THE MEANING OF RESOLUTION AS A REFLECTIVE METHOD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS

Astrid M. O'Brien
Fordham University, aobrien@fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_research

Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_research/21
THE MEANING OF RESOLUTION
AS A REFLECTIVE METHOD
IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THOMAS AQUINAS

Astrid M. O’Brien

Diss., Fordham University, 1975
THE MEANING OF RESOLUTION AS A REFLECTIVE METHOD
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS

BY

ASTRID M. O'BRIEN
B.S., COLLEGE OF MOUNT SAINT VINCENT, '56
M.A., MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY, '59

DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK
1975
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** .......................................................... 1

**CHAPTER**

I. RESOLUTION: ITS MEANING AND SYNONYMS .......................... 11

II. SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING AND PROCESS OF KNOWING .................................................. 42

III. JUDGMENT AND REDUCTION TO THE SENSES ...................... 62

IV. DEMONSTRATION AND RESOLUTION TO PRINCIPLES ............ 100

V. REFLECTION AND RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICAL WISDOM ........ 139

VI. SUPERNATURAL WISDOM AND THE RETURN TO GOD ............... 170

**CONCLUSION** ............................................................. 194

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** .......................................................... 210
INTRODUCTION

This study originated in the author's initial puzzlement and wonder about what appeared to be conflicting views as to the nature of philosophical method found in different parts of the writings of Thomas Aquinas. In his Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle he insists that "in speculative science, it is necessary to proceed in a resolutive manner;"¹ unless such a resolution is made, our knowledge remains uncertain, and scientific knowledge is characterized by its certitude.² On the other hand, he calls reasoning from effects to their causes a resolutive process, and opposes it to reasoning from causes to effects, which he

¹In I Eth., Lect. 3 (Taurini: Marietti, 1949) n. 35: "In scientia speculativa, necesse est ut procedatur modo resolutorio."

²De Ver. XII, 1, resp. (Quaestiones Disputatae, Editio V, Taurini: Marietti, 1927, Vol. III): "Oportet quod de eis fixam cognitionem habeat: quod esse non potest, nisi ea inspiciat in principio in quo possunt cognosci: quamdiu enim non fit resolutio cognitorum in sua principia, cognitio non firmatur in uno, sed apprehendit ea quae cognoscit secundum probabilitatem... non posset enim ex quibusdam in alia pervenire firmitur, non facta resolutione in prima principia." Ibid., XI, 1, ad 17: "Certitudinem scientiae,... habet aquis... per quod [lumen rationis] principia cognoscimus, ex quibus oritur scientiae certitudo,..."
terms a compositive process. Demonstrations which proceed from effects to cause are quia demonstrations, whereas prop-
ter quid demonstrations proceed from cause to effect; science, however, is certain knowledge through causes. How can a method of reasoning which proceeds from effect to cause be the necessary one in science if the latter's cer-
tainty is based on its being "knowledge through causes?"

The fundamental question this dissertation propo-
ses to answer, therefore, is this: "Exactly what does Thomas mean by resolution?" Since Thomas never wrote a treatise dealing with this question directly, but discusses it only in connection with other issues, to clarify the question with which he is directly concerned, no single treatise or

1S. T. I-II, 14, 5, resp. (Ottawa: Institut Albert le Grande, 1941++): "Quod quidem si, sicut est prius in cog-
nitione, ita etiam sit prius in esse, non est processus re-
solutorius, sed magis compositivus; procedere enim a causis in effectus, est processus compositivus, nam causae sunt simpliciores effectibus. Si autem quod est prius in cogni-
tione, sit posterius in esse, est processus resolutorius;"

2S. T. I, 2, 2, resp.: "Duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid et haec est per prioria simpliciter. Alia est per effectum et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos; cum enim effectus aliquid nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae."

3In I Post. Anal., (Opera Omnia iussi Leonis edi-
ta, Vol. I, Roma: 1882) Lect. IV, n. 5: "Scire aliquid est perfecte cognoscere ipsium, hoc autem est perfecte appre-
hendere veritatem ipsius:...Oportetigitur scientem, si est perfecte cognoscens, quod cognoscat causam rei scitae... Quia vero scientia est etiam certa cognitio rei; quod autem contingit aliter se habere, non potest aliquid per certitu-
dinem cognoscere; ideo ulterior oportet quod id quod scitur non possit aliter se habere."
text could be taken as the central one, which others might be seen as explaining or developing in greater detail. The treatise that comes closest to being a discourse on methodology is not in the form of original philosophical reflection, but rather of a theological commentary on the theological reflections of Boethius concerning the Trinity. Thus the initial question this inquiry raised was how much weight to give to Thomas' commentaries.

In his original writings the sole regulative factor is the truth of the matter, whereas in the commentaries there is the added regulative factor of the text being analyzed. Do the commentaries represent the real thought of the author of the work being commented upon, or do they represent, instead, the real thought of the author of the commentary? Where text and commentator are in fundamental agreement, the question may be academic, but where the commentator is Thomas Aquinas it is pressing—-he never wrote a commentary on any of the works of his teacher, Albert the Great, with whose views he was fundamentally in agreement, but only on the works of Christian Platonists and Aristotle, a pagan, with neither of which he was in fundamental agreement, for his method was Aristotelian, and his faith was Christian. It would appear, therefore, that the commentaries must either fail to present his own view on some questions, or, if they do, only at the expense of misrepresenting the view expressed in the work being expounded. In
the first case, these expositions would be of little value as sources of his own thought; in the second, they would be relatively worthless as "expositions."

Thomas himself was well aware of the second danger, and most careful to avoid it; for example, substance as said of God and accident as said of esse, have meanings which Aristotle would not have recognized and which, if applied to the latter's terms indiscriminately, would misrepresent his teaching. In the commentaries on Aristotle, Thomas never gives them these meanings; substance and accident are used only in their Aristotelian sense. Where one of his authorities has made a positive statement with which he cannot agree, Thomas frequently uses such phrases as, "he was led to hold this view because...," explaining as well as the truth of the matter, the error in the view he rejects. But he does not ever attribute to any authority a position which the text under discussion positively excludes.¹

Accordingly, there are those who reject the commentaries as non-representative of Thomas' own thought; those who feel that the commentaries display, in addition, the personal viewpoint of Thomas, and that they may therefore be used without further ado as sources for understanding his thought; and finally, those who hold a middle

position. The last is the one that seems the most prudent for our purposes here.

It is important to recognize, in the first place, that none of the commentaries are the purely objective exegeses, with strict attention to historical accuracy in doctrinal exposition, that would be written today. The medieval approach was quite different. The medieval philosophers were less concerned with what the philosophers held than with how much of the truth could be found, explicit or implicit, in their writings. The commentator considered and sought to penetrate the meaning of the text, not in order to achieve an historical reconstruction of an earlier system of thought, but in order to find therein a witness, more or less partial, of the truth.

Sometimes Thomas is satisfied with explaining the literal meaning of a text; at others he goes beyond this in search of the intention of the author, the logical conclusion of the author's premises, whether or not he himself


4Chenu, p. 177.
ever drew it.¹ Sometimes he goes even further, injecting a new note, a philosophical doctrine of which the author in question was totally ignorant and which does not follow from his premises, though reconcilable with them.² For example, Thomas' doctrine of participated esse is not the logical conclusion of premises found in Aristotle,³ Boethius,⁴ or the Liber de Causis,⁵ though it is possible to accomodate the words of all three to this doctrine. Nor is the distinction Thomas makes in the Summa Theologiae, I, 5, 5, between ratio entis and the ratio boni one which Augustine, on the one hand, and the author of the Book of Wisdom, on the other, ever intended to make in the texts Thomas quotes.⁶

This last is the technique of benign or reverent interpretation: in the document under consideration, "there is perceived a sign... which allows us to reach for something else: the underlying and poorly expressed intuition,

²Doig, p. 21.
³Ibid.
⁵Ibid., p. 44, n. 6.
the direction of the research of the author."¹ In bringing the author's attempt to completion we treat him as a friend, pursuing the truth with us with fervor and self-detachment.² It is thus that Thomas regards his authorities; he himself observes that "the study of philosophy is not for the purpose of knowing what men have taught but for knowing what the truth of the matter is," in the commentary on the De Caelo; not in the Proemium which undoubtedly represents his own position, but in the commentary itself.³

Surely, we can say then that "although basically objective, the commentaries do express views which Thomas holds in other works."⁴ Therefore, we shall regard the commentaries as legitimate sources of Thomas' own teaching as long as such teaching is not contradicted by that which appears in one of his other works; we shall assume that when he does not differ with an authority he agrees with the position in its context, and that what he attributes to an authority is either what the latter intended or would have intended or should have intended-- the view Thomas had

¹Phillipe, p. 94.
²Ibid., pp. 90-91.
³In I de Caelo Lect. 22 (Leonine, Vol. III), n. 8.
⁴Turner, p. 213.
come to hold as the most adequate and fruitful one. Should we find a disparity of views in different treatises we would, of course, prefer that expressed in the treatise which is a direct exposition of Thomas' own thought; should the disparity be between two such treatises, or between two commentaries, we shall take the probable date of the composition of each into account.

In regard to Thomas' commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius in particular, this is one of his earliest works, certainly composed before 1260. However, in this work it is not the literal meaning of the text that is the all-important factor: it is much less an exposition of Boethius' treatise than a scholarly discussion of questions which arise out of it. "With a fulness and precision unknown in any of his other writings [Thomas] develops in these discussions some truly fundamental questions: the problem of the nature and division of sciences and of the proper scientific methods in philosophy and theology. With regard

---


to these problems the *Expos. Super De Trin.* is St. Thomas' principal text.\(^1\) Nevertheless, since it is such an early work, we cannot restrict ourselves to it too narrowly: we have to consider the possibility that it was not his final position; that he perhaps modified it, or at least developed it further during the next twelve to thirteen years. However, each of his other statements concerning methodology is undertaken not primarily for its own sake but within the context of a discussion on a different topic, in order to clarify some aspect of the latter.\(^2\) It is the issue at hand that controls both the depth and breath of the analysis of methodology, and the task of synthesizing the scattered comments is left to the reader. It is a formidable one, inasmuch as we do not yet have either critical editions of all of Thomas' works or a comprehensive index.\(^3\) There is, nonetheless, sufficient consistency in the various treatments to permit such a synthesis; so long as we are careful to interpret each treatment in its own context, we can without hesitation call our synthesis Thomistic. The final test is how well St. Thomas follows this method in his own

\(^1\)Eschmann, p. 406.

\(^2\)M-D Phillipe, p. 85.

\(^3\)This last will soon be available as the exhaustive and accurate *Index Thomisticus*, prepared by computer under the direction of Rev. Roberto Busa, S. J., is presently being finally collated in Venice with publication due to begin shortly.
philosophizing. If he does seem to proceed in this manner, it would appear to substantiate not only the accuracy of our interpretation of his doctrine of resolution, but also the centrality he insists it has, at least in his own philosophy. If this is indeed the case, such a study would seem to be essential for a proper understanding of that philosophy.

The method of investigation has been to rely most heavily on the Thomistic texts themselves, ordering and reordering them by trial and error according to various hunches until, hopefully, some clarity has emerged. In this, secondary sources were of little help at first: as inquiry continued, some that had seemed promising turned out to be false leads, and others which had seemed tangential were found to be most fruitful. I have acknowledged my indebtedness to both wherever I was conscious of it. Furthermore, some insights came through a negative reaction to the manner in which a given text was used or explained; in the absence of a critical and comprehensive index, the research done by others has been of great assistance in locating at least the majority of the relevant texts, even when my use of those texts differed profoundly from theirs.
RESOLUTION: ITS MEANING AND SYNONYMS

What is first revealed by a survey of the texts is that resolution has a variety of meanings for Thomas, and that some of them have no reference whatever to philosophical method. It is used, for example, to designate a whole collection of physical changes which are, broadly speaking, dissolutions, and in most cases, of a disintegrative sort.\(^1\) This sense of resolution includes: liquifaction,\(^2\) the release of bodily fluids,\(^3\) the destruction of anything by

---

\(^{1}\) *In V Meta.*, XXI, #1067 (Taurini: Marietti, Editio III, 1925): "Tertia modo dicitur fieri ex aliquo, sicut simplex 'ex composito ex materia et forma.' Et hoc est in via resolutionis, sicut dicimus quod partes fiunt ex toto... Ratio autem hujus est, quia forma est finis in generatione. Perfectum enim dicitur quod habet finem,... Unde patet, quod perfectum est quod habet formam. Quando igitur ex toto perfecto fit resolutio partium, est motus quasi a forma ad materiam; sicut e converso, quando partes componentur, est motus a materia in formam. Et ideo haec propositio ex quae principium designat, ut eboque comp~tit: et in via compositionis, quia determinat principium materiale; et in via resolutionis, quia significat principium formale."


\(^{3}\) Thus he speaks of resolutio seminis: Cf. *In II Sent.*, d.18, q.2, a.3, sol.; *ST* I, 119, 2 resp.; II-II, 152, 1, resp. ad 4; 154, 3, ad 2, 5, resp.; III, 31, 5, ad 3; 32, 4, resp.; 35, 3, ad 3; and of resolutio lacrymarum: *In IV Sent.*, d.15, expositio textus #743; d.50, q.2, a.3, sol 3; *Quodl.*, VII, 5, #13 (Marietti).
heat or fire;¹ the decomposition of corporeal matter in water² and the distillation by which such water is purified;³ the putrifaction or disappearance of bodies;⁴ the reduction of a physical whole to its physical parts or elements;⁵ and

¹In II Sent., d.6, q.1, a.3, ad 3: "Ex reflexione radiorum solis multiplicatur splendor et calor in aere qui est juxta terram: unde vaporee resolubilis ex aqua et terra elevantur;" ST I-II, 102, 3, ad 8: "Et ideo totum comburentur, ut sit totum anima, resolubilis in vaporem, sursum ascendentur;" III, 59, 5, resp.: "Tandem incineratur omnino resolubilis." Cf. also In IV Sent., d.43, q.1, a.4, ad 2.

²S. T. III, 66, 4, ad 2: "Nec etiam aqua decocotionis carnis, aut aliorum huiusmodi, nisi forte sit factum tanta resolubilis corporum lixtorum in aqua quod liquor plus habeat de aliena substantia quam de aqua..." 

³S. T. III, 66, 4, ad 5: "Aqua rosacea est liquor rosae resolubilis. Unde in ea non potest fieri baptismus. Et... nec in aquis alchimicus, sicut nec in vino. Nec est eadem ratio de aquis pluvialibus, quae generantur ex majori parte ex sublimatione vaporum resolubilis ex aquis, minimum autem est ibi de liquoribus corporum mixtorum; qui tamen per huiusmodi sublinationem,... resolubilis in veram aquam...

⁴S. T. I-II, 73, 2, resp.: "...Unde non minus est mortuus aliquis primo die mortis, et terto vel quarto, quam post annum, quando iam cadaver fuerit resolubilis." Cf. II-II, 107, 2, resp.; III, 51, 3, resp. ad 1; III, 54, 1, ad 2: "Christus ab oculis discipulorum evanuit, non quia corrumpertur aut resolvetur in aliqua invisibilia..." 

⁵In VII Meta., XI, #1478: "... ex partibus, in quas aliquid per corruptionem resolubilis..." Ibid., #1476; In IX Meta. X, #2337: "Quia unumquodque resolubilis in ea ex quibus compositur: in nullis autem videmus resolvi corpora mixta nisi in quatuor elementa..." Cf. In VII Meta. XI, #1480; In IV Sent., d.43, q.1, a.4, sol. 2; In I de Gen. II; Leonine III, #4.
the reduction of a substance to prime matter or to non-being,¹ the first of which exemplifies the maxim that "what is first in composition is last in resolution;"² this can also be said of spiritual disintegration or dissolution.³

¹SCG III, 144, #3: "Si aliquid privatur eo quod est in natura eius ut habeatur, impossibile est illud reparari nisi fiat resolutio in praeiacentem materiam, ut iterum aliiud de novo generetur: . . . ex eodem materia paterit aliiud integrum generari, non idem numero, sed specie. Res autem spiritualis, . . . non potest resolvi per corruptionem in aliquam praeiacentem materiam . . ." In XII Meta. II, #2438: "Per prius etiam est in potentia ad formas elementares, et eis mediantibus . . . est in potentia ad diversas formas unde non potest ex quolibet immediate fieri quodlibet, nisi forte per resolutionem in primam materiam." Also, what has been generated out of prime matter is reduced again to potency by corruption: De Potentia Dei (Quaestiones Disputatae (Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1927, Vol. I)) V, 3, resp.: "Forma vero sicut ex potentia materiae educuntur in actum in rerum generatione, ita in corruptione de actu reducuntur in hoc quod sint in potentia." ST III, 75, 3: "Per consecrationem substantia panis vel vini resolvitur in praeiacentem materiam, vel quod annihilitur." De Pot., V, 3, resp.: "Non est impossibile Deum ad non esse reducere."


³In II Sent., d.22, q.1, a.1, ad 2: "Quod est primum in compositione est ultimum in resolutione; et ideo non sequitur quod si fides est prima in compositione aedificii spiritualis, infidelitas sit prima in resolutione ejusdem." ST II-II, 168, 2, resp.: "Aliud autem attendendum est, ne totaliter gravitas animae resolvatur..."
A frequent synonym for resolution of this sort is reduction,¹ and the usual antonym is composition.²

In another group of texts, both resolution and reduction name one method of division: to divide the complex or composite into its simple parts is said to be division by resolution, or by way of resolution.³ This method may be used in all orders of division;⁴ in practice, however, Thomas does not often call it resolution or reduction when

¹ In IV Sent., d.43, q.1, a.4, sol.2: "Non solum animae et corporis coniunis solvantur, sed eitam elementorum commixtio; sicut etiam acetum non potest in vini qualitatem reduci nisi prius facta resolutione in materia praesitentem: ipsa enim elementorum commixtio... et conservatur, quo ex cessante omnia mixta in pura elementa resolventur." Ibid., sol.1: "Illud quod corruptum, et vitiatum est, in suam novitatem non reductur nisi corruptione mediante; sicut acetum non fit vinum nisi aceto corrupto,...Unde...non erit [natura humana] reditus ad immortalitatem nisi morte mediante."

² Cf. p. 12, n.1 and p. 15, n.2 above.

³ In XI Meta. I, #2172: "Universalia sunt principia scilicet in cognoscendo; et sic genera magis sunt principia, quia simpliciora. Et quod dividantur in plura quam species, hoc est, quia continent plura in potentia. Sed species continent plura in actu. Unde sunt magis divisibles per modum resolutionis compositi in simplicia." In Libros Peri Hermeneias expositio III; (Leonine I) #4: "Divisio fiat per resolutionem ad indivisibilam sive simplicia."

⁴ In III Meta. III, #355: "Invenimus autem duplicem modum compositionis et divisionis: unum scilicet secundum rationem, prout species resolvuntur in genera... Alio modo secundum naturam sicut corpora naturalia componuntur ex igne et aere et aqua et terra et in haec resolvuntur." ST I, 30, 3, resp.: "Est autem duplex divisio. Una materialis, quae fit secundum divisionem continui, et hanc consequitur numerus qui est species quantitatis. ...Alia est divisio formalis, quae fit per oppositas vel diversas formas; et hanc divisionem sequitur multitudo quae non est in aliquo genere..." Cf. In IV Meta. X, #566.
he is speaking of physical division. In the case of formal division, a genus is most often said to be divided into its species, but a species is resolved into, or reduced to, its genus; principles, privations, and accidents are reduced to the genus of their substance or subject; future effects are reduced to their present efficient

1 In De Gen. I, lec. IV, #4: "Videmus removere in omni divisione ea in quae divisionum resolvitur... cum unum-quadque generetur ex his in quae resolvitur. Si ergo resolvitur in nihil, sequitur quod etiam generetur ex nihil. Quod autem componitur ex nihil, nihil est... Quarto probatur... quod non fiat resoluto in puncta. Quia similiter sequeatur quod sit corpus compositum ex punctis." In II Sent., d.18, q.1, a.1, sol.: "Dividitur autem aliud dupliciter scilicet per se ut corpus, et per accidentes ut forma corporalis materiae impressa." ST III, 77, 7, sed con.: "Fractio fit per divisionem quanti."


3 S. T. I, 3, 5, resp.: "Aliquid est in genere du- pliciter. Un modo, simpliciter et proprie, sicut species... Alio modo, per reductionem, sicut principia et privationes." I-II, 10, 1, resp.: "In omnibus autem ea quae non per se insunt reducuntur in aliud quod per se inest, sicut in primum." SCG I, 98, #4: "Omne autem quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per seipsum." In IV Meta. IV, #584: "Omnia entia reducuntur ad contraria, quia vel sunt contraria, vel sunt ex contrarias; contraria vero reducuntur ad unum et multitudinem, quia unum et multitudinem sunt principia contrariorum: unum autem et multitudo sunt unius scientiae, scilicet, philosophiae: ergo et ejus est considerare ens secundum quod est ens." Cf. In III Sent., d.2, q.2, a.1, sol.3; In I de Gen. X, #8; ST II-II, prol.; 30, 3, ad 4; 58, 12, ad 1; 62, 2, resp.; 106, 5, ad 2; 123, 4, obj.4; III, 63, 2, resp.
cause;¹ potency is reduced to act;² variants of a philosophical position are reduced to the basic view they hold in common;³ equivocal terms are reduced to univocal ones, and these in turn are reduced to the analogical term being,⁴ because all that is, in any order, is reducible to being.⁵ Since formal division is employed in the service of defini-

¹In Lib De Causis I, p.9, 1.18-25: "Propter ultimum finem, qui est universalis, alii fines appetuntur, quorum appetitus adventit post appetitum ultimi finis et ante ipsum cessat; sed et huius ordinis ratio ad genus causae efficientis reducitur, nam finis in tantum est causa in quantum movet efficientem ad agendum, et sic, prout habet rationem moventis, pertinent quodamodo ad causae efficientis genus." De Malo XVI, 7, ad 14 (Taurini: Mariettii, Editio V, Vol. II): "Erit enim quemlibet effectum futurum reducere in aliquam causam praesentem vel praeteritam, quam ex quo est vel fuit..."

²This maxim is used so often, in so many different contexts, that the list of instances would be excessively long: these may be found in any lexicon of Thomas' works. One example will be sufficient here: In V Phys. III, #2: "Unde nunc breviter dicere sufficiat, quod quilibet motus est in eodem genere cum suo termino, non quidem ita quod motus qui est ad qualitatem sit species qualitatis, sed per reductionem. Sicut enim potentia reducitur ad genus actus, propter hoc quod omne genus dividitur per potentiam et actum: ita oportet quod motus, qui est actus imperfectus, reducatur ad genus actus perfecti."

³S. T. I, 3, 8, resp.: "Circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim possuerunt quod 'Deus esset anima mundi'... et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum esse animam primi caeli."

⁴S. T. I, 13, 5, ad 1: "Licet in praedicationibus oportet aequivoça ad univoça reduci,... omnia univoça reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum quod est ens."

⁵In IV Meta. IV, #578: "Quaecumque reducuntur in unum et ens, debent considerare a philosopho, cujus est considerare unum et ens: sed omnia contraria reducuntur ad unum et ens: ergo omnia contraria sunt de consideratione philo-
tion, whose function—ideally, at least—is to state the
essence of some real thing, the formal division of concepts
is modelled on the formal divisions among things, so that
almost all the above phrases have this double reference.
Not every definition is by way of resolution, but every
division by way of resolution is by means of division, that
is, by dividing the whole into parts, or the composite into
the simple. The antonym of division, and therefore of
resolution and reduction by division is, again, composition
which has the same double reference to both the ontological
and the intentional orders.

sophi, cujus est considerare unum et ens."

1 In I Phys., 13, n.2 (In octo libros Physicorum
exposito Leonine ed., I): "Ea in quae resolvitur definitio
alicuius rei, sunt componentia rem illam unumquodque resolv-
itur... in ea ex quibus componitur. Sed ratio eius quod
fit secundum naturam, resolvitur in subjectum et formam."
Ibid., n.15: "Ea in qua resolvitus definitio alicujus rei
sunt componentia rem illam, quia unumquodque resolvitur in
ea ex quibus componentur."

2 In III Phys., I, 3: "Differunt autem hoc duae
definitiones. Continuum enim, cum sit quoddam totum, per
partas suas definiri habet: partes autem dupliciter com-
parentur ad totum, scilicet secundum compositionem prout
ex partibus totum componitur et secundum resolutionem prout
totum dividitur in partes. Haec igitur definitio continui
data est secundum viam resolutionis; quae autem ponitur
in praedicamentis, secundum viam compositionis."

3 In II Sent., d.22, q.1, a.1, ad 2: "Ordo compo-
sitione est contrarius ordini resolutionis." In II Meta.
III, #356: "Semper enim videtur illud quod est ultimus
terminus divisionis esse primum principium et elementum in
componendo." In II Sent., d.17, q.3, a.1, resp.: "Aliquid
venire in compositionem alicuius... aut per essentiam suam
per modam principii materialis vel formalis..."
One reason for such variations in meaning is the historical situation: philosophy was born in Greece; it grew and was expressed in the language of Greece, and was influenced by Greek culture. Reciprocally, it affected Greek culture, and modified and developed the Greek language to be a more suitable vehicle for its growth and expression. But nothing similar occurred among the Romans; thus Latin lacked a capacity for expressing philosophical concepts; it was, in this respect, semantically indigent. Consequently, when fluency in Greek diminished to a degree that necessitated translating the writings of the philosophers from Greek into Latin, those undertaking the work of translation faced a formidable problem. They had either to make up words or to attach new, and perhaps forced, meanings to already existing words.\(^1\) Each translator did what seemed best to him— not all chose the same Latin equivalent for a Greek term, and one Latin term might be used as the equivalent for several different Greek terms.\(^2\) Further, the Latin terms themselves evolved through use. Thus our study of resolution must take account of the historical evolution of resolutio up to the time of Thomas Aquinas.

Its earliest use as a technical term appears to

\(^1\)Chenu, p. 94.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 96.
be in a commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* by Chalcidius. It is his name for the method of inquiry which, taking as its starting point what is least real and knowable, and posterior in itself, but most knowable and prior in our experience—the sensible world—proceeds to the discovery of prime matter, the justifying principle of material change. That is to say, it is an analysis of things into their constituent principles, and in that sense, a decomposition.

---


2. Chalcidius, cap. CCC, p. 245: "Est igitur propositarum quaestionum duplex probatio. Altera quae ex antiquoribus posterioribus confirmat, quod est proprium syllogismi. Praecedunt quippe ordine accipientur, quae elementa vocantur, conclusionem. Altera item, quae posterioribus ad praeecedentium indaginem gradatim pervenit; quod genus probationis resolutio dicitur. Nos ergo qui de intiis sermo est, quibus antiquius nihil est, utemur probationis remediiis ex resolutive manantibus... Sunt ergo tam sensibilia quam intelligibilia. Et intelligibilia quidem sunt, quae intellectu comprehenduntur rationabiliter indigine. Sensibilia vero, quae irrationabili opinione praesumuntur, incerto quodam opinionis eventu. Ila quidem ex aeternitatis, nec ullam initium habentia; haec temporaria, et ex aliquo initio temporis a regione nostra primaria, ad naturam versus secunda. Rursem intelligibilia, e regione quidem naturae pricora, juxta nos vero secunda sunt. Quotus quisque igitur in disputatione sic exordietur, ut ab illis quae prima sunt ad nos versum, ascendet ad ea, quae sunt a nobis secunda, resolvere dicitur quaestionem... quid sit illud, quod haec omnia inseparabiliter adhaerens complexumque continet; inventemus aliiud esse quam id quod quaerimus, silvam. Inventa igitur est origo silvestris. Et hoc quidem est unum duarum probationum genus, quod Resolutio dicitur." Cf. Régis, pp. 305-6.
When Boethius translated Aristotle's logic and Porphyry's commentaries on parts of it into Latin, he chose for the Greek term *analusis*, the Latin *resolutio*, and for *analutikos*, *resolutorius* instead of merely latinizing the Greek to *analyticus*.\(^1\) *Analusis*, and so *resolutio*, names the epistemological methodology proper to science explained by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*.\(^2\) He equated it with *judicativa veritatis*,\(^3\) which led later philosophers to identify it with the *via iudicii*.\(^4\)

Scotus Erigena also used *resolutio* as the Latin equivalent of *analusis* in his translation of Pseudo-Dionysius. However, he opposed it, not to *compositio* as Chalcidius and Boethius had done, but to *divisio*.\(^5\) In his *De Divisione Naturae*, he gives *redeo* as a synonym.

---

\(^1\)In *Porphyrium Dialogos I* (Patrologia Latina, 64 col. 64c); In *Cat. Aristotelis*, Lib. I (PL 64, col. 162c); In *Lib de Interpret* (editio prima, PL 64, col. 345 b-c; editio secunda, PL 64, col. 539 c-d) In *Post. Anal. Lib. I* cap 1, 18 (PL 64, col. 734c) *De Diff. Top. Lib. I*, (PL 64, col. 1173c) Lib. II (col. 1184d). Cf. Regis, p. 307.

\(^2\)Regis, p. 307.

\(^3\)In *Top. Ciceronis*, Lib. I (PL 64, col. 1047 b-c) *De Diff. Top. Lib. I* (PL 64, col. 1174 c).

\(^4\)Regis, p. 308.

for resolvo, and reditus for resolutio. It is not for him merely an epistemological method, but a metaphysical law.

Albert the Great, however, does not follow him in this. For Albert, resolutio is only an epistemological method; in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics he equates via resolutionis with via intellectus abstrahentis, or the act of simple apprehension. Resolutoria is the


2Régis, p. 309.

3In I Post. Anal., Tr. 3, cap. 3 (ed. Borgnet, Paris: Vives, 1890) I, 528 b: "In via autem resolutionis, ultimum efficitur primum et e converso, primum fit ultimum. Resolutio est compositi in simplicia, posterioris in prius, et causati in causam. Et incipit ab ultimo secundum naturam quod immediatum sensibile est sensuum, non quidem per se vel commune sensatum sed per accidentes; quia in hoc albo crispo accipitur hic homo, et in hoc homine homo, et sic usque ad primum in quo stat resolutio."

"Et hoc igitur modo different nobis priora et notiora ab his quae natura sunt priora et notiora. Et dicuntur natura priora, secundum intellectum notiora; quia via resolutionis est via intellectus abstrahentis, quae est etiam principium intelligendi id quod naturat." Cf. Régis, p. 310.
name he gives to \textit{scientia judicandi} which the Greeks called "analytics."\textsuperscript{1} There are two phases to any scientific knowing-- the inquiry which leads to discovery, and the evaluation of what is discovered; the latter is made by perceiving some sort of causal relationship joining the discovery to something previously known. Thus the posterior is related to the prior, the composite to the simple, and the material to its formal principle. All of these are resolution, "returning to the sources," so to speak. Only those things can be resolved and evaluated which have been previously discovered, but one cannot make any evaluation of a discovery unless one knows how to evaluate it; therefore, one must have acquired the techniques of resolving and judging even earlier. Therefore, there must be two types of resolution. The first is the resolution of the syllogism into propositions, and these into terms.\textsuperscript{2} The second sort of


resolution\(^1\) consists in the discovery of principles -- immediate and necessary truths without which there cannot be demonstration-- and causes-- the definitions which ensure the truth of the conclusions.\(^2\)

Thus the term as Thomas Aquinas inherited it had come to mean one of the two essential elements of philosophic method, more important, however, than the other essential element, *compositio*, both in the order of apprehension or definition and in the order of reasoning, inasmuch as it is the one which provides those things more knowable to us which must be the starting point for composition. It is a method which proceeds from the complex to the simple, from what is more to what is less

\(^1\)Ibid., cap. I, p. 290a: "Attendum est autem cum omnis et tota logica sit scientia disserendi, et haec dividitur in scientiam inveniendi, et in scientiam judicandi quod inventum est. Inventivum autem fiat per localem habitudinem terminorum ad invicem, judicium autem fiat per resolutionem. Et quamvis intentio quoad nos prior sit resolutione, eo quod non possit resolvi et judicari nisi quod jam inventum est, quia omnis resolutio est ad priora secundum naturam, quia non resolvitur nisi vel posterius in prius, vel compositum in simplex, vel in suum formale principium; et idea ars resolvendi et judicandi secundum rationem resolutionis est ante artem inveniendi. Nec potest esse nisi duplex resolutio, resolutio scilicet rei conclusae in principia et causas per quas concluditur et syllogismi collecti jam et constituti in principia formalia." Cf. Régis, pp. 311-312.

dependent in its being, from effect to cause, from the
divisible to the indivisible. It is the method of ex-
position and explication. This method could be exclu-
sively epistemological, or, more broadly, an ontological
principle as well. It had been equated with abstraction
and also with evaluation. It had been opposed to both
composition and division. Thomas preserves these variations
in meaning and terminology in his writings; nowhere, how-
ever, does he compare these varying senses of resolution
all together, nor give a list of synonyms. "To a super-
ficial thinker, whose grasp of philosophic thought begins

1Régis, pp. 312-13.

2For example: In I Post. Anal., cap. XXII, lect.
35, 2 (Leonine ed.): "Demonstrativa scientia, quae resol-
vendo ad principia per se nota indicativa dicitur, est pars
logicae..." (Ibid., cap. XXXII, lect. 42, 10): "Vocat autem
resolutionem, quando propositiones assumptae non sunt mani-
festae, sed oportet eas resolvere in alieas manifestiores...
principia demonstrativarum syllogismarum sunt immediatae
propositiones, quae vel statim assumentur... vel ad eas
devenitur per resolutionem." In IT Post. Anal., cap. V,
lect. 4, 2: "Sicut enim in Posterioribus Analyticus docetur
resolutio usque ad principia prima, ita etiam in Prioribus
Analyticus fit resolutio ad prima quaedam simplicia per-
tinentia ad dispositionem syllogismi in modo et figura."
In his Expositio super Dionysium De Divinis Nominibus (ed.
Pera: Rome: Marietti, 1950) cap. I, Lect. 2 (51) it is an
ontological principle: "Duplex processus inventur in
rebus, scilicet: resolutionis et compositionis; et secundum
utrumque, tendunt res in divinam similitudinem."

3Nor is there any agreement among lexicographers;
compare Schutz, Deferrari, and Peter of Bergamo.
and ends with an exact use of language, the foregoing will appear as a horrid blemish. But the fact is that the original genius, precisely because he is original, finds all current usage inept for his purposes. It is only through patient and careful study of the relevant texts that we may hope to become familiar with his practice, and through reflecting on this to discover and express his doctrine. The reason for this is that performance always precedes the reflection on performance which enables one to understand and give exact expression to the method employed, and this becomes possible only "long after the philosopher's death when his influence has moulded the culture which is the background and vehicle of such expression."

The first problem a study of this type must face and solve is, "which are the relevant texts?" It is in order to answer this question that the foregoing historical material has been included in detail. We propose to use the various meanings resolution acquired through this

---


2Ibid., pp. 23-4; Cf. p. XII: "Performance must precede reflection on performance, and method is the fruit of that reflection."
evolution, and the synonyms and antonyms associated with these, as a guide to locating the relevant texts in the Thomistic corpus. Our primary interest is in resolution as an epistemological method, but inasmuch as any such method grows out of reflection on logical techniques and psychological processes as well as experiential reality, with a view to ascertaining how the first two can give assurance of true knowledge of the last, we must consider these orders and their inter-relations as well.

The term most often associated with resolution is reduction; in some instances both are used in the same text, and in others, where the topic under discussion and the doctrine are identical, resolution is used in one text and reduction in another. In fact, Thomas uses reduction far more often than resolution, which may be the reason it has been said that Thomas himself prefers the former term. However, the considerations which determine Thomas' choice of a term seem to be more complex

---


2Cf. p. 15, n. 1.

3Ibid., and p. 14, n. 1.

than personal preference alone: in his commentaries, for example, he customarily utilizes the term employed by the author of the text, with whatever nuances it has in that text, as well as any variations in its meaning. Thus, the term analyticus appears only twenty-four times in Thomas' writings, all of them in his commentaries on Aristotle.¹ In William of Moerbeke's translation of the Posterior Analytics, the one Thomas used in writing his own commentary,² analutikos appears twice in Chapter XXII of Aristotle's Greek and is twice rendered as analyticus. Here Thomas uses analyticus four times and resolvendo appears only once. However, in chapter XXXII William translates the Greek analusis as resolutio, and here it is resolutio that Thomas uses four times; analyticus is used only once.

Neither can we assume that because Thomas uses the same term in different texts, it has the same significance. In point of fact, at least some of the time reduction is the Latin equivalent, not of analusis, but of an entirely different Greek term, anagoge, as he

¹I owe this information to Rev. Busa who graciously provided me with as much of the Index Thomisticus as he could prior to its final collation for publication. Cf. p. 9, n. 3.

²This is given along with the Greek text in the Leonine edition, vol. I.
himself states. In fact, the meaning here does seem to be equivalent to that of resolutio, but one suspects that perhaps Thomas is using the Greek term inaccurately, and, where his text makes the meaning of the Greek clear, reductio would also have a different meaning. Significant in this regard is the Latin phrase reduc~o ad absurdum: here the Greek term translated by reductio is yet a third one, apagoge, which is usually translated deductio.

Another term that has been taken as a synonym for resolution is abstraction; and indeed the texts appear to support this, for Thomas does speak of abstraction by way of resolution and abstraction as a type of resolution. Again, however, the fundamental question is, "What does

---

1 In VI Meta., lect. 3, #1202: "...hac reductione, vel anagoge, quod idem est."

2 Ibid., "...Causae entium per accidens reducuntur usque ad aliquid principium, cujus non est ponere aliam causam."


4 Rudolf Eisler, Wortbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1904) v. I, p. 196.


6 S. T. I, 12, 4, ad 3; III 3, 3, ad 3.

7 SCG III, 100, #4.
it mean in each case?" For Thomas also uses abstraction in a variety of senses. It is our own literate culture which tends to equate precision in the use of words with precision in thinking, and to suppose that having a thinker's exact meaning is merely a matter of having the exact words in which he expressed his thoughts.\(^1\) However, "it is virtually impossible to assign to literal meaning a significance any more definite than the first or most obvious meaning of a passage as apprehended by one familiar with the language and context."\(^2\) Thomas' culture was pre-Gutenberg; a manuscript culture, still residually oral.\(^3\) In such a culture, precise terminology and consistence in signification are impracticable ideals; precision and consistency in doctrine was what medieval thinkers were attentive to.\(^4\) Therefore, mindful of Aristotle and Thomas' warning against looking for more


\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 46.

\(^{3}\)Ibid., pp. 267-68; and on p. 271: "Communal memory, invested with the ability of oral cultures to conserve thematic and formulaic (rather than verbatim) accuracy, could actually serve as a stabilizing textual influence to counteract the weakness of written textual transmission endemic in manuscript culture before print."

\(^{4}\)Ibid., p. 47.
certitude than the nature of the subject allows, we must try to grasp what Thomas thought he was doing, not what we might think he should have done.

The verb from which abstraction comes had the general meaning "to draw away from;" in addition to a direct object in the accusative case-- what is drawn away-- there is usually present also an ablative without a preposition-- the ablative of separation-- indicating that from which it is drawn, and even further, perhaps, an indication of the manner in which the accusative was drawn from the ablative. Thus, even in classical Latin it had, in addition to its literal meaning, a number of transferred ones. Thomas is simply using the word as it comes to him; we can discern a graded progression from the physical removal of a bodily part to the logical omission of a "part" of a concept; fluid is drawn out of the body through tears;  

1 In I Eth, 3, #36: "Ad hominem disciplinatum, idest bene instructum, pertinet, ut tantum certitudinis quaerat in unoquoque materia, quantun natura rei patitur... Et ideo auditor bene disciplinatus, non debet majorem certitudinem require, nec minori esse contentus, quam sit conveniens rei de qua agitur."

2 In IV Sent., d.50, q.2, a.3, qua. 3, sed contra: "Fletus corporalis fit per quamdam resolutionem lacrymarum. Sed a corporibus damnatorum non potest fieri perpetua resolutio, cum nihil in eis per cibum restauretur; omne enim consumitur si aliquid ab eo continue abstrahatur." Cf. SCG IV, 90; Quod. VII, 3; Opusc. X.
and life and human nature can be signified in an abstract way.\textsuperscript{1} Even if we restrict ourselves to the immanent activities of sensing, knowing, and willing, we find a variety of senses: concentration on one of these activities withdraws us from the other two;\textsuperscript{2} e. g., sensory appetite can distract a man from making a rational choice since passion suspends judgment.\textsuperscript{3} Stupefaction with earthly delights dulls one's taste for spiritual things;\textsuperscript{4} on the other hand, dedication to the things of the spirit results in

\begin{enumerate}
  \item SCG I, 98, \#2: "Vita enim viventis est ipsum vivere in quadam abstractione significatum." \textit{ST} III, 16, 7 ad 4: "...si tamen ex parte subiecti poneretur aliquid nomen significans naturam humanam in abstracto, posset hoc modo significari ut subiectum factionis, puta si dicatur quod natura humana facta est Filii Dei." (italics mine)
  \item S. T. I-II, 77, 1, resp.: "Passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter in suo actu impeditur." (italics mine)
  \item S. T. II-II, 146, 2, resp.: "Virtus moralis conservat bonum rationis contra impetus passionum: et ideo ubi inventitur specialis ratio qua passio abstrahit a bono rationis, ibi necesse est esse specialem virtutem. Delectationes autem ciborum natae sunt abstrahere hominem a bono rationis." \textit{Ibid.}, I-II, 77, 1, resp.: "Et secundum hunc modum per quandam distractionem, quando notus appetitus sensitivi fortificatur secundum quaecumque passionem, necesse est quod remittatur vel totaliter impeditur motus proprius appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas." (italics mine)
  \item S. T. II-II, 46, 2, ad 2: "Quamvis stultitiam nullus velit, vult tamen ea ad quae consequitur esse stultum, scilicet abstrahere sensum suum a spiritualibus et immergere terrenis." SCG III, 121, \#1: "Sicut autem per cor-
detachment from the delights of the flesh,\footnote{In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3: \textit{Non est inconveniens quod abstractioni a carnali vita aliquod alius praemium accidentale debeatur, quod fructus dicitur.}} and freedom from temporal responsibilities makes it easier for a person to live a life of love.\footnote{S. T. I-II, 89, 2 ad 3: \textit{Illi qui sunt abstracti a cura temporalium rerum, etsi aliquando venialiter peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia committunt et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgatur. Unum talis non superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum manent. Sed peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur, diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt ad huiusmodi peccata venialia delenda per caritatis fervorem.}} \footnote{S. T. II-II, 88, 8, ad 2: \textit{... Servus autem, quia est in potestate domini etiam quantum ad personales operaciones, non potest se noto obligare ad religionem, per quam ab obsequio domini sui abstraheretur.}} (Nevertheless, a man obligated to serve another may not profess religious vows, which would preclude his fulfilling his obligation.)\footnote{Ibid., sol. 3: \textit{Spiritualitas vero superabundans est per quam homo ab huiusmodi delectationibus carnis spiritum suffocantibus omnino se abstrahit... in quo invenitur perfecta abstractio a delectabilibus carnis quantum ad omnes circumstantias.}} But all these uses are analogously related to each other, for they are attributed to one primary one: the abstraction from sensory images which is essential for human knowing, upon which all other specifically human activity, whether speculative or

poralia et sensibilia mens hominis elevari potest in Deum, sic quis eis in reverentiam Dei debito modo utatur, ita etiam earum indebitus usus mentem a Deo vel totaliter abstrahit, dum in inferioribus rebus constituitur voluntatis finis; vel mentis intentionem a Deo retarda, dum ultra quam necesse sit, ad huiusmodi res afficimur." (italics mine)
practical, depends.

Hence, whatever withdraws a person from immersion in matters of bodily concern likewise contributes to the perfection of intellectual and spiritual activity. Thus, even the alienation from sensation and corporeal things which occur in sleep, sickness, demonic possession or ecstasy renders the human spirit more susceptible to reception of extra-sensory types of knowing: for example, foreknowledge of the future and other types of prophetic knowledge. This is, however, a more total withdrawal

---

1S. T. II-II, 15, 3, resp.: "Perfectio intellectualis operationis in homine consistit in quaedam abstrac-tione a sensibilium phantasmatibus. Et ideo quanto intellec-tus hominis magis fuierit liber ab huiusmodi phan-tasmatibus, tanto potius considerare intelligibilia poterit et ordinare omnia sensibilia;... Manifestum est autem quod delectatio applicat intentionem ad ea in quibus aliquis delectatur;... delectionis tactus, ciborum scilicet et venereorum, quae sunt vehementissimae inter omnes corporales delectiones. Et ideo per haec vitia intentio hominis maxime applicatur ad corporalia, et per consequens debi-litatur operatio hominis circa intelligibilia;... Et e converso oppositae virtutes, scilicet abstinentia et cas-titas, maxime disponunt hominem ad perfectionem intellectu-alis operationis." Ibid., I-II, 46, ad 3: "Ad perfectum operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam." SCG III, 47, #2: "Huius autem signum hinc etiam accipi potest, quia quanto magis mens nostra ad contemplanda spiritualia eleva-tur, tanto magis abstrahitur a sensibilibus." (italics mine)

2S. T. II-II, 172, 1, ad 1: "Anima quando abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior redditur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium substantiarum; et etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus qui ex impressionibus naturalium causarum in imaginatone humana relinquuntur, a quibus percipiendis anima impeditur cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata." Ibid., II-II, 175, 1, resp.: "...Alio modo quantum ad modum
from the senses than that which occurs normally in human knowing. The manner of knowing itself is superhuman, not through the normal activity of the intellect, but rather a sort of "abnormal" activity. ¹ If it were not, it would be hard to justify the union of soul and body, since matter is an impediment to understanding. If the soul could function just as well without a sensitive body, union with the latter would seem to be a frustration of the

homini connaturalenum, qui est ut per sensibilia intelligat veritatem. Et ideo quando abstrahitur a sensibilium apprehensione, dicitur rapi, etiam si elevatur ad ea ad quae naturaliter ordinatur, dum tamen hoc non fiat ex propria intentione; sicut accidit in somno qui est secundum naturam; une non potest proprie raptus dici." (italics mine)

Huiusmodi autem abstractio, ad quocumque fiat, potest ex triplici causa contingere. Uno modo ex causa corporali... propter aliquam infirmitatem... secundo modo ex virtute daemonum... Tertio modo ex virtute divina. Et sic loquimur nunc de raptu, prout scilicet aliquis spiritu divino elevatur ad aliquam supernaturalia, cum abstractione a sensibus...." Ibid., II-II, 175, 2, ad 2: "...Unde quando homo ex violentia appetitus inferioris abstrahitur a motu appetitus superioris, magis abstrahitur ab eo quod est sibi proprium." Ibid., II-II, 173, 3, resp.: "Sed quando fit revelatio prophetica secundum formas imaginarias, necesse est fieri abstractionem a sensibus, ut talis apparatio phantasmatum non referatur ad ea quae exterius sentiuntur." (italics mine)

¹ S. T. I, 12, 4, ad 3: "Et ideo cum intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione... potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens." (italics mine)
former's very nature as a knowing power. And in fact we do see that, apart from intervention by more intellectual substances, an illness or bodily injury which impedes the activity of one or more senses, hinders the activity of the intellect, which would not be the case if the human intellect were the kind of power that does not make use of a bodily organ. Thus Thomas sometimes uses absolvo rather than abstraho for this more total severing of the soul from its normal way of functioning in and through the body. A cognate of absolvo, resolvo, is, however, used

---

1S. T. I, 55, 2, resp.: "...Ex ipso modo essendi competit eis [substantiis spiritualibus inferioribus] ut a corporibus et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur; alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur."

2S. T. I, 84, 7, resp.: "...Cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius actum actus alicuius potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utentur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat,... requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quo impedito actu virtuti imaginativae per laesionem organi,... impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu...."

3De Ver. VIII, 12, ad 3: "Et quia male corporis aggravatur, et dum sensibilibus intendit, minus est intelligibilium capax; ideo quando a sensibus abstrahitur vel per somium [sic] vel per aegritudinem, vel quocumque alio modo, fit ex hoc magis idonea ad impressionem superioris spiritus recipiendam. Et ideo dum praedicto modo a nexibus corporis absolvitur, futura praenoscit...."
far more frequently in this sense of severing or dissolving a union of parts.

Where the noun, rather than the verb, is employed, the synonym for *abstractio* is, of course, *resolutio*; we have seen that both are used for the release of bodily fluid. Usually the two are used interchangeably where the meaning is a sort of dissolution; it need not, however, be a physical process, for the intellect also "dissolves"

---

1In *IV Sent.*, d.43, a.4, a.2: "...Sed in cineres potest aliquid resolvi nisi per combustionem..."

2. "Sed contra... Oportet omnia corpora in cinerem resolvi.

Resp....Sicut omnes moriuntur ad hoc quod omnes vere resurgere possint, ita omnium corpora dissolventur ad hoc quod omnium corpora reformari possint. Sicut etiam in poenam hominis mors a divina iustitia est inficta, ita et corporis resolutio... non solvum animae et corporis com- unctio solvatur, sed etiam elementorum commixtio; sicut etiam acetum non potest in vini qualitatem reduci nisi prius facta resolutione in materiam praeiacentem. Ipsa etiam elementorum commixtio ex motu caeli causatur, et con- servatur. Quo cessante, omnia mixta in pura elementa resolventur.

Ad 2...Cineres intelliguntur omnes reliquiae quae remanent, humano corpore resoluto, duplici ratione. Primp...inolevit modus loquendi [apud antiquas] ut in quae corporis humanum resolvitur, cineres dicantur. Secundo, propter causam resolutionis, quae est incendium fomitis, quo corpus humanum radicitus est infectum. Unde ad purga- tionem huius infectionis oportet usque ad prima componentia corpus humanus resolvi. Quod autem per incendium resolvit, dicitur in cineres resolvi. Et ideo ea in quae corpus humanum resolvitur, cineres dicuntur.

Ad 3...ILLE ignis qui faciem mundi purgabit, poterit statim corpora eorum qui vivi inveniuntur usque ad cineres resolvere, sicut et alia mixta resolvet in materiam praeiacentem."
the composite sensible singular in the process of knowing it.\textsuperscript{1} Thomas speaks in one text of "two abstractions made by the intellect,"\textsuperscript{2} but later, dealing with the same question, he speaks of "two resolutions which are made by the intellect," and uses both \textit{abstractio} and \textit{resolutio} as equivalent terms.\textsuperscript{3} This way of resolution by abstraction

\textsuperscript{1}S. T. I, 12, 4, resp.: "...Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. Unde secundum intellectum possumus cognoscere huiusmodi res in universale, quod est super facultatem sensus.

Ad 3... intellectus noster potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia, tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsum formam per se."

Thomas also speaks of reducing material forms to intelligible species by abstraction: \textit{ST} I, 55, 2, ad 2: "esse... formae in imaginatione,... medium est inter esse formae quae est in materia, et esse formae quae est in intellectu per abstractionem a materia et a conditionibus materialibus. Unde... intellectus angelicus non posset formas materiales reducere ad esse intelligibile, nisi prius reduceret eas ad esse formarum imaginatarum. Quod est impossibile, cum careat imaginatione... Dato etiam quod posset abstrahere species intelligibiles a rebus materiaibus, non tamen abstraheret; quia indigeret eis."

\textsuperscript{2}S. T. I, 40, 3, resp.: "Duplex fit abstractio per intellectum. Una quidem secundum quod universale abstrahitur a particulari... Alia vero secundum quod forma abstrahitur a materia..."

\textsuperscript{3}Compendium Theologiae in Opuscula Omnia (ed. Mandonnet, Paris: S. P. Lethielleux, 1927) vol. II, I, 62: "Est enim duplex resolutio, quae fit per intellectum. Una secundum abstractionem formae a materia... Alia vero resolutio est secundum abstractionem universalis a particulari."
from material and individuating conditions, through which we cannot know singulars, \(^4\) is clearly not the same as the reflection by which we return to and know singulars, and which is the opposite of abstraction. Such reflection is an essential part of the method with which we are concerned here, and we have chosen, for clarity's sake, to refer to as resolution; to also speak of "resolution by abstraction" would thus merely complicate things. Further, there is no need to do so: the doctrine on this type of abstraction is well developed in numerous places where it is called simply "abstraction," and this is how we shall refer to it hereafter.

But what of the term reflection itself? The Latin noun reflexio is derived from the third conjugation verb reflecto, having reflexi and reflexum as its perfect active and perfect passive participles respectively; its basic meaning is "to turn or bend back." It can be said in a literal sense of material things, including parts

\(^1\)SCG II, 100, \#4: "Ad intellectum enim nostrum perveniunt per viam resolutionis, per abstractionem a conditionibus materialibus et individuantibus: unde per eas singularia cognosci non possunt a nobis." ST I, 12, 4, ad 3: "... intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione per modum resolutionis cuiusdam,..." Cf. also ST III, 3, 3, ad 3.
of one's own body, e.g., "turn one's eyes back," i.e., "to look back." It can also be said in a figurative sense of non-material things: "to divert the soul or the mind."

Two English words are derived from it: reflection and reflexion. In common usage, the former most often means the bending back of light, which is of no relevance for us here, and a mental "looking back," i.e., deliberating or pondering; the latter retains the more concrete sense of "bending back" or "returning on."¹ The human spirit, as Thomas views it, can do both: it can reflect on what it is presently experiencing, or has experienced previously, whether sensible or intelligible, but also it is reflexive: able to return on itself, i.e., it can also reflect on itself. Since the distinction is of significance for us here, we will adhere to it in our own usage. A careful study of Thomas' usage, based on a representative number of texts selected from the whole of his writings, has been done by Father Wébèrt;² he concluded that the term is used

¹Frequently the two spellings are used interchangeably: "reflection" is the more common, but one still finds, especially in British publications, "reflexion" where the mental activity is what is clearly intended. Yet the distinction is retained in other forms, especially in the adjectival: we speak of a "reflexive verb" but would never speak of a "reflective verb."

²J. Wébèrt, O.P., "Reflexio: Etude sur les opéra-
to name a number of psychological operations; although its varied meanings can be reduced to three principal ones, these cannot be further reduced to a single meaning, referring to a single operation of which the others are types or particularizations.\(^1\) These fundamental senses are: the intellect's "backward glance" at the concrete individual which makes a sort of knowledge of sensible singulars possible;\(^2\) a kind of mutual reflection of intellect on will, and will on intellect;\(^3\) and a properly scientific reflection. It is this last which grounds all science, logic, and epistemology; by means of it one knows the universal, and knows, as well, that he does know it. Thus it is really a double reflection: a direct reflection on the object, and an indirect, or "reflexive reflection" on the act of knowing which assures one of certitude in knowing the object.\(^4\) This scientific reflection is taken to be the prime analogate, the one to which the name "reflection" belongs most properly.\(^5\)

The second type of reflection—of intellect on will and will on intellect—is of no immediate interest

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 324.
\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 307-10.
\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 313-15.
\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 315-19.
\(^5\)Ibid., pp. 324-25.
for our inquiry; how the other two senses of reflection relate to resolution can only be determined in the course of our inquiry. Similarly, the other terms which have been suggested as synonyms—inductio, deductio, examen, and via iudicii—since they refer more narrowly to specific stages in the activity of knowing, seem most appropriately considered in the context of these stages. The sense of resolution we propose to elucidate is that of an epistemological technique whereby the particular is reduced to the general or more universal, including principles, causes, and even the ultimate cause, God. Such procedures assure us of truth in knowing because they reproduce in the intentional order the connections which exist between real beings in the sensible universe, and between the created universe and its Uncreated Cause.
II

SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE MEANING AND PROCESS OF KNOWING

Before we can ask 'what does Thomas mean by the method of knowing he calls resolution?' we must locate it within the larger perspective of 'what does Thomas mean by knowing?' In the history of philosophy up to Thomas' time, two radically opposed views had been advanced:¹ "For the Platonist, knowing is primarily a confrontation; it supposes the duality of knower and known; it consists in a consequent, added movement... For the Aristotelian, on the other hand, confrontation is secondary. Primarily and essentially knowing is perfection, act, identity."² Thomas found Aristotle's view of knowing the more cogent;³

¹SCG II, 98, #19: "Et hoc quidem oportet verum esse, secundum sententiam Aristotelis qui ponit quod intelligere contingit per hoc quod intellectum in actu fit unum cum intellectu in actu;... et secundum hoc est idem intellectus et intellectum et intelligere. Secundum autem positionem Platonis, intelligere fit per contactum intellectus ad rem intelligibilem... Unde et Dionysius dicit quod superiores substantiae intelligibiles sunt quasi cibus inferiorum." Cf. Lonergan, Verbum, p. 183.

²Ibid., pp. 183-4.

³De Ver. X, 6, resp.: "Et ideo prae omnibus praedictis positionibus rationabilior videtur sententia Philosophi..." In III De An. X, #371: "Inducitur autem Aristotelis... ad excludendum opinionem Platonis,..."
he accepted it and made it the basis of his own analysis.¹

Let us begin, therefore, with a brief summary of Aristotle's explanation of knowing as Thomas understood it.

No less than Plato, Aristotle wished to maintain a clear distinction between knowledge and opinion, and between truth and prejudice. Plato had based the distinction in a recognition of the unchangeable and universal character of human knowledge which he explained as rooted in the immateriality of both the knower and the known.²

But because Plato understood this as requiring that the known be completely actual and completely separate from matter, which excludes all change, he was forced to a metaphysical dualism in which matter can be neither the object

¹Lonergan, p. 188.

²S. T. I, 84, 1, resp.: "... Plato, ut posset salvare certam cognitionem veritatis a nobis per intellectum haberi, posuit praeter ista corporalia aliud genus entium a materia et motu separatum, quod nominabit species sive ideas,... Sic ergo dicebat scientias et definitiones et quidquid ad actum intellectus pertinet, non referri ad ista corpora sensibilia, sed ad illa immaterialia et separata; ut sic anima non intelligat ista corporalia, sed intelligat horum corporalium species separatas."
nor the source of knowledge. Consequently, sensation—the contact of matter with matter—cannot in any sense, including an instrumental one, be a cause of knowing, not even of sensory knowing. The most he could allow to sensation was the function of arousing the sensible soul to sense: thereupon it in turn roused the intellectual soul to understand. It has been suggested that the reason Aristotle was uncomfortable with this consequence was that he had a passionate interest in knowing the sensible world directly; however he came to it, he seems to have had the conviction

1S. T. I, 84, 1, resp.: "Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviare a veritate, quia cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicuius similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognosciente eo modo quo est in cognito. Consideravit autem quod forma re intellectae est in intellectu universaliter et immaterialiter et immobiler; quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparat, qui intelligit universaliter et per modum necessitatis culiusdam; modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis. Et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et immobiler. Hoc autem necessarium non est."

2Ibid., 6, resp.: "... Plato vero e contrario possuit intellectum differe a sensu;... Sic igitur secundum Platonis opinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam sensibilem a sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant animam intelligivam ad intelligendum."

that what common sense has always assumed to be so is de-
serving of respectful consideration even by the philosopher.
The common sense view of the matter is that knowledge, however attained, is "about" the sensible world; the ex-
planation Aristotle worked out respected this view, for it enabled him to hold that what is known by the intellect is a partial constituent of the realities first known by the senses.¹

Aristotle described a psychological process by which the intellect derives from changing sensible singu-
lars an immaterial, universal knowledge of their natures; to this process he gave the name aphaeresis, a word which means "subtraction" as opposed to "addition," and can be used in any instance where something is subtracted or removed from something else by any sort of process what-
ever. To abstract is thus to omit or eliminate some-
thing-- the matter-- from consideration. For what is retained Aristotle used a different word meaning "sepa-
rated." But these two opposite notions are combined in
the medieval doctrine of abstraction,² no doubt due to

¹Lonergan, p. 20.
²Owens, The Doctrine of Being..., p. 239.
confusions introduced through variant translations, as described earlier. As a result, the medievals read "in Aristotle" things which doubtless would have surprised the Stagirite, but which were, to them, the plain meaning of his text.\(^1\)

Thus the explanation of human knowing which Thomas adopted from Aristotle is one whose details the latter might well be puzzled to be credited with, even before Thomas further developed any part of it to express or ground convictions and attitudes profoundly different from those of "the Philosopher." To speak of an "Aristotelico-Thomistic synthesis" as if Thomas' position was merely a baptized version of Aristotle is to risk grossly misrepresenting either or both positions. What can be said is merely that Thomas preferred Aristotle's position to Plato's as he understood both of these.

Thomas himself tells us the reason for his preference: he found it more in accord with the experience of working in, and on, a sensible basis towards under-

standing than that favored by his contemporaries,¹ who explained intellectual knowledge by way of an actual participation of eternal truth—Augustine's theory of divine illumination.² Repeatedly he appeals to our psychological experience to manifest the value of what he says: "qui-libet in se ipso experiri potest...";³ "et quod hoc verum sit, experimento appareat;"⁴ "et hoc experimento cognoscimus;"⁵ "quod experimento potest esse falsum."⁶ On behalf of experience he rejects outside intervention in human

¹S. T. I, 88, 1, resp.: "Secundum opinionem Platonis substantiae immateriales non solum a nobis intelliguntur; sed etiam sunt prima a nobis intellecta... Applicatur tamen animae cognitio rebus materialibus, secundum quod intellectus permiscetur phantasia et sensus... Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam quam magis experimur, intellectus noster secundum statim praeentis vitae naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata." (italics mine). Cf. In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; d. 49, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3. In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; ST I, 87, 3, corp. Lonergan, pp. 20-32, 42.


³S. T. I, 84, 7, resp.

⁴De Spiritualibus Creaturis (Romae: Universitatis Gregorianae, 1959, ed. Keeler) X, resp.

⁵S. T. I, 79, 4, resp.

knowing in the form of separated intellect, either agent-
possible or agent alone.¹ Both of these intellects are
properly in man, since he abstracts species from images
and receives the actually intelligible in his mind: had
we not experienced these activities in ourselves, we should
not have come to be aware of them.²

Thomas agreed with Aristotle, as even Aristotle
with Plato, that the goal of human knowing is science,
though this did not mean precisely the same thing to each
of them. The Greek term which Thomas' Latin one,
scientia, translates is episteme which could mean (1)
true and scientific knowledge, as opposed to doxa,
opinion; (2) an organized body of knowledge—science in
our modern sense; (3) theoretical knowledge as opposed
to practical knowledge, or praktike.³ The distinction

¹Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima (Taurini-Romae
Marietti, 1927; v. II) V, resp.: "... Si diligenter con-
sideremus, inveniendus eodem ratione impossibile esse, intel-
lectum agentem substantiam separatam esse, qua ratione et
de intellectu possible hoc supra ostensum est... Utrumque
... harum operationum experimur in nobis ipsis." (italics
mine).

²SCG II, 76, #17: "Sed utraque actio, scilicet
intellectus possibilis et intellectus agentis, convenient
hominis; homo enim species abstrahit a phantasmatibus et
recepit mente intelligibilia actu; non enim aliter in
notitiam harum actionum venissemus, nisi eas in nobis
experiemur." (italics mine)

³Francis E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms
between doxa and episteme seems to be pre-Socratic; at first it was probably no more than a distinction between levels of conviction, a difference of degree rather than of kind. The influence of Parmenides, who sharply divided the world of opinion from the realm of pure being and thought, led Plato to use episteme to mean exclusively knowledge of the eide; the immutable everlasting ground of truth. For Aristotle also, episteme was knowledge of the eide; not, however, the transcendent eide of Plato. Aristotle's eide were immanent in sensible things; accordingly, episteme is demonstrative knowledge of the true causes, whether of being or of becoming, and it is derived from sense knowledge by induction.2

When Aristotle inter-relates the species of episteme in Metaphysics he divides it into praktike, poietike, physike, and theologike: he subdivides the last of these into mathematike, physike, and theologike. However, he frequently uses episteme alone for episteme theoretike or theoria; episteme praktike is also called praxis; and episteme poietike, techne. Techne is knowledge of the causes of becoming, whereas theoria is know-

1Peters, pp. 59-60.
2Ibid., p. 58.
3Ibid., p. 60; Cf. Metaphysics VI, 1025b-26a.
ledge of the causes of being;\textsuperscript{1} the knowledge of the ultimate causes of being, theologia,\textsuperscript{2} is also called sophia.\textsuperscript{3} Philosophia is a synonym for episteme theoretike; there is first philosophy, or theologia,\textsuperscript{4} and second philosophy, or physics.\textsuperscript{5} However, from another point of view physics can be said to deal with the causes of becoming\textsuperscript{6}--the internal causes.\textsuperscript{7} Thus it is distinguished from techne which deals with the external causes of becoming. And theologia studies being as being,\textsuperscript{8} that is, being that is separate and unmoving.\textsuperscript{9} The tendency to restrict theoria to sophia, as Plato

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Metaphysics I, 981b; Peters, \textit{ibid.}, p. 191.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Peters, \textit{ibid.}, p. 193.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Metaphysics I, 980a-83b; Peters, \textit{ibid.}, p. 197.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Metaphysics VI, 1026a; Peters, \textit{ibid.}, p. 156.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Metaphysics VII, 1037a; Peters, \textit{ibid.}; Owens, \textit{The Doctrine of Being...}, p. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Physics II, 199a; Peters, \textit{ibid.}, p. 191.
\item \textsuperscript{7}On the resolution of the apparent conflict see Owens, \textit{The Doctrine of Being...}, p. 169.
\item \textsuperscript{8}Metaphysics IV, 1003a; Peters, \textit{ibid.}, p. 141.
\item \textsuperscript{9}Metaphysics VI, 1026a; Peters, \textit{ibid.}.
\end{itemize}
did\textsuperscript{1} and Plotinus will later,\textsuperscript{2} is tempered in Aristotle by his desire to include physics as a genuinely theoretical knowledge, but his attraction toward the more restricted sense is evident when he considers whether contemplation is the highest human activity in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}.\textsuperscript{3}

It would seem, then, that science is, for Aristotle, "equivocal by reference\textsuperscript{4}" because what science is about is \textit{ousia}-- being or substance-- itself equivocal by reference.\textsuperscript{5} As the primary being is separate substance, so the primary science is \textit{theologia}. It is the most certain science since it is about the most universal causes.\textsuperscript{6} Physics is a secondary instance of wisdom

\begin{flushright}


\textsuperscript{4}We have equivocity by reference when the things called by the same name have different natures, only one of which is the nature the name signifies. The others, however have some reference to this nature, as being a sign of it, or productive of it, hence they are so named; Cf. Owens, \textit{The Doctrine of Being...}, pp. 55-57.

\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 164-68.

\textsuperscript{6}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 140, 151-62.
\end{flushright}
because it deals with a secondary instance of being,\textsuperscript{1} and the same is true of mathematics;\textsuperscript{2} in each case the "being" is less universal than the primary instance. Practical and productive science are about the "coming-into-being" which is always singular; hence it, and the science which deals with it, are still more remote from the primary instances, which are primary precisely because they are in the highest degree permanent and unchanging.\textsuperscript{3} "Being and entity are apparently conceived—somewhat as in Plato—in terms of permanence and unchangeableness."\textsuperscript{4} It is about this that there is science or knowledge, and it is this notion of science as equivocal by reference—because what it is about is equivocal by reference—that Aristotle bequeaths to his philosophical heirs.

So we see that for Aristotle the certainty of knowledge was directly dependent on the immutability of what was known, and this is also Thomas' view. For both, theoretical science is more "scientific" than practical or productive science precisely because the latter deals

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 164.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 174.
\textsuperscript{3}Owens, p. 175; Cf. Metaphysics VII, 1026a 13-19; IV, 1004a 3-9; IV, 1005b 35.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid.
with becoming-being. But, whereas for Aristotle the ultimate and perfect knower is "the unmoved mover-- for all its separateness and permanence remarkably like a disembodied human intellect"\(^1\)-- for Thomas it is God, the creative source of all that is and is known.\(^2\) Whereas for Aristotle man is impeded in knowing truly only because his soul is the form of a material substance, "a form which needs matter" instead of a form separate from matter, for Thomas man is impeded for the further and much more significant reason that he is a created knower and the truth he seeks takes its permanence from the Absolute truth, separated, not merely by being immaterial, but by being uncreated.\(^3\) If, therefore, we find Thomas having problems

\(^1\)This may be why he has such difficulty in the *De Anima* with regard to the Agent Intellect.

\(^2\)De Ver. XI, 1, resp.: "Hujusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia hujusmodi sunt nobis nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritas in nobis resultantis. Unde cum omnis doctrina humana efficaciam habere non possit nisi ex virtute illius luminis; constat quod solus Deus est qui interius et principaliter docet, sicut natura interius etiam principaliter sanat; nihilominus tamen et sanare et docere proprie dicitur modo praedicto."

\(^3\)S. T. II-II, 175, 4, resp.: "Intellectus autem hominis, in statu viae necesse est quod a phantasmatibus abstrahatur, si videat Dei essentiam. Non enim per aliquod phantasma potest Dei essentia videri, quinimmmo nec per aliquam speciem intelligibilem creatam; quia essentia Dei in infinitum excedit non solum omnia corpora, quorum sunt phantasmata, sed etiam omnem intelligibilem creaturam." Cf. Josef Pieper, "On the Negative Element in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," *Cross Currents* IV, (Fall, 1953) p. 47: "It is equally true and yet far from generally known
with, and even occasionally retreating from, Aristotle's thorough-going intellectualism, we should not find it surprising.¹

The changed point of view is reflected even in the connotations of the Latin adjective speculativa which modifies scientia equivalent to the way theoreti
ek modifies episteme. Whereas the Greek term is from a verb meaning seeing or beholding simply, the Latin comes, not from the equivalent verb specio, but from a derived form—the deponent verb speculor, which means to watch, observe, spy, and a speculator is a look-out, scout, spy or investigator. Thus the Latin verb carries connotations of a difficulty and risk, and these have been retained in our English equivalent words speculate and speculative.

The human knower is a scout in a territory of which he is

¹Cf. ST I, 14, 1, ad 3.
not and cannot be the master, in which he may easily go astray. Thomas does not regard Anaxagoras' notion of intellect, nous, as that whose function is to dominate with the same satisfaction as Aristotle does. A philosopher of our own day has expressed the matter in words on which it would be hard to improve: "to dominate, to simplify, to understand... to understand a thing is to fit it into an economical system. And to all of us,... though to some more than others, to understand is a good thing... [but] all economy is essentially arbitrary, and relative to some good other than wonder. And... the love

---

1Pieper, p. 55: "Man is conceived as a traveler, one who is on the way; that means, first, that his steps have meaning, that they are not in principle futile, they do lead nearer the goal. And this, in turn, is unthinkable without that other element: so long as man, in his existence, is 'on the way,' just so long the way of his knowledge is without an end. And this hope-structure of the quest for the essence of things, for philosophic knowledge, springs from the fact... that the world (the world and knowing man himself) is creatura."

2De Anima III, 4, 429a 18-20, of Aristotle; and Thomas' In de Anima, lect. 7, n. 679. I owe this point to R. McLaughlin, Abstraction as Constitutive of Science according to Aristotle and St. Thomas. (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1965) pp. 137 and 342, n. 9. The use I have made of it, however, differs sharply from his.
of understanding is a vow of poverty."¹ With this Thomas Aquinas, though perhaps not Aristotle, would heartily agree.

From another viewpoint, however, Thomas' procedure has far more in common with Aristotle's than with ours today: both lived in a culture where the spoken word dominated the written word. This was very clearly the case in Aristotle's time, dialectic and rhetoric were so much more prominent than writing that Plato refused to commit his deepest philosophical insights to the latter.² The medieval situation was more ambivalent; the importance of writing for transmitting the wisdom of the past to generations unborn had been recognized, yet in a manuscript culture the written word can never be more than a substitute for the spoken word-- the possibility of human error on the part of the copyist is too great. Oral institutions-- dialectic, rhetoric, and all that went with them-- were still very strong: the very form of Thomas' writings, except for some of the later commentaries, is the diputatio or quaestio. Compared with our own print-dominated culture, the Middle Ages were overwhelmed


²Cf. Plato's Seventh Epistle.
We tend to impose the conditions of the printed word—fixed in space, infinitely repeatable in a completely identical fashion—first on the spoken word, and then on the thing for which it stands. We start with the words; we define them clearly by carefully and exhaustively distinguishing meanings and then proceed to fit things into these pre-constructed pigeon-holes. Aristotle, however, proceeded in the opposite direction. He began by examining the things called by the same name to see in what ways they were alike and in what ways different, in order to discover whether they were univocal or equivocal, and if the latter, what sort of equivocals they were. He did not limit a term to one exact meaning and keep it fixed in this precise sense: rather he used the terms as the things being treated demanded. Since the things themselves have likenesses and differences, equivocity in language, and perhaps even in definition, is needed in order that both the likenesses and the differences be faithfully mirrored. Equivocity follows into language from things. Concern for careful, precise, and fixed defini-

\[\text{1Cf. Ong, pp. 266-67.}
\]
\[\text{2}^{\text{Topics I, 15, 106a 9-10. Owens, ibid., pp. 330-31, n. 31.}}
\]
\[\text{3Owens, ibid., pp. 60-62.}
\]
tions is quite proper to grammar and logic, for these sciences deal with language. But such concern is fatal to a science of real things, since, by leaving no room for the richness and ambiguity of reality, it falsifies its object.1

Whatever some later thinkers might hold, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas had no doubt whatever that philosophy deals with real beings, and anyone seeking to understand the thought of either must make a serious effort to do so from the latter's own point of view. We cannot take anything for granted, not the identity of Thomas' perspective with Aristotle's, much less its identity with our own; not even that the correct "literal" translation of Thomas' terms gives us any assurance of equivalent meaning. We must take all possible precautions against any ill-planned or ill-supplied journey of exploration: lest a small error in the beginning cause us to fail in

1Topics I, 15, 107b 6-12. On Generation and Corruption, I, 6, 322b 29-32. Owens, ibid., pp. 55-56. Neither Aristotle nor Thomas envisioned contemporary experimental science which is, consequently outside the scope of this dissertation. However, it appears to differ from the sciences of the real they knew insofar as it does not claim to deal with reality "as it is in itself"-- rather, it does so through models and constructs based on the observed interactions of real things, and thus not irrelevant -- in fact, quite effective-- in controlling these; yet not necessarily corresponding in any point with "the thing in itself."
our efforts, all supplies and maps left by previous explorers must be carefully studied and tested.

Accordingly, we dare not casually translate Thomas' scientia by our English term science: the mental picture associated with the latter is apt to be either a laboratory full of equipment or a library full of books. And even if the scientist or librarian be included in the picture, it would be more for the sake of completeness than because of any real need to have him in it. Thomas would find this picture excessively Platonic—in his mental picture the scientist would be primary, the location and its furnishings secondary. The medieval thinkers had no notion of a "deposit" of knowledge, a kind of commodity contained in some sort of cache. Such a notion cannot be operative before the advent of the printed book, "which truly 'locates' words, locking them once for all in exactly the same place upon the pages of thousands of copies of a work. In earlier ages knowledge could not be thought of as something to be transferred out of books or some other locale into men's minds." For Thomas scientia was the

---


2Ong, p. 270.
name, not of an abstract body of knowledge, but of a qualitative perfection of the human knowing power,\(^1\) one of the three speculative intellectual virtues.

As the habitual presence of intelligible species derived by abstraction from images in the internal senses, science represents the intelligible contours of the sensible things affecting the external senses;\(^2\) as the intellect's own forms, they specify the intellect to become, in its own way, which is immaterial, the things as known by it. The fact that the intelligible species is acquired by abstraction, however, presents certain problems: its ontological status is very different from that of the extra-mental things. How can we be assured that through the former we truly know the latter? In Thomas' epistemology what finally assures this is resolution. As human understanding is a gradual process, proceeding in

\(^1\)St. T. I, 14, 1, resp.: "Cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cognoti est in cognoscente." Ad 3: "Scientia est secundum modum cognoscentis; scitum enim est in sciente secundum modum scientis."

steps from partial to complete understanding, resolution
too is a gradual process and proceeds in steps: each
level of understanding has its corresponding resolutive
process. Therefore, the most direct way to discover the
meaning of resolution appears to be by investigating its
role in each of the stages of human understanding.
III

JUDGMENT AND REDUCTION TO THE SENSES

In this chapter we wish to consider the nature and function of the resolution proper to judgment which Thomas calls "reduction to the senses." That all our knowledge is derived from sense experience in some fashion is repeated by Thomas so insistently in a wide variety of treatises that there are no grounds left for asserting any natural knowledge deriving from another source. He is just as insistent that what establishes it as knowledge is that it be judged by reduction to the senses.¹ Where

¹In IV Sent., d.9, q.1, a.4, q.1, sol.: "Judicium enim perfectum haberi non potest de aliqua cognitione, nisi per resolutionem ad principium unde cognitio ortum habet... Cum ergo omnis cognitio intellectus nostri a sensu oriatur, non potest esse judicium rectum nisi reducantur ad sensum. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in VI Eth. quod sicut principia indemonstrabilia quorum est intellectus, sunt extrema, scilicet resolutionis, ita et singularia quorum est sensus." P. Rousselot, S.J. writes that Thomas "requiert une certaine collaboration des sens, non seulement pour 'fournir aux jugements leur matière, mais pour critiquer l'usage même de la faculté de juger: c'est l'opération de la resolutio in sensibilia." A note to this passage states: "La resolutio in sensibilia est en somme la constatation de l'état normal du sujet connaissant, nécessaire à la légitimité du jugement." L'ensemble des sense acquiert ainsi une valeur criteriologique." L'intellectualisme de S. Thomas (Paris: Beauchesne, 1924, 2 ed.) p. 65.
this is not possible, we cannot have perfect judgment, we do not have real knowledge. Precisely what does he mean by this reduction to the senses? Nowhere does he give a detailed explanation; in fact, he does not mention it more than a few times, as if he thought it something too well understood to need much explanation and too obviously necessary to need frequent mention. Sometimes he speaks of it as a resolution, but most often he calls it a reduction. The most suitable way to begin to investigate its nature is to ask, 'What is its function in human knowing?'

What is known by the human intellect directly and immediately is the natures or quiddities of sensible things. In their proper mode of existence such natures are individuated by matter; but individuated matter, though sensible, is unintelligible. Therefore, in order to be known, these natures must be abstracted from such matter.

---

1S. T. I, 84, 8, resp.: "Unde impossibile est quod sit nobis judicium intellectus perfectum cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibilis cognoscimus."

2Ibid., ad 2.

3De Ver. XV, 1, ad 7: "Unde circa naturas rerum sensibilium primo figuratur intuitus nostri intellectus..." Ibid., I, 12, resp.: "Quidditas... rei est proprie obiectum intellectus."

4S. T. I, 85, 1, resp.: "Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali."
Thus abstraction is a sort of "dissolution" of the concrete sensible thing into its component parts, and can be called "resolution" in this very broad sense of the term. Thomas does, in fact, several times speak of abstraction as resolution.¹ However, when resolution is given its narrower, more technical sense it not only is not synonymous with abstraction, but is actually opposed to it, as we intend to show.

What abstraction yields is a universal;² this is not the way these natures exist in sensible things, however.³ Yet the natural capacity of the human intellect is to know the truth about sensible things.⁴ Its knowing

¹Compendium Theologiae I, 62: "Est enim duplex resolutio, quae fit per intellectum. Una secundum abstraktionem formae a materia, in quo quidem proceditur ab eo, quod formalius est, ad id, quod est materialius; nam id, quod est primum subjectum, ultimo remanet, ultima vero forma primo removetur. Alia vero resolutio est secundum abstracktionem universalis a particulari, quae quodammodo contrario ordine se habet; nam prius removentur condiciones materiales individuantes, ut accipiatur, quod commune est..." Cf. Also SCG II, 100, #4; ST I, 12, 6, ad 3.

²De Ver. II, 6, ad 1: "Unde patet quod abstractio, quae est communis omnium intellectum, facit formam universalis."

³SCG I, 53, #2: "Res exterior intellecta a nobis, in intellectu nostro non existit secundum prouia naturam;" Ibid., #3: "Intellectus... intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit."

⁴In II Meta. I, #285: "Anima humana... secundum naturam est actus corporis, ejus autem intellectiva potestia non est actus organi corporalis, ita habet naturalem aptitudinem ad cognoscendum corporalium et sensibilium veritatem..."
activity, therefore, must reach the things which are external to the knower. Their abstracted species in the intellect are only their formal determinations, deprived of their existential reality; taken in themselves, therefore, they cannot be recognized as having corporeal existence, but only as disincarnate possibilities. It is the thing which measures our knowledge of it, and whether there is truth in what we think or say depends on whether or not the thing is as we think or say it to be. Thus the nature so

1 S. T. I, 84, 2, resp.: "... actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscentem. Cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt."

2 Phillipe, p. 227: "Son objet propre, immergé dans la matière, ne peut exister en dehors du monde sensible. Aussi l'intelligence doit-elle, pour le saisir, le démateriliser: dépouillement qui ne va pas sans le priver de sa vie et de sa réalité existentielle. Un tel objet désincarné ne peut plus être objet d'intuition, si l'on réserve à ce terme le sense formé que lui donne S. Thomas. L'intuition a un caractère immédiat et total, que seul un objet existant peut donner. Un objet abstrait ne peut être que le terme d'une appréhension, et cette appréhension est nécessairement dépourvue des propriétés reconnues à l'intuition. Sans doute l'appréhension, comme l'intuition, impliquent immédiation objective: l'objet comme tel est connu en lui-même sans aucun intermédiaire objectif."

3 S. T. I-II, 64, 3, resp.: "Verum autem intellectus nostri absolute consideratum, est sicut mensuratum a re; res enim est mensura intellectus nostri, ut dicitur in X Metaphy.; ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, veritas est in opinione et in oratione. Sic igitur bonum virtutis intellectualis speculativa consistit in quodam medio, per conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est, in quo ratio veri consistit."
abstracted cannot be known truly unless it is known as actually existing in the material universe.\(^1\) The intellect in its first operation takes account only of the natures of things; it requires a second operation to take account of the proper existence of things.\(^2\)

Thomas explains that in the first act of the intellect its attention is given to the intelligible species as its own form; not until it turns its attention to the conformity between its species and the extra-mental thing can it become aware of the species as true of the thing.\(^3\) Thus it is only in composing and dividing that the

\(^1\)S. T. I, 84, 7, resp.: "Intellectus... humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens;... De ratione autem huius naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali,... Unde natura... ciuscumque materialis rei, cognoscit non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens."

\(^2\)In I Sent., d.19, q.5, a.1, ad 7: "Prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate, ...ideo veritas et falsitas proprie inventur in secunda operatione... et non in prima." Cf. De Ver. I, 3, resp. and Lonergan, p. 44.

\(^3\)De Ver. I, 3, resp.: "Veri enim ratio consistit in adequatio rei et intellectus; idem autem non adaequatur sibi sed qualitas diversorum est; unde ibi primo inventur ratio veritatis in intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens, inter quae adaequatio attendi potest. Intellectus autem formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam."
intellect applies the abstracted intelligibility to the thing.\(^1\) It does not do this, however, merely insofar as its composition or division is a mental synthesis;\(^2\) the copula joining or separating the predicate and subject must express the intellect's commitment to the synthesis.\(^3\) It is the intellect's judgment which posits the synthesis of composition or division as true of the known thing;\(^4\) "without such positing there may indeed be synthesis, as in a question or hypothesis, but as yet there is no judgment."\(^5\) The synthesis may be true or false, but as yet it is not known to be either. "Finally, so long as synthesis is not

\(^1\) SCG II, 96, #10: "Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta ad res."

\(^2\) S. T. I, 3, 4, ad 2: "Esse dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniugens praedicatum subiecto." Cf. ibid., 48, 2, ad 2: In I Sent., d.19, q.5, a.1, sol.; and Lonergan, p. 49.

\(^3\) In I Peri Herm. III, #35: "Huiusmodi enim nomina significant aliquid, scilicet quasdam conceptus simplices, licet rerum compositionem; et ideo non est verum vel falsum, nisi quando additur esse vel non esse, per quae exprimitur iudicium intellectus." Cf. Francis Tyrell, The Role of Ascent in Judgment: A Thomistic Study (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1948) p. 16.

\(^4\) De Ver. I, 9, resp.: "Veritas est in intellectu ... sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consiquitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est." Cf. ibid., X, 8, resp.; ST II-II, 173, 2, resp.; ibid., I, 16, 1, resp.: In I Peri Herm., III, #7; and Lonergan, pp. 49-50.

\(^5\) Lonergan, p. 49.
posed, the peculiar objective reference of the judgment is lacking; as yet the primary meaning of "Est," the affirmation (or negation) of an 'in actu esse' is not involved.\(^1\)

Since the truth is the correspondence of mental composition or division with real composition or division, it is only when the intellect reflects on its synthesis, knowing and judging its conformity with the extra-mental thing, that it formally attains truth.\(^2\)

It is, accordingly, by means of the reflection involved in judging that the abstracted formal determinations are recomposed with their natural mode of existence.\(^3\)

Thus this reflection is an activity opposed to abstraction, though equally a necessary part of human knowing.

Since the common element in several of the epistemological acts which Thomas refers to as resolutions seems to be that they are some sort of reflexive activity, we must inquire what is the specific nature of the reflexion in-

\(^1\) Lonergan, p. 49.

\(^2\) In I Peri Berm. III, #9: "Cognoscere autem praedictam conformitatis habitudinem nihil est alium quam iudicare ita esse in re vel non esse." De Ver. I, 3, resp.: "Quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum judicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra in re. Sed quando adequantur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur judicium verum esse. Tunc autem judicat intellectus de re apprehensa quando dicit quod aliquid est vel non est, quod est intellectus componentis et dividentis;... inde est quod veritas per prius invenitur in compositione et divisione intellectus...."

\(^3\) Phillipe, pp. 22-28.
There are various types of judgments: there are ordinary perceptual judgments about sensible singulars; there are scientific judgments about the universal natures of these sensible singulars, and others about universals which are not perceptible as such by the external senses, though they are apprehended from what the external senses provide. Some of the latter are perceptible to the imagination, but some are perceptible only to the intellect. Finally, there are existential judgments. The way in which each is reduced to the senses depends upon the way in which the knowledge being evaluated in this way was derived from sense experience to begin with. We shall consider each type of judgment in turn, utilizing, in addition to the small number of texts in the Thomistic corpus, the secondary sources that have developed the implications of these texts with respect to specific types of judgments. A few general observations may avoid later confusion: first of all, when Thomas speaks of "the senses," he most often means the external senses; when he means an internal sense, such as imagination, he customarily refers to it by name. Secondly, we shall make use of the helpful distinction made by Fr. Klubertanz between reflexion as a psychological
"bending back" and reflection as "thinking back over."¹ The first need not be a consciously performed act, and in this it is the counterpart of abstraction, which is also psychological and does not require that one be aware of it as such. The second is always conscious and frequently metaphysical.

According to Thomas, every judgment involves reflection;² we judge that the thing corresponds to the form which we apprehend about that thing— that the form signified by the predicate is in fact present in, or absent from, the thing signified by the subject.³ Clearly this requires some sort of comparison between the mental synthesis and the thing; a direct comparison is not possible;


²In II Meta. IV, #1236: ". . . in hoc sola secunda operatione intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et dijudicando ipsam." Cf. Lonergan, p. 76, and Tyrrell, p. 17.

³S. T. I, 16, 2, resp.: "Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intellegibilem cognoscere potest; . . . quando judicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo; nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea." Cf. Lonergan, p. 75.
but for Thomas it is not necessary either. The image of the
thing must be present in the internal senses for its concept
to be actively understood,\(^1\) not only when it is first under-
stood, but at any time.\(^2\) When reflected on in its origin,
there is in this sensible image sufficient evidence about
the thing as it exists outside the mind to ground a judgment
that the composition or division corresponds to the thing.\(^3\)
Since Thomas does not doubt the trustworthiness of our
sense powers (so long, of course, as these are functioning
normally), he is not hesitant to affirm that the intellect
can know the conformity of its mental synthesis with the

\(^1\) SCG III, 41, #2: "Intellectus enim noster secun-
dum statum præsentem, nihil intelligit sine phantasmate,
quod ita se habet ad intellectum possiblem, quo intelli-
gimus, sicut se habent colores ad visum..."

\(^2\) Ibid., II, 73, #41: "Necessitas phantasmatum ad
intellectum possiblem erit sicut est illius qui jam habet
scientiam ad considerandum secundum scientiam illum quod
etiam sine phantasmatis non posset." Cf. De Ver., X, 6,
resp.; and ST I, 84, 7, resp. and ad 1.

\(^3\) S. T. I, 84, 7, resp.: "Natura...cuiuscumque
materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi
secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Par-
ticulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem."
Of this text one author states that it "lays the foundation
for knowledge of the singular and the conformity of the in-
tellect with reality in judgment..." He goes on to say,
however, that Thomas does not discuss these matters ex-
licitly in this text; that here he is not so much saying
that all human knowledge is judgmental as that seeing an
intelligibility in phantasms is the way of knowing proper
to the human intellect as human. Tad W. Guzie, "Evolution
of Philosophical Method in the Writings of St. Thomas,"
Modern Schoolman, XXXVII (1959-60) pp. 115-16.
thing by referring to its sensible image of the thing.\(^1\)
Thus the intellect judges its proposition about the thing by reflecting on the sensible image from which its knowledge was originally derived.\(^2\) Is this a conscious reflection?

The reflection of judgment is that through which any thinking man knows that he knows, that he possesses truth consciously and formally. His explicit knowledge, however, is not a knowledge of truth as truth, but of some universal nature existing in some sensible singular. The universal nature is known by abstraction from sensible singulars: however, the intelligible species received in the intellect in its first abstraction of a universal nature is very lacking in intelligible detail and so an inadequate representation of the nature. Through repeated experience with things having the nature, the intelligible contours of the species are gradually sharpened and clarified— the name

---

\(^1\)In Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, ad 5: "Phantasmata com-
parentur ad Intellectum ut obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem vel per negationem." Guzie, p. 108: "Phantasms, though they are not to be confused with the intelligible content of the judgment itself, must nevertheless be present as sensory representations or symbols of what is affirmed or denied in the act of judging." On the trustworthiness of the sense powers cf. De Ver. I, 9, and ST I, 16, 2.

\(^2\)S. T. II-II, 154, 5, ad 3: "... iudicium, quod perficitur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima principia cogitationis humanae." Cf. Ibid., 173, 3, resp. and Rousselot, p. 65, n. 1.
for this process is induction. Since this knowledge originated in sensible singulars, the intellect must return to the sensible singulars in order to judge its truth. Therefore, we may discover what sort of reflection is involved by inquiring how the intellect knows sensible singulars.

Only the sense powers can know the singular as such. The intellect knows singulars indirectly by a sort

---

1 In VI Eth. III, #1148: "Est enim duplex doctrina ex cognitis: una quidem per inductionem, alia vero per syllogismum. Inductio enim autem inductiur ad cognoscendum aliquod principium et aliquod universale in quod devenimus per experimenta singularum." As we use the term today, induction is the process of collecting and correlating particular sensory experiences of particular sensible things by which we come to a generalization stating a specific observation made under specified constant conditions to be factually true of a certain kind of thing. Induction merely establishes, it does not explain. Thus we distinguish induction from insight—an act of understanding which grasps the nature, the reason for the fact. For Thomas, "induction" named generalization and insight together, but primarily the latter. Cf. In II Post. Anal. 20, #11, #14, #15; In VI Eth.; #1148; In I Meta. I, #29; In Joan I, 1 (S. Thomae Opera Omnia. Parma: Fiaccadori, 1852-73, vol. 10) Cf. J. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1936) p. 268.

2 For a detailed study of all the relevant texts see Klubertanz, pp. 135-66 passim.

3 In I Meta. I, #30: "Cognitiones singularium magis sunt propriae sensibus quam alicui alteri cognitioni, cum omnis cognitionem singularium a sensu oriatur."
of reflection. Since sense and intellect are mutually related powers of the human soul, the intellect can become aware of what the senses know through a reflection on the image which is a particular likeness of the extra-mental thing. Thus the intellect can get some knowledge of the singular because of its dynamic union with the imagination. Thomas says that the intellect knows the quiddity of something directly, extending itself towards the thing, but it knows the singular by a bending back on the image.

---

1S. T. I, 86, 1, resp.: "Indirecte autem et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare, quia, ... etiam postquam species intelligibiles abtrarerit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit.... Sic igitur ipsom universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt propositionem: Socrates est homo."

2De Ver. II, 6, resp.: "Intellectus noster, per se loquendo, singularia non cognoscit, sed universalia tantum;... Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster singularia cognoscit;... Inquantum ergo intellectus noster per similitudinem quam acceptit a phantasmate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasma a quo speciem abstrahit, quod est similitudo particularis, habet quemdam cognitionem de singulari secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem." Ibid., ad 3: "Homo cognoscit singularia per imaginationem et sensum, et ideo potest applicare universallem cognitionem quae est in intellectu, ad particular, non enim proprie loquendo, sensus aut intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque." Cf. Klubertanz, p. 146.
from which the intelligible species were abstracted. The image, however, is derived from the sensible singular through sense experience. Klubertanz observes that there is no reason for thinking that this reflexion is a conscious one.

It can be a conscious reflection, of course: then the result will be a scientific reflective knowledge of the singular, which, because it speaks of the intelligible species which is the principle of the act of knowing, is metaphysical in character: awareness of this species supposes metaphysical analysis and reflection. But ordinary perceptual judgments do not require metaphysical reflection— they require only a reflexion, i. e., a return. The intellect does, in fact, return to the point from which its knowledge originated, but it need not be aware of doing so. Its awareness is rather of the

---

1 In III De Anima, 8, #713: "[Intellectus] cognoscit enim naturam speciei, sive quod quid est, directe extendendo seipsum, ipsum autem singularum per quamdam reflexionem, inquantum redit super phantasmata, a quibus species intelligibiles abstrahuntur." Cf. Klubertanz, p. 147.

2 Klubertanz, p. 165.

3 Klubertanz, p. 147.

4 Klubertanz, p. 147.


6 Klubertanz, p. 148.
thing,¹ and it would seem that what is required for a judgment about a sensible singular would be a recognition of the fact of the presentation of the thing-with-such-a-character, rather than, as in metaphysical reflection, of the manner of its presentation. Therefore, to return to our question, it would seem that reflexion is essential for any judgment. Moreover, since truth is in the intellect as known by the intellect,² it would seem that certitude in judging requires that one be conscious of this reflexion; that it be reflectively grasped.³ Thus we may call it a

¹De Ver. II, 6, resp.: "Similitudo quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab objecto cognoscibili, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitudinem directe cognoscitur; similitudo autem que est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab objecto cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis;... Unde intellectus noster non directe ex specie quam suscipit, fertur ad cognoscendum phantasmata, sed ad cognoscendum rem cujus est phantasmata."

²S. T. I, 16, 2, resp.: "Perfectio... intellectus est verum ut cognitum." Cf. above p. 66, n. 4.

³Cf. In II Meta. IV, #1236, above p. 69, n. 2. Of this text Charles Boyer, S.J. writes: "There, the two acts of the mind are studied in their differences and their relations. The first is the simple apprehension, the conception of a notion, the seizure of a non-complex. By reason of this act the mind comes into possession of a resemblance of the object, but it is still ignorant of the nature of its acquisition. The mind then places a second act by means of which it returns on this possessed resemblance in order to know it as such and to affirm it as such. This second act is the judgment. To judge, therefore, is to seize and affirm the conformity of a first apprehension with the thing known." "The Meaning of a Text of St. Thomas: De Veritate, Q. 1, A. 9," Appendix to Peter Hoenen, S.J., Reality and Judgment According to St. Thomas (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952) p. 301.
reflective reflexion; simultaneous with the reflexion there is an awareness of doing it in a concrete instance.\textsuperscript{1} Thomas describes this reflection in De Veritate I, 9;\textsuperscript{2} Boyer paraphrases it as follows:

Truth is found in the intellect, not only as actualized but as known; and it is known because the intellect, in the act of judgment, reflects upon its first operation, the act of simple apprehension. By means of this reflection, the intellect is not only conscious of its act, but it has certitude that its act is the expression of reality. Now it cannot gain such certitude except in the knowledge of the nature of its act, and it cannot know the nature of its act without knowing simultaneously the nature of the principle of this act. This principle is the intellect, and its nature is to be conformed to what is. All these things can be known together in the act itself of the judgment which terminates in the object and this is possible because there is no need of many acts to attain a cognition and its conditions. Truth is found as known in the judgment because in this act the intellect reflects completely on itself and grasps its proper nature.\textsuperscript{3}

By reflecting on its first act, that of simple apprehension,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Boyer, p. 297: "The judgment is essentially an act of reflection, a return of the intellect on itself."
\item \textsuperscript{2}De Ver. I, 9, resp.: "Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem: quod quidem cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipsa intellectus, in culis natura est ut rebus conformatur; unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur."
\item \textsuperscript{3}Boyer, p. 309.
\end{itemize}
the intellect makes a judgment which is expressed as a composition or division: in order to know at once the nature of its act and its own nature, it must be aware of its act. It is aware of its act inasmuch as it is aware of being affected by the object known through its species. But the material cause of the species is the sensible image; therefore, the reflection of judgment always involves a reduction to the senses, "since the senses are the first source of our knowledge, we must in some way resolve to sense everything about which we judge," Thomas states. As the word quod-dammodo of the text implies, this reduction is not made in the same way in every case. What is attained by abstraction can be reduced to the senses directly, whereas what is attained in some other way may be able to be reduced to the

---

1In III Sent., d.23, q.1, a.2, ad 3: "Intellectus autem... sicut alia, cognoscit seipsum quia scilicet per speciem non quidem sui, sed objecti, quae est forma ejus; ex qua cognoscit actus sui naturam, et ex natura actus naturam potentia cognoscentis, et ex natura potentiae naturam essentiae..."

2De Ver. XII, 3, ad 2: "Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quod-dammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus."

3In Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, resp.: "In qualibet cognitione duo est considerare, scilicet principium et terminum. Principium quidem ad apprehensionem pertinet, terminus autem ad iudicium; ibi enim cognitio perficitur... sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter: quandoque enim est in sensu, quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque oritem in solo intellectu."
senses only indirectly. Hence natural things whose quiddities are abstracted from individual sensible matter, but not from sensible matter altogether,\(^1\) can be judged by reduction to the external senses, since their natures are adequately manifested by their properties and accidents revealed by these senses.\(^2\)

The insight which grasps the essential nature must be judged by being reduced to the external senses; once its truth is thus established, however, reduction to the internal senses is sufficient, since it is through the instrumentality of the image that it passes from habitual to

\(^1\)De Ver. II, 6, ad 1: "Duplex est materia a qua fit abstractio; scilicet materia intelligibilis et sensibilis,... et dico intelligibilem, ut que consideratur in natura continui; sensibilem autem sicut materia naturalis. Utroque autem duplicitur accipitur; scilicet ut signata, et ut non signata: et dicitur signata secundum quod consideratur cum determinatione diminsionum, horum scilicet vel illorum; non signata autem quae sine determinatione dimensio- num consideratur. Secundum hoc igitur est sciemund, quod materia signata est individuationis principium, a qua abstrahit omnis intellectus, secundum quod dicitur abstrahere ab hic et nunc. Intellectus autem naturalis non abstrahit a materia sensibili non signata." Cf. In Boeth de Trin. I, 3; De Malo. XVI, 7, ad 5; SCG III, 84, #6.

\(^2\)In Boeth de Trin. VI, II, resp.: "Quandoque enim proprietates et accidentia rei, quae sensu demonstrantur, sufficienter exprimunt naturam rei, et tunc oportet quod iudicium de rei natura quod facit intellectus conformetur his quae sensus de re demonstrat. Et huiusmodi sunt omnes res naturales, quae sunt determinatae ad materiam sensibil- em, et ideo in scientia naturali terminari debet cognitio ad sensum, ut scilicet hoc modo iudicemus de rebus natura- libus, secundum quod sensus eas demonstrat,..."
actual knowledge. This image is retained by the memory, and it can be recalled at the intellect's command without any need for a sensible thing having the nature to be presently affecting the external senses.\textsuperscript{1} So, in summary, all new knowledge of sensible beings must be reduced to the external senses; but once acquired it need be reduced only to the internal senses in order to be used. Nevertheless, this reduction to the senses is a reflexive process, a "bending back" on the induction and the abstraction, thus it moves in the opposite direction from them. Hence if induction is a synonym for resolution, as has been claimed, it cannot be for reflexive resolution, since induction is not a reflexive process.\textsuperscript{2} But if previously acquired knowledge is used to


\textsuperscript{2} Cf. L-M Régis, \textit{Epistemology} (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 446. The note to his remarks (p. 535, n. 99) refers one to his earlier article (cited above, p. 19, n. 1) for the supporting texts, but in that article the term \textit{inducere} is not listed among the synonyms for \textit{resolutio}, so one can only guess at the text or texts which led him to this conclusion. Perhaps one is SCG I, 12, where \textit{inducere} is used in reference to \textit{quia} demonstration: "Ex rationibus demonstrativis, mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare, quae exprimat Deum esse." Of this text A. Hayen in \textit{La Communication de l'être d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin} (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957) p. 122, writes that here \textit{inducere} is used in a less technical sense, since
to assert something about a sensible singular, the truth of such an assertion must always be established by a reduction to the external senses,\(^1\) for only the external senses contact the singular directly.

When what the intellect apprehends is not perceived as such by the external senses, it cannot be reduced to them directly in order to be judged. It can, of course, always be reduced to them indirectly, since whatever the intellect knows, it acquires from the evidence provided by the external senses. Thomas gives only a few examples; they appear in a variety of contexts and Thomas' terminology likewise varies. There is no one text in which all are correlated and compared with each other: the text which comes closest to this is Question Six, Article Two of his induction as such, according to Thomas is radically distinct from syllogistic reasoning. Cf. \textit{In VI Eth.}, \#1148. As we shall see, \textit{quia} argumentation belongs to the \textit{via inventionis}, and is a non-reflexive sort of a resolution, as abstraction also is: in this sense, induction may be said to be a synonym for resolution.

\(^1\)\textit{In Boeth de Trin. V, 2, ad 4: "Scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, supra quas fundatur. Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic de illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, in quantum illas rationes applicat ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo inferioriorem virium. Ratione enim universalis utitur sciens et ut rescita et ut medio sciendi. Per universalem enim hominis rationem possum iudicare de hoc vel de illo." Cf. \textit{ST I}, 86, 1, resp.; Lonergan, p. 169, writes: "Our science is of the universal and necessary, and to account for a contingent and particular judgment... one must appeal to understanding as reflecting on sensitive knowledge."
Commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, but it deals only with the three speculative sciences. Thus his doctrine must be developed from a few scattered hints. This is not easy for us today for two reasone: the natural sciences no longer concern themselves with seeking the proper definitions of natural things, but rather with accurately describing and predicting their proper behaviour; and, secondly, we no longer accept the physiology from which his theory of sensation is derived. Hence his illustrations more often confuse than clarify, and because his position on both issues was the commonly accepted one in his own day, he seldom says enough about his illustration to enable us to know how he understood it. The best approach would seem to be the one Thomas himself used in such a case: to develop the doctrine in the light of the knowledge not available to an author at the time he set it down.

Since what makes an assertion true is its correspondence with what is, and the only way in which human knowers make contact with the thing as it exists in its own right is through the senses, even what cannot be perceived by the senses must somehow be reduced to them in order that it be recognized as true. But Thomas does not talk very frequently about how this is done: he talks rather of how what is not perceived by the senses, but only by the intellect, is nevertheless derived from what the senses provide. In the one text where he does discuss how
such things are judged to be true, he makes a distinction between what can be perceived by the external senses, what cannot be perceived by the external senses, but can be perceived by the imagination, and what cannot be perceived by either, on the basis of their diverse relations. The first group of knowables, as we have seen, are known by simple abstraction from individual sensible matter, but not from sensible matter altogether. The second group is the object of mathematics; it is known by a different sort of abstraction, often called precision, in which all the sensible characteristics perceptible to the external senses are excluded, yet it is not abstracted entirely from matter. There remains a certain reference to matter which is apprehended by the imagination; hence such things may be judged by reduction to the imagination.\(^1\) The third group

---

\(^1\)In Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, resp.: "Quaedam vero sunt, quarum judicium non dependet ex his quae sensu perceptiuntur, quia quamvis secundum esse sint in materia sensibili, tamen secundum rationem diffinitivam sunt a materia sensibili abstracta. Judicium autem de unaquoque re potissime fit secundum eius diffinitivam rationem. Sed quia secundum rationem diffinitivam non abstrahunt a qualibet materia, sed solum a sensibili et remotis sensibilibus condicionibus remanet aliquid imaginabile, ideo in talibus oportet quod judicium sumatur secundum id quod imaginatio semonstrat. Huiusmodi autem sunt mathematica. Et ideo in mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum judicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensum, quia judicium mathematicum superat apprehensionem sensus." Cf. ibid., V, 3. There is, in addition to mathematicals, another group which cannot be reduced to the external senses, but only to the imagination, since it is the latter which has produced them by dividing and recomposing the sensible characteristics perceived by the external senses. These are the products
is entirely independent of matter, and so cannot be attained by abstraction at all: they are attained either by quia demonstration or by a judgment of separation. Thus they cannot be judged by direct reference either to the external senses or imagination. These are the objects of divine science,\(^1\) which here means both metaphysics and sacred doctrine.

What we learn from this text is that what is material and apprehended with sensible matter can be directly reduced to the external senses, whereas what is material and apprehended with imaginable matter\(^2\) can be directly

\(^1\)In Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, resp.: "Quaedam vero sunt quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub sensu et id quod cadit sub imaginatione, sicut illa quae omnino a materia non dependent neque secundum esse neque secundum considerationem, et ideo talium cognitio secundum iudicium neque debet terminari ad imaginationem neque ad sensum. Sed tamen ex his, quae sensu vel imaginatione apprehenduntur, in harum cognitionem devenimus vel per viam causalitatis, sicut ex effectu causa perpenditur, quae non est effectui consequata, sed excellens, vel per excessum vel per remotiorem, quando omnia, quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi separamus; quod modos cognoscendi divina ex sensibilibus ponit Dionysius in libro De divinis nominibus. Uti ergo possimus in divinis et sensu et imaginatione sicut principis nostrae considerationis, sed non sicut terminus, ut scilicet iudicemus talia esse divina, qualia sunt quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit. Deduci autem ad aliquid est ad illud terminari. Et ideo in divinis neque ad imaginationem neque ad sensum debimus deduci...."

\(^2\)For this substitution of "imaginable" for the usual "intelligible" cf. Maurer's explanation, p. 29, n. 13 in his translation of Questions Five and Six of Thomas' Commentary on Boethius' de Trinitate.
reduced to the imagination, but not to the external senses. On the other hand, what does not exist as material cannot be perceived through the senses directly; it is apprehended either by a judgment of separation or by *quia* demonstration. Hence it cannot be directly reduced to either external or internal senses.

Elsewhere Thomas distinguishes between what is directly (*per se*) sensible and what is sensible only indirectly (*per accidens*);\(^1\) the directly sensible includes both proper and common sensibles. The indirectly sensible is either any proper or common sensible with respect to a sense that does not perceive it, or what is indirectly sensible with respect to all the senses, being apprehended only by the intellect. So, for example, life is not discernible to the external senses.\(^2\) Yet it is known by the intellect in what the senses provide: what the latter perceive is someone speaking or moving about on his own, and the intellect, recognizing these activities as evidence for

\(^1\)In *II De Anima VI*, 1. 13, nn. 383-398.

\(^2\)Thus the biologist recognizes life through the characteristic life functions, such as respiration, assimilation, growth, healing: what gives no evidence of carrying on such activities is classified as non-living, and what, though morphologically identical with other individuals which do carry them on, is not doing so at the time, is classified as dead. The latter can be difficult, as the current discussion regarding organ transplants shows. There would be no such problem if life were directly sensible.
the presence of a life principle, affirms that the subject manifesting them is alive.\(^1\) How is this judgment reduced to the senses? Thomas does not say, but it would seem that its reduction is similarly indirect. He does say, however, that it is through the common sense, which discerns the activity of the external senses, that we perceive that we ourselves are alive.\(^2\) It appears unlikely that we would recognize speaking or moving about as evidence of life without experiencing these in ourselves as flowing from life; hence it appears that the indirect reduction would be to the common sense as well as the external senses. In our own case, however, there would be a direct reduction to the common sense. Likewise our knowledge that we have an intellect is based on our awareness that we do actually

\(^1\)S. T. I, 12, 3, ad 2: "Vita autem non videtur oculo forporali, sicut per se visibile, sed sicut sensibile per accidens; quod quidem a sensu non cognoscitur, sed statim cum sensu ab aliquia virtute cognoscitiva." In II De Anima, VI, 1.13, #396: "Sicut statim cum video aliquem loquem, vel movere seipsium, apprehendo per intellectum vitam eius unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere."

\(^2\)In II De Anima VI, 1. 13, # 390: "Sensus enim communis est quaedam potentia, ad quam terminantur immutationes omnium sensuum. Unde impossibile est quod sensus communis habeat aliquod proprium objectum, quod non sit objectum sensus proprii. Sed circa immutationes ipsas sensuum proprium a suis objectis, quas sensus proprii habere non possunt: sicut quod percipit ipsas immutationes sensuum, et discernit inter sensibilia diversorum sensuum. Sensu enim communi percipimus nos vivere et discernimus inter sensibilia diversorum sensuum, scilicet album dulce." Cf. ST I, 87, 3, ad 3.
understand:¹ it seems the evidence for this too would be provided by the internal senses, and so reduced to them.

Our knowledge of the will is similar: Thomas says that the intellect understands the will through its experience of acting on it and being acted on by it. He further says that we know the will has free choice because we experience that opposite acts proceed from it successively.² But we would not recognize this unless we remembered the

¹S. T. I, 87, 1, resp.: "... seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intelligitur intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam, ex hoc quo percipit se intelligere. Alio modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus.... Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam non sufficit eius praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio." De Malo VI, 1, ad 18: "Principium humanae cognitionis est a sensu; non tamen oportet quod quidquid ab homine cognoscitur, sit sensui subjectum, vel per effectum sensibilem immediate cognoscatur; nam et ipse intellectus intelligit se ipsum per actum suum, qui non est sensui subjectus."

²De Malo, ibid.: "Similiter etiam et interiorem actum voluntatis intelligit, inquantum per actum intellectus quodammodo movetur voluntas, et alio modo actus intellectus causatur a voluntate,... potentia voluntatis ad opposita se habens cognoscitur a nobis, non quidem per hoc quod actus oppositi sint simul, sed quia successive sibi invicem succedunt ab eodem principio."
earlier acts, so it would seem that here reduction is to the internal senses, especially the memory.

The most obscure case of this sort is the existential judgment: in predicative judgments the act of existence is implied rather than stated, but in existential judgments what is asserted is that a certain quiddity is— that it has esse, that it is an ens. ¹ The evidence for the existence of actually sensed being is immediate, and to it all judgments of existence must be reduced. But when we ask exactly what is the evidence for existence found in sense knowledge, we find no direct answer in Thomas' writings. However, Robert Schmidt, S. J. has worked out an answer in an article which limits itself to Gilson's reflection on this question; since the latter is intended as a commentary on and explanation of the thought of Thomas, we see no difficulty in utilizing it here.²

Schmidt discerns in sense perception different levels of evidence, all conducive to knowledge, but not all equally indicative of existence. The first level is that of

formal determination: these determinations constitute definite objects of our knowledge but they are not properly things, for we do not know them as beings or as belonging to beings. So on this level there is not yet any proper evidence for existence. The second level provides adequate evidence for our ordinary perceptual judgments: what we are aware of as present is a concrete subject of multiple determinations, known as an object in a definite situation in space and time, independent of our knowledge and in some sense external to us. Such awareness is intellectual, rather than sensory; but the insight is grounded in the sensory evidence of the togetherness of formal characteristics in a functional unity, interacting with other functional unities in a sensible world. However, the notion of existence to be derived from this level of sense evidence is still very inadequate: existence at this level means "to be there", a purely static notion.

The reason it is inadequate is, of course, that Thomas does not mean by existence merely "being present." By existence he does not mean something static, but some-

1Schmidt, pp. 231-33.
2Ibid., pp. 233-34.
thing dynamic—in fact the most dynamic of all since it is
the source of all other dynamisms. For existence to be
known as dynamic, "the thing must present itself dynamically
... and do so through its own activity, an activity which
must have an influence upon the knower." The knower must
be aware of being affected by the thing—of its exercising
efficient causality with respect to his knowing power, which
is in some sense passive and actualized by it. The funda-

1SCG I, 22, #7: "Esse actum quendam nominat; non
enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed
ex hoc quod est in actu." ST I, 14, 1, ad 3: "Ipsum esse est
perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus.
Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde
ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum." Cf. Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy, p. 34 and p. 446, n. 17; and Schmidt,
p. 241: "Existing is not what some particular sort of being
does under particular circumstances, but what any being does
by the very fact of being a being."

2SCG II, 54, #3: "Ipsum esse... est proprius actus
... substantiae totius; ejus enim actus est esse de quo
possimus dicere quod sit; esse autem... dicitur... de toto;
... ipsa substantia est id quod est..." Ibid., #5: "Etiam
formam comparatur ipsum esse ut actus. Per hoc enim, in
compositis ex materia et forma, forma dicitur esse princi-
pium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae cujus actus
est ipsum esse." Ibid., #6: "... in compositis ex materia
et forma, nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est,
nec etiam ipsum esse; forma tamen potest dici quod est, se-
cundum quod est essendi principium. Ipsi autem tota sub-
stantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo sub-
stantia denominatur ens." Cf. Gilson, Christian Philosophy,
pp. 33-34, p. 445, n. 11.

3Schmidt, p. 235.

4In V Meta. I, #751: "Hoc vero nomen causa, im-
portat influxum quendam ad esse causati." Cf. Gilson,
mental evidence is our consciousness that we are sensing; this awareness is not attained by the external senses, but the common sense attains it in a consciousness of being acted upon by the sensible object.¹ We experience the activity of being as causal activity; reflectively we grasp that such activity must be itself caused by active energy and that this has its origin in the thing's act of being.² Thus the intellect makes use of what the senses present to ground the judgment of existence; when the sensory awareness of being acted upon is recognized formally and reflectively by the intellect as evidence, it provides the motive for the assent of judgment. In sense knowledge, only the particular manner in which something is existing is grasped, but the intellect can, beginning with this, attain existence as such.³ "Our awareness of undergoing the efficient causality of sensible things is the natural evidence upon which all our judgments of existence are grounded."⁴

The judgment concerning the existence of sensible things directly presented to us is "immediate" in

¹Schmidt, p. 237.
²Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 468, n. 4; Cf. In IX Meta., 8, #1851.
³Schmidt, pp. 239-40.
⁴Schmidt, p. 244.
the sense of the Latin term: not the absence of temporal successiveness (as in English) but rather the absence of rational successiveness, i.e., of reasoning through a middle term. No deduction is involved: we have rather a passage from the implicit to the explicit. This is not an inference or reasoning process; rather it is a penetration or inspection, since what is now grasped explicitly is already present in knowledge, although initially something else—essence—is what is directly attended to. Similarly, first principles are not derived from the content of sense knowledge—they are rather manifested by it. Although they are not evident apart from an abstraction, any sensible instance is equally relevant, and none is more than an illustration. They are contained, as being is,


2 S. T. I, 16, 3, ad 3: "Et est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile; sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas."

3 Schmidt, p. 242.


5 Lonergan, p. 56.
in the intellect's first grasp of a "sensible being of x kind," and are immediately operational as soon as the first intelligible species is received in the intellect.

Just as being is utilized, initially at least, without being expressed as such, "these principles are acted out, exercised, lived, before they are expressed in propositions." They need not be made explicit in order to be utilized in actual thinking: in fact, formulating them requires a reflective recognition of the conditions ac-

---

1In Boeth de Trin. VI, 4, resp.: "... Aliqua prima, quae quidem homo non habet necesse addiscere aut invenire,... sed earum notitiam naturaliter habet. Et huius modi sunt principia demonstrationum indemonstrabilia..." Cf. SCG I, 57, #6. Edward Simmons writes that "self-evident propositions cannot come from prior intellectual knowledge, for then they would not be immediate. They are generated from previous sense knowledge by way of an immediate induction. However, to say this is not to imply that they are easily achieved.... It takes a sufficient experience... of the singular manifestation of a universally necessary truth before we are ready to penetrate beyond the accidentals... More often than not... propositions which are self-evident in themselves are not seen to be self-evident by us; and when they are, it is only by way of a tremendously difficult dialectical procedure." "Demonstration and Self-Evidence," The Thomist XXIV (1961) pp. 154-55.

2Donceel, p. 197.

3De Malo XVI, 6, ad 4: "Habere notitiam in actu, dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad actualem considerationem;... Alio modo quantum ad habitualem notitiam.... Non enim nos semper actu consideramus principia, sed ipse habitus principiorum sufficit ad repellendum omnem contrarium errorem cum ipsa." Cf. Lonergan, p. 36, n. 169.
cording to which we know being,\textsuperscript{1} and not all who make use of these principles are able to formulate them.\textsuperscript{2} "In the case of self-evident principles... the mere comparison of the terms puts the mind in immediate contact with the real relation whose evidence is so clear and direct that the affirmation or negation is an instantaneous necessity."\textsuperscript{3} Thomas speaks of this as a judgment by "simple comprehension."\textsuperscript{4} As the first understanding of first principles originates, in this qualified sense, in the external senses, it must be reduced to them; thereafter it origi-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Lonergan, p. 57.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Brennan, p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Tyrrell, p. 20.
\item \textsuperscript{4}De Ver. XV, 1. ad 4: "Iudicare non est proprium rationis, per quod ab intellectu distingui possit, quia etiam intellectus iudicat hoc esse verum, illud falsum. Sed pro tanto iudicium rationi attribuitur et comprehensio intelligentiae quia iudicium in nobis ut communiter fit per resolutionem in principia, simplex autem comprehensio per intellectum." In III Sent., d.24, q.1, a.2, q.1, ad 2: "Termini principiorum naturaliter notorum sunt comprehensibles nostro intellectui: ideo cognitio quae consurgit de illis principiis, est visio..."
nates in and is reduced to the internal senses.¹

What is neither immediately sensed nor manifested through sensation need not remain forever unknown to us: from the existence of what is immediately sensed we can reason by way of causality to what is not sensed, regard-
less of whether it is non-sensible, or whether, though sensible in itself, it is not so to us because it is located in an area to which we do not have access. In either case, our knowledge concerning its existence must be arrived at by a deduction from what is actually sensed: it is inferred to exist because actually existing beings require it as a cause. Thus we judge them to exist by reduction to what is immediately sensed, and the act of existence predicated of them is understood as analogous to that of sensible beings.²

¹Simmons, p. 155, n. 31: "Here precisely is where the immediate induction of the principles of demonstration differs from the mediate induction of a conclusion from a sufficient enumeration of singulars. The induced conclusion is assented to precisely in virtue of the enumeration of singulars and cannot be known without pointing to them for evidence. This is not the case for the induced principles." In the case of the latter, he writes, assent "depends upon and comes with an insight into the intrinsic intelligibility of the proposition itself." Though the insight may be dif-
ficult to achieve, the assent is automatic once it is achieved, and the dialectic which was instrumental prior to insight is no longer needed as evidence for the truth of the principle.

²Schmidt, pp. 241-43.
Every judgment of existence is accordingly seen to be based, either directly or indirectly, upon the immediate evidence provided by our sense knowledge.\(^1\)

In summary, the sort of resolution required for any judgment appears to be an activity which moves in the opposite direction from abstraction: we have called this activity a reflective reflexion. As abstraction takes formal determinations out of the material singulars known through the senses, reflective reflexion refers the knowledge acquired back to its origin in the sensible order to validate it. That is why it is called reduction to the senses.\(^2\) Though some have suggested that some sort of reflection accompanies simple apprehension,\(^3\) it appears to us that Thomas excludes this, asserting that the reflection occurs only in the intellect's second act, and is

---

\(^1\)Schmidt, p. 243.

\(^2\)Sometimes Thomas speaks of it as "resolution to principles," but the text makes clear that "principles" here has the sense of "origin," i.e., sense knowledge, rather than first principles. De Ver. XXVIII, 3, ad 6: "Sed perfectum iudicium intellectus non potest esse in dormiendo, eo quod tunc ligatus est sensus, qui est primum principium nostrae cognitionis. Iudicium enim fit per resolutionem in principia; unde de omnibus oportet nos iudicare secundum id quod sensu accipimus, ut dicitur in III De Caelo et de Mundi."

\(^3\)Tyrrell, p. 17.
the means whereby the composition or division is judged to be true or false.¹ This reduction to the senses can be made directly to the external senses, directly to the internal senses and indirectly to the external senses, or indirectly to both, paralleling the way in which the knowledge to be evaluated was derived from the senses originally. But it must be made in one of these ways in every case if one wishes to avoid erroneous judgments.²

¹In VI Meta. IV, #1236: "Intellectus autem habet apud se similitudinem rei intellectae, secundum quod rationes incomplextorum concipit; non tamen propter hoc ipsam similitudinem dijudicat, sed solum cum componit vel dividit ... in hac sola secunda operatione intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem sei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et dijudicando ipsam." De Ver. XII, 3, ad 2: "Judicium non dependet tantum a receptione speciei, sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus iudicatur examinatur ad aliquod principium cognitionis,... Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quoddammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus."

²S. T. I, 84, 8, resp.: "Judicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur; et praecipue si ignoraretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii... Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum cum ligatione sensus, per quem res sensibles cognoscimus."
Thus, our immediate knowledge—knowledge attained through insight rather than reasoning— involves two sorts of resolutions: on the one hand there are induction and abstraction, non-reflexive resolutions of complex sensibles into their simple intelligible principles; and on the other hand, there is the reflexive resolution by which the intellect assures itself that it has true knowledge of extramental reality. The intellect reflects on its act of simple apprehension, grasping at once the nature of its act and its own nature as a power intentionally receptive of the quiddities of sensible things,\(^1\) and ascertaining whether its apprehension really was derived from information received by the senses due to the efficient causality of sensible things. An apprehension which is so derived is seen to have ontological reference, and recognized as true, whereas one that is discovered to derive rather from the creative activity of the imagination is seen to lack such

\(^1\)S. T. I, 94, 2, resp.: "Secundum igitur primum processum animae, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad seipsam, perficitur animae cognito. Quia scilicet intellectualis operatio animae naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quae sunt extra,... et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte cognosci potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per obiectum. Et per ipsam intellectualenum operationem perfecte potest cognosci humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per proprium actum."
reference, and the intellect does not assert such an apprehension as true of extra-mental reality. Thus in either case the intellect judges truly, for it knows itself and its act truly through this reduction to the senses. When for some reason the reduction to the senses is not carried out correctly and completely, the intellect's reflexive reflection is imperfect, and error is possible.¹

¹Cf. De Ver. XII, 3, ad 2; and ST I, 84, 8, resp.

On the role of the will in preventing the intellect from reflecting perfectly, cf. Tyrrell, pp. 113-16.
DEMONSTRATION AND RESOLUTION TO PRINCIPLES

The understanding attained through abstraction, expressed in a composition or division, and judged through reduction to the senses, even if based on a sufficient enumeration of singulars and reduced to the senses correctly, yet remains knowledge of a single aspect of reality; abstraction atomizes the intelligible aspects, assimilating them one by one. A more comprehensive view can be attained only by comparing and correlating these discrete aspects through reasoning.\(^1\) As the composition or division must be reflexively evaluated, so must the reasoning process; as the former is achieved through reduction to the senses, the latter is achieved through resolution to principles. It is this resolution to principles which makes the reasoning process demonstrative,

\(^1\)S. T. I, 58, 4, resp.: "Sicut in intellectu ratiocinante comparatur conclusio ad principium, ita in intellectu componente et dividente comparatur praedicatam ad subjectum. Si enim intellectus noster statim in ipsa principio videret conclusionis veritatem, nunquam intelligeret discurrendo vel ratiocinando. Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subjecti haberet notitiam de omnibus quae possunt attribui subjecti vel moveri ab eo, nunquam intelligeret componendo vel dividendo, se solum intelligendo quod quid est. Sic igitur patet quod ex eadem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et componendo et dividendo; ex hoc scilicet quod non statim in prima apprehensione alicuius pricii apprehensi, potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtute continentur."
that is, productive of certain knowledge or science. In this chapter we shall investigate the meaning of the resolution to principles with a view to determining its synonyms as well as distinguishing it from other types of resolution and their synonyms.

The procedure analogous to induction on the level of reasoning Thomas called the *via inventionis*, the way of discovery; and that analogous to judgment he called the *via iudicii*, the way of judgment, which resolves the proposed conclusions to principles. The first involves a

---

1De Ver. XV, 3, resp.: "In speculativis autem scientiis non perficitur iudicium rationis nisi quando resolvuntur rationis in prima principia."

2Finding a suitable translation is difficult: to speak of "inventing a conclusion" suggests in English a fabrication rather than a respectable scholarly procedure, and "discovering a conclusion" suggests only a passive rummaging among already formulated possibilities, whereas Thomas' term includes an element of creative ingenuity. But for its usual exclusive association with experimental science, the translation closest to Thomas' meaning might be "the way of hypothesis."

3De Ver. X, 8, ad 10: "Ratio ex principiis secundum viam inveniendi in conclusiones pervenit, et conclusiones inventas in principia resolvendo examinat secundum viam iudicandi." Peghaire, pp. 114-15: "En face de la via inventionis... nous trouvons la via iudicii,... On peut la définir: le procédé de la ratio par laquel celle-ci, ayant prouvée des conclusions, grâce à la via intentionis, recherche leur valeur de vérité. Pour cela, elle vérifie, elle examine le lien logique qui existe entre cette conclusion et les principes premiers. Cet examen, cette vérification, elle ne peut les faire sans ramener ou «résoudre» les conclusions aux principes,... le résultat est un jugement sur la valeur de cette conclusion, d'où le nom de via iudicii."
gathering and analysis of experiential evidence; the second is the demonstrative and organized moment of scientific reasoning.\textsuperscript{1} As the insight attained by induction is expressed in a composition or division and evaluated through reduction to the senses, so the insight attained by the way of inquiry is expressed in an argument and evaluated through resolution to principles; besides the way of judgment, Thomas calls this the way of resolution. In both cases, what we have are two mutually related and interdependent stages: neither can stand alone.\textsuperscript{2} This is important for helping us to determine the meaning of the way of resolution: in texts where it is used to name a distinct and independent process, it cannot have the same meaning as when it is used for the way of judgment. A further clue is that, like judgment, the way of judgment also involves reflexion.

Though Thomas does not explain it in detail, the way of inquiry corresponds to the method of the \textit{Topics}:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{1}Guzie, p. 95.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.: "It is significant to note that, in Aquinas' view, neither of these stages is complete without the other. A philosophically descriptive analysis of experience naturally gives way to judgmental organization, in which the intellect becomes committed to the intelligible necessity of what analysis reveals; while conversely, demonstrative exposition is meaningful and scientifically valid only after a careful consideration of the pertinent concrete evidence."
\end{quote}
the way of finding and positing probable explanations.\footnote{Ludwig Oeing-Hanhoff, "Die Methoden der Metaphysik im Mittelalter," Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter ed. P. Wilpert, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyer, 1963) pp. 72-3.} In oral cultures, various modes of argumentation and possible arguments to prove one or another point were memorized by poets and orators so as to have them readily available at need; extensive lists became possible only with the development of writing. Aristotle's Topics was such a collection: the Latin term for one of these options, which included causes, effects, contraries, related things, comparable things, etc., was locus communis, literally, "common-place." The number of compilations of these common-places available to teachers and preachers in the Middle Ages was enormous.\footnote{Ong, pp. 80-85.} Many of the individual items were "traditional truths"\footnote{The Latin term for these is dignitates: cf. De Ver., XI, 1, resp. The usual English translation is axioms. Cf. Truth, vol. II trans. James V. McGlynn, S. J. (Chicago: Regnery, 1953) and Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John P. Rowan, vv. I-II, (Chicago: Regnery, 1961). The Latin term, however, connotes pre-eminence more than self-evidence. As Oeing-Hanhoff has pointed out on pp. 76-77, many of these are not genuine axioms, for they are not self-evident as given; in fact, some of them are really no more than 'maxims' of Aristotelian natural science. "Traditional truths" seem to suggest that they are worthy of respect while leaving open the possibility that some of them might be questionable precisely as truths, hence more in keeping with "the intention of the author" than "axioms."} whose degree of probability was 

2Ong, pp. 80-85.
3The Latin term for these is dignitates: cf. De Ver., XI, 1, resp. The usual English translation is axioms. Cf. Truth, vol. II trans. James V. McGlynn, S. J. (Chicago: Regnery, 1953) and Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John P. Rowan, vv. I-II, (Chicago: Regnery, 1961). The Latin term, however, connotes pre-eminence more than self-evidence. As Oeing-Hanhoff has pointed out on pp. 76-77, many of these are not genuine axioms, for they are not self-evident as given; in fact, some of them are really no more than 'maxims' of Aristotelian natural science. "Traditional truths" seem to suggest that they are worthy of respect while leaving open the possibility that some of them might be questionable precisely as truths, hence more in keeping with "the intention of the author" than "axioms."
measured by the authority of their originators.\textsuperscript{1} The common-places were consulted and utilized in much the same way as we today investigate a question by consulting the relevant literature looking for a plausible explanation or a suggestive lead.

Of course, possessing a probable answer if not the same as knowing: a plausible explanation can give rise to opinion or faith, but not to knowledge. In order to have knowledge, one must perceive the explanation as implied in self-evident principles.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless, reasoning begins with probable arguments: this is the second of the three senses of "rational method" distinguished in the Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. When the reasoning terminates in the understanding of principles, we have a demonstration; otherwise we have only a rational procedure. But the latter can be used to prepare the way for necessary

\textsuperscript{1}Oeing-Hanhoff, pp. 74-75.

\textsuperscript{2}De Ver. XI, 1, resp.: "Si autem aliquis alicui proponat ea quae in principiis per se nota non includuntur, vel includi non manifestantur, non faciet in eo scientiam, sed forte opinionem, vel fidem...:\n
proofs.¹ What makes it a demonstration is that there be seen to be a relation of causality between the principles and conclusion:² the understanding of the principle causes the understanding of the conclusion.³ "The premises of demonstration... function after the fashion of efficient causes which actuate the potentiality of the conclusion and make it to be."⁴ Thus the proper activity of reason is to deduce principles into conclusions or elicit conclusions,

¹In Boeth. de Trin. VI, 1, resp. q.1: "Quandoque autem inquisitio rationis non potest usque ad praedictum terminum [intellectus principiorum] perduci, sed sistitur in ipsa inquisitione, quando scilicet inquirenti adhuc per probabiles rationes proceditur, quae natae sunt facere opinionem vel fidem, non scientiam. Et sic rationabilis processus divititur contra demonstrativum. Et hoc modo rationabiliter procedi potest in qualibet scientia ut ex probabilibus puritet via ad necessarias probationes."

²S.T. I 14, 7, resp.: "... In scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum sucessionem tantum; sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionem."

³SCG I, 57, #5: "In omni scientia discursiva oportet aliquid esse causatum; nam principia sunt quoddammodo causa efficiens conclusionibus, unde et demonstratio dicitur syllogismus faciens scire..." De Ver. XI, 1, ad 3: "... si doceamur aliquam conclusionem, oportet praescire de subiecto et passione quid sint, etiam principiis per quae conclusio docetur, praecognitis."

⁴Simmons, p. 161. Cf. Quodl., VIII, a. 4: "Insunt enim nobis naturaliter quaedam principia prima complexa omnibus nota, ex quibus ratio procedit ad cognoscendum in actu conclusiones quae in praedictis principiis potentialiter continentur..." Cf. also De Ver., XI, 1; ST I, 117, 1.
and reasoning may be described as "the cause's progression to the caused,"\(^1\) while science is called "the habit of the conclusions."\(^2\)

Properly scientific demonstration is causally decisive knowledge, "through the cause" inasmuch as the mediating factor—the middle term which establishes the necessary relation between the major and minor terms of the conclusion—is the epistemological cause of the conclusion reached.\(^3\) That is, it is the cause of our knowledge; it may be the cause of the fact as well as the cause of its being known by us, but it need not be, for an effect, too, can be the cause of our knowing.\(^4\) Thus, relative to us, demonstration is always causal, but relative to things in

---

\(^1\)In II Sent., d.24, q.1, a.3, sol.: "... ratio autem proprie... est faciens currere causam in causatum; unde proprie actus rationis est deducere principium in conclusionem. Hoc ergo quod est conclusiones elicere est actus rationis." De Ver., XV, 1, resp.: "Unde dicit Isaac in lib. De Definitionibus quod ratiocinatio est cursus causae in causatum."

\(^2\)S. T. I-II, 53, 1, resp.: "Aliquis vero habitus est in intellectu possibili ex ratione causatus, scilicet habitus conclusionum qui dicitur scientia."


\(^4\)De Spir. Creat., a. 10, resp.: "Ipsum autem intelligere animae humanae est per modum motus; intelligit enim animae discurrendo de effectibus in causas, et de causis in effectus, et de similibus in similia, et de oppositis in opposita..."
their ontological status, the middle term of demonstration may be either cause or effect of the existent with which the demonstration deals. ¹ When the middle term is the effect, the demonstration gives us knowledge of the existence of the cause: it manifests the fact and is called quia demonstration. ² When the middle term is the causa in re as well as in our knowledge, the demonstration not only gives us knowledge of the existence of the effect, but also explains the reason behind the effect. This type of demon-

¹In I Post. Anal., IV, #16: "In omni demonstra-

tione, oportet quod procedatur ex his, quae sunt notiora quoad nos, ... non enim aliquid potest fieri nobis notum, nisi per id quod est magis notum nobis. Quandoque autem id quod est magis notum quoad nos, est etiam magis notum simpliciter et secundum naturam; ... Et in talibus fiunt demonstrationes ex his quae sunt notiora simpliciter. Item, quandoque id quod est notius quoad nos non est notius sim-
pliciter, sicut accidit in naturalibus, in quibus essentialae et virtutes rerum, propter hoc quod in materia sunt, oc-

²It is also quia demonstration when the middle term is a remote, rather than, approximate cause: cf. Owens, "The Analytics and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure," Mediaeval Studies, XXVI (1964) pp. 91-92. As noted above, p. 80, n. 2, there is also a non-technical use of inductio with reference to quia demonstrations of the existence of something; technically, however, the two are distinct, since induction as such is immediate.
demonstration is called *propter quid*.\(^1\)

What is significant for our purposes here is that the distinction between the two types of demonstration is based on the way in which the order of knowing compares with the order of being: when the epistemological cause is also the ontological cause, we have *propter quid* demonstration; and when the epistemological cause is an ontological effect, we have *quia* demonstration. In another text, Thomas makes this same distinction, and calls the two ways of inquiry the way of composition and the way of resolution:

> In every inquiry, one must begin from some principle. If this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process is not by way of resolution, but by way of composition, for to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed in a composite way, since causes are more simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of resolution, as when we judge concerning known effects by resolving them to their simple causes.\(^2\)

Here the way of composition and the way of resolution both

\(^1\)William Baumgartner, "Demonstration and Science" in *Essays on Knowledge and Methodology*, ed. Simmons, p. 55; and Owens, "The Analytics...", p. 91.

\(^2\)S. T. I-II, 14, 5, resp.: "In omni inquisitione oportet incipere ab aliquo principio. Quod quidem si, sicut est prius in cognitione, ita etiam sit prius in esse, non est processus resolutorius, sed magis compositivus; procedere enim a causis in effectus, est processus compositivus nam causae sunt simpliciores effectibus. Si autem id quod est prius in cognitione, sit posterior in esse, est processus resolutorius; utpote cum de effectibus manifestis iudicamus, resolvendo in causas simplices."
belong to the way of inquiry: they name two ways of investigating a subject.\(^1\) The way of resolution begins with what is composite and most known to us and proceeds to discover what is simple and most knowable in itself: it analyzes a confused whole into its distinct parts. The way of composition, on the other hand, begins with what is simple and proceeds to what is composite, reassembling the parts into a whole.\(^2\) Thus this "way of resolution" is so called because, like abstraction, it analyzes a composite into its logical parts, and also like abstraction, it is not a reflexive process, though it is, of course, conscious and deliberate.

This "way of resolution" then, is equivalent to quia demonstration, and is a thoroughly respectable scientific procedure: it is not less decisive than propter quid

\(^1\)Lonergan, p. 161.

\(^2\)In II Meta., L. I, #278: "Est autem duplex via procedendi ad cognitionem veritatis. Una quidem per modum resolutionis, secundum quam procedimus a compositis ad simplicia, et a toto ad partem, sicut dicitur in primo Physicorum quod confusa sunt prius nobis nota. Et in hac via perficitur cognitione veritatis, quando pervenitur ad singulas partes distincte cognoscendas-- Alia est via compositionis, per quam procedimus a simplicibus ad composita, qua perficitur cognitione veritatis cum pervenitur ad totum."
proof. All demonstrations are decisive insofar as they put the mind at rest with regard to the particular question being asked: some, however, the propter quid type, not only answer the particular question, but even put the mind at rest with regard to further questions concerning the subject of demonstration. Thus they yield a broader intelligibility than do the quia type; the latter are no less certain, however, they are merely less informative. Thus, when possible, a propter quid demonstration, in which the causality relative to us corresponds to the objective order of causality, is preferable to quia demonstration, in which our knowledge of the conclusion is achieved through something other than the proximate cause-- either a remote cause or an effect.

However, as Thomas clearly states in the text we

1Anderson, "On Proof," p. 99: "Proof is not limited to explanation, in terms of what, how, or why things are. Mere factual proof can be equally decisive; if proof proves, it proves, and there's an end of it... Proof is not... equivalent to... the propter quid variety, which is indeed real proof, but which is, as such, no more probative than factual (quia) proof."

2Wallace, p. 22.
cited,¹ we must begin with what we have.² We can use the ontological cause as an epistemological cause only when we already know the ontological cause, precisely as cause. Apart from mathematics, we rarely if ever know this initially:³ our knowledge begins with sensible things, whose natures are hidden from us. Because, for us, sensory knowledge, which deals with singulars, proceeds intellectual knowledge, which deals with universals, "with respect to the investigation of natural properties and causes, less universal things are known first, because we discover universal causes by means of particular causes... those things which are universal in causing are known to us

¹In I Post. Anal., IV, #16; cf. above, p. 107, n. 1.

²Anderson, "On Proof," p. 100: "There can be no real scientific success in dealing with any problem unless one discovers and uses that kind of proof and procedure which the actual state of affairs, both within and without, calls for and allows; an isomorphic approach can only end in shipwreck."

³The exception is not as unusual as it might seem: until we attain the formal object of mathematics by means of abstraction with precision, we have not yet acquired the habit of this science, but the abstraction by which we do acquire it has as its point of departure the same sensible image which is the determinate source of all human knowing. Cf. In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 2, resp.
only subsequently."¹ Since what we know at the level of sensory knowledge are effects rather than causes, in all cases it is the effect which is better known to us initially.² Thus all our sciences are grounded in the quia demonstrations through which we reach knowledge of the existence of the proper causes of things, which each science can use thereafter in propter quid demonstrations concerning its formal object.³ It is in this sense that Thomas says "in speculative science it is necessary to proceed in


²In I Post. Anal. XXIII, #195: "Scire quia est quando... non fit per causam: sed fit per convertentiam, idest per effectus convertibiles et immediatos. Et tamen talis demonstratio fit per notius, scilicet nobis: alias non faceret scire. Non enim pervenimus ad cognitionem ignote, nisi per aliquid magis notum. Nihil enim prohibet duorum aequae praedicantium, idest convertibilium, quorum unum sit causa, et alium effectus, notius esse aliquando non causam, sed magis effectum. Nam effectus aliquando est notior causa quoad nos et secundum sensum, licet causa sit semper notior simpliciter et secundum naturam. Et ita per effectum notiorem causa potest fieri demonstratio, non faciens scire propter quid, sed tantum quia."

a resolutive manner by resolving the complex into simple principles.\textsuperscript{1} Nor does the fact that it moves from effects to causes lessen the scientific value of such reasoning; as a method resulting in certain knowledge, it is every bit as scientific as a \textit{propter quid} demonstration.\textsuperscript{2} Although Aristotle, in an eternal and necessary universe, can view \textit{quia} proof as not only inferior to \textit{propter quid}, but also less scientific, Thomas, in a freely created universe, can not: the things from which all our knowledge originates are not necessary effects, but rather freely created by God. Thus the familiar Aristotelian doctrine on the nature and rules of scientific proof cannot be transferred to a

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{In I Eth.}, 3, \#35: "\textit{Necessarium est enim in qualibet operativa scientia, ut procedatur modo composito. E converso autem in scientia speculativa, necesse est ut procedatur modo resolutorio, resolvendo composita in principia simplicia."

\textsuperscript{2}Baumgartner, p. 58: "Was the notion, however, of scientific knowledge restricted to \textit{propter quid} demonstration? We see in the text of Aristotle how it was extended to include a kind of knowledge less perfect than the above, to demonstrations of the fact, most often proceeding from the effect to the cause... The one note that this type of argument does retain is that of certitude and necessity." Cf. Anderson, "On Proof," p. 100.
Thomistic context without some reshaping.¹

Demonstration generates a habit of science, "an ordained aggregation of the species existing in the intellect in a semi-actual state."² This habit is acquired through a single demonstration inasmuch as the knower does have scientific knowledge of the conclusion as a result of the demonstration.³ But from knowing one conclusion, one may acquire demonstrative knowledge of other conclusions,

¹Anderson, "On Proof," p. 102. His reason for making this statement, however, differs from mine. The entire controversy over whether, and how, Thomistic metaphysics fulfills the Aristotelian criteria for science, particularly with respect to propter quid and quia demonstration, is outside the scope of this dissertation: those interested in pursuing this question further may consult: Joseph Owens, "St. Thomas and Elucidation," New Scholasticism, XXXV (1961) pp. 421-44 and the subsequent articles in the same journal by H. Nielsen, ibid., XXXVI (1962) pp. 233-36, and Bobik, ibid., XXXVII (1963) pp. 59-63, 411-30; and Owens, ibid., pp. 64-70.

²SCG I, 56, #5: "Omnis autem intellectus in habitu per aliquas species intelligit; nam habitus vel est habilitatio quaedam intellectus ad recipiendum species intelligibiles, quibus actu fiat intelligens; vel est ordinata aggregatio ipsarum specierum existentium in intellectu, non secundum completum actum, sed medio modo inter potentiam et actum." Cf. Dharamony, p. 143.

³S. T. I-II, 51, 3, resp.: "Respectu igitur primi passivi [intellectus possibilis] potest esse aliquod actum quod uno actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad asseriendum firmiter conclusioni;... habitum... scientiae possibile est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum possibilem. Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, necessarium est eodem actus plurites reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter memoria imprimatur."
thus extending his scientific knowledge insofar as it is seen to apply to or include more things. Hence the initial state of a habit of science is in this sense imperfect; it is perfected gradually as one demonstrated conclusion gives rise to a new demonstration through which one reaches a further conclusion. The mature scientist in any area is one who has the habit of carrying on such demonstrations, that is, who has an aptitude for considering a specific type of knowable, so that he acts easily and at will in demonstrating conclusions concerning that knowable. It is only insofar as it is made active by self-evident propositions that the intellect has the power to reason out conclusions,

---

1 S. T. I-II, 52, 2, resp.: "Scientia potest augeri secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem scientiae secundum speciem."

2 S. T. I-II, 54, 4, ad 3: "Ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquidam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens, eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.

3 SCG II, 73, #24-25: "Scientia est de conclusionibus demonstrationem; nam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ... Ex habitu autem scientiae inest facultas considerandi, sicut ex proximo principio actus: oportet enim quod habitus scientiae perficiat potentiam qua intelligimus, ut agat quum voluerit faciliter, sicut alii habitus potentias in quibus sunt."
hence the habit of science is caused in the intellect inasmuch as it is activated by first principles.¹

Therefore, since the knowing of conclusions is the effect of the understanding of first principles,² in order to give our assent to the conclusion we must perceive it to be caused by or follow from these first principles.³ Until we recognize it as implied in the principles from which it was deduced, we cannot be certain about any conclusion, but to test the strength of its connection with these principles is to evaluate it in relation to them. To do this is no longer to inquire, but to judge what the inquiry has turned up; here inquiry gives way to judgment, which is contradistinguished from inquiry as a distinct

¹S. T. I-II, 51, 2, resp.: "... vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per se nota... habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus,"

²De Ver., IV, 2, resp.: "Omne autem intellectum in nobis est aliquid realiter progrediens ab altero; vel sicut progresdiuntur a principiis conceptiones conclusionem, vel sicut conceptiones quidditatum rerum posteriorum a quidditatis priorum,... ipsa enim conceptio est effectus actus intelligendi." ST 1, 79, 4, ad 3: "Quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminas propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones." In III Sent., d.14, a.3, sol. 3: "Ex principiis considerat conclusiones sicut ex causis effectus."

³S. T. I, 83, 4, resp.: "Ratiocinari autem proprio est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius, unde proprio de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex principiis innotescunt... in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimus,..."
step in reasoning. Calling it the way of judgment implies a parallel with legal matters: the original meaning of the term "judgment" was "the correct determination of what is just." The judgment which defined justice was the privilege of the ruler, since it was he who established positive rights by promulgating laws; the judge merely carried out the ruler's judgment.\(^1\) The technical name for the judge's consideration of the evidence presented is \textit{examen}; \textit{judicium} is the technical name for his verdict--his expression of "the just" in the case before him.\(^2\) However, he recognizes the just by looking to the law, which is certain; a "true" judgment is one which is seen to express the way in which the appropriate law applies to the case before him. He "measures" his verdict against the law.

As the judge measures his verdict against the law, so the way of judgment measures a conclusion against its

\(^1\)Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas}, p. 310.

\(^2\)\textit{S. T. II-II}, 68, 2, resp.: "Quando in criminibus per modum accusationis agitur, accusator constituitur pars, ita quod iudex inter accusatorem et eum qui accusatur medius constituitur ad examen iustitiae; in quo oportet, quantum possible est, secundum certitudinem procedere. ... non posset iudici esse certum quid et qualiter dictum sit, debet proferre sententiam, nisi esset in scriptis redactum." (italics mine)
principles in order to recognize its truth. Until a conclusion is so tested, it is not known to be true; it is merely an opinion chosen by chance or a good guess based on natural ingenuity—usually with some help from the commonplaces. Inquiry proposes an argument, and judgment evaluates it by examining it to see whether its conclusion does indeed follow from its premises: in order to do this, we must return to the principles. Thus the way of judgment is reflexive, proceeding in the opposite direction from the way of inquiry, resolving conclusions into

1De Spir. Creat., a.10, ad 8: "Iudicare enim aliquo de veritate dicimur dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut medio; sicut iudicamus de conclusionibus per principia, et de regulatis per regulam. Non enim illud quod est mutabile, vel quod habet similitudinem falsi, potest esse infallibilis regula veritatis."

2We cannot agree with Oeung-Hanhoff, pp. 76-77, that this initial dependence on "natural ingenuity" is "an obvious gap in the method of judicative analysis" as Thomas uses it. For Thomas the very reliance on reasoning as a method of attaining truth is an obvious weakness of the human intellect. ST II-II, 49, 5, ad 2: "... sed necessitas rationis est ex defectu intellectus; illa enim in quibus vis intellectiva plenarie viget ratione non indigent, sed suo simplici intuiti veritatem comprehendunt; sicut Deus et angeli." Ibid., 83, 10, ad 2: "Intellectus et ratio non sunt in nobis diversae potentiae,... differunt autem secundum perfectum et imperfectum." Cf. Also, SCG I, 57, #9.

3SCG I, 57, #2: "Non enim ex hoc aliquis rationcinatur vel discurreit quod inspicit qualiter conclusio ex praemissis sequatur, simul utrumque considerans; hoc enim contingit non argumentando, sed argumenta iudicando,..."
principles.\(^1\) When conclusions are resolved to principles they are known with certainty. Until we examine a conclusion in the light of what is naturally known as self-evident, our assent to the conclusion is merely tentative; but once we judge it to be grounded in self-evident principles, we assent to it unconditionally.\(^2\) The resolution manifests the certitude and motivates the assent, thereby completing the deliberation.\(^3\) Thus through the resolution of con-


\(^2\)De Ver., XI, 1, ad 13: "... tunc enim conclusiones per certitudinem scituntur quando resolvuntur in principia:... certitudinem scientiae non acciperemus, nisi inesse nobis certitudo principiorum, in quae conclusiones resolvuntur." Ibid., XII, 1, resp.: "Quamdiu enim non fit resolutio cognitorum in sua principia, cognitio non firmatur in uno, sed apprehendit ea quae cognoscit secundum probabilitatem." Cf. Ibid., X, 8, resp.; De Malo, III, 3, resp.; In Boeth. de Trin., III, 1, ad 4; In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol.3, #155.

\(^3\)In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 1, #143: "Sciens autem et assensum et cogitationem habet; sed non cogitationem cum assensu, sed cogitationem ante assensum, quae ratio ad intellectum resolvendo perducit." De Ver., XIV, 1, resp.: "Ex ipsa enim collatione principiorum ad conclusiones, assentit conclusionibus resolvendo eas in principia, et ibi figitur motus cogitantis et quietatur... sic non habet assensum et cogitationem quasi ex aequo: sed cogitatio inducit ad assensum, et assensus quietat...
elusions to first principles, science terminates in understanding;¹ for perfect certainty the resolution must be carried beyond the principles of the particular science to the first principles,² and even to the "first" first principle, the principle of contradiction,³ which expresses the intelligibility of being itself.⁴

Regarding the manner in which this resolution is carried out in specific instances, Thomas has little to say: in fact, although he tells us a first principle is one which

---


¹In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 1, #139: "Allo modo potest considerari intellectus noster secundum ordinem ad rationem quae ad intellectum terminatur, dum resolvendo conclusiones in principia per se nota, earum certitudinem efficit. Et hic est assensus scientiae." Cf. ibid., #155.

²In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, resp.: "Ultimus enim terminus, ad quem rationis inquisitio perducere debet, est intellectus principiorum, in quae resolvendo iudicamus, quod quidem quando fit non dicitur processus vel probatio rationalibus, sed demonstrativa." In IV Meta., VI, #607: "Quaelibet demonstrationis conclusio redditur certa per reductionem ejus in primum demonstrationis principium."

³In IV Meta., VI, #603-5: "Omnes demonstrationes reducunt suas propositiones in hanc propositionem [quod est impossibile eidem simul inesse et non inesse idem: et secundum idem] sicut in ultimam opinionem omnibus communem; ... in hanc reducunt demonstrationes omnia, sicut in ultimum resolvendo,... quaelibet demonstrationis conclusio redditur certa per reductionem ejus in primum demonstrationis principium."

⁴In Post. Anal., IV, #5: "Eadem enim sunt principia esse rei et veritatis ipsius."
is self-evident to anyone who knows the meaning of its terms,\(^1\) he nowhere gives a list of first principles. His stock examples are "every whole is greater than any of its parts," and the principle of contradiction.\(^2\) With respect to the first of these, it is fairly easy to see how a conclusion would be resolved to it, for this is a positive principle which can be used as a premise in any argument concerning wholes and parts. As a conclusion may thus be deduced from it, so by a reflexive process the mind returns from the conclusion to the principle: the resolution consists in a reflective recognition that the subject of the argument truly is a particular instance of the general principle, being virtually contained in it in a way analogous to that in which moral virtues are virtually present in our natural inclination.\(^3\) To know that every whole is greater than any of its parts is to know virtually that any specific whole is greater than any one of its parts, and the conclusions "x is greater than y," and "y is less than x" are established in the recognition that "x" is a whole

\(^1\)S. T. I, 17, 3, ad 2: 87, 1, ad 1; I-II, 94, 2, resp.

\(^2\)Cf. S. T. I-II, 51, 1, resp.; SCG II, 83, §31; Lonergan, p. 56.

\(^3\)De Ver., XI, 1, resp.
and "y" one of its parts. This is what is meant by saying "the conclusion is known through the principle;"¹ the resolution is the means by which we assure ourselves that this condition is fulfilled in our demonstration.

What is not easy to see is how the principle of contradiction may be so utilized, either in deduction or resolution. This principle gives us no positive knowledge of anything, and therefore cannot function as one of the premises in any argument; rather it states the condition under which any being is intelligible, and is used to test a completed argument for invalid reasoning: a negative test, for the principle is invoked explicitly only when such a flaw is found. It seems that this is what is meant by resolution to the principle of contradiction: such an interpretation is consistent with what Thomas does say about the way it differs from the principle concerning the relation between a whole and its parts. He tells us that, although both first principles are self-evident, the last mentioned is dependent on that of contradiction in the sense that understanding the relation between a whole and its parts requires understanding the principle of contradiction. The reason for this is that the principle of contradiction is related to being as any enunciation is

¹SCG III, 46, #51; In I Post. Anal. II, #14.
related to the apprehension of its terms: as "a being" is first in the intellect's first operation, so this principle is first in the intellect's second operation, as fundamental in composition and division as "a being" is in the understanding of indivisibles. As knowledge of being is related to knowledge of natures, so knowledge of this principle is related to knowledge of the principles of natures: as no nature can be apprehended without apprehending it as being, so no first principle of any nature can be understood without understanding that a thing cannot simultaneously be and not be,\(^1\) inasmuch as all subsequent enunciations regarding anything are grounded in the identity of that thing with itself.\(^2\) Knowledge is knowledge of being, and the first principles— especially the principle of contradiction—

\(^1\)In IV Meta., VI, #605: "Ad hujus autem evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilitatum intelligentia: alia, quae componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquid primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquid primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens: nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. Et quia hoc principium, imposibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne totum est majus sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquid potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intelligere. Sicut enim totum et partes non intelliguntur nisi intellecto ente, ita nec hoc principium omne totum est majus sua parte, nisi intellecto praedicto principio firmissimo."

\(^2\)Cf. Brennan, p. 18.
are the conditions according to which we know being.¹ Hence in every particular instance of knowledge these principles must be manifested.² In its logical formulation— that the affirmative and negative forms of a proposition cannot be true simultaneously— it grounds the truth of any enunciation;³ in this way it governs all judgments.⁴

The principle of contradiction, like the notion of being, expresses the existential situation of being and knowing, rather than any essential feature: because esse is other than essence, it cannot be known in the way that essence is known, neither can anything be deduced from it, nor resolved to it in the way in which it is possible to do these with the knowledge of essence. Thomas tells us that the truth of any enunciation is reduced to self-evident first principles, and especially to the principle of contra-

¹Lonergan, p. 57.
²Dhavamony, pp. 130-31.
³S. T. I-II, 94, 2, resp.: "In his autem quae in apprehensione hominum cadunt, quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis; et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut dicitur in IV Meta."
⁴Lonergan, p. 57.
diction, as its first causes: however, the way in which an
enunciation is reduced to the first principles of an essence
differs from the way in which it is reduced to being. We
have seen that to reduce our knowledge to being does not
mean to reduce the concept of a nature to the notion of be-
ing, but rather to reduce any enunciation about any being to
its origin in our experience of sensible being: in like man-
er to resolve an argument to the principle of contradiction
would appear to mean examining the argument to be certain it
is free of internal contradictions, rather than trying to
see the conclusion of the argument as contained in the prin-
ciple of contradiction the way that "x is greater than y" is
contained in the principle concerning the relation of a
whole to its parts.

In Thomas' eyes, these first principles are to us
what innate species are to angels: just as angels have know-
ledge through such species, man has knowledge through the
first principles. True, first principles are not innate in

\[1\]

\[2\]
us, for knowledge of them is derived from sensible things.\footnote{1} Yet, the power which makes the potential intelligibility in sensible things actually intelligible is innate. Thomas says that since Aristotle compares this power, which he calls the agent intellect, to a light, its activity may fittingly be ascribed to the mode of intellectual light connatural to us.\footnote{2} Therefore, the first principles, since they become known to us through our natural intellectual angel, namely, he knows first principles immediately without reasoning."

\footnote{1}SCG II, 83, #32: "Praeterea, id quod per sensum in nobis acquiritur non infuit animae ante corpus. Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in nobis ex sensibilibus causatur; nisi enim aliquod totum sensu percipissemus, non possemus intelligere quod totum esset majus parte,..."

\footnote{2}SCG II, 77, #5: "Quod autem lumen intelligibile nostrae animae connaturale sufficiat ad faciendum actionem intellectus agentis, patet,... Aristoteles fuit motus ad ponendum quod ea quae sunt nobis intelligibilia non sunt aliqua existentia intelligibilia per seipsa, sed fiunt ex sensibilibus; unde oportet quod poneret vurtutem quae hoc faceret; et haec est intellectus agens. Ad hoc ergo ponitur intellectus agens ut faciat intelligibilia nobis proportionata. Hoc autem non excedit modum luminis intelligibilis nobis connaturalis. Unde nihil prohibet ipsi lumini nostrae animae attribuere actionem intellectus agentis, et praecipue quum Aristoteles intellectum agentem comparet lumini."
light in so immediate and spontaneous a way\(^1\) that we cannot fail to understand them, or be mistaken about them,\(^2\) since our very nature commands assent to them,\(^3\) may be said to be known to us naturally.\(^4\) Because all the conclusions of

\(^1\) De Anima I, 4, ad 6: "... Actualem cognitionem principiorum habere non potest intellectus possibilitis nisi per intellectum agentem. Cognitio enim principiorum a sensibilibus accipitur, ut dicitur in fine libri Posteriorum. A sensibilibus autem non possunt intelligibilia accipi nisi per abstractionem intellectus agentis." In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 1: "Et hoc quidem contingit in his quae statim lumine intellectus agentis intelligibilia flunt, sicut sunt prima principia quorum est intellectus."

\(^2\) De Malo III, 3, resp.: "Intellectus ex necessitate assentiat interdum propositae veritati, ... tam intellectus quam voluntas ex necessitate tendit in illud ad quod naturaliter ordinatur; naturale enim est determinari ad unum. Unde intellectus ex necessitate assentit principiis primis naturaliter notis, nec potest eorum contrariis assentire; ..." Cf. SCG III, 46, #4; ST I, 17, 3, ad 2, and 62, 8, ad 2. Cf. also Dhavamony, p. 131.

\(^3\) S. T. I-II, 17, 6, resp.: "Actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad exercitum actus... Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius duo actus rationis attenduntur. Primo quidem ut veritatem circa aliquid apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra; hoc enim contingit per virtutem alicuius luminis vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra nec imperari potest. Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra, sed in ordine naturae; et idea, proprie loquendo, naturae nec imperio subiacet." Cf. Dhavamony, p. 130.

\(^4\) SCG III, 46, #4: "Cognitio quae fit per aliquid naturaliter nobis inditum, est naturalis: sicut principia indemonstrabilia, quae cognoscuntur per lumen intellectus agentis."
scientific knowledge are implicit in these principles, Thomas calls them "the seeds of knowledge."\(^1\)

However, the light of the agent intellect, in which these principles are seen, comes to the soul from God as its first source.\(^2\) Accordingly, God is likewise the source of our understanding of the principles which He has impressed on our souls as scientific knowledge in an embryonic state, analogous to the way in which He impressed on other living things the genetic\(^3\) principles according to which such things mature and produce their proper effects.\(^4\)

\(^1\) *De Ver.*, XI, 1, resp.: "Similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiae acquisitio; quod praexsistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina... Et istis autem principiis universalibus omnia principia sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in potentia, et quasi in universali cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere." Cf. *ibid.*, 3, resp..

\(^2\) *Ibid.*, X, 6, resp.: "Quod quidem lumen intellectus agentis in anima rationali procedit, sicut a prima origine, a substantiis separatis, praeceipue a Deo."

\(^3\) Thomas, of course, knew nothing of modern-day genetics— he called them seminal principles. But the substitution seems justified as expressing his insight more accurately than was possible with the biology of his own day.

\(^4\) *De Ver.*, XI, 3, resp.: "Homo ignotorum cognitionem per duo accipit: scilicet per lumen intellectuale, et per primas conceptiones per se notas,... Quantum igitur ad utrumque, Deus hominis scientiae causa est excellentissimo modo; quia et ipsam animam intellectuali lumine insignivit, et notitiam primorum principiorum ei impressit, quae sunt quasi quaedam seminaria scientiarum; sicut et aliis naturalibus rebus impressit seminales rationes omnium effectuum producendorum."
Moreover, the agent intellect not only has God as its source but is a created participation in His own light: \(^1\) "the light of reason by which such principles are evident to us is implanted in us by God as a kind of reflected likeness in us of the uncreated truth." \(^2\) Thus the principles are able to manifest truth because they are in the likeness of the first truth; \(^3\) this resemblance should not surprise us inasmuch as our intellects were created by this same supreme intellect. \(^4\)

---

\(^1\) *De Anima*, V, resp.: "...Intellectus agens, sit quasi quaedam virtus participate ex aliqua substantia superiori, scilicet Deo." *ST* I, 79, 4, ad 1: "Illa lux vero illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virturem..." Lonergan, p. 87: "...Thomist thought is an ontology of knowledge inasmuch as intellectual light is referred to its origin in uncreated Light..."

\(^2\) *De Ver.*, XI, 1, resp.: "Hujusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia hujusmodi sunt nobis nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultantis."

\(^3\) *Quodlib.*, X, a.8, resp.: "Nihil autem possimus veritatis cognoscere nisi ex primis principiis, et ex lumine intellectuali; quae veritatem manifestare non possunt, nisi secundum quod sunt similitudo illius primae veritatis; quia ex hoc etiam habent quandam incommutabilitatem et infallibilitatem." *De Ver.*, X, 6, ad 6: "Prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata, sunt quaedam similitudines increatae veritatis; unde secundum quod per eas de aliis judicamus, dicimur judicare de rebus per rationes immutabiles, vel veritatem increatam."

\(^4\) *S. T. I.*, 79, 4, resp.: "Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrac fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae... unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectualiae participat..." Ibid., ad 5: "Cum essentia animae sit immaterialis a supremo intellectu creatae, nihil prohibit virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahitur a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias."
When we judge according to these principles, we are, in fact, judging by the first truth. Furthermore, as we have seen, it is only through resolution to principles that scientific conclusions can be known with certainty; therefore, we may say that the whole certitude of scientific knowledge comes to us from God, the interior teacher, and that we know all things in the eternal exemplars. As the

---

1De Ver., I, 4, ad 5: "Veritas secundum quam anima de omnibus judicat, est veritas prima. Sicut enim a veritate intellectus divini effluunt in intellectum angelicum species rerum innatae, secundum quas omnia cognoscit, ita a veritate intellectus divini exemplariter procedit in intellectum nostrum veritas primorum principiorum secundum quam de omnibus judicamus. Et quia per eam judicare non possimus nisi secundum quod est similitudo primae veritatis, ideo secundum primam veritatem de omnibus dicimur judicare." Cf. Ibid., X, 6, ad 6; and 11, ad 12. Cf. Dhavamony, p. 148.

2De Ver., XI, 1, ad 13: "Certitudo scientiae tota oritur ex certitudine principiorum; tunc enim conclusiones per certitudinem sciuntur, quando resolvuntur in principia: et ideo, quod aliquid per certitudinem sciatur, est ex lumine rationis divinitus interius indito, quo in nobis loquitur Deus." Ibid., resp.: "Unde cum omnis doctrina humana efficaciam habere non possit nisi ex virtute illius luminis; constat quod solus Deus est qui interius et principaliter docet." Cf. Ibid., ad 17; De Anima, V, ad 6.

3S. T. I, 84, 5, resp.: "Allo modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis principio;... Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quorum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est alius quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationis aeterna." Cf. Ibid., 12, 11, ad 3. Dhavamony, pp. 131-33 analyzes and compares Augustine's doctrine of illumination and Aquinas' abstraction, and summarizes his conclusion on p. 133: "The difference between Augustine's illumination and Aquinas' abstraction, as we see it, is not great. Augustine pleads for an actual participation of eternal truth in all our intellectual knowledge, whereas Aquinas is for an habitual par-
certitude of angelic knowledge comes from innate species which are a reflection of the eternal truth of the divine intellect in the angelic intellect, so the certitude of human knowledge comes from naturally known principles whose truth proceeds from the truth of the divine intellect as from their exemplary cause. As the principles are the source and foundation of all our natural knowledge, they also set the limit of that knowledge: whatever is not implicitly contained in them and cannot be resolved to them cannot be understood as certain, however firmly one may participate of eternal truth in the form of the agent intellect. But...the actualization of this habit needs the cooperation of God... Thus the actual participation of Augustine occurs again in Aquinas but as actuation of the habitual participation of the agent intellect itself. Cf. also Lonergan, p. 189.

SCG III, 47, 7: "Quaedam sunt vera in quibus omnes homines concordant, sicut sunt prima principia intellectus tam speculativi quam practici: secundum quod universaliter in mentibus omnium divinae veritatis quasi quaedam imago resultat. Inquantam ergo quaelibet mens quidquid per certitudinem cognoscit, in his principiis intuetur, secundum quae de omnibus iudicatur, bacta resolutive in ipso, dicitur omnia in divina veritate vel in rationibus aeternis videre, et secundum eas de omnibus iudicare." Cf. ST I, 12, 11, ad 3; 87, 1, resp.; De Ver., I, 4, ad 5; Peghaire, p. 180.
believe it to be certain.¹

Although the human intellect² is the least powerful of intellects, it is yet truly an intellect:³ beginning

¹In II Sent., d.28, q.1, a.5, sol.: "Illa naturalem rationem excedunt quae non possunt concludi ex primis principiis per se notis. Cum enim prima principia sint sicut instrumenta intellectus agentis...oparet ea esse proportionata virtutis ejus, sicut organa/corporalia sunt proportionata virtutis motivae; unde quae ex primis principiis concludi non possunt, naturale lumen intellectus excedunt." In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 3, #156: "Sed quia voluntas hoc modo non determinat intellectum ut faciat inspici quae creduntur, sicut inspiciluntur principia per se nota vel quae in ipsa resolvuntur, sed hoc modo ut intellectus firmi- ter uni adhaereat;...certitudo...fidei est ex firma adhaesione ad id quod creditur." Cf. De Ver., XVIII, 4, resp.

²The term intellectus can be used to signify both the power of understanding (intellect) and the activity of understanding (understanding); it may be taken generally to refer to any intellectual activity whatsoever, including reasoning and even opinion, or, more specifically (and this, according to Thomas in ST I, 79, 10, resp., is its most precise and proper sense) to refer to the act of understanding as such— a direct and immediate grasp of truth, the primary instance of which is intellectus principiorum, (the understanding of principles), an intellectual virtue which habituates the intellectual power to and in active understanding. This narrower sense of intellectus is distinct from reasoning, which is an indirect way of attaining truth, involving inquiry and comparison, proceeding in stepwise fashion from the knowledge of one thing to that of another, through a middle term. Thomas' teaching on this point may be found in De Ver., I, 12; ST I-II, 57, 2; In VI Eth., V, #1179; In II Sent., d.24, q.1, a.3, ad 4 and q.3, a.3, ad 2; De Ver., XI, 1; SCG I, 57, #2, and III, 97, #12; ST II-II, 49, 5, ad 3. The classic secondary source is the study of J. Peghaire previously cited, esp. p. 190ff., upon which the foregoing brief comment is based.

³In II Meta., I, #285: "Cum anima humana sit ultima in ordine substantiarum intellectivarum, minime participat de virtute intellectiva."
in understanding of principles it reasons to what was previously unknown, and terminates its reasoning in understanding by resolving the conclusions arrived at into the certitude of the principles.\(^1\) In itself, understanding is superior to reasoning,\(^2\) but for us science is perfect knowledge,\(^3\) since it is achieved through resolution to the certitude of the understanding of principles.\(^4\) By resolution to principles we judge whether or not we have a true

\(^1\) In III Sent., d.35, a.1, q.2, qa. 2, sol.: "Inquisitio autem rationis sicut a simplici intuitu intellectus progreditur, quia ex principiis quae quis intellectu tenet ad inquisitionem procedit, ita etiam ad intellectus certitudinem terminatur, dum conclusiones inventae in principia resolvuntur in quibus certitudinem habent." De Ver., XIV, 1, resp.: "In scientia enim motus rationis incipit ab intellectu principiorum, et ad eundem terminatur per viam resolutionis."

\(^2\) S. T. I-II, 51, 2, ad 3; Cf. Simmons, "Demonstration and Self-evidence," p. 150, n. 18.

\(^3\) In Post. Anal., IV, #5 and #9.

\(^4\) In I Sent., d.17, q.1, a.4, ad 2: "Sed istorum habituum actus perfecte experimunt suas habitus quantum ad id quod est proprium eis; sicut in actu scientiae est certitudo per causam, in qua expresse scientia demonstratur; et multo plus est hoc in intellectu principiorum." In II Sent., d.7, q.1, a.1, sol.: "...Et similiter patet in intellectualibus; quia principium immediatum naturaliter cognitum determinat potestatem totam rationis. Ante enim quam ad ipsum deveniatur per inquisitionem resolventem, ita adhaeretur uni parti, ut relinquatur quaedam pronitas ad partem aliam per modum dubitationis; sed quando resolvendo pervenitur ad primum principium per se notum, firmatur ad unum cum impossibilitate alterius."
demonstration,¹ not until reasoning thus joins itself to understanding do we have scientific knowledge.² Hence the crux of scientific reasoning is the resolution which manifests that the conclusion has truly been deduced from the principles.³ This resolution is both a reflexion and a reflection: it must be conscious and deliberate, for one cannot be certain that a conclusion is grounded in first principles until he judges it to be, and this he cannot do unless he is aware of what he is doing and intends to do it.⁴

¹In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 1, resp.: "Ultimus enim terminus, ad quem rationis inquisitio perducere debet, est intellectus principiorum, in quae resolvendo iudicamus, quod quidem quando fit non dicitur processus vel probatio rationabilis, sed demonstrativa."

²In Dion. de Div. Nomen, VIII, 9, #73: "Scientia est conjunctio intellectus et rationis..." Cf. De Ver., XI, 1, resp..

³S. T. I-II, 90, 2, ad 3: "Nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia indemonstrabilia..." Ibid., I, 14, 7, resp.: "Terminus vero discursus est quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus." Cf. ibid., I-II, 57, 2, ad 2; In VI Eth., V, #1176; De Ver., XI, 1, ad 4.

⁴S. T. I-II, 112, 5, resp.: "Homo cognoscit ali- quid per seipsam, et hoc certitudinaliter... Certitudo enim non potest haberl de aliquo, nisi possit iudicari per proprium principium; sic enim certitudo habetur de conclusio- nibus demonstratibus per indemonstrabilia universalis principia; nullus autem posset scire se habere scientiam al- culius conclusionis, si principium ignoraret..." Ibid., ad 2: "De ratione scientiae est quod homo certitudinem habeat de his quorum habet scientiam... Et ideo quicunque habet scientiam... certus est se habere."
The resolutive inquiry, although it too must be conscious and deliberate, is, on the contrary, direct rather than reflexive.

We see, therefore, a parallel between composition and division on the one hand, and reasoning on the other; in both cases there are two phases, discovery and evaluation. The discovery is a sort of stretching-out to the as yet unknown, and the evaluation, a bending-back, a reflexion, which must be known as such, therefore also a reflection. And both phases involve resolution—two different senses of resolution, however. Abstraction is a sort of resolution, for by it the intellect attains the intelligible species from sensible images; the intelligible species expresses the determinate nature freed from the material conditions of sensible singulars. Thus it moves from the posterior and composite— the sensible and individual— to the prior and simple— the intelligible and universal. Likewise quia demonstration, which moves from effect to cause, is a sort of resolution, for effects are logically posterior to causes, and causes are simpler than effects. But neither sort of resolution is reflexive. Judgment, however, whether it be of a composition or division, or of a demonstration,¹

¹De Spir. Creat., X, ad 8: "Judicare enim aliquo de veritate dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut medio:sicut iudicamus de conclusionibus per principia,...Alio modo dicitur aliquo iudicare de veritate aliqua, sicut virtute iudicativa, et hoc modo per intellectum agentem iudicamus de veritate."
is necessarily reflexive: in judging we retrace the knowledge to its source in sense experience\(^1\) and intellectual light.\(^2\) The reflexion is known in a double reflection, reduction to the senses and resolution to principles,\(^3\) both of which move from the effect -- the knowing -- to its causes -- the known object and the knowing subject. The steps in this twofold reflection, and the reason it gives us certainty in judging, are set down in *De Veritate* I, 9: we reflect on the passivity of sensing, the efficiency of the sensed object, the activity of knowing, and the nature of the knowing power. The common element in these various senses of resolution, appears to be that in all cases the movement is from posterior/effect to prior/cause: both the couplets, posterior/prior and effect/cause, are analogous as Thomas uses them and he seems generally to regard them as equivalent to each other, at least so far as human knowing.

\(^{1}\) S. T. I, 17, 3, ad 1: "Quia quidditas rei est proprium objectum intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie diciemur aliquid intelligere, quando reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo judiciamus;..." *Ibid.*, II-II, 175, 4, resp.: "Intellectus autem humanus non convertitur ad intelligibilia nisi mediantibus phantasmatis, quae per species intelligibles a sensibus accipit, et in quibus considerans de sensibilibus iudicat et ea disposnit."

\(^{2}\) SCG II, 77, #5, above p. 126, n. 2.

activity is concerned. Inasmuch as it moves from posterior material effects to prior immaterial causes, human knowing is essentially by way of resolution. But the certitude of human knowing too is by way of resolution—a reflexive resolution. In scientific knowing, these two types of resolution are distinct, though not independent: one belongs to inquiry and the other to judging. Yet we can discern a kind of convergence between them, inasmuch as the term of resolutive inquiry is the absolutely first cause, and

---

1 In I Sent., d.17, q.1, a.4, sol.: "Unde... naturale sunt nobis procedere ex sensibus ad intelligibilia, ex effectibus in causas, ex posterioribus in priora, secundum statum viae..."

2 SCG II, 100, #4: "Item, species rerum intelligibiles contrario ordine perveniunt ad intellectum nostrum et intellectum substantiae separatae; ad intellectum enim nostrum perveniunt per viam resolutionis, scilicet per abstractionem a conditionibus materialibus et individuatis;... ad intellectum autem substantiae separatae perveniunt species intelligibiles quasi per viam compositionis; habet enim species intelligibiles ex assimilatione sui ad primam intelligibilem speciem intellectus divini, quae quidem non est a rebus abstracta, sed rerum factiva."

3 Edmund Dolan, F. S. C. in "Resolution and Composition in Speculative and Practical Discourse" Laval Théologique et Philosophique, VI, 1 (1950) pp. 9-62, distinguishes the two types of resolution because one belongs to the ordo determinandi and the other to the ordo demonstrandi. While this is so, we do not find it as fruitful as the distinction we have made between non-reflexive and reflexive resolution.
this same first cause is the term of resolutive evaluation in scientific knowing, since the light by which we judge is a participation in uncreated light. "By the seal of the divine light in us, all things are made known to us." \(^1\)

\(^1\)S. T. I, 84, 5, resp.: "Per ipsam sigillationem divini luminis in nobis omnia demonstrantur."
REFLECTION AND RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICAL WISDOM

We have seen that there is a sort of circle in human intellectual activity: beginning with a simple understanding of truth in an immediate insight into first principles, we proceed to reason in many ways, developing a variety of sciences. When, in each case, the scientific conclusion is resolved into its principles, so as to be seen in their light, reasoning terminates again in a simple, though more profound, understanding of truth.¹

Nevertheless, with respect to the various sciences, the multiplicity remains: so long as human knowing proceeds in this fashion it is incomplete. In the attainment of a more detailed understanding of sensible reality, it has sacrificed the unity of its original act of

¹In Dion. De Div. Nom., VII, 1, II (Mandonnet II, pp. 225-26): "Inquiditio enim rationis ad simplicem intelligentiam veritatis terminatur, sicut incipit a simplici intelligentia veritatis, quae consideratur in primis principiis. Et ideo in processus rationis est quaedam convolutio ut circulus, dum ratio ab uno incipiens per multa procedens ad unum terminatur." De Ver., XIV, 9, resp.: "Quaecumque autem sciuntur, proprie accepta scientia, cognoscuntur per resolutionem in prima principia, quae per se praesto sunt intellectui, et sic omnis scientia in visione rei praesentis perficitur." Cf. also Pegliaire, pp. 278 and 272.
understanding.¹ Until this is regained it has not fulfilled itself as intellect, but is merely reason, for it has not integrated reasoning's various conclusions into a total vision of reality.² As intellect cannot rest in knowing a multiplicity of aspects without understanding, through a reflective judgment, how they are united in the real thing, neither can it rest in the unity conferred on the thing by its essence, but must reach beyond this to the act of being as both the intrinsic source of that unity, and the final intrinsic cause of all the thing is, does, and can become.³ As induction culminates in insight through a reflective judgment, and inquiry in science through resolution to first

¹SCG III, 91, #3;5: "Omnia autem quae in nobis sunt inveniuntur esse multiplica, variabilia et defectibilis... intelligentia nostra multiplicationem habet, quia ex multis sensibilibus veritatem intelligibilem quasi congrugamus; est etiam mutabilis, quia ex uno in aliud discurrendo procedit, ex notis ad ignota proveniens."

²SCG III, 91, #3: "Oportet omne multiforme et mutabile et deficere potens reduci, sicut in principium, in aliquod uniforme et immutabile et deficere non valens."

³De Subst. Sep., IX, #48 Tractatus de Substantiis Separatis, ed. F. Lescoe. West Hartford, Conn.: St. Joseph College, 1962: "Sed quia nihil praeter corpora mente percipere poterant, resolverunt quidem corporales substantias in aliqua principia, sed corporalia... Posteriores vero philosophi processerunt resolventes sensibles substantias in partes essentiae quae sunt materia et forma; et sic fieri rerum naturalium in quodam transmutatione posuerunt... Sed ultra hunc modum fiendi necessae est secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis ponere alium altiorem... Oportet igitur communem quamdam resolutionem in omnibus hujusmodi fieri, secundum quod unumquodque eorum intellectu resolvitur in id quod est et in suum esse."
principles and to the senses, so understanding in all the sciences culminates in a single, all-embracing science in which the multiplicity of scientifically known essences is reduced to a unified vision insofar as these essences are recognized as existing. Discerning in each being the habitude of essence to a distinct existence, intellect perceives this as true of every finite being; so it comes to grasp being as an act distinct from essence, yet proper to each thing that is.¹ This character, reflectively grasped as analogically common to all,² is seen as capable of grounding a scientific study and is expressed in conceptual fashion as a ratio entis.³ Thomas calls this by various

¹In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3, resp.: "Considerant essentias secundum quod habent esse in rebus; et ideo ubi inveniunt diversum modum potentiae et actus, et per hoc diversum modum essendi, dicunt esse diversa genera." Cf. Henry Renard, S. J., "What is St. Thomas' Approach to Metaphysics?" New Scholasticism XXX (1956) p. 74: "Rising from the first intellectual knowledge (primum cognitum) which is material quiddity... to distinguish various types of material things, philosophers examine various essences... according as they have existence in things... The metaphysician, by an analysis (consideratio) of the rationes of the various genera, understands that the existents, from which the rationes are abstracted, have diverse modes of existing. Consequently, he understands that the 'habitude' of these essences to esse is to an existential act which is not identical with, but distinct from, its potency."

²S. T. I, 13, 5, ad 1: "Licet in praedicantionibus oporteat aequivoca ad univoca reduci;... omnia univoca reducantur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens."

³See below pp. 145-146.
names: ens commune, ens inquantum ens, ens in communi, or ens per communitatem.¹

In order to make this clear, let us review the whole structure of the intellect's evolution. We find the following stages: first, an initial act of knowing in which we acquire an intelligible species of some sensible thing, and at the same time, the habit of principles. "This habit of first principles is a kind of natural, pre-scientific metaphysics... It is not the science of metaphysics, for the primitive apprehension of being involved does not reveal the fullness of that notion, nor, consequently, are the first principles comprehended in all their vigor."² Secondly, by virtue of first principles, intellect investigates reality, attaining a fuller knowledge in conclusions grasped with certitude through resolution to these same first principles; thus are generated the habits of the demonstrative sciences. The final criterion of certitude, however, is not

¹Renard, pp. 74-75; p. 75, n. 27.

²Thomas O'Brien, O. P., Metaphysics and the Existence of God: A Reflection on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. (Washington, D. C.: Thomist Press, 1960), p. 7. Cf. also Renard, p. 73: "First of all, we should distinguish between ens meaning thing (which is known to all, children and philosophers alike) and being as being (ens commune) which is the subject of metaphysics..."
the resolution to first principles, but the light of evi-
dence. This, for the human knower, requires a reduction to
the senses, since all human sciences have their source in
sensory experience. But a careful reflective examination

1As Peghaire shows, pp. 271-72, the reduction to
first principles is inadequate as the final criterion of
truth because first principles themselves are certain, not
by reason of being first principles, but by reason of being
evident: what makes them infallible is the light of evi-
dence (and this is why they are first principles). Peg-
haire goes on to demonstrate that this is Thomas' own po-
sition as stated in De Veritate XIV. 9: "Quaecumque autem
sciuntur, proprie accepta scientia, cognoscuntur per reso-
lutionem in prima principia, quae per se praesto sunt in-
tellectui" c'est-à-dire, comme il l'avait défini quelques
lignes plus haut: 'illa praesto esse dicuntur intellectui,
qua capacitatem non excedunt, ut intuitu intellectus in eis
figatur.' Cette présence peut être obtenue par un rais-
onnement ou bien immédiatement, et il conclut: 'et sic om-
nis scientia in visione rei praesentis perficiatur' et non
pas: toute science est parfaite quand on peut en remener les
conclusions aux premiers principes." This does not mean
that the thing in itself is the final criterion either:
evidence is not the property of the thing as such, but ra-
ther results from the union of the thing as object "with a
subject which is in a particular way disposed so that in
this union it is reflexively or concomitantly perceived as an
object of the intellectual desire to know," as Dhavamony
writes, pp. 136-37. Yet in this union, the first principles
are the necessary dispositions conditioning the perception
of evidence: they determine the subject's dynamism to know
truth and influence the evidence of truth, Dhavamony states,
ibid..

2Guzie, p. 95: "Various studies of the writings of
St. Thomas have revealed that the Angelic Doctor had a high-
ly elaborated view of scientific method and a rigorous cri-
terion of philosophical meaning. Summarily stated, the full
commitment of the intellect to a scientific conclusion in-
volves seeing that conclusion in the light both of the ra-
tional principles leading to the conclusion and of the basic
evidence of experience from which the conclusion is ob-
tained. The establishment of a philosophical conclusion
consequently entails a resolution of the higher-order propo-
sition to a twofold principle or source-- the first organ-
izing principles of the science in question, and the ex-
of the evidence reveals to the diligent inquirer that there is more given in it than can be explained by resolution to the scientific definition and the sensory experiences from which the definition has been attained by abstraction; some aspect both of things and of the knowing of things remains unexplained. Knowing what a thing is may enable us to understand what it does and doesn't do, but never why the thing is there at all, nor why we are not free to think it both is and is not there at any one time. Once these questions begin to be seen, the intellect is beginning to reason on a higher level: this higher level science, whose object is thus discovered through resolution, can, accordingly, be acquired only subsequent to the acquisition of physics and the other sciences, for it presupposes considerable experience and scientific knowledge. Therefore it is called metaphysics.¹

¹In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: "Nihilominus ipsa addiscitur post physicam et ceteras scientias, in quantum consideratio intellectualis est terminus rationalis, propter quod dicitur metaphysica quasi trans physicam, quia post physicam resolvendo occurrit." In Meta., proem.: "Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et sa quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim trans physica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia." Cf. Renard, p. 64: "St. Thomas' approach to metaphysics, which is the via resolutionis, does not depend upon intuitive insights and existential moments, but... proceeds by way of reasoned arguments, based upon intellectual analyses of conceptual knowledge which has been obtained through abstractions, judgments, and reasonings." And also, p. 73: "...the

periential evidence or data of sense experience upon which the validity of the conclusion and of the first logical principles themselves ultimately rests."
Metaphysics attains in explicit fashion what the sciences and the understanding of principles grasp implicitly: the being of things upon which all scientific definitions are grounded and the principles of the intelligibility of being which, as the indemonstrable principles of demonstration, ground all scientific demonstration. The object of metaphysics is not the fruit of demonstration in the way that conclusions are: the existence of common being is neither in need of proof nor capable of being proven. It is rather the fruit of reflecting on the implications of many particular conclusions, and is grasped as an immediate insight when one has reflected sufficiently on the evidence:

subject of metaphysics... is the term of a long reasoning process...

1 In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 4, resp.: "Et hujusmodi sunt principia demonstrationum indemonstrabilia, ut 'omne totum est maius sua parte,' et similia, in quae omnes demonstrationes scientiarum reducuntur, et etiam prime conceptiones intellectus, ut entis et unus et hujusmodi, in quae oportet reducere omnes difinitiones scientiarum praedicatarum." Cf. De Ver., I, 1 and ST I 49, 3, ad 6.


3 What Simmons says in regard to the difference between the immediate induction of principles and the mediate induction of a conclusion applies in this case as well: "The induced conclusion is assented to precisely in virtue of the enumeration of singulars and cannot be known without pointing to them for evidence." Assent to the induced principles, however, "depends upon and comes with an insight into the intrinsic intelligibility of the proposition itself." Though this insight may be difficult to achieve, once it is achieved, assent to it is automatic; the dialectic which was instrumental prior to insight is no longer needed as evidence for the truth of the principle. "Demonstration," p. 155, n. 31.
"ens commune is self-evident to us as soon as we consider its ratio."¹ And though the intellect expresses its insight in its natural fashion, as a sort of ratio—a ratio entis—the concept of being is unlike other concepts which are univocal, attained by abstraction, evaluated in judgment, further clarified by reasoning, and which express the quidditative elements of reality. Since being is not a quiddity, but dynamic act, its quidditative form as abstract is the work of the human intellect.² It is attained, not by abstraction, but by a resolutive process called "the judgment of separation:" the realization that being as such is not identical with any essential note whatever, achieved by a reflective consideration of a series of divisions, each separating being as such from some quidditative element of some sensible thing or things. Thus metaphysics is clearly different from the particular sciences insofar as its object is attained by a reflexive resolution, by a judgment. Further, it knows its object, not in a composition, but in a division. Such knowledge by negation is really knowledge; however, it does not enable us to know what something is in itself: rather it enables us to know that it is distinct

¹Renard, p. 76.
²In I Sent., d.19, q.5, a.1, ad 7: "... quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis,..."
from other things. So, in the case of being as being, we
know it as other than essence, but do not have any deter-
minate knowledge of what being is in itself. The concept
of being is the expression of the intelligibility of real
things, each of which is a specific kind of intelligible
thing. Thus the content of one act of intelligence differs
from that of another, though the object of any such act is
recognized as an intelligible thing. For this reason the
content of the concept of being is necessarily indeter-
minate, and consequently the concept of being is necessarily
analogous. It cannot be clarified so as to be expressed in
a definition univocally applicable to all real beings.
However, inasmuch as it is analogously common to all, being
can be the subject of scientific investigation, and its
attributes demonstrated.

1SCG III, 39, #1: "Sed hoc interest inter utrum-
que cognitionis propriae modum, quod per affirmationes pro-
pria cognitione de re habita, scitur quid est res, et quo-
modo ab aliis separatur; per negationes de re, scitur quod
est ab aliis disireta, tamen quid sit remanet ignotum."

2S. T. I, 13, 10, resp.: "... in analogicis vero
opertet quod nomen, secundum unam significationem acceptum,
ponatur in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias sig-
nificationes accepta. Sicut ens de substantia dictum po-
nitur in definitione entis secundum quod de accidente di-
citur;..." Ibid., 11, resp.: "Hoc nomen Qui est... non...
significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse... Quolibet enim
allo nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei; sed
c hoc nomen Qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se
habet indeterminate ad omnes..." Cf. Lonergan, pp. 44-45.
Nevertheless, the mode of demonstration employed in metaphysics differs from that found in the other sciences, since the attributes of being cannot be demonstrated as can those of the subjects of the other sciences, through the definition of the scientific subject whose quiddity we come to know either directly or through its adequate effect. Moreover, propter quid proof as found in the most perfect example of deductive science--classical geometry--cannot be made to fit into a metaphysical context for the further reason that the mathematical type of knowledge concerns itself with intelligible objects in a state of ideal existence cut off from their actual existence in real subjects, whereas philosophy concerns itself with things as they exist in reality. That is why mathematics can demonstrate exclusively through formal causality, but

1^In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 4, ad 2.

2^P. Chojnacki, "Les conceptions épistémologiques de la métaphysique chez S. Thomas d'Aquin et ses origines," in Collectanea theologica (Varsovie) 34 (1963) p. 373: "La métaphysique ne peut pas être une science démonstrative au sens de la démonstration propter quid, car il n'est pas possible de donner une définition des termes ayant un caractère particulièrement premier. Or les termes dont traite la métaphysique sont absolument premiers ou transcendentaux, par conséquent ils échappent à la définition proprement dite. Faute de la définition de l'essence du sujet, qui justifie l'attribution nécessaire du prédicat à cet sujet dans la conclusion, la formation d'une démonstration propter quid devient donc impossible." Cf. Anderson, p. 100.
metaphysics cannot. Metaphysics employs rigorously logical reasoning, not in order to analyze an essence, but in order to reveal the implications of the dynamism of things given in the experience of them. The reasoning leads to the explicit realization that such dynamism cannot have as its ultimate ground the essence of the thing; it needs to be grounded in an act which is other than the essence. This is why metaphysical demonstrations are more properly called resolutions than deductions. Nor does this weaken the

---

1 Chojnacki, p. 373: "D'après S. Thomas d'Aquin, la démonstration propter quid est pratiquée dans les mathématiques, car elles procèdent à une preuve ne considérant que la forme, qui est constituée par la définition.

La métaphysique considère l'objet plus compliqué, que les mathématiques. Son objet n'est pas étudié de la même façon que l'objet des mathématiques, qui se borne à la considération de la seule forme. Les mathématiques se servent surtout de la démonstration analytique. Fr. Brentano a jugé, que dans la métaphysique aristotélicienne est appliquée la démonstration analytique, mais cette opinion ne se laisse pas soutenir, surtout à l'égard de la métaphysique de S. Thomas d'Aquin, qui a souligné dans l'être l'aspect existentiel et contingent. Or l'existential et le contingent échappent à l'analyse mathématique."

2 In I Post. Anal., 1, 43, #391: "Vocat... resolutionem, quando propositiones assumptae non sunt manifestae, sed oportet eas resolvere in alias manifestiores." Geiger, La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, 2 ed. (Paris; J. Vrin, 1953), p. 322, n. 1: "Cette relation spéciale entre l'être et les concepts plus déterminés fait l'originalité de la resolutio ad ens, de cette analyse ou réduction à l'être qui ne saurait s'identifier avec l'analyse logique des notions univoques. Elle n'est d'ailleurs qui la contrepartie de la manière caractéristique dont les transcendentaux se déterminent pour constituer les concepts limités."
status of metaphysics as a science;¹ according to Thomas what certifies any conclusion is its resolution to principles, which is, as we have seen, a reflective consideration of the elements which have led to a particular conclusion in order to show that their rigorous linking reveals the conclusion to be contained in the principles as an effect in its causes.² Thomas' use of both "demonstration" and "science" is analogous rather than univocal.³

The first principles to which metaphysics makes its resolutions are entitative act and potency;⁴ upon these the demonstrations in all the other sciences depend,

¹Cf. Owens, "The Analytics," p. 98ff. For Fr. Owens what makes these demonstrations of metaphysics truly scientific is the prior demonstration of the existence of a first cause of being. We agree that it is the business of metaphysics to demonstrate the existence of such a cause, and that this demonstration is properly called quia demonstration, but we do not see the need for maintaining that the status of metaphysics as a science depends on this demonstration.

²S. T. I, 14, 7, resp.: "Alius discursus est secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum... discursus talis est procedentis de noto ad ignotum... Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas; et tunc cessat discursus." Cf. Peghaire, p. 271.

³Cf. Baumgartner, p. 59.

thus the study of any real thing finds its completion in metaphysics. Because it deals explicitly with the principles which underlie all scientific knowledge of reality, metaphysics may be called first philosophy. However, there are two sorts of principles: those, like entitative act and potency, which are intrinsic to the things of which they are the principles; and those extrinsic to things but constitutive of them as agent or efficient cause. Both the intrinsic principles and whatever extrinsic principles it is discovered any given thing requires must be included in any scientific study of that thing; so in metaphysics the reso-

1In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: "Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur principia omnibus aliis scientiis, in quantum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis, propter quod dicitur prima philosophia." Cf. In Meta., prooem.

2The latter, in addition to being the principles of other things, are also complete natures in themselves, and may thus be the objects of a separate scientific study, whereas the former, inasmuch as they are not complete natures in themselves, but only the principles of other natures, may not be so studied. Cf. In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.

3In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.: "Sciendum si quidem est quod quaecumque scientia considerat aliquod genus subiectum, oportet quod considerat principia illius generis, cum scientia non perficiatur nisi per cognitionem principiorum." In Meta., prooem.: "Ejusdem autem scientia est considerare causas proprias alicujs generis et genus ipsum..."
solution to being and what belongs to being as such\(^1\) raises 
the further question whether such beings do not, in fact, 
need an extrinsic cause. Once we have reflected suffi-
ciently to realize that all the beings we know are composed 
of essence and \( \text{esse} \), it is but a small step further to re-
cognize that since \( \text{esse} \) is not their essence, they need not 
exist at all. They exist because they have \( \text{esse} \), however 
they do not have it by any necessity of their nature; rather 
they have it by participation in that whose essence is 
\( \text{esse} \).\(^2\) But whatever exists through participation in being 
is caused to exist and cannot be uncaused.\(^3\) Just as such a

\(^1\) In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: "Quandoque 
vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando 
est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: componendo quidem 
quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis particularia 
proceditur; resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod uni-
versalis est simplicius. Maxime autem universalia sunt, 
quia sunt communia omnibus entibus. Et ideo terminus reso-
lutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratio entis et eorum 
quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi."

\(^2\) SCG I, 22, \#9: "Omnis res est per hoc quod habet 
esse; nulla igitur res, cujus essentia non est suum esse, 
est per essentiam suam, sed per participatione alicujus, 
scilicet ipsius esse." Cf. Gerald Smith, S. J. and Lottie 
Kendzierski, The Philosophy of Being (New York: Macmillan, 
1961) p. 13, n. 3.

\(^3\) S. T. I, 44, 1, ad 1: "Licet habitudo ad causam 
non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum, tamen se-
quitur ad ea qua sunt de elus ratione; quia ex hoc quod ali-
quid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum 
ab allo. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest esse, quin sit cau-
satum;... Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis 
simpliciter, propter hoc inventur aliquid ens non causatum. 
Cf. Smith and Kendzierski, p. 13, n. 3; and Rev. Louis de 
Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being (St. Louis: B. Herder 
being cannot exist without being caused, it cannot be truly and fully known as long as its causes are unknown; we have seen that for Aristotle and Thomas to know a thing scientifically is to know it "through its causes."\(^1\) In the previous chapter we considered causality within knowledge: the first principles are the epistemological cause of scientific conclusions.\(^2\) Here we have to consider causality as an ontological principle; a principle, not of being as such (i.e., there can be an uncaused cause of being, since to be caused does not enter into the nature of being taken absolutely\(^3\)), but of caused beings.\(^4\) When Thomas asserts that every science seeks the causes of its subject, since the discovery of these is the goal of scientific investigation,\(^5\) it is the ontological cause to which he is referring. The process of discovering this cause is called "reducing an effect to its proportionate cause,"\(^6\) and it is a fundamental procedure in Thomistic metaphysics.

\(^{1}\text{Cf. above p. 2, n. 3.}\)

\(^{2}\text{Cf. pp. 105-7.}\)

\(^{3}\text{Cf. above, p. 152, n. 3.}\)


\(^{5}\text{In Meta., prooem. and In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp..}\)

\(^{6}\text{SCG II, 21, #10 cf. below, p. 155, n. 2.}\)
There are different orders of causes: anything on which something else somehow depends, which explains its actuality in some respect and apart from which it cannot be, is appropriately called its cause, whether effect and cause be distinct substances, or distinct elements and/or activities of one substance. Thus the essence is the cause of the properties and proper activities of any particular kind of thing, and in the natural things of our experience the kind of essence in turn is explained by the efficient causality of another thing of the same kind. The reduction of a thing to such particular causes—causes determined to proper effects of the same kind, as plants produce plants, and human beings, other human beings— is the work of the particular sciences.2 The reductions carried out by the particular sciences also include the reduction of whatever is per

1In VI Meta., 3, #1207: "Hae igitur causae in tertio gradu existentes sunt particulares, et ad proprios effectus secundum singulas species determinatae: ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta plantam." Man, of course, can also produce effects—all those things which constitute human culture—which resemble his spiritual rather than his biological aspects.

2Analogously, "parts" such as principles (i.e., intrinsic ontological principles, such as matter and form, rather than logical principles, such as the principle of contradiction) privations and potencies must be reduced to the "whole"—a substance in act—in order to be understood, although strictly speaking they are not effects caused by a substance. Cf. above, p. 15, n. 3 and SCG III, 11, 10.

3In VI Meta., 3, #1191-1222.
accidens to that which is per se and of future effects to their present causes. 1

In all these instances, however, the effect is particular and the cause is a cause of becoming rather than of being: what the cause accounts for is a modification in something which exists already, rather than the very existence of anything. To cause being as such is to produce being out of nothing. 2 Only metaphysics can seek the cause of being as such, since only metaphysics has being as such for its proper object. The cause of what is participated is that which is per se; thus in the case of being, its adequate cause is a being which does not participate in being, but is being. 3 This being is not merely "a being"— even

1Cf. above, p. 16, n. 1.

2SCG II, 21, #10: "Quum fit aliquod ens, ut homo vel lapis, home quidem per se fit, quia ex non homine; ens autem per accidens, quia non ex non-ente simpliciter, sed ex non-ente hoc, ut Philosophus dicit. Quum ergo aliquid fit omnino ex non-ente, ens per se flet; oportet igitur quod ab eo qui est per se causa essendi procedat; nam effectus proportionaliter reducantur in causas. Hoc autem est primum ens solum quod est causa entis, in quantum hujusmodi est; alia vero sunt causa essendi per accidens et non per se. Quum igitur producere ens ex non-ente praexistentem sit creare, oportet quod solius Dei sit creare."

3In II Sent., d.37, q.1, a.2, sol.: "Per se dictum est causa eius quod per participationem dicitur; et ideo oportet quod illud ens quod non per participationem alicuius esse, quod sit allud quam ipsum, dicitur ens, quod primum inter alla entia est, sit causa omnium aliorum entium. Alia autem entia dicuntur per posterius, inquantum aliquod esse participant." Cf. L-B Geiger, La Participation, p. 464.
"the highest being among others." It is of a different order altogether, since its very nature is to exist; that is, its esse is its essence.\textsuperscript{1} It alone exists by necessity of nature; all other things exist because they are caused by it. What is caused in them is not just their esse; since their essence depends on their esse and cannot be apart from it, it is they themselves as total beings that are caused. Thus whatever they are, acquire, or do, which can be explained quidditatively by their essence, metaphysics explains first by the intrinsic cause, their esse, and finally by reduction to the extrinsic cause, the cause of their being.\textsuperscript{2} There can be only one such cause which accounts for all that exists by participation, and to which all are

\textsuperscript{1}In I Sent., d.8, q.4, a.2, sol.: "In Deo autem esse suum est quidditas suae: aliter enim accideret quidditati, et ita esset sibi acquisitum ab alio, et non haberet esse per essentiam suam." Geiger, p. 475 and Smith and Kendzierski, p. 13, n. 3.

\textsuperscript{2}In II Meta., II, #296: "Et hoc est necessarium: quia necesse est ut omnia composita et participantia, reducantur in ea, quae sunt per essentiam, sicut in causas. Omnia autem corporalia sunt entia in actu, inquantum participant aliquas formas. Unde necesse est substantiam separatem, quae est forma per suam essentiam, corporalis substantiae principium esse."
reduced.\textsuperscript{1} Thus in metaphysics all the composite efficient causes are reduced to this single uncaused cause, which is God.\textsuperscript{2}

The existence of this cause is not evident to us apart from the reduction, thus it constitutes a proof which Thomas, in the second question of the first part of the Summa Theologica\textit{e} refers to as a \textit{quia} demonstration of the cause's actuality.\textsuperscript{3} Yet the proof is not a deduction in the strictest sense: the latter is a matter of drawing out in analytic fashion the predicates which are contained in the the definition of some subject. What we have here is precisely the reverse: instead of deducing the properties of some substance, we reflectively seek its presuppositions;

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}De Subst. Sep., cap. IX, 48: "Cum enim necesse sit primum principium simplicissimum esse, necesse est quod non hoc modo esse ponatur quasi esse participans, sed quasi ipsum esse existens. Quia vero esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, ... necesse est omnia alia quae sub ipso sunt, sic esse quasi esse participantia... Oportet igitur supra modum fiendi quo aliqua fit, forma materiae advenente praestissetiam rerum originem, secundum quod esse attribuitur toti universitati rerum a primo ente quod est suum esse." Cf. SCG I, 66, #9; ibid., 98, #4; p. 15, n. 3, above.
\item \textsuperscript{2}SCG II, 21, #5: "Oportet omnes causas inferiores agentes reduci in causas superiores sicut instrumentales in primarias. Omnis autem alia substantia praeter Deum habet esse causatum ab alio, ... Impossibile est igitur quod sit causa essendi nisi sicut instrumentalis et agens in virtute alterius. ...Nulla igitur substantia, praeter Deum, potest aliquid creare."
\item \textsuperscript{3}S. T. I, 2, 1, resp.
\end{itemize}
rather than what follows from it as consequent upon its nature, we ask what must precede as a necessary condition for it. The precise name for this method of inquiry is not deduction but reduction.¹

Thus the resolution to common being, intrinsic to each thing that is, and analogically predicable of all beings, precedes and is the basis for the discovery of an extrinsic universal cause of being. Here too, intellect proceeds in an resolutive way: the beings of our experience are now seen as unable to account for the very factor they have in common— their being; hence they are revealed as

¹Gaston Rabeau, Speciés Verbum L'activité intellectuelle élémentaire selon S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938) pp. 176-78: "Prenons, comme exemple de réduction les 'cinq voies' par lesquelles saint Thomas prouve l'existence de Dieu. Chacune d'elles repose sur un 'fait philosophique', et, de ce 'fait philosophique', saint Thomas remonte (sans le dire expressément, car il ne pourrait exprimer cette opération de pensée pure en un syllogisme de genres et d'espèces) aux présupposés de cet fait... La déduction parfaite, telle qu'on l'imagine d'après la subvention des classes, tire analytiquement les prédicats contenus dans les sujets: on a le droit de tirer le prédicat du sujet, parce qu'il fait partie de sa définition. Or, saint Thomas note qu'il existe un mode exactement inverse de cette 'praedicatio per se', à savoir quand le sujet entre dans la définition du prédicat... c'est une réduction... 

Mais cet ordre théorique, que suivra le mathématicien dans son exposé synthétique, n'est pas du tout l'ordre que suit la connaissance humaine spontanée: elle remonte, nous le savons déjà, du composé au simple. Dans la multitude elle découvre l'unité comme condition essentielle: l'unité à son tour suppose la division; la division suppose l'être. Cette marche à rebours est une découverte, non l'exposé de ce qui l'on possède. Elle est une réduction."
effects dependent upon an extrinsic cause.\(^1\) A conclusion is considered proven only when the resolution is carried all the way to the first indemonstrable principles,\(^2\) and certitude in judging any effect requires that this resolution to first principles be carried to its extrinsic first principles, its causes.\(^3\) Hence the ultimate end of metaphysical investigation is the discovery of such causes;\(^4\) until they are attained common being is not understood as fully as our intellect is capable of understanding it. They are called

\(^1\) *In VI Meta.*, 3, #1215: "Sed si ulterius ista contingentia reducantur in causam altissimam divinam, nihil inveniri poterit, quod ab ordine ejus exeat, cum ejus causalitatis extendat se ad omnia inquantum sunt entia." Cf. *In II Meta.*, II, #296, above p. 156, n. 2.

\(^2\) *In III Eth.*, L. VIII, #476: "...qui vult probare aliquam conclusionem oportet quod resolvat conclusionem in principia quousque pervenit ad principia prima indemonstrabilia."

\(^3\) *In I Post. Anal. I*, #6: "Iudicium certum de effectibus haberī non potest nisi resolvendo in prima principia..." *ST I-II*, 14, 5, resp.: "Si autem id quod est prius in cognitione, sit posterius in esse, est processus resolutorius: utpote cum de effectibus manifestis iudicamus resolvendo in causas simplices."

\(^4\) *SCG II*, 21, #5: "Et inde est quod oportet omnes causas inferiores agentes reduci in causas superiores sicut instrumentales in primarias. Omnis autem alia substantia praeter Deum habet esse causatum ab alio..." Ibid., #10: "Oportet igitur quod ab eo quod est per se causa essendi: nam effectibus proportionaliter reducuntur in causas."
the separate substances because they are most perfect, supremely in act, without matter or motion. Like the intrinsic principles of common being, their definition does not include matter and their existence does not depend on matter; unlike the principles of common being, they cannot in any way exist with matter and motion. For Aristotle there were a number of such causes; for Thomas, there was ultimately only one. But reinterpreting Aristotle in the light of his Christian belief in the existence of angels

---

1 In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3, resp.: "Ratio enim... procedit quandoque de uno in alium secundum rem, ut quando est demonstratio per causas vel effecctus extrinsicas: componendo quidem, cum proceditur a causis ad effectus; quasi resolendo, cum proceditur ab effectibus ad causas, eo quod causae sunt effectus simpliciores et magis immobili ter et uniformiter permanentes. Ultimus ergo terminus resoluti- onis in hoc via est, cum pervenitur ad causas suprema maxime simplices, quae sunt substantiae separatæ... Haec autem sunt, de quibus scientia divina considerat,... sici- licet substantiae separatæ et communia omnibus entibus."

2 Ibid., V. 4, resp.: "Omnium autem entium sunt principia communia non solum secundum primum modum, quod appellat Philosophus in XI Metaphysicæ omnia entia habere eodem principia secundum analogiam, sed etiam secundum modum secundum, ut sint quaedam res eadom numero existentes omnium rerum principia, prout scilicet principia accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiæ et principia substanti- arum corruptibilem reducuntur in substantias incorruptibi- les, et sic quodam gradu et ordine in quaedam principia omnia entia reducuntur. Et quia id, quod est principium essendi omnibus oportet maxime ens,...ideo huiusmodi prin- cipia oportet esse completissima, et propter hoc oportet ea esse maxime actu... Et propter hoc esse absque materia... et absque motu."

3 Ibid., and In Meta., proem.
enabled him to hold that the other separate substances have, under God, a secondary causal role in respect to the material universe,\(^1\) and so to give them a legitimate place in metaphysics.\(^2\) As Aristotle says, if the divine exists anywhere, it exists especially in such immaterial and immobile natures.\(^3\) Therefore, metaphysics, which studies them, may be called divine science or theology.\(^4\)

Although theoretically whatever is both a complete being in itself and a principle of other things may be

\(^1\)In De Ver., X, 6, resp. Thomas equates the separated substances called intelligences with the angels; in XI, 3 he says it is appropriate for men to be taught by angels and explains the manner of such teaching. On the overall causal role of the angels with respect to the material universe cf. ST I, qqs. 110-13.

\(^2\)In Boeth de Trin., V, 4, ad 3: "Scientia divina, quae est per inspirationem divinam accipita, non est de angelis sicut de subiecto, sed solum sicut de his, quae assumuntur ad manifestationem subjecti. Sic enim in sacra scriptura agitur de angelis sicut et de ceteris creaturis. Sed in scientia divina, quam philosophi tradunt, consideratur de angelis, quas intelligentias vocant, eadem ratione qua et de prima causa, quae deus est, in quantum ipsi etiam sunt rerum principia secunda, saltem per motum orbium, quibus quidem nullus motus physicus accidere potest."

\(^3\)Ibid., resp.: "Et huiusmodi sunt res divinae, 'quia si divinum alicubi existit, in tali natura,' immateriali scilicet et immobili, maxime 'existit,' ut dicetur in VI Metaphysicae." Thomas, of course, does not mean to put the angels on the same level as God: they remain created spirits. But he does, here and elsewhere, follow Aristotle's usage, in which "divine" was a generic term for any immaterial substance considered a cause of motion although itself unmoved. Cf. ibid., ad 3 above and Maurer, p. 40, n. 19.

\(^4\)In Meta., prooem.
studied in both ways, the separated substances may not be studied as the subject of any purely human science, because even though they are most knowable in themselves, they are not so to us. Inasmuch as they are wholly immaterial, they cannot be perceived by our sense powers, but are discovered through studying their effects. Moreover, these effects are not ontologically equal to them; therefore, we cannot come to know what they are in themselves even indirectly. Thus metaphysics, which studies them insofar as they are principles common to all beings, is the only human science which studies them; accordingly, it is the ultimate human science. Metaphysics, like any other science, must inquire about the properties and causes of its subject. Consequently, the goal of metaphysical resolution is the separate substances and it alone of the sciences makes its evaluations by reference to what is truly and absolutely ultimate. Since any final evaluation of whatever is known

1In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.
2SCG III, 41, #10.
3In I Meta., #46.
4In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.
5Ibid., I, 2, resp.; and VI, 4, ad 2.
6In Meta., prooem.
7Ibid.; and In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.
in any science can only be made by reference to what is truly ultimate, it is in metaphysical resolution that the inquiries of all the other sciences receive their final human answer.\(^1\) By correlating the insights and conclusions of the particular sciences, metaphysics reveals to and reproduces in knowledge the unity and harmony of reality. In this, metaphysics resembles understanding more than the other sciences: the latter consider many things in reasoning to one simple truth, whereas understanding, in contemplating one simple truth, comprehends a multitude of things. Compared to the unity of vision proper to understanding, reasoning is a sort of multiplicity,\(^2\) and compared to the unity of vision which metaphysical resolution achieves, the resolutions of the particular sciences are partial and multiple.\(^3\)

\(^1\)In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: "Tota autem consideratio rationis resolventis in omnibus scientiis ad considerationem divinae scientiae terminatur... Unde patet quod sua consideratio est maxima intellectualis." Cf. In II Meta., 1, #273; Bernard Muller-Thym, "St. Thomas and the Recapturing of Natural Wisdom," Modern Schoolman XVIII (Nov., 1941) p. 68; amd O'Brien, p. 8.

\(^2\)In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: "...intellectualiter procedere attribuitur divinae scientiae, eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modus intellectus. Differt autem ratio ab intellectu, sicut multitudo ab unitate... Est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere. ...Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatem considerat et in illa totius multitudinis cognitionem capit,..."

\(^3\)Cf. ST I, 11, 3, resp.
Nevertheless, metaphysics is distinct from the understanding of principles as the term of an action is from its beginning: the understanding of principles is the initial stage of human intellectual activity,\(^1\) whereas metaphysics, since it is concerned with what is final and ultimate with respect to human knowing, is the latter's culmination. Therefore, metaphysics has another name, which takes account of its special status. What Aristotle called sophia, Thomas called sapientia--wisdom.\(^2\) Like understanding it speaks truly of principles; like science, it knows what can be deduced from those principles, and judges its conclusions by reference to them,\(^3\) but it goes further than either science or understanding insofar as it can explain

\(^1\)Cf. SCG III, 37, #8.

\(^2\)In I Meta., 1, #34: "Scientia vero est conclusionibus ex causis inferioribus. Sapientia vero considerat causas primas unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum." Cf. ibid., 2, #51.

\(^3\)The first principle to which metaphysics reduces its scientific conclusions is the principle of causality, though Thomas nowhere treats of this explicitly as a first principle. The certitude of this principle, like the others, is the result of a reflexive intuition. Cf. J. Defever, S. J. La Preuve Réelle de Dieu (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953) p. 33.
and defend the very principles of demonstration themselves.\(^1\)

Thus both science and understanding are dependent upon wisdom,\(^2\) whose proper and unique function is to judge,\(^3\) examining what has been discovered in the light of what is certain.\(^4\) Although he who knows the cause which is highest in any particular order may be called wise in a qualified sense, only he who knows the cause which is absolutely the

---

\(^1\) In VI Eth., V, #1182: "Oportet quod sapiens non solum sciat ea quae ex principiis demonstrationem conclu-
duntur circa ea de quibus considerat: sed etiam quod dicat
circa ipsa principia prima: non quidem quod demonstrat ea:
sed inquantum ad sapientes pertinet notificare communia,...
quibus cognitis principia demonstrationum innotescunt. Unde
et ad hujusmodi sapientem pertinet disputare contra negantes
principia..." Ibid., #1183: "Sapientia, inquantum dicit
verum circa principia, est intellectus; inquantum autem scit
ea quae ex principiis concluduntur, est scientia. Distin-
guitur tamen a scientia communiter sumpta propter eminen-
tiam quam habet inter alias scientias: est enim virtus quae-
dam omnium scientiarum." Cf. ST I-II, 57, 2, ad 1.

\(^2\) S. T. I-II, 57, 2, ad 2: "Et utrumque [scientia
et intellectus] dependet a sapientia sicut a principalis-
simo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientias, ut
de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis

\(^3\) Wisdom is the virtue of right judgment because it
has to do with knowledge of the real as real, and it is
in judgment that we know reality. Cf. Lonergan, p. 66; ST
I, 1, 6, resp.; ibid., II-II, 45, 1, resp; ibid., II-II,
45, 2, and 5.

\(^4\) S. T. I, 79, 10, ad 3: "Dum vero is quod est
excogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel
sapere; quod est phronesis vel sapientia; nam 'sapien-
tiae est iudicare'". Cf. In VI Eth., V, #1180; In Meta., prooem.
highest is said to be completely wise. As the wise man is fitted to rule and direct those less wise than himself, so wisdom is fitted to rule and direct the other sciences: it takes account of the subjects of the other sciences on a more basic level than they do, that of their being, and knows the latter as an effect of the highest cause, which is God. Because it carries its resolutions to this First Cause, ultimate with respect to all human knowing (as it is ultimate with respect to all beings), wisdom's judgment is perfect and universal. Thus it is appropriate for it to

1S. T. II-II, 45, 1, resp.: "...ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam certissime de aliis indicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari oportet. Causa autem altissima dupliciter accipi potest: vel simpliciter, vel in aliquo genere. Ille ergo qui cognoscit causam altissimam in aliquo genere et per eam potest de omnibus quae sunt illius generis iudicare et ordinare, dicitur esse sapiens in illo genere,... Ille autem qui cognoscit causam altissimam simpliciter,...dicitur sapiens simpliciter."

2In Meta., prooem.

3S. T. I-II, 66, 5, ad 4: "Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam: quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei."
judge the other sciences and set them in order;¹ in the unity of wisdom all lower sciences find their integration and final justification.² As the supreme achievement of the human intellect by which it reaches God,³ wisdom is the noblest science and the last to be learned.⁴ Having attained a unified vision of all things as dependent upon

¹Ibid., 57, 2, resp.: "Id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa huiusmodi est 'sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas:...' Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universaliter haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas." Cf. In VI Eth., V, #1177 and 1181.

²In III Sent., d,35, q.2, a.1, sol.2, #117: "Ad sapientem pertinet judicare et ordinare. Judicium autem de aliqibus fieri non potest nisi per ea quae sunt lex et regula eorum. Semper autem oportet quod superiora judicare unde quamvis intentio quandoque ab infirmis incipiat et ad suprema tendat, tamen judicium numquam perficitur nisi per superiora in quibus inferiora resolvuntur. Et ideo oportet sapientem de altissimis cognitorem esse."


⁴In I Meta., II, #46: "...et ideo ista scientia, quae sapientia dicitur, quamvis sit prima in dignitate, est tamen ultima in addiscendo."
God,\(^1\) human reason rests in contemplation: \(^2\) this vision is the human analogue of the intuitive understanding proper to pure spirits, \(^3\) and the highest wisdom man's unaided reason can reach.

The method proper to this wisdom is reflective; only by reflection do we discover the proper object of wisdom and its extrinsic cause. Thus it makes use of two sorts of resolution: a **resolutio secundum rationem**, which proceeds in terms of the intrinsic causes of things, from the particular to the universal, even to the most universal, *ens*, which is common to all that is; and secondly, a

---

\(^1\)In **III Sent.**, d.35, q.2, a.1, sol. 1, \#114: "Quia quodammodo [sapientia quae est virtus intellectualis] comprehendit ipsum [intellectum principiorum], ut dicitur in VI Eth., secundum quod ex principiis negotiatur circa altissima et difficillisma et de his etiam quodammodo ordinat, inquantum reducit omnia ad unum principium,..."  

\(^2\)In **II Sent.**, d.41, q.1, a.1, sol.: "Habitum sapientiae cujus actus est felicitas contemplativa." In **IV Sent.**, d.15, q.4, a.1, q.1, a.2, ad 1: "Contemplatio aliquando sumitur stricte pro actu intellectus divina meditantis. Et sic contemplatio est sapientiae actus." Conley, p. 38, n. 49.  

\(^3\)SCG **III**, 91, \#5: "Angelorum autem cognitione est uniformis, quia ab ipso uno veritatis fonte, scilicet Deo, accipient veritatis cognitionem; est etiam immobilis, quia non discurrendo ab effectibus in causas aut e converso, sed simplici intuitu, puram veritatem de rebus intuentur." In **Boeth. de Trin.**, VI, 1, 3, resp.: "Unde Dionysius dicit \(^7\)c. De divinis nomen. quod animae secundum hoc habent rationem et quod diffusive circuerunt existentium veritatem, et in hoc deficiunt ab angelis; sed in quantum convolvunt multa ad unum, quodam modo angelis aequantur."
resolutio secundum rem, which begins with sensible composites to seek their simple extrinsic cause, which is God.¹ In addition to these, just like any other human science, it evaluates its conclusions through resolution to principles. The last of these is a reflexion in which the mind considers the logical and psychological factors which cause knowing, whereas the first and second are reflexions on the ontological factors which cause the being which is known.

¹Rabeau, pp. 174-75.
VI

SUPERNATURAL WISDOM AND THE RETURN TO GOD

Metaphysical wisdom, however, remains incomplete: although the question regarding common being is answered once it is seen to be dependent upon the causal action of God,\(^1\) nevertheless the God whose existence it has discovered remains hidden from it.\(^2\) Though known in his effects, he is unknown in himself.\(^3\) For Aristotle the ultimate goal of

\(^1\) How the demonstration of the existence of God comes into metaphysics has been long and vigorously debated by Thomists both before and subsequent to O'Brien's study. The list of relevant articles is too extensive to cite here and a careful consideration of all the arguments would constitute a dissertation in itself. Moreover, whether a scientific grasp of the real distinction is possible prior to demonstrating the existence of a first cause, as O'Brien seems to maintain, or only subsequent to it, as Owens asserts ("Analytics...", pp. 96-101; "Intelligibility...", p. 192), there appear to be a general agreement that the demonstration deepens our understanding of the being of creatures; hence it cannot be omitted as irrelevant to metaphysics. Our purpose here does not require that we pursue the question further.

\(^2\) In Boeth. de Trin., I, 2, ad 1: "Dicimur in fine nostrae cognitionis deum tamquam ignotum cognoscere, quia tunc maxime mens in cognitione profecisse inventur, quando cognoscit eius essentiam esse supra quae deprehendere potest in statu viae, et sic quamvis maneat ignotum quid est, scitur tamen quia est." Cf. De Pot., 7, 5, ad 14; In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; De Ver., II, 1, ad 9; De Div. Nom., 7, 4, #731; SCG I, 30; III, 39 and 49. Cf. Conley, p. 57, n. 100.

\(^3\) In Boeth. de Trin., I, 2, resp.: "Quia igitur intellectus noster secundum statum viae habet determinatum habitudinem ad formas, quae a sensu abstrahuntur, ... non potest ipsum deum cognoscere in hoc statu per formam quae est essentia sua, ... Unde relinquitur quod solummodo per effectus formam cognoscatur... Et sic se habet cognitione effectus ut principium ad cognoscendum de causa an est,...
metaphysical wisdom was an unmoved cause of motion, a
thought-thinking-itself, forever locked in the isolation of its self-reflection, incapable of relating itself to other things or even of perceiving their relationship to it. The most the attainment of such a goal could offer the metaphysician was a sort of intellectual satisfaction in discovering the source of the motion of other things, and in achieving his own ultimate fulfillment by contemplating this source, thus imitating the Unmoved Mover insofar as he could. But for Thomas the goal of metaphysical wisdom is an uncaused cause of being; hence in his self-reflection his creatures are comprehended, since he knows the things to which his power extends. Moreover, his creative activity is free rather than necessitated; therefore his motive in creating must be love. Thomas' God is not merely passively attractive to those beings of which he is the final cause (as is Aristotle's Unmoved Mover): he is actively attracting them to himself.\(^1\) Therefore, there is not only the possi-

---

Hoc autem modo se habet omnis effectus ad deum. Et ideo non possimus in statu viae pertingere ad cognoscendum de ipso nisi quia est." Ibid., V, 4, resp.

\(^1\)In Dion. de Div. Nom., I, L. 2, #48: "Primum in purgatione voluntatis est quod voluntas ad bonum incommutabile reducantur; et quantum ad hoc dicit quod Divinitas est revocatio et resurrectione decidentium ab Ipsi, scilicet per peccatum. Et ponit revocationem et resurrectionem, quia non solum attrahit nos, quod est revocare sed etiam dat vires ut revocati surgamus."
bility of a conscious relationship between God and the metaphysician, there is an invitation to it, and even the offering of assistance, through revelation and grace, in accepting the invitation. Hence, for Thomas it is possible to love, not merely the contemplation of God, but God himself.\(^1\) God is no longer simply the highest truth to be known; he is the supreme good to be loved.\(^2\)

Human wisdom can attain God as the supreme object of love: by way of resolution we are able to reason from secondary causes to the first cause so as to seek God

---

\(^1\)S. T. II-II, 180, 7, resp.: "Aliqua contemplatio potest esse delectabilis dupliciter. Uno modo, ratione ipsius operationis, quia unicum delectabilis est operatio sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum. Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale. Ex quo contingit quod omnes hominines natura scire desiderant: et per consequens in cognitione veritatis delectantur. Et adhuc magis fit hoc delectabile habenti habitum sapientiae et scientiae, ex quo accidit quod sine difficultate aliquis contemplatur. Alio modo contemplatio redditur delectabilis ex parte objecti, inquantum scilicet aliquis rem amatam contemplatur; sicut etiam accidit in visione corporali quae delectabilis redditur non solum ex eo quod ipsum videre est delectabile, sed etiam ex eo quod videt quis personam amatam. Quia ergo vita contemplativa praeceptum consistit in contemplatione Dei, ad quam movet caritas, ... inde est quod in vita contemplativa non solum est delectatio ratione ipsius contemplationis, sed etiam ratione ipsius divini amoris." Cf. Conley, p. 45.

\(^2\)Ibid., ad 1: "Ultima perfectio contemplativae vitae: ut scilicet non solum divina veritas videatur sed etiam ut amatur." Cf. Conley, p. 44.
explicitly. But we cannot by human wisdom behold God directly; as we have seen, there cannot be a human science of the separate substances. The joy of metaphysical contemplation is not yet full beatitude, for it attains God only indirectly, through his effects; thus our human intellect falls short of the fuller vision for which it

1De Ver., XXII, 2, resp.: "Virtus primae causae est in secunda, ut principia in conclusionibus; resolvere autem conclusiones in principia, vel secundas causas in primas, est tantum virtutis rationalis. Unde sola rationalis natura potest secundarios fines in ipsum Deum per quamdam viam resolutionis inducere, ut sic ipsum Deum explicite appetat. Et sic in demonstrativis scientiis non recte sumitur conclusio nisi per resolutionem in prima principia, ita appetitus creaturae rationalis non est reditus nisi per appetitum explicitum ipsius Dei,..."

2De Virtutibus in communi, 1, 12, ad 11, Quaestiones Disputatae (Romae: Marietti, 1927) vol. II: "Sapientia qua nunc contemplamur Deum non immediate respicit ipsum Deum, sed effectus quibus ipsum in praesenti contemplamur." Cf. Conley, p. 57, n. 98.

3Cf. above, pp. 144-45.

4SCG III, 39, #1: "...per affirmationes propria cognitione de re habita, scitur quid est res et quomodo ab aliis separatur; per negationes autem habita propria cognitione de re, scitur quod est ab aliis discreta, tamen quid sit remanet ignotum. Talis autem est propria cognitione quae de Deo habetur per demonstrationes. Non est autem nec ista ad ultimam hominis felicitatem sufficiens."
That is why metaphysical wisdom can be no more than a sort of foretaste of a longed-for, but as yet unattained happiness. For Aristotle, such happiness was unattainable to man, but Thomas knows man's longing for more need not be permanently frustrated. There is, above metaphysical wisdom,
wisdom, another way of knowing divine things as such,\(^1\) which is conferred as a gift through faith.\(^2\) As Thomas sees it, the longing to know God perfectly has been divinely implanted in man by his Creator, who destined him for the fulfillment of this longing as his final perfection.\(^3\) Man cannot reach this unless God undertakes to teach him:\(^4\) we

\(^1\) In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.: "Est autem alius modus cognoscendi huiusmodi res, non secundum quod per effectus manifestantur, sed secundum quod ipsae se ipsas manifestant... Et per hunc modum tractantur res divinae, secundum quod in se ipsis subsistunt et non solum prout sunt rerum principia."

\(^2\) Ibid., II, 2, resp.: "...de divinis duplex scientia habetur. Una secundum modum nostrum,... et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes. Alia secundum modum ipsorum divinoram, ut ipsa divina secundum se capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam."

\(^3\) SCG IV, 54, 4: "Quia beatitudo perfecta hominis in tali cognitio Dei consistit quae facultatem omnis intellectus creati excedit, necessarium fuit quamdam hujusmodi cognitionis praelibationem in homine esse, qua dirigetur in illam plentitudinem cognitionis beatae; quod fit per fidem,..."

\(^4\) De Ver., XIV, 10, resp.: "Ultima autem perfectio ad quam homo ordinatur, consistit in perfecta Dei cognitione: ad quam quidem pervenire non potest nisi operatione et instructione Dei, qui est sui perfectus cognitor." Cf. SCG IV, 54, #4.
have God's self-revelation in sacred scripture and all that is left for man to do is to receive and accept this teaching through believing in it. Some of the things we at first believe, we may later come to understand fully, because they are not beyond the grasp of reason, although not everyone has the time and opportunity to develop his reasoning power sufficiently for this. Others, however, we cannot acquire by believing in them, and even when known by faith, they cannot be understood in this life, since for this our human knowing powers are inadequate. Faith, then, is a kind of knowing, for by it the intellect is determined to a knowable object, although in this case the determination comes not from what is seen by the believer, but rather from what is seen by the one in whom the believer

---

1In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.: "Theologia sive scientia divina est duplæX: Una, est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quae alio homine metaphysica dicitur. Alio vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subjectum scientiae, et haec est theologia, quae in sacra scriptura traditur."

2De Ver., XIV, 10, resp.: "Perfectae autem cognitionis statim homo in sui principio capax non est; unde oportet quod accipiatur per viam credidendi aliqua, per quae manducatur ad perveniendum in perfectam cognitionem."

3De Ver., XIV, 10, resp..

4Ibid.: "Quorum quaedam talia sunt, quod in hac vita de eis perfecta cognitione haberi non potest, quae tota vestor vim humanae rationis excedunt: et ista oportet credere quamdiu in statu viæ sumus."
believes.\textsuperscript{1} Far from being the refuge of a man of lazy or careless intellect, such faith is the act of a man of developed intellect, for only such a man is able to clearly recognize the limits of his understanding and to humbly accept as a gift that which exceeds the reach of his intellect, since his love for the truth is greater than his love for his own intellectual ability.\textsuperscript{2}

Because it determines the intellect to a knowable object, faith is a virtue of the speculative intellect:\textsuperscript{3} Thomas defines it as the habit of mind which causes the intellect to assent to what is not apparent.\textsuperscript{4} However, unlike the natural speculative virtues of understanding,
science and wisdom, which are acquired, faith is infused: it is a sort of light superadded to the natural light of reason enabling us to know what exceeds the capacity of our natural light. Our assent to the truths of faith cannot be caused by the light of evidence, for they are neither themselves evident to us nor capable of being made so through resolution to self-evident first principles. It is caused by the will, which moves the intellect to believe in obedience to God. The intellect's assent is not given thoughtlessly: nevertheless the intellect cannot by any effort of deliberation succeed in resolving the truths of faith to self-evident first principles, so as to see the

1 In Boeth. de Trin., III, 1, ad 4: "In fide qua in deum credimus non solum est acceptio rerum quibus assentimus sed aliquid quod inclinat ad assensum; et hoc est lumen quoddam, quod est habitus fidei, divinitus menti humanae infusam... sicut cognitio principiorum accipitur a sensu et tamen lumen quo principia cognoscuntur est innatum, ita 'fides' est 'ex auditu' et tamen habitus fidei est infusus."

2 S. T. II-II, 8, 1, resp.: "Lumen autem naturale nostri intellectus est finitae virtutis;... Indiget ergo homo supernaturali lumine ut ulteriori penetret ad cognoscendum quae per lumen naturale cognoscere non valet." De Anima, V, ad 6: "...supra huiusmodi lumen naturali addit,...copiosus lumen,...sic est lumen fidei."

3 S. T. II-II, 5, 2, resp.: "Intellectus credentis assentit rei creditae non quia ipsam videat vel secundum se vel per resolutionem ad prima principia per se visa, sed quia convincitur per auctoritatam divinam assentire his quae non videt et propter imperium voluntatis moventis intellectus et obedientis Deo." Cf. In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol, 1, #140.
former as implied in the latter. On the other hand, even though there is no resolution to first principles in the order of knowledge, there is resolution to the first principle in the order of being—to God himself, the first cause and final end of all that is. Hence, while the certitude of faith is not based on assent to that which is evident to us, but rather on the firmness of our adherence to what is believed, yet the source of this adherence is

1 In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 1, #143: "Credens autem habet assensum simul et cogitationem quia intellectus ad principia per se nota non perducitur." In Boeth. de Trin., II, 1, ad 5: "Ratio autem persuasoria aumpta ex aliquibus similitudinibus ad ea quae sunt fidei inducta non evacuat fidei rationem; quia non facit ea esse apparentia, cum non fiat resolutio in prima principia quae quae intellectu videntur."

2 SCG IV, 54, 4: "Cogitationem autem qua homo in ultimum finem dirigitur, oportet esse certissimam, eo quod est principium omnium quae ordinantur in ordinem finem; scilicet et principia naturaliter nota certissima sunt. Certissima autem cognitio aliquiiss esse non potest nisi vel illud sit per se notum, sicut nobis prima demonstrationis principia; vel in ea quae per se nota sunt resolvantur, qualiter nobis certissima est demonstrationis conclusio... Et quamvis omnibus divinam essentiam videntibus sit quod-dammodo per se notum, tamen ad certissimam cognitionem habendam oportet reductionem fieri in primum huius cognitionem principium, scilicet in Deum, cui est naturaliter per se notum, et a quo omnibus innotescit: sicut et certitudo scientiae non habetur nisi per resolutionem in prima principia indemonstrabilia."

3 De Ver., XIV, 1, ad 7: "Certitudo duo potest importare: scilicet firmitatem adhaesionis; et quantum ad hoc fides est certior omni intellectu et scientia... Importare etiam evidentiam eius cui assentitur; et sic fides non habet certitudinem, sed scientia et intellectus."
God, the first truth himself; therefore the adherence of faith is even firmer than that of the understanding of principles, or of the science of conclusions resolved to first principles, and faith has the greater certitude.\(^1\)

The light of faith is adequate for judging and cannot be false since it is a sort of imprint of the first truth in our minds, and God neither deceives nor is deceived.\(^2\)

Accordingly, there can even be scientific reasoning about divine things: what is believed may serve as a sort of principle from which further conclusions may be drawn.\(^3\) This scientific knowledge of divine things Thomas

\(^1\)In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 3, #157: "In his ergo quae per fidem credimus, ratio voluntatem inclinans, ut dictum est, est ipsa veritas prima sive Deus cui creditur, quae habet majorem firmitatem quam lumen intellectus humani in quo conspiciuntur principia, vel ratio humana secundum quam conclusiones in principia resolvuntur. Et ideo fides habet majorem certitudinem quantum ad firmitatem adhaesionis, quam sit certitudo scientiae vel intellectus, quamvis in scientia et intellectu sit major evidentia eorum quibus assentitur." Cf. Tyrrell, p. 39: "Throughout his treatment of faith, Cajetan, like St. Thomas, seems to regard the assent of belief and the assent of first principles and demonstration, not as entirely different types of acts, but rather as diverse examples of the same general type of act. They differ rather in the extrinsic factor that brings them into operation than in their nature."

\(^2\)In Boeth. de Trin., III, 1, ad 4.

\(^3\)Ibid., II, 2, resp.: "Et sicut deus ex hoc, quod cognoscit se, cognoscit alia modo suo, is est simplici intuitu, non discurrendo, ita nos ex his, quae per fidem capimus primae veritati adhaerendo, venimus in cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones, ut sic ipsa, quae fide tenemus, sint nobis quasi principia in hoc scientia et alia sint quasi conclusiones."
usually calls *sacra doctrina*,\(^1\) rather than *theology* as we do today though he does use the latter occasionally.\(^2\) The principles from which theology is derived are not known to us by the light of our natural understanding, but are known to God and the blessed by the light of their superior knowledge;\(^3\) likewise, its resolutions are to the principles of this superior knowledge.\(^4\) Thus *sacra doctrina* is superior to the science of divine things handed down by the philosophers;\(^5\) but because it cannot be reduced to naturally known principles, as can the conclusions of philosophical or natural theology, revealed theology is called science in an

\(^{1}\) Cf. *ST* I, 1, 2, resp. below; above p. 162, n. 2; cf. also Maurer, p. 41, n. 23.


\(^{3}\) St. T. I, 2, resp.: "Sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed scieendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus,... Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae,... Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superiori scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum."

\(^{4}\) Ibid., ad 1: "Principia cuiuslibet scientia vel sunt nota per se, vel reducuntur ad notitiam superioris scientiae. Et tali sunt principia sacrae doctrinae."

\(^{5}\) In *Boeth. de Trin.* II, 2, resp.: "Ex quo patet quod haec scientia est altior illa scientia divina, quam philosophi tradiderunt, cum ex altioribus procedat principiis."
analogous sense.\textsuperscript{1} Whereas natural theology or wisdom is rooted in first principles, revealed theology or supernatural wisdom is rooted in faith; guided by faith, the human intellect orders the data of revelation and passes judgment on all other sciences, including, of course, metaphysical wisdom.\textsuperscript{2}

The habit of faith guides the intellect, but does not coerce it: the intellect's assent is necessitated only by apprehending the evident truth, and faith does not make the intellect able to see what it believes. Faith makes the intellect capable of assenting freely, that is, of assenting when it is not forced to do so.\textsuperscript{3} However, to be capable of assenting is not the actual assenting: the cause of the latter is the will which, as we have seen, commands it in obedience to God.\textsuperscript{4} But this requires that the will, too, be given supernatural virtues to direct it to actively seek a supernatural end: the infused virtues of hope and charity perfect man's will as faith his intellect. These three are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}In III Sent., d.33, q.1, a.2, sol. 4: "Si autem esset aliquae scientiae quae non posset reduci ad principia naturaliter cognita, non esset ejusdem speciei cum aliis scientiis, nec univoce scientia diceretur."
\item \textsuperscript{2}S. T. I, 6, and 8. Cf. Lonergan, p. 91.
\item \textsuperscript{3}In Boeth. de Trin., II, 1, ad 4: "Habitus fidei ...non facit videre illa quae creduntur nec cogit assensum, sed facit voluntarie assentire."
\item \textsuperscript{4}Cf. above p. 156, n. 1.
\end{itemize}
called theological virtues because their proper function is to direct man to union with God.¹ But the seeking of this union depends, not only on knowing God as revealed to the believer, but on right judgment regarding all one's actions and manner of life, and this is needed by every Christian, even those least fitted by nature and opportunity to be theologians. Therefore, to enable man to so order his life that it is in harmony with the Father's will, he stands in need of a wisdom not dependent upon intellectual acumen and the opportunity for theological study and reflection: there is such a wisdom, which is the gift of the Holy Spirit. It enables one to judge, not by any process of reasoning, but directly, by inclination.² The wisdom which develops the implications of faith, as metaphysical wisdom develops what

¹S. T. I-II, 62, 3, resp.

²S. T. I, 1, 6, ad 3: "Cum iudicium ad sapientem pertineat, secundum duplicem modum iudicandi, dupliciter sapientia accipitur. Contingit enim aliquem iudicare uno modo per modum inclinationis, sicut qui habet habitum virtutis, recte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem agenda, inquantum ad illa inclination unde et in X Eth. dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula actuum humanorum. Alio modo per modum cognitionis, sicut aliquis instrucus in scientia morali posset iudicare de actibus virtutis, etiam si virtutem non haberet. Primus igitur modus iudicandi de rebus divinis pertinet ad sapientiam quae ponitur donum Spiritus Sancti,...Secundus autem modus iudicandi pertinet ad hanc doctrinam, secundum quod per studium habetur, licet euis principia ex revelatione habeantur." Ibid., II-II, 45, 2, resp.; Cf. Lonergan, p. 91.
is implicit in directly known principles, is not primarily theological wisdom--a way of thinking about God--but the gift of wisdom--a way of acting in union with God. Such wisdom is a gift of grace which does not proceed at all from our natural light, but is added to it as perfective of it, making it docile to the guidance of the Holy Spirit in knowing both human and divine things.

Thus even while we are living in this state of nature, we already are beginning through faith to live a higher eternal life: this will reach its full development when we come at last to our true home with our Father. What

---

1In III Sent., d.35, q.2, a.1, sol. 1, #114: "Sicut se habet sapientia quae est virtus intellectualis ad intellectum principiorum...ita se habet sapientia quae est donum, ad fidem quae est cognition simplex articulorum, quae sunt principia totius christianae sapientiae."

2S. T. II-II, 45, 3, ad 1: "Sapientia quae est donum est excellentior quam sapientia quae est virtus intellectualis, utpote magis de propinquo Deum attingens, per quandam scilicet unionem animae ad ipsum, habet quod non solum dirigat in contemplatione, sed etiam in actione."

3Ibid., 8, 1, ad 2: "Donum autem gratiae non procedit ex lumine naturae, sed superadditur ei, quasi perficiens ipsum." Ibid., I-II, 68, 5, ad 1: "Alicio modo possunt accipi prout sunt dona Spiritus Sancti. Et sic sapientia et scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam perfectiones humanae mentis, secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctum Spiritus Sancti in cognitione divinorum vel humanorum."
we now believe, we shall then understand perfectly.¹

"Though our intellects, because potential, cannot attain naturally to the vision of God, still our intellects as intellects have a dynamic orientation, a natural desire, that nothing short of that unknown vision can satisfy utterly... our minds are restless until they rest in seeing Him."²

Nothing less than this is promised us.³ Yet that wisdom which is the gift of the Holy Spirit enlightens the believer already in this life insofar as he is joined to God in love:⁴ by it the human mind is assisted so as to be raised above itself in contemplating God as being beyond everything

¹SCG, IV, 54, #4: "Adhuc, quia beatitudo perfecta hominis in tali cognitione Dei consistit quae facultatem omnis intellectus creati excedit,... necessarium fuit quamdam hujusmodi cognitionis praelibationem in homine esse, qua dirigeretur in illam plenitudinem cognitionis beatae; quod quidem fit per fidem." ST II-II, 4, 1, resp.: "Fides est habitus mentis qua incohatur vita aeterna in nobis." De Ver. XIV, 10, resp.: "Ista oportet credere quamdiu in statu viae sumus; videbimus autem ea perfecte in statu patriae."

²Lonergan, pp. 89-90.

³In Boeth. de Trin., I, 2, resp.: "...non potest ipsum deum cognoscere in hoc statu per formam quae est essentia sua, sed sic cognoscetur in patria a beatis."

⁴S. T. II-II, 45, 2, resp.: "Huiusmodi autem compassio sive connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem quae quidem unit nos a Deo."
it understands naturally. And though such knowledge is non-scientific and non-conceptual, it is nevertheless real knowledge. "When things divine are intimately joined to us through the love of charity, it is proper to the gift of wisdom to make use of that love, that infused charity, in order to make it pass, under the special inspiration of the Holy Ghost, to the status of an objective medium of knowledge." Though our understanding does not yet behold God...

---

1In Boeth. de Trin., I, 2, resp.: "In hoc autem profectu cognitionis maxime iuvatur mens humana, cum lumen eius naturale nova illustratricibus confortatur; sicut est lumen fidei et doni sapientiae et intellectus, per quod mens in contemplatione supra se elevari dicitur, in quantum cognoscit deum esse supra omne id quod naturaliter comprehendit. Sed quia ad eius essentiam videndam penetrare non sufficit, dicitur in se ipsam quodammodo ab excellenti lumine reflecti..."

2Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959) on p. 261 develops knowledge by connaturality much further than Thomas himself did, with the help of John of St. Thomas; on p. 262 he quotes from the latter's Cursus Theologiae I-II, q. 68-70, disp. 18, a. 4, n. 14: "In its darkness faith attains God yet as He remains at a distance, inasmuch as faith is of things not seen. But charity attains God in Himself immediately, intimately uniting us to that which is hidden in faith. And so, even though faith rules love and the union with God, inasmuch as it is faith that proposes their object, yet, in virtue of this union in which love clings to God immediately, the intellect is, through a certain affective experience, so elevated as to judge of divine things in a way higher than the darkness of faith would permit. This is so because the intellect penetrates, and knows that more lies hidden in things of faith than faith itself reveals, ever finding there more to love and taste of in love. From this more, which love makes the intellect feel is hidden there, it judges more highly of things divine under a special instinct of the Holy Ghost." Cf. also McLaughlin, p. 342, n. 6.
as He is, yet already we love Him as He is, and we are made able to judge rightly about the things of God. "From affection for divine things comes their manifestation." Then the believer no longer merely thinks about God, but experiences Him as a presence. Thomas says far less on this point than Richard of St. Victor or John of the Cross, but what he does say is often illuminated by the descrip-

---

1S. T. I-II, 27, 2, arg. 2: "Deus qui in hac vita non potest per seipsum cognosci, potest per seipsum amari." Cf. Maritain, p. 271, n. 2.

2In Dion. de Div. Nom. II, 4, in fine: "...id est non solum divinarum scientiam in intellectu accipiens, sed etiam diligendo, eis unitus per affectum. Passio enim magis ad appetitum quam ad cognitionem pertinere videtur, quia cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis, et non secundum modum rerum cognitarum, sed appetitus movet ad res secundum modum quod in seipsis sunt, et sic per amorem ad ipsas res quodammodo immutatur. Sicut autem aliquis virtosus ex habitu virtutis quam habet in affectu perficitur ad directe judicandum de his quae ad virtutem illam pertinenc, ita quae afficitur ad divina, accipit divinitus rectum judicium de rebus divinis."


4T. Philippe, "Speculation métaphysique et contemplation chrétienne," Angelicum XIV (1937) p. 245: "Tandis que la contemplation est pour le philosophe un regard, le couronnement de toute la vie intellectuelle; elle est pour le saint l'exercice le plus parfait, le plus divin de la charité: elle n'est pas tant un regard qu'une présence. Depuis le début de l'Eglise les saints et les mystiques affirment par leurs écrits et par leur vie qu'une expérience de Dieu est possible, que Dieu veut bien s'unir à nous et nous introduire, des cette terre, dans son intimité."
tions mystical writers give of this experience.¹

What is important for us to notice is that this is no longer merely an epistemological activity but the act of one's whole being. Indeed, the fulfillment of one's being is a reductio:² the resolutive process which attains first the co-principles of essence and existence, and from these the existence of God, here ceases to be the activity of the speculative intellect alone, and involves the whole personality. "The intellectual resolutio involves a religious act which should never be hidden behind rational scaffolding."³ Resolution is "the very soul and fine art of a return to God."⁴ Although this process has been associated with neo-Platonism, it is not, as a method, tied to these systems: "it is the method of transcendental reflection-- even in a realist philosophy where an awareness of concrete things can sustain the loftiest contemplation because the transcendental is recognized in the world of

¹Cf. Lonergan, p. 92.

²S. T. I-II, lll, 1, resp.: "In hoc autem ordo rerum consistit, quod quaedam per alia in Deum reducuntur; ut Dion. dicit in De Cael. Hier. [P. G. 3, 181-c4, #3]. Cum igitur gratia ad hoc ordinetur ut homo reducantur in Deum, ordine quandam hoc agitur, ut scilicet quidam per alios in Deum reducantur." Cf. In II Sent., d.ll, q.1, a.1, ad 1.


⁴Ibid., p. 74 (French, p. 73).
becoming and time. Although it is present in Plotinus and Aristotle, it is Thomas who has made it one of the most personal parts of his methodology.¹ As an epistemological method it is proper to the supernatural wisdom of revealed theology;² as a return to God,³ it is essential for the connatural knowledge of God conferred by the gift of wisdom. It is but the following of Christ who came from the Father into the world and left the world to return to the Father,⁴ for we too have come from the Father and are destined to return to him. Everything that God has created

¹Chenu, p. 74 (French, p. 73).
²Ibid., pp. 74--75: "In any case this 'resolution' by virtue of its object and its method, cannot fail to be a prototype [procédé type] of the divinely revealed science. Theology as a science is discursive; but to a greater extent than other sciences does it yearn for understanding. Starting from faith, as from the understanding of God, it does not rest until it returns there once again, bringing with it all that it has absorbed and elaborated. This is resolutio ordered and guaranteed by that communion which faith grants to it at its setting forth and which, in the mystery, gives us 'the substance of things hoped for.' Theology, in fact, seeks the knowledge of its conclusions only that it may the better understand its own first principles." (French, p. 73).
³Geiger, La Participation, p. 355 is translated in Chenu, ibid., pp. 73-4 as follows: "This process is unusual from another aspect: it is a journey which never quite reaches its destination. It is forever having to begin again, and it is never more truly itself than when it fills us with the conviction both of its necessity and of its inevitable imperfection. It is a road whereon we set forth but which will never, this side of the grave, lead us to the resting place of fulfillment and possession."
⁴John 16:28.
pre-existed from eternity in his Word, and came forth from
Him, both in its substance and its intentional modes of be-
ing;\(^1\) it is through the Word, likewise, that each returns.

The manner of this return, however, differs: man
returns to God substantially, through God's grace, by living
according to the teaching of the Word made flesh,\(^2\) "the
power and the wisdom of God who by God's own doing has be-
come our wisdom."\(^3\) All lower forms— not only sentient

---

\(^1\) S. T. I, 56, 2, resp.: "...sicut Augustine dicit,
II Super Genesim ad Litt., ea quae in Verbo Dei ab aeterno
praeextiterunt dupliciter ab eo fluxerunt; uno modo, in in-
tellectum angelicum; alio modo ut subsisterent in propriis
naturis. In intellectum autem angelicum processerunt per
hoc quod Deus menti angelicae impressit rerum similitudines
quas in esse naturali produxit. In Verbo autem Dei ab
aeterno extiterunt non solum rationes rerum corporalium, sed
etiam rationes omnium spiritualium creaturarum. Sic igitur
unicuique spiritualium creaturarum a Verbo Dei impressae
sunt omnes rationes rerum omnium, tam corporalium quam spi-
ritualium. Ita tamen quod uniciuque angelo impressa est ra-
tio suae speciei secundum esse naturale et intellectuale
simul, ita scilicet quod in natura suae speciei subsisteret,
et per eam se intelligeret; alienum vero naturarum, tam
spiritualium quam corporalium rationes sunt ei impressae se-
cundum esse intellectuale tantum, ut videlicet per huiusmodi
species impressas, tam creaturas corporales quam spirituales
cognosceret." In Dion. de Div. Nom., II, 5: "Dicit ergo
primo, quod Deitas Jesu Christi est causa omnium, inquantum
per ipsam omnia reducuntur in esse, et est etiam adimpletiva
omnia, inquantum per ipsam omnia suis perfectionibus re-
plentur." Cf. In II Sent., d.12, q.1, a.3, ad 5.

\(^2\) SCG IV, 54.

\(^3\) In I Sent., prol.: "Inter multas sententias quae
a diversis prodierunt, quid scilicet esset vera sapientia,
unam singulariter firmam et veram Apostolus protulit dicens
Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam, qui etiam factus
est nobis sapientia a Deo." Cf. Gilson, Wisdom and Love in
St. Thomas Aquinas (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
1931) p. 52, n. 12. The scriptural quotation is from St.
beings, but even the lowliest non-living substances—return intentionally through man's knowledge; also by God's doing, since it is from Him man receives the power to understand in this fashion.\(^1\) Nevertheless, for these lower forms this manner of returning is a genuine one: their intentional existence in human knowing is actual existence, and even a more perfect mode of existence than their physical one, inasmuch as the former is immaterial, whereas the latter is material.\(^2\) And it is their return, for the intelligible species through which man knows them are not, as are those through which angels know them, infused by God in man's creation.\(^3\) Rather, man's knowledge is dependent upon the sensible things themselves: it is from them that he acquires knowledge of them, and this knowledge endures in him in an habitual state, even after death.\(^4\) Human understanding is at once the perfection of the known object, which previously was intelligible only potentially, and of the knowing subject, whose power to

---

\(^1\) S. T. I, 105, 3, ad 1 and 2.

\(^2\) De Ver., XIX, 1, resp.: "Species autem in ipsa re sensibili habet esse maxime materiale, in intellectu autem summe spiritualem..."

\(^3\) Cf. p. 190, n. 1.

\(^4\) De Ver., XIX, 1.
understand is completed only through actively understanding the object. In this actual understanding the universe achieves its perfection and attains its unification: material things are perfectly themselves only through and in the act of intelligence which confers on them that perfection to which they are destined. The human intellect, which did not create the world, is, nevertheless, through God's plan his collaborator in its completion. But it is equally true that the material world collaborates with God in the full development of the human intellect, which is perfectly itself and luminous to itself only by means of the understanding of the world which the medievals, with profound insight, called the image or mirror of the soul and God.¹

Thus the circle is closed: as God is the origin of all things, so is He their final goal. Intelligent creatures return to Him consciously, through knowledge and love, which in their highest aspirations, reach toward and prepare man for God's self-revelation in Scripture and the unification of knowledge and love in the gifts of the Holy Spirit which culminate after death in the Beatific Vision. But creatures below man, who come forth from God no less

¹André Hayen, "Intentionnalité de l'Être et métaphysique de la participation," Revue Neoscolastique de philosophie (Louvain) (1939) tome 42, p. 401.
than he, also return to God through man, whose intellectual power is activated by knowing them and in whose knowledge they exist more perfectly than in themselves. As man is redeemed through the Word made flesh, so, with man, through his knowledge of it expressed in human words, the universe is redeemed: in being brought to its final end, it is also brought back to its source.¹

¹Hayen, "Intentionnalité..." pp. 408-9.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to investigate the meaning of resolution as an intellectual method in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. We have discovered that it has for him a variety of meanings due in part to the differing ways in which it was understood by his predecessors. In the Aristotelian tradition it was primarily an epistemological technique by which the mind moved from the complex and posterior to the simple and prior; because the mind does this in several different situations, there are different types of resolution.

In simple apprehension, the mind moves from the material composite to its simple quiddity; thus abstraction is a sort of resolution. But in evaluating the concept so acquired, the mind moves from its composition or division back to the sensible thing—a movement from what is posterior in being (the intentional species) to what is prior (the sensible thing of which the species is the intelligible likeness), hence judgment through reduction to the senses is also a resolution. Furthermore, this reduction is achieved through reflexion; in order to know that its concept was apprehended through abstraction from what the senses actually perceived, the mind must "retrace its steps" or bend back upon itself, and the certitude of its knowledge.

\footnote{Cf. above, pp. 19-23.}
is assured through self-reflection, in which not only the thing present in sensation, but also the manner of its presentation, is consciously grasped.\textsuperscript{1} Thus we have the reflective reflexion described in De Veritate I, 9.\textsuperscript{2} Since the truth value of abstractive resolution is known only in reflective resolution, a "thinking back over", it is not difficult to see why resolution and reflection came to be equated. Likewise, in reasoning the mind moves (at least initially) from posterior effects to their prior causes. Even later when, in fact, the movement is from the ontological cause to the ontological effect, nevertheless, the conclusion of the reasoning process is judged by resolution to principles which are the epistemological causes, whereas the conclusion is the epistemological effect. Here again we see a reflective resolution from posterior effect to prior cause.

In the Neo-platonic tradition, however, the three couplets, posterior/prior, composite/simple, and effect/cause, had chiefly ontological connotations, though epistemological connotations were also present. What was primary was not reflection-- a thinking back over-- but

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{1}De Pot., VII, 9, resp.: "...reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit."

\textsuperscript{2}Cf. above, pp. 70-78.
\end{quote}
return—a going back. When man was considered to be really a spirit trapped in alien matter, the method of returning was indeed self-reflection, so that reflection and return were equivalent terms. But this view cannot readily be reconciled with the Christian faith, for which man is both spirit and matter. To man so understood, the material world is no alien prison but the place suitable to his development created for him by God.¹ On the other hand, the Christian longs no less than the Neo-platonist to return to the source of his being; the Neo-platonic way will not serve his need, but the way that does serve

¹Conrad Pepler, O. P. in The Basis of the Mysticism of St. Thomas (The Aquinas Society of London, Aquinas Paper No. 21: Blackfriar's Publications, 1953) p. 17 cites the French biblical scholar Claude Tresmontant as follows: "From the Platonic point of view contemplation and love consist in a man's elevating himself, leaving the sensible and reaching out to the archetype of which the sensible creature is the image. In the biblical tradition contemplation is also an ascent from the sensible creature which is a word. But the difference between the two contemplations comes from the different approach to the sensible creation. Plato and Plotinus had to 'run away.' On the contrary, biblical contemplation assumes the sensible and the particular. It progresses by passing through them..." (Essai sur la Pensée Hebraïque, Paris: Editions du Cerf, Lection Divina 12 p. 66)
will quite naturally be correlated with reflective resolution.\(^1\) What seems to us unique in Thomas is the way in which he integrated these different traditions in his own thought, and guided by his lived experience as a Christian, worked out their mutual implications.\(^2\)

As a discursive activity resolution is contrary to demonstration which "unfolds from within a deduction wherein a predicate is drawn by way of analysis from a containing subject, since that predicate is part of the

\(^1\)In God and the Unconscious (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953), p. 104, Victor White, O. F. comments: "The Absolute Good of Plato was indeed humanly impracticable and unattainable. But now the Christian Revelation showed that in a sense Plato had been fundamentally right, even if for the wrong reasons. For the Absolute Good is no impersonal Idea, no mere principle of intelligibility or ultimate aim of movement and desire (as for Greek speculation generally) but the living God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ.

"So the Summa of St. Thomas begins by affirming what at the beginning of his Ethics Aristotle had been forced to deny: the attainability of man's true and last end and bliss and completion." And Chenu, in his Introduction, explains how the Aristotelian St. Thomas adopted the Neoplatonic resolutio, pp. 160-69 (English, pp. 188-98).

\(^2\)Pepler, p. 14: "[St. Thomas] transformed the platonic ideas and incorporated them in his immense and noble synthesis, and it would be foolish to deny that the platonic tradition made its own vital contribution to his thought. But Dr. Jaeger has argued that Aristotle perfected and completed rather than contradicted the platonic intuitions; and if we followed this line of thought it might be shown that St. Thomas developed what Aristotle had begun in bringing down the ideal and the abstract into the concrete, and that he was guided thereto by living the life of the Word Incarnate."
Resolution moves in the opposite direction: it starts from the contents of a subject and works backward to their necessary prerequisites, that is, to the conditions which render them intelligible. In this case, the process is one of reductio, wherein is revealed something completely different from what is implied in deduction. It is, in the strict technical sense, a resolutio through which thought, in actual possession of a complex of objects, re-possesses what makes them one and is led on even to the contemplation of being. It is a method of discovery and of proof which is more simple than that of syllogistic reasoning, though it can be expressed in a syllogistic form. Actually, the movement of the mind is more direct and concentrated: in this dialectic, which stands at the summit of a metaphysics of participation, we reach the point at which human intelligence functions formally as intellect (intellectus) rather than reason (ratio). Regrettably for our purposes

---

1 Chenu, Introduction, p. 160 (English, p. 188) Cf. La Théologie, p. 70 (English, p. 72).

2 Chenu, La Théologie, p. 70 (English, p. 72).

3 Ibid.


here, Thomas did not leave us a careful and detailed description of resolutions' modes of operation, as he did in the case of syllogistic deduction. However, he did make use of it, as we have seen, and the scattered remarks he has made regarding it\(^1\) are sufficient to justify the assertion that Thomas was clearly aware of its nature and originality. It is the source and method of a reflexive metaphysics.\(^2\)

Our examination of the different senses in which Thomas uses their term *resolution* has led us to conclude that, in his mind, all are analogous variations on the one central theme of a *return to the source*. The latter may be logical, epistemological, or ontological depending upon the particular case. Human knowing begins with an abstractive resolution which moves from some sensible composite to the universal nature which may be seen, logically speaking, as the source of all the singular instances of that nature. However, the source of our knowing the nature is twofold: the sensible singular and the agent intellect (which is, as we have seen, a created participation in Uncreated Truth). Hence there must likewise be a twofold return: through a

---

\(^1\)Chenu, *Introduction*, p. 160, n. 1 (English, p. 188, n. 41) indicates *In Boeth de Trin.*, q.6, a.1, c, ad 3am q. (pp. 211-12 in the Decker edition) as the main text in which Thomas defines resolution.

reflexive resolution called reduction to the senses the intellect recognizes the external source, and through self-reflection, taking account of its own nature as a knowing power, it recognizes the internal source. Thus it assures itself that it is in conformity with reality, for all genuine knowledge depends on self-knowledge.

Thomas insists on this point: "in any intellect whatsoever, the first thing that is understood is its own act of understanding." However, this is achieved by different intellects in different ways: since the divine intellect is its own act of understanding, the understanding of his understanding and the understanding of his essence are one and the same act. Since the essence of God is absolutely and perfectly intelligible in itself, God knows Himself and all other things as well by his own essence. The angelic intellect, on the other hand, is not its own

---

1S. T. I, 87, 3, resp.: "Hoc igitur est primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius intelligere. Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se habent. Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum intelligere."

2Ibid.

3Ibid., 1, resp.: "Essentia igitur Dei, quae est actus, purus et perfectus, est simpliciter et perfecte, secundum seipsam intelligibilis. Unde Deus per suam essentiam non solum seipsum, sed etiam omnia intelligit."
act of understanding, though the first object of that act is the angelic essence.\footnote{Ibid., 3, resp.: "Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere,...sed tamen primum obiectum sui intelligere est eius essentia. Unde etsi alius sit in angelo, secundum rationem, quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, tamen simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit; quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essential, est propria perfectio suae essentiae, simul autem et uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione."} Hence, an angel is able to understand himself by his essence, but not other things; for this he requires intelligible species. These, however, are already present with his nature, rather than acquired from the things of which they are the likeness.\footnote{Ibid., 1, resp.: "Angeli autem essentia est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus, non tamen ut actus purus neque completus. Unde eius intelligere non completur per essentiam suam; etsi enim per essentiam suam se intelligat angelus, tamen non omnia potest per essentiam suam cognoscere, sed cogniscit alia a se per eorum similitudines."} Likewise, the human intellect is not its own act of understanding; further, its own essence is not the initial object of its understanding: what is known to it initially is the nature of some material thing. But it does not know that it knows that thing until (by reflection) it knows that it is a knowing power whose perfection is the act of understanding.\footnote{Ibid., 3, resp.: "Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec suum intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed alliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere."} That is, it knows
itself, not by its essence, but by its act.\textsuperscript{1} Nevertheless, it is only by knowing its act that it knows that it knows other things; thus in all cases it is by understanding the very act of understanding that other things are understood, and the act of understanding may be said to be the "first" understood, meaning not necessarily a priority of time but rather a priority of importance.\textsuperscript{2}

Inasmuch as our initial knowledge of anything is far from comprehensive, we require reasoning to deepen it, and evaluate our conclusions by resolving them to their source, the first principles. The latter include both the first principles of knowledge, and the causal principles, both intrinsic and extrinsic, of sensible effects. Metaphysical wisdom, reflecting on the existential situation of all sensible things, discovers being as such and investigates its properties which are common to all the beings

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}, 1, resp.: "Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet en genere rerum sensibilium, unde 'possibilis' nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus, se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex se ipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu... Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat,... consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species... Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster."

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, 3, resp.: cf. p. 200, n. 1 above.
we experience directly; here we move from the multiplicity of many kinds of beings to a sort of unity insofar as all of them are composites of essence and esse. Through further reflection, metaphysics discovers the existence of the extrinsic cause of their being.¹

Christian wisdom teaches us we need not stop here; we can return to God through living faith, bringing the whole of creation with us intentionally, since without it we cannot fulfill ourselves intellectually,² and without us it cannot return to its Creator. Finally, this return of all things to God through man is completed in the Beatific Vision, where man knows and loves all things, himself included in the eternal exemplars.³ The latter are the divine

¹Chenu, Towards Understanding St. Thomas, pp. 189-90: "The entire dialectics of essence and existence—the two distinct from one another in created being, whence arises the latter's ontological deficiency; one with the other in God Who is Ipsum Esse [Being Itself]—unravels according to the technique and within the atmosphere of resolutio."

²In Meta., prooem.: "Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est ejus beatitudo."

³S. T. I, 84, 5, resp.: Cum ergo quaequitur utrum anima humana in rationibus aeternis omnia cognoscat, dicendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur cognosci dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut in obiecto cognito; sicut aliquis videt in speculo ea quorum imaginem in speculo resulant. Et hoc modo anima in statu praest tis vitae non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sic in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum vident et omnia in ipso."
ideas: the various ways which the divine intellect, considering the divine essence, "devises" in which it can be imitated.\(^1\) Thus the intelligible exemplars of all things created in time pre-exist eternally in Him, their first cause, and are derived from Him as creatures so that they may subsist. He likewise impresses them as intelligible species on created intellects so that the latter are enabled to understand. Thus both the power to understand and the understood species are received by creatures from God, who also maintains and preserves the existence of power and species together.\(^2\) As Thomas indicates in the text just referred to, God gives both our natural power to understand and additional power, beyond that to which our

\(^{1}\) *De Ver.*, III, 2, ad 6: "Una prima forma, ad quam omnia reducuntur, est ipsa essentia divina secundum se considerata; ex cujus consideratione divinus intellectus adinvenit, ut ita dicam, diversos modos imitationis ipsius, in quibus pluralitas idearum consistit."

\(^{2}\) *S. T.* I, 105, 3, resp.: "Similiter cum ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibilis primo existunt in Deo, et ab eo derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant; sic etiam derivantur in creaturas, ut subsistant. Sic igitur Deus movet intellectum inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum, vel naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles: et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse."
nature entitles us, enabling us to know things our own natural power is unable to grasp, because of His bountiful love for us. These include the light of faith,¹ which is perfected by charity,² and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.³ Since the being that each thing has in itself comes from the divine essence as its exemplar,⁴ it is fitting that to that same divine essence all things are reduced. Moreover, inasmuch as all created things have as their exemplars the divine ideas, they come from God's self-reflection,⁵ and it is especially fitting that all should be brought back to Him through reflection, and be known at last in knowing

¹De Anima V, ad 6: "Ulterius autem cum posuerimus intellectum agentem esse quamdam virtutem participatam in animabus nostris, velut lumen quoddam: necesse est ponere aliam causam exteriorem a qua illud lumen participetur: et hanc dicimus Deum, qui interius docet, in quantum hujusmodi lumen animae infundit; et supra hujusmodi lumen naturale, addit pro suo beneplacito copiosus lumen ad cognoscendum ea ad quae naturalis ratio attingere non potest; sicut est lumen fidei,..."

²Cf. above, p. 182.


⁴SCG I, 66, #9: "Esse etiam cujuslibet rei quod habet in seipso, est ab ea exemplariter deductum."

⁵De Ver., III, 2, ad 6: cf. p. 204, n. 1 above.
Him. Here knowing and being are unified in Him whose knowing is His being, and the longing of the human heart is fully satisfied in knowing everything most truly through contemplating the divine essence.

Clearly, no mere Aristotelian nor Neo-platonist could have conceived of such a unification and fulfillment: only a Christian, having been taught his true destiny by the Word of God, could bring about the integration of all that was best in both traditions. In order to do this

1In I Sent., d.19, q.5, a.1, sol.: "Utroque autem veritas, scilicet intellectus et rei, reducitur sicut in primum principium, in ipsum Deum, quia suum esse est causa omnis esse, et suum intelligere est causa omnis cognitionis. Et ideo ipse est prima veritas, sicut et primum ens: unum-quoque enim ita se habet ad veritatem sicut ad esse,...Et inde est quod prima causa essendi est prima causa veritatis et maxime vera; scilicet Deus...."

2Chenu, Towards Understanding St. Thomas, p. 190: "We see, then, to how great an extent the God of Aristotle and the God of Saint Thomas differ from one another as regards both the technical approach to them and the degree of their spiritualness. This is due to the fact that the Aristotelian proof, concluding to the existence of a prime mover, ontologically segregated from all the rest, differs from the Thomistic way which leads on to Ipsum Esse Subsistens Whom the existence of things, by the very fact of their deficiency, reveals as present."

3Pepler, p. 16: "It is...one of the most impressive aspects of St. Thomas' genius that he distinguished without separating--while the Platonic system always tended to separate with the result that the final stage of reascent to the Godhead became one of identification or absorption or pantheism."
he needed to be familiar with both, and with all a brilliant and original thinker. But even more, he needed to be a man whose Christian commitment was more than a matter of intellectual assent to the dogmas of faith; one to whom being a Christian in as deep and complete a sense as possible was the central purpose of life. Thomas Aquinas was such a man. He knew very well that, though God is, indeed, both the source and the goal of all intelligibility and understanding as He is of being, this truth does us but

---

1 Pepler, p. 14: "These two great streams [Platonism and Aristotelianism] converged in the thought and experience of St. Thomas to provide him with the principles that integrated his grasp of the whole movement of love from the first flutterings of natural desire to its soaring flights in the union of the lover with the divine Beloved."

2 Ibid., p. 16: "St. Thomas distinguishes the intellectual and volitional elements in faith from the rest of the work of sanctification of the soul; but that should help the mind of man to grasp more completely, as an integrated part of the way of salvation, what Our Lord meant by faith, a faith that included trust and love as well. Faith gathers all the aspects of truth into a single whole, and the faith of the gospel gathers the three theological virtues into a single act of a complete man, and the complete man is gathered by the body of Christ in the Eucharist into the whole body of Christ on earth..."

3 Ibid., p. 15: "It is against the background of the sacred mystery which remains inviolably in the world that St. Thomas' whole theology is worked out. It is not something that may be ravished by the intellect of man alone; there is not some hidden secret which the chosen few who receive special illumination can attain through an experience beyond faith... Wisdom, understanding and knowledge are the perfection of faith through the working of the Holy Spirit who dwells with greater and greater intensity of life in the Christian who is being sanctified."
minimal good without our personal consent and active co-
operation exercised in living fidelity.\(^1\) This involves an
internal resolution in the depths of man's will, which
"seeks out the immediate end of its acts by virtue of the
effectiveness of a supreme end, with the result that the
particular goods it pursues take on their value from within
this all-encompassing willing that leads us to happiness...
The least action performed in pursuit of some particular
good is laden-- in its intelligibleness and in its reali-
ization-- with the very will urging us on to the pursuit of
the absolute."\(^2\) This volitional resolution supports and
facilitates the intellectual resolution which occurs in
faith: "the faith begins in multiplicity on account of man's
weakness; for he has to begin with many...aricles of the
creed and dogmas. But as he grows in the grace of God,
these are seen to belong to the One Truth, the Word of
God."\(^3\) Living, as he did, by Jesus' Spirit in loving fi-

\(^1\) Hayen, p. 215 and 216: "C'est-à-dire que Dieu me
creée vraiment moi, qu'il fait que j'existe vraiment et que
ce soit vraiment moi qui existe, qui exerce, moi, mon acte
d'exister pour toujours. C'est-à-dire que me créer, c'est
me faire exister activement, dans une nature vraiment
mienne, c'est me faire coopérer à ma propre création, par
mon consentement, conscient et libre, à participer à la
réalité absolue de Dieu....L'exercice concret de ce con-
sentement s'exprimant dans le temps, c'est précisément le
mouvement de la réflexion."

\(^2\) Chenu, Towards Understanding St. Thomas, p. 189.

\(^3\) Pepler, p. 15.
delity to the truth which he knew to be no mere abstract concept, but the very Son of God, his Redeemer, gave Thomas a far deeper insight into that all-encompassing Truth than an uncommitted thinker, however brilliant, could ever gain.¹ Because he lived this resolution, he was able reflectively to grasp its nature,² and so grasping it, was able to integrate and harmonize in his epistemology and metaphysics those aspects of resolution which earlier thinkers had discerned. The ontological resolution at work in creation as a whole, and in intelligent creatures in a twofold way (both physically and intentionally) thus appears as the source and justification for the centrality of resolution as an intellectual method in his philosophy.

¹Chenu, Towards Understanding St. Thomas, p. 166: "Nothing would be more deceiving and nothing more intellectually perverse than to move among these theological texts, and not all the while maintain oneself under the secret communicative action of the work of God and as under the spell of contemplation. The rational structure of these texts can be the same; the light that promotes them has first placed our minds within another world."

²Chenu, ibid., p. 189 comments that "the entire beginning of the Ia-IIae (q. 1 and 2) is a pointed illustration "of the reduction within the human will, and it has been pointed out by many commentators that the plan of the whole Summa illustrates both the beginning of creatures in God and their return again to Him."
I

PRIMARY SOURCES

Aquinas, Thomas. Opera Omnia. iussi Leonis XIII edita Roma, 1882 (16 volumes to date).

-------- -------. Opera Omnia. (ed. Echuardo Di Rubeis) Venetiur 1785-88. 28 volumes.


-------- -------. Summa theologiae. Ottawa: Institut Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis, 1941

-------- -------. Summa theologica in the Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (ed. A. Pegis) New York: Random House, 1945

-------- -------. Summa contra gentiles. iussi Leonis edita. XIII, XIV, XV

-------- -------. Summa contra gentiles. Taurini: Marietti, 1938


-------- -------. Quaediones disputatae et quaestiones duodecim quodlibetales. Taurini: Marietti, 1927-28

vol. I De potentia
vol. II De malo, De spiritualibus creaturis, De anima, De virtutibus in communi, De caritate
vol. III De veritate, qq. I-XIII
vol. IV De veritate, qq. XIV-XXIX
vol. V Quaestiones quodlibetales.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Illustrator</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De spiritualibus creaturis.</td>
<td>Romae: Universitas Gregoriana, 1959</td>
<td>Keeler</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestione disputata de spiritualibus creaturis.</td>
<td>Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949</td>
<td>Fitzpatrick</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Division and Methods of the Sciences</td>
<td>Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963</td>
<td>Maurer</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Aristotelis libros Peri hermenias expositio.</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Leonis</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Aristotelis libros Posteriorum analyticorum expositio.</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Leonis</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio.</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Leonis</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Aristotelis libros De caelo et mundi expositio.</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Leonis</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Aristotelis libros De generatione et corruptione expositio.</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Leonis</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Aristotelis libros Meteorologicorum expositio.</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Leonis</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium</td>
<td>Taurini: Marietti, 1936</td>
<td>Pirotta</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Aristotelis libros de Sensu et sensato de memoria et reminiscentia commentaria.</td>
<td>Taurini: Marietti, 1928</td>
<td>Pirotta</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria</td>
<td>Taurini: Marietti, 1935</td>
<td>Cathala</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle</td>
<td>Chicago: Regnery, 1961</td>
<td>Rowan</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio.</td>
<td>Taurini: Marietti, 1949</td>
<td>Spiazzi</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In librum Beati Dionysii De divini-nis nominibus expositio. (ed. C. Pera) Taurini: Marietti 1950


SECONDARY SOURCES

Anderson, James F. "In Defense of Etienne Gilson," The Thomist XXVIII, 3 (1964) 373-380


Baumgartner, William. "Demonstration and Science," in Essays on Knowledge and Methodology, 53-61


Bougerol, J. Guy. Introduction à l'étude de Saint Bonaventure. Tournai: Desclée et Cie., 1961

Boyer, Charles, S. J. "Le rôle de la connaissance l'âme dans la constitution de la métaphysique," Doctor Communis I (Torino, 1948) 219-224

Brennan, M. Rose. The Intellectual Virtues according to the Philosophy of St. Thomas. Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1941


Chojnacki, Piotr. "Les conceptions épistémologique de la métaphysique chez S. Thomas d'Aquin et ses origines," Collectanea (Varsovie) XXXIV (1963) 5-28


Defever, J., S. J., La Preuve réelle de dieu. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953


Donceel, Joseph, S. J. .. "A Thomistic Misapprehension?" Thought XXXII, 125 (1957) 189-198

Eisler, Rudolf. Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried, 1904


------ ---- -- --. La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin. 2 ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1953

-------------------------- Wisdom and Love in St. Thomas Aquinas. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1951


Hayen, André, S. J.. "Intentionalité de l'être et métaphysique de la participation," Revue néoscolastique de philosophie (Louvain) XLII (1939) 385-410

La Communication de l'être d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957


Isaac, J. "La notion de dialectique chez S. Thomas," Revue des sciences philosophique et théologique XXX, 3 (1950) 481-506


Klubertanz, George, S. J. "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular," New Scholasticism XXVI, 2 (1952) 135-166


Leroy, M-V. "Abstractio et separatio d'après un texte controversé de saint Thomas," Revue Thomiste XLVIII (1948) 236-339


Muller-Thyme, Bernard. "St. Thomas and the Recapturing of Natural Wisdom," Modern Schoolman XVIII, 4 (1941) 64-68


Oeing-Hanhoff, Ludger. "Die Methoden der Meta-


------- ------- -- ---. "St. Thomas and Elucida-


Phillipe, M-D. "Reverentissime exponens Frater Thomas," The Thomist XXXII, 1 (1968) 84-105

Pieper, Josef. "On the 'Negative' Element in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," Cross Currents IV, 1 (1953) 45-56


Simmons, Edward. "Demonstration and Self-Evidence," The Thomist XXIV, 2, 3, 4 (1961) 139-162


While the importance of resolution as a reflective method in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is generally recognized, relatively little has been written about it, and the few articles devoted to it differ in their conclusions as to its nature and use. It is the aim of this dissertation to analyze the major texts in which the term or its synonyms appear in order to discover its fundamental meaning and role as revealed by Thomas' own statements and practices.

The first chapter notes the divergent meanings which the Latin term resolutio acquired through being used to translate several different Greek terms, as well as being given different senses by Thomas' predecessors. A survey of the different contexts in which the term appears in Thomas' treatises manifests a basic distinction between those texts in which it refers to physical processes affecting sensible substances and those in which it refers to intentional procedures, whether logical, metaphysical, or epistemological. Finally the chapter considers briefly the terms most often
taken as synonyms: *reductio, abstractio, reflexio,* and *via judicii;* and notes that *inductio, deductio* and *examen* have likewise been regarded as synonymous by some commentators.

The second chapter is a general account of Thomas' theory of human knowing in order to locate resolution within this broader perspective. It examines the Aristotelian background of Thomas' epistemology, noting the modifications he made in transposing Aristotle's insights into a mental universe which, by reason of the Christian belief in creation, vastly differed from that of the Stagerite. It points out, further, the diversity between Thomas' day and our own as to the primary meaning of knowledge or science: whereas to us it is an abstract body of knowledge, to Thomas it was a concrete term naming a qualitative perfection of the human knowing power. Science consisted in the habitual presence in the intellect of immaterial concepts derived from material things.

This being so, the thing as known has a different mode of being than the thing as existing, which raises a question regarding the correspondence of the former to the latter. In Thomas' view, what assures us of the truth of our knowledge is resolution. As human understanding is a gradual and cumulative activity involving several distinct steps which we today call simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning, there are several types of resolution. The third chapter investigates the resolution proper to judgment,
which Thomas calls "reduction to the senses": an explicit recognition of the two-fold origin of any known fact in sense experience and intellectual activity. Whatever is known must be reduced, either directly or indirectly, to the senses in order to be known truly; the type of reduction used in a particular instance corresponds to the way in which the knowledge was derived from the senses.

The fourth chapter studies the resolution proper to reasoning: the latter derives its content from sense experience, but its formal structure is dependent upon the principles of intelligibility to which all human thinking must conform. The truth of the conclusion of a process of reasoning is established when it is perceived as either implied in or conforming to these first principles.

The fifth chapter investigates the way in which metaphysics reduces the plurality of the sciences to a unity through resolution to being (ens) and the first cause of beings. For Thomas, however, even metaphysical resolution is incomplete, for it attains the existence of a first cause, but not its nature. Accordingly, chapter six follows Thomas beyond metaphysics into the realm of faith, where resolution functions, not as an epistemological technique, but as an existential pilgrimage back to the God from whom man has come through creation.

The conclusion of this study is that Thomas' doctrine of resolution is a synthesis of an Aristotelian epistemo-
logical procedure with the Neoplatonic way of salvation, carried out under the influence of his Christian faith. The basic meaning of resolution from Thomas is always that of a return to the source, which includes both the sources of our knowledge and the source of our being. All the specific types of resolution are finally integrated when man, being united to God in eternity, knows all things, himself included, in their creative source.
VITA

Astrid Richie O'Brien, daughter of Frank J. and Cathryn M. Richie, was born March 24, 1934 in Staten Island, New York. She attended Notre Dame Academy in Staten Island and was graduated in June 1952.

She attended the College of Mount Saint Vincent, New York, and received the degree of Bachelor of Science in June, 1956. She entered the Graduate School of Marquette University as a student of Philosophy in September, 1956 and received the degree of Master of Arts in August, 1959.

In September, 1958 she was employed as a teacher of general science by the New York City Board of Education. In September, 1959 she was employed as an adjunct instructor of Philosophy at Fordham University and as a teacher of biology at Notre Dame Academy, Staten Island. In September, 1960 she was employed as Instructor of Philosophy at Fordham University. Married in 1960 she since has had three children.

She was awarded an Assistantship by Marquette University for the academic year of 1956-57 in the office of the Dean of Women and an Assistantship in the Department of Philosophy for the year 1957-58. She was accepted as a doctoral candidate in the Graduate School of Arts and Science, Fordham University in September, 1959, and was awarded a New York State Regents Doctoral Fellowship for the year of 1964-65. She majored in metaphysics under the mentorship of Professor W. Norris Clarke, S. J.