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HEIDEGGER’S WILL TO POWER
BABETTE BABICH

Not so long ago, everyone was engaged in the search for psychoanalytic foundations of poetry, *jetzt trief alles von Volkstum und Blut und Boden*, but it’s still all the same.

Heidegger, GA 39, 254

Heidegger’s *Beiträge* and Nietzsche’s Will to Power

Nietzsche’s importance for Heidegger is not in doubt as Heidegger engages Nietzsche, directly or indirectly, throughout his writings, both early and late. But without a discussion of the complexities of Heidegger’s reading of the same Nietzsche Heidegger intriguingly associates with the question of modern science/technology as the nihilating essence of nothing other than *Machenschaft*, the function and meaning of the *Beiträge* in Heidegger’s thinking will inevitably elude us.1 And the relevant conjunctions go further than a simple connection. Without emphasising the scientific significance of the question of truth (and modern technology), without attending to the differentiation to be made between the resonant conceptual associations of the German word *Wissenschaft* and those of the English (and French) *science*, indeed, without considering Heidegger’s contributions to the broadest sense of the philosophy of science as such, one can only misunderstand Heidegger’s reflections on science and one further runs the risk of mistaking or even denying the continuity of Heidegger’s thought.2 This same attention to continuity or a complex whole is also evident in the new turn to Heidegger’s rhetoric,3 crucial just because it opposes the tendency to read one readerly construction known as the “early Heidegger” and another and similarly readerly construction called the “later Heidegger.”4

Yet adding the influence of Nietzsche in Heidegger’s thinking seems merely to compound the challenge for many readers, especially after Lukács, but also after the repeated forays of Richard Wolin and Tom Rockmore into the political forests of (more or less) foregone conclusions contra Heidegger. For Nietzsche’s name continues to serve as an almost automatic signifier of irrationalism5 when it is not connected, as it continues to be, with Nazism. Hence Otto Pöggeler contends that Heidegger’s excess regard for Nietzsche6 was at the root not only of Heidegger’s brush with fascism but also his lack of understanding of the poets he is most famously associated with.7 On these terms, it has been argued that Heidegger’s irrationalism is revealed in his apparent antipathy to modern science and technology, which same antipathy (the argument here is conclusive because it is circular) had already rendered his thinking initially and lastingly amenable to an association with Nazism but also with fascism in general.8
I argue that Heidegger deliberately composed the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* in order to keep it as an *unpublished* work throughout his life.9 Attesting to this reading, Heidegger’s epigraph to the *Beiträge* articulates this withholding gesture: “Here is tellingly held fast [festgehalten] that which was withheld [Verhaltene] in prolonged restraint.” Such a proclaimed “retention” of the text was rather less than absolute as Heidegger quite overtly directed a variety of scholars to the *Beiträge* over the years, including Otto Pöggeler, among others. Indeed, by way of Pöggeler’s 1959 essay “Ereignis,” addressed to the subtitled theme of the *Beiträge*, Heidegger could seem to have arranged an advance interpretation of his second “master”-work.10 Patently too, Pöggeler’s *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking* (first published in 1963), makes explicit substantive reference to the *Beiträge*, contradicting Pöggeler’s assertion in 1991 (in the same locus that he names the *Beiträge* Heidegger’s “second major work”),12 that “Heidegger never mentioned this work, even to his closest students.”13

As I read it, Heidegger composed his *Beiträge* on the model of the publishing phenomenon that could be called Nietzsche’s “Contributions to Philosophy,” had Nietzsche only written his own *Will to Power*, as, of course, he did not. There are other patterns,14 but it is not irrelevant that the material that became Nietzsche’s *The Will to Power* derives from the very Nachlaß, or unpublished remains, Heidegger celebrates in his lecture courses as the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and which same non-book, *The Will to Power*, Heidegger, in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, identifies as Nietzsche’s “planned major work [*Hauptwerk*].”15

Thus Heidegger’s first lecture course on Nietzsche, presented during the period of the *Beiträge*’s composition (in the series of the same courses Heidegger notoriously and, for many readers, implausibly, describes as instantiating his resistance to National Socialism), includes an importantly parallel reflection on the elusive notion of *Ereignis*. *Ereignis* is famously difficult to translate in a Heideggerian context and there are several options: *appropriation, occasion, eventuality*, William J. Richardson’s *e-vent*, or else *emergence*, the word John Bailiff uses to translate Pöggeler’s *Ereignis*, which same translation echoes in the more metonymically ambivalent *emergency*, as we can find it in Elden and Polt, among others.19 In the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger sets *Ereignis* equivalent to “nihilism,”15 which nihilism Heidegger polemically affirms as the focus of Nietzsche’s thought as such.18

As it engages the issues of power [*Macht*] and domination [*Machenschaft*] in an explicit and politicized fashion, the *Beiträge* may also, in just this explicit sense, be taken as Heidegger’s *Will to Power*.19 Thus Heidegger engages the concept of political power in global or indeed geo-graphic terms.20 It is *Machenschaft* that for Heidegger exemplifies the character of modernity, which character, so Heidegger maintained, following Nietzsche’s
historicising, was a framework already cast and determined in the nineteenth century. (See B § 102) As Heidegger would later identify this modernity in his lectures to the Club of Bremen, Machenschaft represents the objective/objectifying world view of modern techno-scientific culture. Throughout its differing political manifestations, the essence of Machenschaft was, for Heidegger, expressed by way of a practical and all-too-political and politicized commitment to all the devices – technical and cybernetic, biological and psychological – of modern science and its totalizing development. As such, Machenschaft crosses political borders, as a global essence of the kind that for Heidegger dissolved the supposed differences between Bolshevism (this is Russia) and Capitalism (this is instructively, for Heidegger, not the UK, not France, but the US) as well as the reigning rule of National Socialism (this is Germany in its absorption with European conquest). It goes without saying that such inflammatory comparisons and assimilations continue to plague political analyses of Heidegger.

From Heidegger as Editor to the Published Edition of Heidegger’s Beiträge

I have made the case that Heidegger was consciously (or unconsciously) inspired (as almost any reader of Nietzsche’s texts can be seduced into seeking) to appropriate Nietzsche’s style. Yet to raise the question of Heidegger’s encounter with Nietzsche’s thinking in terms both of its substance and its explicit stylization is to raise the more complicated question of style as such in Heidegger’s own work. Most philosophical studies of Heidegger avoid the question of style in Heidegger’s writings, apart from a generalized presumption of obscurity as either damning – we may name this, roughly following Robert Bernasconi, the “Gilbert Ryle response,” which Rylean response Simon Blackburn has recently exhumed for his own part – or else as precisely liberating, presenting seemingly inexhaustible material for a robust industry of explication and/or rehabilitation (rescuing the “good bits,” and so engendering a politically corrected Heidegger or even a Heidegger, like a Nietzsche, up to analytic snuff).

In 1935, Heidegger was named to the board of directors for the National Socialist edition of Nietzsche’s collected works. This experience brought Heidegger into contact with the editorial forces that control an author’s legacy, even an author of Nietzsche’s formidable stylistic powers. And as is typical enough, the parallel Heidegger drew was a personal one. In response, Heidegger composed what might stand as his own “Nachlaß” material. The Beiträge would then work to limit Heidegger’s vulnerability to editorial manipulation inasmuch as it could be claimed as Heidegger’s authoritative legacy.

If I am right that Heidegger intended the Beiträge as part of his edition “aus letzter Hand,” that is, as last set forth by the author himself, it is ironic indeed
that it has not been published as such. For if, as we do know, Heidegger himself first composed and arranged and then left the order of his manuscript (and corresponding typescript) unaltered from 1939 until his death in 1976, we have today nothing less substantially significant than a radical reordering of the order or arrangement of the divisions of the Beiträge as it has in the interim been published in both German and English editions.

Shifted from its original position as the section following the prelude, Seyn, now makes up the eighth section as the final division of the text. The shift radically changes the disposition of the work. Rather than having the text end, as suggested in Heidegger’s prospectus, with the Last God (B §§ 1, 23, 34, 39, 42, 43), which section is, in turn, now displaced from its ultimate position to a penultimate locus, the Beiträge now definitively concludes, this is the beauty of a publishing decision, with Seyn. Such an ending accords with certain interpretive expositions of Heidegger’s thinking, confirming a break between the Heidegger of Being and Time and the so-called “later Heidegger” (I and II) rather than highlighting the prime problem of the readerly reception of Being and Time for Heidegger (which engagement may be read as the substance of Seyn, and here, too, Heidegger could well identify with Nietzsche, and the liabilities of this first book for readers inclined to what Heidegger throughout his life regarded as “journalistic” misrepresentations).23

Apart from my own discussion, the radicality of the textual disposition of the Beiträge from its original form to its published rearrangement has not been the subject of commentary.24 We recall here that the Beiträge’s editor, Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann was able to justify his ordering of the published text as he cited a note slipped into the typescript, dated 8 May 1939: “‘Seyn’ as Part II is not correctly arranged; as an attempt to grasp the whole once again, it does not belong at this juncture.”25 Von Herrmann took this note to justify shifting “‘Seyn’ as Part II” to the end of the manuscript, manifestly on the assumption that the phrase, “as an attempt to grasp the whole once again” necessitated placing Seyn as epilogue.26

How should one read or interpret the slip of paper in question where Heidegger not infrequently calls attention to the order of exposition appropriate, or, contra the reader’s suppositions (and indeed to the optimum order of approach to particular authors: Aristotle before Nietzsche, to take a particularly non-random example) or else his remarks in his lecture courses where such asides also correspond to the didactic disposition of the course? It is anything but uncommon in Heidegger’s case to find him drawing attention to an apparent ordering dissonance in his published texts27 and, as I have elsewhere explored Heidegger’s “musical” style of writing,28 he also offered both anticipatory and retrospective reviews – in good scholastic style – throughout his texts and not merely at the conclusion of the same. Indeed Heidegger’s addenda [for Heidegger often added to his text (he belonged to a
writerly generation that added insertions to a completed text, a generational habit that has vanished with word-processing and its volatilization of the very idea of such “original” conceptual outlines or schemas and plans]) in the form of such subsequently inserted parentheses (indeed of more than one kind: both round and square) have been the subject of no little dispute in the case of the Introduction to Metaphysics [when exactly did he add them? were some of these “mental” parentheses (or reservations) already present to him at the time of composition? did he compose all of them later? some of them? why were they added?]. Given such questions and given the length of time between 1939 and 1976 and considered together with his ongoing editorial engagement with his own collected works, I have found it at least plausible to suppose, that if Heidegger had in fact meant to introduce such a displacement of his second section to the end, he could have done so (and the thematic recurrence of material from the Beiträge throughout his later works makes this more rather than less plausible).

*Nietzsche as the Last Metaphysician: Science and Technology and the Truth of Illusion*

In the later Zollikon Seminars, referring to the subtitled theme of the Beiträge: Vom Ereignis, Heidegger links the misapprehension of these two themes as he reflects on the failure to understand (the essence of) technology and Ereignis as a consequence of a decisive “conviction” on the part of the modern era: “as long one understands being as presence ... one cannot understand technology and surely not the event of appropriation [Ereignis] at all.” Heidegger links the question of Ereignis to the question of science and the question of art, which is always, although commentators somehow manage to be astonished by this connection, nothing other than the question concerning technology. Thus although von Herrmann rightly attends to the relevance of the essay on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (the ultimate justification for his editing decision), and although Stuart Elden, for one, also emphasizes the significance of the conjunction between poiesis/techné in his reading of both the Beiträge and sections of Heidegger’s lecture courses on Nietzsche, the trick still remains for today’s reader to bring the two together. What do Heidegger’s reflections on truth in art and truth in technology tell us in the context of his engagement with Nietzsche?

For in his Nietzsche lecture courses, Heidegger emphasizes that the state of the question itself, considered as questioning as such and in the wake of or following the modern technological epoch can best be illuminated in terms of Nietzsche’s reflective self-assessment of his own first work, The Birth of Tragedy. As Nietzsche writes in his Attempt at a Self-Criticism, “the task is to regard science through the lens [Optik] of the artist, but art in that of life.” (BT §ii) The question Nietzsche raises here, claiming that he is “the first” to do so,
is nothing less than “the problem of science itself, science ... as problematic, as questionnable” (Ibid.). For Heidegger, writing in 1936/37, Nietzsche’s critical provocation of what he named the “problem of science” has been misunderstood from the start: “Half a century,” he wrote, “has passed in Europe since these words were written. In these decades, this point has again and again been misinterpreted and, indeed, especially by those, who sought to struggle against the increasing rootlessness and devastations of science.” (N1, 218)

Not a matter of missing or overlooking Nietzsche’s passion or his joyful or ‘gay’ science, Heidegger explains that what has been missed or misunderstood in reading Nietzsche is his insight into the coming to pass of nihilism as such. This is, of course, the same theme that would become the subject matter of Heidegger’s 1949 lectures, Einblick in das was ist (GA 79). The called for ‘insight’ into chronic decadence and the sudden devastations of the modern world, the same insight that requires Nietzsche’s radical questioning after science, precisely considered as science, is the counter-intuitive call repeated in What is Called Thinking? (GA 8) This is the call to question the very thing that we in the modern age of science and technology do not question. As Nietzsche undertook to doubt more radically than Descartes and to raise the possibility of critique yet more radically than Kant, Nietzsche’s method adumbrates the same questioning Heidegger shared with Nietzsche, a project which also includes Hölderlin’s syncretistic constellations in Heidegger’s project of redoubled questioning, as Heidegger’s 1942 lecture course on Hölderlin’s Ister (GA 53) also makes clear.

Heidegger does not merely install Nietzsche in the pantheon of philosophy (always already and in itself a not irrelevant achievement): “What Nietzsche for the very first time and indeed with reference to Platonism, recognized as nihilism, is in truth, and seen according to the grounding question that is alien to him, merely the foreground of the far deeper happening of the forgetting of being, which comes forth more and more directly in the course of finding the answer to the guiding question [Leitfrage].” (B §55) With respect to this epochal connection with the eventuality of appropriation, what comes to pass, that is to say, Ereignis, Heidegger emphasizes that the phrase “God is dead” routinely associated with nihilism obscures the compass of Nietzsche’s claim. “‘God is dead’ is no aesthetic principle but the formula for the foundational experience of the event [Ereignis] in Western history.” (N1, 156, emphasis added) Thus “Seynsverlassenheit,” as the basic experience of the eventualizing of Western history is “perhaps the most concealed and denied by way of Christianity and its secular descendents” (B §55).

Heidegger sets his own articulation of truth as ἀληθεια in opposition to the rationalist confidence of the interchangeability of correctness with truth at every level, especially at the level of the absolute (as patently expressed in
Hegel and as realistically, positivistically presupposed in the technological articulation of modern natural science). But in a section entitled, *Thinking: The Leading-Thread of the Leading-Question of Western Philosophy* Heidegger emphasizes the inadequacy of this absolutizing ambition in modern science, reminding us that Nietzsche shows us how little “such a controversy” as the rationalist project *per se* “can succeed.” (B §102) On Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche’s powerful one-page history of philosophy traces the transformative history of the idea as (Platonic or purely ideal) truth, as successively reduced to illusion. Nietzsche is thus the “last and most passionate thinker to inquire into truth.” (B §239) For Heidegger both Platonism (which Heidegger duly distinguishes from Plato) and positivism may be viewed as modes of calculative thought, assuming, be it in a supersensuous or an empiricist mode, that “knowing is approximation to what is to be known.” (N1, 151) As Nietzsche understands the progress of truth as “The History of an Illusion,” the opposition between the apparent and the real (that is also “ideal truth” and phenomenal reality, which is also to say the progress of scientific discovery) inevitably “decays into necessary illusion, into an unavoidable consolidation, entangled in beings themselves [here we recognize Heidegger’s challenge to the ontic metaphysics of Western technical rationality], now determined as ‘will to power’” (B §102).

In this sense, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche constitutes both the culmination of and at the same time the overcoming of Western metaphysics. Heidegger’s challenge to Western techno-scientific rationality is manifest in this declaration of the closure and turning point of metaphysics.

*Heidegger, Technology, and the Devastation of Style: Nietzsche and Heidegger*

What I have been calling Heidegger’s *Will to Power* is thus Heidegger’s appropriation not only of the idea of Nietzsche’s *Nachlaß* (the very idea), remaking the *Nachlaß* as Heidegger reconceived this project as his own legacy, but also in the wake of the seductive allure of a thinker who could summon the kind of readership Nietzsche commanded and who could really do the kinds of things with words that Nietzsche achieved with his writing.

Heidegger succeeded, at least until his death, with his first ambition: that is to say, he guarded the finished work that would be his *Will to Power*, as his writerly legacy. Yet he would be “ruined,” or “destroyed” (*kaputtgemacht!* to use his own expression), by the effort to engage and to follow Nietzsche’s style and it is in this same language-stylised sense that I have elsewhere argued that we might begin to understand his declaration of Nietzsche as his ultimate undoing. This is Nietzsche’s stylized direction of his texts to certain readers (always an achievement in a published – and therefore, as Nietzsche would remark, a public and consequently all-too-common [cf. BGE 30] – work). But
Nietzsche intended his stylistic achievement esoterically. The selective device in question is as old as Plato. By drawing his readers into the text, writing a seemingly accessible text and, most importantly, by giving all comers something to take away from the text as a supposed meaning, Nietzsche was able to exclude the majority of his readers. As a consequence of this precisely esoteric accessibility, what (ever) esoteric meaning the text might be said to have would effectively be ‘protected’ in plain view.

For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s esoteric distinction bears directly on Heidegger’s own otherwise differently esoteric, but still Nietzsche-inspired, conception of the nature of questioning as the still awkward elusiveness of his invocation, “For the few, for the rare” [Für die Wenigen – Für die Seltenen] (B §5; cf. NI). The appeal of this same stylistic restraint culminates in Heidegger’s unremittingly problematic expression of silence, which is, to be sure, a silence that is not (or not only) a matter of speechlessness. “The word breaks for us ... originarily,” Heidegger writes, “the word fails to come even to word.” (§13, Reticence and Concern) Reflecting on “Maintaining Silence and Questioning,” he will claim that an intimate even essential relationship inheres in both questioning and restrained silence. The point here turns on the one who has ears to hear, that is, on attuned listening or hearing.

Where Heidegger sets questioning in its guiding modality as authentic or genuine questioning (as opposed to the kind of questioning that, so Heidegger emphasizes by contrast in the Beiträge, corresponds to “curiosity” and which, we can add, likewise corresponds to investigative or techno-scientific research), Heidegger further details the nature of questioning in the Nietzsche lectures.35 The style of questioning to be opposed is answer-bound or problem-directed inquiry, the routine or “normal” scientific inquiry that for Heidegger inevitably stops short of authentic questioning.

Contra received logic, or better said, in opposition to received beliefs or convictions on logic,36 Heidegger proposes the radical poverty of reflective thinking. I have elsewhere drawn attention to Heidegger’s emphasis upon the immediate, that is, the here and the now, the small or the trivial and easily overlooked, as he invokes this emphasis in his discussions of technology.37 Intriguingly, the minimal achievement that is the modesty of open reflection, or reticent questioning, turns out to offer us far more than we are used to regard as thinking, just because we find ourselves brought out beyond the calculative thinking of our day: “the poverty of reflection is the promise of a wealth whose treasures glow in the resplendence of that uselessness which can never be included in any reckoning.”38

The tenor of this proposal – “the poverty of reflection,” “resplendent uselessness” beyond any calculation (measure, reckoning), continues to strike many readers as wrong-headed and just and exactly because it seems to challenge science in its modality as calculating investigation. By contrast,
although this is not a simple contrast, were this a religious reference for Heidegger, a reference to the spiritual side of life rather than an explicit discussion of scientific inquiry, logic, and technology, we would have little problem with such language and some readers of Heidegger and technology emphasize a spiritual or meditative dimension for just this reason. To critique science, to advert to the limits of logic and language or even and only to clarify the respective roles of philosophy and science without giving the palm to science, seems plainly anti-scientific and it is relevant to this anxiety that more than one author has suggested that Heidegger was science-incompetent (an inaccurate, but tenacious, assertion). If today’s philosophy of science is no longer dominated by scholastic philosophy or neo-Kantianism, as in Heidegger’s day, it continues to be dominated by the still enduring analytic approach to conceiving the very scientific problem of science on the terms of the modern world view (this is what Heidegger means by speaking as he does of “science as world view,” i.e., contra the idea and ethos of Heidegger’s thinking of science in the Beiträge and beyond).

Much of Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Nietzsche’s claim concerning the victory of scientific method over science itself derives from the philosophical importance of the qualifying philosophical ability to make distinctions. As Heidegger cites Aristotle’s judgment on judgment in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” as well as throughout the Zollikon Seminars (following a lifetime of such references): “For not to know of what things we may demand proof, and of what one may not, argues simply a want of education.” For his part, Heidegger is at pains to emphasize that his philosophical analysis and “characterization of ‘science’ doesn’t correspond to hostility to science because such hostility is altogether impossible.” (§76, Propositions on “Science” §21) As the position of reflection and the object of such reflection, that is to say, the disposition between philosophy and science, inevitably excludes any kind of ‘hostility’ as affect: “Philosophy is neither for nor against science.” (Ibid.)

Heidegger’s critics are famously unmoved by such arguments. And the reason for this is clear if it is also importantly a matter of affect. Under the aegis of science which often claims the aura of objectivity, the appropriate affect continues to be all-important, For this reason, among others, any criticism of science is automatically taken as a sign of irrationality on the critic’s part. All Heidegger’s training in logic and mathematics, all his painstaking references to Aristotle, the first master of scientific logic, together with his references to the development of that logic into the organon of precisely modern science in Descartes (and Galileo) and in Kant (and Leibniz), all of this has and can do nothing to abrogate the charge of irrationality. Heidegger had to expect this objection. What he will later name the thoughtlessness of modern science in What is Called Thinking? excludes
in advance, as he writes in the *Beiträge*, “every question of the truth of Seyn (all philosophy) ... as unnecessary, dealt with without distress and removed from the practical domain.” (B § 73) Fixated in machination, modern science preemptively excludes philosophy (a preemption that extends to what is known as the philosophy of science) “insofar as modern science claims to be one or even the only decisive knowing.” (ibid.)

The *Beiträge* thus repeats what Heidegger also affirms in his better-known passage in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Regarded in terms of the calculative, technological-rational ideal of modernity, regarded as a triumphalist “logical” ideal, Heidegger claims that both “America” and “Russia” are effectively, on these very logical or scientific terms, identical or “the same.” In context (and it is clear that this context would make a great deal more difference in the debate on Heidegger and Nazism had he published his *Beiträge* rather than retaining it as he did), Heidegger reproves or challenges the then-current regime, that is to say, National Socialism, as he explicitly names it in the *Beiträge*, as representing the same dynamic politicizing, the same technologizing order and ordering momentum as other (and otherwise different) imperial cultures. In consequence, the impetus Heidegger calls *Machenschaft* would be as common to ‘Bolshevik’ Russia as to ‘Capitalist’ America, and such technological machination would also be characteristic of ‘National Socialist’ Germany as well. Accordingly, Heidegger argues, “the ‘folk’ [i.e., National Socialist or ‘German’] ‘organization’ ‘of’ science moves on the same track as the ‘American.’” (§76: *Propositions on ‘Science’*, §10) We can argue – if it remains a touchy political claim – that this very same globalizing ideal, i.e., technological machination as such, continues unabated in the monotonic, more totalized than monopolistic capitalist-cum-consumerist ethos of our own day.

Commentators have attempted, with varying success, to undertake a hermeneutics of Heidegger’s quasi-Winckelmanian or aesthetic descriptors of the “inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism. Heidegger cannot be exonerated from the rhetorical excesses of National Socialism particularly with respect to racism and its mortal consequences. But it might do, at least for the sake of an all-too neglected issue, to consider the side of racism that is species-ism. Looking beyond our absorption with ourselves as human beings in a world of other beings who share life with us, our continued absorption with humanity (alone and only) might yet reveal itself as a symptom of a problem we have yet to engage. This is the philosophical problem of life as such, all life, and hence a problem with immediate consequences (if most analyses speak of these for our still all-too-calculating sensibilities as *bio-costs* or as *life- or eco-tradeoffs*).

I refer here to a parallel between the Holocaust and animals in Heidegger’s reference to agriculture as a “mechanized food industry [motorisierte
Ernährungsindustrie,” when he writes, “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same [im Wesen das Selbe] as the fabrication of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade and the starvation of countries, the same as the fabrication of hydrogen bombs.” The appalling parallel that Heidegger himself draws could not be better analysed as has already been done by Emmanuel Levinas and by others who have emphasized that it is not to be countenanced in its sheer and rhetorical substance. As Levinas expresses it: “This stylistic turn of phrase, this analogy, progression, are beyond commentary.” And while taking Levinas’s point, we do well to recall that Heidegger’s own substantive context was originally that of a reflection on the difficulty of a seemingly straightforward term: Stellen, setting up or disposing, placing, positioning or framing. Heidegger is here concerned to draw out the transformation of the word in its use and what that use tells us about the modern world. “A district of land is set up with respect to the presence of coal, so to say, and the ore in it.” The disposition in question is for the sake of the resources to be mined as such. The ordering of Ge-Stell is familiar to us from The Question Concerning Technology. Thus we follow his argument as he emphasizes that “By means of such a set up, the land becomes a coal mining district, the ground becomes a mineral deposit.” Thus Heidegger reflects that a manner of speaking that had meant something altogether different in traditional agriculture, to “set” a field [die Feldbestellung], has now “gone over into the same ordering [Be-stellen] that sets up the air for nitrogen, sets up the ground for the sake of coal and ore, ore for uranium, uranium for atomic energy, this for destruction on demand.”

On the terms of Heidegger’s context, that is, with respect to a review of the original character of agriculture in its traditional sense now transformed into the new and dominant form of the modern food industry, Heidegger’s comments can do with commentary just to the degree that they are fitting enough, if still (and on several levels) unsettlingly so. The perspectival context of the food industry can seem to be a matter of providing for the needs of human nutrition. This is the viewpoint of food, for us, as we need to be nourished. Moving, with Heidegger’s “stylistic turn of phrase, analogy, progression,” from the food industry to the manufacture of corpses, we are speaking of animals, as such and rendered as so many varieties of meat.

The viewpoint of the animal is defined from the outset as more than other, more alien to us than any other to ourselves. Thus we are not taking the viewpoint of the stranger but we are referring to the utter alterity of those who are precisely all too familiar. These utter other others are the animals (and note that even here we do not begin to speak of plants, let alone the elements as Empedocles and a long tradition would speak of these, and as Arne Naess and others can speak of the earth itself).
Rilke who invokes the animal’s immersion or insertion in what he names the
Open, plays on the same utter alterity. God creates creation itself – this is die
Kreatur – the animal as creature, but the human is something else again, higher
here than Rilke’s angels. From such a perspective, if we attend to the life-context
and circumstances, that is: what the phenomenologist calls the world of the
animals raised and butchered for food or (and this includes cats and dogs, in
addition to horses, pigs, sheep, cows, and so on) leather, wool, fertilizer, etc., then
we may in the process be able to attend – and I am here seeking to emphasize
how elusive such an attention would be – to the animal’s perspective, as the story
teller Isaac Bashevis Singer has suggested that we might, somehow, begin to do.

In his story, “The Letter Writer,” Singer offers a comparative analogy (one
that is uncannily, awfully, similar to Heidegger’s) to remind us that from the
viewpoint of animals and their suffering, that is, if we begin to consider their
imprisonment, their torture, and their way of execution, as they are butchered
in wretched consciousness (the stunning demanded by law is not just
sometimes but as a rule incomplete, just because, among other reasons having
to do with automation and with speed, the law that requires that the animal not
be conscious as it is slaughtered is factively opposed to the industry demand
to have the animal’s own heart pump out its own life-blood). In concentration
camps that dare not even lay claim to be named as such, that is to say, in the
“meat packing” industry, the animal is without any possible recourse and thus
it is that “all people are Nazis.”51 From this point of view, Singer underlines, in
sadness, “for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka.”

If we almost automatically respond to the story teller’s parallel by refusing
it: dismissing it by pointing out that, after all, animals are only animals and the
proper concern of justice has to do with humanity, we not only overlook our
own animal being but we ineluctably replicate, as Adorno has also observed,
the same fascist logic that dismisses concern for the victims of extermination
by saying that some victims of injustice, say, need not be considered as they
are only [nur] Jews, just as we diminish injustices done to other victims,
saying that, after all, they are only Bosnians, only Rwandan Tutus, only Iraqi
civilians and so on. Thus Adorno emphasized what can seem the
counterintuitive (and thus the successful) logic of oppression as it operates by
way of the emphasis on human valuation (beyond price) in Kant, justifies
distinguishing the transcendent worth or dignity of persons (human beings) by
contrast with (and this is the point here) the “market value of things and
animals,”52 that is to say: all things that, like animals and including slaves or
others esteemed non-human or sub-human, can be said, in distinction to the
human, to have an exactly market price. Thus Adorno declares, paralleling
Singer’s comparison, but also echoing Heidegger’s parallel (as Levinas for his
own part had underscored it in an opposed context), “animals play for the
idealistic system virtually the same role as the Jews for fascism.”53
In the eighth of his *Duino Elegies*, Rilke writes of what the animal sees as it looks into “the Open, which is;” he says, “so / deep in animal’s faces.” We (as Plato captivates us in his story of the cave of our fascinated idealism), look behind, “our eyes are turned / backward.” We train ourselves not to see “what is really out there;” but, stand over against objects, things for us, rather than, for Rilke, facing God. It is not irrelevant to note that even Walter Benjamin’s “Angel of History” looks backward. By contrast, for Rilke, “Our eyes only are / as if reversed.” Rilke repeats the image here of that monstrous Nietzschean figure of Lyncaeus, who could turn his eyes within, seeing with paradoxically-named Lynx-eyes.

Lyncaeus eyes are the eyes of human reflection and self and inward-turning into the space of subjectivity and to the times that are not all times, but our past and our future. In reflecting on such a constellation of images and meanings, as a moral call to action, we do not take the perspective view or glance of the animal. Indeed and much rather, we systematically avoid it. This is what Rilke means, if his precisely elegiac voice takes him in his conclusion to give us a melancholy place, as poetic watchers, as “spectators, always, everywhere,” who, like distracted godlings, are always set in the pose of one poised to leave. So “turned toward the world of objects,” which we order in the time of past and future constituted – built – of our own consciousness, “We arrange it.” Only to see the decay of the world so made: “It breaks down.” Our response to this breakdown is immediate and issueless. And as children replace their toys after a fall, we “re-arrange it,” and “then break down ourselves.”

All I am doing here, as a writer, as an intellectual, as a teacher, is to write, and writing is not action, no matter what we academics (or critics of the academy) may say. All the reader is doing here, if the reader has come so far, is to read. If possibility is higher than actuality, we can remember that more than thinking stands action in all its possibilities.

*The Question Concerning Technology as the Question of Globalization*

In the reigning conviction that the current world conflict in the struggle against terrorism is a struggle against an anti-rationalistic, anti-scientific world-view, the Manichaean vision of one world (the “free world”) that is pro-modernity and another world (that would be the terrorist’s world) somehow *contra-modernity* continues to dominate. This conviction persists in spite of the ubiquity of both the resources of technology and of scientific rationality on all sides in the last century and before (if we, once again, recall Heidegger’s Nietzschean reminder to us that the nineteenth century sets the tone for today’s now twenty-first century science [B § 102]). Thus and seemingly to advance a simplified agenda, many political analysts tend to color any opponent of Western culture with the Luddite brush of a putatively antirationalism. But, as Israel’s recent invasion of Lebanon makes plain in the wake of Hezbollah’s
high-tech resistance to a high-tech invasion and as the recent North Korean test (or exhibition) of nuclear prowess similarly demonstrates, a perfectly pro-science dogma and a matching technological aptitude reigns supreme in our world, permeating even creationist ideology on the conservative side of American politics. For it is relevant that what is wanted, even among religious fundamentalists in the US, is never to abolish science or science instruction but only to advance as science the doctrines of creationism or, as it is called in such debates, creation science.

It will do to reflect on Heidegger’s warning to us in his “Question Concerning Technology,” a warning which has nothing to do with what Heidegger speaks of as the “danger.” Heidegger’s caution is not concerned with what technology might wreak or do to us but rather with what we presume to know about technology, which is also the reason he inquires after the essence of technology. We are thus warned that we are most in thrall to technology not when it astonishes us but exactly when we take it for granted, when we assume that we are control, that is, when it is ubiquitous enough that we presume upon its anthropological and instrumental character, convinced that, as he says, “everything depends upon getting technology as an instrument in hand in the appropriate way. One will, as it said, get technology spiritually in hand.”

The rationalist ideal Heidegger named logic well beyond the dominion of the imaginary sublime is now consummate as the virtual image of modern technology. This is what Heidegger in the Beiträge analyses as technological enchantment, it is also Baudrillard’s “virtual” in his ongoing reflections on the imaginary (first) Gulf War and the second ongoing war in Iraq, broadcast or publicized or disseminated in the United States in carefully calculated sound and photo bits – all the news ‘fit to print’ or think to notice on the nightly news. This is the irreal hyperreal that stands as the certification of the only reality we acknowledge as Real. For both Heidegger and Baudrillard, the modern scientific world view that rages today ever more unencumbered by any ‘possible’ (imaginable) alternative is the rule that remains. Neither pluralism nor a ‘return’ to the phantasm of traditional societies can alter the monotonic play of technique. Neither the modern world nor supposedly pre-modern societies may be thought or understood as anything other than technological. There is only modernity, liberal or not, as we choose to claim it, and this is what Heidegger in the Beiträge names Machenschaft.

From this perspective, as Pöggeler also emphasizes, all reflections following or in the wake of metaphysics become inescapably “transitional.” Modelled on Nietzsche’s seemingly fragmentary form of the aphorism and the truncated outline, such “contributions” are and can be all that remain of Heidegger’s legacy – his Will to Power. This is also because, in the keenest transition from Heidegger I to Heidegger II, paraphrasing Hölderlin’s Death of
Empedocles and in equally patent reference to Nietzsche, Heidegger begins his *Beiträge* with an express allusion, referring as much to the history of philosophy as to the misapprehensions inspired by his own first book: “The time for ‘systems’ is over…” (B §1) If Hölderlin’s Empedocles, resisting popular acclamation as king, declares the time of lordship past, we need to note that the allusion for Hölderlin himself invoked the French Revolution. How shall we take Heidegger’s “‘systems’”?58

The problems of today’s modern technology are not merely the problems of nations and dictators, the problems of politicizing and of war, where our proximity to political violence, even on the level of the state of the world, remains safely ‘virtual’ not only because at a distance but also because publicized only intermittently, so that we, the consumers, can, in the interim, turn our attention to the distractions of advertised possible lives, perhaps assuming too, as we often assume, the problem resolved. (We do make such assumptions: consider the problem of storing nuclear waste, a problem since the beginning of the atomic age. One might consider it somehow solved, given all the time that has passed. One would be wrong.) Political problems today are increasingly enmeshed in conflicts concerning the world. And one can say that they always were. But these are the resources that are reserved or needed for specific technologies, not only our technological dependency (what kind of need is this?) on the same fossil fuels, that Heidegger in *Gelassenheit*, a public lecture given in 1955, took to be a need that he in his own very technologically enchanted innocence assumed destined by nothing less than atomic power to be rendered nugatory. We need a critical perspective because the developmental or resource/reserve politics of modern technology is a biopolitics in a sense that Foucault’s theorists have not imagined. For such a biopolitics one needs Lacan, Bourdieu, Baudrillard and Badiou but one also needs Adorno and one still needs Heidegger. This is a critique of technology, that is also a questioning of technology addressed to the economic engine that drives the dynamic of the genome project, like the discovery of DNA in Heidegger’s day (and it is worth saying that Heidegger was more prescient with regard to the chemistry of life than he was with respect to gas and oil).59

In our own day, this is the fruit of the high bio-technological powers of nothing but the exactly motorized, aggregately or corporately industrial, agriculture industry. It makes every bit of difference to this point that Dolly was a sheep, cloned for the first time nowhere else but Scotland. The same promise drives the nanotechnological fantasies of retro-engineering mortality by cleaning out cellular debris by mechanical means (the computer programmer’s vision of nano-rotorooters or flushing: household plumbing remedies at the mitochondrial level) and the seemingly more proximate promises imagined to await humanity (and investment options) behind a moral
curtain of religious limitations, there for the taking, as the allure of stem-cell research.

It is worth paying attention to the metaphorical dreams of modern technology. Not a representation of Shelley’s *Frankenstein*, of cobbled together body parts, joined with Volta’s power of the electricity of nature, not even Fritz Lang’s robot fantasy that still charms us in television’s androids, technology’s new illusions have given way to the fantasy of the cyborg. (For my part, I would hold that there is a difference between the amalgamation of human and machine as it appears as early as Pythagoras’ golden thigh or Daedalus’s wings of wax and feathers and a span of flight high enough that the sun becomes a danger and, by ordinary technological contrast, a man with a hearing aid: but the we-are-cyborgs enthusiasts disagree with me). This displacement continues in the flat avatars of gaming spaces and imaginary discontents (and second lives), between the virtual and the real. Add to this the disappointing postdated language of genes and our hope to find ourselves and not just rice and soybeans and corn named in our essence, what we miss in cyberspace can perhaps be attained, if not or not yet by way of genetic retro-engineering, then by way of a mechanism already functional, via stem-cell research or failing that, as it may fail, by means of biotechnology as yet to be invented.

The point here is not then that humanity itself and not only the ‘natural’ world of so-called ‘natural resources’ may one day come to be taken in the image of what Heidegger called standing reserve. For this is already (and already trivially ontic) reality. In terms of marketing potential (and the grand ‘information theory’ of the genome), we may name the entire population of Iceland. In practical or working functionality (on a more traditional cytological level), we can refer to fertility clinics as veritable banks of human beings, potential and actual. So many ova, so many vials of sperm, so many embryos, not to mention stem cells and cloned cell-lines, the basis of genetic research not limited to the future, but already cultivated, in some cases for well more than fifty years. All already stock on hand and nothing at all compared with the (still-virtual or as yet unactualized) promise of the same technology. If the genome project has proven to be as anticlimactic as it has, the genetic code, the sheer molecular idea of a registered and accessible essence of humanity continues to allure us as a signifier we, perfectly complicit, hope to take for granted in place of or as a remedy for the lived complexities of human life and death.

Rilke reminds us that it is exactly death that makes us, all of us, animals. Unlike the animal, which moves “already in eternity, like a fountain”, we humans, alone and “only, can see death.” In the contradiction that is the complement to the metaphysical condition or to the convictions Rilke has the grace to invoke as the Open, “that pure space into which flowers / endlessly
open,” there is “that pure / unseparated element which one breathes without
desire and endlessly knows.” This is the truth of our deepest destiny. Dying,
Rilke says, we do not move into the Open. For the poet, we are now one with
the animal, almost and in all the possibility that for Heidegger remains, as we
have already alluded to this, higher than actuality: “nearing death, one doesn’t
see death; but stares / beyond, perhaps with an animal’s vast gaze.”

In a mortal world, “forever turned toward objects,” seeing in them “the
mere reflection of the realm of freedom, / which we have dimmed”, it may be
time (this would be Nietzsche’s “high time”) to think about what we do. Not
what we eat and what world we live in but what we do and have done and what
we stolidly continue to do to that world and to the beings we raise in order
to live off their life, from their suffering, consuming and shod by and dressed in
the products of the same. For we have indeed inherited the earth, we do indeed
have dominion over it, over all the animals that crawl, fly, or swim. And be it
by hunting, poisoning, neutering, genetic modification, or ordinary sacrifice
(which language, as Shiv Visvanathan reminds us with the example of “triage,”
also makes an appearance in the conventions of political ecology and
sustainable development), we have proven ourselves East and West, North and
South to be consummate masters at emptying the world of as many species as
we can, and at break neck speed.

The ecologists have informed us that the dynamic of modern technology
cannot be ‘sustained’. But what upsets us is neither the enormity of our
temperity nor the efficiency of our destruction of species, or our pollution of
land or water, or our veritable alteration of the air, that is to say, the winds, our
climate, the balance of the world’s temperature or times. What upsets us, as it
would upset a small child, is the single thought that the things we do might not
be doable for all time. That it cannot be sustained is what galls us, not what we
do. That is the project of ‘sustainable development’ as a problem to be solved
by science and technology, via legislation and above all as the critics of the
very idea of sustainable development have reminded us from the start,
beginning with Adorno and with Marcuse, Winner, Davison, Shiva,
Visvanathan, and Illich, by way of corporate involvements or profits. Yet the
idea of sustainable development in its purest sense, if we could find a way to
believe in this ideal, that is, even at its optimistic best, in advance of the
automatic cooption of vested interest, apart from capital, suggests only the
very politic conception of limits or restraint, but never change. We seek to
slow, we hope to conserve, and that is exactly because we mean to continue as
we have ever done.

In this way, Heidegger’s question concerning modern technology and
modern science does not inquire into the practical question of instrumental
reason but much, much rather seeks to ask, “what may I hope?” as Kant had
posed this more venturesome question (in Rilke’s sense, as Heidegger draws it
out for us) after the first two of his critical questions, “what can I know?” and “what must I do?” And in the book that can be read together with *Being and Time*, namely *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger adds a dissonant parallel, suggesting that Kant had raised a further and fourth question, “What is the human being?”

Among other things, this fourth question is the reason Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is articulated by means of an inquiry into that being that is always mine to be, that being that remains always ours to be, *Da-sein*. As Heidegger expresses this question beyond anthropology (and its coordinate instrumental articulation), the danger of modern technology is relevant to this fourth question, as he explores what remains his most dissonant challenge to us today, spoken as a challenge to Western metaphysics, which is to say, by raising the question of humanism, as the question of human being, *as a question.*

Nietzsche for his part had earlier raised this same question in terms of nature, a question inviting or daring us to de-humanize our understanding of nature, a question he argued that would help us re-naturalize humanity. “When will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds? When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to ‘naturalize’ humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?” (GS § 109) The current debates on ‘naturalism’, as analytic philosophers understand the notion, so both Heidegger and Nietzsche would remind us, inevitably fail to raise the grandly and the trivially complex question of nature just because the conventionality of such debates takes its point of departure from the very position Nietzsche challenges. These debates (and the language of the same) assume that we know what the natural is and that we know what nature is. For Nietzsche, we can only fail to naturalize humanity to the extent that we deify which is also to say that we reify nature, distancing it from ourselves whereby we exclude the human (as such) from what we take nature to be. It is this exclusion that fails, now for Heidegger, to ask the question of essence, which is, as we know, for Heidegger, a failure of thinking or letting be: *Gelassenheit*.

There is today no task more pressing than to raise Heidegger’s question of humanism precisely as the question of the human, whereby we might begin to raise the question of animal, plant, that is to say, and withal, natural (and that always means also supernatural) being, as open questions. Raising the question of technology (art) and nature, as multifarious aspects of the question of humanism, might take us in just the spirit of self-overcoming that is for Heidegger, and for Nietzsche, the meaning of the above-human – the *Übermensch* – beyond ourselves.
References

1. Although Heidegger’s relationship to Nietzsche is well-marked in Heidegger’s writings, beginning with but especially after his *Being and Time*, and in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* [Gesamtausgabe 65, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1989), in English as *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999)] in particular, this relationship is only infrequently invoked in recent discussions of the *Beiträge*, with the exception of Stuart Elden who makes use of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures. Likewise absent from most discussions of the *Beiträge* to date, with the exception of Elden and Glazebrook (both cited below), the question of science and technology was key for Heidegger throughout his life. And although scholars read Heidegger in terms of engagement with Nietzsche’s thinking (not easy as I argue elsewhere) and although others have attempted to read Heidegger in terms of his concern with science and technology, such scholarship is not only far from the rule in Heidegger interpretation but the conjoined emphasis I argue here is still more rarely to be found. It is to the point that the conjunction between Nietzsche and science was Heidegger’s own.


4. How late? Will this be the Heidegger of the turn? The Heidegger of the *Speigel* interview? The Heidegger of the seminars at Le Thor, Zähringen, Zollikon? The Heidegger in the years before his death, reviewing his writings for publication?


6. The emphasis on excess is not accidental here and we may recall that Habermas has spoken of Nietzsche’s influence as an ‘infection’ or ‘contagion’ (contaminating grounds for Habermas for suspecting not only Heidegger’s political sensibilities but even for calling from some distance from Adorno and Horkheimer, the founding fathers of the Frankfurt School). See Jürgen Habermas’s essay ‘On Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge: Postscript from *Nietzsche’s Erkenntnistheoretischen Schriften*’ and the companion essays in Babich, ed., *Habermas, Nietzsche, and Critical Theory* (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books 2004), pp.47-68 and following.


8. These names can be multiplied almost at will, but notorious among these are the French anti-Heideggerians, but also Richard Wolin, Hans Sluga, and so on.


13. Ibid. Pöggeler’s first book, *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking*, he alludes to the subtitle of the *Beiträge* in his first book in a way that would seem to indicate at least a familiarity with Heidegger’s elliptic epigraph: speaking of the thanks made to “what remained unsaid, as what is to be said in the future, and is thus heedful to what is promised but unconcealed (cf. *Das Ereignis*).” p.228.

14. The subtitle of Spengler’s 1931 *Der Mensch und die Technik* was subtitled *Beiträge zu einer Philosophie des Lebens*. Heidegger quotes this text (with antipathy) in his 1942-1943 lecture course on Parmenides.


16. Elden does not refer to this when he discusses the status of the claim that the *Beiträge* might be counted as Heidegger’s second major work after *Being and Time*, for Elden it simply appears out of nowhere on the dust jacket of the German edition. Elden, *Speaking Against Number: Heidegger, Language, and the Politics of Calculation* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2006). But see above, as well as Pöggeler’s own account of Heidegger’s reason for writing the *Beiträge* after the events of 1933-34 in *Neue Wege Mit Heidegger*, (Freiburg: Alber 1992), “Als er sich auf seine philosophische Arbeit zurückgeworfen sah, schrieb Heidegger in den Jahren 1936-1938 sein zweites Hauptwerk.” p.11. If Elden similarly explains the nature of the *Beiträge* as such a “working through,” he makes no reference to Pöggeler’s discussion of this issue for his own reading.

17. Heidegger writes “Eine der wesentlichen Formeln zur Kennzeichnung des Ereignisses des Nihilismus lautet: *Gott ist tot.*+ ... Mit Nihilismus meint Nietzsche die geschichtlichen Tatsache, d.h. das Ereignis, daß die obersten Werte sich entwerten, daß alle Ziele vernichtet sind und alles Wertschätzungen sich gegeneinander kehren.” Heidegger, *Nietzsche I* p.185. And in a much milder manner, what Pöggeler had already done for German scholars ‘in the know,’ David Farrell Krell as translator would do in one of his notes to the text. Krell points out that Heidegger’s invocation of the ‘event’ of nihilism,” cited four times in this and the following paragraphs, occasions perhaps the earliest ‘terminological’ use of the word *Ereignis* in Heidegger’s published writing.” Krell goes on to conclude with what this reader
reads as a reference to the *Beiträge* made by Heidegger and published in 1969. Krell is referring to the protocol made by Alfredo Guzzoni to the lecture ‘Zeit und Sein’, dated 11-13 September 1962. See *Zur Sache des Denken* (Tübingen: Niemayer 1969), p.46; Guzzoni’s protocol is also translated in *On Time and Being*, Joan Stambaugh, trans. (New York: Harper and Row 1972), p.43. See the prior reference to the context of this reference in *The Letter on Humanism and Identity and Difference*, p.36. Krell cites as follows “The relationships and contexts which constitute the essential structure of *Ereignis* were worked out between 1936 and 1938, which is to say, precisely at the time of the first two Nietzsche lecture courses.”


18. It is worth attending to the connection between Heidegger and Spengler in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures.


20. I have already explored the political and corresponding ethical implications of Heidegger’s non-publication of the *Beiträge* be it during the time of its composition or else afterwards. This failure of political action (and of courage) cannot be gainsaid. Yet the political insights of this same text are important.


22. Walter Otto was a member of the board of directors of the critical edition of Nietzsche’s works planned during the time of National Socialism since 1933 and invited Heidegger as well as Heyse and Max Oehler in 1935. For a schematic listing of this involvement, see David Marc Hoffman, *Zur Geschichte des Nietzsche-Archivs* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1993), p.115.

23. Thus the *Beiträge* § 259 (entitled ‘Philosophy’ like the previous § 258) and thus effecting an express recapitulation on the model of Nietzsche’s repetition of “ascetic ideals” in the third section of the *Genealogy of Morals* I and II, as a troping allusion Heidegger repeats throughout the *Beiträge*. In this way Heidegger both engages and positions the journalistic demand for “intelligibility” as well as the urgency for the novel and the cutting edge as this is characteristic of our theoretical post-postmodern, post-phenomenological, post-existential, etc., sensibilities today: “Making itself intelligible,” Heidegger writes in Nietzsche’s voice, “is suicide for philosophy.” (B § 259)

24. Although he does not address the issues I am raising here, Silvio Vietta does call attention to questions of identifying relevant dates, *Heideggers Kritik am Nationalsozialismus und an der Technik.* (Tübingen Niemayer,1989), pp. 70ff.

25. See von Herrmann’s “Editor’s Epilogue: Contributions to Philosophy,” p.365/514.

26. The assumption is fairly radical because, as von Herrmann also notes, the fiftieth section of the *Beiträge* both in “the manuscript as well as the typescript begins with Be-ing [Seyn],” Ibid.

27. These routine asides and comments on the arrangement of his texts (directed to the presumptions readers might have and employed to undercut the apparent ordering of the text as a whole) are far from unusual for the Heidegger who makes similar comments about argumentative array in *Being and Time* or *Introduction to Metaphysics* or *What is Called Thinking*.

28. See Note 3 above, for reference to my discussion of the cadence of Heidegger’s schematic argumentation as well as, more recently, Babich, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers*, Chapter Eight.
31. One of the virtues of The Ister, the 2004 Australian documentary by David Barison and Daniel Ross is the focus on technology, exemplified by the film’s intercalated citations from Heidegger’s lecture course. Like the *Beiträge*, it has been uncommon for scholars to offer commentaries on The Ister without adverting to the immediate relevance of technology in Heidegger’s 1942 lecture course on Hölderlin’s hymn.
33. Gadamer has famously recounted Heidegger’s expression of regret at the end of his life” “Nietzsche ruined me!” [*Nietzsche hat mich kaputtgemacht*] Although I have, as have others, this directly from Gadamer, Gadamer himself did not hear this from Heidegger as he tells us but rather from Heidegger’s son. On the occasion of a conference on the twentieth anniversary of Heidegger’s death, in the context of his speaking remarks for a discussion on Heidegger and Nietzsche (Gadamer himself had spoken on Heidegger and Hegel), Gadamer reflected on the meaning of “transition” or Übergang (both in philosophy in general and specifically in terms of Nietzsche’s thinking). Concurring with Heidegger’s assessment, Gadamer reflected that “it would not be with a conscious “I’ve done it” that Nietzsche effected the transition. And then there is a remark I repeatedly now invoke, ever since I first heard it from Heidegger’s son, that in the last months of his life, Heidegger constantly repeated ‘Nietzsche ruined me!’ One could hear that declaration from him regularly, acknowledging his own failure. What Nietzsche had attempted to do, he likewise failed to achieve,” Gadamer, ‘Heidegger und Nietzsche. Zu Nietzsche hat mich kaputtgemacht’, *Aletheia* 9/10 (1996): 19. See Babich, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers*, Chapter 1, pp.3 and 266.
36. This received logic would not merely be the logical positivists (the logic that was to become Carnap’s intellectual capital) but would have more generic proponents of another less rigorous kind in the journalistic self-importance and correspondingly cavalier self-confidence of the critics of *Being and Time* that would take Heidegger’s musing to more bitter reflections in other contexts, I refer here to Heidegger’s comments on death and what he called the “journalistic” (and “philistine”) interpretations of his *Being and Time* which, when it was not presented as an anthropology (evolving into the terms of existentialism) was presented as a philosophy of death. See Heidegger’s remarks in the *Beiträge*, § 162, 163.
40. For more on Heidegger on science, see references in Note 43 below as well as Babich
'Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science and the Critique of Calculation: Reflective Questioning,
Gelassenheit, Life’ forthcoming in Patricia Glazebrook, ed., Heidegger’s Critique of Science,
(Albany: State University of New York Press 2007) as well as in a context including an
overview of earlier discussions of this theme, Babich, “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science”
(cited above).
41. See Robert Sokowlowksi’s classic and insightful discussion: ‘Making Distinctions,’ Review
42. Aristotle, Meta. 1006a, cf., Nic. Eth. 1094b, etc.
43. I have long opposed such a reading and note that there is now increasing attention to the
question of Heidegger and logic, such as, for example, a new collection of essays edited by
Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski, eds., Heidegger und Logik (Rodopi 2006). More
broadly, see Dan Dahlstrom, Heidegger and the Concept of Truth as well as Michael
Friedman (cited above) and, on Aristotle, see Patricia Glazebrook’s Heidegger’s Philosophy
of Science (New York: Fordham University Press 1999) and for a still more focused reading
from a similarly Aristotelian perspective: William McNeill, The Glance of the Eye (Albany:
44. Heidegger’s conviction concerning the sameness of both Russian and American regimes (for
the longest time both were imagined as patently antithetical) is at once absurd (it is tacitly or
immediately rejected as naive or wrong) and it is also, given the tactically, politically
unexpected events of recent history, exactly accurate.
46. “Ackerbau ist jetzt motorisierte Ernährungsindustrie, im Wesen das Selbe wie die
Fabrikation von Leichen in Gaskammern und Vernichtungslagern, das Selbe wie die
Blockade und Aushungern auf Landern, das Selbe wie die Fabrikation von
Wasserstoffbomben.” Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge GA 79 (Frankfurt:
Vittorio Klostermann 1994), ‘Das Ge-Stell’. p.27. The incendiary quote from this then (and
as yet still) untranslated text was first cited in violation of authorized access to the text in
question, a matter of great consternation for the Heidegger family. Nevertheless the breach,
in the form of a citation included in a book otherwise little debated (this says more about
professional philosophy’s lack of interest in the question of Heidegger and technology than
anything else) inspired an academic as excerpts can do (acontextually adds to this) in the
Winter 1989 issue of Critical Inquiry 16/2 on ‘Heidegger and Nazism’ and featuring
Gadamer, Derrida, Habermas, and most significantly Levinas’s discussions of Heidegger’s
failure to speak about his Nazi past. I discuss this further, and offer additional references in
Babich, ‘Heidegger’s Silence: Towards a Post-Modern Topology’ in Charles Scott and
Arleen Dallery, eds., Ethics and Danger: Currents in Continental Thought (Albany: State
47. Emmanuel Levinas, ‘As if Consenting to Horror’ Critical Inquiry 16/2 (Winter 1989): 483-
488; here p.487.
49. Ibid.
50. There are numerous books of note on this theme in recent years. See for a general and
comprehensive start, Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences
Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust (New York: Lantern Books
52. Adorno, Beethoven, p.80.
53. Ibid.
54. This is Heidegger’s point in his ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ [‘Die Frage nach der
55. Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil.
59
56. Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, p.115.

57. This reference to Hölderlin’s *Empedocles* was important in much the same way for Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*. This is a complex point of reference and interconnection and I discuss this in *Words and Blood, Like Flowers*, Chapter Four. See too Veronique Foti, *Epochal Discordance* (Albany: State University of New York 2006) and David B. Allison’s discussion of Zarathustra in his *Reading the New Nietzsche* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2001). See here also *Beiträge* §43 where Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s *Twilight of the Idols*: “Der Wille zum System ist ein Mangel an Rechtschaffenheit.”

58. It is important to consider, in addition to the points and references noted just above, Pierre Bertaux, *Hölderlin und die Französische Revolution* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1969) just to begin to explore the significance of this event for an understanding of Hölderlin’s life story (most particularly, most incendiarily, Hölderlin’s madness) and see any number of extant historical accounts of the political involvement of Hölderlin’s writing for an understanding of the allusion.

59. Heidegger himself attends to this very constellation. See, for a discussion, Babich, ‘Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science and the Critique of Calculation: Reflective Questioning, *Gelassenheit*, Life’.