"An Impoverishment of Philosophy"

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Dr. Babette Babich is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at Fordham University where she has taught since 1989. Her work focuses on Continental philosophy, especially Nietzsche and Heidegger, philosophy of science, as well as politics and aesthetics. Her books include Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life; Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, and her most recent, Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie. She is the Executive Editor of New Nietzsche Studies, a journal she founded in 1994.

PURLIEU: As the editors of Purlieu we have been accused of attempting something superfluous — or even detrimental — to the field of philosophy. Among the charges leveled against us, some critics have claimed that we risk diluting the rigor demanded of our discipline and that we thus compromise its integrity. As the editor of seven books and the founding and Executive Editor of New Nietzsche Studies, what can you tell us about our duties as editors? More generally, what is the value and the future of academic publishing, both with periodicals as well as books?

BABICH: These are excellent questions, and as is often the case with excellent questions, I find more than just a few queries packed into what you say. And it is because you have just started a journal (and because I have founded not just one but two journals, one founded as an undergraduate, which continued after I graduated for several years before it vanished, as well as New Nietzsche Studies, which you mention above and
which of course continues), I take your first set of questions as very important indeed. Because such issues are rarely addressed in the profession and because the new technologies of publication and communication have changed much of the playing field, I feel compelled to reply to your question at some length. Later, I’ll abbreviate my replies to your following questions for the sake of balance.

To begin with your initial remark regarding “the charges leveled against” your editorial project, such charges seem to reflect what we may, for convenience, call the “gate-keepers” worry.¹ I recall a conversation with Larry Hatab in which he denounced the many publishing opportunities, as he perceived them, that seemed to be springing up everywhere. At the time (and now), I didn’t see the explosion as being either all that explosive or indeed as undesirable — so obviously we were on different sides on the matter.

I held that we needed even more journals than we have. And in my view, current journals, even new ones, tend to reproduce very standard points of view, just with different names. I believe that one should have, just as Nietzsche argues, as many viewpoints as possible. And yet I should underline, and this is a more elusive point, I do not believe that we should have only or just those viewpoints we regard as “good.” I say this because what we call “good” is itself a judgment established on the basis of the things we take ourselves to know. Another word for such judgments, as we learn from hermeneutics, is prejudice.

Nietzsche had his own way of putting this as he foregrounds it at the start of his The Gay Science, after his musical jokes (and here it matters very much that we keep in mind, from a publishing perspective, which was always of crucial interest to Nietzsche, that The Gay Science was a prelude to his Zarathustra, itself a parodic or, again, playful prelude to his very important and to date ill-understood, Beyond Good and Evil):

it has often seemed to me as if anyone calling for an intellectual conscience were as lonely in the most densely populated cities as if he were in a desert. Everyone looks at you with strange eyes and goes right on handling his scales, calling this good and that evil. Nobody even blushes when you intimate that their weights are underweight; nor do people feel outraged; they merely laugh at your doubts. (GS §2)

Larry, who is of course an excellent Nietzschean in every other sense, had his own good reasons for his concern. The gate-keeper’s worry reflects the confidence we have, and we academics do count on this conviction for hiring and tenuring and so on, that so-called better or “top tier” journals — and we may extend this to our views of publishing houses
or even of universities and so on — are indeed *better* than other journals and publishing houses. And we hold that they are better (this is the point David Hume tries to make in his *On the Standard of Taste*) in some sort of objectively sanctioned fashion. It is essential to a conviction, in order for it to be a conviction, that it remains unquestioned.

The notion of “top-tier” corresponds to what the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called “distinction” and such things are the most solid things we have in our capitalist world: silk and cashmere are in truth more valuable (more goes into their production) than, say, acrylic or polyester. Beyond the stuff of stuff, beyond fabrics, a Rolls Royce, like a Bentley, is an excellent car, but how much better than a Jaguar? Or to make it a harder question, how much better than a Ferrari? — a Porsche? — a Mercedes Benz? — and so on. The car industry happily provides exemplars to answer such questions and much of what counts as excellence is perceived excellence. In addition, when it comes to truly high-end automobiles, it is a buyer’s market only, and that means that most such questions hardly concern us as consumers, as users, and to that extent our own experience of high-end “excellence” in the real world is a spectator’s, an observer’s, rather than a user’s experience. The “goodness” of the Rolls Royce, for most of us, is to see it driving past us if we are in downtown Beverly Hills or out in the Hamptons. So too, and this is the value point of the cost issue, an Ivy League education is similarly *exclusive* (ergo rarified) and *excluding* (and this is, the economists tell us, *how* scarcity is manufactured).

Publications are different by nature. And desktop and online publishing only make the issue more complex. Thus the anxiety about new publications is related to anxiety about whether or not they have been properly ‘vetted’ and this in turn is really about another question: will these new publications upset established apple carts? And so on. Nevertheless, founding journals is something you have in common with a number of illustrious forbears such as Friedrich Schiller and Friedrich Hölderlin.

At the start, one journal is no better and no worse than any other. In fact, your greatest challenge is not so much the project you are beginning but whether it can be kept: there are many journals that have appeared, with ‘good’ editors, and ‘good’ contributors, only to vanish after a single issue. Thus what makes a journal, beyond reader judgment (and on an individual level that is always a matter of taste: what issue do you pick up? which do you continue to read?), is the editors’ vision. At the same time, it depends even more on the authors who contribute, and yet more important (and I would actually add layout to the mix) is the question of dissemination. Dissemination is related to distribution, but in addition, and this is still more elusive, there is the challenge of acquiring readers even given distribution. Thus what makes a journal (or a press) top quality has to do
with “reception” and reception is tied to academic capital, again, in Bourdieu’s sense of the term. Publishers such as Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press, Gallimard, Walter de Grutyer, have such capital.

At the same time, the paradox of academic capital is its utter dreariness: the material such well-respected publishers publish is so very standardized (as a matter of sheer conventionality) that one very soon discovers that one is only reading the same old (or same young) folk talking to (and about) the same old (or young) folk. This is, for example, a complaint commonly uttered against the New York Review of Books just because the New York Review of Books, like most review publications, does not exist in order to, say, as one might innocently suppose, review books as such as much as it exists to review just and only the kind of books its editors/reviewers like — which almost always means only the kind of books its editors/reviewers write. This is well before Eli Pariser and others wrote about the Internet bubble, the academic bubble that used once to be called, shades of Simeon Stylites, the ivory tower.

However, even as the inherent circularity, insularity, nepotism of academic publishing can be deadly, at the same time (and this is also the stuff of media studies, propaganda research, and the sociology of advertising, this is the McLuhan effect), it’s also the case that as a species we crave repetition: repetition reinforces our beliefs and all of us are happy to confirm our prejudices. This is how the ‘bubble’ (Google is calling this your ‘circles,’ Facebook just filters your buddies for you without giving the filter a name) works as a bubble. Leibniz liked the word monad, in this case, to push the metaphor, windowless even with, just because of, windows and internet access.

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As I see it, the charges leveled against you derive from this broader circumstance. In general, what we don’t like is for people who rock the boat. And when one starts a journal, I would say, especially as an undergraduate, one is inevitably rocking the boat, whether or not one means to be.

To turn to your question about the “duty” of an editor, I should qualify my views by emphasizing that I always also edit with the perspective of an author in mind. For my own part, and I am also thinking historically about what has been the case with regard to journals founded in the past (here we are back to Schiller and Hölderlin, et al.), the role of an editor is ultimately, and inevitably, to produce a whole. The editor qua editor edits a journal or (a book collection), that is then published as an entirety: the
journal is not this or that article, the book is not this or that chapter, it is the book as a whole. It is this entirety that conveys the spirit of its editors, its editorial board, and (this works backwards because this is also what draws future contributions) its authors as well.

In this sense, the role of the editor is like a musical conductor’s role, whereby the role of the editor is to permit or allow a certain overarching, unified voice or spirit to emerge. This spirit is already in evidence in what makes a given issue of a journal to be a particular issue (sometimes this is effected by nothing more than an ingenious title, sometimes it is evident in reading a table of contents), and it is what makes a book collection to be a book rather than a collocation of unrelated essays (this last question, when it comes to collections, is something book publishers worry a good deal about, although and in fact publishers tend to publish collections that are timely even when they do not cohere).

At the same time, and I always find this surprising, not only do authors rarely appreciate an editor’s efforts, authors brought together in a journal (or a book collection) tend not to read one another. This is relevant because when one speaks of readers one automatically discounts the authors themselves just as one discounts the editors and the reviewers and conjures up, in the general fantasy that is publishing, a great mass of readers: which mass is then reified as the ideal reader. But the one thing that emerges from web 2.0 hype is that for the most part all of us exemplify in the best and worst, i.e., most literal, way what Mark Twain once said (I owe the reference to Tracy B. Strong): all of us have music and poetry inside of us, but most have a hard time getting it out.

Well, Mark Twain, i.e, twice and again: it’s not hard anymore. Thus there’s YouTube, there’s Facebook, the rightly-named Twitter (proving, as if it had needed to be shown, that deep or complex thoughts cannot be expressed with brevity), and any number of other outlets. All ways, as I argue elsewhere with respect to today’s internet, that are surprisingly similar to the activity of writing on a public bathroom wall, metaphorically speaking . . .

Graffiti, Kilroy was here, or better words to that effect, is of course a kind of publishing and in many ways it trumps Twitter and proves that, in context and in the real world, far more can be done with far less.

Hence, when the Barnes and Noble store closed at the Lincoln Center triangle of Broadway and Columbus Avenue, for a brief moment, passersby would be able to see what had been written on the wall in the universal idiom of spray paint, the medium and font of choice for urban commentary: “UNION JOB NOT” and all the despair of the current
downsizing that is shattering the American nation and its dream is written there.

The real world point here has to do with the writing one can read on such a wall. In the case of a closing store, that inscription is soon painted over or boarded up, but with a journal that can last in the case of a print issue as long as the issue itself lasts, in libraries, stores (of course there are fewer and fewer of these and that trend will only continue), personal collections, and so on. What one encounters with a real print issue of a journal is the whole journal; printed and bound, for any given issue of a journal is effectively a book, and like a book collection, it is the editor, from the point of view of the Library of Congress, who counts as the author.3

By the same token, this experience of an encounter with a journal (or a magazine) is changing with the atomizing effects of on-line publishing, an atomization which extends the original insularity of the authors of the articles themselves, as the authors of those articles (never mind the intentions of the editor, and this is even the case with a commissioned book, that is to say: even when an editor conceives the theme and invites contributors to contribute) remain intrinsically isolated one from another.

Readers too relate to the text as such in an increasingly atomistic fashion, and as Nietzsche once observed fairly disparagingly, one often reads (just as one often stops reading altogether) only for the sake of a book of one’s own. But as I noted above, and as many commentators on the internet or web have also noted, especially Jaron Lanier but also media theorists at every level, there is a massive “conversion” of consumers aka “content users” who are now, willy-nilly, and merely by posting, merely by ‘sharing,’ also “publishing.” The point is an instructive one, and it would be great if economists could learn a bit from it.

Those who produce are also those who consume. Note that this is not new: it was always so. What is new is that it is now true for more and more people. The writers in other words are the readers. This is literally so in the case of a Twitter ‘retweet’ which is simply a more redundant version of a Facebook ‘like’ — all of which are so many ways to advertise.

By contrast, of course, the old model of publishing assumes a set of dynamics that have not changed since the means of the propagation of texts in antiquity: there we are back to writing on the wall, with parallels to and with proportionality that were themselves much older, drawn from public spaces to the theater in the open air and from the specific acoustics of a closed space, a cave, a tholos tomb (and we still see this in the lecture hall) or, expanding the theater (and therewith the lecture hall), to a public rally in the open air, where with the last we now assume loud speakers, as we must do ever since Hitler made this problematic. As Rudolf Arnheim noted, among
many others who have explored this, an understanding of this phenomena must be extended ‘over the air’ itself, across borders, with a study of radio broadcast. Thus we cross the world, and today, given a network link, wireless or not, publishing is broadcast on the internet, visually in every graphic sense and acoustically. As the model goes: there is productive content (whether online, on the radio, at the podium, on stage) and there is a listening, receptive audience: ‘Hello world,’ says the first time blogger.

The ideal is the theatre, which is very interesting as that goes back to the dawn of democracy in antiquity, or the musical concert (which was in antiquity the same as Nietzsche sought to remind us, not that those who study him have managed to notice), and it continues to this day in a market economy, which engenders the kind of entertainment that made the world “a stage” in the middle ages, because what one wants, after all, are paying customers. It is the spectacle that sells, or better said, as Nietzsche also shows to the frustration of his Zarathustra: it is a particular kind of spectacle, in this case that would be the cruel prospect of the undoing of the “overman” (the fall of the tightrope walker) that attracts people to the market place to begin with.

This works with a medieval masque or fair, as this also works with a travelling show, with today’s music concerts, be they classical or not, or when the circus comes to town (provided one does not think, as one ought to think, about the cruelty to animals). For the terms of publishing today, the trouble begins when it comes to understanding the new media.

And today, in point of fact, everyone pays. You get your internet from somewhere; even if you don’t personally pay AOL or Compuserve, you do pay the phone company for DSL or you pay for cable or what have you. Or if you use your university connection, you pay for that pretty directly (even if the university, to confuse matters, sometimes calls these ‘indirect costs’). The problem when it comes to publishing, and it is this that gets Lanier’s goat, is that the same everyman (to use that metaphor as we may, having introduced the medieval masque above) also produces or generates their own experience.

Again: everyone pays but not everyone gets paid. And that last bit continues to resist comprehension although it is the most obvious of all, which was the point of Shakespeare’s all the world’s a stage, as I already alluded to it, and the point your composition or journalism teacher tried to drive home to you by suggesting you write, à la Kerouac, from ‘life.’ If you want to sing Karaoke fine, if you don’t want to sing fine, you are still part of the spectacle if you turn up for Karaoke Night at your local bar. And as Lanier and others are at pains to explain, you are still part of the spectacle if you skip the local bar and simply tune in to American Idol.
Likewise, and because of its ubiquity, you are involved with YouTube whatever you do. YouTube is a giant machine for “free” content supplied by both individuals and professional content makers. Content drives a system that goes beyond content itself. Indeed, the content is ultimately utterly irrelevant. It is there to occupy your mind, catch your critical attention while the real work is worked upon you, that is to say, the more interesting you, from the point of marketers, that is the uncritical and more receptive you. This is true of the poem, as T. S. Eliot tells us, and it is true of music and it is true of Google and Facebook ads, which is also how and why Google and Facebook make the money they do make. You don’t think you pay attention to these ads but you do, and ten out of ten people (ok: nine because I would certainly say Yes! let them be gone forever, if anyone ever asked) say in fact, No: they would not want advertising banned from television: they want ads on tv, on the radio, on the internet. Even those who oppose ads, as in the case of the activist journal Adbusters, produce a product that is indistinguishable, and that is of course the editor’s point, from a journal full of ads.

Everyone pays but not everyone gets paid…

And that last bit continues to resist comprehension although it is the most obvious of all. The problem for the producers/consumers is that content production happens to be a one-way street, as Lanier and others have observed. In general, it does not lead to a book contract, or a record contract, or a movie contract. Most of my colleagues, especially those with an interest in political philosophy, who would like to have CNN, say, call them in as “experts,” do not in fact get called. Most bloggers will not be able to turn their blogs into a book. (Sorry.) If you write a book about your senior year and turn it into an ebook, it may not get buyers; but then again it might. Lanier worries that is an inevitably one-off phenomenon, affected all the way down by a certain interplay (and many of his critics fail to note this and simply counter that, after all, it might happen again, not note that this is not how Lanier puts it, between mimesis and projection/conjecture). The point is the old science fiction paradox, which academics, from Žižek to me and many others, love to write about by abbreviating the reference to the SF paradox to a mere mention of the movie, Minority Report (though Twelve Monkeys is probably more to the gut existential point), and Minority Report is in fact, and as Avatar was, a kind of advance marketing for putatively future technologies (so far, however, 3-D screens, for example, are not selling as well as had been hoped).
Beyond the monotony that is the inevitable consequence of this phenomenon, the problem is the most pernicious for musicians. Indeed musicians tend to get the short end of the stick in all times. They were not well served by the past system: the recording industry serves the recording industry not the musicians, and radio serves the recording industry not the musicians and not the listeners (what choice do you have, a question one always ponders when one’s local public broadcasting station hits one up for bucks to support programming of a kind in which one as a member of the public has in fact no say whatever). Thus as Lanier observes in his book, you are not a gadget, the internet offers all kinds of possibilities, among them musical, but almost none of them serve the working musician.6

In other words, as the saying goes, ‘Don’t quit your day job.’ In his Against the Machine, Lee Siegel tries to track this from the start, going back, as Lanier also goes back, to the now nearly romantically iconic WELL (but this was also true of almost all of the old BBS and .alt communities, and indeed every chat room, a certain vestige of which survives, albeit, one-on-one in Facebook messages). For Siegel’s point, as I would gloss it, trades on the inherently economic equivocation built into the meaning of ‘exchange’ per se: “behind every intimate expression lay a self-advertisement; hidden in the invitation to a relationship was the bid for a profitable connection.”7

It’s all about the sell, as Marschall McLuhan observed a long time ago — which is why, although people periodically “rediscover” him inside and outside of the academy, McLuhan never left the advertising world. Not for a single moment. Elvis may have left the building: McLuhan is always with us.

Siegel too refers to McLuhan: he even includes a citation. Lanier repeats the same point leaving out Siegel along with his references. This is not a comment against Lanier, Siegel himself published his book apparently after slashing his own references which live on as allusions, as echoes and mentions which the majority of the readers one worries about, the readers one supposes will be lost if one has too many (that would be any) footnotes, can blissfully ignore: what you don’t see won’t bother you.

What concerns Siegel is the nature of the urge to turn one’s private experience into a public commodity, and Siegel’s book is about the eagerness of the public in general to do just that. To illustrate, consider New York on New Year’s Eve. The crowds who show up in Times Square do not merely come to see the ball drop: they come decked out and fully hoping to be seen seeing the ball drop.

This is not about expression: this about the media, i.e., this is a reflection on publishing.
Thus Siegel titles his central chapter, every allusion to McLuhan as patent as you please, “The Me is the Message.” And the point is that exactly this message is Madison Avenue’s message: like the shirt or tie you plan to buy: the savvy salesperson sidles up to you, murmuring, it’s you, it’s all you. And we identify with this, a mirror of selling and sold, sold and selling. Thus the other day at a camera store, a young man pointed to his glasses and explained that this identified him as a PC, ‘You know,’ he said to me patiently, noticing my bewilderment: ‘like the commercial,’ dutifully deconstructing the point for my benefit: ‘Macs don’t wear glasses.’ I did not buy the camera I came to buy.

Here the point is to become, and we are indeed to become, like the tv–commercial-watching-young-salesman himself, the products we ‘consume.’

For editors this is a conundrum, but it is also an opportunity and others can tell you the opportunity. The conundrum is what interests me as an editor and as a philosopher, for as an editor (and indeed, as an author) what follows from this is that it is hard to count on readers. Hence, as Derrida would say, ‘friends, there are no friends!,’ here we may simply say: ‘readers, there are no readers!’

To return to the heart of your question, when you ask about the duty of the editor, the question is inevitably an ethical one. For my own part, I follow what I take to be the editor’s imperative. For me this is not about serving a public, more or less imaginary as that public happens to be imaginary in a Lacanian sense, but I take the role of an academic editor — and I note of course that this will be different if one is editing items of public or general interest — to be always to allow the author to speak.

From an editor’s point of view, what this means in real effect is that in academia as elsewhere, the editors, like the sound engineers in a music concert or a music recording, are invisible. As a corollary, you should note that editing will never do anything for you, neither for your ego nor for your career. Editing will not get you into graduate studies; it will not get you a job. In part this is a structural matter: the role of the editor is all about bringing out, foregrounding, the work of others, sometimes this is by way of direct editing, including direct cuts and glossing (this is hard because you have to be able to judge what is meant and you have to be correct in that judgment and every author, not only Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, claims to mean what they do not in fact say, not because they are perverse but because of the way language and context work in a text). In most cases in the academic world, editing is simply a matter of recommending revision (this lets the author say what they mean). Or the ultimate edit, which is of course either publishing a text as is or refusing it.
But at the end of the day, and this too is a corollary of editorial invisibility, it remains the author, not the editor, who is responsible for what is published under the author’s name. When articles appear in print they do not carry a little asterisk saying, ‘changed here and there by editorial fiat’ although such changes can and do happen (my own titles have been changed by editors, my texts have suffered awfully idiotic rephrasings and, on the other side of the desk, for my own part and as an editor, to my pain, if mostly for space reasons but sometimes for reasons of precision, I have myself had to change the odd title or two).

At the same time, to go back to the idea of the supposedly undiluted “rigor” of the profession, now to use the language of your critics, an editor's judgment nearly always reflects, like the New York Review of Books already mentioned, today’s prevailing standards and these are not only all-too-human but notoriously subject to change. And as standards they often fall short of precisely what they claim to ensure as mentioned above: distinguishing between good and bad work.

Here I find it salutary to reflect on the fact that Nietzsche’s own academic peers refused to recognize his work at all (never mind refusing to name him as “best” in his era). Nor has that changed in his field of classical philology and that remains the case now after an interval of more than a century.

Max Weber pointed to this as well – and although it always seemed to me that Weber could have had Nietzsche in mind I believe he was thinking (as authors often are) only about himself in fact. At the heart of Weber’s recommendation to anyone considering an academic life as a vocation, be it as editor, or author, professor, researcher, no one ought to consider academics (which he also called “science,” using good German 19th century terminology as he happened to have done) if what one expects of it is to be recognized for one’s work. The unfairness of this lack of recognition is the signal character of academia. It is also the prime reason for despair and burn out among academics.

Weber’s advice is empirically well-founded. Nor should one enter into the life of a scholar, as an academic or a scientist of any kind, if one has hope to be recognized thereby for talent, for achievement or for dedication. Nor should one enter the life of academia if one hopes to find colleagues in the true sense (ah, that would be others who share your interests). Weber’s reasons for saying this were empirical hence his advice is practical: so many counsels of prudence, as Kant would say, and Thomas Kuhn would go on to repeat them, with a good deal less verve, a little later. For us what follows from this is that supposedly higher gatekeepers, the people one supposes to be in control, the academic departments who make various appointments,
especially at the level of distinguished chairs, the editors and the peer reviewers who vet submitted essays, the publishers who publish, all do so always according to their own reasons and “excellence” is inevitably the least of these.

The current worry in the peer-review process used in the natural sciences in particular, and arguably this is most the important for a science-faithful public such as our own, concerns the nepotism or inherent circularity of peer review. In fact, that is to say: in end effect, peer review guarantees not objectivity but insularity. Like the *New York Review of Each Others Books*, as it is sometimes called, the problem with “peer review” in the natural sciences is that it inevitably concentrates power (and grants) in smaller and smaller circles of mutually reinforcing self-promotion.10 The problem of industry supported research, namely that sponsored by big tobacco and big pharma and so on, is only a more transparent and manifestly more egregious variation on this. Science in general, and this is the source of the influence of the sciences in the university, draws enormous revenue (only museums and archaeological sites compare) from all kinds of sponsors, the government included, and that sponsorship as Feyerabend emphasized is by no means neutral.11 Where power is conferred on a few hands, one hand inevitably washes the other.

For Weber, and speaking practically, what this means for the student is that if one wishes to choose the life of the mind or the life of public service, that is academia/science or politics as a *vocation*, one is choosing science or politics as a vocation, that is to say: as a way of life. These then are recommendations for action, so Weber counsels us. At the same time, what people do in practice is not ideal. And what one does in anything that one is called to do, one does because one feels, for whatever reason, and this will vary from person to person, that it is worthwhile to do (maybe it serves a personal ambition, maybe everyone in one’s family is also an academic, maybe one has nothing better to do, etc.)

Your last question in this first series of questions is also, because it is general, the most difficult. You ask: “*what is the value and the future of academic publishing, both with periodicals as well as books?*”
I think the most immediate value of specifically academic publishing is that it about the “life of the mind.” Publishing is its life’s blood as it were, and only through publishing can the “life” of the life of the mind be assured beyond individual scholarship itself (or Wissenschaft as both Goethe and Kant and Nietzsche and Husserl and Heidegger spoke of it). This life is the ultimate value of the real or actual production of books: by which I mean the generation of the books themselves, the journals themselves, and that for me is always all about ‘real’ journals and ‘real’ books — of the real-life kind, on real paper.

Of course I realize I sound old-fashioned by talking about real books and real paper. At the same time, the point I am hoping to make is a physical, visceral, vital one. I would add along the way that the publication of real journals, real books, already presupposes, as higher things tend to do, the lesser coincident things as well, namely digital publication. Thus by saying that publishing ought to be “real,” I am hardly choosing against virtual or online publication, PDFs or E-anything. Publishing a journal in print form automatically generates the digital form (for we are not talking about setting type as this Gutenberg-style legacy is a craft which is no longer practiced and has thus become an “art,” occasionally resuscitated and meaning, to be sure, and I underline this: that much of what once belonged to it qua craft is lost, perhaps irretrievably so as the things that are the most crucial in any craft are always the things that go without saying and are hence unrecorded — but what is certain, in any case, is that the printer’s skill in setting type is not used in today’s academic publishing).

I have already expressed my preference for print journals, but note too, as far too few of us do — even on the level of theoretical reflection on digital publication — that digital publishing as such is one of the most evanescent, that also means the most fragile, invisibly so, of all publishing forms. For this reason, real, physical journals; real, physical books, are essential for enduring scholarship and preservation remains, given our mortality and given our forgetfulness, the reason for scholarship as such.

At the same time as I would argue that there is no reason to choose between “real” and virtual publication, just such a choice happens (by default) more and more. Excellent on this topic would be both the aforementioned books by Lanier and by Siegel but also Cliff Stoll’s Silicon Snakeoil, which last includes an account of the mindless destruction of information that was resultant not simply by destroying books as Google has been and is doing (wholesale), but the things one never notices: the loss of the accoutrements of past information technology, that would be university library card catalogues, which contained, in their physicality, corresponding in each case to their uniqueness to each institution, inherently uncatalogued information added by the librarians (usually
penciled in by hand, with soft, paper and revision friendly, lead), both in user choices and through the unfortunate effects of decisions made by librarians, which again reflect issues more of ideology than budgets. In addition, and this matters in the context of periodical publication, when a library cuts, as many libraries have cut, periodical subscriptions or book orders, such cuts rarely translate to savings overall. Much rather, funds spared in that way are usually spent in another way (this is a consequence of working with “budgets” of any kind but especially as institutionally administered and one has recently been able to observe the terrible cost of “budget thinking” during the debt ceiling debates which could only consider certain — and never other — cuts).

This Heidegger emphasizes, if it is also true that my old teacher Don Ihde, despite his brilliance as an analyst of technology, manages because of his own later focus on his own work (here Ihde is exactly like Heidegger who was in turn exactly like Nietzsche) to miss the point of the point Heidegger had been making with regard to both the printing press and the typewriter. For his part, Ihde is only following Friedrich Kittler, but Kittler, who is himself otherwise quite ingeniously brilliant, nevertheless, and like many people in Germany (and elsewhere), seems apparently afflicted with the desire to eschew Heidegger on principle (Sloterdijk is only somewhat of an exception to this). Yet Heidegger, attuned as he was to the dynamic evolution of technological artifacts, reminded us that “the invention of the printing press coincides with the inception of the modern period.” To be sure, Heidegger observes, this is the “triumph of the machine,” but his point is that it moves our relation to reading, to writing, away from a relation to the word, to another way of forming the word. We no longer “form” words with a stylus in our hands, with a reed pen or an ink brush in this way. Following the imprint of the printing press as the printer composed it, thereby setting a page as a whole and at a blow, we are all become typesetters, printer’s assistants, ourselves: turned via the touch typing of a Hemmingway towards the finger. Perhaps better said, we now key without impact, we text: we have a fingertip relationship and increasingly less and less of a haptic or tactile one to our keyboards, our blackberries, iPads: soon, this is the point, again, about the pre-marketing marketing function of Minority Report, we will soon write in the air (thus the future is a not a personal jetpack or little spaceship, à la the Jetsons, but simply a business woman, usually oriental, surrounded by technological displays and competently conjuring an invisibly curved column of still more transparent displays in the air around her, as seen in television, internet, and magazine advertisements, as these always reinforce one another), but we will not be writing, and perhaps not even indicating, but something a bit closer to ‘completing’/’completed by’ via the services of what we fairly revealingly call a cloud which by then, of course, we will call something else.
Academic study allows us to pay attention to things such as the past relationship to the text as this informed what scholars of the past wrote about, in some cases and here Foucault but also Pierre Hadot, Ivan Illich, and a range of authors following the Homer question and the use of new technology (recording and computer analysis) have all of them helped us to frame the question once again. As Hadot has taught us, what we take to be straightforward theoretical texts were written therapeutically, that is to say very literally for the sake of life, as practical aids to changing one's way of living, rather than for the kind of speculative theoretical reflection that appeals to us as children of the text and less and less of the book.

I hardly need to remind you that there are more publications now than ever before. What is worth remembering as a scholar and a thinker is that less is read than ever before. New authors should keep this in mind. The sheer fact that you publish something does not entail that it is read. Even if your blog has a respectable number of hits, it does not follow that your blog has been read, and there is a similar caveat concerning the email you may have received telling you that one of your articles has been ‘downloaded’ so and so many times. In fact, the more articles one downloads, the less, so I would hazard to say, one reads them.

As an illustration, consider the stunt at MIT recently used to dramatize the inaccessibility of scientific articles to a reading public. If we bracket for the sake of argument (this is not a court of law) the closet Aaron Swartz is said to have broken into, there are still a few hoops to jump through, yet a few “gates” to pass through. Access to MIT’s library (access to the “Tool,” as MIT underpants used to call their library when I was in Boston/Cambridge) does not rank right up there with general access for anyone. Just think how hard it is to get into your university library: what is a mere annoyance for you in possession of an ID card turns out to be an obstacle for anyone without one. My only point, the point worth thinking about here is that accessing, downloading the articles, does not correlate to articles actually read by the person who so assiduously downloaded them — and of course Swartz very geekily did this, i.e., automatically, but to do so requires a certain amount of gadgeteering which is why he needed to be in an inaccessible place to begin with and indeed why he needed to be in the particular place he was.

Increasingly, we are all such geeks, minus the latest or best hardware and certainly minus the publicity plan. That is to say, to a greater and greater degree, we tend to download on automatic pilot. The determinism or autonomy of “downloading” allows us to do this. I note as I have already cited Stoll’s point to this effect, that periodical reading rooms are increasingly disappearing at university and college libraries across the country. At my university, the entire periodicals room which had been
architecturally designed into a library recently built at Fordham’s Rose Hill campus in the Bronx, featuring grand light for reading, was re-purposed into a museum (rather like Stoll’s dream of housing socks in old card catalog drawers). Ironically and to be sure, the light, so excellent for reading, cannot but be a liability for the artifacts housed there (even in their light filtering display cases), and it is hoped that the curator eventually notices this.

At the same time, and this attests to the continuity between technologies of one kind or another, one always ran out of time in old fashioned reading rooms which means that one always anticipated running out of time, in advance of time. Thus if one could not make copies automatically, one spent one’s archival time, Nietzsche did this, I myself did this in reading rooms where photo-copying was prohibited, taking manual notes, with the mind to reconstruct later. The entire industry of “Nietzsche philology,” i.e., source scholarship, is thus concerned not with the philological issues of interest to Nietzsche himself but and much rather with the inevitably positivist and inevitably limited minutiae of sifting out what Nietzsche thought all by himself, as it were, from what Nietzsche took or derived from others. The very obvious fact that the two bleed into one another in the life of the mind only compounds the philosophic limits of this kind of work.19

If the technology at one’s disposal is a real-live reading room, with real-live limited hours but featuring copy machines, we anticipate the consequences of limited time and proceed to subvert the same. This kind of subversion however is conformity, determinism. We tailor our behaviour to the fact that there are, as the T shirt goes, so many books, so little time. Thus we spend our time copying the journal for an article to read “later.”20

I have binder volumes of articles I copied years ago just for this purpose, and I have in fact read many of them (because I am keen on reading). But I would also argue that the reason I have read many of them is the fact that I happened to have a real photocopy that I could read later the same day or happen across so many years later, be it serendipitously or deliberately. Today, what makes the PDF phenomenon so intriguing for philosophical reflection is the fact that when one has a PDF one does not have a real “copy.” One scans a text, even better one downloads it from JSTOR. With that virtual advance, there is no need to actually read the text or (recalling the digital activism of Swartz’s automatic downloading stunt) have any contact whatever with the text at all. As an author, you may still get a note that your article has been downloaded so and so many times, but this does not mean that anyone has read it.
In fact, most articles, most books, have very few readers and among those readers, so I would say (but this is the professor in me talking), very few can be said to have really read the text. I have a German friend, the best of my best friends, who vigorously denies having read books I know he has read because I have seen him reading them with my own eyes and because I know the marginal marks he makes (he has left many of these in my own books). Now he happens to be a Suabian, and Nietzsche says that Suabians simply like to lie, but in his defense, it matters that his father was a classical philologist and it matters that he himself was a student of modern philology, a rigorous training which meant, as it took me years to realize, that he would refuse to say that he had read something until he had really, really read it.

Nor was he wrong in so stylizing what counts as reading for this is the very kind of reading an editor or an author hopes for.

When it comes to PDF’s, Jaron Lanier has pointed out that the hit phenomenon has the effect it has on us because we have adapted ourselves to the structural design he names the UNIX legacy. This is the effective absence of time as part of the command line interface. We count on this absence (this is how we adapt to it/subvert it to use the sociologist’s language) when we text during down moments (as my students do this in elevators, they also do this in class). But when we send them we know that we are not dealing with the infinitely timeless patience of the machine command line: we are no longer out of time, as it were. Once sent, the message enters the real time that it takes for a text message to arrive at its destination, for with texting as with email or a Facebook or blog post or a tweet, we assume that arrival to be instantaneous. This we parse in human time and hence we expect an immediate response the minute we send it. In this way we negotiate the difference between lived or real or human time and the timeless time of the command line (that is, until we hit return or “send” which is another name for return and we should note that the metaphor in question has already lodged itself in our consciousness). The immediacy of email or texting, which is between writing for the long term, parallels, although it is to be sure not the same as, immediate, face-to-face communication as Ihde very insightfully analysed this last and newer scholars would do well to explore this. (Note for instance that Facetime or Skyping is inherently difference from meeting in person, however much the software purveyors and your own increasingly busy life work to persuade you to think otherwise).

There are all kinds of problems here (of course, what is at stake is nothing but a version of the Turing test), but the only issue that is currently thought to matter in a cash culture such as ours is whether or not you
yourself or a machine has submitted an order form for a purchase or for some other purpose, signed an online petition, and so on.

The Turing dimensionality of the test in question moves beyond or outside of the command line interface because it cannot do otherwise if it wishes to function as a test. What is problematic is that, and because it has to produce feedback of a digital kind, it is a matter of translation.

Google wants the data for scanning purposes and otherwise, this we know, or should if we were consciously noticing the ads (we do notice subliminally/peripherally). Thus to prove that we are the one placing an order or whatever, one is given a squiggled text or garbled text of the kind that can nevertheless be read (eventually, and this is the fatality of this process, because Google wants the data, in a fairly short term, this test will no longer be able to function as a test), but it functions for now and one types in the so-called “captcha” and one is good to go.21

If our relation to the text has moved from the hand holding a stylus or a quill pen of the kind Nietzsche still used before his very temporary foray, encouraged by his illness and his myopia, to the use of typewriter, to the typewriter/keyboard/keypad, using the tips or pads of our fingers. As typewriters change (Nietzsche’s typewriter was actually better than the typewriters we know from our parents, just in terms of precision/speed), so too texting, now ‘aided’ with helpful machine completions (younger people learn to accommodate this telegraphy, and accommodate one must in order to use it), because as Heidegger also reminds us, the machine, be it old or new, the technology (or the technique as Ellul would say) “imposes its use.”22

In A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy, you claimed that analytic philosophy

“. . . stands to science as scholastic philosophy once did to theology. Continental philosophy differs from analytic philosophy in its openness to questioning which also means that it is less concerned with solutions than it is with critical questioning (including the question of its own presumptions or prejudices). But this focus on critical questioning also means, at least ideally, that continental philosophy does not aspire to take its rational warrant from science itself.”
Nearly a decade on, there remains heated discussion about this ‘analytic/continental divide.’ What is the usefulness of this term and its possible future?

The “heatedness” of the discussion in question is mostly, so far as I can tell, a matter of denouncing the “significance” of the distinction altogether and thus ultimately tending to deny its very existence. Your question regarding the “usefulness of this term” seems to point in this way for it seems to be most “useful” in order to pretend (here the Brian Leiter-report and associated blogs are good instantiations of this particular “use” or desire as nerdy wish fulfillment) that scholars such as those whose work one does not like can be not merely ignored, this is the ostrich effect, but and ultimately “designated” out of existence. And this sort of thing is quite old hat in academia, which has always been a competitive arena (going as far back as Heraclitus who recommended junking everyone else but himself). It’s also emblematic of the modern, thus we hear the trope at the penultimate level of Nietzsche’s short “History of an Error,” which is more about the natural history of errancy and illusion than an account of the difference between the “real” world (which originally of course meant the ideal world) and the apparent or phenomenal world when he writes:

— an idea no longer of any use . . . — an idea grown useless, superfluous, consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, How the Real World at Last Became a Myth)

It goes without saying that abolishing “an idea grown useless” is inherently risky not for reasons of, say, reverential regard but because the supererogatory is not therefore or thereby “refuted.” Occam’s razor is a principle of convenience, not demonstration, and it is not a matter of ontology. In the case of Nietzsche’s particular example, if we proceed to abolish the so-called “real world” we will find that “we have also abolished the apparent world (Ibid.).” The case of the real/apparent world is a case of co-relevant concepts. Nietzsche’s joke is in the rhetorical array: it’s because the idea may be said to be “useless,” one supposes one may do away with it: because it is “superfluous,” one concludes that it has been, as a result, “refuted.”

Why not get rid of it?

More than one person has told me that that one of the more compelling points in my article, as you quote it, from Carlos Prado’s book collection, *A House Divided,* is that I highlight the closed-off character of analytic style philosophy. Thus contemporary analytic philosophy is not
open to questioning, and it is not closed because I say so but on its own terms. Thus I describe traditional continental philosophy in its critically hermeneutic and reflectively phenomenological character as the practice of intensifying questions. I contrast this with analytic philosophy’s ongoing passion for deflating, puncturing, or otherwise dissolving questions, here, again, just to use the rhetoric of the mainstream. It is a common place in analytic philosophy to dismiss questions as such, i.e., “unmasking” them as not (really) “real” questions, declaring them pseudo-questions. In this sense, analytic or mainstream philosophy regards its task as the solving of problems (to this extent, analytic philosophy follows Karl Popper), dissolving all other problems and issues as irrelevant or unreal, as pseudo-problems.

I should say that in the same way that continental philosophy describes a philosophical style and is thus otherwise than a description of philosophy as currently practiced on the continent, analytic philosophy which is otherwise called “mainstream” or received philosophy, is itself and likewise a style, referring to more than one kind and is thus not only a single or specific method or locus.

In the case of continental philosophy, we do not ask which of the world’s continents counts as the locus of continental philosophy. The referent, as we know, betrays the Anglo-Saxon, British origins of the distinction as such. Hence talk of European philosophy hardly settles the question as some have sought to settle it, nor is the issue resolved by arguing that there is no difference to speak of because analytic philosophy is now dominant the world over.

Again, and in place of analytic problem solving, I highlight traditional continental philosophy’s willingness to pose questions and to hold with them as such, as I take Heidegger and Nietzsche as prime exemplifications of this willingness to question and even, and as I have sought to do in my own work, to render what is questionable or problematic even more problematic.

Where one asks whether it is ‘useful’ to distinguish between maintaining and dissolving problems, perhaps simply by stipulating them as solved or else by declaring them useless or meaningless, as so many distinctions to be “abolished,” one still means thereby to eliminate what is problematic and as a consequence one gets to dismiss those who present or maintain such problems. This is what makes the focus on what may be designated as ‘useful’ or ‘efficient,’ an expeditious one. This is done by the difference quashing power of the first person plural. Hence, one says: “we” don’t need to talk about continental and analytic philosophy any longer, “we” don’t find the distinction “useful.” But such a way of speaking has its
own utility and the result of that is a patently monolithic conception of philosophy.

My worry in response to this has always been, firstly, that philosophy is and has always been all about making distinctions.26 “I’ll teach you differences,” says Wittgenstein, himself quoting Shakespeare in his turn. Secondly, as just noted, I am struck by how self-serving such claims have tended to be for certain elements of the academy. When I first wrote this essay in 1991, twenty years ago, I noticed that when authors claimed as they did in book after book on the post this or post that “turn” in analytic philosophy, authors tended to declare how very advanced analytic philosophy was, how open-minded it was, and so on but all such books tended almost without exception to use such claims as the basis for excluding or limiting rather than encouraging dialogue, conversation, exchange.

If one wanted to talk about Husserl and Heisenberg in the philosophy of science, as one of my teachers did, or about Nietzsche and about Heidegger as I did, one met closed doors, there was and is no dialogue, no conversation, certainly no exchange. And when it comes to the profession, simple non-mention, utter exclusion turns out to be far more efficient than refutation.

It does not seem to me that claiming that the distinction isn’t ‘useful’ or that it is ‘meaningless’ is terrifically different.

The purpose to be served is exclusion.

We all already know all that, say the powers that be, but analytic philosophy isn’t that way at all, it has changed, analytic philosophy is now so various and so new, hence it is, as my colleagues at Fordham will tell me, that there are so many different kinds of philosophy of mind and analytic metaphysics and so on, the logic of which adverting to such proliferation of kinds and kinds translates in effect to saying: don’t talk to us about your concerns, about the kinds of things you do, we’re not interested, we don’t want to hear from you, we don’t want to hear from those like you, we already know what you have to say. And besides: we don’t ‘understand it.’ Instead of engaging in dialogue, instead of talking about what has been done in your tradition and what your current concerns are, what you ought to do is listen to us. Rather than exchange and conversation: it is just and only analytic philosophy that should be read, you should hire scholars trained in analytic philosophy who do so-called ‘continental’ work, you ought to dialogue with analytic philosophers only, converse solely on our topics, using only our terminology.
It seemed to me then and it still seems to me that this only serves the purpose of enshrining one particular style of doing philosophy as the only style of philosophy. And this is the effect whenever one says, as many younger scholars who also and despite an analytic formation describe themselves as continental (in good analytic fashion, let it be noted), let’s not perpetuate such distinctions, but let’s talk instead of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ philosophy. But what counts as good and what counts as bad always turn to be kinds of philosophy that exemplify that same analytic formation.

I will hold off discussing the last issue you raise in your question for my reply to the following question as it bears on the issue of science (in place of theology).

Much of your work has focused on Nietzsche’s relationship to science. What is the significance of Nietzsche, a figure predominantly read in the humanities, to a philosophy of science and to practical scientific endeavors?

I hold that Nietzsche matters for anyone who wants to think philosophically, i.e., critically about science. I say this because Nietzsche undertakes to question science purely philosophically by raising the question of science as a question and as such. This is the question Nietzsche poses in a preface added to his first book in the wake of his experience of being misunderstood by his peers with respect to his project there (as scholars continue to fail to understand it). That book, *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*, hardly seems, as you correctly point out, to be a book about science as such or at all and certainly it seems irrelevant to the so-called hard sciences.

Nietzsche’s first book, the book he says is all about this very question of science, thus seems to be very much concerned with what you call the humanities, that aesthetic philosophy, historical questions of poetry and theatre and literature and music as well as political culture. Yet it is exactly with reference to this book that Nietzsche claims that he is the first to raise the question of science as a question. Most scholars simply dismiss this claim. I take it seriously and when one does that and when does so in a sustained fashion, one sees that Nietzsche’s book is a genuinely, methodologically scientific undertaking just where Nietzsche qua classical philologist seeks to understand the genesis of the tragic work of art as the title of the book tells us that he does, out of the sounding, i.e., out of the spirit of ancient Greek (as this was, so Nietzsche had discovered, an explicitly, literally musical voicing). The “science” in question, disciplinarily speaking, was Nietzsche’s own discipline of classical philology,
methodologically articulated in accordance with the procedure of ‘any science whatever’ as this was supposed possible in the 19th century and Nietzsche did suppose this, following Kant, and the very specific understanding of the nature of lyric poetry in the tragic, musical work of art, in terms of the function of the chorus, and the entirety of the tragic artwork in terms of the role of culture as a whole in the same tragic era of ancient Greece, just and precisely because that era comes to an end, as Nietzsche argues in his first book, with the tragedies of Euripides (and coincidentally with Plato/Socrates).

Note that what we name tragedy today, what Shakespeare called tragedy, what Walter Benjamin called tragedy, has in consequence nothing to do with the historical focus of Nietzsche’s book and only thus can one understand why he speaks of the possibility of a rebirth of tragic culture (and his appeal to Wagner and his followers to support his cause).

With Nietzsche’s claim that he is the first to raise the question of science as such, as we have already noted this above, he takes science methodologically and as I show elsewhere, citing Karl Jaspers, this emphasis on method was no kind of conceit: many scientists, including students of medicine and physiology, turned to philology just to learn the rigorous of method. Nor was it an accident that Darwin himself turned to the linguistic schema that was the legacy of the very same Alexandrian grammarians that Nietzsche speaks of in order to borrow the differential relations between the evolutionary development of language to pattern his own theory of the origin of species. And what Nietzsche means (and we recall that he recommends that one question grammar itself) is thus that he is the first to put the presuppositions of science itself in question, as this of course corresponds to the very Kantian question of putting science itself on the path, as it were, of a science.

Nietzsche also raises the related question of truth, he questions causality as well as our presuppositions about it, and he goes on to frame or raise the question of the origin of logic itself in very logical and historical terms, again and in every case logically or scientifically (and in the case of the last he reminds us of the oddity of our universal conviction that we can proceed from non-knowledge to knowledge, transition from error to truth, and in general and thereby manage to advance from mythic thought and convention to logical and rational thinking). How, Nietzsche asks, does that work? How is it possible to begin with error and proceed to truth? If we begin with superstition and ignorance, exactly how do we attain enlightenment and knowledge? Everything depends upon the question of foundation or ground and Nietzsche’s question asks the ultimate question of ground.
As I have pointed out throughout my career, these are logical questions. Logic conserves or preserves what truth one has to begin with. Reasoning logically, we do not deviate from correct insights, whereas illogical process leaves any and everywhere, even when our premises are true.

The problem for Nietzsche (and Heidegger), as for Kant, Hume, Descartes, is to find a secure foundation.

Today we no longer worry about such questions because we take science as our foundation, as our point of departure. Hence, we take ‘as true’ what science says is true. And maybe it is, but philosophy does not raise critical questions.

Here I return to the parallel you cited above in your previous question on the analytic/continental divide, where scholastic philosophy once served theology and where theology indeed and very conscientiously, even anxiously required its services (even if this anxiety tended to lead to an ultimate movement to “deny reason” in order, as it were, to make room “for faith”), today’s science is not in need of philosophy’s contributions be they analytic or continental. Just this sovereignty on the part of modern science is problematic for the dominant mode of philosophizing, that is, analytic philosophy, to the extent that it embraces (as traditional philosophy never for its part ‘embraced’ theology, per impossibile, in the case of Aristotle) science as its model, or ideal.

In other words, analytic philosophy embraces an enterprise, the natural sciences, that has no need of its services.

Such an embrace does not characterize the critical, continental kind of philosophy of science, like Nietzsche’s, as I have argued, that does not model itself on science and does not aspire to be taken “as” science whenever that might be possible but instead and much rather puts science itself in question. In this way, although analytic philosophy emphasizes what is called ‘critical thinking,’ there is in fact a radical avoidance of critique especially where it concerns science, and I have always found this problematic for the philosophy of science. I have some small comfort, though it may not comfort him to have me cite him here, but the perfectly analytic P.M.S. Hacker makes a similar point.29

Now to say that analytic-style philosophy radically avoids critique when it comes to science is hardly to say that there is a lack of critical terminology in analytic philosophy, and it doesn’t mean that analytic philosophers aren’t nasty about this or that. Indeed, from the point of feminist and other perspectives in the academy, speaking more universally, one of the more problematic characteristics of mainstream philosophy is that analytic philosophy features a style and modality that is one of the
nastier styles to be found in the academy as a whole, specifically when it comes to friendliness towards women in philosophy, which thus extends, as I have argued in another context, toward other reflective styles or ways of doing philosophy such as the continental modalities we were discussing above.

If analytic philosophy does not question science, science in turn, as I have noted, does not for its part regard philosophy, no matter whether analytic or continental, as theology once regarded philosophy. Thus it is not the case that science gives a hoot about the distinctions between philosophical kinds that I am making here. Hence I have always found it worth reflecting that when it comes to the relevance of the philosophy of science of any flavor (analytic or continental), for “practical scientific endeavors,” to use your terminology to refer to the work of contemporary scientists, science itself happily proceeds without referring to philosophy at all. Thus although traditional philosophers of science may regard what they write upon as having more significance to practical scientific endeavors (as opposed, say, to Nietzsche’s philosophy of science), the scientists themselves do not depend upon philosophy of any kind and are, it would appear, universally united in not taking it to be particularly significant for their own practice.

And indeed that has always been true. If Quine could say that mathematics is philosophy enough, the physicists, and this is why Nietzsche addresses himself directly to the physicists (“my dear Messieurs Physicist,” he writes), might counter that physics is philosophy enough. If yesterday’s scientist, scientists like Heisenberg and Einstein and Schrödinger, enjoyed a background that included philosophy in addition to classical studies, that did not mean that they revered the philosophers of science of their day. They always held themselves perfectly capable of philosophizing all by themselves — and many did. They did not need to and they did not appeal to their colleagues in philosophy to help them out.

Let me note further that analytic philosophy, especially analytic philosophy of science, especially the cognitive sciences, are not at all sanguine about this state of affairs and they often undertake to do whatever they can to get scientists to pay attention to them. Hence it is precisely analytic philosophy — and precisely to the extent that it very deliberately patterns itself on science — that is concerned to persuade science to take its efforts seriously, to find its efforts useful, and so on. This may well be behind the recent turn to empirical philosophy, which is philosophy by survey, an amusing ennobling of the appeal that is called the argumentum ad populum (and which used once upon a time to be regarded as a textbook fallacy). I note in passing however that this changes little with regard to the point I am making here, inasmuch as this turn will at best make of
philosophy a social science, which social sciences have their own anxieties about presenting themselves to the natural sciences as sciences. In place of 19th century method, we have 20th (and so far or to date 21st) century quantificational analysis.

I don’t think analytic philosophers have had much success persuading the scientists per se that they need analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers, claiming to speak for the scientists, do however have success in persuading university deans that they in fact represent the sciences although I don’t know how long this will last. I have often thought that if there are, as indeed there are, many universities that host Departments of Cognitive Science along with Departments of Linguistics and Departments of Neuroscience as well as Departments of Cognitive Pyschology, Information Science, Robotics, and so on, that a Department of Philosophy taken as translator of the sciences to the sciences, might well seem to be redundant or unnecessary, assuming, as I assume, a competent faculty in the aforenamed disciplines, all of whom can teach what analytic philosophers regard as ‘critical thinking,’ and all of whom know the sciences to which analytic philosophers appeal (say, regarding brain states) far better than the philosophers themselves.

Unlike theology that conscientiously drew upon philosophy, science faculty are well able to explain their own ways to themselves and to students and others and do not need such handmaidens or (ancillae).

Perhaps it might be useful to replace departments of analytic philosophy...with real science studies programs that would teach stock or standard accounts of the aims of science to the general public, i.e., science literacy.

Perhaps it might be useful be to replace departments of analytic philosophy, dedicated as many are today to a kind of simplified science literacy (and not the critical analysis of science, as that last has died the death of the so-called strong program of the sociology of science and the evaporation of the anthropology of science into actor network analysis), and to the celebration of what it takes to be the content of science, with real science studies programs that would teach stock or standard accounts of the aims of science to the general public, i.e., science literacy.

This is not the same for continental philosophy which for the most part, and because it is less and less what it used to be and more and more what analytic philosophy has left over for it to be, dutifully avoids reflection on science like the plague. This is not the case for continental philosophy of
science but, as if I needed to emphasize this once again, that is a very small subfield.

As someone who has spent considerable time working abroad, what are the primary differences among university systems in the United States and in the countries of Europe, and how do those differences bear on the way philosophy is regarded in these places?

European universities have the great luxury of drawing upon students who have been trained at the level attained by secondary education in Europe, which is actually, although Americans rightly hate it when I say this — I lament that I have to say this — breathtaking by comparison with an American high school education, even a private high school or prep school education.

By the time European students get to university they know languages (and American students tend not to learn languages at all, not even when they are doctoral students), they've read texts. Most importantly, perhaps, they have learned how to read those texts, which is something that American students do not do perhaps for the simple reason that like high school teachers, professors in the US teach out of fragments of texts or bits of books. In other words, most US philosophy professors use textbooks and self-made textbooks (those would be course packs) and draw on examples or case studies rather than reading what they call the “history” of philosophy, and so on.

In addition and related to this, European students have also grown up in a culture of the same bookish and musical sort. In other words, there is a general regard for knowledge and for training, and especially for philosophy (that does not mean analytic philosophy as it currently conceives itself but it does mean philosophy as it has been historically and traditionally conceived). In the US, many people have little understanding of the meaning of philosophy and this circumstance has worsened in my judgment as today even educated people in the US assume that ‘philosophy’ is exactly (and only) what the analysts say it is.

I am reminded here of Theodor Adorno’s wry reflection that one of the things that he learnt for the first time during his sojourn in America was just how unimportant, how non-influential the so-called “life of the mind” or the intellect, could manage to be for a society as a whole. What Adorno realized, this was the culture shock of the man who went on, on the basis of this shock to write about what he thus called the “culture industry” for the rest of his life, was that what immediately enjoyed respect in Germany, what
seemingly went without saying in Europe, counted for little or nothing in the United States. This is an acknowledgment, on the one hand, of the freedom of the American spirit, but and because this is Adorno speaking (who immediately and rudely connects this with what he also calls the least common denominator of intellectual capacity), it is also and on the other hand, a sobering point, and rather than bristle at the very idea, we should feel chastened by it.

As a corollary, and in fact, when we go abroad we are often delighted by the opposite circumstance as it holds in Europe, whereby, metaphorically speaking, we all become so many Neg-Adorno particles, (not that so very many of us can afford to travel in Europe any longer). What is telling here is that if you wander about the US and tell folks on your travels that you are studying philosophy you can expect to meet a certain amount of incomprehension and even more indifference. By contrast, your expressions of philosophical interests will likely meet comprehension and respect and may even lead to valuable discussions in Europe. Thus I routinely hear from students who study abroad both astonishment at just how much they find their foreign peers to “know,” in the sense of sheer knowledge and depth of knowledge, and regarding how much these peers ‘value’ and enjoy learning and knowing.

In sum, the primary difference between studying philosophy in Europe and studying philosophy in the US is that in the US we have neither the luxury of the level of pre-university preparation nor the overall breadth of European culture...
system, which if thinned or abbreviated is still impressive) a tradition or culture of learning that is still well worth learning.

But if that is not enough for you, I have always maintained that the only reason one ever has or will need to travel to Paris, for example, is the simple promise of a cup of coffee. Just a cup of coffee: just sitting in a café or standing at the bar. But once you get there, you might as well take a walk along the Seine, and that means books and books and books again.

Mario Bunge, one of the many authors thinking about the ‘crisis of philosophy,’ wrote in Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction that “all the philosophical schools are in ruins.” What are your thoughts on Bunge’s claim, and what are the political and philosophical ramifications of the dialog of ‘crisis’?

Here, I agree with Bunge, although and of course he is writing from the analytic side in the philosophy of science and I too believe that things are as bad from his point of view as they are from mine. On the other hand, we do not of course agree as Bunge is strongly anti-hermeneutic.

For my own part, agreeing as I do agree that “all‖ the schools of philosophy are in “ruins,” I also hold little hope that it is possible to reconstruct or rebuild or start anew. Once one loses the teachers (and we have lost them, not all but most), it is not just hard, it is impossible to proceed with what deserves the name of philosophy. At the same time as I say this, even if I mean only to say that most of the great minds are lost and because those who take their place are not, just to say this politely, as great, it is of course true that we still have to proceed as best we can.

The trouble as I see it is that those who now occupy positions of prestige (here we are back to our original reference to standards and the ‘rigor’ of the profession) are as newer scholars also are as mediocre as they tend to be. For me, that only means that they are poorly trained and ill read, and these, my younger colleagues, become angry examples of what Nietzsche called Ressentiment if this is suggested, and I do suggest it.

If you want to know if this description of being poorly trained and ill read applies to your professors, look around their house: how many books do they have? I exclude the books in one’s office as these, very physically, very literally, are not the books one lives with.

Such bookish standards are all about what is meant when one talks about formation as the French speak of it and Bildung as the Germans speak of it. This is what Nietzsche meant when he talked about getting
oneself an “educator,” which is to say, doing what it takes (that means reading and more reading) to acquire an “education” or a “culture,” and it should go without saying that Nietzsche’s standards were much higher than mine could possibly be, just given my own inevitable limitations. This is what Isaac Newton also meant when he talked about the giants of a past intellectual formation.\(^{35}\) It is simply mind-blowing what people once knew.

I would point out that, and I blame myself as well, although I did my damndest, albeit without success, that it is today’s professors who have presided over the current state of the profession. Bunge himself is to blame; I am to blame. Of course Bunge has had vastly more power and influence than I have had (this is easy to claim because I have had almost no influence), and his failures are for those reasons far more significant than mine just because I am not as important as he is.

Let me put this in another manner: there is no doubt in my mind that Bunge has read not a word written by continental philosophers of science and certainly not a word I have written.\(^{36}\) By contrast I have, of course (of course I say: of course) read Bunge (and many, many others). Analytic philosophers of science take themselves to be reading continental philosophy of science if they read Foucault — just as analytic philosophers take themselves to be continental if they read, say Heidegger or Nietzsche. What they do not do is read those continental authors or even many analytic authors who write on Foucault, Heidegger, Nietzsche. And yet by discounting the broader array of philosophy and philosophical authors and commentators, analytic philosophy has painted itself into its own smaller and smaller corner.

What is most regrettable perhaps is that at this point there seems to be no robust alternative. Thus it is that today in most departments of philosophy there is no other style of philosophy than the analytic kind. Analytic philosophy has had the power in the academy (and it takes the power because it is a tradition of entitlement and not mutuality) and the result of its dominion (and it has and still has dominion) has been an impoverishment of philosophy.

I will say that had the only kind of philosophy being taught when I was a student been philosophy of what is today the analytic or mainstream variety, not only would I not have been able to become what I am but I would not have bothered in the first or last place.\(^{37}\) Life, after all, is short.
and mentoring of students. How are these responsibilities related? Do students benefit from faculty research? How do these academic responsibilities relate to the work of the philosopher, per se? Does it make any sense today to speak of the non-academic philosopher?

Let me answer this, your last question, by starting with the last part of your question. I don’t believe there are really many non-academic philosophers, unless they are independently wealthy. The Spinozas and the Schopenhauers have always been in short supply.

But that said, the comparison is misleading. The simple fact that one does not have an academic appointment is itself irrelevant to one’s academic qualifications or what I was above calling a formation. Both Spinoza and Schopenhauer were academically extraordinarily well qualified. So I would need more clarification with regard to your last question to be able to speak of it. Do you mean, for example, is one able to be a philosopher with no academic background whatever? I am not sure. Can one think thoughts that might interest one and perhaps be of interest to others? Certainly. Would this count as philosophy? To pose the question is already to make it over on the terms of the academy. And to this entire question it would still remain to consider what is to be counted as philosophy as there is a certain amount as it is indeed contested. So my answer here is simply an institutional one. Intriguingly over the years, and this is one of the perks (or more accurately said one of the downsides) of being an editor, I have received a fair bit of mail from non-academics who feel that they should be regarded as philosophers. It goes without saying that they themselves were seeking approbation from an academic — otherwise they would not have been writing to me to begin with.

The task of teaching, at least as I teach the traditional texts of philosophy, keeps one in tune with both the field and the questions that are called perennial because they are undying: they resist ultimate solution. I think students benefit from faculty research just to the extent that that research is in touch with the tradition: one studies not the current work of any given professor active in a given research field, although one may find this of use to form one’s own work, but and much rather to learn from that scholar how to approach extant scholarship and above all how to read the texts of philosophy and to learn the problems of philosophy. For me, the two simply go together.
Notes

1. In fact, this worry is related to Plato's concern, ‘who will guard the guards?’
3. Interestingly enough this is the reason it is Nietzsche’s sister, along with her co-editors, and not Nietzsche who is the author of the infamous Will to Power published in his name but not therefore under his authorship. I discuss this with reference to Nietzsche and Heidegger in Babich, “Le sort du Nachlass: le problème de l’œuvre posthume” In: Pascale Hummel, ed., Méliures / Misbooks. Études sur l’envers et les travers du livre (Paris: Philogicum, 2009), pp. 123-140.
5. I thank my student, the musician Carrie Gillespie, for bringing the sheer existence of this journal to my attention in the context of a class I was teaching on Politics and Technology in the department of Political Science at UCSD. 
9. Here I note that contemporary digital media scholars should go and rediscover what Lacan says about television and not just by reading Žižek and then go back and read not just Postman but Jerry Mander to boot.
10. There are several studies of this, of course. One useful and respectable because insider’s account, is David B. Resnick, The Price of Truth: How Money Affects the Norms of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) another and more popular account, not because of its authorship, the authors are similarly academics like Resnik, as historians of science, Naomí Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011), but because the target is not, say AIDS or cancer or physics research but (and only) big tobacco and global warming. For a discussion dedicated to the role of journals and editors whose ultimate editorial policy is to simply block publication, see Pilkey, Orrin H., and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can’t Predict the Future (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 136 and passim. Neither scientists nor engineers, as it turns out, are willing to revise a good model once they have one, no matter whether it models reality or not, and this recalcitrance was the inspiration for the Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis. For a nicely theoretical discussion, see Philip Mirowski’s The Effortless Economy of Science (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) as well as his earlier co-edited collection with E.-M. Sent, Science Bought and Sold (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). For a more general account, see Martin Walker, Dirty Medicine (London: Slingshot Publications, 1993). And if one really doesn’t mind rocking the boat, see the arguments of the important but obviously controversial molecular biologist, Peter Duesberg’s popular or exoteric, Inventing the AIDS Virus (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1995), and for a perfect scientist’s account, see Duesberg, et al., “The Chemical Bases of the Various AIDS Epidemics: Recreational Drugs, Anti-Viral Chemotherapy and Malnutrition,” J. Biosci., 28/4 (June, 2003): 383-412. See further Gordon Moran, Silencing Scientists and Scholars in Other Fields: Power, Paradigm Controls, Peer Review, and Scholarly Communication (Greenwich: Ablex Publishing, 1998).
11. For a rare account using the tools of journalistic science, a science that has itself recently been coopted by its sponsors, see David S. Bertolloti, *Culture and Technology* (Bowling Green: Ohio University Press, 1984).

12. This is the still too-little adverted to point of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air Pump* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). I say too little adverted to because this “invisible” point has gone without remark while the modest one, has captivated our attention. We are all of us the modest witness in question, just as we are all cyborg. See too for a related discussion, similarly insufficiently noted or discussed, but it is a glorious book and recommend it to philosophers if only for the implications to be drawn by reading the very first page, Lawrence Principe’s *The Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and his Alchemical Quest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

13. I should note the phenomenon, and it is a phenomenon, of publishing by printing press on occasion and stamped wood cuts that constituted by Earl Nitschke’s extraordinary mailing of postcards and prints to a wide range of Nietzsche scholars. As editor, I have characterized this as I feature his work in recent issue of *New Nietzsche Studies*, as dynamic performance art, as an art event: co-relevant here would be Nietzsche’s own description of a letter as being akin to an unannounced visit, shaking one up, disturbing, affecting one. The internet wishes it could be so effective. And Earl Nitschke is particularly good at this as a professor of industrial art and design. Thus publishing as noted at the outset with reference to writing on the wall, has many means. Postcard art is one of them.


15. Add to this the literality of the humanities faculty and one finds that humanities’ faculty members tend go along with rather than protesting such cuts. By contrast, science faculty, less literate perhaps, certainly unused to taking orders from librarians, often protest to high heaven when anyone proposes to cut their subscriptions. It goes without saying that the difference in costs between humanities subscriptions and science subscriptions are mind boggling, which means that relatively little is gained from the complicity of the humanities professors.


18. Aaron Swartz apparently broke into a restricted area at MIT and downloaded millions of articles from JSTOR.

19. This is an old habit, reducing Nietzsche to Emerson or Lange or Wagner as one’s personal inclinations prefer. Nietzsche himself found it fairly useless philosophically speaking and spoke instead not of the originality of the Greek but their genial qualities as masters of what he called “the art of fruitful learning.” Anyone can pick up anything, the challenge is to make something of it, to “take up the spear from where another has left it and‖ — and this is what is hard — “throw it further.” See his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.

20. Marcus Aurelius chides himself on the bootlessness of this, the original bookish *idée fixe* in his *Meditations*.

21. The technology in question depends upon keeping inherently bodily issues in mind, hence it would be profitably explored by means of phenomenology (and Ihde should be quick to notice this aspect). The captcha website defines a captcha “as a program that protects websites against bots by generating and grading tests that humans can pass but current computer programs cannot.” See “CAPTCHA: Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically,” http://www.captcha.net/. Accessed 8:56, Pacific time. Albeit from NYC, but my computer does not know this.


23. Of the few people who ever read the essay, a subset that regrettabley (in my view as I would have welcomed the resultant dialogue) includes no one who writes on the topic.
INTERVIEW: Babette Babich

24. My essay, “On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, Heidegger’s Speaking Language, and Philosophy” in Carlos G. Prado, ed., A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus/Humanity Books. 2003), pp. 63-103 goes back quite a bit as an initial version of it was originally written for a conference I organized in Dubrovnik in 1991 just before the “war(s)” that dismantled Yugoslavia and what had been other countries of the time (countries to be sure that were themselves drawn, borderwise, following the previous world war(s)). It was revised and published four years after that as “Against Analysis, Beyond Postmodernism” in the collection I edited (together with Debra B. Bergoffen and Simon V. Glynn, eds.), Continental and Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science (Avebury. Aldershot, UK/ Brookfield, USA. 1995), pp. 31-54.

25. I have a book on this topic, forthcoming in French, where the distinction and the divide is similarly problematic: Babich, La fin de la pensée. Sur la différence et la politique de la désunion entre philosophie analytique et philosophie continentale.

26. Thus Aquinas cites Aristotle’s de Anima on the matter of such distinctions:

scientiae dividuntur quemadmodum et res, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed philosophia est de ente; est enim cognitio entis, ut dicit Dionysius in epistula ad Polycarpum. Cum ergo ens primo dividatur per potentiam et actum, per unum et multa, per substantiam et accidens, videtur quod per huiusmodi deberent partes philosophiae distinguiri.” Aquinas, Librum Boetii de Trinitate Expositio (Quest. 5. Art. 1.)

In addition, we remember Descartes’ identification of the “clear and distinct” as the distinctive characteristic of what might (ultimately, promissorily) be known with certainty. In an article on this topic, Robert Sokolowski notes that the entire impetus of Aristotle’s characterization of his predecessors depended upon distinguishing their lack of distinctive distinguishing. Sokolowski cites Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1.7 988a180-b15, noting as he does that Aristotle’s own method proceeds by ‘clarifying’ what his predecessors confusedly knew. See Sokolowski, “The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions,” The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Mar., 1998): 515-532. Prior to Sokolowski, see too Hannah Arendt’s letter entitled “Distinctions” which she sent to New York Review of Books, Volume 13, Number 12 (January 1, 1970) in reply to a review published on her book, Men in Dark Times. Although by her own self-assessment, a political theorist rather than a philosopher, Arendt draws upon her clearly philosophical background to argue against her reviewer that

the point at issue is not the past but tradition, and the distinction between them: Tradition orders the past, hands it down (tradere), interprets it, omits, selects, and emphasizes according to a system of pre-established beliefs. Tradition is a mental construct and as such always subject to critical examination. If I say that no tradition can claim validity today, I do not say that the past is dead but that we have no reliable guide through it any more, from which it follows that tradition itself has become a part of the past.” Ibid.

27. I have written of course a good deal about this and I am happy to note that there is an increasingly interest in the topic – indeed Günther Abel and Helmut Heit organized a conference during the summer of 2010 on the theme of “Nietzsche’s Wissenschaftsphilosophie/Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science.” A full three day, international conference and that, intriguingly enough, would not be the only such conference recently organized on Nietzsche science. Quite independently of such conferences, I myself begin a recent overview essay on the philosophy of science as such with an extended reference to Nietzsche in Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,” International Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2010): 343-391.

28. See the first few sections of Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science.”


31. I am sure that Michael Wreen, who argues nicely that fallacies typically regarded are only qualifiedly so, would be comparably enlightening on the matter of this traditional informal fallacy. I cite Wreen and others in Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science.”

32. I have elsewhere observed that some of the limitations of Peter Kingsley’s recent work on the presocratic tradition corresponded to his apparent limited knowledge of Nietzsche, owing to the constraints inherent in classical studies, but not less to the limitations of the analytic tendencies that dominate departments of philosophy.


34. This is Jenneman's point which he takes up from Jäger and others as well. I discuss this in the initial sections of Babich, “Adorno on Science and Nihilism, Animals, and Jews,” *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2011): 110-145.

35. Read Principe’s book just for the philosophical frisson of the first few pages, and read the rest for its own sake (not to mention for useful bits on Newton).

36. Being unread is, of course, what it means to be non-influential, that is why I discussed the elusive quality of the readerly public above.

37. There is also what one may call a boredom quotient that matters (to me) in philosophy. Bunge has that in spades, Nietzsche rather less of it.