FORDHAM UNIVERSITY
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

April 15, 1957

This dissertation prepared under my direction by

Gerard C. Farley

entitled The Pragmatic Element in the Philosophy of

Royce

has been accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts

Fr. Clarke, S.J.
(Faculty Adviser)
THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN THE

PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE

BY

GERARD C. FARLEY
B.A., College of the City of New York, '54

DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK
1957
THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PRAGMATISM AND RADICAL EMPIRICISM IN THE THOUGHT OF WILLIAM JAMES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE BEARING OF JAMES' THOUGHT ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE TRANSITION IN ROYCE'S PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Pragmatism in its many forms has played a very important role in modern American philosophy. Proponents of pragmatism in some form or other are to be found in the philosophical chairs of most American secular universities. Its catchphrases and clinchés have become part of the working vocabulary of most educated people.

One of the most remarkable things about all the leading pragmatists is their acknowledgements of debt to one another. Both James and Dewey admitted their deep indebtedness to Peirce and, as a result of what he considered their distortions, Peirce was forced to make some of his leading ideas clearer.

Early in our own study of pragmatism, we became interested in the relationship of James' thought to the thought of C. S. Peirce. As our study progressed we came into contact with the works of Josiah Royce, who, it seemed, made some of the most acute insights into the nature of pragmatism. Our readings in Royce appeared to show that Royce was at one time an adherent of Jamesian pragmatism and that, as a result of different interpretations of the implications of this pragmatism, a very important development ensued in the thought of
both Royce and James. In the case of James, the result was "radical empiricism", a system of thought very akin to and perhaps the progenitor of Dewey's instrumentalism. In the case of Royce, the result was the establishment of an entirely new epistemology whose premises were radically opposed to the premises of his earlier theory of knowledge and were based mainly on ideas derived from his studies of Peirce's philosophy.

When we had completed the reading of the primary sources and had turned to the historians of American philosophy and the chief commentators on Royce's thought, we were amazed by the lack of accord among them as to the nature of Royce's philosophy and as to whether or not a transition had ever taken place in it. For example, Gabriel Marcel in his La métaphysique de Royce tells us that he does not consider Royce to be a pragmatist at all.

It goes without saying that this theory, which is directly connected with the post-Kantian philosophy, has no pragmatic elements at all: It consists solely in considering the volitional dynamism involved in any idea as the condition for the possibility of any truth whatsoever. ¹

¹ Paris, Aubier 1945, p. 48. The above is our translation of the French text which reads: "Il est bien entendu que cette théorie qui se rattache directement à la philosophie postkantienne n'a rien de pragmatiste: elle consiste seulement à regarder le dynamisme volitionnel qui est impliqué dans toute idée comme la condition de possibilité de toute vérité quelle qu'elle soit."
Yet we have statements from Royce that in the early days of his life he was a follower of James and in the introduction to The Problem of Christianity he refers to himself as an absolute pragmatist. Frederick Mayer in his History of American Thought views Royce's thought as one organic whole. He describes Royce's system as though it were static, each successive work representing a different emphasis or a different aspect of the system. Joseph Blau, on the other hand, sees the later development of Royce's thought as constituting a radical change. Richard Hocking, in an article in the Review of Metaphysics wherein he evaluates the current works on Royce, takes strong exception to the view that there was a radical change in Royce's later thought.

To what extent does Royce's final doctrine of the community of interpretation represent a departure from the principles of his earlier thought? One is tempted to sharpen the contrast between the earlier Royce of the totem simul and the later Royce of the progressively realized community of interpretation, with the consequence that this question becomes unavoidable. Mr. Smith refers to the "all-important change" in his conception of the Absolute (p. 13 cf. also

To be sure, this shift of emphasis in the course of his development should be in one's mind. But one may question whether it should be taken as suggesting discrepant or incompatible phases of thought in the life of one thinker. The record of Royce's writing shows a sustained struggle toward ampler treatment of his own original problems. And among the original problems those of process and time stand out as peculiarly insistent, whether treated in terms of the idea of the totum simul or of the community of interpretation. If one is going to maintain that the later doctrine displaces the earlier one rather than amplyfying /sig/ it what must be shown is that the idea of a community of interpretation which is infinite, in the sense of possessing no temporally last number rules out the idea of an actual perfect apprehension of the whole community at once.  

Harry Cotton concurs with Hocking's opinion that at different periods different aspects of Royce's system received more thoroughgoing treatment, but that the basic principles were the same. Finally, Schneider, in his History of American Thought, claims that a radical change did take place.

But at this point Charles Peirce took pity on Royce and gave him a piece of advice that transformed his philosophy radically. Peirce said in effect: Royce, why don't you study mathematical logic? It would clarify your problem and tighten your philosophic system. Royce took the advice and discovered just what he needed: the mathematical idea of an infinite series and the idea of the community of interpretation. On the basis of these ideas he reworked his entire system. ... By shifting the problem of knowledge from the dyadic relations of epistemology to the triadic relations of interpretation, Royce

---

achieved a fresh and important reconstruction of idealistic philosophy... He took over bodily Peirce's doctrine of the infinite community of scientists engaged in the co-operative pursuit of ultimate truth and transformed it into a metaphysics.¹

The main purpose of this thesis will be to show in precisely what way Royce was an adherent of Jamesian pragmatism and how, as a result of their different conclusions regarding the implications of this pragmatism, vital developments in the thought of both men took place. We shall try to show how James' conclusions regarding the nature of pragmatism, namely, "radical empiricism", formed a threat to Royce's idealism as it was then constituted. We shall then attempt to show how Royce met this threat by radically revising the epistemology at the base of his idealism with the aid of ideas derived from Peirce's philosophy. We hope that this study, based on the original sources, will prove of value in settling the forementioned controversy among the authorities.

With this undertaking in mind, we have devoted the first chapter of the thesis to an exposition of James' pragmatism. The second chapter deals with the influence of these ideas on the thought of Royce and the crisis which different interpretations of the implications of these ideas brought about in the thought of each of these men. The third chapter attempts to trace the

steps that Royce took to meet this crisis and discusses the degree of success that he had. The criterion of evaluation in this discussion will be his original aims. Finally, in conclusion, I discuss the factors which any radical change in a system seems to imply.
CHAPTER II

PRAGMATISM AND RADICAL EMPIRICISM IN THE THOUGHT OF WILLIAM JAMES

The two basic doctrines which run through James' thought are pragmatism and "radical empiricism". Pragmatism is basically a method or philosophic attitude which permits many views as to the ultimate nature of reality. "Radical empiricism" on the other hand is a distinct world-view which attacks rationalism and constitutes a development of British empiricism. Despite several remarks made by James to the effect that radical empiricism is completely independent of pragmatism and that there is no logical connection between the two, it is our conviction that its explicit formulation in his later works, Some Problems of Philosophy, came as an attempt to resolve certain difficulties which pragmatism, considered as such, entailed. The first step in this chapter, therefore, is to elucidate pragmatism as we believe James understood it and to bring the aforementioned difficulties to the surface as we go along.

Pragmatism has taken on so many meanings in its history that, if confusion is to be avoided, great care must be taken to specify exactly what is here meant by

it. William James credits Peirce as being the first one to use the term. The meaning of pragmatism as Peirce first expounded it, in an article written in 1878 entitled, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", was that it was a method for ascertaining the meaning of a conception in terms of its concrete results.

...the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name.

James proceeded to use this method, as we shall point out in detail later on, in a way which was not at all pleasing to Peirce. James used it as a means of justifying hypotheses whose "workability" could only be privately verified. Options such as the belief in a moral order in the universe, or the belief that there is a spiritual reality underlying the material world, can, James maintained, be neither scientifically proved nor disproved. Nevertheless, any opinion concerning these options, including the opinion to remain undecided, will have an

1. Pragmatism, pp. 45-46.
effect upon the life of an individual. In view of this fact, the individual has an intellectual right to choose that opinion which he thinks will have the best consequences for him. The criterion of truth for such options is: What "cash value" does this postulate have in helping me to come to terms with the universe? This interpretation of Peirce's formula was undoubtedly due to the influence of Renouvier. A strict empiricism abandons the hope of absolute certainty since all beliefs, it must hold, are subject to modification in the event of future experiences which may contradict them. Since reason can never assure belief, one can only assume a belief by an act of the will. The only justification for such an act is moral. Belief arises from subjective motives and if these motives are legitimate, then belief is justified. Perry expresses this in the following words:

Broadly speaking, we may say that where experience and logic are not decisive, and where there is at the same time a practical need of belief, there belief may and should be dictated by moral and religious considerations. As a matter of fact, says Renouvier, followed by James, all of the great philosophical systems are expressions of the temperaments and inclinations of their authors, however much they profess to submit only the irresistible proof.

1. This is a highly abridged version of the argument contained in James' *Will to Believe*, New York, Longmans, 1897.
Some of James' critics interpreted "cash value" to mean "organic survival with the greatest quantity of personal satisfaction." James, however, was not advocating such a hedonistic naturalism. It was the individual who was to determine what his needs were. Many individuals have strong needs which would be opposed to a hedonistic naturalism. According to Royce, James felt that an openness to experience would reveal needs that a smug naturalist would never have dreamed of.

For my own part, I have ventured to say elsewhere that the new doctrine, viewed in one aspect, seems to leave religion in the comparatively trivial position of a play with whimsical powers—a prey to endless psychological caprices. But James' own robust faith was that the very caprices of the spirit are the opportunity for the building up of the highest forms of the spiritual life; that the unconventional and the individual in religious experience are the means whereby the truth of a superhuman world may become most manifest... You can only win your way on the frontier in case you are willing to live there. Be, therefore, concrete, be fearless, be experimental. But, above all, let not your abstract conceptions, even if you call them scientific conceptions, pretend to set any limits to the richness of spiritual grace, to the glories of spiritual possession, that, in case you are duly favored, your personal experience may reveal to you. James reckons that the tribulations with which abstract scientific theories have beset our present age are not to be compared with the glory that perchance shall be, if only we open our eyes to what experience itself has to reveal to us.

To say that survival or pleasure is the only factor in James' pragmatism is to limit it unduly. Habits, propensities and ethical needs may have as much influence in volitional activity as pleasure. Our postulations concerning God, the nature of the universe, and our fellow human beings arise from our individual experiences. But to maintain that the narrowness of our subjective states excludes realms of truth beyond them would be absurd. The result of this interpretation of the pragmatic principle is that hypotheses which, considered theoretically, might be mutually exclusive, could both be pragmatically true. James sums up the situation very well in the following passage:

It (pragmatism) has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. As the young Italian pragmatist Papini has well said, it lies in the midst of our theories like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume; in the next someone on his knees praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a body's properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in the fifth, the impossibility of metaphysics is being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting in or out of their respective rooms.

The wise man therefore, recognizing that the origin of all these outlooks is the differing needs of different

1. Pragmatism, p. 12.
individuals, will tend to develop a tolerance towards all viewpoints. "What is one man's meat is another man's poison!" James would say that the only possible objection to this would be the prejudice that reality is absolutely consistent. The scientific desire to explain many events in terms of a unifying principle and the metaphysical habit of doing the same thing on a speculative basis tend to give such a prejudice support. James contended however, that attention to experience showed that there is anything but consistency in reality.

In his *Psychology*, James stated that the nature of mind is primarily teleological and that most of our notions of truth are defined in terms of utility.¹ James applied the pragmatic principle to religious and moral problems in *The Will to Believe* and in chapters 15, 16, 17 and 18 of *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. In *Pragmatism* James extends to the entire realm of "truth" the definition that "the whole meaning of an object lies in what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare.² Thus a true fact becomes any fact that can "work". Taking the notion "workability" as the criterion of truth, James proceeded to apply it to various traditional metaphysical notions such as

¹ New York, 1950, p. 182.
² *Pragmatism*, pp. 45-56.
substance and unity. The result of this is an extremely functionalistic conception of substance. If the word "climate" helps us to plant our crops and plan our vacations, it has meaning as the "substance" underlying the yearly cycle. If its generality prevents us from studying meteorology, we posit other unifying principles by which to deal with the same phenomena. The notion, "substance" has meaning only by virtue of its "workability" in helping individuals realize their purposes. Aside from these purposes, it has no meaning. We posit different types of unity on experience such as the unity of a world of discourse, continuity, causality, etc. However, it should be kept in mind that we posit these different types of unity solely to achieve certain purposes. Aside from these purposes there would be no unity. The very chaos of initial perception involves organization. The organization is never complete and is always being modified by new experiences. In so far as organization works, it is true. Certain types of unity are possible, others are not. Reality is the realm of infinite possibilities. It is human purposes which establish the conditions for the realization of many of these possibilities. Those which are not realized could not have been possible or else are not possible under the present circumstances. Those which are not possible, at least for the present, are not true.
Despite James' insistence that pragmatism was a method and not a doctrine, it is obvious that the pragmatic method is an attack upon the very possibility of an objective metaphysics. The pragmatist says it is all right to be a Thomist, Kantian or positivist, so long as you realize that your reason for adhering to your doctrine is not that it explains objective reality, but rather is the answer to one of your subjective needs. However, if one admits that this is the reason for holding these particular opinions, he has ceased to be a Thomist, or Kantian or Hegelian, etc. The doctrine that all opinions concerning the ultimate nature of things are basically manifestations of certain subjective needs, places its opponent in a very awkward position. Cardinal Newman describes the position of an opponent to such a doctrine in the chapter entitled "Mr. Kingsley's Method of Disputation" in his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*. Newman says that if a Roman Catholic clergyman is by definition, a person who reserves to himself the right to 'lie, it follows that anything he says in his defense will be taken as the words of an unreliable witness. The opponent to James' pragmatism is tempted to say: "If everything I maintain is, no matter how much evidence I produce to justify it, no more than the rationalization of a subjective need, I have no means of convincing you of the objective truth of my doctrine. Win or lose, I lose!"
Yet, pragmatism constitutes a theory of truth with all the responsibilities of any other truth theory. Since, by its very nature, it defies traditional criticisms of truth-theories, the only effective type of criticism is to study its implications to discover if it can be maintained only by sustaining certain internal inconsistencies. In other words, we shall see whether or not it hamstrings itself. The question is "how pragmatic is pragmatism?"

The first crucial question concerns the status of the world of infinite possibilities out of which James tells us we forge our purposes. Does this world have ontological status or is it no more than a working postulate itself? James is very ambiguous on this. If one were to hold "pragmatism" strictly, there seems to be no doubt that this would be an issue that could be solved solely in terms of individual purposes. The external world, like substance, is no more than a "working postulate". In his sequel to Pragmatism entitled The Meaning of Truth, he clearly maintains that the external world can by no means be considered an arbitrary postulate:

The pragmatist calls satisfactions indispensable for truth-building, but I have everywhere called them insufficient unless reality be also incidentally led to. If the reality assumed were concealed from the pragmatist's universe of discourse, he would straightway give the name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their satisfactoriness. For him,
as for his critics, there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about. Ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some mirrored matter gives them cognitive luster. This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully posited 'reality' *ab initio*, and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist.¹

Despite this attempt to settle the matter, ambiguity still remains. If James is "an epistemological realist", why does he then feel it necessary to say: *I posited reality *ab initio*"? The question we are asking is: Is this reality of infinite possibilities no more than a working postulate or is it a state of affairs independent of and yet the condition for any postulation whatsoever? Someone is supposed to have said to James: "When you say 'pragmatism' is the truth about truth, the first truth is different from the second."²

There is an even more fundamental ambiguity. If it is agreed that there is a realm of infinite possibilities, whether it be a postulate or independent of postulation, it would follow that such a realm would be the condition for any other "workable postulate". Now there are many postulates which this "world of possibilities" could actualize, but which are considered inexpedient. Now those possibilities which are rejected as inexpedient are called by James false. But the very fact that they are considered proves that they are possible. This

leads us to ask: When James says that the criterion of truth is workability, does he mean by workability, that a thing is possible or that it is expedient? In many instances that which is regarded as possible is considered inexpedient. Expediency has a much narrower application than possibility. This ambiguity in theory of the very meaning of workability would produce great difficulties in practice.

Another difficulty inherent in James' pragmatism comes to light when one considers the past. If anything is regarded as absolutely true, it is the past. The past is not possibly true. It is true. Yet, although some individuals may find it expedient to regard the past as true, others at times might find it expedient to regard it as untrue. The problem is whether James' criterion of truth involves a distortion of the past.

Royce poses the problem very well in the following passage:

Let us suppose that a witness appears upon some witness-stand, and objects to taking the ordinary oath, because he has conscientious scruples, due to the fact that he is a recent pragmatist who has a fine new definition of truth, in terms of which alone he can be sworn. Let us suppose him, hereupon to be granted entire liberty to express his oath in his own way. Let him accordingly say, using, with technical scrupulosity my colleague's (James') definition of truth: 'I promise to tell whatever is expedient and nothing but what is expedient, so help me future experience.'

Now when we say that a course of action is expedient we mean that it is preferable in the "long run." But how one is to determine what constitutes the "long run" is a nice question. Pragmatism, because of its weak "theoria" is involved in all kinds of difficulties in "praxis". Royce states this difficulty in this passage:

Tell me, 'This opinion is true,' and whatever you are talking about I may agree or disagree or doubt; yet in any case you have stated a momentous issue. But tell me, 'I just now find this belief expedient, it feels to me congruous,' and you have explicitly given me just a scrap of your personal biography, and have told me no other truth whatever than a truth about the present state of your feelings... If, however, you emphasize my colleague's wording to the effect that a truth is such because it proves to be an idea that is expedient 'in the long run,' I once more ask you: When does a man experience the whole of the real facts about the 'long run'?"

Although traces of the doctrine called "radical empiricism" are to be found as far back as James' first book, it becomes more prevalent in his writings after the storm of criticism which followed the publication of Pragmatism. In the Introduction to Some Problems of Philosophy James' son quotes from a memorandum left by his father: "Call it a beginning of an introduction to philosophy. Say that I hoped to round out my system, which now is too much like an arch

From this and other such statements, we may infer that there is a fundamental change in attitude from that expressed in Pragmatism: "It (pragmatism) has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method." Since it is our contention that this doctrine of "radical empiricism" had a decided influence on the development of Royce's philosophy and constituted in many ways a major attack upon it, it seems fitting to give a general outline of its main principles.

According to James, "radical empiricism" consists of a postulate, a statement of fact and a general conclusion. The postulate is that experience in the ultimate arbiter of all philosophical discussions. However, unlike the traditional British empiricists, James does not view experience as something which informs a passive intellect. For James the mind is active and selective. According to James, the trouble with British empiricism is its tendency to think of the mind in terms of something which is acted upon (efficient causality) rather than as something whose main attribute is that it shapes and modifies that which acts upon it. The mind has various purposes based upon certain needs. By studying experience, the mind discovers which purposes

can be realized and which cannot be. In this sense is experience to be understood as the final arbiter of all discussions, philosophical and non-philosophical. An empiricism which views the mind as a tabula rasa or a bundle of sensations is, according to James, asinine. It seems to me that it would be incorrect to view the foregoing postulate as identical with the axiom that truth is that which works. The reason for this is that the question posed above, Is this world of infinite possibilities also a working postulate?, no longer applies. We are no longer surprised when James tells us that he is an "epistemological realist ab initio".

The second major tenet of "radical empiricism" is a statement of fact. It states that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are as much matters of direct particular experience as the things themselves. It was James' opinion that another great error of traditional empiricism is its tendency to ignore the conjunctive relations between things and to focus its attention on the disjunctive relations. The ultimate result of this was Hume's viewing reality as a flow of discrete sensations. The conjunctive relations which experience exhibits were regarded as a mere habit brought about by the activity of the imagination. This arbitrary denial of the reality of conjunctive relations also distorts the nature of the discrete things. James
maintained that our perceptions overlap and run into each other in varying degrees. The result, James tells us, of this denial of the ability of percepts to have their connections within themselves, gives rise to the postulation of "transcendental unities of apperception" and "Welt-Geiste" to do the job. "Naturam expellas furca, tam usque recurrat!" The systems of relations which the German idealists impose upon experience, James regards as within experience and given just as immediately as any other qualia. James sees no need for postulating a transcendental unity of apperception or an absolute in order to explain the connectedness of experience. There is no dominant order in reality; there is a unity of concatenation, a compenetration of many orders:

Far back as we go, the flux, both as a whole and in its parts, is that of things conjunct and separated. The great continua of time, space, and the self envelop everything betwixt them and flow together without interfering. The things that they envelope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in others. Some sensations coalesce with some ideas, and others are irreconcilable. Qualities compenetrate one space, or exclude each other from it. They cling together persistently in groups that move as units, or else they separate. Their changes are abrupt or discontinuous; and their kinds resemble or differ etc.

1. For a full discussion of this see Chapter 3 of Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York, Longmans, 1912.
The third aspect of 'radical empiricism' is a
generalized conclusion which constitutes James' attempt
to solve the problem of the one and the many. If things
are independent of each other, how can they have any
relationship to one another at all? If they are really
united, how can there be such striking diversity? As was
stated above, James firmly held that the relationship be-
tween things was not something imposed from without, but
was rather part and parcel of experience itself. His task
was to establish this metaphysically. In chapter five
of A Pluralistic Universe, he tells us that he sincerely
and patiently tried to do this for years and in the
process covered hundreds of sheets of paper with notes
and memoranda. He goes on to tell us that he doesn't
think he would ever have solved the problem were it not
for his discovery of the writings of Henri Bergson.

According to Professor Kallen in his comparative
study of the philosophies of James and Bergson, the main
influence of Bergson on James was Bergson's observations
on the nature of conceptualization.¹ This opinion seems
to be highly corroborated by chapter six of A Pluralistic
Universe. Bergson showed James that abstraction by
its very nature distorted the flow of life. Concepts
are only signs of things which exist in an overlapping

¹. H. M. Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson, A
Study in Contrasting Theories of Life, p. 46,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1914.
interpenetrating stream of being. These concepts are drawn out of the flow of being for practical purposes, and this arbitrary separation of a thing from its context always means distortion. Our concepts are discrete representations of things which in themselves are neither discrete nor representative. Therefore the problem of the one and the many is strictly a mental problem, a "professorial problem"; in reality, there is no such problem.

However, despite this debt to Bergson, there is a profound difference between the philosophies of the two men. For James, the truth is that which works. If a concept works in the flow of experience, it is true. For Bergson, the concepts which are formulated for practical purposes are not the real truth. The real truth is the flow of experience, from which the concepts are forged and which the concepts necessarily distort. Thus where Bergson gives superiority to the flow whence our concepts are derived, James gives it no superiority whatsoever. The "flux" is not more real than the conceptual world. It is merely different. Concepts provide an immense map of relations among the elements of things. Secondly, concepts such as God, a moral order, freedom of the will bring new values into the perceptual life and reanimate our wills. James from the very beginning is a philosophical democrat. The sole difference he
sees between things if functional and no individual is
the absolute arbiter of which function is superior to
another. He can and must decide this for himself, but
never for the world.

Another difference between James and Bergson is
James' insistence that the difference between per-
cepts and concepts is one of degree. In so far as con-
sciousness can be viewed as a percept, it differs in no
wise, from any other percept. Things, no matter how
different they be, are linked together but

our multiverse still makes a 'universe'
for every part, tho /sic/ it may not be in
actual or immediate connection, is neverthe-
less in some possible or mediated connection
with every other part, however remote through
the fact that each part hangs together with its
next neighbors in inextricable interfusion.
The type of union it is true, is different
from the monistic type of Alleinheit. It is
not a universal co-implication or integration
durcheinander. It is what I call the string-
along type, the type of contiguity or con-
catenation.1

It is not a universal co-implication or integration
durcheinander. There is no gap between the perceptual and
conceptual orders. The conceptual order is constantly shed-
ding new light on the perceptual order. It, in turn, is con-
stantly being enriched by "coming to grips" with the per-
ceptual order. The only difference between mental and

1. A Pluralistic Universe, p. 325.
non-mental objects is that of function. To posit an antinomy between matter and spirit is inadmissible by James. The only distinction for "radical empiricism" is that of function.

It seems safe to say that Bergson solved the problem of the one and the many for James by pointing out to him a world of "pure experience" wherein all things moved and lived and had their being. However, the major difference between the two men remains, inasmuch as "pure experience" as the stuff of reality is absolutely continuous for James. James cannot go along with Bergson in declaring that a universe of time is opposed to a universe of space, a universe of concepts is opposed to a universe of percepts. Everything that is, is made up of pure experience. The following passage should give a good idea of what "pure experience" meant for James:

My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known.1

1. Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 4.
He goes so far as to say that "though one part of our experience may lean upon another part...experience as a whole is self-containing and leans on nothing." In his Problems of Philosophy, he again emphasizes this continuity called "pure experience": "The great difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are continuous and concepts discrete. Not discrete in their being, for conception as an act is part of the flux of feeling (pure experience), but discrete from each other in their several meanings." Thus the problem of the one and the many is solved.

James insisted to the end that he was not a materialist. However, by reducing both conscious and non-conscious life to the same principle in order to have continuity, he did leave the door open to a naturalistic interpretation of "radical empiricism". James himself was aware of this possibility, but nevertheless stuck to his conviction that "pure experience" was the "stoff" of existence:

But a last cry of non possumus will probably go up from many readers...they will say, 'but our consciousness itself intuitively contradicts you. We, for our part, know that we are conscious... We feel our thought, flowing as life within us, in absolute contrast with the objects which it so unremittingly escorts. We can not be faithless to this immediate intuition. The dualism is a fundamental datum: Let no man join what God has put asunder.'

My reply to this is my last work, and I greatly grieve that to many it will sound materialistic. I can not help that, however, for I, too, have my intuitions and I must obey them. Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them...breath which was ever the original of 'spirit', breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.\(^1\)

In summation we repeat the three notes of "radical empiricism: a) experience is the final arbiter of truth; b) relations, both conjunctive and disjunctive are as real as sensations; c) all diversity is ultimately reducible to one principle, "ure experience".

As James told us in the introduction to Pragmatism, it is possible to accept pragmatism and reject radical empiricism. However, it is clear that it is very easy to be a pragmatist and a radical empiricist. One can say that truth is that which is expedient in experience. The world of experience is thereby made subservient to

---

human ends. Truth is forged in it. It simply constitutes the conditions for these purposes to be forged and supplies the needs which brought about the desire to forge ends, in the first place.

Had James lived longer and fulfilled his desire to give a systematic presentation of his philosophy, I feel certain that a good part of such a work would deal with the meaning of pragmatism for radical empiricism and vice-versa. As things now stand it is possible to forge many doctrines out of James' writings. The polarity in his thought, which in my opinion existed from his early manhood, is between a theistic voluntarism and an evolutionary naturalism. That any number of opinions and doctrines can be constructed between these two poles is probably the reason that James had been understood and misunderstood in so many different ways. James complained in his lifetime that he was misunder-
stood; considering the variety of views he enunciated, often at the same period in his life, this is not at all surprising. Be this as it may, we shall now proceed to examine the influence that pragmatism and "radical empiricism" had on the philosophy of Royce.
CHAPTER III

THE BEARING OF JAMES' THOUGHT ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE

Royce first became acquainted with James in 1877. At this time he was a student at Johns Hopkins University. The following year he heard James lecture in Baltimore.1 At a meeting in James' house, January 18, 1910, Royce gave a speech telling how, at that time, he had poured out his soul to James concerning certain misgivings about remaining in philosophy and expressed gratitude for the encouragement which James at that time had given him to continue his studies. During the course of this speech he admits that for some time he had been strongly influenced by James:

The result of my own early contact with James was to make me for years very much his disciple. I am still in large part under his spell. If I contend with him sometimes, I suppose that it is he also who through his free spirit has in great measure taught me this liberty. I know that for years I used to tremble at the thought that James might perhaps some day find reason to put me in my place by some one of those wonderful, lightening-like epigrams, wherewith he was and is always able to characterize those opponents whose worldly position is such as to make them no longer in danger of not getting a fair hearing, and whose self-assurance has relieved him of the duty to secure for them a sympathetic attention. The time has passed, the lightening in question has often descended—never indeed on me as his friend, but often

1. Perry, op. cit., pp. 779-780.
on my opinions—and has long since blasted, I hope, some at least of what is most combustible about my poor teachings.\footnote{Perry, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 780.}

This is but one of the many statements made by Royce in which he acknowledged his indebtedness to James.\footnote{Cf. \textit{The Religious Aspect of Philosophy}, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1885, Preface, n. vi, \textit{The Philosophy of Loyalty}, pp. 325-327.} However, we also have statements from James wherein he refers to Royce as his master.\footnote{Cf. Perry, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 799.} There is in this relationship between the two men an admitted reciprocity of influence. James influenced Royce and Royce in turn influenced James. What we are attempting to do at this moment is to delineate the specific aspects of James' pragmatism which Royce adopted and single out those aspects which he rejected. We shall then investigate the intellectual developments which these differences initiated. We shall see that certain points made by Royce as the logical consequences of James' basic tenets were unacceptable to James, but nevertheless forced him to meet the issues which Royce raised. The way he met these issues in "radical emicrism" constituted an attack upon Royce's idealistic inferences from the pragmatic premises. But for the present we shall confine ourselves to describing what elements Royce had in common with James at the very beginning of his philosophical career.
In *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* Royce tells us that every cognition involves purposefulness. The given is a manifold out of which the mind selects certain features, the choice of which is determined by the mind's purposes. Reality answers some purposes and denies others. A given segment of experience can fulfill many different purposes. A given piece of protoplasm will disclose certain things about itself to a physicist which a person making a biological or chemical inquiry would never find. We want to know because we have a need to know. When we want to know something about the nature of an object, we postulate. Hence postulation arises from needs and truth arises when experience reveals that which is postulated. Now in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* Royce recognizes different types of postulation. There is the postulation of the very act of knowledge. Postulation creates the very walls around us. Then in making scientific inquiries, we postulate as to the causes of such and such a reaction. In this type of postulation, we know whether the postulate is justified by reality as soon as we make the test. Now there is another type of postulation that Royce speaks of which does not admit of the same type of verification made in the act of knowledge and in testing scientific laws. This is the ethical postulate.
The very need for an ethical postulate would be questioned, says Royce, by two types of thinkers: a) the intuitionist; and b) the believer in an ethic derived from the nature of things; the first section of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy consists of an exhaustive analysis of these two types of objection. Briefly, Royce claims that your believer in an ethic derived from "the nature of things" ends in difficulties because there is no part of nature which does not have another part working against it:

Nature is, so regarded, a confused hum of voices. 'Nature', says one voice, is meant to provide bountifully for the wants of sentient life'. 'Therefore', says another voice, 'all the weak, the sick, the old, must starve, and all the carnivorous destroy their neighbors.' 'Nature aims at the evolution of the highest type of life', says the first voice. 'Therefore', it is replied, 'she bountifully provides swarms of parasites of all sorts to feed on higher life.' 'Nature desires order and unity', says the voice from the heavens. 'Therefore she makes meteors and comets', replies the echoing voice. Etc.

Your believer in an ethic derived from the nature of things becomes an intuitionist when it comes to deciding which aspect of nature shall serve as the criterion for "the good of things".

in difficulties because no two "value-responses"
philosophers can agree on which are the values and which
the disvalues. How, for example, would a Nietzsche
convince Max Scheler? Ultimately they would both hurl
anathemas at each other and claim that their respective
adversery is value-blind. The difficulty of an in-
tuitionist system is that there is no means of
mediating between two people who have different notions
as to the nature and hierarchy of value. Except for
the fact that they may be using the same words, they
have no means of knowing that even their disciples have
the same intuitions as they do.

This evaluation of two traditional methods of con-
structing ethical systems leads one into a world of
doubt. Yet, Royce points out that it should be kept in
mind that one of the reasons we are in this world of
doubt is that we were incapable of finding a harmony in
nature or in the opinions of men as to what is the good.
Underlying our doubt is a deep-rooted desire for harmony.

Now, how, says Royce, are we to get out of this
hornet's nest of skepticism? How are we to escape the
state of moral paralysis and slavery to every passing
inclination which such a world imposes upon us? The
only alternative is postulation. We mentioned above
that Royce was in complete agreement with James as to
the teleological nature of knowledge. The knowledge
of the simplest fact was no more than the fulfillment of a need. Otherwise, why did we choose to see this fact and not one of the million others which are present in any given area of experience? Now in Chapter One of this paper I also mentioned that one of the main problems of James' pragmatism was the question: Is this world which meets my postulates no more than a postulate itself? Although James finally assumed a realistic position and claimed that the world in which postulates are realized is prior to and thereby independent of postulation, it was shown that it was quite feasible, from pragmatist premises, to regard the external world itself as no more than a working postulate. As the first step in setting the stage for his ethical postulate Royce proceeds to regard the external world as no more than a working postulate:

The first answer that occurs to this our question about the meaning of the external world that has so far troubled us, is this: The assumed world is no fixed datum, to which we are bound to submit at all hazards, but a postulate, which is made to satisfy certain familiar human needs. If this postulate is found to have no religious significance, we may supplement the doubt thus arising by remembering that we who postulated once have the right to postulate again!

Not only do we have the philosophic right to

postulate again, we actually do postulate again inasmuch as we have science. There is still much unknown in the world; there is still much apparent chaos and tendencies which strike out against the satisfaction of human needs. However, this is no way makes us deny the validity of the scientific postulate that the world and all that is in it is governed by law. The faith of the scientist is not a faith in any given fact; it is a faith in general methods and principles. Royce asks if this is the case with science, why may not religion or ethics also postulate certain demands concerning the moral goodness of things? The religious postulate would say, "The real world must, be, whatever its true nature, at least as high in the moral scale as my highest ideal of goodness."¹

Anyone who is unwilling to make a postulate that arouses the highest moral interest and satisfies the highest moral needs, has no reason, if he is thorough-going, for maintaining his scientific postulate:

If one is weary of the religious postulates, let him by all means throw them aside. But if he does this, why does he not throw aside the scientific postulates, and give up insisting that the world is and must be rational? Yea, let him be thoroughgoing, and since the very perception of the walls of his room contains postulates, let him throw away all these postulates too, and dwell in the chaos of sensations unfriended. There is no reason why he should not do this unless he sees a deeper foundation for his postulates. We have no mere

dogmas to urge here. Let one abandon all mere postulates if he has not the
courage to make them, but then let one
consistently give them all up. The
religious postulates are not indeed
particular creeds. One may abandon
creeds of many sorts, and yet keep the
fundamental postulate. But if he
abandons the fundamental postulate of
religion, namely, that universal good-
ness is somehow at the heart of things,
then he ought consistently to cease from
the fundamental postulate of science,
namely, that universal, order-loving
reason is somehow the truth of things.
And not to do both is to lack the courage
of rational and moral life.

It is important to observe that Royce is maintain-
ing the exact theory of knowledge which James was to
bring forth in his Psychology. The act of knowledge
involves purposefulness, which in turn is determined
by individual purposes. What works is true; what doesn't
work is false. The ultimate criteria are the purposes
of the individual. However, even in this fundamental
adaptation of James' pragmatic principle of knowledge
(and thereby truth) there is a slight discrepancy which,
when logically developed, leads to wide gulfs in the
thinking of the two men.

James' pragmatism would agree that the postulate
of order in the universe is required by most people.
However, the universality of the postulate that moral
goodness is at the heart of things is questionable to

dogmas to urge here. Let one abandon all mere postulates if he has not the courage to make them, but then let one consistently give them all up. The religious postulates are not indeed particular creeds. One may abandon creeds of many sorts, and yet keep the fundamental postulate. But if he abandons the fundamental postulate of religion, namely, that universal goodness is somehow at the heart of things, then he ought consistently to cease from the fundamental postulate of science, namely, that universal, order-loving reason is somehow the truth of things. And not to do both is to lack the courage of rational and moral life.¹

It is important to observe that Royce is maintaining the exact theory of knowledge which James was to bring forth in his Psychology. The act of knowledge involves purposefulness, which in turn is determined by individual purposes. What works is true; what doesn't work is false. The ultimate criteria are the purposes of the individual. However, even in this fundamental adaptation of James' pragmatic principle of knowledge (and thereby truth) there is a slight discrepancy which, when logically developed, leads to wide gulfs in the thinking of the two men.

James' pragmatism would agree that the postulate of order in the universe is required by most people. However, the universality of the postulate that moral goodness is at the heart of things is questionable to

¹ Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 331.
him. The basis of postulation, James would remind Royce, is individuals with their different needs and purposes. James sees no need to be "thoroughgoing" in one's postulations. If a man feels a need to postulate that moral goodness is at the heart of things he is welcome to postulate it. However, if he finds that he can do without such a postulation, and in fact that it seems impossible to accept it in the face of the evil that he constantly sees around him, he too is justified in not postulating that moral goodness is at the heart of the universe. By the very fact that scientific procedures have answered and do answer many needs, the truth of these procedures is nearly universally postulated. However, the moral postulate is not so universally acceptable and there are many needs which would lead one to deny it.

Furthermore, even if one hold that moral goodness be at the heart of the universe, it does not follow that there is universal agreement as to just what that moral goodness is. The fact that many people who claim that moral goodness lies at the heart of things have entirely different notions concerning the quality of that moral goodness, leads us right into the difficulties of an intuitionistic system of ethics. What one man calls good, the other man calls evil. There is no means of mediating the differences, so each ends up by calling the other
"value-blind". James, ever aware of the diversity in experience, simply says that moral postulates can validly differ with different individuals. Their justification is purely subjective. Not only was the postulate subjective, but also its content. Only the individual can determine what is, and what is not good for him.

The important thing, as we stated above, is to note Royce's full agreement with James (or for that matter James' with Royce) concerning the epistemological foundation of postulation. In his Psychology, James says that Chapter Ten ("The World of the Postulates") and Chapter Nine ("Idealism") of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy "are the clearest account of the psychology of belief with which I am acquainted."1 The only difference seems to be about the necessity and quality of the postulates of religion and morality. The question which naturally arises is: Why this big difference concerning the postulate? If the difference is not an arbitrary one, on what grounds can it be understood? It behooves us therefore to see if we can discover a more fundamental difference by which the differences concerning the moral postulate may be understood.

In a letter written by Royce to James from California on January 8, 1880, Royce raises two matters

which he thinks will be the distinguishing mark of the type of philosophizing that he conceived himself and James to be engaged in. The first matter, "What is the inner structure, the nature of thinking as a process of understanding things?" Although it is conceivable that the words "inner structure" might raise James' eyebrows, it is a fact that one of James' chief activities was to change the current conceptions as to the nature of thinking. The second statement made by Royce in this letter makes plain a very fundamental difference:

What is the use, the inner and hidden motive, of making such asseverations as we are accustomed to make about the world of experience? Certainly the thinkers who first make molecules and then fall down in mute and holy reverence before the awful mystery of how the molecules ever could make them, are far from knowing what it is to cross-question consciousness with any real spirit in their questionings. If I understand you, it is such cross-questioning of consciousness which you want to have done.

It is in this second statement that we have the arrow pointed right at the heart of James' pragmatism and the seed of the objection with which Royce forced James to struggle for years. The question Royce is asking is "How is it possible to postulate in the first place?" Why is it that experience answers the demands of our postulates at one time and denies them at another? If we are the creators of reality through our cognitive

---

1. Quoted by Perry, op. cit., I, 733-34.
activity, why is it that all things are not at our disposal by a "fiat"?

In another letter to James, (Sept. 19, 1880), Royce says that he has solved to his own satisfaction the question as to the objects of knowledge, and in an idealistic sense. By this I infer, on the basis of his later writings, that he means that the object of knowledge must be of the same quality as the subject of knowledge. He tells James, however, that he is still very much puzzled over the structure of knowledge and then goes on to say that he considers James' method of discussing psychological problems as the "propaedic to this deepest philosophic study." Royce follows this with a statement of what he believed James' discussion of psychological problems must lead to. This statement is not a far-cry from the absolute which becomes the cornerstone of his later philosophical writings:

Experience is a series that everyone admits. Experience is known as a series; that most writers regard as too simple a thing to mention. Yet here is the kernel...in each state only itself is given. Hence each state can know the others only by actively constructing or postulating them... Hence time as a series of states is never a datum, only a postulate or construction... If experience is possible only through this constructive process, then what is the ultimate datum? Not matter, not mind, not a series of experiences, not the distinction of object and subject, but just this: a moment of reception
of some content, joined with a constructive act that postulates a world of other consciousness beyond the present data.¹

This is Royce's Absolute. If, by definition, there is no knowledge outside of postulation by cognitive agents, then the existence of a world which at times resists and at other times meets my postulations can only be explained in terms of a higher postulator who transcends, constitutes, and sets the conditions for all finite postulation. We have a "block-universe."

Royce admitted he has not at this time worked out all the implications of this postulation of an absolute datum of consciousness, the condition for all other consciousness. However, he has definitely set up his tent in the idealistic camp. In his answer to Royce (Dec. 25, 1880)² James admits that he has not fully understood Royce's speculation concerning "the structure of thought" and after making a few anti-Hegelian remarks, he expresses the sentiment that he still considers Royce to be a member of his own camp. After this, most of their correspondence deals with the possibilities of Royce obtaining a professorship at Harvard. However, in a letter dated December 28th, 1881, Royce makes it clear

1: Ibid., pp. 787-88.
to James that he is an idealist: "And yet I am no subjective idealist of the old fashioned sort. Not myself is the ultimate truth, but consciousness as such."

Let us proceed to scrutinize the Absolute which Royce first mentioned in his letter to James of Sept. 19, 1880. This postulate, in a much more developed form, is proposed in Chapter Eleven of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. This chapter entitled "The Possibility of Error" contains the core of Royce's teaching concerning the Absolute. As late as his Gifford lectures in 1899 he claimed that he felt no need to modify the basic argument. 2

As we stated before, Royce's main problem was: How is it that knowledge is not a simple question of a "fiat" on the part of the finite will, if we are correct in assuming that all knowledge results from the postulation of a cognitive agent? Another way of stating this would be: If truth depends on what cognitive agents postulate, how can there be error? Now the whole problem and a good deal of speculation might have been avoided, had someone challenged the premise that truth is solely a result of postulation. However, the Jamesian pragmatic method was so much a part of Royce's thinking that this possibility was not considered.

1. Ibid., p. 792.
At the beginning of this chapter, he tells us that for a long time he was deeply concerned with the problem of the continuity between past, present and future. If the only given is the present moment in which we are creating the universe by postulation, how are we to say that a judgement concerning the past or future is true? The past as such is non-existent for the present moment. So far as our memory is concerned, it and all the facts in it are present datum. How do we know that it refers to the past as it really was? Likewise for the future. The future aside from its anticipation in this present moment is non-existent. Royce's question is: How escape the confinements of the present?

What the Now is, the Then has ceased to be, or has not yet appeared. To return to the Then of the past is impossible. To go forward to the Then of the future is to destroy the Now. How can the Then of the past and the Then of the future be given at all? The Now contains every immediate datum of consciousness. And in this Now is no suggestion that can be recognized as succession.¹

James' ideas about postulation gave him the means of escape. As an activity of the present we postulate both the past and the future.

It is only by means of postulates that our thought even seems to have unity from moment to moment. We live in the present. If our thought has other truth or falsity than this, we do not know it.

¹. Quoted by Cotton, from unpublished manuscript of Royce, op. cit., p. 23.
Past and future exist not for this present. They are only postulated. Save as postulated, they have no present meaning.¹

Later on in the discussion Royce tells us that this view led him into a general skepticism: "From moment to moment one can be sure of each moment. All else is postulate."

At this point a certain ambiguity set in; an understanding of this ambiguity I believe, provides an explanation of why Royce differed with James on the objective necessity of the ethical postulates. This seems to be the focal point for the transition that took place in the later stages of Royce's thought. In Chapter Nine of this book, he claimed that the very walls around us were the result of postulation. Yet in Chapter Eleven, he seems to imply that the immediate datum of consciousness is not a postulate. This and many other passages seem to indicate that the present moment is never devoid of an immediate datum which is not the result of a postulate, and which indeed contains the needs which causes us to postulate in the first place.

On the other hand passages from Chapter Nine of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy and unpublished manuscripts which Cotton quotes, do indicate that the only thing in the present is some type of "constructive ego" which

¹. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 388.
creates all that is by postulation. It is interesting to see this fluctuation in Royce from a purely voluntaristic starting point (i.e. the viewpoint that states that the knowledge of even the simplest fact is the result of postulation) to a viewpoint that would state there are elements in experience which are decidedly not the result of the postulations of a "pure ego." What I should like to point out in this regard is that despite his statements that there is nothing non-purposeful in thought, Royce does on many occasions admit non-purposeful data and it seems to me, is indeed forced to do so in order to set the stage for his argument.

However, let us return to Royce's basic question: "How, if there is nothing absolutely certain beyond the data of the immediate present, can we make judgements concerning a past or future which transcends this immediate present?" Does not such a formulation of the basic problem involve a discussion of solipsism? In section five of Chapter Eleven, wherein he discusses the possibilities of knowing the states of another's mind, he makes a remark which contains the basis of his detailed criticism of mysticism which appeared in *The World and The Individual*. The remark is basically that the problem of solipsism automatically clears up once the problem of the possibility of error is solved. The problem of solipsism, he declares, is subsidiary.
For we are not here concerned to answer Solipsism, but merely to exemplify the difficulties about the nature of error. If our neighbors did not exist, then the nature of the error that would lie in saying that they do exist would present almost the same difficulties.

However, in the light of Royce's starting point, namely, that there is nothing given beyond the immediate datum of our present moment, we feel entitled to ask: Is this immediate content of the present moment part of the individual or is it composed of elements that are not the self? If it is the self, the onus would fall on Royce's shoulders of explaining how this non-self can be. On the other hand, if he takes the other alternative and agrees that the mind is informed from without, why restrict the mind's passivity merely to the immediate data of consciousness? Why not say that this data is related to the mind in time and space and that the mind as an enduring element can record changes in this data which is presented to it in a continuous existential flow? Why not say that predictions as to the future are based on certain regularities or, for that matter, irregularities that the mind has recognized as (whether for practical purposes or not) existential in this stream? When Royce says that even

our memory of the past is but a present memory, a mere
construction, why does he not hold that even this pre-
sent data is a construction? He is unwilling to do this
because it would involve an explanation of why the mind
has constructed this present data rather than some
other data. It would mean an explanation of why we
have these needs, whose frustration is at times so
excruciating, rather than some other needs. There-
fore we maintain that if these needs are not constructs,
there is no reason for denying that the connectedness of
this data with its purposes is something belonging to it
and is not something added to it by a constructive
mind. It is interesting to note that James used this
type of argument against Royce as a result of his studies
of Bergson. It was this objection, I maintain, that
started Royce on the road to a Peircian brand of prag-
matism.

However, to get back to the original question:
"Now, if there is nothing absolutely certain beyond the
data of the immediate present, can we make judgements
concerning a past or future which supposedly trans-
cends the immediate present?" As was pointed out on
page 32 of this dissertation, Royce claims that he
arrived at the conclusion that we postulate the past
and the future; but this nevertheless led him to a
thoroughly skeptical position. Postulations are too
insecure. How could he be certain that his postulation was correct? As a result of this question another question arose in his mind which seemed more fundamental and upon further consideration he felt that the answer to the second question would automatically provide an answer to the first. The question is basically "How is error possible?" I think it would suit our purposes to quote the entire passage wherein Royce formulates this second question:

From the depths of this imperfectly defined skepticism, which seemed to him provisionally the only view he could adopt, the author escaped only by asking the one question more: 'If everything beyond the present is doubtful, then how can even that doubt be possible?' With this question that bare relativity of the present moment is given up. What are the conditions that make doubt logically intelligible? These conditions really transcend the present moment. Plainly doubt implies that the statement doubted may be false. So here we have at least one supposed general truth, namely, 'All but the immediate content of the present moment's judgment being doubtful, we may be in error about it.' But what then is an error? This becomes, at once a problem of exciting interest.

I have taken great care to outline the background in which Royce's argument concerning the possibility of error was framed in order to avoid misrepresenting him in any way. In the beginning of the chapter Royce himself warns us that the way will be thorny, and in a letter from James to Renouvier of the 29th of March 1888,

wherein James explains Royce's argument he makes the remark:

To go straight to the point, either I have misunderstood you, or you have failed to grasp the full force of his (Royce's) argument from 'error' for an absolute mind. I believe the latter; for I find that very few persons grasp it, and I myself should not have grasped the depth and importance of it without many an oral discussion with Royce himself. 1

Royce starts out with the definition of error which is generally accepted by logicians:

A fallacy is a false assertion that a certain conclusion follows from certain premises. Error is therefore generally defined as a judgment that does not agree with its object. In the erroneous judgement, subject and predicate are so combined as in the object the corresponding elements are not combined.

Now, given Royce's view of the process of cognition and the foregoing definition of error, we should have a good idea of what Royce's task was. If the objects of knowledge are only what they are because the mind intends them to be so, how is it that the mind can be wrong? But it is a generally accepted fact that the mind is quite often wrong. The only way that Royce can escape this dilemma without sacrificing either premise is

1. Perry, op. cit., p. 703.
to say that it is not the mind that is wrong, but only his finite mind. One's mind is wrong because its intention does not conform to its object as the object is intended in a higher all-embracing mind which a fortiori sees as its object both your judgement and its intended object. Royce offers us the following alternatives: "Either there is no such thing as error which is a flat self-contradiction, or else there is an infinite unity of conscious thought which is present to all possible truth." ¹

Although the fundamental position is restated at least a dozen times (Royce never seems to have been at a loss for words), to my mind this is the most concise statement of it:

What then, is an error? An error, we reply, is an incomplete thought, that to a higher thought which includes it and its intended object, is known as having failed in the purpose that it more or less clearly had, and that is fully realized in this higher inclusive thought. ²

As we endeavored to point out before, it is possible to press the point that although quite a bit of knowledge seems to be the result of purposive activity on the part of the mind, there are even in

2. Ibid., p. 424.
Royce's very starting point non-purposive elements. An error can be defined as a disconformity of the mind to being, which disconformity can be verified by other minds without the necessity of some higher postulator. Royce's view can only be maintained upon the premise that there is absolutely no knowledge that is not postulated. This is an extremely doubtful premise.

In the forementioned letter of James to Renouvier, James remarks that he finds the argument "irresistible, so long as we take the relation of really intending an object au sérieux". In this statement we have the key to both a difficulty in James' pragmatism considered in itself as it stood at that time and also the key to the way that James was to escape from the clutches of Royce's absolute idealism or, as Royce liked to call it, "absolute pragmatism". The key is fundamentally the question: "How far are we going to stretch the purposeful character of thought?" Our very needs springing from within or imposed on us from without are the causes of our postulation. They themselves are not postulated. This involved the obvious difficulty for James which would formulate itself in the following question: If we define truth as a postulate that works, does it

1. Perry, op. cit., p. 703.
follow that those facts (needs) which are not working postulates are not true? This is the question which, as we tried to point out in Chapter One of this paper, forced the transition in James from pragmatism, considered as such, to radical empiricism. Royce, on the other hand, insisted that all truth must be the result of a working postulate. Those truths which do not seem to be the result of my postulation are the result of someone else's postulation. The basis for all postulates and all their connections must be an absolute postulator who holds all being within his grasp. Thus we arrive at the absolute postulator through a study of the implications of the pragmatic theory of truth. Such an absolute postulator also provides the possibility of error which would otherwise be an impossibility. An error is basically a non-conformity of the purpose of a finite postulator with the purpose of the infinite postulator.

It is important at the present time to bring the reader's attention to a fact which Renouvier overlooked and which became even more explicit in Royce's later discussions of the absolute. This fact is that Royce regards all the objects of the knowledge of his absolute, including our finite selves, as constitutive of him. Their reality is part of him just as the limbs are part of the body.
This obviously involved several problems for pragmatism as it was then being propagated by James. First of all, James was concerned with the effects of this argument on freedom. He had found as one of his fundamental postulates the doctrine of a free will. His statement was: "Let the first act of your free will be to declare itself free!" Royce held that the doctrine of indeterminism was not incompatible with his "block-universe." Secondly, James was very much concerned with the danger of the individual being swallowed up by this absolute. To conceive of oneself as a letter in a word of an epic poem or perhaps even a whole word in such a poem, may result in a great inertia and loss of individuality. Royce was aware of these difficulties and true to his initial inspiration, he did spend quite a bit of time dealing with them.

Finally there is a third predilection of James which Royce did not seem to be able to do justice to; namely, the problem of evil. How can any God postulate so much evil? Royce's answer is basically of two types. First, the totality of being which God experiences is not a creation; it has always been God's postulate. We see it only from a finite viewpoint where things come into being and go out of being. There is no coming into being or going out of being with the absolute. He constitutes all being and thereby is all time totum.
We call a thing evil which is only partially seen. If seen in its fullfillment we should see that it really is good.

Although James at first found Royce's reasoning irresistible, he refused to become an idealist for the foregoing ethical considerations. What it is important to keep in mind at the present point is that Royce forced the simple pragmatic theory of truth to a crisis by showing that other factors would have to be referred to if the possibility of error were to be established and the folly of solipsism avoided. Royce met this crisis by his postulation of the absolute.

James on his part finally solved the crisis by developing his doctrine of radical empiricism. Having done this, he started his offensive against Royce's absolute which he now felt was no more than a speculative solution to certain difficulties in pragmatism which were more satisfactorily solved by his "radical empiricism". The postulation of an "absolute" might be justified on subjective grounds. An individual might feel a need for such a postulation. But let such an individual maintain it as a subjective belief and not as a "rational necessity" for all thinking men. The next chapter will be mainly concerned with showing how Royce met this assault on his absolute.
CHAPTER IV
THE TRANSITION IN ROYCE'S PHILOSOPHY

It was pointed out in the foregoing chapter that James escaped the "necessity" of Royce's absolute by asserting that reality did not depend upon mind for its existence. Particular facts which come about through the postulating activity of a mind, depend upon the activity of mind for their coming into existence (and if their being requires maintenance, for their continued existence). However, there are many more facts such as the sea and the stars whose existence is apparently independent of the activity of mind. Psychic and non-psychic objects compose the one continuous stream of existence. This stream of reality is so constituted that under certain conditions it meets the demands of individuals. The fact that it meets these demands, by no means indicates that it has a rational structure. The only thing that is proved when a postulate is rewarded is that such and such a postulate has been found to bring forth such and such results under such and such conditions. Whether or not this will always be the case can not be determined. One can declare that reality is rational because it fulfills certain needs. On the other hand, one can claim that it is irrational because it frustrates other needs. To claim that reality is either absolutely rational or irrational is to utter nonsense. Thus the
first basic item in Royce's philosophy that is subjected by James to attack is his doctrine that all reality is the embodiment of one rational purpose.

The second item that is severely attacked is Royce's insistence on the universality of the ethical postulate. All postulates arise from our need to adjust to this "pluralistic universe", James would say. Since no two individuals occupy the same position in it, no two individuals will require the same ethical postulates. Furthermore James maintained that Royce's notion of "the necessary ethical postulate" is replete with practical difficulties. In the final chapter of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Royce claims that, given the validity of the Absolute, one's duty would be to lose his life in the Absolute's life; "Live out thy life in its full meaning; for behold, it is God's life."

Practically speaking this seems to mean that it is the duty of the ethical man to fulfill as many possibilities as possible. But the difficulty is that one has possibilities such as murder and theft whose realization Royce would consider unethical. If the standard is objective it must supply a means of distinguishing those possibilities which should be realized from those which should not be realized. This difficulty becomes even more serious in the light of Royce's severe criticism of intuitionist ethics. If the Good is
defined as fulfilling the divine and if that life is the
determinant of everything that is, where is there room for
freedom? Just where that life is going poses another
problem. Some have said that the ultimate outcome of
"Die Entwieclung des Geistes" is the hegemony of imperial
Prussia; to others it has been the establishment of a
classless society. James would avoid all these dif-
ficulties by saying: "Obey your own intuitions! But
remember that others also have their intuitions. The
capital sin is to claim that your intuitions of the Good
are the only ones to be had!"

Here in a nutshell we have the essence of James'
assault upon Royce's absolute. Now it is a good prin-
ciple that any theory of truth must also be able to
state the conditions whereby it can be overthrown. It
is a valid question to ask an opponent: Under what cir-
cumstances will you agree that your theory is inadequate?
Now it seems that the condition whereby James' theory
could be refuted would involve a demonstration of the fact
that reality expresses one rational purpose despite the
fact that so many individual purposes are frustrated.
Secondly, Royce would have to demonstrate that there is
an ethical imperative which is grounded in the nature of
this one rational purpose that reality expresses and
furthermore that this ethical imperative is not so general
that it leaves most ethical decisions arbitrary. Finally
he would have to show that his world does not involve the
exclusion of freedom.
We shall now try to show how the demonstration of these factors involved a radical change in one of Royce's basic principles (namely, that truth meets needs) and why this change was necessary if James' challenge were to be met and the Absolute preserved. (It is not implied that this was the sole reason that Royce changed his approach. His genuine interest in truth might have brought about the change regardless of any ulterior considerations. However, it seems to me that James' "bombardment of the Absolute" accelerated this switch.)

The first step in establishing the fact that reality is consistent would be to point out that human purposes are not the sole criteria of rationality. Otherwise, everytime a purpose was defeated, Royce would be open to the charge that reality, at least in part, was irrational. Secondly it would have to be demonstrated that the self is part of a rational whole and has meaning solely in terms of this. Finally it would have to be shown that this conception of the self, as meaningful only in terms of the whole, does not negate freedom or leave most of the crucial ethical questions go begging.

As stated in the preceding paragraph, the first step is to show that the self, qua self, is not the determinant of rationality. The immediate retort would seem to be: If the self is not the determinant of rationality, then what is? The answer would have to be
"realities." "The real is rational! The rationals are real!"
To a statement like this James would immediately reply
"Hogwash!" In order to prove this sweeping generality
Royce would have to show that there is no such thing as
an immediate intuition of the self. The self would have
to be shown as knowing itself only in terms of those
purposes which reality has assigned to it. Nothing is
known intuitively, but only in terms of its relations.
Thus every act of knowledge would presuppose that
reality is composed of an intricate set of rational re-
lations. To speak of any reality, including the reality
of the self, as anything but this, is to deny that there
is any knowledge at all. The whole is the totality of
relations which is presupposed in any act of knowledge.

The foregoing are daring statements and if demon-
strated would certainly be a hammer blow to James'
highly individualistic radical empiricism. But to
accomplish this was not an easy task, nor did Royce
attempt to do it all at once. It seems, as we shall try
to show in the following pages, that this new direction
in Royce's thinking starts in The World and The Indi-
vidual and culminates in the second volume of The
Problem of Christianity. James could not have been
aware of this transition since he remarked upon reading
The World and The Individual:
I have in the last days, gone so far as to read Royce's book from cover to cover, a task made easy by the familiarity of the thought as well as the flow of the style. It is a charming production; it is odd that the adjectives 'charming' and 'pretty' emerge so strongly to characterize my impression. The book leaves a total effect on you like a picture—a summary impression of charm and grace as light as breath. The book consolidates an impression which I have never before got except by glimpses, that Royce's system is... to be classed as a light production.

The fact that James published Pragmatism in 1907 when he was fully aware of Royce's destructive criticism of that doctrine suggests that it was intended as a propedeutic to radical empiricism. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that The Meaning of Truth, which is a defense of radical empiricism immediately followed the publication of Pragmatism.

It seems that Royce borrowed his ideas concerning the self and the nature of knowledge from C. S. Peirce in order to overcome the difficulties for his Absolute which radical empiricism posed. Although Peirce's review of The World and The Individual in The Nation makes certain differences between his and Royce's view clear, he does note several basic similarities. Royce himself acknowledges his debt to Peirce in the preface to The World and The Individual:
In particular, however, I have now to mention what there can only appear in a very inadequate fashion, viz. my special obligation to Mr. Charles Peirce, not only for the stimulus gained from his various published comments and discussions bearing upon the concept of the infinite, but for the guidance and the suggestions due to some unpublished lectures of his which I had the good fortune to hear. I need not say that I do not intend, by this acknowledgement, to make him appear responsible for my particular opinions.¹

The following passage from the preface to The Problem of Christianity should dispel all doubt as to whether Peirce's influence upon Royce increased or decreased:

In spirit I believe my present book to be in essential harmony with the bases of philosophical idealism set forth in various earlier volumes of my own, and especially in the work entitled The World and The Individual...On the other hand the present work contains no mere repetition of my former expressions of opinion. There is much in it which I did not expect to say when I began the task here accomplished. As to certain metaphysical opinions which are stated in outline, I now owe much more to our great and unduly neglected American logician, Mr. Charles Peirce, than I do to the common tradition of recent idealism...²

When two men are concerned with the same philosophic problems and are philosophizing in the same milieu, it is difficult to ascertain what is original from what

¹ The World and the Individual, Preface p. xiii.
has been learned from the other. The preceding statements by Royce make it plain that he derived much from his association with Peirce. However, we also have evidence that Peirce learned from Royce. For example, he acknowledges a debt to Royce in a letter to him thanking him for *The World and The Individual*.

I should not have omitted to write and thank you for one of the most valuable works on my shelves. You seem to have penetrated metaphysics deeper than anyone... I now see most clearly the fundamental dependence of logic upon ethics, and also the indispensability of the active element in thought.¹

In *The Problem of Christianity* Royce refers to several papers of Peirce from which he has gleaned much information.² Since all of the mentioned papers were written in the late 1860's, there is no question concerning the fact that, in this case, the ideas are originally Peirce's. However, Royce became aware of the importance of these ideas only during the latter part of his career and tells us that to his knowledge James was never aware of them.

Those ideas of Charles Peirce about interpretation to which I shall here refer, never, so far as I know, attracted William James' personal attention at any time. I may add that, until recently, I myself never appreciated their significance.³

---

2. *I*, 115.
Now granting that Royce was unaware of the significance of these papers, nevertheless the ideas contained in them (namely, an attack upon the possibility of immediate cognition) appear in Royce's work as early as the publication of The World and the Individual. Their full exposition in The Problem of Christianity seems to be the culmination of a process started in 1899 rather than a revolution in Royce's thinking as the preface to this work might suggest. Having voiced these considerations concerning the reciprocity of their influence upon one another, we shall now proceed to give an exposition of the basic argument contained in these papers and to show how Royce adopted these ideas to save his absolute from the onslaughts of "radical empiricism".

In his paper entitled "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man", Peirce first considers whether or not it is possible to judge whether a cognition be immediate or determined by a previous cognition. (By an immediate cognition or intuition he means a cognition not determined by a previous cognition or, to put it another way, a premise not deduced from other premises). He is led to believe that we cannot distinguish an immediate cognition from a mediate cognition and offers the following evidence in its support: a) It is common for witnesses to confuse what
they have seen with what they have inferred. b) Our dreams appear to us as immediate events, but it is commonly accepted that dreams are determined by previous cognitions. c) Children believe that they have always known their mother-tongue. d) Before scientific discovery proved it otherwise, it was commonly believed that the third dimension of space was immediately intuited. e) The pitch of tone seems immediate, but investigation shows that it depends on the successions of the vibrations which reach the ear.

From this evidence Peirce concludes that it is impossible to know on the basis of an intuition itself whether or not it is immediate or mediated. From this it follows that the question of whether there is an immediate intuition of the self cannot be answered by the fact that we seem to have such an intuition, but rather must be answered in terms of evidence. Peirce submits the following evidence to show that our self-knowledge is not immediate: a) Children use the word "I" at a relatively late stage in their development. b) Children view their own bodies as important "things". c) When a sound or bell is heard by a child, he thinks, not of himself as hearing, but of the bell or other object as sounding. d) The child takes testimony by others as the surest sign of fact, including the facts about what the self called Johnny or
Willy is. (Is he smart, dumb, white, Negro, etc.?)

e) There is a class of appearances which are often contradicted; these are the particular feelings about reality and are the source of error. The self becomes known as that which errs.

From this Peirce concludes that there are definite existing facts which bring about self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is not direct; it is indirect.

On the basis of his certainty that all knowledge is mediated, Peirce distinguished three aspects in every cognition. The first is the experience of an object. Secondly, there is the element or sign whereby the object is interpreted. (In order to be known the object must be compared to something which it is not; either in terms of its effect on those things or by a comparison of differentiating or similar features, we establish a criterion by which the experience of the object can be described). Finally, there is that agent which does the interpreting. Now the question immediately arises, How do you know the nature of the sign (the factor in terms of which the new experience is interpreted)? In order for it to be known did it not also have to have a sign by which it could be understood? The question is briefly, In order for knowledge to have started, must there not have been at least one immediate intuition to start the whole process going? Gallie, who is very sympathetic
to Peirce, tries to get out of this difficulty by saying that although it is not absurd to say that there is in any individual a specific time when his knowledge started, it would nevertheless be valid to say that it is impossible in principle to pin-point such a time.

From the foregoing description of the implications of Peirce's criticism of intuitionism one might be led to suspect that he was a positivist and indeed certain positivists claim him to be one of their founders. However, Peirce did admit of metaphysical procedures. For example, he held that that by which the nature of a thing is interpreted must be conceived in universal terms. Although no universal can be verified empirically, he held that it could be demonstrated that every act of knowledge implied the existence of universals:

Five minutes of our waking life will hardly pass without our making some kind of prediction; and in the majority of cases these predictions are fulfilled in the event. Yet a prediction is essentially of a general nature, and cannot ever be completely fulfilled. To say that a prediction has a decided tendency to be fulfilled, is to say that the future events are in a measure really governed by a law. If a pair of dice turns up sixes five times running that is a mere uniformity. The dice might happen fortuitously to turn up sixes a thousand times running. But that would not afford the slightest security for a prediction that they would turn up

sixes the next time. If the prediction has a tendency to be fulfilled, it must be that future events have a tendency to conform to a general rule. 'Oh,' but say the nominalists, 'this general rule is nothing but a mere word or couple of words!' I reply, 'Nobody ever dreamed of denying that what is general is of the nature of a sign; but the question is whether future events will conform to it or not. If they will, your adjective 'mere' seems to be ill-placed.' A rule to which future events have a tendency to conform is in fact an important thing, an important element in the happening of those events. This mode of being which consists, mind my word if you please, the mode of being which consists in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take on a general determinate character, I call Thirdness.¹

Furthermore, Peirce's philosophy was not simply an accumulation of facts concerning the nature of experience. It included a dialectic which explained how and why our knowledge of these facts progressed. According to Peirce every attempt to discover the nature of an experience was brought about by the "inrush" into the field of those experiences to which we are adjusted of an unknown, a novel experience. An adjustment to experience is called a belief. A belief is that which we are ready to act upon. Our beliefs are the sum total of interpretations we have made concerning reality. In many cases a belief can be a reliance on the interpretive ability of another. For example, we interpret a dentist as being a man capable

of interpreting the nature of tooth cavities to the extent of being able to fill them. The following two conditions give assurance to our beliefs: a) We find that a given experience is interpreted in the same way as we have interpreted it by independent inquiry. b) One can predict and control an experience as a result of the interpretation made of it. (Go to the dentist with a tooth ache and leave with the tooth cured.)

Now this "inrush" of something which shakes a belief, this new experience for which we have no prepared pattern of behavior, produces a state of disharmony or maladjustment. For example, when it turns out that the shoemaker has not fixed my shoe, to take an easy example; or a more difficult one, when people are stricken with an unknown disease. The difference between the disharmony caused is one of degree, not of kind. This status of having an experience towards which one does not know how to act is called a state of doubt. That event whose nature is to a large extent "unknown" (unknown to the extent that the factors which control it are not known) is called experience. Experience can be defined as that for which we have no planned readiness and the status of the individual before experience (as it has been just defined) is doubt. However, as soon as an individual or community is faced with an "unknown experience" it immediately starts all its forces of interpretation going
to understand the nature of the new experience and get it under control. This process whose end is to eradicate doubt is called inquiry.

Thus with every new experience brought under control through a successful interpretation, the community grows "in knowledge and truth" and now has a wider context in terms of which to interpret any new experiences and in terms of which to reinterpret its past experience. This fund of knowledge is not held by any one member of the community but is spread throughout the entire community.

In the light of the preceding sketch of Peirce's pragmatism, its differences with James' should be obvious. James believed in pure intuition. As far as Peirce was concerned, there is no such thing as pure intuition. James believed that "workability" could be defined privately. Peirce believed that any truth worthy of the name had to belong to the community.

James was a nominalist. It is only particulars that exist. Peirce is a metaphysical realist.

We pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that, if Boyce was to meet the objections of radical empiricism, he would have to dethrone the individual as the determinant of rationality or irrationality. The individual could no longer judge the world as rational or irrational with the criterion being whether or not it met his needs. The needs had to be explained as objects
supplied to the individual from without in accordance with a rational plan. Thus when a given need seemed to be frustrated, the frustration would not prove that reality was irrational, but rather that the overall rational plan called for the frustration of a certain need. Thus starting with The World and the Individual, the rational structure of a reality prior to any individual postulation begins to play an important role in "Joyce's speculations. To put it briefly, the basic tenet of his idealism, "Truth meets needs", is being given a new interpretation.¹

In The World and the Individual Joyce starts his entire discussion by an investigation of that which apparently lies outside of the mind. (The basic question is, How can an idea be related to its object?) After rejecting the view that the object of knowledge is independent of the subject of knowledge on the grounds that to the extent that the object of knowledge is independent of the subject of knowledge, to that extent it cannot be known, Joyce proceeds to investigate the mystic view. The mystic view attempts to solve the problem of the relation of an idea to its object by denying that there

¹. See Appendix I for a comparison of a passage from The Religious Aspect of Philosophy with a passage from The World and the Individual which demonstrates the transition view which has taken place in the period lying between these two books.
is any distinction between the two. The mystic, in effect, denies plurality. His cry is, All is one! Royce points out that there is a contradiction in the mystic view in so far as it must first assert plurality in order to deny it. The mystic's assent to plurality is not a mere formal one. Before he denies plurality, he admits that there is such a state of affairs as plurality. He may call it an illusion, but even admitting there is illusion is an admission that all is not one. The mystic way of solving the problem of the one and the many is unacceptable.

The third possible way of viewing Being, says Royce, is that of the critical rationalist. The critical rationalist does not deny the diversity of things. Neither does he deny the diversity of things. Neither does he deny that the fact of relation implies some kind of "ens commune". He simply accepts the fact that things are different and yet somehow connected by some unifying principle. How this can be is an insoluble problem for him and he insists that any attempt to do so leads into an infinite number of paradoxes. The critical rationalist confines himself to an impartial study of the relations to be found in being without assuming to give a metaphysical reason for the existence of these relations in the first place.

Royce claims that the critical rationalist view
implies the belief that the whole of reality is the expression of one overall purpose. One could not begin to seek objective relations unless he also held that there was a metaphysical principle which sustained them. When a scientist makes a mistake, he does not say that reality is wrong. He says: "I have misinterpreted reality." Or to put it another way, he says, "I have not seen the relations or purposes which such and such an aspect of reality possesses." However, the one fact that he never denies, be he a mathematician, chemist or physiologist, is: The real is rational. The rational is real.

Thus in the first volume of The World and the Individual Royce has attempted to show that the self as such is not the judge of the rationality of the world. Thus Royce vindicates the first item in his philosophy that was subjected to attack by radical empiricism; namely, the proposition that reality is completely rational.

Royce has met this attack by adopting a new procedure for establishing his absolute idealism. In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy the argument for the absolute was based upon the fact that all truth is the result of postulation. The fact of error implies that there must be a transcendent postulator. The argument started with the individual knower. The argument in The World and the Individual does not start with the
assumption that all knowledge is the result of postulation. It starts with the fact that there are external objects and ideas whose truth seems to depend on their conformity to these objects. In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy the existence of the external world is not supposed. In The World and the Individual the existence of such a world is the starting point of the entire discussion.

The method of the first volume of The World and the Individual is analytic. The question asked is: What are the possible ways of explaining the relation between an idea and its object? Royce then attempts to show that the only consistent explanation is absolute idealism. Cognitive dualism (which Royce unfortunately calls realism) ends up by denying the possibility of relation. Mysticism can only be maintained by denying diversity. Critical rationalism implies absolute idealism.

In the first volume of The World and the Individual, the individual does not occupy the center of the scene, but Being as such does. This analysis of being results in the conclusion that the individual as such is not the determinant of what is rational and irrational in the world. However, this rejection of the individual as the determinant of rationality does not end here. In lecture six of Volume two wherein Royce discusses the human self, he argues that the self is not the separate ego accepting and rejecting various aspects of reality.
The self is formed by its relation to the reality which goes beyond it. Since no two people have the same spatial and temporal environment, no two individuals have the same formation. That most of the influences brought to bear on us are social in origin can hardly be denied. Neither can it be denied in the light of our discussion of Peirce that there is a distinct Peircean element to it. Royce states this novel view concerning the nature of the self in the following passage:

Nobody amongst us men comes to self consciousness so far as I know, except under the persistent influence of his social fellows. A child in the earlier stages of his social development, - say from the end of the first to the beginning of the fifth year of life, - shows you, as you observe him, a process of the development of self-consciousness in which, at every stage, the Self of the child grows and forges itself through Imitation and through functions that cluster about the Imitation of others, and that are secondary thereto. In consequence, the child is in general conscious of what expresses the life of somebody else, before he is conscious of himself.1

This description of the evolution of the self does not differ essentially from the description given by Peirce which we brought forth at the beginning of this chapter. It is interesting to note that in Peirce's review of Volume two of The World and the Individual, taking note of Royce's definition of the internal meaning of an idea.

as signifying all the purposes an idea was capable of fulfilling, he draws a parallel with his own "pragmatist" definition of truth, namely, that any concept can be defined in terms of all the practical differences it makes. However, he also marks a difference. Whereas Royce holds that all these purposes (or to state it another way, all these systems of relations) composing reality, must be contained in an absolute mind which exhibits to itself the entire course of time, he (Peirce) holds that although indeed there must be an objective goal to inquiry, it is not necessary to infer that this goal is already attained by an all-embracing mind.

That for the most important signs the signification is intrinsic, the denotation (quod nominant) extrinsic, is generally recognized. Professor Royce marks the distinction by the terms Internal Meaning and External Meaning. He conceives of the Internal Meaning in a special way. Another writer, a quarter of a century ago proposed this maxim: 'Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object.' Carrying this pragmatic spirit a trifle further, Professor Royce holds that the internal meaning of an idea is a purpose, instead of regarding it with his predecessor, as a germinal purpose.1

1. Review of The World and The Individual, The Nation, LXXV (1902),
We hasten to point out that Peirce makes a clear distinction between germinal purpose and a purpose. The whole notion of purpose as Peirce clearly stated it is that it is partially unfulfilled. That is to say it is partially in potency to act. Now for Royce this potency is real. It is a concrete idea in the Hegelian sense. For Peirce this potency to act is not a concrete Hegelian idea. It is a potency to act whose actualization is among other factors subject to chance. The truth and falsity of many judgements rests upon whether or not a thing is in potency or in act. Since all potency for the absolute idealist is "already concretized" in an all embracing mind, the distinction between potency and act becomes metaphysically unreal. Peirce retains the scholastic sense of potency which Royce rejects. However, Peirce goes on to say that despite this implication of the "block-universe" theory, Royce clearly does make this distinction (between potency and act) especially in his criticism of other philosophers.

All reasoning goes upon the assumption that there is a true answer to whatever question may be under discussion; which answer cannot be rendered false by anything that the disputants may say or think about it; and further, that the denial of that true answer is false. This makes an apparent difficulty for idealism. For if all reality is of the nature of an actual idea, there seems to be no room for possibility or any lower mode than actuality, among the categories of being. (Hegel includes modality only in his Subjective
Logic.) But what, then, can be the mode of being of a representation or meaning unequivocally false? For Hegel, the false is the bad, that which is out of harmony with its own essence; and since, in his view, contradiction is the great form of activity of the world, he has no difficulty in admitting that an idea may be out of harmony with itself. Professor Royce, however, seems almost to resent the idea that anybody could suppose that he denied the validity of the distinction of truth and falsehood. He is fairly outspoken in pronouncing sundry doctrines false (a word Hegel hardly uses), even if we do not quite hear his foot come down.

To be sure Peirce holds the nature of knowledge to be teleological. He does maintain that the community does have as a goal the total comprehenion of reality. But to maintain this does not necessarily mean that this total comprehension of reality is already completed.

Now in The World and the Individual Royce disestablishes the self as the determinant of what is and what is not rational. He also tries to demonstrate that the very notion of the self arises from the external world. These are Peirccian doctrines which were forcibly defended by Peirce in 1868 in his paper Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man. Since there is only a general statement of indebtedness to Peirce in the introduction to The World and the Individual, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not Royce adopted this doctrine as a result of his studies of Peirce. That

1. Review of The World and the Individual, The Nation, LXV,
the doctrine is the same can scarcely be denied.

Royce utilized this doctrine of the self to dethrone the self and its needs as the determinant of whether or not reality is rational. However, as a result of his analysis of the four conceptions of being, he maintains that the world must be a self-contained rational whole. This view is rejected by Peirce as we have tried to show in our discussion of his review of *The World and the Individual*. Royce's views concerning the "block-universe" which are based upon the assertion of the actuality of possibility is strictly Hegelian and is employed by him against James as late as the Publication of *The Philosophy of Loyalty* in 1908. For example, in the chapter entitled *Loyalty, Truth and Reality* wherein there is an exhaustive analysis of James' pragmatism, he makes the following statement.

But the real whole conspectus of experience, the real view of the totality of life, the real expression of that will to live in and for the whole, which every assertion of truth and every loyal deed expresses well a conspectus that includes whatever facts are indeed facts, be they past, present or future. I call this whole of experience an eternal truth. I do not thereby mean as my colleague (James) seems to imagine, that the eternal order exists and then our life in time comes and copies that order. I mean simply that the whole of experience includes all changes, and, since it is the one whole that we all want and need, succeeds in so far as it supplements all failures, accepts all, even the blindest of services and wins what we seek. Thus winning it is practically
good and worthy. 1

In summation we should say that Royce meets James' attack on the absolute rationality of the world by three thrusts. The first thrust is Royce's undermining of the individual self as the determinant of rationality, by a doctrine of the self which was expounded by Peirce as far back as 1868. This thrust was based upon the presupposition that no knowledge, including self-knowledge, was immediate. The second thrust is Royce's defense of the idea that the very conception of Being presupposes that being, both potential and actual, is a rational totality. The third thrust is his conjunction of his notion of reality as the expression of an absolute Purpose with pragmatism. Everything that works is true, but it only works because it is an expression of the divine plan.

This leads us to a consideration of the second aspect of James' attack upon Royce's absolute idealism; namely, his charge that absolute idealism cannot offer any practical criteria for making value judgements and secondly, his charge that it (absolute idealism) implies a determinism which destroys freedom and stifles individuality. In his discussion of freedom in The World and the Individual, Royce tells us that a strict determinism can only be maintained by denying what is

1. The Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 344-45.
individual in experience. Since his absolute idealism is highly individualistic he feels that the charge of determinism is unwarranted.

To explain man in causal terms is to view him as an external observer sees o. might see him; and not as he himself means to be when he expresses his will in his deeds. Hence what you never causally explain about a man is precisely his primary character as a Self, namely, his conscious meaning itself, in so far as it is his. And secondly, all causal explanation has to do with the types and the describable general characters of events, and never with whatever is individual about events. For the individual...is the indefinable aspect of Being. But what you cannot define, you cannot explain in causal terms.

Whether this notion of the individual as the aspect of being which cannot be causally described is derived from Peirce cannot be determined. We know that Peirce maintained that an explanation of why this individual exists rather than another cannot be given. One can dissect and analyze its elements and infer the laws by which these elements came together, but this analysis can never give the reason why it is this particular individual that is rather than another. This doctrine of haecceitas Peirce derived from his studies of Duns Scotus. Since Peirce was not a subscriber to the "block-universe", he had no difficulties in accepting it.

However, Royce did have quite a few difficulties reconciling individuality with a "block-universe". The individual, Royce claimed, was not irrational. It had meaning in terms of the whole. The whole itself would not be a whole were it not for the individuals which composed it. The whole depends on the parts; the parts depend on the whole. Since the nature of rationality implies universality, we are forced to ask, How can there be anything individual in a world that is totally rational? Royce's answer seems to be that the only true universal is the mind of the absolute and everything becomes rational in terms of the absolute. Outside of the absolute, he would claim, the world seems irrational. Thus things in themselves seem irrational. Conceived in terms of the absolute they become rational. Not only this, but the knowledge of any individual implies a rational whole. Peirce is very aware of this peculiar nominalism of absolute idealism wherein there is but one universal. "Hegel was a nominalist of realistic yearnings". The fact that Peirce was a realist in the scholastic sense (i.e. regarding universals) makes this one of the chief difference between the two men. At first glance, it seems that Royce is open to the charge that if reality is composed of billions of discrete individuals, there

cannot be any science. However, Royce immediately points out that their difference lies solely in their relations and not in their substance. There is only one substance, the absolute. All else are his manifestations. The differences between individuals are not substantial, but modal. Science is that which compares the modality of things in experience and seeks to find patterns of regularity. Since any two individuals contain an infinite number of scientific laws can be discovered. But it should be remembered that the discovery of these patterns of regularity would constitute a new development in the human community. Every discovery is one more step on the road to the total comprehension of reality. Furthermore, a new discovery can only be made by reaching out of oneself into the whole. Now in so far as the individuals who try to comprehend things causally are unique, they defy causal description. At its very best, causal description is piecemeal. In order to give a scientific description of an event, it is necessary to isolate the relevant factors and then to generalize concerning them. Thus causality as such can never reach the distinctively individual in experience. Furthermore since that which is unique cannot be causally explained, it follows that the individual must be free.
Now into the endless discussions as to the causal relations of this or that aspect of the human will we have declined in this discussion to go. We have declined because we have said that all causation, whatever it is, is but a special case of Being, and can never explain any of the ultimate problems about Being. But when we have asserted, as we have now done, that in our rational life our momentary will and its finite expression belong to this very unique aspect of our finite life, we have indeed found in our finite will an aspect which no causation could ever by any possibility explain. For whatever else causation may be, it implies the explanation of facts by their general character, and by their connections with other facts. Whatever is unique, is as such not causally explicable. The individual as such is never the mere result of law. In consequence, the causal explanation of an object never defines its individual and unique characters as such, but always its general characters. Consequently, if the will and the expression of that will in our finite life possesses characters, namely, precisely these individual and uniquely significant characters which no causal explanation can predetermine, then such acts of will, as significant expressions of purpose in our life, constitute precisely what ethical common sense has always meant by free acts.

Thus Royce bases freedom on uniqueness. To be unique is to be free. But upon reflection, the question immediately arises, What in the world is not unique? Since all objects known to man are individuated, does it follow that all are free? If Royce would say that the

individuality of the different objects of experience is not derived from themselves, but from their relation to a mind, it would follow that they were no longer free (i.e. undetermined) but rather dependent and determined by the mind on which they depended. Thus despite Royce's contention that his absolute idealism did not exclude freedom, it seems to me that James' point is well taken. It seems that one of the essential requirements of a free act is an objective field wherein more than one course of action is possible. Now if one has conceived the metaphysical structure of reality in such a way that all possibilities are already actualized in a "block-universe", he has destroyed one of the necessary conditions of a free act. If, as Royce maintained, all reality is already actualized in the absolute, then there is "really" no such thing as a real possibility. Everything is already actualized in the absolute. But the fact that potentiality is a mode of being constitutes the foundation for freedom. Since Royce's notion of an absolute fulfillment prohibits a real distinction between potency and act, his inclusion of freedom in his system cannot be systematically defended. It is to his merit that his system did not blind him to the reality of freedom and he did try very hard to make room for it. However, his efforts did not convince James and to the very end, this was one of James' reasons
for rejecting absolute idealism.

Having stated these problems concerning freedom, we now proceed to discuss Royce's answer to James' charge that his system was unable to produce a practicable ethic. In The Philosophy of Loyalty, Royce tells us that all men, regardless of commitment in life, maintain that to have a purpose in life is better than not to have a purpose. Now since all purposes involve an individual with other men, either directly or indirectly, it is clear that what is here meant is a social purpose. Royce calls this status of having a purpose a "cause". Thoroughgoing devotion to a cause is called loyalty. Royce's appeal for loyalty as a basic good which all men can accept is based upon pragmatic considerations. The biggest problem in life for anyone is finding a purpose and, once having it, to discover how to realize it most efficiently. The need of the individual is no longer the satisfaction of any fleeting desire through postulation. The need arises from the basic need underlying all needs, namely, what is my place in the universe? The postulation is not that of an individual locked up in himself, but rather of an individual in a real world, upon which his very existence has an effect and which is constantly affecting him. The postulation is not made by blind courage, but rather by a cool assessment of the talents and opportunities at that individual's command.
The recognition of loyalty as the basic good does not involve any insight into an arbitrarily established realm of values. It simply is the recognition of a need that all individuals have whether they be Englishmen or Hottentots. Once it is established that loyalty is the basic good, Royce believes that it is possible to form a hierarchy of values by saying that those loyalties which tend to spread loyalty are of a higher value than those which tend to do away with loyalty. For example, the loyalty of a man to his family is of higher value than the loyalty of a criminal to his gang. A loyalty which tends to abolish universal loyalty, such as the loyalty of a criminal to his gang, is what Royce would call sin. If by evil is meant not having a cause, then that cause which undermined "having a cause" would be an evil cause. Thus with "Loyalty to Loyalty!" as the categorical imperative, Royce claims that his absolute idealism provides the means of making even the most delicate ethical decisions. Furthermore, with each individual purpose fulfilled, the whole is that much more developed. Thus Royce's ethic is solidly anchored in his absolute idealism.

Questions regarding the exact details of the end of the process of being, whether it will be a communist society, a pluralistic society, a mystic reverie or what not, do not concern Royce. The end will take care of
itself. The important thing for the individual is to be loyal himself and thereby encourage universal loyalty.
CONCLUSION

We have tried to show that the basic problem for Royce was that of reconciling certain antinomies; the basic one was the world and the individual. "Truth meets needs" represented the dynamic, the individual aspect of truth; "Truth is also true" represents the complete, the eternal aspect of truth. In his early works, the description of the way that truth met needs was extremely Jamesian. The individual felt a need within himself and then postulated. The need could have either a public or private verification. In the latter stage of his thought, there was no need and no postulation which was not imposed from without. There is no question concerning whether or not the external world is no more than one successful postulation among many others. In his final work, The Problem of Christianity, wherein he acknowledges his indebtedness to Peirce for the ideas that the quest for truth is a community endeavour and that all knowledge is mediate, the transition is seen quite clearly. It is tempting to speculate concerning whether or not Peirce's influence on Royce would have increased, had the two men lived longer. Would Royce have substituted Peirce's community of interpreters for the absolute? It would also be interesting to observe whether or not James' radical empiricism would have developed into an instrumentalism of the Dewian
variety as a result of Royce's criticism of it. In any case, the point that seems to be established, and indeed, the point which it has been the purpose of this paper to demonstrate, is that there is a major difference in Royce's early understanding of what needs and postulations are, and his later understanding of them.

Despite this major difference between the "early Royce" and the "later Royce", one aspect of his thought remains constant throughout. The traditional distinction between essence and existence was never maintained by Royce. He attempted to formulate existence in his early philosophy by claiming that it consisted in the totality of facts postulated by an all-including postulator. In his later philosophy it was a community of interpreters progressing toward a goal of complete interpretation of reality. In either case existence is subjugated to essence. The form of being determines the act of being. Royce claimed in his early philosophy that the underlying form which determined reality could be ascertained through an analysis of postulation. In his later philosophy, we are told that this knowledge is to be attained through an understanding of the nature of interpretation. The very nature of interpretation precludes the Jansenian voluntarism of Royce's initial system. How, it is asked, was this transition in the basic starting point made possible? It seems that this possibility rests on
the tacit admission that no concept can exhaust Being.
How else could Royce have abandoned his original ex-
planation of absolute idealism? To admit that his original
concept did not really include all the possibilities of
its object is to say that its object transcended it. The
historical fact of the transition in Royce's philosophy
seems to suggest that although he believed that he had
the key to reality, there was an even more fundamental
key whereby to test the original. The reality of this
more fundamental formula, whether it be called existence,
experience or anything else, would imply that all concepts,
no matter how broadly conceived, are based on objects
which are not concepts and which are both logically and
temporally prior to any concepts which are derived from
them. To designate Being as an "all-embracing concept"
is to preclude all knowledge of it that lies outside of
one's formulation of this "all-embracing concept." But
when one admits the existence of elements which do not
fall into one's conceptual scheme, one is forced to alter
the scheme. But if the alteration is no more than a
broader generalization, how can one be sure that it, too,
is not complete? If one has been wrong once, it is not
possible that he can be wrong again? The transition in
Royce's philosophy seems to imply that he also tacitly
held that that aspect of Being called existence or ex-
perience is the ultimate arbiter of philosophical truth.
Otherwise no transition would have been possible. How could a formula which claims to explain all reality, explain a change in itself? This conclusion, it seems to us, would be inevitable in the light of the fact that a transition did take place in the philosophy of Royce.
APPENDIX I

The following quotations, one from Royce's earlier period and the other from his later period, seem to illustrate the transition that we have commented on. There are many other such comparisons that can be made, but we feel that the following suffices to make our point clear. In the first passage the knowledge of reality is conceived to be the result of postulation of an independent self. In the second passage the knowledge of reality including the knowledge of the self is conceived as the result of processes which are temporally prior to and in this sense independent of the self.

Passage 1

If one is weary of the religious postulates, let him by all means throw them aside. But if he does this, why does he not throw aside the scientific postulates, and give up insisting that the world is and must be rational? Yea, let him be thoroughgoing and since the very perception of the walls of his room contains postulates, let him throw away all these postulates too, and dwell in the chaos of sensations unfriended. There is no reason why he should not do this unless he sees a deeper foundation for his postulates. We have no mere dogmas to urge here. Let one abandon all mere postulates, if he has not the courage to make them, but then let one consistently give them all up. The religious postulates are not indeed particular creeds. One may abandon creeds of many sorts, and yet keep the fundamental postulate. But if he abandons the fundamental postulate of religion, namely, that universal goodness is somehow at the heart of things, then he ought consistently to cease from the fundamental postulate of science namely, that universal, order-loving reason is somehow the truth of things. And not to do both is to lack the courage of rational and
Passage 2

Nobody amongst us men comes to self consciousness so far as I know, except under the persistent influence of his social fellows. A child in the earlier stages of his social development, say from the end of the first to the beginning of the fifty year of life, -- shows you as you observe him, a process of the development of self-consciousness in which, at every state, the Self of the child grows and forms itself through imitation and through functions that cluster about the Imitation of others, and that are secondary thereto. In consequence, the child is in general conscious of what expresses the life of somebody else before he is conscious of himself.2


---: *Pragmatism*, New York, Longmans, 1907.


---: *Some Problems of Philosophy*, New York, Longmans, 1911.

---: *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York, Longmans, 1912.


---: "Review of the World and the Individual", *Nation*, 1900, LXX and 1902, LXXV.


---: *The Sources of Religious Insight*, New York Scribners, 1912.


VITA

Gerard Clifford Farley, son of Bernard and Madeline McKee Farley, was born June 17, 1933, in New York City. He attended Christopher Columbus High School, New York City, and was graduated in June 1950.

He entered the City College of New York in September 1950 and received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in January 1954.

In October 1955 he was accepted as a graduate student in the Graduate School of Arts and Science of Fordham University, where he majored in philosophy under the mentorship of Professor W. Norris Clarke S. J.