the conveyance of meaning, the processes of ideation and naming, and other features we associate with language. Skerl describes the word virus as consisting of “linguistic-social constructs linked to particular economic and political structures” (*William S. Burroughs* 63), and if we accept this model, escape from this virus involves “an escape from entrapping modes of consciousness” (Johnston, “Consumption” 110). In his more avant-garde writings Burroughs works toward this escape through experimentation with cut-ups (in which two texts are cut apart, and the pieces are aligned to create a new text), fold-ins (in which a text folded over on top of itself generates altered content), and other forms of textual manipulation deliberately designed to subvert meaning as it is determined by the ordering process of words constructed into sentences.

Burroughs himself states, “My general theory since 1971 has been that the Word is literally a virus, and that it has not been recognized as such because it has achieved a state of relatively stable symbiosis with its human host” (*Adding Machine* 48). He uses as evidence for this claim the following argument: “The Word clearly bears the single identifying feature of virus: it is an organism with no internal function other than to replicate itself” (48). From this angle we can see that the word virus, even if we do not accept it as a literal virus as Burroughs apparently does, is capable of obtaining an independent and perhaps even quasi-mystical force, often operating beyond the usual levels of human control, but nevertheless manipulated by some in ways that allow words to subdue individuals and control social organization. One way to think of this is via the model of sentence structure that posits an entity (the subject, usually a noun) that acts upon another entity (the object, manipulated through a verbal limb that controls the relation between these two ideations). Gunther Kress, in a context totally unrelated to Burroughs’ description of the word virus, illustrates this relation well when comparing the linguistic presentation of rain in the sentence “It is raining” to the visual, auditory, or
other modes in which rain is presented as a feeling of wetness, the sounds of water splashing, and so on. The sentence structure in the lingual mode posits an “it” that is somehow making raining occur, suggesting a subject-based manipulation of perception that relies on an external or perceptually distinct entity or quality that makes raining operate (“it”). Whether for Burroughs such powers as those that these features of language permit are controlled by forces beyond earth, as some of the novels suggest, or whether such meanings are deliberately subverted by experimental textual techniques such as the cut up or the fold in, which try to undermine the domination of the word and the representational presentation of reality that it often manifests, much of the effort in Burroughs’ work is to describe control structures and to show how these structures can be attacked and subverted through violation of the social and linguistic forces that shape or determine appropriate social behaviors.

In the novels these attacks often take the form of overt social violence, and are accompanied by descriptions of obsessively obscene, vicious erotic practices such as asphyxiation by hanging, almost invariably in a homoerotic context. Yet importantly these practices are not accompanied by any sense of standardized abiding moral evaluation. The style of writing, involving what Burroughs calls the “routine,” removes us from moralistic or “bourgeois” consideration (particularly after Burroughs develops the mature style that starts with *Naked Lunch*), and becomes reportorial, deadpan, fantastical, generally macabre, and comic in a “black” or “arabesque” way. This effect, and the general style of the routine as an anecdotal strategy, is exemplified well by the famous routine describing the talking asshole in *Naked Lunch*, a passage that also illustrates in graphic manner how language takes over and degenerates individual existence:

Did I ever tell you about the man who taught his asshole to talk? His whole abdomen would move up and down you dig farting out the words. It was unlike anything I ever heard.

This ass talk had a sort of gut frequency. It hit you right down there like you gotta go. You know when the old colon gives you the elbow and it feels sorta cold inside, and you know all you have to do is turn loose? Well this talking hit you right down there, a bubbly, thick stagnant sound, a sound you could smell.

This man worked for a carnival you dig, and to start with it was like a novelty ventriloquist act. Real funny, too, at first. He had a number he called “The Better ‘Ole” that was a scream, I tell you. I forget most of it but it was clever. Like, “Oh I say, are you still down there, old thing?”

“Nah! I had to go relieve myself.”

After a while the ass started talking on its own. He would go in without anything prepared and his ass would ad-lib and toss the gags back at him every time.
Then it developed sort of teeth-like little raspy in-curving hooks and started eating. He thought this was cute at first and built an act around it, but the asshole would eat its way through his pants and start talking on the street, shouting out it wanted equal rights. It would get drunk, too, and have crying jags nobody loved it and it wanted to be kissed same as any other mouth. Finally it talked all the time day and night, you could hear him for blocks screaming at it to shut up, and beating it with his fist, and sticking candles up it, but nothing did any good and the asshole said to him: “It’s you who will shut up in the end. Not me. Because we don’t need you around here any more. I can talk and eat and shit.”

After that he began waking up in the morning with a transparent jelly like a tadpole’s tail all over his mouth. This jelly was what the scientists call un-D.T., Undifferentiated Tissue, which can grow into any kind of flesh on the human body. He would tear it off his mouth and the pieces would stick to his hands like burning gasoline jelly and grow there, grow anywhere on him a glob of it fell. So finally his mouth sealed over, and the whole head would have amputated spontaneous — (did you know there is a condition occurs in parts of Africa and only among Negroes where the little toe amputates spontaneously?) — except for the eyes, you dig. That’s one thing the asshole couldn’t do was see. It needed the eyes. But nerve connections were blocked and infiltrated and atrophied so the brain couldn’t give orders any more. It was trapped in the skull, sealed off. For a while you could see the silent, helpless suffering of the brain behind the eyes, then finally the brain must have died, because the eyes went out, and there was no more feeling in them than a crab’s eye on the end of a stalk. (*Naked Lunch* 110-112)

What happens in this passage is a literal takeover of ego-centered humanity as expressed through language by a malevolent oppositional force in what Skerl calls a “downward metamorphosis” (*William S. Burroughs* 39). This process occurs through a gradual assertion of voice over the person via political and emotive manipulation (the demand for equal rights and the crying jags). In the anecdote this voice reduces the body through a non-human (or perhaps, à la Nietzsche, too human) shutting down of the brain through cliché, emotion, and demand. Base human functions overtake capacities of language and all possible normal oral expression, and in this instance the effect is the devolution of the person into undifferentiated tissue, a form of stem cell material, though here achieving the opposite possibilities of plenipotentiar y cells in that this material becomes almost a type of napalm disfiguring the body and devolving it toward the level of the crustacean or even further.

If for Burroughs much language usage incorporates a “definite technology for the negative use of words to cause confusion,” this is “the opposite of what a writer does” (*Adding Machine* 34). “An essential feature of the Western control machine,” Burroughs states, “is to make language as non-pictorial as possible, to separate words as far as
possible from objects or observable processes” (Burroughs and Odier, qtd. in Baldwin 63). The writer, on the other hand, trains himself or herself to use words to focus on the particularities of existence, away from the exigencies of power and control, perhaps by setting up a counterbalance to this control. One might compare this vision of the word and how it works to evoke “charged” particularities, even if imagined or hallucinated, with the idea of the image developed by Ezra Pound, one of the leading Modernist poets whose work helped break the gridlock of traditional forms to usher in the free verse movement. According to Michael Alexander, Pound’s *Cantos* follows a strategy in which “honesty to perception involve[s] a shifting focus and the use of superimposed images and dissolving forms” (138), in a way that foreshadows Burroughs’ adaptation of the rapidly shifting routine. In a similar vein, “Imagism,” the pioneering focus on “direct treatment of the thing” that Pound and others introduced in the years before World War One, “attempted a new purchase on reality (‘direct treatment of the “thing”’) by a process of limitation (‘the “thing”’) and exclusion of inessentials by a formal purism. The pursuit of the essential, the illuminating moment caught in the significant detail, was Pound’s habitual aim, an empirical mysticism involved in the origin of descriptive poetry” (90). This “direct treatment of the thing” can be compared with Burroughs’ explanation of the title of *Naked Lunch* as referring to “a frozen moment when everyone sees what is on the end of every fork” (Burroughs, *Naked Lunch* 199).

Pound’s imagism thus bears relation to the strategies Burroughs employs. We must of course recall that the “image,” as it is presented in poetry, literature, and writing generally, directly implicates itself in the “word,” from which it is formed. For Pound, and in poetry generally, images are the creation of words that are used to stimulate or recall mental processes initiated by sensory perception. In this way the word, if not a virus, is a manifestation of energy, or at least becomes a funnel (like Pound’s vortex) that can direct energy through its establishment of relations between energy fields. Thus Hugh Kenner can say of Pound’s strategy that “Patterns made visible ... occupied [Pound]”; “‘Emotion [evoked through language became] an organizer of form’” (146); “‘Energy creates patterns’” (147). The “funneling” that words achieve is presented by Kenner as operating through indirection established by relation: “For Pound Imagism is energy, is effort. It does not appear itself by reproducing what is seen, but by setting some other seen thing into relation.... The action passing through any Imagist poem is a mind’s invisible action discovering what will come next that may sustain the presentation ... to the end that the poem shall be ‘lord over fact’...” (186). Again, this “image” is a creation of the word or of words that have been arranged to provide “psychic charge” through “direct treatment of the thing.” It could be argued then that Burroughs achieves intensely “imagistic” effects through his presentation and disbursement of (often erotic) scenes that appear, evoke, and “fade out” in rapid order, rendering and in fact deliberately imitating a style that is often associated with the filmic or cinematographic.

The core concepts regarding the word and the power structures surrounding us lead us to Burroughs’ suggestions regarding human interaction with the world in a way that can point toward the pedagogical approaches he mentions in some of his writings. Burroughs identifies his approach to the world as “magical thinking,” and he contrasts it with other perspectives such as ego-dominated rationalistic thinking. Irwin associates Burroughs’
position with “animistic values” and “a literary and mystical move which attacks the basis of Western modernity and indeed the very self-justification of the West itself” (278). Burroughs does this, Irwin continues, through the introduction of “demonology and ... thematic possession” (278) in a way that posits these forces without reduction, recalling (Irwin states) the position Paulo Freire takes toward animistic societies in Cultural Action for Freedom: “As Freire has shown, reductionist readings of animism and magic in non-Western societies apply an externalist logic which fails to understand the inner coherence of the magic system” (Irwin 278). A primary aspect of Burroughs’ magical thinking is a belief that the individual is at the center of his or her own perceptual universe and in some ways makes things happen in that universe, be it intentionally or unintentionally. That is to say, the perceptual universe of the individual is specifically that person’s universe, created and manipulated by that person, though often without that person’s knowing or conscious intention. In fact the question of intentionality versus non-intentionality, insofar as it is centered in ego consciousness and rational decision, is misleading in that Burroughs sees “the ego” as a “liability,” at least insofar as artistic creation goes. As he puts it, “The best writing and painting is only accomplished when the ego is superseded or refuted. An artist is in fact transcribing from the unconscious” (Adding Machine 88).

The power to make things happen surpasses conscious manipulation through ego-centered domination in that Burroughs suggests that Freudian Id and Superego merge with ego, and that most action occurs outside conscious thought, though the links between consciousness and unconsciousness can often be traced. Burroughs believes in fact that the Freudian model offers an “outmoded” (Adding Machine 88) description of the spheres of human consciousness and the subconscious. To the end of usurping the domination of perceptions by the ego and increasing awareness of the connections between consciousness and the subconscious, he describes exercises he uses in writing classes that involve observation and a pursuit of the thought patterns that lead to particular events or perceptions. These exercises, which resemble some of the techniques used in Scientology and aim at results similar to those underlying spiritual beliefs and practices associated with eastern religions and disciplines, alert the student to perceptual processes and help the student understand or trace subliminal links that underlie “accidents” (which, for Burroughs, who is operating in a magical universe, are never accidental) and other actions and interactions in which the student is involved. In a way we could call these practices instances of spiritual pedagogy, in that behind them lies an effort to increase awareness and perhaps mindfulness. These efforts thus become central to developing a sense in which the student learns to shape or construct his or her own world, which Burroughs essentially sees as the activity the artist or writer engages in — making reality.

Burroughs points toward this understanding of magical thinking in his collection of essays The Adding Machine, where he declares his acceptance of magical truth. As he puts it, “Magic is the assertion of will, the assumption that nothing happens in this universe (that is to say the minute fraction of the universe that we are able to contact) unless some entity wills it to happen. A magical act is always the triumph or failure of the will” (99-100). He continues:
Among so-called primitive peoples, if a man is killed in a fall from a cliff, the friends and relatives of the victim start to look for a killer…. The magical push or pull, which potent magic men achieve by a projection of their malignant will, reaches its purest form in defenestration…. You can observe [the mechanisms of magic] operating in your own experience. If you start the day by missing a train, this could be a day of missed trains and missed appointments. You need not just say ‘Mektoub, it is written.” The first incident is a warning…. Writers operate in the magical universe and you will find the magical law that like attracts like often provides a key note…. In the beginning was the word and the word was God. And what does that make us? Ventriloquist dummies. Time to leave the Word-God behind. (100-103)

Many of the exercises Burroughs recommends for writers involve acts of perception designed to increase awareness of the immediate environment. As an example, he presents the following recommended practice: “when walking down any street, try to see everyone on the street before he sees you. You will find that if you see others first they will not see you, and that gives you time to observe” (Adding Machine 33). Whether we can say that the results of this practice are true – whether, that is, by seeing others first you prevent them from seeing you – is obviously debatable, and would need to be tested through data collection or controlled experimentation, though such an approach would inevitably sabotage the results of the testing of the “magic” by its imposition of controls. Variations on this exercise mentioned by Burroughs involve successive observations of objects of specific colors as one walks, so that for instance one focuses on the red objects, then on the blue, green, yellow, etc., taking note of each. Burroughs’ name for this exercise is “walking on colors,” and he describes it this way: “Pick out all the reds on a street, focusing only on red objects…. Switch to green, blue, orange, yellow” (Adding Machine 50). The point of such exercises is that perceptually, the writing student who practices externalized focus of attention develops observational skills that increase awareness through centering on external realities rather than a potential interiorized monologue of random thought, or in literary terms a “stream of consciousness.” Additionally, these exercises turn perception into montage, recalling Douglas Baldwin’s assertion that for Burroughs, “montage in film and literature more closely matches human perception (especially urban perception) than ideologically inspired linear narrative with its satisfying closure” (Baldwin 71).

I have suggested that such techniques resemble some of the strategies that Scientology employs. In Scientology, one simple exercise can be interpreted as involving an effort to consciously observe objects via a process of direct questioning that emphasizes objective existence. An example would be to choose an object, say a tree, and consciously follow the steps suggested by the words “See that tree? Look at that tree. Thank you. See that sign?” and so on. An interlocutor might start you on this process, but eventually it gets internalized, so that the perceiver him- or herself follows the steps of itemization, observation, and disengagement via acknowledgement. The person practicing the exercise is of course expected to actively connect through the steps by really looking at
the tree (or whatever), even to the point of acknowledging its individuality and the particularities of its existence, appearance, and qualities through the act of thanking, paying respect to the tree, which perhaps merges with the self-congratulation implied in the acknowledgement of one’s participation in the exercise. The effect might be said to involve separation of the perceiver from the visible world, and objects in the visible world from each other, so as to emphasize the individual’s existence as a detached being (in Scientological terms, an operating Thetan) that is not actually part of the physical world as such. In fact one of the physical effects of such exercises is increased depth perception and awareness of existential dimensionality, accompanied by a “quieting of the mind” through externalized concentration on perception that makes the exercise useful as a technique of increasing mindfulness and awareness.

The connection between Burroughs’ approach and strategies employed in Scientology may not be accidental. Burroughs himself practiced Scientology and apparently reached the state of “Clear” (Kostantinou), which refers to a level of consciousness in which past memories (called engrams) no longer generate uncontrolled reactive response. Burroughs has written regarding Scientology,

Some of the techniques [of Scientology] are highly valuable and warrant further study and experimentation…. On the other hand I am in flat disagreement with [its] organizational policy. No body of knowledge needs an organizational policy. Organizational policy can only impede the advancement of knowledge. There is a basic incompatibility between any organization and freedom of thought. Suppose Newton had founded a Church of Newtonian Physics and refused to show his formula to anyone who doubted the tenets of Newtonian Physics? All organizations create organizational necessities. It is precisely organizational necessities that have prevented Scientology from obtaining the serious consideration merited by the importance of Mr. [L. Ron] Hubbard’s discoveries. Scientologists are not prepared to accept intelligent and sometimes critical evaluation. They demand unquestioning acceptance. (“William S. Burroughs on Scientology”)

We see Burroughs acknowledging the possibilities Scientology offers, but attacking it because of its adherence to bourgeois order, and in fact its slippage into the “control” mode that underlies “organizational necessities.” Scientology becomes just another control structure attempting to dominate thought and existence. The freedom implicit in the exercise, in that it distinguishes and provides individuality to each entity perceived, is negated by the mechanisms of control that the Church of Scientology imposes upon its members, not to mention its control over the techniques this organization has developed to increase individual awareness.

One goal in Scientology is the “clearing” of reaction to external stimuli that “trigger” the individual. A strategy employed to this end involves sitting in a chair facing another person. The goal is to remain in a still, “meditative” state while the person opposite you says or does any number of things to provoke you or to “push buttons.” The exercise is
meant to eliminate charge from what Scientologists call “the reactive mind.” Similarly, the e-meter, a device that resembles a lie detector, is used to measure reactions with the aim of reducing the emotional “charge” associated with memories, just as by repetition one might imagine a subject reducing the charge measured by a lie detector. The intention is to “clear” the subject of emotional reactions generated by latent memory in order to prepare the subject for direct reception of the Scientological “truth” of human existence as “operating Thetans” (which is beyond the scope of this paper; as the Scientologists would put it, “understanding is agreement”). Hence the idea of “going clear” or of being “clear” refers to achieving or being in a state where the emotional charge of past events has been lessened or erased. Writing to Allen Ginsberg, Burroughs described this method of clearing as involving “directed recall”: “[the Scientologists] simply run the tape back and forth until the trauma is wiped off. It works” (qtd. in Kostontinou).

Similar goals of deprogramming operate in the “pedagogical sets” (if one can use such words to describe them) of disciplines or religions such as yoga and Buddhism, both of which employ or encourage exercises to limit, counter, or reduce the “charge” of reaction generated by experience — sometimes in past lives — and its (often unconscious) internalization. Thus in these traditions the aim is to “empty” the mind through restraining and ultimately “clearing” mental content, as is made evident in the description of yoga that opens Patañjali’s *Yoga Sutra*, which specifies the aims of yogic practice:

Yoga is the cessation of the turnings of thought.  
When thought ceases, the spirit stands in its true identity as observer to the world.  
Otherwise, the observer identifies with the turnings of thought.  

(Stoler Miller 29)

The “turnings of thought, whether corrupted or immune to the forces of corruption” (31), are identified as “valid judgment, error, conceptualization, sleep, and memory.” These in turn are defined as follows:

The valid means of judgment are direct perception, inference, and verbal testimony.  
Error is false knowledge with no objective basis.  
Conceptualization comes from words devoid of substance.  
Sleep is the turning of thought abstracted from existence.  
Memory is the recollection of objects one has experienced.  

(Stoler Miller 31)

The role of language in perpetrating such “turnings of thought” should be obvious. Language arguably underlies all acts of inference and verbal testimony, as well as all “false knowledge” and “conceptualization,” even if these relations are not always immediately obvious. Arguably the “image” structure of the brain involves visualization existing under a layer of verbalization that shapes and disguises visualization. The Poundian “imagism” discussed above in fact achieves its “psychic charge” through the
word’s power to evoke the (deeper) visual or sensual image and/or perhaps to link images in a way that generates energetic responses. In many ways, then, “thought” can be understood as a manifestation of language, and often this manifestation occurs as what Patañjali calls “verbal delusion.” Yogic practices included among the eight limbs of yoga, such as *asana* (yoga poses) and *pratyahara* (withdrawal of the senses), are designed to move one progressively toward “the cessation of the turnings of thought,” which includes the cessation of (internalized) language.

Buddhism similarly encourages practices such as meditation that are meant to lead to states involving the stilling of thought. A primary aim here is to move the subject away from the separation of self and other and imprisonment in the past (i.e., karma) towards a recognition of the illusory nature of reality, or the “void.” Burroughs in fact describes a conversation he had with Allen Ginsberg in relation to his theory of the word, as follows:

I asked some of my Buddhist friends, including Allen Ginsberg, this simple question: who are you actually talking to when you are ‘talking to yourself’? Without presuming a complete understanding of the nature of the Word, I suggested that such an understanding would make it possible to shut off the internal dialogue, to rub out the Word. Allen replied that the Buddhists have developed techniques over the centuries to do just that; it may be so. Not having experimented with their techniques, I can’t say. But I wanted some answers, and it seems to me that in the three thousand years the Buddhists have had to toss this around, they have not come up with any. I offered this challenge then and I repeat it now: give me ten years and a billion dollars for research, and I’ll get some answers for the question of the Word. (*Adding Machine* 48)

The suggestion Burroughs here makes in fact echoes one sometimes associated with Scientology, in that (so the argument goes) the Scientological employment of the e-meter and other technologies or practices eliminates the trial-and-error or “marathon” approach of the ancient disciplines, substituting technological solutions for ardor and money for time. It should also be noted that Burroughs’ focus is much narrower than those of these ancient disciplines, in that 1) Burroughs concentrates exclusively on the effect of the word on human consciousness, and links it with the effect of social control mechanisms on human consciousness in a way that if addressed at all in the ancient systems, is only approached indirectly; 2) Burroughs lays aside the direct focus on morality as traditionally understood, not evoking concepts such as faith or consideration of observances (the yogic concern with *yama* or moral principles, the Buddhist emphasis on “right speech” and “right action” as part of the eight-fold path). In fact Burroughs hints in *Naked Lunch* that the state of peace and full awareness sought in *samadhi* (which he calls Soma) is in some ways just another form of addiction: “I have heard that there was once a beneficent non-habit-forming junk in India. It was called *soma* and is pictured as a beautiful blue tide. *If soma* ever existed the Pusher was there to bottle it and monopolize it and sell it and it turned into plain old time JUNK” (*Naked Lunch* 201). It must also of course be remembered that Burroughs here is writing a novel rather than
exploring a philosophy, so we are allowed to “suspect” the representation of the “truth” as it appears in the text, or in the perspective of the characters presented in the text.

If we wanted to link Burroughs’ perspective to a more familiar or western pedagogical stance, we could point to Paulo Freire’s description of the human relation to the world as presented in Cultural Action for Freedom, where he suggests the effect language has on human interaction with the world:

Engagement and objective distance, understanding reality as object, understanding the significance of men’s action upon objective reality, creative communication about the object by means of language, plurality of responses to a single challenge — these varied dimensions testify to men’s relationship with the world. Consciousness is constituted by the dialectic of man’s objectification and action upon the world. (40-41. My emphasis)

In Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire posits the “banking school of education” as the tradition in which students become depositories of information later to be regurgitated at will or at the bequest of the educational system. He argues for a critical pedagogy of “problem posing” that should allow the oppressed to regain their humanity and overcome their condition of oppression, a position that tallies in part with the Burroughsian approach in which the pupil becomes central to (and hence presumably gains some power over) interpretation of the world. Freire, however, does not suggest that the individual “makes” his or her own reality, but rather confronts and (hopefully) overcomes the problems posed by an extant reality, be they environmental, physical, or social. Burroughs goes beyond oppression at the social level by exploring the mechanisms of thought through which such information can be posited. The word virus, for example, becomes a controlling motif pointing toward the mechanisms of control that need to be confronted to go beyond the mechanism. In this way, through the quasi-spiritual or magical, the Burroughsian approach sidesteps the Freirian position in that Burroughs calls the very mechanisms of organization of the ‘real’ into question. For instance, in discussion with Daniel Odier, Burroughs points out that “If we realize that everything is illusion, then any illusion is permitted. As soon as we say that something is true, real, then immediately things are not permitted” (qtd. in Baldwin 70). An example of this approach to reality can be seen in the perception of something as seemingly basic to the human experience as time. Vecchio, in discussing the impact of Burroughs’ theories on industrial music, points out that “The linear nature of time is usually not thought of as a ‘deliberate attack’ from an enemy, but time is an imposition that is never agreed upon a priori” (25). While it is difficult to imagine how one might escape from temporal linearity, it is not totally inaccurate to state that the perception of time as linear (in opposition, for example, to a cyclical understanding of time) is generated by social, cultural, and perhaps mechanical forces. It might in fact describe the difference between a mythical and a rationalistic approach to existence, in that it replaces eternal recurrence with temporal linearity. In his writing, Burroughs often undermines the perception of linear time through paramnnesiac manipulations of words meant to generate senses of déjà-vu or jamais-vu. Bonome relates this practice to “ritornello,” “a term describing a
section of a musical composition, which is repeated at some point during its performance,” and discusses this practice in relation to “paramnesia”:

“paramnesia” typically defines a condition where the subject is not able to remember the proper meaning of words. Two other forms of paramnesia are worth mentioning; one occurs when someone thinks she has seen a scene before or lived a situation when in reality it is the first time such scene or situation is encountered, and is associated with “déjà-vu.” The other type of paramnesia, where the familiar is thought to be experienced for the first time, is called “jamais vu.”

These effects, manipulated in textual presentation, perhaps call into question, or reflect, or sabotage similar factors of control that are seemingly embedded in our perceptions, so that (Baldwin states), according to Burroughs, “both visual and verbal narratives traditionally fail to mimic real processes of perception; they instead redefine how people ‘see’.... [T]his ‘redefining’ becomes a trope for how perception — individuals’ ‘narrative self-fashioning’, as it were — is controlled by outside forces” (65). Thus we reach Burroughs’ contention that “‘Reality’ is simply a more or less constant scanning pattern — The scanning pattern we accept as ‘reality’ has been imposed by the controlling power on this planet, a power primarily oriented towards total control” (qtd. in Baldwin 69).

Other exercises Burroughs suggests for writers go beyond the direct focusing on externalities described above, and may suggest ways in which “magical” approaches can begin to undermine such established notions as temporality. These approaches involve an effort to provide inroads into the subtle psycho-spiritual or magic interactions that emerge from the interplays of self, unconscious, environment, and perhaps the unnamable or unspeakable. Thus Burroughs recommends an exercise that mingles subject, object, and other potential entities or agents, perhaps as a way of beginning to penetrate the dichotomies such naming suggests. Here is the exercise, along with some results and suggested effects:

Take a walk around the block. Come back and write down precisely what happened with particular attention to what you were thinking when you noticed a street sign, a passing car or stranger or whatever caught your attention. You will observe that what you were thinking just before you saw the sign relates to the sign. The sign may even complete a sentence in your mind. You are getting messages. Everything is talking to you. You start seeing the same person over and over.… At this point some students become paranoid. I tell them that of course they are getting messages. Your surroundings are your surroundings. They relate to you. (Adding Machine 101-102)

“Writers operate in the magical universe and you will find the magical law that like attracts like often provides a key note” (Adding Machine 101), Burroughs explains. In the exercise one of the most notable features is the subject’s subtle perception of escape from linear time and rationalized organization of events. The sign completes a sentence
in a way that might suggest pre-perception or Jungian synchronicity (which Burroughs mentions, though he does not associate the phenomenon with Jung), or it points to the interference of environment with thought so that the sign becomes the logical or necessary end by somehow imposing its message on the subject’s consciousness prior to direct awareness. Again, rational or any scientific testing of this approach and its effects would require some form of double-blind testing that given the subjective nature of the experience would be almost impossible, since it would require an affirmation of subjectivity through objective means — employment of the sort of organizational structure that Burroughs wishes to subvert, and a process posited upon the terms and meanings the exercise in some ways seeks to question. The question becomes, to what extent do we live unconsciously outside rational order in a world where voices float in the air, a sign completes a seemingly unrelated meaning, synchronous occurrences immerse us in repetitions of the same, invisibility is achieved through perception, etc.? These are both features of and questions posed by the magical world Burroughs claims he exists in and defends, and they return us to the realm of the shaman, spirit traveler, and other beings who exist in a world we in contemporary society claim to have left behind, a world of “primitive” “magical” existence in which all events are controlled not by assigning them meaning, but by attributing causal components that are often identifiable as unnamable forces. Burroughs’ deliberate Rimbaudian deregulation of the senses, not to mention his experiences living in Mexico and Morocco, and his deliberate immersion in hallucinogenic experimentation during his journeys in the Amazon as depicted in The Yage Letters, suggests the extent to which he has tried to replicate, in modern terms, qualities of the primal, magical world order that seems ubiquitous in primordial societies. As he puts it, “I [give] my writing students various exercises designed to show how one incident produces a similar incident or encounter. You can call this process synchronicity and you can observe it in action” (Adding Machine 101).

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Burroughs lived as a writer rather than a teacher, so his comments on teaching are limited. From the few examples of strategies he developed to teach writing students, however, we can reach some conclusions, including those Burroughs himself presents. The intention of his teaching is to increase student awareness of the immense subtleties of the present moment as it passes, and to suggest the degree to which slippage of past and present, and interference of subliminal components, constitutes what we perceive as present reality, which so often includes what we don’t perceive even though too often this component becomes the dominating agent in events that shape lives. It is the effort to capture the complexity of this reality, or to make this moment as fully alive as possible, that motivates the artist, Burroughs might suggest. The “word technology” the writer uses as a tool of trade is a “technology of magic,” he would maintain, though “in the case of newspapers and magazines, [it is] mostly black magic. They stick pins in someone’s image and then show that image to millions of people” (Adding Machine 49). Burroughs aims to sharpen perception “to help [students] make their own enquiries into the nature of word and image as they manifest themselves along association lines” (Adding Machine 50). The approach of “taking a walk with the continuity and perceptions you encounter” (Adding Machine 50) is useful to writers because “Writers operate in the magical universe” (Adding Machine 101), and the “variations of the walk exercise [are] all designed to show the student how incidents
are created and how he himself can create incidents. Artists and creative thinkers will lead the way into space” — a goal Burroughs foresees as pivotal in the next stages of human evolution — “because they are already writing, painting and filming space” (Adding Machine 102). We can give the last word to Burroughs, who describes “writing as [a] magical operation” and “[t]he written word [as] an image” “originally ceremonial or magical” (Adding Machine 48-49) in nature, perhaps because of its very capacities to generate, collect, and direct energy in all its forms. The continuity of the magical capacities of language is central to Burroughs’ attempt to “destroy society through fantasy” in an effort to assert the viability of the individual’s power of invention and imaginary force as basic to the center of perceptual control — as creating a reality remade through magic.
References


Vecchio, Joseph. “*I Was In a Position to Dismantle It*: Industrial Music Appropriations of William S. Burroughs.” M. A. Thesis presented at Texas State University, 2014.