1-1-2009


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Chapter 2

A philosophical shock: Foucault reading Nietzsche, reading Heidegger

Babette E. Babich

Michel Foucault analyzes the formation of the ‘subject’ or ‘self’ in a post-Nietzschean, post-Heideggerian, quasi-Marxist, or today, we had better correct that to say, just because few scholars have any desire to be named Marxist: simply, vaguely leftist context, exceeding what has been called the poststructuralist as much as the postmodern moment by means of different epistemic discourses of imitation, representation, but also rhetorical or ‘stylistic’ discourses and including practical or therapeutic analysis. Additionally, to recall the important question of practice and the increasingly popular language of philosophical therapy, more than Nietzsche’s vision of either convalescence (and nihilism) or healing or indeed of the philosopher as lawgiver or a physician of culture, Foucault is illuminated by Pierre Hadot’s analysis of the Stoic ‘art’ of philosophy as ‘a way of life’.

To many readers, Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche has seemed the most obvious of all and to the degree that Foucault’s epistemology foregrounds the genealogical transferences of power or its productive technologies, including the calculative stratagems and technologies of the body, manifest in the history of the natural and social or human sciences, as in art and literature, Foucault’s analysis has often been read as a straightforward elaboration/continuation of Nietzsche’s own ‘genealogy’ (as if this itself were somehow a transparent affair as I have long argued that it is not) and this is often coordinate with a variety of efforts to distinguish the two, where all such distinctions are always effective associations.

Nietzsche’s arch-polemical and highly elliptical genealogy goes beyond Foucault’s rather more traditional understanding of genealogy if only because and in great measure, Nietzsche often invents his genealogies which is not to say that he makes them up but only that he ‘paints’ his genealogies, like his hopes, on the metaphorically conceptual wall (Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) §296) in bold colors and broad strokes for the sake of what he called his future and for Nietzsche that future always means the
reader. In this fashion, Nietzsche would compose his *The Gay Science* as a complex readerly appeal to philologists and scholars cum scientists of all stripes, recasting his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music* in terms of the chronologically, culturally different example of the *gai sabre* that was the song tradition of the Provencal knight-poets or troubadours. Highlighting Nietzsche’s re-envisioning of his first elaboration of the relation between music and word, one has also to note how very tendentious this had, inevitably, to be for Nietzsche and if only because and very like Foucault in this regard, Nietzsche also and always sought to do more than just one thing in any of his writings.

In this multifarious fashion, Nietzsche concludes the first book of *The Gay Science* with a provocation against the all-too common ‘clamor about distress’ and the habit of those who seemingly seek suffering (Nietzsche’s readers imagine that he is here thinking of Schopenhauer or else of Wagner but the reference is perfectly political, where Nietzsche denounces the slogan ‘Neediness is needed! [Not ist nötig],’ a political convention that has yet to go out of style). Against the ‘clamor’ of the ‘politicians,’ against the youthful enthusiasms of those who, as Nietzsche puts it, ‘do not know what to do with themselves,’ Nietzsche proposes yet another and still indeed very Foucauldian tactic, one little adverted to by his advocates who often miss his extraordinarily melancholy but still and perfectly solar or divine joy: ‘—Pardon me, my friends,’ Nietzsche writes in a style captivating for Derrida and others on the seductive and forgotten art of friendship, ‘I have ventured to paint my happiness on the wall.’ (*The Gay Science* (GS) §56). This painted, dappled happiness would be a ‘happiness humanity has not known thus far’ (GS §337). Like the sun at evening, when ‘even the poorest fisherman rows with golden oars,’ this would be ‘the happiness of a god full of power and love, full of tears and laughter’ (Ibid., cf. GS §383).

**Foucault and Nietzsche; Foucault and Heidegger**

Although there is no lack of efforts to read Foucault and Nietzsche together or indeed to align Foucault and Heidegger, Foucault scholarship overall tends to be split on these same terms. In the following, I argue that the opposition is misleading for the complicated reason that Foucault’s Heidegger can only be understood on Nietzschean terms while and at the same time, Foucault’s Nietzsche only takes place by way of Heidegger albeit (and this point simply cannot be overemphasized) a very Frencophone reading of Heidegger.
For these and other reasons, reading Foucault *qua* Nietzschean (apart from Foucault’s Heidegger) is as misleading as reading Foucault *qua* Heideggerian (apart from Foucault’s Nietzsche). The difficulty here, both singularizing and pernicious, is that reading both Nietzsche and Heidegger apart from one another is so common as to be automatic. Explicitly Heideggerian readings of Foucault are thus inclined to content themselves with more rather than less stumbling caricatures of Nietzsche and the same can be said for Nietzschean readings of Foucault which tend to be less clumsy than patently, vehemently anti-Heideggerian.

Critics on both sides argue that Foucault overlooks the philosophical specificity of either Nietzsche or Heidegger and that he does so for the sake of his own very particular social analyses of praxes and institutions. On the level of rhetoric, Foucault appropriates what he can take to be Nietzschean tactics for his own purposes—Michel de Certeau is superb on this,—but it can also be argued that such rhetorical aims work in a wholly other sense in Nietzsche’s similarly ambitious strategy as a writer, effecting a tactical chiasm between Foucault and Nietzsche as between Foucault and Heidegger.

Marx, Freud, Nietzsche: in Ricoeur’s shadow

Foucault is at times read together with Nietzsche, at times regarded as a ‘Nietzschean’ of sorts and at times as if Foucault’s work simply elaborated upon or developed the Nietzschean project that is supposed to carry the name of a ‘genealogy’ alternately opposed, somewhat artificially given the pleonastic character of the term for Foucault, to an archaeology. There is, as part of this, a vague reflection on matters of philosophical style and rhetoric, taking Foucault to be a master tactician in this regard and noting that Nietzsche too might be regarded in the same way. Indeed with respect to rhetoric and style, supposedly sanctioned readings of Foucault have been more or less winnowed from the rest, or so one pretends. But reading Foucault, like reading Deleuze, like reading Nietzsche and Heidegger, is itself a thoroughly politicized business where some and only some readings are engaged (or to be explicit rather than allusive: only some readings of what seem to be a limitless and seemingly interdisciplinary array are cited/criticized/discussed) and others are not. In addition to such selective scholarly receptivity we may add the bean-counting politics of scholarly name-dropping, and today one finds less and less the older argument that Foucault’s genealogy continues an archaeological project that somehow begins if not with Freud than surely with Nietzsche. Gary Shapiro offers an
important correction of this habitual reading of Foucault, taken indeed on Foucault’s own terms\(^1\) just where Foucault contends that his project is a critical one that may be traced back to Kant.

Writing as ‘Maurice Florence,’ Foucault contends that to ‘the extent that Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant, and his project could be called a Critical History of Thought.’\(^1\) In just such a Kantian modality, Foucault is able to specify that ‘a critical history of thought would be an analysis of those conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those relations constitute a possible knowledge [savoir].’\(^1\)

It is in this critical spirit\(^1\) that Foucault responds to Ricoeur’s lectures on Freud,\(^1\) setting Nietzsche alongside Marx and Freud. For his own part, Ricoeur reflects on ‘Interpretation as Exercise of Suspicion,’ invoking the three musketeers of hermeneutics Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, the ‘three masters of suspicion,’\(^1\) I note that it is significant, revelatory even, that Ricoeur appropriates Nietzsche’s already conventional invocation not merely of the word but the phrasing of a ‘school of suspicion,’ where Nietzsche, in a late-written preface to Human, All too Human reminds his readers that his ‘writings have been called a school of suspicion [eine Schule des Verdachts] . . .’ [HH §i]. Ricoeur’s naming convention became standard even beyond Foucault, hence one may read Jean-Luc Marion’s Idol and Distance as offering another set of contenders for a new era, very nearly post-political, in the guise of Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Denys.\(^\) Nor is it irrelevant that in, and amidst, such variations, Nietzsche remains constant.

Jefferey Minson has argued that associations such as these and others do not license us to reduce Foucault to Nietzsche (bracketing for the space of this essay just what such a reduction might mean).\(^1\) Nevertheless a range of critically epistemic tactics often associated with Nietzsche recur in Foucault. If Nietzsche goes further than Foucault it is because he does not merely claim, in a provocative instantiation of what most commentators call his perspectivism, that ‘there is no truth’ but continues further to compound his own reflections, further reflecting upon the perspectival significance of such perspectives on perspectives and as such.\(^2\) Indeed, Nietzsche’s philosophy, early and late, is a sustained reflection upon the significance of or else on the consequences of this very lack of truth and our fondness for or belief in the truth (this corresponds to what he calls, and in a serried array: our asceticism and our piety).

For Douglas Smith, the interpretive dynamic or contest between Ricoeur and Foucault (and I would add here: Deleuze) inevitably excludes Heidegger,
which did not mean (as Smith observes with some understatement) that Heidegger had no role to play. Smith’s point is set contra Vincent Descombes’ interpretive troika for the explication of ‘French Philosophy.’ Thus the triad ‘Marx, Freud and Nietzsche,’ drawn from Ricoeur, functionally adumbrates not the relevance of Heidegger for Foucault but his irrelevance. Heidegger is as absent from Foucault as from Ricoeur, a claim repeated in tension with Foucault’s last interview ‘My whole philosophical development has been determined by my reading of Heidegger. But I acknowledge it was Nietzsche who got the upper hand.’

But Foucault’s French readers are inherently strangers neither to Nietzsche nor to Heidegger and one can argue that, ceteris paribus, the following reflections might also be extended to a reading of such (I am here speaking of Deleuze but it is important to emphasize that one might just as well refer to others such as de Certeau and Baudrillard, etc.).

Heidegger himself is yet another story and not only for Foucault scholars. Hence and although one has now the benefit of several readings of Foucault and Heidegger, one continues even here and even for such recent perspectives, to be faced with a neatly exclusive disjunction between either Heidegger and Foucault or Nietzsche and Foucault but rarely both together. As already noted, most French readers can be counted as exceptions, like Janicaud in addition to scholars like Prado and others.

For it is key that with Foucault one has to do with a continental thinker who has enjoyed a long and fruitful reception among analytic scholars (not only Hubert Dreyfus and Gary Gutting but also Ian Hacking, etc.) in addition indeed to interdisciplinary readings that extend throughout the social sciences.

Foucault and Heidegger

If one has had one’s Heidegger only by way of analytic readings such as Dreyfus’ (very) influential approach, the very same and still very analytic lens often reveals rather more Heidegger in Foucault than Foucault himself liked to confess. As a corollary, it may be added that a good part of the reason for deciding that a lion’s share of the influence between Nietzsche and Heidegger should be given to Nietzsche derives from the habit of assuming that what a thinker says in his last publications represents what he ‘really,’ somehow, thinks. So we take Foucault’s off-hand reflections as an ultimate confession: ‘. . . I am simply a Nietzschean, and
Foucault’s Legacy

I try to see, on a number of points, and to the extent that it is possible, with the aid of Nietzsche’s text—but also with anti-Nietzschean theses (which are nevertheless Nietzschean!)—what can be done in this or that domain. 28 And yet what does Foucault tell us here? Perhaps it is worth noting that by speaking of ‘anti-Nietzschean theses (which are none-the-less Nietzschean!)’ Foucault adumbrates an identifiably Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche. 29

One can and one has been urged to sidestep the rigors of both Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and his critique of the scientific limits of science. Most readers have enough to do follow Foucault. Indeed, Foucault himself has enough to do as when he reflects on the locus of power in writing and the diminution of the writer in modern times. Hence and on the specifically political issue of technoscience and biopower, Foucault could suggest that the modern scientifi c intellectual ‘emerged’ in the wake of the Second World War, ‘as a point of transition between the universal and the specifi c intellectual.’ 30 For Foucault, speaking of Oppenheimer in this particular context, it was owing to a very ‘direct and localised relation to scientifi c knowledge and institutions that the atomic scientist could make his intervention; but, since the nuclear threat affected the whole human race and the fate of the world, his discourse could at the same time be the discourse of the universal.’ 31 In the context of such ‘technico-scientifi c structures’ (and with respect to nuclear scientists, but also pharmacists and computer experts, etc.), Foucault is able to point out that ‘[t]ruth is’ in effect ‘a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth,’ i.e., ‘the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true.’ 32 As Foucault explains, and one can read Nietzsche (and indeed Heidegger on the same questions), such truth functional discourse tech-nologies include ‘the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.’ 33 Thus Foucault refers no less to Nietzsche than to Kant’s conception of belief or opinion as holding for true [für Wahrhalten, tenir-pour-vrai]. But to connect such a critical perspective on truth as well as technoscience and thence indeed to include, as Foucault includes, politics/society one needs to add Heidegger to Foucault’s Nietzschean and critical Kantianism (if only because Adorno would constitute an alternative or competing voice).
Foucault-Heidegger-Nietzsche: the politics of influence

I have been emphasizing the interpretive consequences to be drawn from the simplistic yet still dominant habit of reading either Heidegger or Nietzsche but rarely both together (the problem is compounded when one omits, as one tends to do in both cases, Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s Kant or else and indeed Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s Descartes). One assumes that Heidegger and Nietzsche are somehow antithetical thinkers, despite the famous/infamous detail that Heidegger devotes more of his writing (and reading) to Nietzsche than to any other thinker with the possible exception of Aristotle, whom Heidegger however also read as propedetic to a reading of Nietzsche (not the worst idea in the world, provided indeed one reads one’s Aristotle as Nietzsche did, and that is critically not categorically). Thus, we noted that Hans Sluga felt no need to integrate Foucault’s recollection that he ‘had to read Nietzsche in the fifties . . . Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me’ with his own claim that what was decisive for Foucault was Heidegger and not Nietzsche. It is likewise instructive that Dreyfus dismisses Foucault’s Nietzschean allusions although he too quotes the same final interview to emphasize his own focus on Heidegger. The problem, of course, turns upon Heidegger’s political liabilities (to speak gingerly here) and if Foucault is best set as far to the anarchic left as can be imagined (for an enthusiast of all things American, as he was), Foucault still and very blithely asserts contra the intellectually respectable dynamite that was/is Nietzsche and the very easy associative work that it is to read his genealogy as of a piece with Nietzsche that the decisive coordination was the two taken together, that is, Nietzsche and Heidegger. The combination functioned for Foucault, as it still ought to function for anyone, as an exactly ‘philosophical shock.’

Indeed, the ongoing shock is and remains this same conjunction. If Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger highlights a connection that may have been old news for (classically formed!) continental readers (it is the very point of departure, indeed for David Allison’s pathbreaking book collection, The New Nietzsche), Heidegger’s specific role in France has recently been highlighted in Janicau’s two volume Heidegger en France and (for Anglophone readers), Ethan Kleinberg’s Generation Existential. Indeed I argue that such political and sociological issues can often be the only thing at stake in deciding who one cites and who one does not cite but also whether or not one finds a thinker to have been influential. We tend as Nietzsche says not merely to find just and only what we are looking for but we also tend to be incapable of seeing anything else.
Reading

We will be hard pressed to answer the question of debt or influence with respect to the question of Heidegger and Foucault just because, and like other French authors, Foucault himself does not read his Nietzsche or indeed his Heidegger as Anglophone scholars tend to read Nietzsche and Heidegger. That is: what Foucault does not do is ‘read’ (or cite) certain texts and then explain these same cited texts to readers who have already read (and indeed often cited and explained) the same texts themselves. The problem is compounded (and hence we have the problem to begin with) because and as we have noted the ‘influence’ of his interviewers, when asked about such influences Foucault amiably acknowledges the same. So far so good, but how are we to understand the very idea of an intellectual ‘debt’?

We might go further and actually read Foucault. If so we may find ourselves in difficult straits, for Nietzsche tells us that reading does not come to us automatically: we need first to learn to read, and then we need to read in fact or actually, something we do only reluctantly and then only with authors who matter, or where the investment can pay us back (for the sake of, or as Nietzsche said, in order to write a book or essay of one’s own: in just such cases, so Nietzsche points out, one is, as Heidegger would say, still not reading).

To trace Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger we ourselves need to read but that means to read as Nietzsche reminded us that one might read, rather than merely set off on a hunt for relevant names. To this degree, any effort to limn Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault has more to do with random detail than Foucault’s specific engagement with Nietzsche or with the inevitably metonymic Nietzscheanism of French philosophy—a Nietzscheanism culminating, with a Freudian tinge, by a pretended denial in Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut’s collection, Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas nietzschéens /Why We Are Not Nietzscheans. The authors in this collection hardly oppose Nietzsche as much as they reflect upon the loss of a certain way of philosophizing in Nietzsche’s name. Thus Robert Legros muses: ‘How could a philosopher not be a Nietzschean, when all of Nietzsche’s philosophy sets out to radicalize the two quests that are at the very birth of philosophy: to criticize the obvious tenets that carpet the world and, through, creation, to evoke wonder at the irreducible enigma the world conceals? How,’ he repeats for emphasis, ‘to pretend to be a philosopher without feeling oneself to be Nietzschean?’ A similar sentiment echoes in Alain Raynaud’s insightful reflection on Nietzsche’s critical enlightenment
perspective on the enlightenment itself, as a post-Kantian project that was begun but ought not end with Nietzsche. Raynaud thus argues that if ‘Nietzsche can make of the Aufklärung an instrument for his critique of Reason, then we in turn can make of his “irrationalism” the means to continue the liberation that began with the Enlightenment.’ Looking to the very same Kantian adumbration of the question of enlightenment as his own self-description, his own very formalistic ecce homo, emphasizes it, Michel Foucault’s philosophy continues the same critical tradition.

Science and The Birth of the Clinic

We have come to hear the relevance of Canguilhem and Cavailles in Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic but of course the same text can be read between both Heidegger and Nietzsche as indeed with reference to other names, especially, and this is significant, in the philosophy of science. How do scientists see? How does science progress? There are convergent parallels with Norwood Russell Hanson’s extremely suggestive Patterns of Discovery but there are also parallels in Heidegger’s Being and Time and (specifically for Foucault’s analysis) in Heidegger’s ‘Science and World-Picture’ [Zeit des Weltbildes] a lecture from 1938, the same year in which the first translation of Heidegger’s work into French appeared (and including selections from Being and Time) in the collection Qu’est ce que la Métaphysique? To Heidegger one must also add Merleau-Ponty especially with regard to the specific notion of phenomenology to which Foucault himself makes reference. De Certeau, again, is useful here as he reminds us that what Foucault ‘discerns at this level’ is ‘the move [le geste] which has organized a discursive space.’ De Certeau points out that what is ‘decisive’ in such practices is less a matter of such discourses as might exclude ‘people from normal social intercourse’ than the very Cartesian, ‘miniscule and ubiquitously reproduced move of “gridding” (quadriller) a visible space in such a way as to make its occupants available for observation and “information.”’ If this is the panoptic example of Discipline and Punish, this is also the effective invention of modern medicine (all diagnosis, test, and demonstration—and less and less a matter of healing: that issue remains the patient’s problem not the clinician’s, henceforth medicine is no longer a matter of the relationship between ‘sickness and what alleviated it’ [The Birth of the Clinic (BC 55)] but a matter of teaching, of show and tell, the patient remade as an ‘object of positive knowledge’ [BC 197; cf. xviii]) as Foucault details this in The Birth of the Clinic.
Speaking here of the change of clinical discourse and the changing perceptions of the ‘greyness of things,’ Foucault writes of the relation between “things” and “words” where . . . seeing and saying still are one. We must reexamine the original distribution of the visible and invisible insofar as it is linked with the division between what is stated and remains as unsaid.

Here Foucault alludes to Heidegger’s emphasis on physis as well as his unmistakable notion of truth as aletheia, where Foucault notes the Heraclitean ‘obscurity, the density of things closed upon themselves’ and the illuminating power of ‘the gaze that passes over them, around them, and gradually into them, bringing them nothing more than its own light. The residence of truth in the dark centre of things is linked, paradoxically, to this sovereign power of the empirical gaze . . .’

In his preface to The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault reads not only Heidegger but Nietzsche, as he himself attests to this influence, beginning with the title The Birth of the Clinic but also in Foucault’s fourth section, entitled: ‘The Old Age of the Clinic’ echoing the theme of the decline and the death of tragedy that was the subject of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music.

Foucault’s readings between both Nietzsche and Heidegger are thus much closer to Heidegger’s own readings of Nietzsche than American scholarship tends to recognize, hence Foucault’s coordination of Nietzsche, Hölderlin, and Heidegger. This ‘French’ Heidegger raises the question of the subject as Foucault poses it as a radically critical challenge (and not an appeal to a transcendental humanism) and when Foucault moves between anticipated or likely alternatives as so many misunderstandings he is reading rival theorists as much as Nietzsche and indeed and especially Heidegger.

Thus with respect to ‘living individuality’ and beyond the highly charged (because philosophically decisive) ‘old Aristotelian law, which prohibited the application of scientific discourse to the individual’ (BC 170) in his prefatory reflections on the status of ‘scientifically structured discourse about an individual’ (BC xiv), Foucault recalls that ‘accession to the individual’ recalls ‘the most concentrated formulation of an old medical humanism’ (ibid.) before going on to invoke the ‘mindless phenomenologies of understanding’ (and here Foucault deploys a very Nietzschean characterization) referring to the ‘sand of their conceptual desert’ and thence to the Heideggerian notion of the ‘non-thought’ (ibid.). Each move alludes neither to Heidegger nor to Nietzsche but to a Heidegger who reads Nietzsche. Sharing a Heideggerian lineage, Foucault’s genealogy does not simply move to a kind of archaeology (any more than Bruno Latour’s strong sociology of science simply becomes a polite engineer’s history of lionized science).
In a voice including the language of Heidegger on science as much as Canguilhem, Foucault writes that ‘[m]edicine made its appearance as a clinical science in conditions which define, together with its historical possibility, the domain of its experience and the structure of its rationality’ (BC xv). The critique thus invoked calls not only for Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s critique but for Nietzsche’s reading of the same critique:

It may well be that we belong to an age of criticism whose lack of primary philosophy reminds us at every moment of its reign and its fatality; an intelligence that keeps us irremediably at a distance from an original language. For Kant, the possibility and necessity of critique were linked through certain scientific contents, to the fact that there is such a thing as knowledge. In our time – and Nietzsche the philologist testifies to it – they are linked to the fact that language exists and that, in the innumerable words spoken by men – whether they are reasonable or senseless, demonstrative or poetic – a meaning has taken shape that hangs over us, leading us forward in our blindness, but awaiting in the darkness for us to attain awareness before emerging into the light of day and speaking. We are doomed historically to history, to the patient construction of discourses about discourses and to the task of hearing what has already been said. (BC xv–xvi)

Nietzsche asks us to pay attention to the names and this we pretend to do, more often than not. Like Heidegger, Foucault, is one of Nietzsche’s rare readers to suggest that we attend to Nietzsche’s questions. If Heidegger calls emphatic attention to what Nietzsche means by science [Wissenschaft] drawing a parallel to love and to passion [Leidenschaft], Foucault emphasizes not only about origin and genesis [Ursprung, Herkunft, Entstehung, Genealogie] but also the good [agathon].50 Foucault thus alludes to the first section of On the Genealogy of Morals, where Nietzsche raises the question ‘what was the real etymological significance of the designations for ‘good’ coined in the various languages?’ (GM I: 4) contending as Nietzsche mused that ‘they all led back to the same conceptual transformation’ (ibid.). Indeed, Nietzsche concludes the first section of his ‘polemic’ (the polemical scholarly attack is, as we recall, the rigorously ‘suspicious’ subtitle of Nietzsche’s Genealogy: Eine Streitschrift) with a reprisal of this same question: ‘What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?’ (GM I: 17)

The challenge as Nietzsche poses it is one Foucault embraces, where Nietzsche contends that ‘every table of values, every “thou shalt” known to
history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science.’ (Ibid.). Foucault seems post-Kantian as he notes almost in Heidegger’s voice that ‘in stating what has been said, one has to re-state what has never been said’ (BC xvi). Here Foucault points to what is elicited via questioning and its power to call forth ‘a remainder that is the very essence of that thought, driven outside its secret.’” (Ibid.). Both the later Heidegger and the Heidegger of ‘What is Metaphysics?’ echo Foucault’s declaration that ‘this unspoken element slumbers within speech,’ especially, singularly to be articulated in questioning.

Speech is thus for Foucault ‘an act of “translation,”’ which means that ‘it has the dangerous privilege images have of showing while concealing’ (xvii). One is not merely using the language of semiology and reading in what de Certeau called the squared or ‘gridded’ field of the clinic but an aural, haptic, ocular discursive adaptability that continually changes with the technologies of its adumbration, requiring ‘a sort of sensorial triangulation in which various atlases, hitherto excluded from medical techniques, must collaborate: the ear and touch are added to sight’ (163). In this triangulation one has not to do with three senses to which one might someday add one or two but with the enhancement and transformation of ocularity as such and that is to say of vision. ‘The structure that commands clinical anatomy, and all medicine that derives from it, is that of invisible visibility.’ (165). A Zarathustran echo in the idea (and the ideal) of ‘immaculate perception’ is also at work in Nietzsche’s late-written preface to *The Gay Science* in a remark Nietzsche sets into the mouth of a girl-child. From such a moralizing, moralistic perspective, Nietzsche reflects on the purely epistemological idea of an all-seeing, all-knowing god, the very idea of a transcendental, timeless, ultimate truth: “Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and “know” everything. “Is it true that God is present everywhere?” a little girl asked her mother; ‘I think that’s indecent.” (GS §iv)

Emphasizing that ‘at the end of the eighteenth century . . . education was given a positive value as enlightenment’ (BC 64), the language Foucault uses of the ‘birth of truth’ (ibid.) recalls Nietzsche’s emphasis on the ‘late-born’ status of truth among human beings and indeed the discourse of corrective regulation. This for Nietzsche is the scientific conviction of our age: namely ‘the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of logic, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it.” (The Birth of Tragedy (BT) §15)). Foucault goes on, as Nietzsche goes on, to add nudity, the physician’s
‘invisible visibility,’ the same nudity Nietzsche seems to invoke when he speaks in the section of *The Birth of Tragedy* that seems relevant here: ‘[t]here would be no science if it concerned itself only with one naked goddess’ (BT §15).

The point for Nietzsche as for Foucault is the point of perversion and the distractive, sustaining focus on revelation, the intellectual bachelor’s investigative ‘laying bare,’ yet this ‘perverse’ emphasis does not follow for the reasons one might imagine. Hence Nietzsche contrasts the gaze of the scientist (or Foucault’s clinician) with the artist: ‘[w]henever the truth is uncovered, the artist will always cling with rapt gaze to what still remains covering even after such uncovering; but the theoretical man enjoys and finds satisfaction in the discarded covering and finds the highest object of his pleasure in the process of an ever happy uncovering that succeeds through his own efforts.’ (Ibid.).

Foucault speaks of ‘a language that did not owe its truth to speech but to the gaze alone’ (BC 69) and Heidegger speaks of calculation, a terminology echoing in Foucault in what is also indeed the Marxist sensibility of his discourse (cf. BC 83–85). Drawing, as Nietzsche does, upon the inherently “ocular” (88) interest of science, Foucault also traces the genesis of the pathological “fact” apart from the vagaries of individual illness, the invention of positive diagnosis, the birth of the clinic:

In the period of Laplace, either under his influence or within a similar movement of thought, medicine discovered that uncertainty may be treated, analytically, as the sum of a certain number of isolatable degrees of certainty that were capable of rigorous calculation. Thus this confused, negative concept . . . was to be capable of transforming itself into a positive concept and offered to the penetration of a technique proper to calculation. (97)

Speaking in terms of ‘events of the open domain’ (98), the clinic is read in Heideggerian terms that echo with Merleau-Ponty and Canguilhem. And it is Canguilhem who can be heard (along with Bataille) when Foucault compares ‘chest diseases’ with venereal diseases, as ‘diseases of love: they are the Passion, a life to which death gives a face that cannot be exchanged.’ (172). If this reference to death inevitably recalls *Being and Time* and the death that is ultimately and always mine (and not just a trivial inevitability or a tragical fate not to be outgone), death is also the inherently singularizing end or limit of all mortal being in the world (and not only, pace Heidegger, pace Levinas and Derrida, our own only-too-human mortality).
Reading Heidegger on death, Foucault’s reading of death in *The Birth of the Clinic* recalls Nietzsche: ‘Death left its old tragic heaven and became the lyrical core of man: his invisible truth, his visible secret.’ (Ibid.).

Foucault invokes Nietzsche and Heidegger as much as Schreber and Lacan when he affirms that the ‘first scientific discourse about the individual had to pass through this stage of death. Western man could constitute himself in his own eyes as an object of science, he grasped within himself, a discursive existence, only in the opening created by his own elimination: from the experience of Unreason was born psychology . . . from the integration of death into medical thought is born a medicine that is given as a science of the individual. And, generally speaking, the experience of individuality in modern culture is bound up with that of death: from Hölderlin’s Empedocles to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and so on to Freudian man.’ (197).51 If Foucault goes on to discuss Empedocles in a Hölderlinian mode, the emphasis is a Heideggerian one inasmuch as it is a focus on death: ‘after Empedocles, the world is placed under the sign of finitude, in that irreconcilable, intermediate state in which reigns the law, the harsh law of limit.’ (198). Keeping to the tenor of Nietzsche’s own reflections on genealogy, Foucault remarks that is perhaps understandable that ‘the figures of knowledge and those of language should obey the same profound law, and that the irruption of finitude should dominate in the same way, this relation of man to death, which, in the first case, authorizes a scientific discourse in a rational form, and, in the second, opens up the source of a language that unfolds endlessly in the void left by the absence of the gods?’ (Ibid.).

Theory of knowledge, theory of science and the agonistics of a discipline

The language of mathesis, taxinomia (or taxonomy), and genesis as Foucault uses such terms in *The Order of Things* reveals his debt to Heidegger but emphasizes the Kant he sought to underscore (almost like Adorno who insisted on the need to privilege, alternately to be sure, both Kant and Hegel). In this Kantian spirit, Foucault emphasizes the overall project of science in terms of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. Thus the sciences ‘always carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world.’ (*The Order of Things* (OT) 74). Taxinomia, the idea of taxonomy has in the interim, following Foucault but not less after Agamben as well as Borges and Eco, become
quite common as Foucault had defined it and as Agamben following Taubes had also defined it in distinctly Heideggerian terms: not only as a matter of regional ontologies but ontic articulation and indeed not only in terms of the very Heideggerian conception of mathesis but a peculiarly Heideggerian reflexive use as Foucault emphasizes that ‘Taxinomia’ is not in opposition to mathesis: it resides within it and is distinguished from it; for it too is a science of order—a qualitative mathesis.’ (OT 74). As the ‘knowledge of beings,’ taxinomia ‘treats of identities and differences’ as a ‘semiology confronted by history . . . it defines . . . the general law of beings, and at the same time the conditions under which it is possible to know them’ (ibid.). Mathesis itself is to be understood, by contrast, ‘in the strict sense,’ as ‘a science of equalities, and therefore of attributions and judgments: it is the science of truth.’ (Ibid.).

The contemporary critical change from the Classical period takes place in the alteration of mathesis reframed to constitute ‘an apophantics and an ontology’ leaving the human sciences or better said the humanities on the side of ‘history and semiology’ on the hermeneutic schema Foucault traces here, along with Ricoeur rather than with Gadamer ‘from Schleiermacher to Nietzsche and Freud.’ (Ibid.). Although and like Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault was concerned with reading the history of science for the sake of a philosophical understanding of science, his readers have been chary of this association. Indeed, apart from some early first attempts, only Ian Hacking has taken Foucault as relevant for the philosophy of science and then only, and this has been decisive for subsequent readings, in historical and social terms but that is also to say as carefully distinguished from the philosophy of science proper. Foucault can also be read in correspondence with Heidegger’s own reflections on physics qua physics or biology as biology when he observes that historians of science want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century; but they do not realize that biology did not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and fifty years is not valid for a previous period. And that, if biology was unknown, there was a very simple reason for it: that life itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural history. (OT 127–128)

For Foucault, the very idea of natural philosophy as is under siege: the idea of natural history is transformed taxonomically, finally to become biology
(cf. OT 160–162). Biology, now defined as the ‘science of life,’ turns out to be other than a philosophy of life and is hence and historically nothing ‘vital.’ Thus ‘Natural history is situated both before and after language; it decomposes the language of everyday life, but in order to recompose it and discover what has made it possible through the blind resemblances of the imagination; it criticizes language, but in order to reveal its foundation.’ (OT 116). What is lacking is ‘radical questioning’ (ibid.) as Heidegger defines it but what is at stake is the genesis of the very ‘life sciences’ themselves out of the spirit (or echoing Nietzsche: out of the death) of natural history per se. Life thus ‘becomes one object of knowledge among others, and is answerable, in this respect, to all criticism’ if it also ‘resists this critical jurisdiction, which it takes over on its own account and brings to bear, in its own name, on all possible knowledge.’ (OT 162). This echoes Heidegger’s claim that the essence of technology is nothing technological as indeed Heidegger’s still more intriguing claim that the essence of the *polis* ‘is nothing political.’

Foucault’s reflection on the implications of Nietzsche’s teaching of the Overman, his ‘Promise-Threat,’ as Foucault describes ‘the notion that man would soon be no more—but would be replaced by the superman’ (OT 322), is combined with a rigorous reflection on the consequences of the Eternal Return (legions of Nietzsche commentators have yet to do the same), explaining that ‘this meant that man had long since disappeared and would continue to disappear, and that our modern thought about man, our concern for him, our humanism, were all sleeping serenely over the threatening rumble of his non-existence.’ (Ibid.). Foucault’s reflections are thoroughly epistemological in Nietzsche’s radical sense but also with respect to Heidegger’s brief on humanism. This takes Foucault farther than Heidegger, with a more extreme doubt than Descartes’ own and just as Nietzsche called for a more radical doubt than Descartes. ‘Ought we not to remind ourselves—we who believe ourselves bound to a finitude which belongs only to us, and which opens up the truth of the world to us by means of our cognition—ought we not to remind ourselves that we are bound to the back of a tiger?’ (Ibid.).

The tiger’s back to which are bound is, of course, the dream tiger of Nietzsche’s reflection upon the limits of truth and knowledge/reasoning/power in his never published post-Kantian reflections on language, as on grammar, social conventionality and logic, ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense.’ Writing ‘beyond’ good and evil, Nietzsche proposes to consider the parallel right and wrong of rationality and logic itself. And so Nietzsche borrows from standard texts to do so.
Reading between Heidegger and Nietzsche, Foucault accords with Kant. The consequence is a tragically (in Nietzsche’s sense) rigorous (in Heidegger’s sense) musing upon the limits of cognition, such as we find in ‘The “Cogito” and the Unthought’ in *The Order of Things*. Speaking in the same Kantian terms of the human being as ‘the locus of an empirico-transcendental doublet’ (OT 322), Foucault contends that ‘man is also the locus of a misunderstanding’ (OT 323), finding its fundamental necessity ‘in the existence—mute, yet ready to speak, and secretly impregnated with a potential discourse—of that not-known from which man is perpetually summoned towards self-knowledge.’ (Ibid.). This modality frames Foucault’s revision of Kant, moving from the question ‘How can experience of nature give rise to necessary judgments?’ (ibid.) to the very Nietzschean and Heideggerian (cum Lacanian) question ‘How can man think what he does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation something that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority?’ (Ibid.). There is thus for Foucault a fourfold shift, the question is no longer that ‘of truth, but of being; not of nature, but of man; not of the possibility of understanding, but of the possibility of a primary misunderstanding;’ (ibid.) and finally and with respect to science the shift has been ‘from the possibility of a science of nature to the possibility for man to conceive of himself.’ (325)

Thus Foucault has all along been speaking of Heidegger if indeed by way of Nietzsche and Hölderlin (cf. OT 333–335). And Foucault has been speaking of Nietzsche all along, most of all when he invokes mathematics in his concluding chapter on ‘The Human Sciences’ pointing out that ‘the recourse to mathematics, in one form or another, has always been the simplest way of providing positive knowledge about man with a scientific style, form, and justification,’ (OT 351), a point coordinate with Nietzsche’s contention that ‘mathematics is merely the means for the general and ultimate knowledge of man.’ (GS §246).

If Heidegger’s counter to Heisenberg is right—Heisenberg had thought, as Heidegger reflects on the observation that ‘man everywhere encounters only himself’59—Foucault’s vanishing subject is already Nietzsche’s, already Heidegger’s. In this sense, Nietzsche’s plaintive cry ‘Two thousand years and not a single new god!’ might suggest how we should hear the supposed death of the subject. Nietzsche is the prophet of an end inaugurated not so much by ‘the absence or the death of God . . . as the end of man’ (OT 385) and Foucault in a Heideggerian voice traces the ‘wake of that death and in profound coordination with it—what Nietzsche’s thought heralds is the end of his murderer: it is the explosion of man’s face in laughter, and
the return of masks.’ (Ibid.). Echoing Heidegger’s anti-humanist reflections and hence far from a world transfigured in our own image, laughing in Nietzsche’s voice at our own and ongoing self-presumption—this is Foucault’s ‘Promise-Threat’ of the Overman—‘one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the end of the sea.’

Notes

1 Beyond Michel Foucault’s own ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx’ in: Martial Guerolt, ed., Nietzsche. Cahiers de Royaumont (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 183–192, see Etienne Balibar’s insightful discussion, ‘Foucault and Marx: The Question of Nominalism’ in Timothy J. Armstrong, ed. and trans., Michel Foucault: Philosopher (New York: Routledge, 1992) 38–58. One has to add Marx along with Heidegger and Nietzsche, but as those scholars who once read Marx now abjure him (and his works) and newer scholars have never read him, to note that one has to add Marx is the equivalent of a sigh. One tends not to read Nietzsche and Marx together, and those who do so tend not to get the Nietzsche bits straight (as Gillian Rose and Howard Caygill have noted). Efforts, not exceptions, include James Miller’s ‘Some Implications of Nietzsche’s Thought for Marxism,’ Telos 37 (1978) or Anthony Giddens, ‘From Marx to Nietzsche: Neo-Conservatism, Foucault, and Problems in Contemporary Political Theory,’ Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (1982): 215–230. More broadly, for an overview of some of the difficulties that bedevil any reading between Nietzsche and Marx, see Clifford Geertz’s reflections on academic-cum-cultural power-exchanges in his ‘Anti-Anti-Relativism,’ American Anthropology 86 (1984): 263–178. The effort to find a voice for Marx in Habermas (and indeed Habermas’ criticism of Foucault) yields considerable challenges on more than one level. See Dominique Janicaud on this, ‘Rationality, Force, and Power: Foucault and Habermas’ Criticisms’ in Armstrong, ed., Michel Foucault, 283–300.


4 This point goes beyond the differences between Ursprung and Herkunft as Foucault himself has emphasized in his discussion of ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’


7 As Henry Corbin says in his June 1978 interview with Philippe Nemo: ‘A philosopher’s campaign must be led simultaneously on many fronts, so to speak, especially if the philosophy in question is not limited to the narrow rationalist definition that certain thinkers of our days have inherited from the philosophers of the “enlightenment.” Far from it! The philosopher’s investigations should encompass a wide enough field that the visionary philosophies of a Jacob Boehme, of an Ibn ‘Arabi, of a Swedenborg etc. can be set there together, in short that scriptural and visionary (imaginal) works may be accommodated as so many sources offered up to philosophical contemplation. Otherwise,’ Corbin goes on to emphasize, ‘philosophia no longer has anything to do with Sophia.’ http://www.amiscorbin.com/textes/anglais/interviewnemo.htm. Accessed May 18, 2008.

8 The relevance of such an array is evident in Arnold Davidson’s nevertheless selective and consequently limited collection, Foucault and his Interlocutors (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998) including Hadot and Derrida, among others. See too Armstrong, ed., Michel Foucault Philosopher.


11 See above notes, especially Pizer but see also C. G. Prado, Starting with Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy (Boulder: Westview, 1995) and Todd May’s work in addition to Stuart Elden’s several studies (also to be considered in conjunction with Heidegger).
Foucault’s Legacy

12 For an example of such restrictive engagement, see Timothy Rayner’s *Foucault’s Heidegger: Philosophy and Transformative Experience* (New York: Continuum, 2007). The discussant in question is, perhaps unsurprisingly, Dreyfus with a rather spare nod towards Rabinow. That other scholars apart from Dreyfus find Heideggerian elements in Foucault’s writing is patent but Rayner, foregrounding what amounts to a calculatedly *elective affinity*, seems only to address scholars who follow Dreyfus’ Foucault/Heidegger.


16 Ibid.

17 NB: this is a French rather than an Anglo-American Kant, and rather than the several German varieties of Kant.


21 See Minson, *Genealogies of Morals* but see too the alternative readings by Alan Megill and May.

22 See Nietzsche’s own discussion of this in *On the Genealogy of Morals* and see for a discussion of this very specific distinction with reference to the conceptual relevance of relativism, Babich, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science*, 46–56.


26 See Ian Hacking, ‘Michel Foucault’s Immature Sciences’ *Nous* 13 (1979): 39–51 but it is Gary Gutting who authored *Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). On these sensibilities, analytic and not, C. G. Prado can ruefully recall that as a student he opted not to hear Foucault speak, a recollection which confirms quite apart from its personal significance for Prado, that Foucault had been invited, as had MacIntyre and Rorty, to give a lecture in the first place. See Prado, *Searle and Foucault on Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Derrida is the almost (not really) martyr of the difference it makes not to have such an open reception while Jean Baudrillard has the best credentials for such a regrettable distinction. Saying this does not mean that it is easy to incorporate Foucault in the increasingly quantified constellation or image of the social sciences. For a how-to, see Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham, *Using Foucault’s Methods* (London: Sage Publications, 1999) and note that while Kendall and Wickham mention Nietzsche (if only in passing), they steer well clear of Heidegger.


28 Foucault, ‘Politics, Philosophy, Culture,’ 251. As Foucault goes on to say: ‘I’m not looking for anything else but I’m really searching for that . . .’ (Ibid.). The incompleteness of the sentence attests, of course, to its oral character, undergirding the ambiguity that permits contrary interpretations.


31 Ibid., 128.

32 Ibid., 131.

33 Ibid.

34 Sluga, ‘Foucault’s Encounter with Heidegger and Nietzsche,’ 250. See note 27 above.


clear it cannot be consummated simply owing the French background in the history of philosophy that is anathema to analytic philosophy. Such a historical background characterizes those Schrift identifies as the ‘leading’ French scholars, such as Jules Vuillemin, Gaston Granger, Jacques Bouveresse, etc., and so exceeds a comparable formation for their Anglo-American counterparts that the distinction wavers. What does not waver, bien entendu, is the enthusiasm for things analytic in Paris as in Oxford.


40 In today’s electronic era, the very idea of the hunt itself has lost a bit of luster: given search engines, all we need do is click and we are on our way to an automatic table of answers.

41 Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, eds., Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, Robert de Loaiza, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

42 Robert Legros, ‘The Nietzschean Metaphysics of Life,’ in Ferry and Renaut, eds., Why we are Not Nietzscheans, 110–140, here 111.

43 Raynaud, ‘Nietzsche as Educator,’ in Ferry and Renaut, eds., Why we are Not Nietzscheans, 141–157, here 145.

44 This text was first translated in 1938 by Henry Corbin as Qu’est ce que la Métaphysique? Suivi d’extraits sur L’Être et le Temps et D’une Conference sur Hölderlin, (Paris: Gallimard, 1951 [1938]).

45 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 46.

46 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 46–47.


48 Ibid., xiii.

49 Xavier Tilliette, discussing Hölderlin and Heidegger invokes the same Corbin we noted above on the matter of multifarious proficiency in connection with the difficulty of reading Heidegger and Hölderlin for, on the one hand, students of literary criticism and, on the other hand, romantic idealism from Schiller to Hegel, Schelling, and Jacobi. See Tilliette, ‘Hölderlins Empedokles im Lichte Heideggers,’ in Peter Trawny, ed., ‘Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch wohnt / Der Mensch auf dieser Erde’. Heidegger und Hölderlin (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klossermann, 2000), 149–162.

50 This philological analysis is a focal point of Foucault’s ‘Nietzsche, Marx, Freud.’

51 Empedocles leaps into the volcano and the Freudian man, we know, is concerned with death as with sex and Nietzsche has plans for Zarathustra or a substitute to die. See for a discussion and further references Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche, 157–162. For a reading of Hölderlin’s Hyperion and death, see the conclusion of Babich, Words in Blood, Like Flowers, Introduction.


55 Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne ‘Der Ister’* (Summer semester 1942), ed. Walter Biemel, (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995 [1984]), §14b, 80 [98].


57 For further references and a discussion of such ‘borrowings,’ see the first two chapters of Babich, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers*.