2018

On Guenther Anders, Political Media Theory, and Nuclear Violence

Babette Babich
Fordham University, babich@fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_babich

Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Digital Humanities Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Other Film and Media Studies Commons, and the Other Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation

https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_babich/94

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact considine@fordham.edu, bkilee@fordham.edu.
On Günther Anders, political media theory, and nuclear violence

Babette Babich
Fordham University, USA

Abstract
Günther Anders was a philosopher concerned with the political and social implications of power, both as expressed in the media and its tendency to elide the citizenry and thus the very possibility of democracy and the political implications of our participation in our own subjugation in the image of modern social media beginning with radio and television. Anders was particularly concerned with two bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II, and he was just as concerned with the so-called ‘peaceful’ uses of nuclear power, what he named our apocalypse-blindness and the urgency of violence. To make this case I draw on Baudrillard on ‘speech without response’ and Gadamer on conversation.

Keywords
critical theory, Günther Anders, nuclear power, technology, violence and non-violence

Like Hannah Arendt, Günther Anders was a theorist of power who philosophized about violence. Yet even those political philosophers familiar with his work tend to find Anders’ reflections on power – Macht – difficult to comprehend, less because his style of writing is elusive than because his approach, focusing on technology, is one that has been systematically avoided not merely generally but specifically in thinking about politics and power. And Anders wrote, very critically, about technology as most political philosophers and, indeed, most political theorists, with few exceptions, do not. This extends to media theory, where one scholar characterizes Anders’ approach as an ‘Undiscovered Critical Theory of Technology’. The exceptions when it comes to philosophers engaged with technology would be Jacques Ellul and Ivan Illich, Jean Baudrillard and Martin Heidegger, and for critical readings today, we may name Peter Sloterdijk and, a bit more complicatedly, Bruno Latour, crossing political theory and
philosophy from the side of ethnography, transformed into his own mini field, actor-network theory. In sociology, we may add Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau as well as Stanley Aronowitz. Front and centre for media theory is, of course, Friedrich Kittler, who can seem to be a tech-enthusiast to the extent that readers can overread his critique, especially of war technology, including communications and who made his alliance with Heidegger clear but who often inspires readers less than familiar with Heidegger. Those philosophers of technology, like Bernard Stiegler, who read Gilbert Simondon and Gaston Bachelard, tend to the side of cheerful optimism, not quite up there with Steven Pinker or Steve Fuller or Don Ihde (and his various influential followers) but close enough to be well distinguished from Günther Anders. But where Pinker perhaps first and foremost as well as Ihde and Fuller are mainstream thinkers, Anders was an oblique thinker and, like Illich on medical technology, Anders was the kind of author who upset one’s intellectual apple cart.

Here it is instructive that the range of Anders’ work is complex and that that complexity is essential to understanding his thought. Hence, one needs to include his early reflections on having, as well as his sociological reflections on music as both resonate throughout his study of the human being as a kind of ‘antique’, obsolete or quaint. If scholars typically translate the title of Anders’ 1956 book Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen as The Obsolescence of Humanity, I prefer The Antiquatedness of the Human in order to foreground, as Anders does, the outdated, the old-fashioned, the second-hand. A wonderful partial translation of that first book appears in Christopher John Müller’s Prometheanism just where Anders invokes Prometheanism in an Aeschylean tenor to address the clash of old and new gods and the terrible temerity of titans.

Anders in no way intends his title in the sense of today’s transhumanist projections of technological perfectionism/enhancement fantasies and this specificity is also an issue when it comes to contemporary media studies. Although Anders is a child of his times (1902–1992), his analysis of his era and the media of radio and television and film remain so prescient that we can benefit from an engagement particularly where this is also echoed, and helpfully updated, in Jean Baudrillard’s media analysis. In addition, there is Anders’ pacifism, his concern with the atom bomb twice deployed in Japan in August 1945 and the direct humanism of his correspondence with the Hiroshima airman, Claude Eatherly.

For Anders, ‘Hiroshima is everywhere’, a claim that continues years later with his apothegmatic ‘Chernobyl is everywhere’ at the start of his interview with Manfred Bissinger, published as Gewalt – Ja oder Nein. The ubiquity invoked remains ‘invisible’, better said, opaque in just the fashion in which radioactive contamination of one kind or another remains unadverted to, however ‘real’ it happens to be, however much it affects us, suffused as we are in a miasma of microwave and cell phone and all kinds of broadcast radiation (and not merely every time we go through federal building or airline security), an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ affair.

**Günther Stern/Günther Anders**

Casually calling himself ‘something else’, so the apocryphal story goes, at the behest of an editor who complained that there were too many ‘Sterns’ on the newspaper masthead, Anders, who would seem to have taken his own designation to heart, is strikingly less
well-known than he should be\textsuperscript{10} despite belonging to an (almost) incestuous group of famous names. Middle son of William Stern, the inventor of the IQ test, his early childhood chronicled in detail by Stern and his psychologist wife Clara Stern in their study of child development,\textsuperscript{11} Günther Stern [Anders] was Walter Benjamin’s cousin. First husband of the political thinker, Hannah Arendt, Anders was a student of Erwin Panofsky and Ernst Cassirer as well as Heinrich Wölfflin and, in psychology, Wolfgang Köhler and Max Wertheimer. He also worked with Martin Heidegger, like Arendt, and wrote a dissertation in 1924 on categorical propositions with Edmund Husserl. And, were that insufficient, Anders was, along with Max Horkheimer (and Theodor Adorno), and Herbert Marcuse, one of the original founders of the Frankfurt School.

In \textit{Gewalt – Ja oder Nein?}, Anders argued that the ideology of non-violent resistance meshed far too, all-too conveniently with the \textit{Nicht-können} that is also the rule of law: a bourgeois excuse for inaction out of respect for law. This, our cowardice, is exacerbated as it is an automatic consequence of our dependence on technology. But Anders’ critique of technology cannot be separated from his phenomenological music broadcast and music reception studies,\textsuperscript{12} which also have a technical psychological component as well, as Anders argues in his own analysis, like Adorno’s/Horkheimer’s and Rudolf Arnheim’s critiques of radio programmes and television programming.\textsuperscript{13} For Anders, who pioneered the notion of the ‘homeworker’ (the ‘mass’ human being as a solitary fabricator of himself/herself in accord with stock programming) – with some inspiration from the argument Heidegger also makes with respect to the radio and in the ambit of Benjamin and Adorno – arguing in a fashion more sustained than any of these, that the consumer himself or herself manufactures himself or herself in the image of mass media into a participant in mass media by means of nothing other than media consumption.\textsuperscript{14} One becomes a consumer of media (and society at large) by consuming what mass (today we say social) media broadcasts. The issue Anders ironically highlighted was the challenge of continuing media consumption as such, which worked best with products like the daily news, products that had to be consumed, \textit{used up}, in order to be used. Like bread, like hand grenades, Anders writes, and like bombs. The daily desire for the one is a matter of organic necessity, the latter two would preoccupy his reflections on the industrial production of violence. These references introduce the second volume of his \textit{Antiquatedness of the Human} (1980), including the mass human being as such, Anders epitomizes our new need: ‘Give us this day our daily hunger’.\textsuperscript{15} Think today of our newsfeed: we concern ourselves, often first of all, with just this. Like Heidegger, Anders focuses on the hermit phenomenon of isolation (everyone has their own radio, everyone watches television alone, even \textit{en famille}), a phenomenon still theorized by today’s theorists of technology, to use the title of one of Sherry Turkle’s books, \textit{Alone Together}.\textsuperscript{16} Likewise Baudrillard and, more recently, Sloterdijk emphasize this singularizing, isolating, point.\textsuperscript{17}

Our preoccupation with (and by) technology is, for Anders, preternaturally religious, filling the void or wake of what Hegel in his \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} had already announced – well before Nietzsche – as the ‘Death of God’. In this way, Anders’ \textit{homeworker} is a kind of ‘hermit’ as he says, working at home, tirelessly, for the sake of their own soul – like a monk – on the vocation of creating themselves. Thus, and Anders emphasizes, as unpaid home labour, in as many hours of the conscious day that one has to
oneself in order to produce oneself as the mass human being, capable of appreciating on command, on demand, mass media: an asocial mediatic preoccupation for which privilege of self-creation one pays, as Anders repeats, in the kind of stylistic dissonant insight that was his watchword. Spoon-fed, as he says, by the media, watching TV as one does all alone (even in the presence of others), TV is a classically, quintessentially autistic medium. So too of course YouTube, etc., accessed on one’s computer/laptop or on our cell phones and tablets, as I analyse the phenomenon in The Halleluah Effect. There, I draw on Anders along with Adorno who had been imported to the United States to work on the wartime Princeton Radio Project, arguing that today we might best understand Facebook, and other forms of surfing today’s Internet, Twitter and Instagram, among other newer apps, as exemplifying this autistic but not less politically malleable ‘effect’ just where this very autistic induction seems to secure its appeal.

Anders, like Adorno and Horkheimer but, more specifically, like Neil Postman and Gerry Mander but also like Baudrillard and Ellul, argued that there could be no possibility of democracy in a world with television (much less, so we can add, the Internet). Hence contrary to popular belief, connectivity and cell phones do not (think surveillance) enable political revolutions, if they surely make it possible to coordinate fleeting encounters, erotic and otherwise, with friends and total strangers. We are distracted and directed, led by our social media and the all-pervasive filtering of the same, including Google searches. As Anders emphasizes our solitary status, Jean Baudrillard explains the media dynamic by which this isolation functions:

The mass media are anti-mediatory and intransitive. They fabricate non-communication – this is what characterizes them, if one agrees to define communication as an exchange, as a reciprocal space of a speech and a response, and thus of a responsibility (not a psychological or moral responsibility, but a personal, mutual correlation in exchange).

Baudrillard is making an important point that requires its own unpacking apart from the current context of attempting to raise the question of violence as Anders speaks of this with respect to atomic reactors (typically regarded as a ‘peacetime’ use of nuclear power). Given that Anders wrote of Chernobyl – and we have now had a number of such disasters, disarmed of their specifically ‘nuclear’ associations by being more generically designated as environmental catastrophes, like the recent and still ongoingly problematic Fukushima – we may ask what radio, even given the ‘spookiness’ Anders foregrounds about it in his ‘Spuk und Radio’, might have to do with violence?

Even citing, as I do elsewhere, Steve Goodman’s Sonic Warfare, to explain some of the points Anders makes regarding music on the radio or as a television broadcast, music as such seems, qua entertainment and even with the on-demand appellation that covers over the necessity of exposing oneself in the undertaking not merely to sound but all kinds of other ambient radiation, to be the pure antithesis of violence. Goodman himself, echoing Kittler, prefaces his book with a quote from Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now, referring to Wagner’s Ride of the Valkyries, which Goodman, a Scots philosopher and performance artist (under the name ‘kode9’), attributes to one ‘General Kilgore’, actually: Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore: ‘We’ll come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out, we’ll put on the music’.
That was Vietnam, Hollywood style. The reality today, as Goodman handily demonstrates, is far more pernicious, ongoing, ubiquitous (this last was seemingly Adorno’s favourite word when it came to the culture industry and it has never been more apt). For Anders writing on radio in 1930, what is ‘spooky’, uncanny, especially for auditory perception, is hearing the same music from every window, with fading echoes following us and, potentially, greeting us as we pass every door in an apartment building corridor.26 Anders’ point is that we hear the radio broadcast in immediate proximity against the acoustic background of now more distant music. This is, and this is the ghostly cascade, the same music. Theodor Adorno arguably borrows the uncanny echo, if without attribution, in his Current of Music.27 And a year after Anders’ ‘Spuk und Radio’, the role of loudspeakers in Huxley’s 1931 Brave New World recurs, only to play the same part in Orwell’s 1949 novel, 1984.28 It makes all the difference in the political sphere that loudspeakers as such were specifically developed for party rallies.29 This presence (whether proximate or distant) entrains and captivates us in our commercial jingles on television—and increasingly on Facebook now via video ads—, priming or triggering our thinking (our ‘brains’) in response to our attention to radio programmes, television programmes, all the way to YouTube playlists and streaming media, all programmed.

The social manipulation of Facebook in the recent US presidential election (and of course such ‘social engineering’ ought to be considered along with direct hacking, not necessarily via the meme du jour of Russian interference but as part of ordinary party politics)30 is the latest manifestation of what Anders describes with the model of spoon- or force-feeding, contending that we do this to ourselves when we watch television, to use his 1956 example (or, updated for today, when we ‘go on line’ or use our cell phones for texting, or via GPS for finding our way around town): the technology is inherently political.31 We mention such things and may think about filter bubbles, data mining, privacy concerns, but Anders was concerned about what followed for the conditions for the possibility of democracy. For Anders, if ‘democracy supposedly consists in that one disposes over the right to express an opinion of one’s own, then democracy is rendered impossible through mass media’.32

Anders’ point is not about what one takes to be one’s opinion one way or the other but whether one is free to form such an opinion in the first place. As Anders wrote in 1978: ‘our opinions and worldviews are coined; these are supplied to us — in short, “my opinion” is not “my” opinion, “our” opinion is not “ours.”’ For Anders, who wrote a phenomenological study of ‘having’ in 1930s, ‘having’ is what we no longer ‘have.’ Almost half a century later, Anders reflects that our opinions are not our own, observing that if this is pointed out to us it makes no difference to us. Consider the Trump White House: manipulations are constantly revealed, and constantly tolerated. As Anders had earlier explained, referring to the cold war, ‘the producers of our opinions need not fear the demasking of the fact that they are the producers of our opinions’.33 Anders’ reflections on framing an opinion and on the possibility of having a democratic voice grows out of his reflections on media. As he emphasized, this anti-democratic character is endemic to technologico-digital media: ‘Media’s reproductive technique not only does not have a democratizing but, to the contrary, a de-democratizing, atomizing effect.’34 Like the unconscious, publicity works in one direction as public opinion research since
the early 1920s has underscored. Thus repetition, as Adorno argued on behalf of the Office of Wartime Information in World War II, beginning with his work on the Princeton Radio Project in 1937, entails that there need be no risk of a democratic hit parade when it comes to music – or politics.35 It is being played on the radio, as any professional musician will tell you, that makes a hit a hit. And news, as the current dismaying debates on ‘fake news’ would also underscore, is news because it is broadcast as such. The desire to certify some news as ‘true’ not only leads directly to censorship but betrays a dangerous nostalgia for a monopoly (Anders calls this ‘totalitarian’) on what is permitted to be regarded as ‘true’ and what must be named a ‘lie.’

Here the Trump White House shows, if it shows anything, that the president of the United States can lie with impunity. For Anders this is a result of what he regarded as pragmatism. As Anders explains, this is a corollary of pragmatic ideology: only what ‘cannot be used is non-true. This phrase belongs not only to the axiomatic arsenal of Anglo-Saxon pragmatism, but also to the praxis of the totalitarian regime of the economy.’36 Nietzsche reflected on the cooption of words in On the Genealogy of Morals when he explains that the slavey moraline ascendance of reactive thinking effects a revaluation of values simply by changing what things are called.

At issue here is not a matter of slavey moraline character or predisposition, good or evil. Much rather, it is what Anders named media’s reproductive technique, i.e., the architecture of modern media that, as Baudrillard argues, ‘always prevents response’.37 These media forms, television, Facebook, Twitter, and so on, constitute, for Baudrillard, an address we give ourselves over to without the possibility of (real) response and so we post on our Facebook walls and tweet into the void, while being exposed to the assaults of the same, augmented by television, cable and network, radio and Internet feeds.38 And as Anders writes in 1979, there is nowhere that we are apart from media today:

….in the age of electronic media there is no longer any place where one cannot be informed/dis-informed [informiert bzw. desinformiert], or, more accurately, where one may escape the obligation to be informed/dis-informed, therefore no provinces – there are also no places where one’s ears are not filled with idle chatter concerning the “loss of meaning” by vulgar philosophers, psychoanalysts, and radio preachers, or “automatic consolation tapes,” selected via telephone at one’s individual option.39

Programmed to receive speech to which, as Baudrillard reflects, one cannot actually or genuinely respond but to which Baudrillardian ‘Speech-without-response’ one is nonetheless bound, beginning with radio and television sets in the living room, but now on every media platform, 24/7, we are ‘primed’ to look for this stimulus-(non)response at every waking moment, thus Internet psychologists, above I mentioned MIT’s Sherry Turkle, study the phenomenon, along with what I call Facebook ‘autism’.40 For Anders, who already anticipated this, we are at work at every moment in the creation of ourselves in the image of mass media, now named social media.

Contra Anders, contra Baudrillard, et al., we do suppose ourselves free to respond to someone on Facebook (or Twitter). We post a reply, we countertweet, but quantitative measures and competing claims mean that, mostly, all we really ‘do’ is hit the like button, letting the sender (and Facebook/Twitter) know that we have seen and received
the message.\footnote{41} Sometimes we can augment the same event with our own repetition: reposting or retweeting or posting a ‘reply’, perhaps alongside ‘replies’ already written, engendering any range of possibilities for miscommunication, what Baudrillard presciently named a \textit{simulacrum} of a conversation. The result never yields speech-plus-response if only because speech \textit{with} response presupposes communicative exchange (not \textit{action} as Habermas one-sidedly insists), including everything that constitutes what Gadamer calls \textit{conversation}. Conversation, as Gadamer emphasized, and which in a surprising coincidence Ivan Illich also argued, is an emergent property of the spirit resistant to formalization (and every kind of institutionalization, as Illich insisted in a passage that confounded his interlocutors).\footnote{42}

\textit{‘Seit ein Gespräch wir sind’}.\footnote{43} Hölderlin, in his poem \textit{Friedensfeier}, names human beings a ‘conversation’. By this the poet (obviously) is not talking about the capacity to ‘like’ or to ‘reply’ on Facebook or retweet a tweet or even the ordinary kinds of exchange. Hölderlin emphasizes ‘\textit{hören von einander}’, key to the phrase that concludes the verse: ‘\textit{bald sind wir aber Gesang}’.\footnote{44} And here, and this underscores a connection with Heidegger, Anders foregrounds the echoing capacity on our phenomenological, hermeneutic part, to be attuned to one another, arguing that what is at stake is precisely what Kant called \textit{Mündigkeit}, the ability to speak in our own mouths, with our own voices, \textit{for our own part}. The media today entail however, as Anders has it, that ‘\textit{Der Mensch ist kein “mündiges” Wesen mehr}’. In other words:

\begin{quote}

The human being is no longer an entity capable of speech, such that he might express his own opinion with his own mouth.\footnote{45}
\end{quote}

Anders is concerned precisely with, and this is a technological dictate, the ‘unilaterality’ of broadcast and social media. Driven by media, collimating our senses, we are ‘eye people’, we are ‘ear people’, and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (\textit{On Redemption}), already predicts a human being who had become only a giant ear. Anders uses the (appalling) phrase ‘\textit{Genudelte Gänse}’, emphasizing that in all the years he lived in the United States he himself had never been free, just as he never met anyone who was free for and on their own part to express his or her own opinion. Anders insisted on this and elements of this insight dominate both volumes of \textit{The Antiquatedness of the Human}.

We are thereby constrained by the social media we use (notice that saying \textit{social} media makes the claim easier than saying radio or television as in the case of Heidegger or Anders) to create ourselves in the image and likeness of the media. But there is no extern’s tyranny in this constraint. This is curated self-creation of the self in the exact image that social media would have us make of ourselves, which, as Anders emphasizes, we do willingly. ‘Soft totalitarianism likes nothing better than allowing its victims to have the illusion of autonomy or even instilling them with this illusion’.\footnote{46} As Anders explains, what is expropriated from the average American, as he writes in accord with Kant, is what had previously been, in the sense in which Rousseau speaks of this (and later, along with Derrida and Heidegger), most \textit{properly} his own: him- or herself. Social
media as we speak of it is thus quite specific. No property is taken from us, no part of the relations of capital are put in question. Much rather:

The “only” thing that must be taken from him is his “uniqueness” [“Eigentümlichkeit”], his personality, his individuality and his privacy: only himself. Unlike ordinary socialization, which involves what the person has, here we are “only” dealing with a socialization of what the human being is.47

What is characteristic of the modern age is that it is of our own free will that we appropriate the task of creating ourselves as ‘the masses’ thereby rendering the notion of ‘the masses’ obsolete. In particular, what is crucial for Anders’ analysis is akin to his sobriquet, ‘America uses psychoanalysis for the purpose of establishing conformism’.48 We think of ourselves as unique, as individuals, and certainly not as workers much less as the proletariat. Anders’ point is Benjaminian, we create ourselves as human beings in the digital era of technical reproducibility, repeatedly consuming mass products.49 In the age of digital media, the ‘massifying’ products we consume are digitally conveyed, and thus we are attached to our phones, oblivious to – how, we might ask, could this possibly matter to us? – the effects of omnipresent radiation.

Baudrillard makes the point that ‘power belongs to the one who can give and cannot be repaid’.50 Thus he argues, ‘the revolution everywhere: the revolution tout court – lies in restoring this possibility of response’.51 To do this, however, would presuppose a complete transformation of the media. For Baudrillard, ‘All vague impulses to democratize content, subvert it, restore the “transparency of the code,” control the information process, contrive a reversibility of circuits, or take power over media are hopeless – unless the monopoly of speech is broken; and one cannot break the monopoly of speech if one’s goal is simply to distribute it equally to everyone.’ This Baudrillardian suggestion presupposes Gadamerian, hermeneutic conversation, face to face: we need Hölderlin’s ‘hearing from one another’, and it is this that cannot countenance media, digital and the like, as conversation elementally escapes transmission, storing, liking, sharing, retweeting. Baudrillard invokes such a Gadamerian conversation when he writes that ‘Speech must be able to exchange, give, and repay itself as is occasionally the case with looks and smiles’. For Baudrillard, ‘It cannot simply be interrupted, congealed, stockpiled, and redistributed in some corner of the social process’.52 Arguably, Anders is even less compromising than Baudrillard, naming citizens today as so many ‘cosmic parvenus, usurpers of the apocalypse’, contending, this is the dark side of his language in his open letter to Eichmann’s son, *We Sons of Eichmann*, that we have our excuse at the ready, in our non-action owing to the impermissibility, the illegality of any counter-action: *It’s against the law*. Thus Occupy Wall Street was put down in New York City, way back in 2012, in good, fascist fashion by ‘locking up’ (it will do to remember the language Trump used to trump Clinton) as ‘terrorists’, as the Occupy Wall Street protesters were designated. Protestors today are on the front lines of a battle: they can be teargassed, shot to death, bulldozed with impunity. And if arrested in the US, they face felony charges.

To this day, violence *can* only be deployed by those in power. In the past, that might have been ‘the masses,’ but as Anders reminds us, ‘the masses’ are obsolete. The
violence of violence is that once set in motion, once deployed, it constrains all acts that follow. Someone rebukes you, recall Epictetus on responding to insults, let it trouble you and by simply being troubled you remain enthralled by your abuser.

Like the gas chambers in Auschwitz, like the bomb deployed in Hiroshima, Anders argued that nuclear power plants constitute a similar insult, an ongoing factive and invisible circumstance of constant danger to the earth and everything on it. Thus Anders spoke of ‘globicide’.  
And in the face of such an extreme, global danger, he argued that the stakes increasingly constituted an emergency situation, necessitating counteraction, Notstand und Notwehr.

Anders emphasizes this trajectory in his first writings on the bomb: ‘Über die Bombe und die Wurzeln unserer Apokalypse Blindheit’. In an excerpt in English published at the same time, Anders began by adverting to the consequences of our displacement of ourselves in place of God – an argument that begins in Nietzsche and can be tracked in Heidegger and Sartre. The argument Anders makes is the Aeschylean, Promethean argument:

Creatio ex nihilo, which was once the mark of omnipotence, has been supplanted by its opposite, potestas annihilationis or reductio ad nihil: and this power to destroy, to reduce to nothingness, lies in our own hands. The Promethean Dream of omnipotence has at long last come true, though in an unexpected form. Since we are in a position to inflict absolute destruction on each other we have apocalyptic powers. It is we who are the infinite.

But if we are the infinite in this sense, if we play with omnipotence in this sense, we are not omniscient. We lack self-knowledge and we lack knowledge in general. We have to this extent made no progress since leaving the mythical garden of Genesis. If ‘we are the first Titans, we are also the first dwarfs or pygmies...’ Thus Anders can characterize our problem with emergency thought, the thinking of exceptionality, as apocalypse-blindness. In the midst of disaster, we do not see where we are nor indeed how we are. Lacan in another context speaks of this as the Real.

We might characterize this nescience as a new ‘Fat Man’, to use the military code name for the bomb dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, a kind of ultimate ‘trolley problem’, as analytic philosophers are fond of calculating ethical consequences. Anders argues that a constant state of vigilance, as we describe nuclear preparedness, corresponds to a constant state of violence. For, even if we manage not to see it, ‘the devil has moved into a new apartment’. Thus for Anders’ and even as we do not like to be lumped in together, the point of this ‘new apartment,’ the annihilation of thousands, perhaps tens and hundreds of thousands, that is our complacency with nuclear preparedness, nuclear energy, today we may add (it is the invisibility of the attack that matters), geoengineering and drone attacks at a distance – and Sloterdijk emphasizes the continuity of both geoengineering and drone attacks and the history of bomb warfare from the first world war to the nuclear climax of the second – entails that all of us must be counted as so many new ‘sons of Eichmann’, implicated by nothing other than our inaction, even if we name that non-action non-violence, peaceful resistance. All of us are complicit in a planned crime against humanity and not less against all other living beings, all plants and animals and even the earth itself, that same Gaia having already been blown to bits on a
regular basis by atomic testing in deserts, Pacific islands, and oceans, earth and sea and air contaminated already for millennia to come. In the face of the violence of violence/non-violence, our complicity not only gives consent but perpetrates violence. There is no non-violent action.  

Conclusion: In defence of violence

Anders was uncompromising in his conviction that the problem was not the inferiority of Russian versus West European ideology much less versus American know-how or technology. He insisted much rather that ‘Hiroshima is everywhere,’ hence Chernobyl attested to a ‘plague.’ Today, this is how radiation works, Chernobyl continues to be everywhere. Underlining the near and present danger of globicide by specifically reflecting on ‘incidents’ at nuclear power plants, in as much as the media suppresses such incidents by failing to mention them or else under-reporting them, Anders goes on to say: ‘Although I am very often regarded as a pacifist, I have in the interim come to the conclusion that nothing more can be attained by nonviolence’. As we have seen, owing to its already coopted quality: ‘Renunciation of action does not suffice as action’. Thus the proportionate challenges of emergency, Notstand, and the need in such circumstances to defend oneself by any means possible, Notwehr.

The under-reporting of the media is more than a problem of so-called ‘fake news’. For the problem of the media is that it fashions opinion as Plato argued but calculatedly so since the end of the World War I when Bernays published his Crystalizing Public Opinion, a project driving the coordination of industry, media, government and (especially) military interests. Thus as David Bertolotti argues in his chapter on the bomb in Culture and Technology, US media censorship advanced national interests during World War II, with nary a sense of this censorship, and this censorship, quite official, quite successful, remains unquestioned to this day. Significantly, and this bears on the official narrative contra engineering and scientific assessments of 9/11 or today’s chemtrails, Bertolotti recounts media efforts to resist or tweak eye witness perceptions in August 1945, ‘spinning’ the sunset itself. Thus, even in the plain talking Midwest:

Chicago readers had to be assured that an exceptionally dramatic sunset in the west had no relation to the atomic bombing. Said a meteorological forecaster: “Any time you get smoke and moisture in the western sky you have a red sunset”.

Baudrillard’s political analysis of media as ‘Speech without response’ turns out to be an effective way to, as it were, and in the lines of The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, print the ‘legend’ in place of the fact. Nevertheless (and the point is dramatised in John Ford’s film), the problem is the violence of violence. Violence does not leave one the choice of non-violence in response. The Stoic counsel of ataraxia reminds one that one can be bodily bound but still keep one’s spirit, if only one might assume that one is able to recognize what is and is not up to us. But the engine of technology has its way with whatever is set in motion. For this reason, the poet Aeschylus reminds us that: by the sword you did your work, and by the sword you die (Agamemnon, line 1558). And we read too, as we may prefer, the Gospel, to cite the King James version: ‘Then said Jesus
unto him: Put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword’ (Matthew 26:52).

Jesus, who said, we are told, ‘I am the life’, encourages non-violence – for the sake of life. Anders reminds us that the path of non-violence is not a path of resistance. As Prometheus speaks: ‘Craft is far weaker than necessity’ (Prometheus Bound, line 512). Thus, and a comparison with Prometheus is apt, at the moment of violence incited by the High Priest, the bodily seizure of Jesus by the guards who would bring him to Pontius Pilate, before torturing him to death – the same torture common among Romans at the time, highly effective for ‘encouraging the others’, as then supposed and later, as wreaked upon the British to compel them to leave Palestine (the so-called ‘Seargent’s affair’) – Jesus responds to one of his followers who sprung to his defence to sheath his sword and allow the violence about to transpire to transpire. This practical syllogism entails the crucifixion.

Let me be clear, Anders, a perfectly good Jew, is not invoking Jesus Christ, another perfectly good Jew, as we recall Jacob Taubes’ ‘nice guy’ encomium. Anders underlines that non-violence offers no defence against violence. The non-resistance in the Garden of Gethsemane so little defends that it is central to the myth of redemption that is surrender or sacrifice: yielding Jesus bodily, to be carried off to a vapid conversation with the man in power (about truth), to a sentence to death issued by Herod Antipas, the hereditary governor tolerated by the Romans, and then, one after another – this is the necessity that cannot be outgone as Prometheus who foresees all, himself laments – to whipping, piercing with thorns, the labour of complicity, himself carrying the means of his own death, including three falls, and, finally, as the antecedents are crucial to the quick fatality of the last, crucifixion.

Anders’ reservations concern the cooption of the impotent and to this extent he indicts as culpable those who recommend in such extreme circumstance a form of resistance that can only be ineffective. Does one think, he asks Bissinger in Gewalt – Ja oder Nein?, that anyone with power cares in the slightest about the little meal one does or does not eat? The only thing done by a hunger strike is to suggest to you, the self-starving one, that you are doing something, which you are doing to yourself. This is the great achievement of the ascetic, as Nietzsche points out. One takes what one does not do, not eating in the case of a hunger strike, turning the other cheek in the case of non-violence, as if it were action.

If Anders was critical of the ‘happenings’ of the 60s, it was because unlike those who were young in the 60s, Anders, himself in his 60s saw non-violent actions, sit-ins, handing bouquets of forget-me-nots to soldiers, as bits of ‘theatre’, to which, like fascism, he said, they were related. Beyond the ready-to-hand illustration that captured Heidegger’s readers in 1927, of a broken or missing hammer, Anders recalled the violent, and just because monstrous, virtual invisibility of what had struck him some 10 years earlier, at the age of 15 on his way home after World War I, after being deployed to a student staging post in France:

On my way back, at a train station, maybe it was in Liege, I saw a line of men, who strangely seemed as if they began at the hip. These were soldiers who had been set on the platform on
their stumps, leaning them against the wall. Thus they waited for the train that would take
them home.\textsuperscript{70}

This is the all-too-real work of the sword in our day.
I close here, as I think it still timely, still a matter of our apocalypse-blindness, with
Anders: ‘Today, the real danger consists in the invisibility of the danger’.\textsuperscript{71}

Notes
1. I mention Christian Dries, for example, as this is his point of departure in Dries, “Technischer
Totalitarismus: Macht, Herrschaft und Gewalt bei Günther Anders,” \textit{Etica \& Politica/Ethics \\
& Politics: Rivista di Filosofia/A Review of Philosophy} 15, no. 2 (2013): 175–98, but other
specialists have similarly found it difficult to read Anders on the issue of power. Thus Konrad
Paul Liessmann reads Anders in correspondence with Arendt who is thereby the interlocutor
for thinking power. See Liessmann’s, “Thought after Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Günther
Space of Time, and Apocalyptic Blindness: On Günther Anders’ \textit{Endzeit–Endtime},” \textit{Etica \\
74, as well as, in the same issue, Edouard Jolly, “Entre légite de défense et état d’urgence. La
pensée andersienne de l’agir politique contre la puissance nucléaire” in addition to Vallori
Rasini, “Il potere della violenza. Su alcune riflessioni di Günther Anders.” A recent exception,
who has for many years been writing about Anders is Jason Dawsey, “Ontology and Ideology:
Günther Anders’s Philosophical and Political Confrontation with Heidegger,” \textit{Critical His-

2. Thus George Kateb writes about technology but his themes are broader than the purpose of
offering a critique or seeing technology as such as itself political. John McCormick writes in
the same broader spirit, with his \textit{Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as
Technology} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) such that technology can seem
an adjunct to the argument. By contrast, and he has been less received than perhaps he should
have been, Langdon Winner’s \textit{The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of
High Technology} Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) as well as the even less
received Gilbert G. Germain, \textit{A Discourse on Disenchantment: Reflections on Politics and
3. Christian Fuchs, “Günther Anders’ Undiscovered Critical Theory of Technology in the Age of
4. See here Reinhard Ellensohn, \textit{Der andere Anders: Günther Anders als Musikphilosoph} (Bern:
Peter Lang, 2008) and elsewhere I note that the musicologist F. Joseph Smith had for years
sought to draw attention to Anders’ work only to be rebuffed (and ultimately silenced to
inattention by those interested in acoustic phenomenology) by Don Ihde.
5. And most of us could not agree more, ready as we are for the post-human, the transhuman, as
in Steve Fuller’s \textit{Humanity 2.0}, referring to the quantitative meme that dominates our sense of
contemporary culture, ‘the next generation’, waiting for our own upgrades, as we are primed
to wait for the next-generation consumable, like an iPhone.
6. See Christopher John Müller’s, \textit{Prometheanism: Technology, Digital Culture and Human
Obsolescence} (Lanham: Rowman \& Littlefield, 2016).


10. We academics tend to limit our writing and our reading to only a few received names.


27. See references and further discussion, Babich, “Adorno’s Radio Phenomenology,” 2014.


30. The reference here has been the subject of a 2006 HBO documentary, *Hacking Democracy*, showing the discovery of a citizen researcher, Bev Harris not regarding the Trump election but, dating back to the famously disputed election-fixing with Gore and Bush, showing that, rather than ‘hanging chads,’ given digital technology, any election at all can be hacked without anyone being able to detect the hack one way or the other. https://www.youtube.com/watch?
The more recent discussions of the new kinds of social media ‘hacking’ correspond to those kinds of social digital engineering that happen to be discussed but which hardly means that that we are conscious of such manipulation or that we know its extent. The manipulation of public opinion Adorno and Horkheimer named the ‘culture industry’ and called ‘programming’. Thus such discussions go back to the beginnings of broadcast technology as the control of public opinion, cf. for a conventional discussion, Noam Chomsky, *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008) or, still more neutrally, what we call ‘public relations’ or ‘spin’ in Adam Curtis’ 2002 BBC documentary *The Century of the Self*.


36. Ibid., 191. This means that, like the notions of good and evil, as Nietzsche had already argued, truth and lie are fluid concepts, with political—in Anders’ sense ‘pragmatic’—rather than epistemological value.

37. Baudrillard, “Requiem for the Media,” 170. As Baudrillard argues, the media thus make ‘all processes of exchange impossible (except in the various forms of response simulation, themselves integrated in the transmission process, thus leaving the unilateral nature of the communication intact). This is the real abstraction of the media. And the system of social control and power is rooted in it’ (Baudrillard, “Requiem for the Media,” 169).


41. Indeed, this is the repost, one can even share the post on one’s own page – a kind of a super ‘like’ (similar to a retweet).


44. In a related hymn, *Versöhnender, der du nimmergeglaubt*, we read: “Ein Chor nun sind wir. Drum soll alles Himmlische was genannt war, / Eine Zahl geschlossen, heilig, ausgehn rein aus unserem Munde. / Denn sieh! es ist der Abend der Zeit, / Die Stunde wo die Wanderer lenken zu der Ruhstatt. / Es kehrt bald Ein Gott um den anderen ein.” Friedrich Hölderlin,
49. This is the subject of Anders 1956 *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* (vol. I) but no less thematized as our consumption of mass media in Anders’ interview with Manfred Bissinger, already cited above: *Gewalt – Ja oder Nein?*, Anders who wrote a philosophical reflection on ‘having’ contends that the fact that you appropriate something not yours as yours, does not make it yours. The point (and this is why one must take Anders’ distancing of himself from Heidegger, who wrote on being, with more than just a grain of salt) is a matter of *Eigentlichkeit*.
58. In a footnote to the second volume of *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen*, we read the following reflection echoing the industrial production of corpses that was for Heidegger characteristic of modern agribusiness, in Anders’ voice, a reflection on violence: “‘Only a half hour a day’, we read in *Der Spiegel* from 21 November 1977, ‘is all it takes a farmer named Groth, who annually raises two thousand pigs for slaughter every year (total value: 700,000 marks) in his stalls (worth 280,000 marks). The gates have to be opened and closed. Everything else works by itself . . . Thus, in one hour he can bring eighty cows to their milking places in ten enclosures, easily and without any effort . . . Then, Groth can go hunting.’ By the way: note that the time Herr Groth does not need for preparing his herds for slaughter, he dedicates to killing other kinds of animals.’ *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen*, vol. 2, 438.
61. See also, in addition to Fukushima already mentioned, the challenges of nuclear waste in Pilkey-Jarvis, “Yuca Mountain,” 2007.
65. ‘There were also times before the attack when the secret of the atomic bomb was in jeopardy, and in danger of being uncovered. In one instance, a reporter from the *El Paso (Texas) Herald* investigated reports of a huge explosion on July 16, 1945 – the date of the test bombing. The official report stated that an underground ammunition dump had accidentally exploded. Such a
mundane story was too bland for this enterprising reporter who went on to embellish his account with exaggerations of “the greatest fireworks show” which “illuminated whole mountain chains.” (Apparently, Japanese spies did not read the El Paso Herald – circulation 27,046). Another near disclosure occurred when reporters asked what was being built in Oak Ridge, Tennessee in October of 1944. The response was that “35,000 workers are making Roosevelt campaign buttons.” Even comic strips were censored to insure that the slightest hint of disclosure would not occur. In an April 14, 1945 Superman comic strip, Superman was to be bombarded by a 3,000,000 volt charge generated by a cyclotron: “Even Superman can’t take it.” Superman had been warned. David S. Bertolotti, “The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima,” in Bertolotti, Culture and Technology (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Press, 1984), 81–112, here 106. As Bertolotti adds, the comic book was told to cease and desist, and desist it did. As Bertolotti cites, the Newsweek article, “The Superman Way”: ‘Superman could take it, and did. What he couldn’t take was the office of censorship which asked McClure Newspaper Syndicate to discontinue references to atomic energy. A new series of strips, then in production, was cancelled, and Superman went into a sequence in which he played a baseball game single-handed,’ Newsweek, August 20, 1945.


Anders, “Ten Theses on Chernobyl,” Sixth World Congress of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in 1986, accessed March 8, 2018, https://libcom.org/library/ten-theses-chernobyl-%E2%80%93-g%C3%Bcnther-anders. An earlier version of this essay was presented as a lecture at the gracious invitation of Michaela Latini and Alessandra Sanella in Cassino, Italy, 24 November, 2016. I thank the conference participants as well as the journal’s reviewers for helpful comments.