2003

Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought

William J. Richardson
Boston College, william.richardson@bc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_research
Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_research/38

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Hermeneutic and Phenomenological Philosophies of Science at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Resources by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact considine@fordham.edu, dsabol@fordham.edu.
HEIDEGGER

Through Phenomenology to Thought

by

WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, S.J.
Docteur et Maitre agrégé de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain

PREFACE BY
MARTIN HEIDEGGER

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York
2003
HEIDEGGER

Auf einen Stern zu gehen, nur dieses
Auf der Erfahrung des Denkens

To follow a star, only this
Thoughts Along the Way
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

*Preface by Martin Heidegger*  
VIII

*Preface to the U.S. Edition*  
XXV

*Acknowledgments*  
XXXIX

*Writer's preface*  
XLI

*Writer's preface to the third edition*  
XLVI

*List of Symbols Used*  
XLVII

**Introduction**  
1

**Part I: From There to Being**  
25

Chapter I. Being and Time  
27

Chapter II. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics  
106

Chapter III. The Essence of Ground  
161

Chapter IV. What is Metaphysics?  
194

**Part II: Reversal**  
209

Chapter I. On the Essence of Truth  
211

Chapter II. The Self-assertion of the German University  
255

Chapter III. Introduction to Metaphysics  
259

**Part III: From Being to There**  
299

**Section A. The De-volution of Thought**  
299

Chapter I. Plato  
301

Chapter II. Aristotle  
309

Chapter III. Descartes  
321

Chapter IV. Hegel  
331

Chapter V. Nietzsche  
361

Chapter VI. Logic  
383

Chapter VII. Humanism  
387

Chapter VIII. Transition: Rilke  
391
TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION B. THE RE-TRIEVE OF THOUGHT

| Chapter I. The Origin of a Work of Art, Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry | 403 |
| Chapter II. The Time of World-as-Picture | 418 |
| Chapter III. “As when upon a day of rest…” | 423 |
| Chapter IV. Nietzsche’s Word “God is dead” | 434 |
| Chapter V. “Homecoming,” “Recollection” | 440 |
| Chapter VI. What is Metaphysics: Epilogue | 473 |
| Chapter VII. Ἀλήθεια | 484 |
| Chapter VIII. Αόγος | 490 |
| Chapter IX. Towards an Analysis of Release, Nihilism in Terms of Being-as-history | 510 |
| Chapter X. The Saying of Anaximander | 514 |
| Chapter XI. Whereunto the Poet? | 527 |
| Chapter XII. Letter on Humanism | 530 |
| Chapter XIII. Interlude From the Experience of Thought | 553 |
| The Pathway | 558 |
| Chapter XIV. What is Metaphysics?: Introduction. The Essence of Ground: Prologue | 562 |
| Chapter XV. The Thing | 566 |
| Chapter XVI. Language | 577 |
| Chapter XVII. Working, Dwelling, Thinking | 583 |
| Chapter XVIII. “…Poetically doth man dwell…” | 588 |
| Chapter XIX. What E-vokes Thought? | 595 |

CONCLUSION

Epilogue | 643 |

Chapter Outlines | 651 |

Appendix: Courses, Seminars and Lectures of Martin Heidegger | 669 |

Bibliography:
- Heidegger’s Works | 683
  - A. Order of Publication | 683
  - B. Order of Composition | 687
- Other Works Cited | 691
- Selective Bibliography | 693
- English Translations | 698

Glossary | 701
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indexes:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Index of Texts Cited</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Index of Proper Names</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Index of Greek Terms</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. General Index</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dear Father Richardson:

It is with some hesitation that I attempt to answer the two principal questions you posed in your letter of March 1, 1962. The first touches on the initial impetus that determined the way my thought would go.¹ The other looks for information about the much discussed "reversal" [in my development].

I hesitate with my answers, for they are necessarily no more than indications [of much more to be said]. The lesson of long experience leads me to surmise that such indications will not be taken as directions for the road of independent reflection on the matter pointed out which each must travel for himself. [Instead they] will gain notice as though they were an opinion I had expressed, and will be propagated as such. Every effort to bring what has been thought closer to prevailing modes of (re)presentation must assimilate what-is-to-be-thought to those (re)presentations and thereby inevitably deform the matter.²

This preamble is not the lament of a man misunderstood; it is rather the recognition of an almost insurmountable difficulty in making oneself understood.

The first question in your letter reads: "How are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in

¹ [Translator's note. With regard to the translation of Denken, see below, p. 16, note 43.]
² [Translator's note. For the translation of Vorstellung by "(re)presentation," see below, p. 106, note 5.]
Sehr geehrter Herr P. Richardson!


Diese Vorbemerkung ist kein Klagelied eines Mißverstandenen, sondern die Feststellung einer fast unaufhebbaren Schwierigkeit der Verständigung.

Die eine Frage Ihres Briefes lautet:

"Wie ist Ihre erste Erfahrung der Seinsfrage bei Brentano eigentlich zu verstehen?"
Brentano?" "In Brentano." You have in mind the fact that the first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano's dissertation: *On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle* (1862). On the title page of his work, Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: το  ὁ λέγεται πολλαχῶς. I translate: "A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its Being) in many ways." Latent in this phrase is the question that determined the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings? This question raised others: What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined? One need but run over the names assigned to them in the language of the philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they seem, at first, irreconcilable: Being as property, Being as possibility and actuality, Being as truth, Being as schema of the categories. What sense of Being comes to expression in these four headings? How can they be brought into comprehensible accord?

This accord can not be grasped without first raising and settling the question: whence does Being as such (not merely beings as beings) receive its determination?

Meanwhile a decade went by and a great deal of swerving and straying through the history of Western philosophy was needed for the above questions to reach even an initial clarity. To gain this clarity three insights were decisive, though, to be sure, not yet sufficient for the venture of analysing the Being-question as a question about the sense of Being.

Dialogues with Husserl provided the immediate experience of the phenomenological method that prepared the concept of phenomenology explained in the Introduction to *Being and Time* (§7). In this evolution a normative rôle was played by the reference back to fundamental words of Greek thought which I interpreted accordingly: λόγος (to make manifest) and φαίνεσθαι (to show oneself).

A renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises (especially Book IX of the *Metaphysics* and Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*) resulted in the insight into διήθεσις as a process of revealment, and in the characterisation of truth as non-conceal-

Diesen Einklang können wir erst dann vernehmen, wenn zuvor gefragt und geklärt wird: Woher empfängt das Sein als solches (nicht nur das Seiende als Seiendes) seine Bestimmung?

Indes verging ein Jahrzehnt, und es bedurfte vieler Um- und Abwege durch die Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie hindurch, bis auch nur die genannten Fragen in eine erste Klarheit gelangten. Dafür waren drei Einsichten entscheidend, die freilich noch nicht ausreichten, um eine Erörterung der Seinsfrage als Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein zu wagen.

Durch die unmittelbare Erfahrung der phänomenologischen Methode in Gesprächen mit Husserl bereitete sich der Begriff von Phänomenologie vor, der in der Einleitung zu "Sein und Zeit" (§ 7) dargestellt ist. Hierbei spielt die Rückbeziehung auf die entsprechend ausgelegten Grundworte des griechischen Denkens: λόγος (offenbar machen) und φαίνεσθαι (sich zeigen) eine maßgebende Rolle.

Ein erneutes Studium der Aristotelischen Abhandlungen (im besonderen des neunten Buches der "Metaphysik" und des sechsten Buches der "Nikomachischen Ethik") ergab den Einblick in das ἀληθέως als entbergen und die Kennzeichnung der Wahr-
ment, to which all self-manifestation of beings pertains. Only someone who is thinking superficially or, indeed, not thinking at all can content himself with the observation that Heidegger conceives truth as non-concealment. As if with ἀ-ἀληθής what is properly worthy-of-thought did not take merely a first approximate form.\(^3\) The situation is not improved by proposing the translation “non-forgotten-ness” in place of “non-concealment.” For “forgotten-ness” [too] must be thought in Greek fashion as withdrawal into concealment. Correspondingly, the counter-phenomenon to forgetting, [sc.] remembering, must receive a [genuinely] Greek interpretation which sees it as a striving after, an attaining to, the non-concealed. Plato’s ἀνάμνησις of the Ideas implies: catching-sight-once-again, [hence] the revealing, of beings, sc. in that by which they shine-forth.

With the insight into ἀληθής as non-concealment came recognition of the fundamental trait of ὀντόστροφος, the Being of beings: presence. But a literal translation, sc. a translation that thought draws out of the matter itself, is expressive only when the heart of the matter, in this case Presence as such, is brought before thought. The disquieting, ever watchful question about Being under the guise of Presence (Present) developed into the question about Being in terms of its time-character. As soon as this happened, it became clear that the traditional concept of time was in no respect adequate even for correctly posing the question concerning the time-character of Presence, to say nothing of answering it. Time became questionable in the same way as Being. The ecstatic-horizontal temporality delineated in *Being and Time* is not by any means already the most proper attribute of time that must be sought in answer to the Being-question.

Subsequent to this tentative clarification of ἀληθής and ὀντόστροφος, the meaning and scope of the principle of phenomenology, “to the things themselves,” became clear. As my familiarity with phenomenology grew, no longer merely through literature but by actual practice, the question about Being, aroused by Brentano’s work, nevertheless remained always in view. So it was that doubt arose whether the “thing itself” was to be charac-

\(^3\) [Translator’s note. Possibly: “… As if it were not with ἀληθής [that] what is properly speaking worthy-of-thought reached a first liminal appearance…”]
VORWORT

heit als Unverborgenheit, in die alles Sichzeigen des Seienden gehört. Man denkt freilich zu kurz oder überhaupt nicht, wenn man sich mit der Feststellung begnügt: Heidegger faßt die Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit. Als ob nicht mit der $\delta \lambda \zeta \theta \varepsilon \alpha \alpha$ das eigentliche Denkwürdige erst zu einem ungefähren Vorschein käme. Der Sache wird auch dadurch nicht geholfen, daß man statt "Unverborgenheit" die Übersetzung "Unvergessenheit" vorbringt. Denn die "Vergessenheit" muß griechisch als Entzug in die Verbergung gedacht werden. Entsprechend muß das Gegenphänomen zum Vergessen, das Erinnern, griechisch ausgelegt werden: als Erwerben, Erlangen des Unverborgenen. Platon's $\alpha \nu \alpha \mu \nu \gamma \varepsilon \varsigma$ der Ideen besagt: das wieder-zu-Gesicht-Bekommen, das Entbergen, nämlich des Seienden in seinem Aussehen.

Mit dem Einblick in die $\delta \lambda \zeta \theta \varepsilon \alpha \alpha$ als Unverborgenheit wurde der Grundzug der $\omega \sigma \tau \alpha$, des Seins des Seienden erkannt: die Anwesenheit. Aber die wörtliche, d. h. die aus der Sache gedachte Übersetzung spricht erst dann, wenn der Sachgehalt der Sache, hier die Anwesenheit als solche, vor das Denken gebracht wird. Die beunruhigende, ständig wache Frage nach dem Sein als Anwesenheit (Gegenwart) entfaltete sich zur Frage nach dem Sein hinsichtlich seines Zeitcharakters. Dabei zeigte sich alsbald, daß der überlieferte Zeitbegriff nach keiner Hinsicht zureicht, auch nur die Frage nach dem Zeitcharakter der Anwesenheit sachgerecht zu stellen, geschweige denn, sie zu beantworten. Die Zeit wurde in derselben Weise fragwürdig wie das Sein. Die in "Sein und Zeit" gekennzeichnete ekstatisch-horizontale Zeitlichkeit ist keineswegs schon das der Seinsfrage entsprechende gesuchte Eigenste der Zeit.

Mit der vorläufigen Aufhellung von $\delta \lambda \zeta \theta \varepsilon \alpha \alpha$ und $\omega \sigma \tau \alpha$ klärten sich in der Folge Sinn und Tragweite des Prinzips der Phänomenologie: "zu den Sachen selbst". Bei der nicht mehr nur literarischen sondern vollzugsmaßigen Einarbeitung in die Phänomenologie blieb jedoch die durch Brentanos Schrift erweckte Frage nach dem Sein im Blick. Dadurch entstand der Zweifel, ob "die Sache selbst" als das intentionale Bewußtsein oder gar
terised as intentional consciousness, or even as the transcendental ego. If, indeed, phenomenology, as the process of letting things manifest themselves, should characterise the standard method of philosophy, and if from ancient times the guide-question of philosophy has perdured in the most diverse forms as the question about the Being of beings, then Being had to remain the first and last thing-itself of thought.

Meanwhile "phenomenology" in Husserl's sense was elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The historicity of thought remained completely foreign to such a position (see the too little observed work of Husserl: "Philosophy as a strict Science," which appeared 1910–11 in the review Logos, pp. 289 ff.).

The Being-question, unfolded in Being and Time, parted company with this philosophical position, and that on the basis of what to this day I still consider a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology.

What a few strokes can thus sketch, in retrospect that verges constantly on retractatio, was, in its historical reality, a tangled process, inscrutable even to me. This process inevitably remained captive to contemporary modes of (re)presentation and language, and was accompanied by inadequate explanations of its own intentions.

Now if in the title of your book, From Phenomenology to Thought, you understand "Phenomenology" in the sense just described as a philosophical position of Husserl, then the title is to the point, insofar as the Being-question as posed by me is something completely different from that position. The title is fully justified, if the term "Thought" is shorn of that ambiguity which allows it to cover on the one hand metaphysical thought (the thinking of the Being of beings) and on the other the Being-question, sc. the thinking of Being as such (the revealed-ness of Being).

4 [Translator's note. For the sense of "guide"-question as distinct from "ground"-question, see below, p. 7, note 15.]
5 [Translator's note. We retain the Latin form retractatio, because: the English "retraction," in the sense of "recantation," is obviously incoherent with the author's intention, which warrants rather the notion of "retouching" ("retreatment," "re-thinking") suggested by the Latin; the translation "retouching," though consistent with the metaphor contained in the text, fails to retain the apparently deliberate allusion to St. Augustine which retractatio contains.]
als das transzendentale Ich zu bestimmen sei. Wenn anders die Phänomenologie als das Sichzeigenlassen der Sache selbst die maßgebende Methode der Philosophie bestimmen soll und wenn die Leitfrage der Philosophie sich von alters her in den verschiedensten Gestalten als die Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden durchhielt, dann mußte das Sein die erste und letzte Sache selbst für das Denken bleiben.


Gegen diese philosophische Position setzte sich die in "Sein und Zeit" entfaltete Seinsfrage ab und dies auf grund eines, wie ich heute noch glaube, sachgerechteren Festhaltens am Prinzip der Phänomenologie.

Was sich so durch einen Rückblick, der stets zu einer retractatio wird, in wenigen Zügen darstellen läßt, war nach seiner geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit ein verwickelter, mir selbst undurchsichtiger Vorgang. Dieser blieb unausweichlich der zeitgenössischen Vorstellungsweise und Sprache verhaftet und führte unzureichende Deutungen des eigenen Vorhabens mit sich.

If, however, we understand "Phenomenology" as the [process of] allowing the most proper concern of thought to show itself, then the title should read "Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being." This possessive [of Being], then, says that Being as such (Beon) shows itself simultaneously as that which is to-be-thought and as that which has want of a thought corresponding to it.

This indication already brings me to touch upon your second question. It reads: "Granted that a 'reversal' has come-to-pass in your thinking, how has it come-to-pass? In other words, how are [we] to think this coming-to-pass itself?"

Your question admits of an answer only if first we make clear what "reversal" means, [or] more precisely, if one is ready to think through in becoming fashion what has already been said, instead of constantly circulating unwarranted assertions. The first time in my published writings that I spoke of the "reversal" was in the "Letter on Humanism" (1947, p. 71; separate edition, p. 17). The inference has thus been drawn that since 1947 Heidegger's thought has undergone "in-version," or even, since 1945, "con-version." No allowance whatever is made for reflection on the fact that a good number of years are needed before the thinking through of so decisive a matter can find its way into the clear. Perhaps the text cited below will serve to show that the matter thought in the term "reversal" was already at work in my thinking ten years prior to 1947. The thinking of the reversal is a change in my thought. But this change is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental issue, of Being and Time. The thinking of the reversal results from the fact that I stayed with the matter-for-thought [of] "Being and Time," sc. by inquiring into that perspective which already in Being and Time (p. 39) was designated as "Time and Being."

* [Translator’s note. The original title of this book was From Phenomenology to Thought, which, when translated into German, became Der Weg von der Phänomenologie zum Seinsdenken. What the writer understood by "Phenomenology" in this case must be gathered from the entire study that follows (but see especially below, pp. 624, 631). Be this as it may, Professor Heidegger’s suggestion is a valuable one, and in view of it the title was changed to its present form just as the book went to press.]

† [Translator’s note. For the sense of Seyn and its translation by “Beon,” see below, pp. 457, 554. Braucht in the present context might be translated by "needs," but we prefer "has want of" for reasons that appear below, pp. 597, 600, 614.]
Verstehen wir aber die "Phänomenologie" als das Sichzeigenlassen der eigensten Sache des Denkens, dann müßte der Titel lauten: "Ein Weg durch die Phänomenologie in das Denken des Seins". Dieser Genitiv sagt dann, daß das Sein als solches (das Seyn) sich zugleich als jenes zu Denkende zeigt, was ein ihm entsprechendes Denken braucht.

Mit diesem Hinweis streife ich schon die zweite von Ihnen gestellte Frage. Sie lautet:

"Zugegeben, daß in Ihrem Seinsdenken eine 'Kehre' geschehen ist – wie ist dann diese 'Kehre' geschehen – oder, anders gefragt, wie ist dieses Geschehen selbst zu denken?"

The reversal is above all not an operation of interrogative thought; it is inherent in the very matter designated by the headings: "Being and Time," "Time and Being." For this reason, the passage cited from the "Letter on Humanism" reads: "Here the Whole is reversed." "The Whole": this means the matter [involved] in "Being and Time," "Time and Being." The reversal is in play within the matter itself. Neither did I invent it nor does it affect merely my thought. Up to now I know of no attempt to reflect on this matter and analyse it critically. Instead of the groundless, endless prattle about the "reversal," it would be more advisable and fruitful if people would simply engage themselves in the matter mentioned. Refusal to do so obliges one ipso facto to demonstrate that the Being-question developed in *Being and Time* is unjustified, superfluous and impossible. Any criticism of *Being and Time* starting in this fashion, however, must obviously first be set straight.

One need only observe the simple fact that in *Being and Time* the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism – that the entire anthropological problematic is kept at a distance, that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience of There-being with a constant eye to the Being-question – for it to become strikingly clear that the "Being" into which *Being and Time* inquired can not long remain something that the human subject posits. It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its time-character, [that] makes the approach to There-being. As a result, even in the initial steps of the Being-question in *Being and Time* thought is called upon to undergo a change whose movement cor-responds with the reversal.

And yet, the basic question of *Being and Time* is not in any sense abandoned by reason of the reversal. Accordingly, the prefatory note to the seventh unrevised edition of *Being and Time* (1957) contains the remark: [This] "way still remains even today a necessary one, if the question about Being is to stir our There-being." Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of *Being and Time* is decisively ful-filled in the thinking of the reversal. He alone can ful-fill who has a vision of fullness.

---

8 [Translator's note. For the translation of *Dasein* by "There-being," see below, p. 34, note 17.]

9 [Translator’s note. The translation offered here is at best a reasonable facsimile of the *ergdenzen-Ganzes* correlation in the German. Someone has suggested: "... is decisively whol-ified. He alone can whol-ify who has a view of the whole...." Very Heidegger, but not very English!]


Der "Weg bleibt indessen auch heute noch ein notwendiger, wenn die Frage nach dem Sein unser Dasein bewegen soll".

Dagegen wird im Denken der Kehre die Fragestellung von "Sein und Zeit" auf eine entscheidende Weise er-gänzt. Ergänzen kann nur, wer das Ganze erblickt. Diese Ergänzung erbringt auch erst
This fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an adequate characterization of There-being, sc. of the essence of man [as] thought in terms of the truth of Being as such (cf. *Being and Time* § 66). Accordingly, the first draft of the lecture course for the winter semester of 1937–38, which tries to analyze the necessity of the question of truth in the perspective of the question of Being, reads in part:

Over and over again we must insist: In the question of truth as posed here, what is at stake is not only an alteration in the traditional conception of truth, nor a complement of its current (re)presentation; what is at stake is a transformation in man’s Being itself. This transformation is not demanded by new psychological or biological insights. Man here is not the object of any anthropology whatever. Man comes into question here in the deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective: man in his relation to Being – sc. in the reversal: Being and its truth in relation to man.

The “coming-to-pass” of the reversal which you ask about “is” Being as such. It can only be thought *out of* the reversal. There is no special kind of coming-to-pass that is proper to this [process]. Rather, the reversal between Being and Time, between Time and Being, is determined by the way Being is granted, Time is granted. I tried to say a word about this “is granted” in the lecture “Time and Being” which you heard yourself here [in Freiburg] on January 30, 1962.10

If instead of “Time” we substitute: the lighting-up of the self-concealing [that is proper to] the process of coming-to-presence, then Being is determined by the scope of Time. This comes about, however, only insofar as the lighting-process of self-concealment assumes unto its want a thought that corresponds to it.

[The process of] presenc-ing (Being) is inherent in the lighting-up of self-concealment (Time). [The] lighting-up of self-concealment (Time) brings forth the process of presenc-ing (Being).

It is [due] neither [to] the merit of my questioning nor [to some] arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal bearing reposes in a [mutual] ap-propriation and is called e-vent

10 [Translator’s note. Awkward though it appears, this translation of *Es gibt* offers distinct advantages over the more natural “there is,” for reasons that appear in the lecture to which Professor Heidegger alludes.]
die zureichende Bestimmung des Da-seins, d. h. des von der Wahrheit des Seins als solchen her gedachten Wesens des Menschen (vgl. "Sein und Zeit", § 66). Demgemäß lautet ein Text des ersten Entwurfs der Vorlesung für das Wintersemester 1937/38, die versucht, die Notwendigkeit der Wahrheitsfrage im Hinblick auf die Seinsfrage zu erörtern:


Anwesen (Sein) gehört in die Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit). Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen (Sein).

Es ist weder das Verdienst meines Fragens noch der Macht- spruch meines Denkens, daß dieses Gehören und Erbringen im Er-eignen beruht und Ereignis heißt (vgl. "Identität und Difle-
(cf. *Identity and Difference*, p. 30 ff.). The fact that what we thoughtlessly enough call "truth" the Greeks called "A-μήγεια" – as well, indeed, in poetical and non-philosophical as in philosophical language – is not [a result of] their [own] invention and caprice. It is the richest endowment of their language, in which that-which-comes-to-presence as such attained non-concealment and – concealment. Without an eye for the granting of such a gift to man, without a sense for the e-mitting of such an e-mittence, one will no more comprehend what is said about the mittence of Being than the man born blind can ever experience what light and color are.

The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II.

Meanwhile, every formulation is open to misunderstanding. In proportion to the intrinsically manifold matter of Being and Time, all words which give it utterance (like reversal, forgotten-ness and mittence) are always ambiguous. Only a [commensurately] manifold thought succeeds in uttering the heart of this matter in a way that cor-responds with it.

This manifold thought requires, however, not a new language but a transformed relationship to the essenc[-ing] of the old one.

My wish for your work – for which you alone bear the responsibility – is this: may it help set in motion the manifold thinking of the simple business of thought, which, by reason of its very simplicity, abounds in hidden plenitude.

Freiburg im Breisgau, early April, 1962

*Martin Heidegger*
renz", S. 30 ff.). Daß für die Griechen das, was wir gedankenlos genug "Wahrheit" nennen, $\alpha$-$\alpha$ heiβt, und zwar in der dichterischen und in der nicht philosophischen ebenso wie in der philosophischen Sprache, ist nicht ihre Erfindung und Willkür. Es ist die höchste Mitgift für ihre Sprache, in der das Anwesende als ein solches zur Unverborgenheit und – Verbergung gelangte. Wer für das Erblicken des Gebens einer solchen Gabe an den Menschen, für das Schicken eines so Geschickten keinen Sinn hat, wird die Rede vom Seinsgeschick nie verstehen, so wenig wie der von Natur Blinde je erfahren kann, was Licht und Farbe sind.


Dieses mehrfältige Denken verlangt zwar keine neue Sprache, aber ein gewandeltes Verhältnis zum Wesen der alten.

Mein Wunsch ist, Ihr Werk, für das Sie allein die Verantwortung tragen, möge helfen, das mehrfältige Denken der einfachen und deshalb die Fülle bergenden Sache des Denkens in Gang zu bringen.

Freiburg i. Br. Anfang April 1962

MARTIN HEIDEGGER
PREFACE TO THE U.S. EDITION

After forty years of scholarship that has carefully pawed over the data on which the research effort reported in this book was based, and after the gradual publication, in somewhat parallel sequence, of a major portion of Heidegger’s Collected Works (the Gesamtausgabe) that contained prodigious amounts of material relevant to this research but inaccessible to the writer when it was undertaken, any serious effort to “revise” the original text in preparation for its U.S. publication in a more student-friendly form than the original is, as a practical endeavor, simply not feasible. One would have to start all over again. What does seem feasible, however, as a way of introducing the text to a new generation of readers, is to briefly discuss a single theme, characteristic of (and central to) the book’s entire argument, that may suggest the sense and continuing relevance of the work as a whole.

It will be clear to anyone familiar with Heidegger scholarship over these years that the apparent difference between the philosophical style of an early Heidegger (for example, the author of Being and Time), which in the following study I labeled “Heidegger I,” and that of a much later period, which I designated roughly as “Heidegger II,” became a bone of contention among Heidegger’s interpreters and provoked more sound and fury

than it perhaps deserved. The debate itself has long since, like any storm, spun itself out, yet it remains part of the Heidegger story in the United States and deserves at least a historical note. It seems worthwhile for the contemporary reader to understand how this distinction came about in order to assess what value it may or may not retain today, long after it was first proposed. Under the circumstances, I hope the reader will be indulgent with the inevitably autobiographical tone of the following account.

When I first arrived in Freiburg in the early fall of 1955, in order to follow Heidegger’s announced lecture course on *The Principle of Reason*, I had the extraordinary good fortune to share lodgings with an Italian student, Virgilio Fagone, who was finishing his dissertation on Heidegger for the Gregorian University (Rome) under the direction of a German professor with a special interest in Heidegger, J.-B. Lotz (a contemporary and friend of the eminent theologian Karl Rahner, both of them former students of Heidegger in the turbulent thirties). Fagone was a small, ebullient man who loved life, loved philosophy (especially à la Heidegger), and loved to talk. As a personality, he was bubbling champagne. He was also an exceptionally gifted man, whose lucid mind and solid erudition had earned him (through the mediation of Professor Max Müller—former student become personal friend of Heidegger) an invitation to participate in Heidegger’s by-invitation-only seminar on Hegel’s *Logic* that ran concomitantly with the public lecture course and is known to the reading public by the presentation with which Heidegger himself concluded it, “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics.”

For my own part, I was the total innocent. I was beginning graduate studies in order, eventually, to teach metaphysics, and I knew that Heidegger was a contemporary who had something to say about it. I had been accepted at the Higher Institute of Philosophy (Louvain) and had made some preliminary contact

---


with the Heidegger specialist there, Alphonse De Waelhens, who had tentatively agreed to supervise my work. Beyond that, I knew practically nothing. Fagone mistook my interest for knowledge and would return from his seminar sessions with Heidegger burning with eagerness to pour out all he had heard on my attentive but uncomprehending ears. In particular, he kept stressing (for reasons I did not yet understand) the coherence between what Heidegger was then doing with Hegel’s *Logic* and what he had attempted in *Being and Time*. The secret? Whispered with raised eyebrows and a roll of the eyes, some mysterious alchemy called “the Kehre.” All those who thought that with *Being and Time* Heidegger had reached some kind of dead end were simply oblivious to the wonderfully transformative power of the Kehre.

Slowly, I realized that De Waelhens, dean of the French commentators on *Being and Time* and Doktorvater-designate of my thesis-to-be, was precisely one of these unenlightened. Recalling my initial conversations with him, I remembered his saying how he felt that the original project of *Being and Time*, so full of promise, had simply gone bankrupt, and that Heidegger, in frustration and disappointment, had turned to some kind of poetizing—sorry substitute for one so gifted for rigorous philosophical analysis as he. Clearly, there were at least two ways of understanding the meaning of the later Heidegger or, at least, two ways of conceiving the relationship between the early and the later periods: as escape or as fulfillment. In this sense, the question of “two” Heideggers was, from the beginning (in 1955), a given—the use of “I” and “II” was simply the most practical shorthand device I could think of to refer to them in note-taking. The task would be to find some way of examining the relationship between them.

But how? Here, too, Fagone had a suggestion, though it tumbled out one evening inadvertently, à propos of something completely other: “Foundational thinking (*Das wesentliche Denken*)! Now there’s an interesting idea! How does it relate to the phe-

---


The idea stuck. I spent the semester casting about for a suitable dissertation topic and considered many, but in the end this seemed the most promising of all. Before the term was over, I revved up enough courage (naive brashness?) to approach the Lion himself in his den during one of the scheduled “office hours” that followed each public lecture. Would the tracing of the notion of the “thinking of Being” be a suitable dissertation topic? A firm “Ja” was all the answer I needed, and the decision was made.

De Waelhens was appalled. “Are you serious? Do you really want to work on that?” he asked. Dismayed by his reaction but bolstered by Heidegger’s approval, I had the sinking feeling that this might be bite-the-bullet time and, with deep breath and anxious gulp, muttered, “Yes.” He sighed deeply, shrugged his shoulders, and shook his head in disbelief as if to say, “You must be out of your mind”—but did not refuse to provide supervision. It turned out to be an ideal match. De Waelhens deeply disliked the later Heidegger (had Heidegger’s Nazi experience influenced his attitude?), but he took his professional obligation seriously: he read what I wrote carefully and incisively; his criticism was forthright, often expressed with wry, half-smile humor (“un peu de distance, quand même”); and he remained committed to the task long after the direction of the work pointed toward a conclusion that clearly would challenge his own deeply held views. Best of all, he helped me understand the burden of freedom and showed by very concrete example what it meant to “let [someone] be.”

Course work in Louvain finished, research resumed in earnest back in Freiburg. When I had worked through the texts of the early period up to (and including) “On the Essence of Truth” (1930–43), in which the phrase “the thinking of Being” first appeared in the published work and the shift of focus from Dasein to Being that characterized (as far as I could see) the later period was first clearly discernible,7 I was tired of being a schoolboy and wanted to wrap up the doctorate so as to be able to return home to go to work. Subsequent research, I thought,

could be left to the postdoctoral years. De Waelhens advised against that plan. "Your work is solid enough, but you have dealt with texts that others, too, have interpreted. Now that you have both a method and a momentum in using it, you are in a position to interpret texts that others have not yet worked through. If you finish what you have started and work through the rest of his recently published texts, this could become a real contribution that would be of help to everybody." And so, with some reluctance, I continued. I was aware, of course, that there were a number of unpublished manuscripts around that could be very illuminating, and I began to collect them, or at least to photograph them. But in that pre-Xerox era this was a cumbersome and time-consuming task that yielded unreliable (ultimately, unusable) results. So I decided to make a virtue of necessity and limit my research to the published texts for which Heidegger himself could be held responsible.

Working conditions in Freiburg were congenial. What began as a small reading group grew into a circle of friends, one of whom, Michael Theunissen, would later become an eminent member of Germany's academic philosophical scene. On the professorial level, Eugen Fink, Bernard Welte, and Max Müller were all accessible; but it was Müller, to whom I was first introduced by Fagone, who quickly became teacher, mentor, and friend. Insight came slowly. Texts such as *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935) and some of the interpretations of Hölderlin (for example, "Andenken," 1943) clearly belonged to the later period yet just as clearly contained configurations that conformed to patterns of *Being and Time*. With the "Letter on Humanism" (1947) the issue of the *Kehre* was explicitly introduced, and the shift from the thought patterns of the early

---

8. Even this presented problems. Recall, for example, the unannounced and unexplained shift in the text of the first edition (1943) of the "Epilogue" to *What Is Metaphysics?* which read, "being indeed comes-to-presence without beings" (my emphasis), to the second edition of the same text (1949), which read, "Being never comes-to-presence without beings" (my emphasis). This demanded some hermeneutic acrobatics, after all (cf. Richardson, *Heidegger*, 562–65).


Heidegger to those of the later period were given a local habitation and a name. It was here that he confirmed the interpretation that I had proposed for the essay “On the Essence of Truth.” It was particularly reassuring to find the following text:

The lecture “On the Essence of Truth” . . . provides a certain insight into the thinking of the turn from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being.” This turn is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being.12

After meditating on this text, I fell upon the idea (actually, to be more precise, it fell upon me as I tumbled out of bed one morning when I was back in Louvain to consult with De Waelhens) that the later period could be thought of as an attempt to retrieve (Wiederholung) the unsaid of the earlier period—what was not and could not be said in the mindset of Being and Time. That would settle the question about “two” Heideggers: the hypothesis of the later “retrieving” the earlier would account for unity/continuity of the two in a single enterprise yet also explain the difference of focus and style between them that gave De Waelhens and company such dyspepsia. Hooray!

But this did not do much for the question of thinking and its possible relationship to the phenomenology of Being and Time. The most direct address to the question occurs in the voēiv elīvα correlation as analyzed in the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935),13 in which thinking is conceived essentially as an active acceptance of Being. The notion comes full circle in What Is Called Thinking? (1952), in which the same fundamental structure is discernible in another text of Parmenides as correlation between lēγενν-voēiv and ἐδον-ἐμμενα.14 Here the sense is that thinking means to let-lie-forth (lēγενν) and accept-the-care-of (voēiv) beings in their Being (ἐδον-ἐμμενα)—a reading that focuses more sharply than the former text on the ontological dif-

12 Ibid., 243.
ference as such between Being and beings. In another context of the same work, thinking (Denken) is considered on one hand as (dynamic) structure, that is, “re-cord” (Gedächtnis), and on the other hand as process, that is, “thanking” (Danken). In short, the nature of thinking is for Dasein, whose own Being consists in its openness to Being, to acquiesce in an accepting gesture of gratitude to Being as it reveals itself through Dasein in finite fashion. But this corresponds exactly to what in Being and Time was the gesture of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), that supreme moment in the phenomenology of Dasein when it lets itself be (manifest as) what it is in all its finitude. This much seemed clear to me after studying What Is Called Thinking? (1952), but I kept looking in the subsequent works for some kind of smoking gun evidence for this transformation that no one could deny. I was about to give up when, finally, Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking (1944–46) appeared in 1959, offering the following text: “Thus, the essence of thought, i.e., release unto [Being], would be resoluteness unto truth in its presencing” (Dann wäre das Wesen des Denkens, nämlich die Gelassenheit zur Gegnet, die Entschlossenheit zur wesenden Wahrheit). Eureka! There was the smoking gun. The time had come for the real test: to present these findings to Heidegger himself and face up to his critical assessment of them.

In requesting an interview, I included a letter of recommendation from Max Müller, which I am certain had much to do with the response, and a twenty-five-page summary of my argument. When Heidegger pulled the summary out of a folder, I was shocked to see that every page (apparently) had been stroked, counterstroked, circled, and daggered to death with red ink. Obviously, he had read my text carefully, but the only two negative comments he offered were both minor, only one of which I recall now: I had misused the word “subjectivity” with regard to Leibniz. The proper term in the case of Leibniz is not Subjektivität but Subjektität. Amen! Otherwise, Heideg-
ger seemed to accept the whole package. We spent the rest of the time (which included coffee and cookies served by Frau Heidegger) talking about many other things than my text as such.

The following day, on the way to the University, I bumped into Müller's assistant, who asked me how the visit had gone. I told him that from my point of view I thought it had gone pretty well but that I had not yet had time to absorb it. He then told me that, following the interview, Heidegger had talked to Müller by phone to say, in effect (as I was given to understand it): "Who is this guy? So many have gotten me wrong, but here is someone who has gotten me right—and he's an AMERICAN! How is that possible?" Müller was justly pleased and could take credit for his tutelage, mediated so well in the beginning by Fagone. I was astonished and soon began to have wild thoughts—like . . . even . . . maybe . . . well, why not go for broke? . . . a preface! With Müller's encouragement I asked and received "in principle" a promise of a preface, provided that I submit one or two questions that could be addressed directly. These were carefully honed (after much reflection and consultation with my Heidegger-savvy friends) three years later when the book was already in print and scheduled for publication. The substance of my letter of March 1, 1962, was simple indeed: "You will recall that you were kind enough to offer to write a preface for my book, From Phenomenology to Thought, provided I formulate one or two questions that might be directly addressed. The questions that seem most relevant to me are these. . . . In advance, please be sure of my deep gratitude, etc." There was no more immediate context for them than that.

When Heidegger's preface arrived a month later, I was ecstatic. In the first place, the change he suggested in the title (from From to Through [Phenomenology to Thought]) was fruitful, easily made, and engaged his authority in the formulation of it. Great! More particularly, I was delighted (perhaps too hastily) with what he said about my use of the formulae "Heidegger I" and Heidegger II": "The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that it is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Hei-
degger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II." 16 I could not conceive of a clearer confirmation than this of the inferences I had drawn after a long journey through his texts and articulated in my conclusion to the book—a text, in fact, that he had never read. This had been composed after our interview in February, 1959 (three years earlier), and had long since been locked up in print.

Relying on texts that suggested the receptive character of his thought as early as 1921, I had argued:

From this it becomes clear that, no matter what must be said about the orientation of Heidegger I in SZ (1927), the experience which comes to expression in Heidegger II (where Being as simultaneous revealment-concealment holds the primacy over thought) dates at least from 1921, when he was already engaged in what he later calls the historical process of thought-ful dialogue. What else is there to conclude than that Heidegger II is more original than Heidegger I, went before him along the way? By the same token we are given to understand that if Heidegger [takes a turn in his way] in order to become Heidegger II, the reason is not that the effort went bankrupt but that the thinker simply left one place in order to gain another along the same way. "What abides in thought is the way." 17

It would be from that other place that Heidegger II could be said to "retrieve" the unsaid of Heidegger I. Beyond them both and motivating them both I postulated a more primordial experience still that I called (rightly or wrongly) the "Ur-Heidegger." 18

By this I had in mind the original experience of the Being-question as occasioned by his reading of Brentano's thesis on Aristotle, the event when it all began. For the discovery of the Being-question was also the discovery of its forgottenness. Heidegger says as much when he first spoke publicly of the Kehre in the "Letter on Humanism": "This turning is not a change of standpoint of Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being." 19 Clearly, it was the Being-

16 Martin Heidegger, preface to Richardson, in Richardson, Heidegger, p. xxii.
17 Ibid., 632.
18 Ibid., 633.
question in its forgottenness that energized his reach for the unreachable star to the very end.

In our conversation, he expressed himself on the matter with a nuance slightly different from what, as far as I know, he says elsewhere. My recollection is that he put it this way: “After discovering the Being question as a question in Aristotle, I read Aristotle (and others) assiduously to find an answer to it, but found none. Simultaneously with the Being-question, then, was the experience of its forgottenness. Nonetheless, Aristotle and all the others used the word ‘is’ hence had some understanding of what it means even though they had failed to pose the question of what ‘is’ (Sein) as such means. If one were to pursue this question, one would have to begin by investigating that lived (but unnoticed) understanding of ‘is’ that is in Aristotle and, for that matter, in all of us (Dasein). The best instrument available for such a task obviously was phenomenology. So...” It was with the expectation that he would repeat this sequence in writing that I formulated the first question for him to address in the preface. In fact, he chose not to do so. I was very aware of all this, however, in formulating my conclusion and made the best case I could for an “Ur-Heidegger” with the data available for citation. In any case, Heidegger’s remarks about “Heidegger I/II” I took to be a clear and totally unanticipated confirmation of my own conception of the relation between them as stated in the conclusion, and I was very happy about it. I thought about adding a note to the translation of the preface, pointing out its correlation with my conclusion, but rejected the idea as too obvious, hence an indiscreet overkill that would annoy more than it would enlighten the attentive reader. What a mistake!

Let this say, then, that from beginning to end, from De Waelhens (who read with a hermeneutic of suspicion every fragment, piece by piece), through all sorts of lesser (but highly exigent) folk, through major critics (for example, Max Müller, Henri Birault, and Emmanuel Levinas), to Heidegger himself, no one—but no one!—ever raised the slightest objection to my use of the I/II formula—instinctive, highly convenient shorthand that gradually insinuated itself into the formal text. The difference between Heidegger I and II (in style, tone, and
focus) was (to me, working with the texts available 1955-60) a
given; the unity and continuity between them, I believed, had
been carefully demonstrated. It was not until the book was
published and I returned home to try to find some way into the
philosophical community that the Grand Illusion was shattered
and the pernicious Scandal of this distinction was finally laid
bare for all the world to see.

But I noticed that the reviews usually cited nothing more
than my introduction; and without plowing through them all
over again, I have no memory of anyone who ever addressed
the I/II issue as finally crystallized in the conclusion at all—still
less in direct confrontation with Heidegger’s comments in the
preface. Yet for me, the conclusion, not the introduction, was
the culmination of the study. Even so astute a reader as Reiner
Schürmann, for example, in rejecting this terminology, cites
Heidegger’s comments as “reservations.”

As indicated above,
I found them to be in no way “reservations” about the termi-
nology but the clearest possible confirmation of its validity.
What element of “reserve” was in them I felt I had anticipated
and taken account of in the conclusion. Significantly, Schür-
mann gives his reference to page 22 of my book (introduction),
not to pages 632–33 (conclusion). The “most unkindest cut of
all,” however, came one evening at a Society for Phenomenol-
ogy and Existential Philosophy smoker when one well-known,
well-published, pipe-smoking Heideggerian came up to me,
feeling totally isolated, and said in kind, avuncular fashion: “All
these people are bad-mouthing you for your two-Heidegger
thing. I want you to know that I, at least, am on your side. I,
too, believe that there really are two Heideggers.” Puff, puff,
puff!

None of this should be taken to suggest that I would claim
that there is no other way to understand Heidegger’s develop-
ment than the one I proposed. Schürmann’s conception of
things, for example, must be respected as a compelling one;
and the more we know about Heidegger’s previously unpub-
lished work, the more closely we can follow every twist and

---

C.-M. Gross (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 17 and n. 43.
turn in his zig-zag way through the prodigious twenties, the more nuance we must supply to the notion of *Kehre* as such. As for my own proposal—the essentials of which are that there was a *Kehre* (by Heidegger’s own testimony) and that there was, therefore, a pre-*Kehre* (what I took to be Heidegger I—typified by *Being and Time*) and a post-*Kehre* (what I took to be Heidegger II—typified, say, by *Time and Being*)—I would still defend its cogency as a plausible hypothesis for appreciating the whole of the Heidegger phenomenon taken in the sum.

When I speak of the need to nuance the understanding of *Kehre* in the light of the current availability of Heidegger’s previously unpublished work, I have in mind such a text as his *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1936–1938)*, which, published in 1989, was obviously inaccessible when my own work was done. There we get a closer look at the several moments of the turn from I to II, in which the “analytic of Dasein” is retained even as the perspective of “fundamental ontology” is abandoned, precisely through the *kehrige Bezug des Seyns*, that is, “the turning-relation-in Being itself” as this becomes apparent through the thinking of *Ereignis*. *Contributions to Philosophy*, for example, helps us to understand why and how such essential ingredients as “projection” and “thrownness” in the existential analysis of Dasein (Heidegger I) remain equally essential to the thinking of *ereignis* (Heidegger II), precisely in its need for these very same characteristics of Dasein in order that it may come to pass at all. Given such clarifications as this that have become common coin among Heideggerians over forty years of scholarship, is there still need for so pedestrian a distinction as that between Heidegger I and II? Whatever its history, does it serve any longer a useful purpose?

There is no doubt that *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, as interpreted by him, adds welcome precision to what I propose in my conclusion, but in no way, as far as I can see, does it gainsay what is said there. Given the history of my

---

own involvement with the problem, a judicious answer to this question must be left to others, but, with reserve for better judgment, I would argue that the distinction is, indeed, still a useful one, at the very least for heuristic purposes. Contributions to Philosophy, for all its power (it is touted as Heidegger’s “second major work” after Being and Time), is hardly the most lucid of his writings; and some find in it, remarkable though it is, good reason to understand why he chose not to publish it. At best, it is an extremely difficult text that makes heavy demands upon the most sophisticated Heideggerians, hardly bread for the proletariat for whom the I/II distinction was invented. It is hard to imagine what the plodding scholar would have made of Contributions to Philosophy in 1938, that is, without the subsequent works up to and including Time and Being (1962) to illuminate it. It is not even clear what Heidegger made of it himself. Certainly, there would have been no preface to offer us the perspective of our hindsight. Just as Heidegger’s own journey of self-discovery was long and arduous, so it is hardly inappropriate that the journey of those who try to follow him over difficult terrain be marked by dark ravines and valleys that may wisely be left for subsequent exploration in order that the primary journey may be finished at all. If it is not too pretentious, I would like to make my own in this regard the spirit of Heidegger’s brief prologue to the ninth edition of Sein und Zeit, in which he remarks: “The way [this study follows] still remains even today a necessary one if the question about Being is to stir our Dasein.” Stressing the point in our interview (1959), he insisted: “I would write Being and Time all over again now, if it were still necessary to do so.” It is in this sense, then, that I do think the I/II distinction remains useful—no more than that, perhaps, but heuristically useful—at least for the proletariat, heavily burdened as we are by the poverty (Armut) of thought that, when all is said and done, makes beggars of us all.

And De Waelhens? He encouraged the enterprise, praised

---

23 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, neunte Auflage (Tübingen, Germany: Niemeyer, 1960). p.3.
what he could find good in it, and supported it to the very end. But he was never for a moment convinced—he went to his grave happy in his disbelief. He was a fine man, a true philosopher, and a great mentor. May he rest in peace!

WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, Ph.D.
September 2002

24 What his real feelings were would appear only long after the book had appeared and he was given his day in court. Invited by the editor of International Philosophical Quarterly to write a review essay of my work, under the rubric of “Contemporary Currents” (Alphonse De Waelhens, “Reflections on Heidegger’s Development. A propos a Recent Book,” International Philosophical Quarterly 5 [1965]:497–502), he treated the book with great respect but then made his own position clear. The tenor of his position may be divined from his concluding paragraph: “With Heidegger, thought, in the sense of What Is Called Thinking, comes down to projecting a fundamental experience without place, without home, without partners unable to be situated, unable (when all is said and done) even to be uttered, and with regard to which all the discernible modalities of human existence are only deviated productions. There is no true thought outside of that experience, no true experience of Being outside of that one. And of this experience itself, one cannot say since all language is borrowed from it—whether it is Being, the revelation of Being in man, or the contribution of man to Being. All these expressions pose all over again the very questions that they elucidate. This ‘dubious struggle’ in which everything is at stake cannot fail to remind us of a certain phrase of Hegel aimed at the nocturnal character of Schelling’s Absolute, and which we will not have the irreverence to cite, for after all we must leave to the genius of a Hegel the cruelty of Hegelian irony.” The reference, obviously, is to Hegel’s characterization of Schelling’s Absolute as the “night in which all cows are black.” Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), 19, cited ibid., 502n.21.
The long-time debts of this study are beyond number and beyond payment. For the U.S. edition, however, I wish in particular to thank Mrs. Maja S. M. de Keijzer and Mrs. Berendina Schermers van Straalen of Kluwer Academic Publishers; and Anthony F. Chiffolo, former Managing Editor/Acquisitions Editor, and Loomis Mayer, Production Manager of Fordham University Press, for their efficient work in bringing this book to term.

In a special way I wish to thank two colleagues and friends of many years, Professors John D. Caputo, Ph.D., and Richard Kearney, Ph.D., without whose initiative, enthusiasm, and support this reprint edition never would have appeared.
If anyone takes the Introduction of this book as his first plunge into Heidegger, he will find the water rather cold. These pages do not pretend to be a propaedeutic to this difficult thinker. They attempt rather to formulate in as concise a statement as possible the essentials of his entire problematic. The statement is coherent but compressed. Its density may make it (for the uninitiated) obscure. The Introduction was the last part of this work to be written—perhaps it is the last part to be read. At any rate, the neophyte would be well advised to start with Chapter I.

And yet a few prefatory remarks are in order. That the time has come for a study of the problem of thought in Heidegger seems clear, for none of the interpreters has given the matter the treatment it deserves. Henri Birault's lucid article in 1950 promised a full-length analysis to follow, but unfortunately it never appeared.1 J. B. Lotz's review of the problem in Heidegger's recent publications makes no pretense of being a complete study,2 and Heinrich Ott's fine book on the bearing of foundational thought upon theology leaves room for a purely philosophical treatment that examines thought precisely inasmuch as it evolves out of the early Heidegger.3

---

3 Heinrich Ott, *Denken und Sein, Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie* (Zollikon: Evangelischer Verlag, 1939).
Methodologically, the research began with a general orientation in Heidegger's thought through the secondary literature of the most authoritative interpreters, then proceeded to make a close textual analysis of all of the author's published work according to the order, not in which these works were published, but in which they were written. The result was a typewritten manuscript of more than 1100 pages, which, however abundant in detail, were tediously repetitious. Yet the method of following the author's order of composition proved so illuminating that it seemed unwise to discard it in favor of a mere synthesis of the results. In editing the original manuscript, then, we took as a working principle simply to avoid unnecessary repetition, and restricted synoptic treatment to two chapters of a more general nature: Introduction and Conclusion.

The study itself we divide along the simplest lines possible: Part I treats the early Heidegger; Part II deals with the so-called "reversal" in manner and method of the early Heidegger; Part III examines the later Heidegger. As for the rest, the effort to eliminate repetition forces us sometimes to collate texts that come from different periods, but we have done the best we can to keep the different moments of the development in their proper place.

The original research continued until "Hegel and the Greeks" (1960), but in the present redaction we stop with What E-vokes Thought? (1952). The reason is not that Heidegger has said nothing of importance about the problem since 1952, but for our purposes we reach with the university lectures of that year the point of diminishing returns. For the years between 1952 and 1960, we have sifted out what properly concerns us and fitted it into the analysis wherever it could be accommodated best.

The author's massive work on Nietzsche, giving in two volumes the full text of a series of university lectures delivered at Freiburg between 1936 and 1940 together with certain essays that date from 1940-1946, appeared (1961) after these re-
searches were concluded. It was upon these same texts that Heidegger’s other Nietzsche interpretations,\(^7\) which were published earlier and hitherto had served as the basis of our own analysis, were based. This new publication, then, imposed a reconsideration of Heidegger’s Nietzsche-interpretation but effected no essential alteration in the writer’s understanding of it. Minor revisions have been made, however, for the sake of completeness.

Scope and style of the exposition have been determined by the writer’s desire to do something scientifically sound, yet in a language intelligible to discerning students of the English-speaking world who approach Heidegger with some philosophical background but no specialized familiarity with his manner or his milieu. This imposes the following canons: to supply certain explanations that specialists would find superfluous; to sacrifice all embellishing subtleties for the sake of clarity and conciseness; to keep clearly in view the basic perspectives by frequent repetitions of the argument.

Heidegger’s language, of course, presents a special problem of translation. We have tried, however, to avoid neologism. Except in one or two cases, the translations pretend to be nothing more than approximations, and readers who can suggest still closer approximations would render the writer a service in doing so. Even orthography is a problem, since the German uses capitals for all nouns without discrimination. On principle, we have decided to reserve capitalization for Being itself and for words that stand in its place. One exception: we capitalize There-being (Dasein) as one way of suggesting the unique relationship to Being that for Heidegger this word comports.

As far as the “critical attitude” is concerned, we are trying to understand Heidegger’s notion of thought and nothing else. In analysing his interpretation of specific phenomena or of other thinkers we make no attempt whatsoever to judge whether the interpretation is satisfying or not. We try simply to let Heidegger be and thus throw light on himself.\(^8\) What critical position we ourselves take we reserve for the closing pages.

---


\(^8\) This same endeavor likewise accounts for the fact that we let Heidegger speak for himself as much as possible. We restrict the citation of commentators to those instances where we are obliged to acknowledge a debt or where this is necessary for the progress of the argument.
The writer feels that he should apologize for the impression of pedantry that the abundance of footnotes may give. Originally textual references were intended to explain to the director of the research and recall to the writer why he said what he said. We have eliminated many of them, to be sure, and combined others, but because of the dreadful difficulty in reading Heidegger (many a patriotic German has despaired), we felt that anyone desirous of facing for himself the rigors of the original might welcome here and there a few friendly spots of blood that would show him how someone else made his way over the rocks.

The reader will notice very soon that the entire work suffers from chronic hyphenitis, and pur-ists may find it an-noy-ing. With little heed for the canons of syllabification, this purely mechanical device sometimes transposes the German original (v.g. ek-sistence), sometimes is the writer's own invention to express by several words what in German is a single idea (v.g. Anwesen: coming-to-presence), sometimes calls attention to an unfamiliar meaning for a familiar word (v.g. re-collection). It is really not very often, then, that we do it out of sheer mal-ice.

One final word. The altogether central place of foundational thought in Heidegger's endeavor forces us to treat in one way or another almost all of his principal themes. There is one problem, however, that we resolutely avoid: the problem of God. This is not because there is nothing to say about God in Heidegger's thinking. On the contrary, it is because there is too much to say for it to be said merely by indirection. Besides, any study of this problem presupposes, if it is going to be serious, the very analysis that we are attempting here. We reserve the matter, then, for another day, and content ourselves for the present with the modest task of watching a thinker follow his star.

And now, the pleasant task of acknowledging, at least, the debts that one can never really pay. Accumulated over many years, they are in fact beyond number, and we must be content here with mentioning only the very heaviest of them. The writer wishes to express his profound gratitude:

   to Professor Martin Heidegger for the criticism, encouragement and help so graciously given, and especially for the honor he does the writer in contributing to this book its preface;

   to Right Reverend Monsignor Louis De Raeymaeker, Presi-
dent, and to the entire professorial corps of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain, who by both precept and example during the writer's student years inspired him with the ideals that, however unattainable, served as model for these pages;

- to Professor ALBERT DONDEYNE, of this same Institute, for his critical suggestions, and especially for the lecture course on "Heidegger and the Problem of Finitude" (1956), which helped the writer at a critical time to see more clearly the essentials of this difficult problematic;

- to Reverend HERMANN L. VAN BREDA, O.F.M., Director of the Husserl Archives, Louvain, who from the very beginning made accessible to the writer the immense resources of this world center of phenomenological research;

- to Professor MAX MÜLLER (Munich), who not only by his teaching helped form significantly the writer's philosophical attitudes but first made possible his personal contact with Professor Heidegger;

- to Professor EUGEN FINK (Freiburg) and Professor BERNARD WELTE (Freiburg), who directly and indirectly both in lecture and seminar helped the writer to a deeper understanding of the contemporary German mind;

- to the BOLLINGEN FOUNDATION for the fellowship award that made it possible to bring this study to a conclusion;

and in the last place, because in the first place, to Professor ALPHONSE DE WAELHENS, of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain, Director of this investigation from the beginning, who, although placing his own vast erudition and critical penetration entirely at the writer's disposition, encouraged nonetheless a most complete liberty in the research, and thus knew how to be at all times and in the very best of ways the ideal pedagogue.

August 15, 1962

Louvain
The third edition of this work contains no substantial revisions. Certain typographical errors have been corrected and the bibliography of Heidegger's works (including English translations) updated, but otherwise the text and supplementary apparatus have remained unchanged.


New York City
# List of Symbols Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Einführung in die Metaphysik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FW</td>
<td>Der Feldweg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Gelassenheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>Brief über den &quot;Humanismus&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>&quot;Hölderlins Himmel und Erde&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HG</td>
<td>&quot;Hegel und die Griechen&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW</td>
<td>Holzwege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identität und Differenz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KM</td>
<td>Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPV</td>
<td>Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRV</td>
<td>Kant, Kritik der reichen Vernunft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Zu einem Vers von Mörike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Nietzsche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>&quot;Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φοιος&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Zur Seinsfrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Der Satz vom Grund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>Sein und Zeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Unterwegs zur Sprache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Vorträge und Aufsätze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>Was heißt Denken?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>Vom Wesen des Grundes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WM</td>
<td>Was ist Metaphysik?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WM:Ep</td>
<td>Was ist Metaphysik? Nachwort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WM:ln</td>
<td>Was ist Metaphysik? Einleitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Was ist das – die Philosophie?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW</td>
<td>Vom Wesen der Wahrheit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Abendgang auf der Reichenau

Seewärts fliesst ein silbern Leuchten
zu fernen dunkeln Ufern fort,
und in den sommermüden, abendfeuchten
Gärten sinkt wie ein verhalten Liebeswort
die Nacht.
Und zwischen mondenweissen Giebeln
verfängt sich noch ein letzter Vogelruf
vom alten Turmdach her –
und was der lichte Sommertag mir schuf
ruht früchteschwer –
aus Ewigkeiten
eine sinnjenseitige Fracht –
mir in der grauen Wüste
einer grossen Einfalt.

Eventide on Reichenau

Over the waters flows a silvern glimmer
Forth to distant, darkened shores.
And in the summer-weary, dew-damp gardens
Falls, like a lover's word withheld,
The night.
From moon-white gabled prison
Neath the ancient tower's roof
A bird sings one last song.
And the yield to me of shining summer day
Rests like heavy fruit –
From long eternities
A burden beyond sense –
For me in the gray desert
Of a great Simplicity.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER, 1917
There is a long and winding way that leads from Reichenau to Todtnauberg. It is Martin Heidegger’s way. Past the moor and through the fields it wends its way over the hills, only to wander now this way, now that, along uncharted forest trails. Yet for all its meandering, it moves in a single direction, it is but a single way. The purpose of these pages is to trace in some measure that way in order to raise the question if others may walk it too.  

A. THE PROBLEM OF BEING

1. The Grounding of Metaphysics

From the very beginning, Heidegger’s exclusive preoccupation, hence the unique sense of his way, has been to lay a foundation for metaphysics. By his own account, it all began on a summer day in 1907 when, as an eighteen-year-old gymnasist in Constance, he received from Dr. Conrad Gröber, later archbishop of Freiburg (1932–48) but at that time pastor of Trinity Church in Constance, a book that was only gathering dust on Dr. Gröber’s shelf. It was Franz Brentano’s dissertation, *On the Manifold Sense of Being according to Aristotle* (1862), and it served not only to open Heidegger’s eyes to the problem of

---

1 Reichenau: a small island in the western arm of Lake Constance, where a Benedictine abbey, founded by Pirmin (724), was an important center of Christian culture in mediæval Europe. Todtnauberg: Heidegger’s Black Forest retreat. The poem, “Abendgang auf der Reichenau,” composed during the summer vacation of 1916, appears in *Das Bodenseebuch*, 1917 (Constance, 1917), p. 152. Writer’s translation.
INTRODUCTION

Being but to introduce him into the philosophical world of the Greeks. In recalling the fact now, he likes to cite Hölderlin's line (in "Rhine Hymn"): "As you began, so will you remain." 2

More precisely, the problem of Being arose as soon as Heidegger began to meditate with Brentano the meaning of the word "being" (βείν) for Aristotle. Here he became fascinated by "is," the little word that applies to everything — that enjoys an inconceivable polyvalence (makes world to be world and man to be man), without detriment to the marvelous unity of itself. 3 Yet what of this unity? This must be Being itself, that which renders possible all "is." Well, then, what about Being? What meaning does it have? If it is true, as Aristotle says, that the function of metaphysics is to ask "what are beings as beings?" (τί τοῦ βείν ἔστι), then, on the supposition that Being gives beings their "is," should we not first ask about Being itself? 4 Such was the beginning of the way. Our only task is to watch its progression.

Aristotle's question was, to be sure, a "metaphysical" question. Whatever the post-Aristotelian origin of this word in the libraries of Rhodes, clearly the question about beings as beings was a "passing beyond" beings to that which makes them be, their "being-ness" (οὐαλῶν). 5 Hence even if Aristotle called such an interrogation "first philosophy," we see with what justice may be attributed to the word "metaphysics" itself an interpretation that has become common currency since Simplicius in the fifth century: a "going beyond" (ἐξερχόμενον) the "physical" (τὰ φυσικὰ). This "going beyond" the Latins would call transcendere, so that metaphysics always comports in one way or another the process


The fascination abides. As in 1929 (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd ed. [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951], p. 205 [hereafter: KM]), so in 1932 (Was heisst Denken? [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1934], pp. 107, 137 [hereafter: WD]), the author returns again and again to the strange magic. N.B. We translate Heidegger's Seiende (that-which-is) as "being" and Sein (that by which it is) as "Being."

4 In 1935, Heidegger meditates the sense of the Greek word for Being (εἶναι). After examining first its grammar (pp. 42-54), then its etymology (pp. 54-55), he finds the results meager enough, then resorts once more to meditating "is" (p. 68), concluding that the primal form of εἶναι must be neither the substantive nor infinitive, but the third person singular, sc. "it" itself (p. 70). (Einführung in die Metaphysik [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953], pp. 40-70 [hereafter: EM]).

6 The question bifurcates immediately into the question of what beings are and that they are, hence the question of essence and existence.
of transcendence. The φωσηά must be understood as τα φώση δηνα (beings which "are" by reason of φώση), where φώση must not be taken to mean what we would call "physical" nature but must be understood in the sense that this word had for the pre-Socratic thinkers, as that by which all things emerge into presence as what they are, sc. Being itself. Briefly: metaphysics means the transcendence of beings to their Being in such a way that beings are thereby considered as beings.

If metaphysics be understood thus, however, is Aristotle, in finding the formula, thereby its genuine founder? No, metaphysics as we understand it here emerged initially, Heidegger claims, with Plato, when he made the distinction between the beings of experience as a world of shadows and the Being of these beings as a world of Ideas. In the metaphor of the cave (Politeia VII, 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7), for example, he speaks of "going beyond" the shadows and "over to" the Ideas (516 c, 3). For all practical purposes, then, the sense of metaphysics, if not the formula, is here clearly disengaged.

Yet with this all is not said. For if it is clear that metaphysics thinks beings as beings, it must be equally clear that they appear as what they are only by reason of some strange light that renders them un-concealed (unverborgen) before, to and in the metaphysical gaze. Furthermore, this light as such, in rendering beings un-concealed, remains itself concealed (verborgen) within them, for it is itself not a being but merely the light by which they shine forth.

What is this light, the concealed source of non-

---


7 Heidegger claims that this sense of φώση may still be found even in Aristotle (Metaphysics IV, 1, 1003 a 27). Moreover, he maintains that, given this sense of φώση, all metaphysics, whether it conceive Being as Pure Act, as Absolute Concept or as Will unto-Power, remains essentially a "physics." This gives rise to an ambiguity on which the author later capitalizes. If all metaphysics is a "physics" because it considers beings as beings (in their φώση) then to go beyond metaphysics in order to consider Being (here: φώση itself is to attempt a meta-"physics" of a higher sort. It is to this type of meta-"physics" that Heidegger himself would introduce his readers, because it means "overcoming" or "founding" metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense. This ambiguity, deliberately embraced, gives rise to the title of the lecture series of 1935 (see EM, pp. 14–15).

8 Μετά τε ηθήναι... είς ταυτίνα. (Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, 2nd ed. Überlieferung und Auftrag, Band 5 [Bern: Francke, 1954], p. 48 (hereafter: PW)).

concealment? This is the question that metaphysics has never posed. But it is a question that must be posed, and, indeed, for the sake of metaphysics itself, since it is only by reason of this light that metaphysics can go about its task. The lighting-process by which beings are illumined as beings — this is what Heidegger understands by Being.

Let us pause for a moment and savor this. “Being, indeed — what is Being?” writes the author in the famous formula of 1947:

“. . . [It] is not God, nor [some] ground of the world. Being is broader than all beings — and yet is nearer to man than all beings, whether they be rocks, animals, works of art, machines, angels or God. Being is what is nearest [to man]. Yet [this] near-ness remains farthest removed from him. . . .” 10

Being is not a being, because it is that which enables beings to be (present) to man and men to each other. It is nearest to man, because it makes him to be what he is and enables him to enter into comportment with other beings. Yet it is farthest removed from him because it is not a being with which he, structured as he is to deal directly with only beings, can comport himself.

From the point of view of beings, Being encompasses them all, just as a domain of openness encompasses what is found within it. This domain is not, of course, “space” but rather that dimension out of which even space and time themselves come-to-presence. Being is the domain of openness, because it is the lighting-process by which beings are lighted-up.11 If these beings be “subjects” or “objects,” then the light itself is neither one nor the other but “between” them both, enabling the encounter.


11 This process-character of Being accounts for the fact that the important word Wesen has for Heidegger a verbal sense. See: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1954), pp. 25, 46. (Hereafter: WW). Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen; Neske, 1954), p. 38. (Hereafter: VA). WD, p. 143. To underline the process-character we have been tempted to translate Sein by the infinitive: To-be. We have opted for the more normal form, however; because Heidegger himself usually uses the definite article das, when by omitting it he would have drawn attention to the verbal character of Sein; because Being is better accommodated to the exigencies of readable English than To-be; because the ambiguity that inevitably results may not be altogether a bad thing.
to come about. The author makes much of the metaphor suggested by Descartes in his letter to Picot, according to which all philosophy is as a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics and whose branches are all the other sciences. But what, Heidegger asks, is the ground in which metaphysics is rooted? The unequivocal answer: Being. Being can be called, then, the ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the philosophy tree, is held fast and nourished. To interrogate the ground of metaphysics, we must pose the “ground”-question, the question about the sense of Being. Now the “sense” (Sinn) of anything for Heidegger is the non-concealment by which it appears as itself. Non-concealment, however, is the literal meaning of ἀ-λήθεια, sc. “truth.” ‘...'Sense of Being' and ‘truth of Being' [are] but one.” So it happens, then, that the ground-question of metaphysics becomes the interrogation of Being in the light of itself, Being in its truth.

The Being-question must, indeed, be posed, but it is not the task of metaphysics as such, concerned only with beings as beings, to pose it. To be sure, metaphysics talks about Being, but only in the sense of the total ensemble of beings, or of being-ness, with all of the ambiguity which, as we shall see, this implies. The fact is, however, that metaphysics cannot pose such a question. As long as its gaze is fixed upon beings, it profits from the light of Being by meditating these beings-as-they-

---

12 HB, pp. 77 (Lichtung), 101 (Zwischen). May we say that Being thus conceived “is”? If so, then only Being "is"; beings, properly speaking, “are” not. The essential is to recognize the difference. (See HB, p. 80). In 1957, Heidegger will accept the formula "Being is," provided that "is" be understood transitively. See Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 62. (Hereafter: ID).
13 WM, p. 8.
14 WM, p. 7 and passim.
15 The "ground"-question (Grundfrage) is to be distinguished from the "guide"-question (Leitfrage), the question about ἀ-λήθεια. See: EM, p. 15; N.I, pp. 75-81; 454-462. N.B. Parenthetical German words in notes are for purposes of identification only. Hence we cite the original form without alteration.
INTRODUCTION

appear, ("... metaphysics always presents beings (6v) in that [dimension] which as beings (fl 6v) they themselves have manifested. . . ").\textsuperscript{17} but cannot meditate the light itself, simply because the light does not appear by itself as a being but only in the beings it enlightens ("... metaphysics, however, never pays heed to precisely that [dimension] of 6v which, to the extent that 6v becomes un-concealed, is by that very fact concealed").\textsuperscript{18} There is no way, then, that metaphysics can get Being, the lighting-process as such, in focus. That is why "... metaphysics as such is excluded from the experience of Being by reason of its very essence. . . "\textsuperscript{19}

As Heidegger goes about meditating the process of δ-λήθεια, this strange paradox (hidden from the metaphysician) that Being contracts into the beings it makes manifest and hides by the very fact that it reveals, never loses its fascination for him. He interrogates Being precisely inasmuch as it is hidden always in 6v (yet different from δv), for it is "upon the hidden [dimension] of δv that metaphysics remains grounded. . . "\textsuperscript{20} We find striking confirmation of this in the inaugural lecture at Freiburg (1929), when, in posing the question that gives the lecture its title, "What is Metaphysics?," he meditates the sense of Non-being (Nichts). The hiddenness of Being (in beings) is, then, for Heidegger as essential a part of his experience as Being itself.\textsuperscript{21}

What we call here the "hiddenness" of Being (in beings) may be understood in terms of a "not" that contracts Being in beings and at the same time differentiates it from them. Since the function of Being is simply to en-light-en beings, then this contracting "not" is intrinsic to its very nature. For want of a better word, let us call the "not"-character of Being "negativity." Then the manifestive power that shines forth in beings

\textsuperscript{17} "... denn sie stellt das Seiende (δv) stets nur in dem vor, was sich als Seiendes (fl 6v) schon von diesem her gezeigt hat. . . " (WM, p. 20). Cf. p. 8.
\textsuperscript{18} "... Die Metaphysik achtet jedoch dessen nie, was sich in eben diesem δv, insofern es unverborgen wurde, auch schon verborgen hat." (WM, p. 20). Note that in speaking here of two "dimensions" in beings, we have all that is necessary to help us understand the distinction between "ontic" and "ontological" as it appears in SZ.
\textsuperscript{19} "... Als Metaphysik ist sie von der Erfahrung des Seins durch ihr eigenes Wesen ausgeschlossen. . . " (WM, p. 20).
\textsuperscript{20} "Auf dieses Verborgene im δv bleibt die Metaphysik gegründet, . . . " (WM, p. 20).
\textsuperscript{21} Cf. N, I, p. 460.
as beings we may call "positivity." 22 Once we comprehend this fusion of positivity and negativity into the unity of a single process, we begin to grasp what Heidegger understands by Being as the process of truth. For truth, understood in the radical sense of ἀλήθεια, is literally non-(ἀ-)concealment (ἀλήθης).23 Being as the process of non-concealment is that which permits beings to become non-concealed (positivity), although the process is so permeated by "not" that Being itself remains concealed (negativity). To think Being in its truth, then, is to think it in terms of both positivity and negativity at once.

In the simplest of terms: Heidegger's whole effort is to interrogate the positive-negative process of ἀλήθεια, insofar as it gives rise to metaphysics. The full import of this can be appreciated, however, only when we watch him at work. He meditates, for example, the formula τὸ ἐὰν ἄν ὅσαι and endeavors thereby to disengage the interior structure of metaphysics. Now the formula, he insists, is essentially ambiguous. To be sure, "beings as beings" means the whole ensemble (καθόλου) of beings, considered in terms of that which makes them "be," sc. their being-ness (φόσαι). The being-ness of the ensemble of beings, however, may be understood in at least two ways: it may mean the common denominator of all beings (ὅν καθόλου, κοινών), hence Being, as we say, "in general"; or it may mean some ultimate "ground" which lets the ensemble of beings be, where this is understood in the sense of some being, supreme among the rest (ὅν καθόλου ἀριστέστερον), and, because supreme, often called "divine" (θεῖον). Insofar as the task of metaphysics is to make affirmations (λόγῳ) about beings (ἐνιαίοι) meditated in this way, it is of its very nature onto-logy. When this word emerges in the seventeenth century, however, it is usually reserved for metaphysics in the first sense, sc. the interrogation of Being-in-general, whereas metaphysics in the second sense, the interrogation of a supreme Being (however this be conceived), is properly speaking a theo-logy, or, as we might better say, a theio-logy. The term

22 The terminology as such is not Heidegger's, although we shall find a certain warrant for it in SZ. We are inclined to think of positivity and negativity here (if images of this kind do not do more harm than good) as two complementary components in a single movement, as in the composition of forces. In any case, the words must not be taken in any dialectical sense.
23 V.g. See WW, p. 15.
"transcendence" shares the same ambiguity. It can mean the passage from beings to Being-in-general, from beings to the Supreme Being, or even the Supreme Being itself.\footnote{SF, p. 18. Thus in Kantian terms one would speak of metaphysics in the first sense as a reflection upon the "transcendental," and in the second sense upon "transcendent transcendence." See HW, p. 318.} What is capital, however, is to note that, since the formula $\delta v \text{ ß} \delta v$ itself is ambiguous, metaphysics necessarily compasses both these modalities, its innermost structure is onto-theo-logical.\footnote{WM, pp. 19–20. In ID, p. 51, the author recalls the formula of WM (1929), p. 38, which says that metaphysics meditates beings-as-such (therefore Being-in-general) and in their totality (Being as Supreme Being). We follow here the prologue added to fifth edition of WM (1949). The sense is the same. Cf. KM, p. 17.}

2. The Ontological Difference

But the problem lies deeper still. Why is it, after all, that $\delta v \text{ ß} \delta v$ gives rise to the confusion in the first place? The reason, we are told, lies in the nature of $\delta v$ itself. Grammatically, it is a participle and as such may be used either as a noun (v.g. can a human being live on the moon?) or as an adjective with a verbal sense (v.g. being curious, we want to know). More precisely: $\delta v$, when taken as a noun, means that which is, sc. a being ($\text{Seiendes}$); taken as a verbal adjective ($\text{seiend}$), it designates that process by which a being (as noun) "is," sc. its Being ($\text{Sein}$).\footnote{HW, pp. 161–162, 317.} The word itself, then, comporting both senses, is intrinsically ambivalent, and it is because $\delta v$ itself can mean either Being, or beings, or both, that the interrogation of $\delta v \text{ ß} \delta v$ can evolve as a meditation on either Being-in-general (onto-logy) or on the ultimate ground (theo-logy).\footnote{Heidegger claims that the word participium meant precisely "taking part" in two senses, sc. of noun and verb, at once. The point, however, is less cogent in English than in German, for we reserve the word "participle" to the verbal adjective, calling the verbal noun a "gerund." See WD, p. 733.} In other words, the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics is rooted ultimately in the intrinsic ambivalence of $\delta v$.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to think that this ambivalence of $\delta v$ is something peculiar to Aristotle. The fact is that it characterizes the entire history of Greek thought. The primitive form of $\delta v$, Heidegger claims, is most probably $\delta v$, as the word is found, for example in Homer (v.g. Iliad, I, 70), or
even in Parmenides and Heraclitus. The ἐ- would indicate the stem ἐσ- (hence ἐστιν, est, ist, is), in whose dynamic power the participle shares in double fashion. What more, in Parmenides and Heraclitus, ἐν can mean, in addition to the ambivalence we have mentioned already, the ultimate and unique process that we know as one-in-many (Ἐν-Πάντα). That is why the author, in a much later exposé (1957) of the onto-theological structure of metaphysics, feels free to meditate the ambivalence of ὤν under the guise of Heraclitus’ Ἐν, which in turn is identified with Λόγος, conceived as the process of grounding beings. Ἐν, the grounding process, is correlative with Πάντα, the ensemble of beings that are grounded, and the correlation is so intimate that one correlate cannot “be” without the other: “Ἐν can no more serve as ground unless Πάντα be grounded than Πάντα can be grounded without Ἐν. This intimate correlation between Ἐν and Πάντα, intrinsic to the Heraclitean Λόγος, corresponds precisely to the duality of Being and beings that we call the “ambivalence” of ὤν. What more, out of the ambivalence in Λόγος arises even for Heraclitus the same ambiguity that we find later in the structure of metaphysics: “Ἐν is unifying one in the sense of the absolutely primary and universal; “Ἐν is that unifying one in the sense of that being, supreme among the Πάντα (for Heraclitus: Zeus), which grounds the rest because it is in some way or other the “fullness” of Ἐν in the first sense.

Coming again to Plato, we can see that the distinction between sensible and supra-sensible, sc. between physical and metaphysical worlds, derives from the same ambivalence. In this respect it is instructive to recall that this ambivalence is expressed when we call ὤν a participium. For the old grammarians, this meant that the word “participates” in two meanings at once, that of a noun and that of a verb. The conception of “participation,” however, is not a grammatical but a philosophical one. The Latin grammarians took it from the Greek grammarians (μετοχή), who took it, Heidegger claims, from Plato. For Plato, the word describes the relationship between beings

---

38 HW, pp. 317-318.
41 ID, p. 67. Cf. VA, pp. 222, 224.
and Being, sc. the Ideas. A table, for example, is what it is because it offers its visage to us as a table. To the extent that an individual being offers the visage of a table, Plato maintains that it "participates" (μέτεξις) in the Idea of table. In other words, between Being (Idea), the participat-ed, and beings, the participat-ing, there is a χαρακτήρ, sc. Being and beings abide in different "places" (χώρα), and what bridges the difference between the two "places" is the process of participation. For Heidegger, however, what accounts for the conception of Being and beings as abiding in two different places is precisely the ambivalence of δν. It is this that gives rise to χαρακτήρ. Participation presupposes ambivalence.

Clearly, then, metaphysics is rooted not merely in the ambiguity of the formula δν τ δν but more profoundly still in the ambivalence of δν itself. It follows that the process of δν-λήθεια must be conceived somehow as the coming-to-pass of δν in this peculiar duality, and therefore if we are to ground metaphysics, we have no other choice but to think Being as the process through which this ambivalence takes place.

But we must go one step further. What is this ambivalence, after all? Nothing else but the correlation in a single word of "being" as noun and "being" as verbal adjective, hence of that which is (manifest) and the process by which it is (manifest), of beings and Being. Now we could not speak of "ambivalence," of "duality," or, for that matter, of "correlation" at all, unless we experienced some difference between the correlates. The ambivalence in δν, then, names a difference between Being and beings, and from the very beginning Heidegger has called it the "ontological difference." It follows, then, that whenever we have spoken of the duality of δν, we could have used the term "ontological difference" just as well. The Being, then, whose sense, sc. whose truth, Heidegger seeks in order to ground metaphysics is nothing else than the emergence of the ontological difference, and conversely, the forgottenness of one is equivalent to forgottenness of the other. "... The forgottenness of Being is the

---

forgottenness of the *difference* between Being and beings." 34

Out of this forgottenness, metaphysics is born. Nor need the forgottenness be conceived as a deficiency in the metaphysician. Rather it is inherent to metaphysics as such: "because metaphysics interrogates beings as beings, it remains with beings and never returns to Being as Being . . . " 35 As the word is used in the context of this citation, metaphysics is still conceived as arising with Plato, and, thus understood, it is in the strictest sense a going υπερ τα φυσικά. That is why it emerges first with Plato's distinction between sensible and supra-sensible. When we recall, however, that metaphysics in this sense is no more than one manner in which the ambivalence of ἄτομον comes-to-pass, we realize that its roots go deeper than Plato, reach down, as we have seen already, to the very origins of Greek thought. Hence if we think . . . the essence of metaphysics in terms of the duality of [beings and Being], which derives from the self-concealing ambivalence of ἄτομον, then the beginning of metaphysics and the beginning of Western thought occur together. If, on the other hand, we take the essence of metaphysics as the distinction between a supra-sensible and a sensible world, . . . then metaphysics begins with Socrates and Plato . . . . 36

In probing the ground of metaphysics, Heidegger meditates its "essence," sc. that which lets it be what it is, in both these senses, and since in each case, though in different ways, the ontological difference goes un-thought, he poses as well the question as to why it has been forgotten—forgotten, indeed, necessarily. 37

---

84 "... Die Seinsvergessenheit ist die Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des Seins zum Seienden." (HW, p. 336). (Writer italicizes here; Heidegger italicizes the whole). The same point was made in 1929 (KM, p. 212), but it comes into sharp focus only in retrospect.

85 "Weil die Metaphysik das Seiende als das Seiende befragt, bleibt sie beim Seienden und kehrt sich nicht an das Sein als Sein . . . ". (WM, p. 8). Yet metaphysics profits from the difference constantly, and the transcendence proper to it must pass through the difference as such (WD, p. 175).


87 ID, pp. 46-47.
This proposal to ground metaphysics by interrogating the sense of Being as the process of \( \delta \chi \theta \alpha \zeta \) through which the ontological difference breaks out has been Heidegger's unique preoccupation since the first pages of *Being and Time* (1927). One must admit, of course, that the focus on the difference as difference becomes sharper in the later years than we find it in the beginning, and the evolution in clarity will warrant very special attention. But the fundamental position is made sufficiently clear as early as the inaugural address of 1929, when the author formulates the ground-question with Leibniz' formula: “why are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?” 38 For Leibniz, of course, the formula asks effectively about a Supreme Being that “grounds” all other beings, is therefore eminently a metaphysical question. For Heidegger, the question means: how is it possible that beings (independently of “where” they might have come from, “who” or “what” may have “caused” them, as metaphysics understands these terms) can be (manifest) as beings. In other words, it is a question about the coming-to-pass of the lighting-process of \( \delta \chi \theta \alpha \zeta \), which we now understand as the emergence of the ontological difference. What is more, it is a question about this process as permeated by negativity. Heidegger himself expands the question thus: “... How does it come about that everywhere [about us] beings have the primacy ... while that which is not a being, which is thought of as Non-being in the sense of Being itself, remains forgotten? ...” 39 The ground-question meditates not only Being but obliviousness to Being, the forgottenness of the ontological difference.

One last word: Since metaphysics by reason of its nature cannot meditate the Being-process which is its ground, then to ground metaphysics we must pass beyond it. This is the sense of “overcoming” metaphysics. By overcoming it in this way, do we vitiate or destroy it? Of course not. If we leave metaphysics, it is only to return to the ground from which it draws its vitality. Heidegger explicitly does not wish to tear the roots of philosophy.
out; he will simply dress the ground, till the soil wherein it finds
its strength. This effort to lay bare the foundations of ontology
was called in the early years “fundamental ontology,” but
after 1929 the word disappears completely. In 1949 we are told
why: the word “ontology,” even with the epithet “fundamental” to explain it, makes it too easy to understand the grounding of metaphysics as simply an ontology of a higher sort, whereas ontology, which is but another name for metaphysics, must be left behind completely. The essential is to realize that
whether we speak of fundamental ontology or the ground of
metaphysics, the sense is identical: we are talking about the
ultimate process out of which metaphysics arises, the essence
(Wesen) of metaphysics. Conversely, to meditate metaphysics
in terms of its essence will mean always to leave it in order to
return to its ground, sc. to think upon the truth of Being.

B. THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT

If anyone wishes to assess Heidegger’s philosophical effort,
one would think that the best way would be to measure the
success or failure with which he has been able to answer his own
question about the sense, sc. truth, of the Being-process. But
such a project is unfeasible, not only because he has not yet said
his last word about Being, but because it becomes increasingly
clear that for him a last word probably cannot be said, insofar
as the sense of Being lies in the fact that it is eminently question-
able. If he has an importance for his contemporaries, then, this
importance must be measured not by the question as answered
but by the question as asked. It is in terms of the very posing of

40 WM, pp. 9-10 (gräbt, pflügt). Rückgang appears in the title of the introduction
to WM (1949) and passim throughout. Note a discrepancy between text (1929) and
introduction (1949): in 1929, it seems possible to ground metaphysics while remaining
interior to it, for the question of Non-being is a “metaphysical” question (WM, pp.
41, 24-27, 38). Similarly in KM, pp. 13-14, we are told that the foundation of meta-
physics must not be conceived as a basis that supports it from the outside but as the
projecting of a blueprint (Entwerfen des Bauplans) for metaphysics, as discernible
in the nature of man. It is the “metaphysics of metaphysics” (v.g. KM, p. 208). In
1949, it is clearly necessary to quit metaphysics entirely in order to meditate its
ground. Latent here is the entire transition from the early to the late Heidegger.
42 WM, p. 21. Thus the word “ontological” has become for Heidegger suspect.
Cf. Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 55. (Hereafter: G). In the later years,
even the “ontological difference” becomes simply the difference (Differenz, Unter-
Schied), v.g. US, p. 24.
the question, therefore, that one might seek to assess the originality of his work.

The question about the sense of Being remains through Heidegger’s entire work an indefatigable effort to think the Being-process. The question, then, about the sense of Heidegger ultimately may reduce itself to this: what does it mean to think? Such is the question that we wish to pose in these pages: what does Heidegger mean by the thinking of Being? We propose to trace the development of this notion in the published work. It is a notion that becomes thematized only in the later work, so we shall examine the shift from the problem of fundamental ontology in the early period to the search for authentic thought later on, as a metamorphosis that is as much controlled by an internal unity as it is dictated by an intrinsic necessity. We have, then, a privileged opportunity to watch the interior dynamics of the so-called “reversal” (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thought.

In order to know what we have to look for as we begin our examination of SZ, let us sketch out in very bold lines the nature of the thought that thinks the Being-process. To begin with, what shall we call it? The author himself speaks of it in many ways, but we settle on one of them for reasons of clarity and consistency. The thought which interrogates the foundations (Wesen) of metaphysics we call simply “foundational” thought (das wesentliche Denken). How is it to be understood?

I. Negatively

We gain best access to the notion of foundational thought, if we first determine what it is not. The thought that overcomes metaphysics is not a metaphysical thought. But what is metaphysical thought? Only a Heidegger-eyed view of metaphysics in its history can give us an understanding of it.  

43 Denken is literally an infinitive. Used as a noun (more often in German than in English), it implies the activity or process of thinking. In English, this is more easily rendered by the participle than by the infinitive. Hence we translate it usually as “thinking,” occasionally as “thought,” intending this always to mean “thought” in the active sense, sc. as in the process of accomplishing itself. Wesentliche comports the full verbal sense of Wesen, which can be appreciated only as we proceed.

44 In the résumé that follows, we condense Part III of our research into the briefest possible form. Since the analysis is examined later in detail, we omit here all textual justification. We refer only to such matters as we shall not have the occasion to remark again.
However oblivious the pre-Socratics may have been to the ontological difference as Heidegger himself thematizes it, they had a profound sense of the Being-process, for they conceived Being as φύσις. Whatever it is that spontaneously emerges, or opens-up and unfolds, and, having unfolded, appears in abiding self-manifestation – this is φύσις. It is not simply what we call "nature," which is a being like the rest, sc. only one form of emergence. Rather it embraces all manner and types of beings: heaven and earth, gods and men. By reason of φύσις, beings arise and stand forth as being what they are, sc. they become con-stant and observable, able-to-be-encountered. Φύσις is emergent-abiding-Power. Whence does it emerge? From concealment. Recent philological research finds a relation between the stem φυ- and the φα- of φανέρωσις, suggesting that φύσις is an emerging-into-light, a shining-forth, an appearing. Hence, by reason of φύσις, ἀλήθεια comes-to-pass.45

With Plato, this early Greek conception of φύσις-ἀλήθεια, sc. truth conceived as non-concealment, undergoes a transformation, for, although on the one hand the Ideas retain the original sense of ἀλήθεια, insofar as they are conceived fundamentally as a source of light by reason of which, through participation, the "beings" of experience shine forth, nevertheless the Ideas become at the same time something-to-be-seen (εἴδος-εἶδος), and truth comes gradually to mean the proper viewing of the Ideas, the conformity (δρόμος) between the being that views and the Ideas (conceived as beings) that are viewed. Here the Ideas are transformed from a source of light into that-which-is-viewed. In other words, Being is reduced to a being. The confusion will mark the entire subsequent history of metaphysics. Token of the confusion will be the domination henceforth of the conception of truth as conformity and a disregard of the original sense of truth as non-concealment. Since truth-as-non-concealment is what Heidegger understands by Being, it is easy to see in what sense he understands metaphysics as the perennial forgetfulness of Being.

But if metaphysics begins with Plato, it reaches its term in the subject-ism of Descartes and the entire modern period. With

45 EM, pp. 11-12 (aufgehenden und verweilenden Walten), 54, 77 (φυ-, φανέρωσις), 47 (ἀλήθεια).
the liberation of man unto himself that characterizes the epoch, 
Descartes seeks some *fundamentum inconcussum verilatis*, by 
which man himself may become the arbiter of his own truth. 
Truth, then, becomes not only conformity but the verification 
of this conformity, sc. certitude. This *fundamentum* will 
"underlie" all truths, hence will be the "subject" of truth, 
which for Descartes himself is, of course, the *cogito-sum*. The 
*fundamentum verilatis* becomes the *res* (subjectum) *cogitans*, 
where *cogitatio* is to be understood as the present-ing, or pro-
posing, of an object to a subject, in such a way that the present-
ing or pro-posing subject can itself guarantee its conformity to 
the object in a manner analogous to the way in which the subject 
guarantees to itself its own existence. Since only that is true 
which is certifiable, beings are "true" only insofar as they enter 
into the subject-object polarity, sc. are either subjects or objects. 
Hence the Being of beings becomes that by which they are 
subjects (subject-ivity) or objects (object-ivity); their only 
presence is found not in their own non-concealment but in the 
order of (re)presentation by a subject. With Descartes, then, the 
transcendence which characterizes all metaphysics becomes not 
a passage unto something specifically non-human, whether an 
Idea or God, but rather unto a *subjectum* which in one way or 
another is related to human nature itself. It is, then, less a 
"going beyond" the human orbit than an exploring of it. Hence 
for the epoch of subject-ism Heidegger suggests that we speak 
not of "transcendence" but of "rescendence." 

However this may be, the subject for Descartes is an individual 
human ego, but Leibniz extends the notion so that it can 
apply to every being. For every monad is endowed with the 
power of present-ation, sc. *perceptio et appetitus*. Kant's transcen-
dental philosophy is an attempt to discern the conditions 
necessary to render possible the present-ing of objects to the 
subject. But the culmination of subject-ism (hence of all meta-

---

46 Present-ative thinking reaches its fulfillment in the subject-ism of Descartes 
but it is a type of thinking that is intrinsic to metaphysics as such. For in meditating 
beings as *beings* it (re)presents these beings in terms of their being-ness, hence 
present-ative thought simply transposes onto the level of thought the process of 
transcendence. It has its origin in Plato to the extent that, in transforming *Being* 
into a *being* (Idea), Plato conceived the being-ness of beings as *see-able* (ἐδοξο

47 SF, p. 18 (Reszendenz).
physics) arrives with Hegel, for it is he who explores the absolute character of the certitude in which Descartes' quest for the fundamentum inconcussum terminates, sc. the certitude of self-awareness.

Culminated in Hegel, subject-ist metaphysics reaches its ultimate consummation in Nietzschean nihilism. On the one hand, Nietzsche sees that the old supra-sensible (meta-physical) values have lost their meaning for nineteenth century Europe, and, to the extent that he takes God to be the symbol of these values, God is certainly dead. On the other hand, his own effort at revaluation remains itself a metaphysics, for the Will-to-Power, posing as it does new values (truth and art), is eminently a subject-ism. The only change is in the way in which the present-ative subject is conceived: now it is Universal Will. Nietzsche fails, then, to overcome metaphysical nihilism. In fact, he adds to its momentum, for to the extent that his super-man responds to the exigencies of Being conceived as Will-to-Power, he seeks (and must seek) domination over the earth. This he achieves principally through scientific progress. Such is the meaning of the "technicity" which crystallizes for contemporary society the forgetfulness of the Being-dimension in beings, of the ontological difference. The measure of Nietzsche's failure is his inability to escape the subject-object polarity. This can be done only by a type of thinking that can transcend subjectism, meditate the essence of metaphysics by going beyond it to think that which metaphysics invariably forgets: the sense of Being itself.

What is said here of metaphysics may be said for the science of logic as well, for this formulates the rules of present-ative thought. Like metaphysics, logic, too, is chained to the conception of truth-as-conformity. In similar fashion, Heidegger interprets the traditional conception of humanism. Interpreting the essence of man as a rational animal, all traditional humanisms, he claims, either spring from a metaphysics or found one.

Foundational thought, then, is of such a nature that it can overcome metaphysics, technicity, logic, humanism. It must be a process that is non-subjective (better: pre-subjective), therefore non-presentative (pre-presentative). By the same token, it is non-logical (pre-logical), and as long as we remain in the per-
INTRODUCTION

spectives of logic and metaphysics, we will be able to think of Being only as Non-being. If "rational" (ratio) means the same as "logical" (λόγος), then this thought must be called non-rational: not irrational, but pre-rational. As opposed to the tendency to dominate the objects of thought, the attitude of foundational thinking will be simply to let beings be, hence render them free unto themselves.

2. Positively

More positively, foundational thinking tries to meditate Being as the process of truth, sc. the coming-to-pass of the lighting-process in beings. What is the fundamental structure of this thought? It is brought-to-pass by the nature of man conceived as ek-sistence, sc. endowed with the prerogative, unique among beings, of an ecstatic open-ness unto the lighting-process of ἀ-λόγεια. Ek-sistence thus understood may be called the "There" (Da) of Being, because it is that domain among beings where the lighting-process takes place. Since the There comes-to-pass in a being, sc. man, this privileged being is the "There-being," (Dasein), and, conversely, There-being must be understood always as the There of Being among beings, nothing more.

To understand thought, then, we must first see more precisely the relationship between Being and its There. It is, in fact, a cor-relation. For on the one hand, Being maintains a primacy over its There, throwing it out and dominating it at all times, revealing and concealing itself through its There according to the necessity of its own nature. Yet on the other hand, it needs its There in order to be itself, sc. the coming-to-pass of non-concealment, for unless non-concealment comes-to-pass in a There that is found among beings, it does not come-to-pass at all. To think Being will be to think the truth of Being in which There-being is ek-sistent.

Being discloses itself to and in its There, but since it is Being that holds the primacy, Being is conceived as sending itself unto its There. We may speak of this self-sending as proceeding from Being and call it a "self-emitting," or, if we may be permitted a neologism to designate a completely new concept, a "mittence" (Geschick) of Being. We may speak of it, too, as terminating in
INTRODUCTION

There and therefore call it a "com-mitting" or "com-mitment" (Schicksal) of There to its privileged destiny as the shepherd of Being. In any case, one thing is certain: intrinsic to the mittence of Being is a certain negativity, by reason of which Being withdraws even as it bestows itself, conceals itself even in revealment. The reason is that even though Being reveals itself in revealing beings, it can never be seized for itself and by itself (since it is not a being), therefore conceals itself in the very beings to which it gives rise. To think Being, then, will be to think it as a mittence, not only in its positivity but in its negativity.

We must go one step further. Since the mittence of Being is intrinsically negatived, no single mittence exhausts the power of Being to reveal itself. Hence Being discloses itself to the nature of man by a plurality of mittences, which we shall call "inter-mittence" (Ge-schick-te), and it is this that constitutes history (Geschichte). Foundational thought must think Being-as-history and therefore is a profoundly historical thought.

All this describes, however, the relation between Being and its There. What is the precise rôle of thought in the process? It brings this relationship to fulfillment. If we consider this fulfillment with reference to Being, thought completes the process of non-concealment by bringing Being into that form of manifestation that is most proper to the nature of man: language, through which he says "is." If we consider this fulfillment in terms of the There, thought is that process by which ek-sistence assumes, therefore achieves, itself as the There of Being. From either point of view, the fundamental attitude of thought will be one of acquiescence to Being, of responding (Entsprechung) to its appeal (Anspruch), of letting Being be itself.

The structure of this process will take the form of a re-collection (Andenken): the tri-dimensional process by which Being comes ("future") to the thinker in and through what already-has-been ("past") and is rendered manifest ("present") by the words that the thinker himself formulates. Such, too, is the structure of the thought-ful dialogue. Profoundly a temporal process (future-past-present), foundational thought is by this very fact historical, sc. thinks Being-as-history in continual advent to thought through its dialogue with the past. Furthermore, thought thinks not only Being-as-history (inter-mittence), but
thinks every mittence of Being in its negativity, as well as in its positivity, endeavoring to comprehend and express not what another thinker thought/said, but what he did not think/say, could not think/say, and why he could not think/say it.

But when all is said and done, the function of foundational thought is to help Being be itself, to dwell in Being as in its element, the way a fish dwells in water. Thought, as the fulfillment of the There, proceeds from Being and belongs to it, for the There is thrown-out by Being. On the other hand, thought attends to Being, inasmuch as by it the There assumes itself as the guardian of Being. This thought that belongs to Being and attends to Being is what Heidegger in his later period – let us call him simply “Heidegger II” – means by the “thinking of Being” (das Denken des Seins). Briefly: foundational thinking is the process by which human existence responds to Being, not only in its positivity but in its negativity, as the continual process of truth-as-history. Our first task is to see how all this finds its roots in the early Heidegger (“Heidegger I”), as he reveals himself in SZ and the perspectives characteristic of this work.

Before we conclude this general survey, it is worth-while calling attention to the fact that an authentic response to the appeal of Being is precisely what Heidegger understands by “philosophy.” He develops the point in an address to the philosophers of France in 1955.48

The word appeared for the first time, the author claims, in Heraclitus, and there as an adjective rather than as a noun, describing the man who φιλέι το σαραφόν. Φιλέι is interpreted to mean “respond,” and σαραφόν to mean “Εν-Πάντα, sc. Being-as-λόγος (“Εν), insofar as it gathers together beings (Πάντα) unto themselves and lets them be. During the era of sophistry, both appeal and response took different forms. Then the mystery of Being in beings disclosed itself to the true thinker as threatened by the crass charlatanism of the sophists. In such a situation the authentic response was to try to salvage Being from this fallen condition, hence to strive after Being in beings beyond the level of every-dayness. The fundamental drive was an ερως. To Aristotle, the Being-to-be-sought disclosed itself as the being-ness.

INTRODUCTION

Now Heidegger’s thesis is that what the occidental man traditionally has called “philosophy” is precisely that striving after the Being of beings that implies a passage beyond the sensible (physical) to the supra-sensible and begins with Plato. We can see, then, that for Western thought philosophy, as we know it, is identified with metaphysics, so that when Aristotle comes to define philosophy, the result is the classic definition of metaphysics: ἐπιστήμη τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτίων θεωρητική. Paraphrasing in Heidegger’s sense, we take this to mean: philosophy is that endowment in man (ἐνέργεια) by which he can catch and hold in view (θεωρητική) beings in that by which they are as beings (ἀρχῶν, αἰτίων). No one will doubt, least of all Heidegger, that this conception of philosophy is a legitimate one. What makes it so, however, is not that it crystallizes once and for all the meaning of metaphysics, but that it is an authentic response by Aristotle to the address of Being to him. The author insists, however, that the historic formula is only one way of conceiving the correlation of address-response between Being and man. It is helpless, for example, to express this correlation as it came-to-pass in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Why, then, absolutize it? Being remains after Aristotle, as before, eminently “free” to address itself to man in some other type of mittence, articulated in some other way. If we, for our part, remain docile to Being, which in the Aristotelian tradition imparted itself as metaphysics, are we not after all – indeed in a very original way – still “philosophical”?

During the course of Heidegger’s development, he uses the word “philosophy” sometimes in the narrow sense, by which it is identified with metaphysics, sometimes in the broad sense, as a response to Being’s appeal. In the first case, it shares the same destiny as metaphysics and must be overcome. In the second, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished. We make no attempt to retain the problematic beyond calling attention to

---

49 WP, pp. 21–22 (Heraclitus), 23–24 (Sophists), 24–25 (Aristotle).
50 WP, pp. 25–27 (ὑποτηθήκας...), 28–29 (freie Folge). The word “free” here has a polemical connotation, directed against the Hegelian notion according to which the mittences of Being would be determined by a dialectical necessity. Cf. p. 31.
51 V.g. PW, p. 48 (narrow sense); WW, p. 24 (broad sense).
it here. Let it suffice to say that in disengaging the sense of foundational thought, we delineate Heidegger’s conception of philosophy as well. For there is only one philosophical question that interests him, the question about Being and its truth. This is the “one star” – the only – that remains constant along the way.\textsuperscript{52} It is, one might think, the evening star that must have caught his eye when, in the gathering darkness of Reichenau, he watched the light go out of the west.

\textsuperscript{52} “Auf einen Stern zugeben, nur dieses....” (\textit{Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens} [Pfullingen: Neske, 1954], p. 7 [Hereafter: ED]).
PART I

FROM THERE TO BEING

Forever falling night is a known
Star and country to the legion
Of sleepers whose tongue I toll.

Dylan Thomas, "Vision..."
CHAPTER 1

BEING AND TIME

I. The Problem of Fundamental Ontology

A. ANTECEDENTS

When the young philosopher started his advanced studies at Freiburg after a brilliant Abitur in Constance, Neo-Kantianism was in full command of the German universities.1 This meant that only two problems were philosophically acceptable: the critical problem of knowledge and the critical problem of values. The Being-problem – and with it all ontology (metaphysics) – had long since been dissolved, indeed by Kant himself. Of course there were reactions against the trend, two in particular, both strongly influenced by Brentano. One of these reactions was Husserl’s phenomenology, which, despite its “transcendental idealism,” gave nevertheless to “ontology” a place of honor. The second reaction was the movement of Neo-Scholasticism, which could claim Brentano as its own, and with him, after the example of St. Thomas, essayed a return to Aristotle. Both these tendencies found in Heidegger a sympathetic audience: Neo-Scholasticism helped him find his way in mediaeval and ancient thought; phenomenology opened up for him what was contemporary. Traces of the latter are discernible in the habilitation thesis of 1915; 2 traces of the former in the emphasis, during the early teaching years, on ancient philosophy as far as Augustine.

Meditating Aristotle in these years, Heidegger probed deeper the problem of τι τὸ δὲν ὃν. Augustine, however, gave him a new insight: that man is not a being like other beings but enjoys

1 For the following exposé, see Max Müller, “Die Philosophie Martin Heideggers im Horizont der Gegenwart,” radio talk delivered on Südwestfunk, Sept. 20, 1959, published Badische Zeitung (Freiburg), Sept. 26/27, 1959, p. 7.
2 Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (Tübingen, 1916).
a prerogative all his own by reason of which his own Being is not from the beginning a *fait accompli* but something that he himself must achieve, a task in which he can default.

During this time, too, Heidegger saw more and more clearly that the dichotomy between realism and idealism was thoroughly inadequate. Realism, as a philosophical tendency, assumes, with an appeal to the example of ancient and mediaeval thinkers, that the being-ness of beings can be discerned without further ado in the beings themselves which lie before man as simple entities (*Vorhandene*). Idealism, as a philosophical tendency, sees the origin of all being-ness in thought, or consciousness, which alone supplies a unity for the multiplicity of beings, thereby allowing each individual the sense it has in relation to the whole ensemble. Heidegger saw that the problem had to be posed on a different level in terms of an intimate correlation between the Being-process and man, by reason of which the "sense" of beings was something more than mere entity, yet also more than the fabrication of consciousness. This would demand, however, an analysis of man in his relationship to Being that would shatter the realist-idealist dilemma by overcoming the subjectivism that lay at its roots.

The need for a study of the ontology of man was underscored by the researches of Max Scheler, who, starting from Husserl's phenomenology, insisted that philosophical anthropology must be the fundamental discipline of all philosophizing. Finally, there was Wilhelm Dilthey. He had undertaken in effect a critique of man's "historical" reason after the manner of Kant's critique of "pure" reason, raising the question as to how the historical transformation of the world may be the consequence of transformation in the world-view of man's essentially historical consciousness.

These were the major influences (who can count the minor ones? – beginning, no doubt, with Kierkegaard) that crystallized in the remarkable synthesis of SZ (1927). As means of access to this difficult work, we choose not the book's own introduction, admirable though it is, but the closing section of the Kant-interpretation (KM), and for more than one reason. Published subsequently to SZ (1929), it was conceived beforehand (1925–26) and intended as the first section of SZ, Part II, the first salvo
in the "destruction" of metaphysics, which as such was never fired. For clarity and conciseness these pages are unsurpassed by anything in SZ, and it seems perfectly legitimate to let Heidegger introduce Heidegger, as long as both are contemporaneous. This much would justify our approach, but we have a better reason still. Letting KM guide us through SZ lets us see how Heidegger's entire effort strikes at the roots of Neo-Kantianism, which had dominated so completely the philosophical world of his youth. For the whole function of KM is to show that Kant's purpose in the Critique of Pure Reason is by no means to construct a theory of knowledge, as the Neo-Kantians assumed, but precisely to lay the foundation for metaphysics. Hence, Heidegger's problematic is nothing else than a re-trieve of Kant's. This helps us to see that, more than anyone else, the unannounced adversaries throughout SZ are the Neo-Kantians, and that KM, because so profoundly a complement to SZ, is therefore the best propaedeutic to it.

B. KANT AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

For Kant, metaphysics in the proper sense is the metaphysica specialis of the tradition which preceded him (theology, cosmology, psychology), but the laying of the groundwork for such a metaphysics quickly becomes the problem of grounding a metaphysica generalis, sc. ontology. The reason is simple: a knowledge (ontic) of those beings with which metaphysica specialis is concerned would be impossible (and this the example of

3 KM, p. 7. We utilise chiefly the fourth section, entitled "The Founding of Metaphysics in a Re-trieve" ("Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik in einer Wiederholung"), pp. 185-222.
4 KM, pp. 25 ("Erkenntnistheorie"), 13, 15 (Fundamentaontologie), 216 (Wiederholung). "Re-trieve" for the author has a very precise sense which appears in the analysis of the temporality of There-being. For the present, let us accept without comment the description offered in KM, p. 185: "By the retrieve of a fundamental problem we understand the disclosure of those original possibilities of the problem which up to the present have lain hidden. By the elaboration of these possibilities, the problem itself is transformed and thus for the first time is conserved in its proper content. To preserve a problem, however, means to liberate and preserve that interior force that renders this problem in its innermost essence possible as a problem." ("Unter der Wiederholung eines Grundproblems verstehen wir die Erschliessung seiner ursprünglichen, bislang verborgenen Möglichkeiten, durch deren Ausarbeitung es verwandelt und so erst in seinem Problemgehalt bewahrt wird. Ein Problem bewahren heißt aber, es in denjenigen inneren Kräften frei und wach halten, die es als Problem im Grunde seines Wesens ermöglichen.")
scientific research makes clear), unless the metaphysician already possessed some previous comprehension of the structure of those beings (ontological knowledge). This, according to Heidegger, is the proper sense of the famous “Copernican revolution,” sc. that ontic knowledge is rendered possible only by an ontological comprehension that precedes it and resides in the very structure of the knower.5

How Kant’s effort to thus lay the groundwork for ontology becomes a Critique of Pure Reason will appear, if one recalls that “pure reason” is Kant’s term to describe that capacity by which man knows according to a priori principles. The ontological knowledge which he wishes to explain, however, must be of such a type. As a knowledge, it would consist in judgements (Kant does not dispute here the Leibniz-Wolff tradition), and, indeed, synthetic judgements, since it would be a knowledge of beings other than the knower and must achieve the union of knower and known (synthesis). Yet because these judgements are ontological (pre-ontic), they are prior to all experience (a priori). The grounding of ontological knowledge, then, will involve the study of synthetic a priori judgements (principles), and, more radically, it will involve the delimiting and delineating (therefore “critique”) of the essence of that power in man which forms them (pure reason). Fundamental ontology for Kant had to be a Critique of Pure Reason.6

Such a critique is essentially an analysis of transcendence, sc. the transcendence of the human mind. Insofar as this ontological comprehension of a being precedes the ontic cognition of this being, rendering this cognition possible, it is such an orientation of the knower towards the known that it constructs not only the term of this orientation but the horizon itself within which this being can be experienced in the empirical synthesis. Such is the a priori synthesis of ontological knowledge: the passage of pure reason beyond itself to the beings-to-be-known in such a way as to comprehend the Being that makes them what they are prior to any experience of them. The examination of the conditions which render such transcendence possible will

5 KM, p. 20. For the distinction between “ontic” and “ontological,” see Introduction, note 18, apropos of WM, p. 20.
6 KM, pp. 22–23.
be itself "transcendental," Kant's fundamental ontology a transcendental philosophy.°

Now what characterizes the transcendence of the human reason is precisely its humanity, sc. its finitude. Hence the human reason, because finite, cannot create the object of its knowledge. If human knowledge is composed both of immediate intuition (Anschauung) and a universalizing judgement (Denken), both of these are profoundly finite: the intuition is essentially receptive; the universalizing judgement attains only mediately an object that it can represent only as universal (Diskursivität). Intrinsically limited within themselves, both of these elements are all the more limited by reason of their dependence upon one another in order to constitute the complete act of knowledge. Human knowledge (and human reason), then, are completely finite, non-creative. Consequently the problem of transcendence for Kant is this: how can finite (non-creative) reason, essentially dependent upon the presentation of an object for its act of knowledge, nevertheless so transcend itself that it comprehends the Being of its object prior to any experience of this object? Briefly: how is the ontological synthesis possible? 8

Heidegger's task is to re-trieve this problematic by probing deeper into its origins (ursprünglicher). With Kant – and this is decisive for SZ – he maintains that fundamental ontology must investigate what Kant calls the "natural propensity" (Naturanlage) of man for metaphysics.° He concedes, then, the justice with which Kant adds to the three basic questions which give rise to the traditional disciplines of special metaphysics (what can I know? [cosmology], what must I do? [psychology], for what may I hope? [theology]) a fourth: what is man? But this involves more than an anthropology, even a philosophical one, for it must explain the very ontological structure of man which is the source of the propensity to pose the first three questions, and still more to pose the fourth.° Briefly: it involves a fundamental ontology. Notice, however, that Heidegger shifts the emphasis from an investigation of man's reason (Kant) to an investigation of man in his totality.

° KM, pp. 24-25.
8 KM, p. 42. See pp. 32 (Rezeptivität), 35 (Diskursivität).
° KM, p. 13.
Heidegger endorses, too, and this is capital, Kant's insistence upon the finitude of man. The very questions that give rise to (special) metaphysics betoken the finitude of the being that poses them: to ask "what can I . . . ?" is to ask "what can I not?," hence to betray an essential limitation; to ask "what should I . . . ?" implies not only a "what should I not?" (therefore negativity) but also an intrinsic incompleteness; to ask "what may I?" implies hope, therefore expectancy, therefore indigence. Each of the questions, then, and still more their ensemble, reveals the basic finitude of the one who by these questions gives rise to metaphysics. Furthermore, what interests the questioner is the finitude itself, not in the hope of being able to dissolve it, but simply in order to verify it, that he may comport himself accordingly. So it is that finitude is not simply a mere accident of the human reason but characterizes this reason in its depths, sc. reason's finitude consists in a way-of-being-finite (Verendlichung) in its concern for itself as an essentially limited power-to-be ("Sorge" um das Endlich-sein-können). Hence, one may say that the human reason is not finite because it poses the first three questions, but rather it poses these questions (and gives rise to metaphysics) because it is finite, so finite that it is concerned about its own finitude.11

The questions which give rise to metaphysics, then, are not only related to man's finitude but spring from it and from man's concern about it. If one is to lay the groundwork for metaphysics, one must first pose the question: what is the interior ground of the finitude of man? It is the special function of the Kant-interpretation to bring to light the necessity of such a question.12 But this is not all. The task of fundamental ontology does not consist merely in posing the question about the finitude of man's Being but must ask how it happens that this finitude is the source of the metaphysical questions, and therefore what is the relationship between human finitude and the origin of metaphysics. Now the origin of metaphysics is the Being-process as the coming-to-pass of the ontological difference. The task of fundamental ontology here becomes more sharply de-

---

11 KM, pp. 195–196. Clearly the author, in using the word "reason" (Vernunft), intends the entire man (Endlich-sein-können). Note intimate correlation between finitude and "concern" (Sorge).

fined: to bring to light the intrinsic correlation between the Being-process, sc. Being as such, and the radical finitude of man.\(^{13}\)

Reducing the matter to its simplest terms, then, we may put it this way. Fundamental ontology attempts to lay the foundation for ontology. The research is controlled by a double polarity: on the one hand, to found metaphysics one must interrogate the Being-process; on the other, the very posing of the question betrays the finitude of the questioner. To succeed, then, fundamental ontology must explain the dynamism which unites these two poles, hence not only pose the Being-question but explain why it is raised by man precisely as \textit{finite}. The \textit{status questionis}: For Kant, what are the conditions which render possible the ontological synthesis (transcendence) of finite reason? For Heidegger, what is the relation between the radical finitude of man and the comprehension of Being as such?

\textbf{C. HEIDEGGER AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY}

Let us begin with an initial fact: even before posing the question, man has some comprehension of Being. No matter how dark or obscure Being itself may be to him, still in his most casual intercourse with other beings, they are sufficiently open to him that he may experience that they are, concern himself about what they are and how they are, decide about the truth of them, etc. He comprehends, somehow, what makes them what they are, sc. their Being. Again, every sentence that he utters contains an “\textit{is}.” His exclamations (v.g. “Fire!”) suppose the “\textit{is}.” His very moods reveal to him that he himself “\textit{is}” in such and such a way. He must comprehend, then, no matter how obscurely, what “\textit{is}” means, else all this would have no sense.

This radical comprehending of Being, however, even if undeniable, is not for that reason seized by any clear concept. It is pre-conceptual and for the most part undetermined, therefore inevitably vague. If one maintain that all knowledge is conceptual, then though beings may be known, the Being by which they are what they are (and which man comprehends) remains

\(^{13}\) KM, pp. 200–204.
unknown. Finally, this pre-conceptual comprehending of Being is unquestioning, for the Being that thus yields itself is so obvious that it calls no attention to itself, raises no questions, appears as if it were not. Vague, undefined, unquestioning, the comprehension of Being is nonetheless an irreducible fact, which the research accepts in order to begin.14

As a matter of fact, it is this pre-conceptual comprehension of Being, though itself unquestioning, that renders the Being-question possible. For to question is to search, and every search is polarized by its term. One could not ask, then, what Being means, unless one comprehended somehow the answer. The task of pursuing the Being-question, then, reduces itself to this: what is the essence of the comprehension of Being rooted so deeply in man? 15

It is this comprehension of Being that for Heidegger most profoundly characterizes man. "... Man is a being who is immersed among beings in such a way that the beings that he is not, as well as the being that he is himself, have already become constantly manifest to him. . . ." – manifest, that is, in their Being.16 Such a conception of man is momentous. Above all, it explains why Heidegger prefers to designate the questioner of Being by a term which suggests this unique privilege that distinguishes it from all other beings, sc. its comprehension of Being as such: the "There-being." 17 Henceforth we shall use this

14 For the two preceding paragraphs, see KM, pp. 204–205; SZ, p. 5. The insistence is still the same in 1952 (WD, p. 107). N. B. Wherever such precision is necessary, we translate Verstehen as "comprehending" to underline the verbal sense, and (Seins) Verständnis as "comprehension (of Being)." Ordinarily, however, we use both words indiscriminately.

15 SZ, pp. 5, 7; KM, p. 204. We have chosen to translate Verstehen by "comprehension" because: the normal meaning of "comprehension" corresponds to the normal meaning of verstehen, sc. "to understand." Yet the etymology permits it to suggest the Heideggerian sense: Verstaendigende ("to grasp, seize") suggests the seizure of Being, both in its anticipation (precedent structure) and in its coming-to-pass (construction); cum- ("with"), sc. with itself, suggests that the Being of this being is such that it seizes Being.

16 "... Der Mensch ist ein Seiendes, das inmitten von Seiendem ist, so zwar, daß ihm dabei das Seiende, das er nicht ist, und das . Seiende, das er selbst ist, zumal immer schon offenbar geworden ist. . . ." (KM, p. 205).

17 See SZ, p. 12. Thus we translate Dasein. Henri Birault ("L'Existence et vérité d'après Heidegger," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale LVI (1951), p. 38, note 1) suggests "presence" for good reasons, but we prefer to transliterate the German: because the English "There" more easily than the French là may suggest simple presence of a being (v.g. there is a book on my desk), hence need not (here does not) suggest merely place in space, or at least no more so than does the German Da (see SZ,
term exclusively, reserving for later the explicit question as to the precise relationship between There-being and man.

We are in a position now to understand some of the characteristics which Heidegger ascribes to There-being in virtue of the comprehension of Being as such which characterizes, or rather constitutes, its very ontological structure. The comprehension is not simply a theoretical knowledge but a manner of being in such a way as to comprehend Being. As a radical comprehension of Being, There-being's own Being, sc. that by which it is what it is, is to be concerned about Being. Hence the relationship to Being (the comprehending) constitutes the very ontological structure of There-being. Further, this comprehension of Being embraces not only its own Being but the Being of all other beings as well. Hence, as a being it is not just one more mere entity among many others, but it enjoys a primacy among the rest: "... the ontic excellence of There-being lies in the fact that it is ontological." 18 Furthermore, "... this manner of man's Being we call existence. It is only on the basis of a comprehension of Being that existence is possible." 19 Existence for Heidegger, then, means to be in that relationship to Being which we have called "comprehending." Only this! It is comprehension which constitutes the inner possibility of existence so that in turn existence constitutes the interior possibility (Wesen) of There-being. 20

Now human existence, thus understood, Heidegger also calls "transcendence." For us the word is disconcerting, because we have seen already that it is profoundly metaphysical in its implications. But we were viewing the matter in retrospect. In the period with which we are dealing now (1927), the author had nothing else but metaphysical words to work with in grounding

---

20 SZ, p. 42. Obviously this notion of existence has a completely different sense from the existentia of the tradition. For existentia, Heidegger uses Vorhandensein; we translate in accordance with his intention as "mere entity." Just as obviously, Wesen here does not mean essentia in the ordinary sense. What it does mean becomes clearer as we proceed.
How profound a problem this poses we shall see in time. For the moment, let us be content to see that his use of the term is legitimate, even if not wholly satisfying. For the word means, as we have seen, "to pass over." According to the different senses that are given to the being that achieves the passage, to that over which the passage is made, to the manner of passage and to its term, the word may assume any one of the numberless meanings that successive philosophers have given it. For Heidegger, the term is analysed most closely when interrogating There-being as the in-the-World-being, where There-being, considered as a being, passes beyond beings (even itself) to the World. But the sense of There-being as transcendence appears at the very starting point of fundamental ontology, where we are engaged at present. For There-being is a being whose structure is such that it comprehends the Being of beings. By this very fact, There-being passes beyond (therefore transcends) beings to the Being-process as such.

Thus "... with the [transcendence of There-being] comes-to-pass ... the [comprehending] of the Being of beings as such ...;" again "... transcendence achieves the [comprehending] of the Being of beings. ..." Note, however, that transcendence is the "coming-to-pass" (Geschehen), the "achieving" (Vollziehen) of ontological comprehending. This comprehending of Being, then, is not simply a domain that has been captured once and for all, to be retained henceforth as a permanent possession.
Much more is it a coming-to-pass that dynamically continues, therefore an occurrence which is always in the process of being achieved. The There-being, constituted by ontological comprehension, is essentially not a thing but a happening, and this happening is transcendence (better: transcending).

Besides this dynamic character of transcendence, remark, too, its profound finitude. In the first place, the There-being, in the original situation in which we first discover it as a problem, dwells in the midst of beings, engaged in continual comportment with them, because they have become manifest to it in virtue of its radical comprehension of their Being. There-being is, then, essentially referred (angewiesen) to beings. Essentially referred to them, hence referentially dependent upon them, it can never become either by culture or by technicity completely their master - the first testimony to finitude. Again, if There-being's referential dependence makes it powerless over other beings, it is no less powerless with regard to itself. There-being is not the source of its own Being but rather finds itself as an already existing fact, sc. immersed in its original situation as a comprehension of the Being of beings, and its "... origin and destiny are equally obscure..." Heidegger will later describe these two elements of the original situation, There-being's non-mastery of its own origin and its referential dependence on other beings, by the single term, "thrown-ness" (Geworfenheit), which must be understood in a purely ontological sense as wishing to signify the matter-of-fact character of human finitude.

Furthermore, this thrown-ness is not simply a characteristic of There-being's coming-into-existence, but permeates the There-being as such, sc. the entire coming-to-pass of its transcending comprehension. Heidegger will describe this abiding character of thrown-ness by another term, sc. There-being's "fallen-ness" among beings (Verfallenheit). By this he means

---

26 KM, pp. 206 (überantwortet), 212; SZ, p. 135. Hence the danger of such attractive translations as "abandon," "desiliction," "dejection," etc. - all are too rich with anti, anthropological connotations. We retain "thrown-ness" as closest to the original and, perhaps, least misleading.
that There-being’s comprehending of Being always comes-to-pass in and through its comportment with beings, for by Being, after all, is meant simply that by which all beings are. There-being, then, although comprehending Being in itself does not seize Being by itself, sc. as separate from beings. We should understand, too, that fallen-ness implies a certain ineluctable drag toward comportment with beings, hence an innate tendency to forget the Being-process as such. In any case, fallen-ness does not have here an axiological sense; it is simply another characteristic "of the innermost transcendental finitude of There-being."  

But we may articulate this finitude still further, if we consider the obscurity of the Being that is comprehended. It is so self-evident that it is unquestionable, comprehended but not conceived, obvious but nonetheless forgotten. It defies those thought patterns or language structures that are geared to the conception and expression of any being, because this is exactly what it is not. Being, as that by which all beings are, is not a being, nor the collection of beings – it "is" Non-being (das Nichts). "... The Being of beings is, however, comprehensible only under the condition ... that There-being, by reason of its very nature, thrusts itself into Non-being. ..." And Heidegger interrupts the sentence to remark: "... and herein lies the profoundest finitude of transcendence. ..."  

Because There-being in its comprehending of Being is so profoundly finite, its prerogative of existence hides within itself a need of its own, i.e. the need for continued comprehension in order that it be itself, therefore in order to exist. This internal indigence of There-being, grounded in finitude, is the innermost core of its dynamism. Because There-being’s comprehension is finite, its structure compels it to continue to comprehend Being in order to remain, therefore to be (and to become), itself. By reason of its very Being, then, There-being is still an incomplete seizure of Being, propelled by its own indigence toward an

17 "... der innersten transzendentalen Endlichkeit des Daseins" (KM, p. 213).
18 KM, pp. 204, 205, 210.
20 KM, p. 206. We use "become" in the sense of geschehen and sich vollziehen, not in the sense of werden.
unattainable completeness. This is why the author affirms as one of his first principles: "the 'essence' of this being lies in its to-be...", where the "to-" connotes not only the power-to-be (Seinkönnen) but the compulsion-, or drive-to-be, and the "-be" implies not only entity but the comprehension of Being. Taken in its ensemble, "to-be" is synonymous with existence, and the author adds: "the 'essence' of There-being lies in its existence...."31

Once one understands There-being's already-begun-still-to-be-achieved dynamism, one will find no difficulty with Heidegger's insistence upon the essentially ec-static character of There-being (later emphasized by the spelling "ek-sistence"), so central to his conception of time, history, truth and Being itself. Likewise we understand in what sense There-being does not have potentiality (Möglichkeit) but is its own potentiality, its power-(drive)-to-be.32

It is clear, then, that human transcendence is finite in the very roots of its Being, and that this finitude, or rather the indigence which is its consequence, is the interior source of its dynamism. It should be understood, however, that this dynamism is not just a property of transcendence but the structure by which it is what it is, sc. its Being. So it is that "existence, as a manner of Being, is itself finitude, and this [finitude] is possible only on the basis of the comprehension of Being..."33 Hence it becomes clear that the innermost ground of There-being's finitude is the comprehension of Being itself. This permits us, however, to answer the first question of fundamental ontology as to the relationship between the finitude of the questioner and the comprehension of Being, or, more precisely, to understand

---

31 "Das 'Wesen' dieses Seienden liegt in seinem Zu-sein...", and in the next paragraph "Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz..." (SZ, p. 42). Heidegger italicizes the latter. Zu-sein, sometimes translated pouvoir-être (A. De Waelhens, La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger [Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1941], p. 26), sometimes devoir-être (Biemel, Le concept..., p. 7), should include, it would seem, both these nuances. One should insist, too, that the devoir be stripped of any moral connotations and designate a completely ontological thrust, or drive-towards-Being. We intend "power-to-be" and "drive-towards-Being" as essentially synonymous.

32 "... ist je seine Möglichkeit..." (SZ, p. 42). For Existenz written as Ex-sistence, see v.g. WW, p. 15; HB, p. 66. We translate Möglichkeit with "potentiality" as suggesting better than "possibility" a "concrete" dynamism. "Power-to-be" translates Seinkönnen, but we use drive-towards-Being as legitimate variant. "Thrust" we reserve for Sichhineinhalten.

33 "Existenz ist als Seinsart in sich Endlichkeit und als diese nur möglich auf dem Grunde des Seinsverständnisses..." (KM, p. 206).
that it need not be asked: "... the comprehension of Being ... itself is the innermost essence of finitude. ..." 34

One final word. If eventually we distinguish several different components in this process of transcending, they are nevertheless all synthetized into a profound unity, the single process of a There-being whose unique concern is to salvage itself, to (continue to) be. This unity Heidegger calls "concern" (Sorge), a term which, like "fallen-ness," has for him not an axiological but only an ontological sense, sc. the "structural unity of the intrinsically finite transcendence of There-being." 35

The broad lines of Heidegger's problematic are now clear, and we are almost in a position to examine Being and Time (SZ), which ambitioned to develop a fundamental ontology such as is here described, without permitting the luxuriance of its trees to obscure the unity of the forest. Fundamental ontology, itself only a preliminary analysis to expose the horizon necessary for the analysis of the sense of Being itself, will prepare to interrogate the Being that is comprehended by first interrogating the comprehending itself. The prelude to the question of Being is the question of There-being. 36 We have seen already a rough draft of Heidegger's answer to such a question: There-being is transcendence, sc. a being in which the comprehending of Being comes-to-pass in a radically finite way. If, by pushing further to discover the sense of such a being, one discovers that the ultimate foundation which renders it possible is time, then we add to the first two characteristics of There-being (transcendence, finitude) a third, sc. temporality. We will have achieved, too, the program proposed by the author in the imposing title of SZ, Part I: "The interpretation of There-being in terms of temporality and the explanation of time as the transcendental horizon

35 "die strukturelle Einheit der in sich endlichen Transzendenz des Daseins" (KM, p. 213). We translate Sorge as "concern" because: it is less misleading, perhaps, than "care"; it admits of derivatives parallel with German (v.g. besorgen: "to be concerned with"); it suggests in English (though without verbal warrant in German) a correlation between Sorge and Dasein: "[dem es] in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht." (SZ, p. 12 and passim). What true disciple of the master will begrudge us this modest comfort?
36 SZ, p. 7.
of the question of Being." 37 We will also have laid the foundation for metaphysics by achieving a fundamental ontology.

D. Prenotes

Before we proceed to the text proper of SZ, let us pause for several remarks which may serve as transition.

1. Presuppositions

That Heidegger has certain presuppositions as he begins his task no one will deny – least of all Heidegger. In the first place, he presupposes that in man there is already a comprehension of Being. Out of this he develops, as we have seen, the notions of There-being, existence, transcendence. To the extent that the analysis of There-being to follow permits him to discern the sense of There-being's Being, the result of his analysis is itself based on the original presupposition. Is this not to argue in a circle? Heidegger sees the difficulty and formulates it himself: "... the idea of existence and of Being altogether is 'presupposed' and the There-being interpreted 'accordingly' in order that from this the idea of Being can be gained. ..." 38 His answer is to admit the circle but deny any warrant for reproach. He maintains, for example, that the comprehension is presupposed in that vague, pre-conceptual, self-evident seizure of Being which he holds to be an irreducible and indisputable fact. It is not, however, the explicit concept of the sense of Being which Heidegger ambitions as the end of his research. His effort at clarification has nothing to do with a vicious circle in the logical sense. 39

Yet a circle it is, to be sure, if one prescinds from the passage from vague to precise and considers only the passage from comprehension to comprehension. Such a circle, however, lies in the nature of the comprehension of Being, and the "circle" expresses

37 "Die Interpretation des Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit und die Explikation der Zeit als des transzendentalen Horizontes der Frage nach dem Sein." (SZ, p. 41).
38 "... die Idee der Existenz und des Seins überhaupt wird 'vorausgesetzt' und 'dannach' das Dasein interpretiert, um daraus die Idee des Seins zu gewinnen...." (SZ, p. 314). See p. 8.
39 SZ, pp. 7–8.
the *a priori* structure of There-being itself. The philosopher's task, then, will not be to deny, to conceal or to break the circle. On the contrary,

... the effort should much rather be to seek to leap into the "circle" in an original and thorough-going way, in order that from the very beginning of the analysis of There-being one gain the full view of the circular character of its Being. ... 40

Notice that the task involves effort, and this effort involves an initial "leap" (*springen*). The necessity of a leap will explain at once the difficulty of the analysis which follows, and its importance should be emphasized from the start. There is no gradual pedagogy in Heidegger. To fail to make with him the initial leap into the circular structure of There-being is to render any sympathetic understanding impossible.

Briefly, then, Heidegger feels that the concept of There-being as a comprehension of Being is a fact. It warrants no justification beyond itself; it needs only to be accepted and understood. Is this to proceed on a presupposition? So be it! This is a commentary on the nature of philosophy itself.

... Philosophy will never want to deny its "presuppositions," though it may not simply concede them. Rather, philosophy grasps clearly these presuppositions and, together with the analysis for which they are presupposed, brings the presuppositions themselves to a more penetrating elucidation. ... 41

This much Heidegger explicitly concedes. If, however, we must presuppose that There-being is endowed with a comprehension of Being, must we not also admit as presupposed what is comprehended? It would certainly seem so, but the author is less explicit here. Heidegger presupposes a conception of Being that not everyone will find as self-evident as he. How are we to understand it? If Being is that "which determines a being as a being," sc. that by which a being is what it is, what is the most fundamental characteristic of beings? 42 The fact that they are *re-*
sealed (offenbar) to There-being as being what they are. Being, then, is that by reason of which beings are revealed to There-being.

... As impenetrable as is the obscurity that enshrouds 'Being' and its meaning, so certain remains [the fact] that in the entire domain of the manifestation of beings we continually comprehend some such thing as Being. ... 43

Furthermore, this revelation of beings is somehow correlative with There-being's existence, sc. its antecedent comprehension of Being: "with existence ... comes-to-pass an irruption in the totality of beings of such a nature that now for the first time beings ... in themselves, sc. as beings, become manifest. ..." 44

Being, therefore, is that by reason of which beings become manifest — not for their own sake but to and for There-being.

The point is capital. Being for Heidegger is always correlative with There-being, that by reason of which beings are accessible to man. Furthermore, from this point of view it becomes easy to understand why he can say: "above all, only so long as There-being is, i.e. the ontic potentiality of the comprehending of Being, 'is there' Being. ..." 45 Furthermore, if Being is understood as that by reason of which beings are manifest and truth is essentially the process of non-concealment, then "'there is' Being — not beings — only insofar as truth is. And truth is only insofar and as long as There-being is. Being and truth 'are' simultaneous. ..." 46 All of this, we say, rests on a supposition. It is not our task to question this conception at present — in the strictest sense a preconception — even to ask if it is the only conception of Being that is legitimate for finite man. We wish only to call attention to the fact that this is a preconception, even if,

43 "... Denn so undurchdringlich das Dunkel ist, das über dem 'Sein' und seiner Bedeutung lagert, so gewiß bleibt, daß wir jederzeit und im ganzen Feld der Offenbarkeit des Seienden dergleichen wie Sein verstehen, ..." (KM, pp. 204–205). Writer’s italics.


for someone whose approach is phenomenological, an inevitable one.47

2. There-being

What is the initial conception of There-being? We have seen how There-being is conceived as a comprehension of Being that is radically finite. It is, then, a completely ontological (not anthropological) phenomenon, whatever may be its relation to man. Whatever is to be said of it will be a consequence of this ontological character. Existence, thus understood, is conceived as an “irruption” (Einbruch) into the totality of beings, by reason of which these beings as beings become manifest. “On the basis of [his] comprehension of Being, man is the There through whose Being the manifestive irruption among beings takes place.…”48 In other words, There-being is the There of Being among beings — it lets beings be (manifest), thereby rendering all encounter with them possible. It follows, then, that, correlative to the referential dependence of There-being on beings, there is a dependence of beings on There-being that they be (manifest). In letting beings be (manifest), however, There-being obviously does not “create” them but only discovers (ent-decken) them as what they are. What about beings before There-being discovers them? The question cannot be asked, as long as one restricts oneself to the focus of sheer phenomenology. In any case, this mutual dependence between beings and There-being is in fact only an explicitation of what we said before about Being as a correlate of There-being.49

If it is by the irruption among beings of existence that these beings become manifest, then there is no difficulty in understanding how There-being “lets” these beings be (seinlassen). In letting them be manifest, it “liberates” them from concealment,

47 “… Le principe primordial de la philosophie de Husserl — encore qu’il soit plus souvent implicitement supposé qu’explicitement exprimé — c’est celui qu’il est avoir un sens; l’être vrai est l’être pour un sujet….” (Quentin Lauer, Phénoménologie de Husserl [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955], p. 4). Though There-being is not a “subject” in the Husserlean sense but transcendence, the similarity of attitude between Husserl and Heidegger on this point is beyond question.


49 SZ, pp. 219–221.
hence renders them free. We are prepared for Heidegger's notion of liberty, at first so disconcerting. Liberty is liberation, sc. letting-be, hence not primarily an "act of the will" but a purely ontological process of the same order as, in fact identical with, There-being as transcendence.50

But what is the precise relationship between There-being and man? To be sure, the relationship is intimate. The entire problematic of fundamental ontology arises out of an attempt to explain the ontological structure of man which renders possible his natural penchant for metaphysics. We have seen how There-being is a comprehending of Being which is intrinsically finite, and which is the source of unity between the Being-question and the finitude of man who poses it. If fundamental ontology is not an anthropology, it is and remains an interrogation of There-being insofar as this is the ontological structure of man in his intrinsic finitude. It will be easy, then, to see why There-being is spoken of so often as the equivalent of man.51 It is perfectly understandable, too, why the author insists so strongly that There-being is always "mine," to the extent that he will designate "mine-ness" as the second (after existence) fundamental characteristic of There-being.52

But it could be exceedingly misleading to reduce this intimacy between There-being and man to the simple identification of There-being and the individual, still more to consider the ontological dimension as a property of man, more precisely of his intellect. Rather, the There-being is the ontological structure of man, ontologically prior (ursprünglicher) to man, and it is the finitude of There-being as an intrinsically finite comprehension of Being that is the ground of the finitude of man: "... more original than man is the finitude of There-being in him."53 Hence the There-being, rather than a mere synonym for man, is essentially a coming-to-pass that takes place in man. Of course, this poses problems. If There-being takes place in man, what is the precise relation between the two? For that matter, what man are we talking about? There is an obscurity, then,

52 SZ, pp. 42–43.
not only concerning the relationship between There-being and Being but concerning the relationship between There-being and man—all the more, then, between Being and man. If one retains a purely ontological (vs. anthropological) interpretation of There-being, one can see that Jean Beaufret’s question becomes plausible, even inevitable: “How give a sense to the word ‘humanism’?” 54

3. Method: Phenomenology

We have seen that the task of fundamental ontology is to discern the Being of There-being. Given the fact that Being is that by which beings (There-being) manifest themselves as what they are and how they are, then how else will fundamental ontology discern the Being of There-being than by letting it manifest itself for what it is?

Such, says Heidegger, is the genuine task of phenomenology: λέγειν τὰ φαινόμενα, where λέγειν has the sense of δηλοῦν (“to make clear”), or more precisely ἀποφαίνειθαι (sc. “to permit something to appear of itself, make itself seen”), and φαινόμενα means “that which shows itself as it is.” Hence phenomenology means ἀποφαίνειθαι τὰ φαινόμενα, sc. “to permit that which of its own accord manifests itself to reveal itself as it is.” 55

But what precisely is it within a being which “of its own accord manifests itself” that phenomenology lets be revealed?

... Obviously that which first of all and for the most part does not show itself, that which alongside of what first of all and for the most part does show itself is concealed, yet at the same time is something that essentially belongs to what first of all and for the most part shows itself, in such a way, indeed, as to constitute its sense and ground. 56

In other words, phenomenology lets-be-seen the Being of beings. Now to let-be-seen, sc. to investigate thematically, the Being of beings is the classical function of ontology. It is clear, then, why Heidegger claims that “... ontology is possible only as phenomeno-
nology. . . ." and reciprocally that phenomenology is effectively
ontology.\footnote{"... Ontologie ist nur als Phänomenologie möglich...." (SZ, p. 35). Heidegger italicizes whole. See p. 37.}

In the present case, the phenomenon with which we are concerned is There-being itself. The task is to let-be-seen the Being of There-being – Being that is concealed, or that was once revealed and has slipped back into oblivion, or that is revealed but in a distorted fashion so that There-being seems-to-be what it is not – briefly, Being that in one way or another is negativated. And it is precisely inasmuch as Being, because negativated, is \textit{not} seen that phenomenology is so necessary.\footnote{SZ, pp. 35–36.}

To permit the There-being, then, to reveal of its own accord what it is and how it is (as ontological comprehension, existence, finite transcendence), Heidegger will submit it to a phenomenological analysis and thus lay the Being of There-being out (\textit{Auslegung}) in full view. Such a "laying-out," sc. interpretation of There-being, Heidegger also calls "hermeneutic," but the full import of this fact will not appear for some time.\footnote{SZ, pp. 37–38. See p. 312 (Selbstauslegung).} For the moment, let us be content with remarking that There-being is in the strictest sense a \textit{self}-interpretation, sc. something that There-being must achieve in, for and as its self.

It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology for the evolution of foundational thought. Clearly it is not simply one method arbitrarily chosen from among others equally possible. It is imposed by his conception of the Being-process itself as that which renders beings manifest in a negativated way. If phenomenology is the method chosen for the meditation upon There-being which is to prepare a way to interrogate the sense of Being itself, this means that it is the way that the Heidegger of 1927 goes about the \textit{thinking of Being}.

4. \textit{Starting point: Everydayness}

Given the fact that we are to make a phenomenological analysis of the There-being in man, under what circumstances will we begin? Recall the terms of the problem: There-being is an in-
trinsically finite comprehending of Being. One of the consequences of this finitude is the fact that There-being takes its prerogative so completely for granted that it forgets the prerogative and thus forgets its self. Let the analysis of finite transcendence, then, start with There-being in that condition where it is most victim to its finitude: thrown-down among beings and immersed in them, There-being's unique prerogative lies lost in forgotten-ness. This is its every-day condition. Let it be called "every-day-ness" (Alltäglichkeit).

By everydayness, Heidegger wishes to designate that condition in which There-being first of all and for the most part finds itself in its day-in-day-out contact with beings. "First of all" indicates the manner in which There-being is initially disclosed to itself by reason of its coexistence with others, in the comings and goings, the constant superficial exchanges which constitute daily intercourse. "For the most part" indicates the manner in which There-being usually, though not always, shows itself for every man. It is consummate ordinariness.60

In this ordinariness, There-being's great prerogative lies forgotten. The phenomenological analysis of everydayness is not concerned, of course, with describing how a man handles his knife and fork, but how underneath all commerce between There-being and other beings, there lies the coming-to-pass of transcendence. Let this transcendence be designated by a term more congruous with the context of everydayness: let it be called "to-be-in-the-World" (In-der-Welt-sein).61 The term does not change its nature: it remains the coming-to-pass of Being-comprehension, sc. existence, by which the There-being is what it is. Henceforth, There-being, (finite) transcendence and to-be-in-the-World are synonymous. But in the multiple engagement of everydayness, this transcendence is obscured. Such is the forgottenness that follows upon finitude.

Finitude! The propensity to forgetfulness, then, is as inevitable and as abiding as everydayness itself. It cannot be dissolved. It can only be overcome. It is the task of fundamental ontology to overcome it, to tear There-being away from the

60 SZ, pp. 370 (Alltäglichkeit), 43 (Durchschnittlichkeit).
61 KM, p. 212. This explains why the author, after an introduction that thematicized There-being as Being-comprehension and existence, takes it to be self-evident that There-being's nature is to-be-in-the-World. See SZ, pp. 52 ff.
forgottenness of its authentic self. Hence the principal act of fundamental ontology is "re-collection" (Wieder-erinnerung) which, to be genuine, must "collect" within itself all over again ("re-") in the innermost springs of its possibility that which is recalled. In the present case this will mean that the entire analysis will be controlled by its fundamental ontological purpose: to discern in everydayness the ontological structure of finite transcendence, whose ultimate sense is time.

5. Terminology

a. EXISTENTIAL vs. EXISTENTIELL – We are examining the ontological structure of There-being, whose essence lies in existence. Let the analysis be called, then, “existentiAL.” But the term must be understood. Since existence for Heidegger is that structure by which There-being, thrown among beings, comprehends their Being, only that is existentiAL which pertains to There-being’s comprehension of the Being-structure of beings, hence to the primordial constitution of There-being itself. The term pertains to existence in its ontological dimension.

It is to be distinguished carefully from what is called “existentiELL.” For existence, as a finite comprehension, is thrown among beings and remains always fallen among them with the need of achieving transcendence only through comportment with beings. Hence, if by reason of its Being-comprehension There-being exists in an ontological dimension, then by reason of its finitude it exists simultaneously in an ontic dimension as well, sc. in continual engagement with beings, whether this engagement be imposed upon There-being by circumstances, the result of unconscious adaptation to milieu, or the result of a free choice. This dimension of existence and all that pertains

62 KM, p. 211. It is impossible to retain author’s play on words: Wieder-erinnerung, Erinnerung, Erinnerte, verinnerlichen. We have tried to be faithful to the sense by playing with “recollect.” This anticipates the notion of Andenken.

63 SZ, p. 12 and KM, p. 207. Existential is used by Heidegger: as an adjective, v. g. to describe the (phenomenological) analysis which he is undertaking (v. g. SZ, p. 13); as a noun, to designate an essential component of the structure of There-being as existence. In this sense it is opposed to Kategorie: a structural determination of beings other than There-being (v. g. SZ, p. 44).
to it is called "existentiELL," and is synonymous with "ontic." 64

It is worth while insisting on the fact that although existential and existentiell in There-being are distinct, they are not separate. They are different dimensions of a unique and profoundly unified phenomenon: finite transcendence. The function of the existential analysis as a re-collection of forgotten transcendence will be to discern the existential dimension which structures existentiell everydayness. It must respect the unity of the phenomenon that it analyses. The existential analysis must be rooted in the existentiell, sc. unless it discerns the existential within the existentiell, it remains groundless.65 One begins to see more clearly what the phenomenology of There-being as a process of transcendence will imply. It must be itself brought to achievement in some existentiell (ontic) comportment through which There-being re-collects the existential dimension of its self.

b. Authenticity and Inauthenticity - The author never defines explicitly what he means by "authenticity," but he offers the following ingredients for a definition: There-being is its own potentiality; as its own potentiality, it can "choose" itself in its own Being, i.e. "assume" itself; it can also "lose" itself, or rest in only an apparent assumption of itself. If There-being achieves itself, it is authentic (eigentlich); if it fails to achieve itself, it is inauthentic (uneigentlich). Hence both authenticity and inauthenticity are fundamental modes of Being (Seinsmodi) and have their basis in the fact that There-being, as existential, is a to-be-achieved-There.66

At this point, how much do we know about the self of which there is question of choosing or not choosing? As its own potentiality, it is a being so structured that it is to-be, sc. it is an already-begun-still-to-be-achieved-process of transcending beings to Being. This process is the very essence of the There-being, its existence. As such it distinguishes There-being from all other

64 SZ, pp. 12-13. Normal English would probably use the spelling "existentiel." The distinction is so important, however, that it must somehow be emphasized. Hence we have the choice of writing it either as "existentiELL" or as "existentiell" (italics are already over-worked). We choose the latter as the lesser of two barbarisms.

65 SZ, pp. 13 (verwurzelt), 312 (bodenlos), 315. For a lucid exposé of the unity of existential-existentional (ontic-ontological), see Biemel, Le concept..., pp. 85-91.

66 SZ, pp. 48-49.
beings. But this existence, as its process-character already indicates, is profoundly finite, sc. thrown-and-fallen-among beings; its structure is characterized by two dimensions, simultaneous and inseparable: ontic-existentiell and ontologico-existential. But the ontological dimension (and this is another mark of its finitude) in ordinary everydayness lies in forgottenness. To "choose" such a self — what else is it than to re-collect the unique prerogative which in all the poverty of its finitude constitutes the primacy of this being among all others? Such a choosing achieves There-being for what it is. For There-being, to fail to re-collect its prerogative of comprehension is to lose itself by letting its unique prerogative lie in forgottenness, by restricting its interest to the merely ontic-existentiell.67

Yet this achieving or not-achieving of the authentic There-being is a "choosing," hence is accomplished by some spontaneous orientation that lies within the competence of There-being to elect or fail to elect. There is here, then, a decision, a deliberate engagement, a willing to be faithful to itself which, though of course structured by Being and admitting of existential interpretation, lies nonetheless in the ontic dimension of There-being and is one of its existentiell possibilities. Eventually this choice will receive the designation "re-solve" (Entschlossenheit).68

We come now at long last to the text of SZ. We have no intention of offering a complete summary of the book as such, for our purpose is only to discern the first traces of what later emerges as foundational thought. If even so limited a focus forces us to examine most of the major themes, the examination is admittedly selective. From the beginning, we know that There-being is finite transcendence whose ultimate meaning is time. We let these two points polarize our résumé, reserving for special treatment in a separate section two remarks of a more general nature which are of special importance for us.

67 Heidegger in this context assumes that the only type of inauthenticity of There-being is that which forgets its own ontological dimension. Would not There-being be equally inauthentic, if it forgot its ontic dimension and lost itself in a pure mysticism or mythicism of Being? See M. Heidegger, *De l'Essence de la Vérité*, trans. Alphonse De Waelhens et Walter Biemel (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1948), p. 16.

68 SZ, pp. 42, 287–288. Most of the early interpreters took the fact that a choice is necessary for There-being in order to achieve authenticity to be an illicit transfer of the problem to the moral order. (See A. De Waelhens, *La Philosophie...*, p. 31, note 2). Reviewing the problem in the broader horizon that Heidegger II supplies, we see now that such an interpretation is unwarranted.
II. The Existential Analysis

A. THE WORLD

There-being is the coming-to-pass of finite transcendence, which under everyday circumstances is first discernible as a being whose nature is to-be-in-the-World. In analysing it, we follow the author's order by first attempting to disengage the sense of the World into which There-being transcends and subsequently the sense of what it means to be "in" such a World. We cannot begin, however, without anticipating the second part of the analysis. When we say that There-being is "in" the World, "in" here has by no means a purely spatial sense, for example as water is "in" a glass, but rather the sense of to be "at home" or "to sojourn" in, to be entrusted with a privileged "familiarity" with the World-about. Again, it is to be immersed somehow in the World (Sein bei) into which There-being has entered and with which it has intercourse. This immersion in the World is obviously more than mere juxtaposition of There-being and World, as if they were two entities placed alongside of each other but mutually inaccessible. It is a profound intimacy of There-being with the World, by reason of which other beings that are within the World may be "encountered," sc. reveal themselves for what they are when they come in contact with There-being. This contact, however, is not in the order of "knowledge" in the usual sense of the term, but of the nature of a having-to-do-with these things and a dealing with them that is found simply in daily intercourse. In this sense, the familiarity with beings is nothing "theoretic," if this be understood as mere contemplation, but a thoroughly concrete dealing with them.

The author enumerates four senses in which the term "World" may be taken: 1. as the totality of beings that are encountered by There-being within the World; 2. as the Being of this totality of beings other than There-being; 3. as a complex which is not opposed to There-being, wherein There-being itself "lives"; 4. as the Being (Weltlichkeit) of this "wherein." It is the third

---

69 SZ, pp. 54-55.
70 SZ, pp. 67, 69.
of these senses that Heidegger intends when he speaks of the World in which There-being is and which he will seek to analyse. To understand World in this way is to take it in an ontic sense, sc. as the Wherein of an ontic engagement with beings which renders this engagement possible. For the same reason, World has an existentiell meaning. This sense is pre-ontological, sc. (here) pre-thematic, hence prior to any reflective distinction between ontic and ontological, therefore in the initial stage of everydayness. It is the World of There-being's matter-of-fact situation, sc. of its "facticity." It is the task of this part of the analysis to make this World thematic and discern what it is that constitutes the World as World.\(^71\)

The first fact of the phenomenological analysis of the World-about (Umwelt) is that it is filled with beings other than There-being. With allusion to the Greek sense of πρᾶγματα as that of which one makes use (παρακάτω) in one's daily preoccupation, the author chooses to describe them as instruments (Zeuge) or tools, thereby indicating an inherent usefulness in them by reason of which they are intrinsically adapted to a certain purposeful pattern which characterizes the preoccupation itself. They are beings that are ready-at-hand (Zuhandenes) for There-being's intercourse with the World-about. To discern the Being of these instruments will be to discover what makes them to be instruments, hence their instrumental-ness, or what constitutes them as capable of revealing themselves as ready-at-hand.\(^72\)

Let us examine more closely the Being of these instruments with which There-being is preoccupied. Every instrument is essentially "for the purpose of" (um zu) doing something, sc. purposeful (v.g. the pen for writing), and this purposefulness has within its very structure a reference (Verweisung) to that for which it serves a purpose. Referred beyond itself to a task-

\(^{71}\) SZ, pp. 64-65.

\(^{72}\) SZ, pp. 68-69. Clearly to be distinguished from these being-instruments are those beings which are not instruments, sc. those "beings" which for one reason or another have been torn from the purposeful pattern of There-being's daily commerce. These beings are no less "real" than the instruments, but, deprived of their functional relationship within the dynamic pattern of There-being's daily commerce, their Being is of a different sort from that of the instruments. To distinguish the two, non-instrumental beings will be called "mere entities" (Vorhandene). At this point the author refuses to use the word "things" (Dinge), for the word implies certain preconceptions about the structure of things. What he means by this we learn in HW, pp. 12-20. In 1950, the matter no longer presents a problem (VA, pp. 163-181).
to-be-accomplished, the instrument (v.g. pen), in company with other instruments (v.g. paper, ink, desk, etc.), resides in a pattern of references which constitutes the instrument as purposeful, therefore as an instrument. It is the task-to-be-achieved which constitutes the unity of this pattern, and the task itself becomes an instrument inserted into a still broader pattern which constitutes the total unity of preoccupation (Besorgen).\textsuperscript{73}

The ontological structure of the instrument, then, is characterized by its reference beyond itself by reason of its insertion into a total purposeful pattern. This pattern, or complex, of references, always latent and taken for granted by the very fact of preoccupation, becomes apparent the moment that the pattern is disturbed, as occurs, for example, if an instrument, when broken, becomes useless. The very fact of disturbance, however, indicates that the total pattern itself was always somehow in view, even if taken for granted. This totality which was always in view is what Heidegger understands by World.\textsuperscript{74}

Every instrument, then, is encountered within the World which renders possible its purposefulness, and, conversely, every instrument has an ontological relation to the World. So it is that once an instrument has been discovered, the World itself, by a certain ontological priority, already has been discovered, even if not yet thematized.\textsuperscript{75} This totality, within which instruments are encountered and which is the ultimate term of their reference, is not foreign to There-being but intimately associated with its ontological structure. Recall that the instruments we are analysing are those with which There-being is engaged in its daily pre-occupation with the World-about and under the control of There-being's view-of-the-World-about (Umsicht). The World is profoundly There-being's World.

More precisely: We have already seen that the ontological structure of the instrument is characterized by its reference beyond itself. Its very Being, therefore, consists in its being-destined (Bewandtnis), sc. its ontological structure includes a double character: a being that is destined and a being whereunto

\textsuperscript{73} SZ, pp. 68, 70.
\textsuperscript{74} SZ, pp. 74-75.
\textsuperscript{75} SZ, p. 83.
it is destined. That whereunto the instrument is destined will depend, of course, upon the pattern into which it is inserted (Bewandtnisganzheit), and this pattern will in turn be inserted into a larger one. For example, the hammer will have its immediate destination in a hammering, the hammering in a nailing, the nailing in the building of a house. But the process does not continue indefinitely. The house is destined for There-being. There-being is the term of all destinations – and this, not because of a banal “ego-centricity” of its own (a purely ontic conception of There-being), but because of its ontological structure, sc. the Being of instruments is to-be-destined to another, but the Being of There-being is to be concerned with its own Being and cannot therefore be referred beyond itself.

We have said that when There-being discovers an instrument, it does so in virtue of its view of an already pre-discovered whole which we have called the World. Now let us ask: what is the nature of this pre-discovery? The whole which lights up for There-being on the occasion of a disturbance of the order of the whole is not itself an instrument, much less a simple entity (Vorhandenes), but rather a “There” (“Da”) which precedes all affirmation or contemplation. The whole which lights up is not even accessible to the view-of-the-World-about, insofar as the latter always focuses on the totality of beings with which There-being is preoccupied, yet it is prior to this view-of-the-World-about and for such a view that the “There” is already disclosed.

Hence, the “There” in question is not in the ontic dimension of beings at all, since it precedes both the being-instrument (for it is the total pattern which renders the instrument purposeful) and There-being’s view-of-the-World-about (for which the “There” is already disclosed). Furthermore, the “There” is not thematic but remains undisclosed as long as the pattern is not disturbed, and it is precisely in this unthematic form that it constitutes the Being of the instrument in everyday intercourse. Since it is already pre-disclosed to the preoccupied There-being,

76 SZ, p. 84 (mit . . . bei).
77 SZ, p. 123.
78 SZ, p. 75. In the following discussion we reserve the word “disclosed” to translate erschlossen, a term that always pertains to There-being, and “dis-covered,” or, when occasion permits, “un-covered,” to translate entdeckt, sc. a term that pertains always to beings other than There-being.
this "There," the World, is that "within" which There-being, if considered as itself a being, already was and to which, in any explicit (thematic) approach, it can only return. The World, then, is a non-ontic, non-thematic, pre-disclosed "There" wherein There-being encounters the purposeful beings with which it is preoccupied in its everyday commerce with the World-about.

The World is a Wherein. This is not to be understood spatially but as a horizon within which an instrument is encountered by There-being. Hence it is a Wherein in which both There-being and instruments reside. For the instrument, the World is a matrix of relations (Bezugszusammenhang) into which the instrument is inserted (whereunto it is referred), which renders possible the instrument's purposefulness, hence constitutes it in its Being. But the unity of this matrix is There-being itself, since There-being is the ultimate whereunto of all references (Worum-wollen). There-being, then, comprehends the matrix insofar as it comprehends itself, and is referred to the matrix in the same way that it is referred to itself in the radical comprehension of its own Being. So it is that the horizon of There-being's own self-comprehension is likewise the ultimate term of reference of an instrument, and its disclosure is ontologically prior to any ontic encounter with an instrument. One sees, then, in what sense the Being of the World is an existential component of There-being as finite transcendence.

It is with this matrix of relations, which constitutes the World, within which There-being comprehends both itself and other beings, that There-being enjoys a radical familiarity. In fact, this familiarity with the World constitutes There-being's radical comprehension of Being (Seinsverständnis). Are we to infer that familiarity with the matrix and the comprehension of Being are but one? Certainly the author's thought is moving in that direction, for There-being's comprehension of its own Being is at once its comprehension of the World; but the identification is not yet as explicit as eventually it will become.

Let us examine more closely this matrix of relationships which There-being comprehends in a disclosed-ness that is prior

---

79 SZ, p. 76 (zurückkommen).
80 SZ, pp. 86, 88.
81 SZ, pp. 85-86.
to every encounter with other beings. The relational character of the relations within the matrix will be said "to give meaning" (be-deuten), sc. it is the relations which constitute the purposefulness of the instruments. The entire matrix of these relations will be called "Meaningfulness" (Bedeutsamkeit), and it is this which constitutes the structure of the World with which There-being, as to-be-in-the-World, already enjoys familiarity. But There-being's familiarity with Total Meaningfulness does more than enable There-being to comprehend itself. It enables There-being to comprehend other beings (instruments) with which it is engaged, and therefore makes it possible for them to be discovered as instruments, possible for them to announce themselves for what they are in themselves (an sich). So it is that the ontological dimension of There-being, sc. its radical comprehension of Meaningfulness, renders possible the discovery of purposeful patterns in There-being's ontic engagement.  

More precisely: The discovery of a purposeful being as purposeful implies that There-being in its encounter lets the instrument be destined toward its purpose (Bewenden-lassen). This occurs on two levels: ontic, sc. the individual instrument is permitted to be according to the suchness of its individual particularity, v.g. as a hammer or a chisel; ontological, sc. the instrument, considered simply as a being (Seiendes), is permitted to be. This ontological letting-be is prior to the ontic, for an instrument (v.g. hammer) must first be before it can be a hammer. It is a liberation (Freigabe) of the instrument in its Being, for it permits the instrument to be, not in the sense, of course, that it creates or produces the instrument, but simply that it renders possible its discoverability, thus permits it to be encountered. Now this pre-ontic letting-be of the instrument as a being is a condition of the possibility of the encounter with the instrument as such and such a being (v.g. hammer). It is just such a pre-ontic letting-be which is the result of There-being's intimacy with Total Meaningfulness.  

Let it be noted, however, that There-being exists in both dimensions simultaneously. The ontological dimension, though structurally prior to the ontic, is not disclosed until after some

---

82 SZ, p. 87.
83 SZ, pp. 84-85.
instrumental complex has been discovered on the ontic level. Conversely, insofar as There-being is, sc. exists in its ontological dimension, it is already orientated toward a “World” of beings in its ontic dimension. The orientation toward, and therefore referential dependence upon, an ontic “World” belongs to the very Being of There-being. Both the World of There-being’s ontological dimension which is disclosed, and the “World” of its ontic dimension which is discovered, are revealed together.84

What, then, are we finally to understand by the World into which There-being transcends? It is the existential dimension of There-being by reason of which is pre-disclosed the matrix of relations which constitute Total Meaningfulness, within which There-being may encounter beings under the guise of purposeful instruments. But if it is an existential component of There-being, may we still say that There-being “transcends” to it? Yes, provided we understand the terminus a quo of the transcendence as the ontic dimension of There-being, the terminus ad quem (World) its ontological dimension. We may say that There-being is transcendence, sc. transcending, simply because “... the ontic excellence of There-being consists in the fact that it is ontological.” 85

B. IN-BEING

We have just seen how World is disclosed in There-being prior (ontologically, not temporally) to any ontic engagement of There-being with other beings. This disclosedness of the World pertains to the very Being of There-being. In fact, the term “There” expresses this disclosedness of the World. The “There” of Being and the disclosedness of the World are but one.

Translate this into terms of the metaphor of light. The tradition has spoken of the lumen naturale in man. This is an effort to express by what Heidegger considers an image of the ontic order what is in fact the ontological structure of There-being,

84 SZ, pp. 87, 212. Note importance of what is said here for the whole problem of realism (p. 202, ff.).
85 “… Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, daß es ontologisch ist.” (SZ, p. 12). Heidegger’s italics. The term “transcendence” is not thematized in SZ, but that the interpretation given is perfectly legitimate is clear from WG, pp. 17–21, 34–35, 41–43.
sc. that it is in such a way as to be There.\textsuperscript{86} To say that There-being is "lit-up" (erleuchtet) means that, insofar as it is to-be-in-the-World, There-being is illumined not by some other being but rather is itself the lighting-process (Lichtung). This luminosity of the There (disclosedness of the World) is not something added to There-being but it is its innermost constitution. Without it, There-being would simply not be what it is. "... There-being is its [own] disclosedness."\textsuperscript{87} This identity of the disclosedness of the World and the There (luminosity) of There-being is precisely what constitutes There-being's in-being in the World.\textsuperscript{88} Furthermore, this disclosedness of the World is at the same time the disclosedness of Being. Hence the constitutional luminosity of There-being is not only the in-being of There-being in the World but its radical comprehension of Being as well.\textsuperscript{89}

Heidegger's task now will be to examine in detail the constituent elements of the There of There-being. We must insert an important prefix, however, which we can only mention without development. There-being is not an isolated being, existing in complete separation from all other There-beings. It is in-the-World with other There-beings. It is by reason of this with-being, too, that There-being is what it is. For the same reason, the World is always a with-World, sc. There-being is to-be-in-the-World-with-others. And since this with-being is constitutive of There-being, then in There-being's comprehension of its own Being lies the comprehension of others too.\textsuperscript{90}

I. Comprehension

Let us begin with a component of disclosedness for which we have received already a certain propaedeutic: the compre-

\textsuperscript{86} SZ, pp. 133. When Heidegger calls lumen naturale an ontic image, we can discern in inchoative form the entire polemic against subjective thinking. He does not deny, rather he endorses the image, but since in the tradition this refers to a characteristic of the human intellect, it implies for him an opposition between a being-subject (intellectus) and a being-object (intelligibile), hence remains in the order of beings, sc. is ontic. His entire effort is to try to transcend this opposition by conceiving There-being in a completely ontological dimension as a being whose Being is to be the luminosity of the World.

\textsuperscript{87} "... Das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit." (SZ, p. 133). Heidegger italicizes whole.

\textsuperscript{88} SZ, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{89} SZ, pp. 147, 12, 14-15 taken together.

\textsuperscript{90} SZ, pp. 118, 123.
hending (Verstehen) that constitutes There-being and differentiates it from all other beings. By reason of this comprehending, the Being of beings (itself included) becomes accessible to There-being. This is possible, however, only insofar as comprehending is of the nature of a project (Entwurf). To “project” means to “throw forward.” In German, the word is commonly used in the transferred sense which implies that what is thrown forward is already somehow possessed by the one who throws it forward; by this pre-possession, the structure of the project-ed precedes itself in the project-or; this preceding structure of the project-ed in project-or is an anticipation; the anticipation is the bringing-to-pass of this precedent structure as precedent. Thus far goes the natural understanding of “project.”

For Heidegger, the meaning of project is apparently clear enough to dispense him from the necessity of an explanation. Let us try to determine how he understands it from his use of it. The clearest indication of the sense in which he accepts the term is to be found in a citation from Kant. In explaining the development of the Kantian problematic, Heidegger indicates how Kant wished to transpose into terms of metaphysics the discovery of the physical scientists that “… the reason discovers only what her own projects educe….” The projects of reason for Kant in this case are the structure(s) which anticipate what will be discerned in the object, and determine the basic concepts and fundamental principles of the various sciences. Heidegger, in indicating Kant’s application of this observation to the problem of metaphysics, expresses Kant’s thought process in terms more properly his own: “… Accordingly, what renders comportment

---

91 In SZ, Heidegger begins with Befindlichkeit (pp. 134-140), but in KM (p. 219) places Verstehen first. Both are “equally original” (gleichursprünglich). The KM order is to the writer more clear. For the German Entwurf, “project” seems a respectable translation. Derived from werfen (“throw”) and ent- (“forth,” “from,” “out,” “away”), it is used less often in the literal than in a transferred sense: to sketch, trace out, plan, draw up a document, design, invent (a plot), draft (a document), frame (a bill), etc. Project: -ject comes from jacere (“throw”) and pro-, originally ablative neuter of prius-a-um, but used as preposition to signify (literally) “before” in spatial sense, or “in front of” in answer to questions of “where?” or “whither?” Hence, in English “project” retains a literal meaning ("to throw an object forward," v. g. light rays) as well as a transferred sense ("to contrive" [a scheme], "to externalize and regard as outside of oneself" [v. g. sensation, image, desire, etc.]).

92 “… die Vernunft nur das einsieht, was sie selbst nach ihrem Entwürfe hervorbringt…” (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Raymund Schmidt Hamburg: Meiner, 1952) B XIII).
with beings (ontic knowledge) possible, is an antecedent comprehending of the Being-structure, [sc.] ontological knowledge."

We have here the Heideggerian formula “antecedent comprehending” correlated with the Kantian use of “project” to signify that structure of the reason (Heidegger speaking for Kant) in virtue of which the reason is so constituted that in comportment with beings their Being-structure is discerned. We have, then, a first sense for “project”; as a structure that ontologically precedes the comportment, this project is already a pre-possession, an anticipatory seizure of that being-to-be-encountered.

There is a second sense which Heidegger adds: “... the explicit achievement of the projecting must ... necessarily be a construction.” The construction, however, is not arbitrary but is determined previously and assured. We understand this to mean: prior to the encounter, There-being is so constituted as to seize by anticipation the structure of the being-to-be-encountered; during the encounter, the seizure which was anticipated is explicitly achieved according to the pre-determined plan as dictated by the primordial constitution of There-being. The achievement, then, is the actual process of discerning, the laying-in-the-open of the structure of the being-encountered, so that by the encounter the structure is “built.” In this sense, there is a construction. To “project,” then, taken in its totality, means: to seize by anticipation the structure of a being-still-to-be-encountered; to bring-to-pass the seizure of this structure in the coming-to-pass of the encounter.

It is with this double sense of “project” that Heidegger describes fundamental ontology itself as the project of the inner

---

83 “... Was demnach das Verhalten zu Seiendem (ontische Erkenntnis) ermöglicht, ist das vorgängige Verstehen der Seinsverfassung, die ontologische Erkenntnis.” (KM, p. 20).

84 Of course there is no question of a banal idealism here. Since Heidegger has appealed to the lumen naturale of the tradition to explain the luminosity of the There, one is justified, to confirm his argument, in having recourse to this tradition, without intending any simple concordism. In the Schools, for example, the faculties have each their formal objects, sc. are so structured as to perceive in objects only that which corresponds to the formal object. In particular, the intellect is endowed with certain habitus naturales, dispositiones innatae, by reason of which it is capable (therefore has the potentiality) of understanding Being, the first principles of metaphysics, of the moral order, etc.

possibility of metaphysics. This inner possibility, we know now, is the coming-to-pass of finite transcendence, which in turn "... achieves the project of the Being of beings. To project thus [is] to comprehend. ..." With this orientation from KM, the cryptic treatment of comprehending in SZ as one of the existential components of the There will be less enigmatic.

Precisely what does There-being comprehend? KM answers: the Being of beings; but SZ works toward this conclusion phenomenologically. Let us begin with an ordinary sense of "comprehend," v.g. "to know." To "know" is frequently used to signify "to be able to handle or deal with" (etwas können), v.g. to "know" a language, jiu-jitsu, stocks and bonds, etc. Comprehending in the existential analysis retains this nuance of potentiality-for. For what? For "Being, in the sense of existing," hence for its own Being. There-being's power-to-be (Seinkönnen) consists in the fact that existence, by which Being-structures become manifest, has already begun but is still dynamically propelled toward the achieving of its self. It is a drive-toward-Being. Of course, since There-being exists in two dimensions, ontic-existentiell as well as ontologico-existential, the existential power-to-be of which there is question here will be articulated in all the existentiell potentialities (Möglichkeiten). Now such a comprehending as the power-to-be of There-being is clearly a project, for it is the power to discern Being-structures (including its own) in the still-to-be-continued encounter with beings. As a power-to-discern, it is an antecedent seizure of

98 SZ, p. 143 (das Sein als Existieren). Obviously this comprehending power-to-exist (Möglichsein) of There-being is far removed from any of the traditional senses of "possibility": either as a logical potency (intrinsic non-repugnance of notes) or as a "real" potency in the sense of the capacity of a mere entity (Vorhandenes) to receive further modifications which it does not yet (noch nicht) possess.
99 If, by an impossible supposition, one could consider There-being (existentiell and existential) as a mere entity, one could say that it is always "more" than it actually (tatsächlich) is. Yet never more than it factually (faktisch) is, for facticity connotes that which distinguishes There-being from any mere entity, sc. its existence, with all the dynamic propulsion toward Being that this implies. See SZ, p. 145.
100 It is thus that we understand Heidegger's use of the singular and plural of Möglichkeit. We are taking the singular to refer to the ontological dimension and plural to refer to the ontic.
these Being-structures. As an antecedent seizure, it is a project of these Being-structures in the sense of an anticipation.

Comprehension, then, as a component of the luminosity of There, is a project. In the perspectives of SZ, what is projected? Firstly, There-being itself as the ultimate whereunto of all referential patterns. From another point of view, however, one may say that There-being in its comprehending also projects the World. For by World now we understand the complex of relations which we call “Total Meaningfulness.” This, however, finds its basis in the ultimate Whereunto. Thus the project of comprehending extends to the total phenomenon of to-be-in-the-World, so that in the comprehending of World, in-being will likewise be understood, and, vice versa, the comprehending of existence as such is always a comprehending of the World.\textsuperscript{101} More fundamentally still, Being itself is disclosed:

\ldots In the fact that There-being has projected its own Being as the ultimate whereunto and [the Being of the World] as Total Meaningfulness lies the disclosedness of Being altogether. \ldots\textsuperscript{102}

Briefly: comprehending projects the entire transcendence of There-being.

Before we conclude, it will be instructive to mention another formula that the author uses to express the projective character of comprehension, sc. the metaphor of “seeing” or “viewing” (Sicht). “Comprehending, characterized as project, constitutes in the existential dimension what we call the seeing of There-being. \ldots”\textsuperscript{103} Obviously, there is no question here of understanding the seeing as a sense perception, nor even as an intellectual apprehension. Rather it corresponds to the luminosity which we have seen to characterize the disclosedness of the There. Since the tradition of philosophy from the very beginning has been orientated toward explaining the approach to beings and to Being as “to see,” Heidegger will accept the metaphor insofar as its sense is broad enough to signify any approach to the Being of beings whatever. Hence all of the traditional formu-

\textsuperscript{101} SZ, pp. 143, 146, 152.
\textsuperscript{102} "\ldots In der Entworfenheit seines Seins auf das Woruxnwillen in eins mit der auf die Bedeutsamkeit (Welt) liegt Erschlossenheit von Sein überhaupt\ldots” (SZ, p. 147).
\textsuperscript{103} “Das Verstehen macht in seinem Entwurfcharakter existenzial das aus, was wir die Sicht des Daseins nennen\ldots” (SZ, p. 146). Heidegger’s italics. Hence the existential basis of Um-sicht, Durchsichtigkeit, etc.
lae for "seeing" beings, such as Kant's "intuition" and Husserl's "intuition of essences," are for Heidegger derivative forms of the promordial seeing which is the existential comprehension of Being.104

2. Disposition

The everyday There-being is a fact. We are simply trying to analyse this fact. Before it begins to analyse itself, or even to pose the Being-question, There-being finds itself — whether expressly or not — already there, luminous. This already-having-found-itself-there-ness (Befindlichkeit) of There-being is not simply a datum which its own luminosity reveals, but itself is one component of this luminosity.

More precisely, what is disclosed by this already-having-found-itself-there-ness of There-being? The author discerns three data. The first datum is the fact that There-being is as it is. Here distinguish the fact of There-being and its how.105 Both its origin and destiny remain obscure, but this much is clear: the irreducible fact that There-being already is, facticity. Already is! hence is not itself the author but the recipient of this facticity. It has been given to There-being to be as it is. Furthermore, as well as the sheer fact of There-being's existence, there is disclosed, too, something about the nature of this existence, sc. that its facticity is not the matter-of-fact-ness of a mere entity. Rather, There-being, by reason of its very structure, is opened up upon Being in such a way that its own Being is not a fait accompli but a task still-to-be-achieved (zu sein). It has been given to There-being to be! Both of these aspects (already a fact, Being to-be-achieved) are to be understood when Heidegger unifies them into the single concept of the "thrown-ness" (Geworfenheit) of There-being.106

The second datum that is disclosed by the already-having-found-itself-there-ness of There-being is that the There is a disclosedness not only of There-being's Being as existence, but also, and with absolute simultaneity, of the World, for There-being's

104 SZ, p. 147.
105 SZ, p. 134.
existence is to-be-in-the-World. Hence it is the totality of a to-be-in-the-World that is here disclosed. The third datum disclosed is that the There-being is essentially referred (Angewiesenheit) to the World. That component of the disclosedness in the ontological dimension which renders possible the approach to There-being by other beings in the ontic dimension is precisely the basic reference to the World which constitutes There-being as to-be-in-the-World. This component is precisely the World-open-ness of There-being. Yet if all this is disclosed in the already-having-found-itself-there-ness of There-being, what is the nature of this finding? Certainly it is not a type of knowing (Erkennen), for the finding has a depth and richness which the processes of knowing are incapable of grasping. Rather it is an “awareness” of the affective order which in the ontic dimension may be described as “mood” (Stimmung), or “attunement” (Gestimmtheit), completely spontaneous and unreflective, that renders apparent to There-being not so much what it is but how it is, and thus brings There-being before its own Being as a There. But if in the ontic dimension this “finding” takes the form of moods, how describe the ontological dimension which has been designated as a component of the disclosedness of the There? One must avoid such terms as “affection” or “feeling” as already clothed with ontic connotations. Let us call it the “ontological disposition.” This connotes a certain affectivity (v.g. “he is in a good disposition this morning”), and at the same time, if analysed in its etymology (ponere, positum: “to place,” “having been placed”) might suggest the thrown-ness of There. The qualification “ontological” will emphasize the fact that disposition is a structural component of the There. In any case, the formula

---

107 SZ, p. 137.
109 SZ, p. 138. If we can strip “sentiment” of all ontic nuance, then a translation such as “sentiment of the original situation” is very suggestive. (See A. De Waelhens, La Philosophie..., p. 82). We prefer, however, a briefer formula. The one we have chosen has been suggested by W. Biemel (Le concept..., p. 99, f.), who translates as disposition affective. Biemel, however, uses the term to translate Stimmung as well, so that when he must distinguish between the ontological (Beindichkeit) and the ontic (Stimmung), he is forced to invent dispositionalité to suggest the structural aspect of disposition. To avoid this difficulty, we reserve “disposition” to signify the ontological dimension and “mood” (Stimmung) to signify the ontic dimension of There-being's affectivity.
will be taken to express the more precise but somewhat muscle-bound expression: the already-having-found-itself-affectively-there-ness of There-being.

3. Logos

The third component of disclosedness is less emphasized in SZ than it will become in the later Heidegger, when it will play an essential rôle in the evolution of foundational thought. Equally fundamental as comprehension and disposition, it is that existential component of There-being by reason of which the latter is capable of bringing to expression that which it comprehends.

How shall we designate this existential? Heidegger's term is Rede, which in purely formal translation would mean "speech," "language," "discourse." But in this case, the word does not mean "language-as-spoken" but that ontological constituent of There-being which renders spoken language possible. One could in justice render it by "articulateness," sc. There-being's constitutional capacity to articulate itself, and call spoken language (Sprache) the "articulation" itself. We would prefer to render it still otherwise. It is with Rede that Heidegger translates the Greek λόγος. Good English usage permits simple transliteration of the Greek. Since the word λόγος assumes ever increasing importance through the whole evolution of Heidegger, let us use "logos" from the beginning so that we may see the later development in its initial stages.

We know already that Heidegger understands the Greek λόγος to mean originally a process of making-manifest or letting-be-seen. If a third existential component of There-being be called "logos," the reason must be that it lets "something" be seen. What is this "something"? The author himself is very obscure in this, the least satisfying section, perhaps, in all SZ. The reason is that he himself is still very much in the dark at this point and is groping for some way to express an experience that still defies

110 SZ, pp. 160-161.
formulation. But we must make the best of what elements SZ offers, and we propose to understand him as follows.

(Finite) comprehension projects the World, sc. the complex of relations that constitutes Total Meaningfulness. The relations are so intimately joined one to another that we may speak of Total Meaningfulness as a "jointed" (and in that radical sense an "articulative") whole. There-being always exists in a given concrete situation, hence Total Meaningfulness, as also its articulative-ness (das Artikulierbare), must always be explicitated according to the demands of the situation, sc. concrete "meanings" (Bedeutungen) must be disengaged. The process of explicitating There-being's antecedent comprehension of Total Meaningfulness (World) Heidegger calls "interpretation" (Auslegung) which, as we have seen, he in turn designates as "hermeneutic." Now correlative with this process of explicitating the original project is the process by which There-being brings the articulative-ness of Total Meaningfulness to concrete articulation in some form of human expression. That element in There-being's structure by reason of which it brings the articulative-ness of the World to concrete expression in articulation is what we call articulate-ness and what we understand Heidegger to mean by the existential component of logos. Through the articulate-ness, sc. logos, of There-being, "... Total Meaningfulness ... comes into words..." We distinguish, then: articulate-ness, the World as Total Meaningfulness projected by the existential component of comprehension; articulate-ness, the power of articulating Total Meaningfulness by letting-been meanings in existentiell situations, sc. the existential component of logos; articulation, the concrete expression, sc. language (Sprache).

But is this not a little too facile? Perhaps. What is the precise relation, after all, between comprehension of World (Being) and logos? Let us admit the obscurity and move on, noting only the fact that both must be conceived as equally original, therefore

---

112 US, p. 92.
113 It is in terms of such "meanings" (Bedeutungen), disengaged from the articulate whole, that we must approach the problem of what Heidegger means by the "sense" (Sinn) of beings.
114 "... Das Bedeutungsganze der Verständlichkeit kommt zu Wort..." (SZ, p. 161). Heidegger's italics. We base this interpretation on pp. 160-161 but admittedly go beyond the text in precisng the terms: articulate-ness, articulate-ness, articulate-ation.
mutually complementary, in There-being. The difficulty is locked up inside the conception of "hermeneutic interpretation," which the author certainly experiences but cannot formulate as yet.\(^{115}\)

Understanding logos, as an existential, to mean the power-to-let-be-seen what comprehension projects, we can understand how Heidegger can propose as two possible modes of logos: keeping silence (Schweigen), for this, too, can be revealing; and attend-ing (Hören).\(^{116}\) The latter is more important, as the subsequent development will show. It will suffice for the moment to mention two types of attend-ing.

The first type of attend-ing consists in listening to others (Hören auf). Recall that for Heidegger There-being is never solitary, but to its Being pertains a with-being, sc. with other There-beings, in such a way that the Being of others helps to constitute the Being of There-being. It is this with-being that is the existential dimension of all existentiell dealings with others. Without it, all dialogue, all community would be impossible. This with-being, since it pertains to the Being of There-being, is disclosed in the primordial luminosity of the There which illumines its self as well as the World. Hence, the disclosedness of the World comes-to-pass in There-being-with-others. Logos, too, as the power-to-let-be-seen what is comprehended, will be characterized by the essentially communal character of the comprehending. It is a letting-be-seen that essentially comes-to-pass together-with-others, and it is thus that it is ontologically always a communication (Mitteilung), even though in the ontic dimension of a particular individual comportment there may be no one around to see. It is for the same reason that, when, by attend-ing to others, There-being lets-be-seen the project which it shares with others, this attend-ing is a mode of logos. "... Attend-ing-to ... is the existential open-ness to others of There-being as a with-being..."\(^{117}\)

We see here, then, the existential-analytical foundation of so

---

\(^{115}\) See SZ, pp. 148-160, where the author explains hermeneutic interpretation and the emergence of concrete expression (Aussage). An account of the argument is a luxury we cannot afford here.

\(^{116}\) SZ, pp. 161, 163 (Hören), 164 (Schweigen).

\(^{117}\) "... Das Hören auf ... ist das existenziale Offensein des Daseins als Mitsein für den Anderen..." (SZ, p. 163).
central a theme in foundational thinking as dialogue (Gespräch) in the many forms that this will take.

The second type of attending of which there is question here takes place when There-being attends to its self. There is a letting-be-manifest of There-being which comes to pass as if it were listening to the voice of a friend hidden within its depths and telling it of its own most proper self. Such an attending as this is an openness-to, a letting-be-seen, a logos. It “... constitutes, indeed, the primordial and authentic open-ness of There-being for its own most proper power-to-be. ...” 118 How this will develop as an attending to the call of conscience in achieving the totality of finite transcendence we shall see shortly.

We conclude this discussion of the three existential components (comprehension, disposition and logos) by insisting on the fact that they are all equally original in There-being and that the principal task now is to bring to light their essential unity. 119 But the author himself never explains how this unity is to be conceived. We are left once more to our own resources and, with the necessary reserves, propose the following hypothesis.

There-being as the disclosedness of the World, sc. as the process of transcendence, is a profoundly finite unity. What rôle does comprehension play in this unified process? It projects the World as Total Meaningfulness. This is the disclosure of something eminently positive. To be sure, the project is itself a finite project, but the rôle it plays in disclosure is apparently not to disclose finite transcendence precisely as finite but as transcendence. What rôle does disposition play? It discloses There-being’s thrown-ness and also its referential dependence on beings encountered in the World. We shall soon see that under the guise of anxiety it discloses the World in terms of Non-being. What disposition discloses, then, seems to be a crushing testimony to There-being’s finitude. It would seem, then, that if in the unified process of disclosure comprehension discloses There-being precisely as transcendence, disposition discloses it precisely as finite. Hence, both are necessarily comple-

118 “... Das Hören konstituiert sogar die primäre und eigentliche Offenheit des Daseins für sein eigenstes Seinkönnen, als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt. ...” (SZ, p. 163.)
mentary. According to this hypothesis, the rôle of logos would be simply to let the process of disclosure, both in its transcendence and in its finitude, be seen.\textsuperscript{120}

4. Fallen-ness

We have insisted often enough on the finitude of transcendence. Evidence of this finitude thus far: thrown-ness, taken in the large sense as including, together with thrown-ness in the strict sense (non-mastery of own origin, dynamic incompleteness), also the referential dependence on other beings. This finitude, however, does not simply characterize the beginnings of There-being but permeates the entire process of transcendence. Considered as an abiding characteristic, this finitude, as we have seen, is also called “fallen-ness.” Before proceeding to examine the unity of There-being, Heidegger pauses to underline the abiding finitude of fallen-ness. We thus regain the perspective of the starting point: the everydayness of There-being lost in a forgotten-ness of its self.\textsuperscript{121}

By fallen-ness, Heidegger does not imply a negative value in There-being. He means simply that There-being is “first of all and for the most part” preoccupied with the “World” of its ontic experience, sc. that totality of beings opposed to itself with which it is continually engaged. And inevitably so. For it is bi-dimensional, ontic as well as ontological: it is only through an existentiell engagement that the existential prerogative can come-to-pass. If, however, There-being is so absorbed in the ontic as to be oblivious to the ontological (Being), it has forgotten the very prerogative that constitutes its uniqueness; it has “fallen from,” “taken flight from” its authentic self, it is lost in inauthenticity (\textit{Uneigentlichkeit}).\textsuperscript{122} Such is the condition of There-being “first of all and for the most part” in the intercourse of every day.

\textsuperscript{120} We note for the sake of completeness a single text which presages the eventual importance of poetry for Heidegger, but it is not precise enough to warrant treatment here: “... Die Mitteilung der existenziellen Möglichkeiten der Befindlichkeit, d. h. das Erschließen von Existenz, kann eigenes Ziel der ‘dichtenden’ Rede werden.” (\textit{SZ}, p. 162). The Text is precise enough only to tantalize.


\textsuperscript{122} \textit{SZ}, pp. 175–176, 184.
The author analyses this condition in detail. Its basic characteristic is that There-being, forgetting its ontological primacy, becomes simply one of the crowd—it loses itself in what we may refer to as "people" (Man). There-being talks the way "people" talk (loquacity), gawks at things—not in order to comprehend but simply for the sake of gawking—the way "people" do (curiosity), comprehends things not according to their inmost structure but the way "people" generally do (ambiguity). Yet "people" is not a universal subject. Rather it is a manner of being of There-being that has been caught in the vortex of onticity. "People" is There-being's inauthentic self.

Yet how can There-being be delivered from its ontic entanglement? To achieve authenticity, There-being need not withdraw from the ontic; it need only recall the ontological. This would suffice to permit There-being to re-collect its self. "... Authentic existence is not something that hovers over everydayness in its fallen condition, but in the existential sense is simply a modified fashion of apprehending it." How this will come-to-pass, how There-being can be faithful both to its transcendence and to its finitude—this can be explained only when we understand how the various elements of the structure of There-being are woven into a unified totality. Let this be the next step.

C. THE UNIFIED TOTALITY OF FINITE TRANSCENDENCE

II. Unity

A unified totality! Let us consider There-being first in its unity, then in its totality, noting how finitude permeates both. To begin with, recall that There-being, as still-to-be-achieved,
is constantly in need of Being in order to be itself. To alleviate this need is for There-being its unique concern. A unique concern is unifying. It integrates into a one-ness the multiple elements of a self whose Being is such that it is concerned about its own Being. Let this “structural unity of intrinsically finite transcendence,” this “transcendental unity of finitude” be called . . . “concern”!\(^{127}\) We must inspect, then, the structure of concern.

Furthermore, since our method is phenomenological, this structural unity of There-being must be discerned in some analyzable phenomenon. What phenomenon shall it be? “. . . Is there a comprehensive disposition in There-being in which There-being [in its unity] is in some exceptional fashion disclosed to its self?”\(^{128}\) The author replies: yes, in anxiety (Angst).

Anxiety is to be distinguished from fear. Both are forms of the ontological disposition of There-being by which its situation is affectively disclosed. Fear, however, is always the shrinking from something (or someone), sc. from some being that is found within the World, always of a clearly determined nature, imminent, injurious, inescapable. Distinguish here that which a There-being is afraid of (wovor), afraid for (worum) and the process of fearing itself.\(^{129}\) For example, a little boy (or a big boy) in the dentist’s office: he is afraid of the drill (a determined being), for himself in a process of fearing.

Anxiety differs from fear principally in the first of these three elements. That about which There-being is anxious is not any being within the World at all, nor is it injurious in any determined or determinable way, nor is it “here” nor “there” nor “anywhere.” It is no-being and no-where.\(^ {130}\) It is about Non-being that There-being is anxious. And yet this Non-being is not an absolute nothing. It is grounded in a “something.” What is the nature of this “something”? Heidegger answers: “the World as such.”\(^ {131}\) That is to say, in the phenomenon of anxiety, which

\(^{127}\) “die strukturelle Einheit der in sich endlichen Transzendenz des Daseins” (KM, p. 213); “der transcendentalen Einheit der Endlichkeit” (KM, p. 214).


\(^{129}\) SZ, pp. 140–141, 185.

\(^{130}\) SZ, p. 186.

\(^{131}\) “. . . das Wovor der Angst ist die Welt als solche . . . ” (SZ, p. 187). Heidegger italicizes whole.
may occur, to be sure, only briefly and on rare occasions, the manifold beings which preoccupy There-being in the dissipation of everyday fallen-ness slip away into insignificance, and there is disclosed to There-being, not conceptually but by affective disposition, the dark horizon wherein beings and There-being meet and which is the existential dimension of There-being.

To be anxious, however, implies not only anxiety-about but anxiety-for. For what or whom is There-being anxious? Its self. Yet just as There-being is not anxious about any being in particular but about the complete indetermination of the World as such, so it is not anxious for itself as modified by any existentiell potentiality in particular, but rather as it is when stripped of all modifications and association with others, left to the empty individuality of a being whose only characteristic is to-be-in-the-World. There-being is anxious for its self, then, insofar as it is the disclosedness, luminosity of the World, hence in its own dynamic drive-toward-Being. By reason of this drive-toward-Being, There-being is its own potentiality, a potentiality, indeed – and the uneasy disquiet of anxiety is the proof of it – for its own authenticity.

Now the phenomenon in its completeness is the welding of anxiety-about and anxiety-for into the unity of a single process. There-being is anxious about its self as (to-be-in-)the-World; it is anxious for its self as to-be-in(-the-World). There-being is anxious-about and anxious-for the same identical self. The phenomenon of anxiety brings There-being before its self as to-be-in-the-World, sc. as the coming-to-pass of transcendence. Hence, anxiety is the comprehensive disposition by which There-being in its unity is disclosed to its self.

The unity is a synthesis of three elements, all disclosed by anxiety taken in its completeness. 1. Anxiety discloses There-being as to-be-in-the-World, a being already constituted as concerned with Being. Better, it is a drive-toward-Being, sc. essentially an inexhaustible potentiality to transcend beings unto Being. As such it is always in advance of itself, if “self” be understood in the sense of a mere entity. From the viewpoint of authen-

---

133 SZ, pp. 187-188.
134 SZ, p. 188. It should be kept in mind that the analysis here has no anthropological, but only an ontological, significance. See KM, p. 214.
ticity, of course, one would not say that There-being is in advance of its self but that the self is its own potentiality. But our language is geared to the every-day World of fallen-ness, so let us designate the essentially potential character of There-being as "anticipation" (Sich-vorweg-sein), understanding it to signify the ecstatic nature of existence. Anxiety discloses There-being in its thrown-ness into the World. It is a process which is not its own source, which is already-begun (schon-sein-in) and still-to-be-achieved. This is its facticity. In other words, "... existentiality is always determined by facticity." Anxiety discloses There-being in its referential dependence on the World (Sein-bei-der-Welt) and, indeed, as caught by the drag of the ontic (fallen-ness). For it is to a There-being lulled into the complacency of everydayness that anxiety brings disquiet and through the consequent uneasiness suggests that the dwelling places of the ontic are not There-being's true abode (Unheimlichkeit).

Consequently, anxiety, as a single concrete experience of There-being, has disclosed the Being of There-being. We fashion it into a single awkward formula by saying that There-being is "an anticipatory drive-towards-Being, thrown-down-as-still-to-be-achieved-(in-the-World), and fallen among the beings (it encounters within the World.)."

2. Totality

We are trying to comprehend finite transcendence in its unified totality in order that we may understand how There-being, even though lost inevitably in everydayness, may nevertheless re-collect its self. In concern, we examined this process in its unity. Now we consider its totality.

For to speak of unity is not necessarily to speak of totality. To be sure, in concern something is said, even if negatively, of There-being's beginning: it is thrown, sc. it is not the author of its self, it has been given over (überantwortet) to itself to be. As a process-still-to-be-achieved, There-being apparently has a not-

---

135 SZ, pp. 191-192, 193.
136 "... Existenzialität ist wesenhaft durch Faktizität bestimmt." (SZ, p. 192).
137 SZ, pp. 188, 192.
yet that must still come-to-pass, but nothing has been said yet about the end of the process. It is only when we add to the analysis of concern an examination of its term, sc. that point beyond which it does not exist (Nicht-mehr-da-sein), that we shall have laid bare the process as a whole and have revealed the completeness of its finitude. Heidegger examines the process of There-being in its term by his existential analysis of death.\textsuperscript{139}

For There-being ends (who will deny it?) in death. What, then, is the authentic sense of death which is There-being's end? One would be tempted, perhaps, to say that in death There-being is simply at-its-end, understanding end to mean "perfection," "cessation," "disappearance" or the like, but this would be to interpret There-being as a mere entity and therefore misinterpret it completely.\textsuperscript{140} What characterizes There-being is existence, sc. the ecstatic drive-toward-Being by reason of which it is its own potentiality. It already is what it can-be, hence what it not-yet-is, sc. its end. Since the potentiality of There-being includes already interior to itself in existential fashion its end, then the death of There-being must be described not as a being-at-its-end (Zu-Ende-sein) but as the Being unto-end (Sein zum Ende) of There-being, indicating thereby that the end always penetrates the whole existence. So it is that "... death is a manner of Being which There-being assumes just as soon as it exists..."\textsuperscript{141} for Being unto-end and Being unto-death (Sein zum Tode) are but one.

Death, then, as Being unto-end of There-being, is inscribed within that potentiality which There-being in its existential dimension is. "... Death, as the end of There-being, is in the

\textsuperscript{139} SZ, pp. 233–234, 236, 259. We are concerned with the problem of death, insofar as this is the term of finite transcendence as to-be-in-the-World, in the context of fundamental ontology. Hence, any considerations such as: the biological sense of death, the possibility of life after death, how death came into the world etc. are all for Heidegger, if they have any sense at all, beside the point. See SZ, pp. 246–248. Here more than ever we must make the effort to realize that Heidegger is interested not in an anthropological but an ontological interpretation of death, albeit discerned phenomenologically in terms of the existentiell.

\textsuperscript{140} SZ, pp. 244–245 (Vollendung, Aufhören, Verschwinden).

\textsuperscript{141} "... Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, sobald es ist..." (SZ, p. 245). Heidegger compares the immanence of the end (death) in There-being to the immanence of maturity in the unripe fruit, sc. it already is its not-yet-ripeness. The difference: ripeness implies the perfection of the fruit; the end (death) does not necessarily imply the perfection of There-being. See SZ, pp. 243–244.
Being of There-being unto its end." 142 We have every right to translate das Ende here as "limit." Hence, Being-unto-death in There-being means for Heidegger that the limit is not simply the term of the process but permeates every part of it and makes the potentiality, which There-being is, limited through and through – thoroughly and irretrievably finite.

It is when we consider death, however, in the ontic dimension as one potentiality of There-being among countless others, that death enjoys a certain pre-eminence. "... Death is the most proper, exclusive and ultimate potentiality [of There-being]....": 143 "most proper," because There-being’s own, substitution is impossible (every There-being must die for its self); "exclusive," because There-being not only dies for its self but by its self, stripped of all relationship to others, isolated completely; "ultimate," because it cannot be surpassed, inasmuch as beyond death there is no-more-There-being (Nicht-mehr-da-sein), no more potentiality. "... Death is the potentiality for the absolute im-potence of There-being...." 144 It is the potentiality of There-being for a negation of itself, hence for a non-being (Nichts), a negativity (Nichtigkeit) intrinsic to the Being of There-being itself. 145 It is the ultimate seal of There-being’s finitude.

Obviously, There-being in its fallen condition is oblivious to the authentic sense of death, sc. that its self is a concern that is ineluctably unto an end, finite. How is it to come to such an appreciation? This poses the entire problem of authenticity. Now that we have considered the process of There-being in its unity (concern) and totality (Being-unto-end), we are in a position to pose the question: how does authenticity come-to-pass?

143 "... So enthüllt sich der Tod als die eigenste, unbezügliche, unüberholbare Möglichkeit...." (SZ, p. 250). Heidegger’s italics. "Proper" here is to be understood in the sense of proprius.
145 SZ, p. 306.
3. Authenticity

a. Existential — Heidegger considers the problem of authenticity on two levels. As a re-collection, it is an ontic comportment of There-being, hence an existentiell potentiality. As existentiell, this potentiality is structured by an existential dimension that renders it possible. The author considers first the ontological dimension of authenticity in terms of the death problematic as “authentic Being-unto-death.” This done, he considers authenticity as an existentiell potentiality by an analysis of conscience, guilt and re-solve. The intimate correlation of these procedures will appear in the notion of an “advancing” re-solve. We try to trace the essentials.

We examine first the ontological dimension of authenticity, insofar as this can be done without reference to the ontic comportment of which it is the structure. If one will, we are proceeding by constructing an hypothesis, based upon the data supplied by what precedes, without considering how this hypothesis is to be verified (bezeugten). Therefore: if the Being of There-being is concern, and if this concern is essentially unto-an-end, sc. finite, then how would be achieved in authentic fashion the coming-to-pass of There-being? In answering the question, the author proceeds by discussing the authentic nature of each of the constituents of concern: comprehension, disposition, fallen-ness.

What would be existential comprehension, if it were to be completely authentic? Would it not be to comprehend (project) the potentiality of There-being as the potentiality that it is? This would be to reveal There-being not as an actualization of its own potentiality but this potentiality itself as such, in all its wealth and in all its poverty, sc. as “the potentiality of immeasurable impotence” that marks its finitude. More precisely, if There-being were to comprehend itself authentically, it would reveal by its project its own potentiality in what is most properly, exclusively and definitively characteristic of this potentiality: its immanent ending. To comprehend itself according to the potentiality which is most properly

146 SZ, pp. 266–267.
its own will be the first condition of all "propriety" (Eigentlichkeit) in There-being, sc. all authenticity. This potentiality is There-being's end (death), and if There-being in the process of concern comprehends itself as immanently ending, this comprehension would reveal to There-being its de facto aberration in the ontic, tearing it away from the forgotten-ness of its self. Thus an authentic comprehension of the most proper potentiality of There-being would reveal in concern not only itself (comprehension) but fallen-ness as well.148

To comprehend its immanent ending as not only properly its own but exclusively so is for There-being to comprehend that the achieving of its authenticity is its own exclusive task, to be brought-to-pass by its self alone, without the complicity of the "World," or the collaboration of other There-beings. "... There-being can only then be authentically its self when through its self it renders this possible. ..." 149

Finally, that potentiality which is most proper and exclusive to There-being is also an ultimate, definitive potentiality. In authentic comprehension of its self, then, There-being would comprehend that the "... ultimate potentiality of its existence is to relinquish its self. ..." 150 The There-being would reveal to its self its potentiality for non-potentiality. If There-being comprehended that this is what it is, it would no longer flee from the definitiveness of this end (death) but would accept it as constitutive of its finitude and thus "... render its self free for it. ..." 151 This process of becoming free for its own end (death), for its own ineradicable finitude, would liberate There-being from its ontic perdition, to be sure, but the fundamental sense of such a gesture is and remains an acquiescence to finitude. "... Free for that potentiality which is properly its own, determined by its limit, i.e. comprehended as limited. ..." 152 There-being would be ready to accept "existence in its finitude." 153

148 SZ, pp. 263, 266.
149 "... Dasein kann nur dann eigentlich es selbst sein, wenn es sich von ihm selbst her dazu ermöglicht...." (SZ, p. 263). Heidegger's italics.
150 "... als äußerste Möglichkeit der Existenz bevorsteht, sich selbst aufzugeben. ...." (SZ, p. 264).
151 "... gibt sich frei für sie...." (SZ, p. 264). Heidegger's italics.
152 "... Frei für die eigenen, vom Ende her bestimmten, d.h. als endliche verstandenen Möglichkeiten,..." (SZ, p. 264). Heidegger's italics.
153 "die Existenz in ihre Endlichkeit" (SZ, p. 384).
Yet in our efforts to determine the conditions necessary for the achievement of authenticity in concern, we have spoken only of two of its constituent elements: comprehension and (by indirection) fallen-ness. What of that other component of disclosedness which is integrated into concern, sc. the ontological disposition? What type of ontological disposition would characterize the achievement of authenticity? Heidegger’s answer: anxiety.

We have already distinguished the about-which and the for-which of anxiety, and added that in the process of concern the about-which is Non-being and the for-which is There-being as drive-towards-Being. In achieving authenticity, the Non-being (Nichts) to occasion There-being’s anxiety would be the Non-being of its own finitude. In other words: There-being is certain of its own immanent ending, for this is disclosed to it in the authentic comprehension of its self. Yet at the same time, the death of There-being is always undetermined, for it does not come-to-pass at a “when” that is determinately “known” but is always immanent to a potentiality that is immanently ending. Constantly immanent, There-being’s end (death) is an abiding menace. It is in the presence of this abiding menace that There-being experiences the uneasiness which we call anxiety before its own internal limitation. “... In [anxiety] There-being finds itself before the Non-being of the potential impotence of its existence. ...” 154 The for-which of There-being’s anxiety would again be its own potentiality, but determined in the present case by its own inescapable finitude. Taken in its totality, the process of anxiety would disclose by the way of affectivity the authentic nature of There-being as concern-onto-end, as finite. That is why “... Being-onto-death is essentially anxiety. ...” 155

All of this Heidegger puts into a famous formula, but in reading it one must keep clearly in mind the expressly existential purpose of the research and the existential sense that Heidegger has given to each of its terms:

... Advancing (in potentiality) reveals to There-being its submersion in "people" and brings it primarily, without the support of the "World"

154 “... In ihr befindet sich das Dasein vor dem Nichts der möglichen Unmöglichkeit seiner Existenz....” (SZ, p. 266). Heidegger’s italics.
155 “... Das Sein zum Tode ist wesenhaft Angst....” (SZ, p. 266).
and other There-beings, before the potentiality to be its self. This self, however, delivered from the illusions of "people," is a passionate, self-assured, anxiety-tempered freedom unto death.156

b. EXISTENTIELL - That which we have just described is what would be the ontological structure of authentic existence, if There-being in its concern were to achieve its self properly. Under what existentiell circumstances, however, will this come-to-pass? Heidegger's answer: when There-being listens to the voice of conscience.157 How, then, is the phenomenon of conscience to be understood?

Certainly there is no question here of analysing a faculty of the soul (understanding, will, feeling, etc.), or any of the popular interpretations of the term. Nor are we interested in conscience in the moral sense, although as a matter of fact the structure in question renders a moral conscience possible. For Heidegger, the existential conscience is that which in the state of everydayness gives There-being to "understand" what it is and thus calls it to authenticity. Insofar as it "gives to understand" it "lets-be-seen," and therefore the call of conscience is a mode of logos. In this call to authenticity, who is it that is called? There-being in its everydayness, lost in ontic dissipation. And whereunto? Unto its authentic self, sc. unto its own proper potentiality. And the call comes not with cry or sound — but in stillness and silence out of There-being's interior wellspring.158

More precisely, however, who is it that calls? One cannot simply say "There-being," for in that case, how would There-being as called differ from There-being as calling? Besides, the call of conscience is not subject to the whims and moods of There-being, hence it is marked by a certain imperiousness, almost an alterity, which, however, does not come from another There-being but out of There-being's own depths.159

156 "... Das Vorlauf en enthüllt dem Dasein die Verlorenheit in das Man-selbst und bringt es vor die Möglichkeit, auf die besorgende Fürsorge primär ungestützt, es selbst zu sein, selbst aber in der leidenschaftlichen, von den Illusionen des Man gelösten, faktischen, ihrer selbst gewissen und sich ängstenden Freiheit zum Tode." (SZ, p. 266). Heidegger italicizes. Never was he more a prisoner of the language of metaphysics that he was trying to ground than here. If most of the early critics gave an existentiell interpretation to SZ, was it completely their fault?
157 SZ, pp. 267–268.
159 SZ, p. 275.
is the apparent alterity of the caller to be understood? Heidegger answers by recalling the analysis of anxiety. As an ontological disposition, it discloses to There-being both the Non-being of the World and its own drive-towards-Being, hence the fact that There-being in the ontic preoccupation of everydayness is somehow an expatriate. The "World" of everydayness is not its true abode. It is There-being as expatriate, claims Heidegger, that calls the inauthentic There-being to its self: "... [the one who calls] is There-being in its state of expatriation; the original, thrown-forth to-be-in-the-World as home-less; the naked 'that' in the Non-being of the World. ..."  

What wonder, then, that to There-being lost in everydayness the call to return to the homeland seems like the voice of a stranger?

With this we achieve a certain clarity as to the structure of the existential conscience. Who is the called? There-being, victim of the consequences of fallen-ness. Whereunto is There-being called? To There-being as authentic existence, sc. as the anticipatory drive-towards-Being by which it is its own potentiality. Who is it that calls? There-being in its sheer thrown-ness as disclosed by the disposition of anxiety. But existence, facticity and fallen-ness are exactly the constituents of concern, so that now "... conscience manifests itself as the call of concern. ..."  

Thus it is that the third of the existential components of the disclosedness of the There, sc. logos, is incorporated now into concern as the call of conscience. Through conscience, the unity of There-being becomes complete.

But we must go further. What is it that this call of conscience "gives [There-being] to understand"? Experience and philosophy are unanimous: somehow or other There-being's "guilt" (Schuld). In determining the existential sense of guilt, the author analyses various senses that the word can have and concludes that the common denominator would be the notion of "lack" or "absence" of what can and should be. In this sense, there can be no guilt in There-being, which already is what it can-be, sc. it is its own potentiality. However, more radically still there lies
within the idea of guilt somehow or other a "not" (Nicht), sc. a limitation. Furthermore, in some cases, guilt implies the ground for a "not" (lack) in another, as when a crime has been perpetrated. Heidegger fastens the existential notion of guilt, then, thus: "... to be the ground for Being that is determined by a not, i.e. to be the ground of a negativity. ..." 162 If in There-being there is the "ground for a negativity," sc. limitation, There-being is in the existential sense guilty.

How often have we seen that There-being is determined by a negativity. There-being is thrown, sc. it is not the origin of its self, and it never overcomes its primitive helplessness. If its essence is to exist, sc. if existence is the ground of the potentiality that it is, then this existence as permanently thrown is permeated by the 'not' of its origin. It never is and never becomes master of itself but must continually take-over (Übernahme) its self. If there is a "not" in its origin, then there is a "not" in its achievement. Furthermore, if existence as its own ground is permeated with negativity, so too is existence as project. All project will also be tainted by a "not," for the project, too, is thrown.

... This not belongs to the existential sense of thrown-ness. Being [its own] ground, [There-being] is itself the negativity of itself. Negativity ... means a not that constitutes the Being of There-being [in virtue of] its thrown-ness. ... 163

And it is this radical negativity, penetrating There-being to its depths, which renders it possible to fall into the negativity which constitutes inauthenticity. What more need be said to prove that "... There-being as such is guilty. ..."? 164 The guilt consists in its finitude.

The "structural unity of the intrinsically finite transcendence of There-being" (concern) consequently includes within it a logos (conscience) that by a word uttered in silence gives the everyday There-being to understand its finitude and at once invites it to achieve its authentic self. The achievement of au-

thenticity for There-being is not, of course, a suppression of its finitude. On the contrary. It consists simply in accepting its self for what it is: a drive-towards-Being that is constitutionally limited. For There-being to accept itself as such is to let itself be called, to become free for the call, to attend to the voice which tells it of its finitude. It is this "readiness to be called" that constitutes There-being's choice of self.165

And in this choice is achieved authenticity. Such a choice Heidegger will henceforth designate as "re-solve" (Entschlossenheit). But is it really a new phenomenon? It would be more exact to call it a special mode of disclosedness of There-being.166 It implies, after all, a comprehension, a disposition and a logos: comprehension, because by re-solve There-being comprehends itself as a drive-towards-Being that is thrown-forth-and-still-to-be-achieved; disposition, because by re-solve There-being becomes willing to accept the disposition corresponding to such a comprehension, sc. anxiety, that uneasiness born of There-being's discovery of its own expatriate condition; logos, because in re-solve There-being attends in silence to a voice that speaks without sound, and the attend-ing itself is a mode of logos that draws out of the superficial loquacity of everydayness a deep resounding word.

This modality can be called "new" only insofar as it comes-to-pass as an existentiell comportment of There-being, which lies somehow in There-being's power to choose or not to choose. And even in the choosing, There-being is not delivered from the referential dependence upon beings but only enjoys a transparency to itself as itself in its situation: a being plunged into a determined context of potentialities (some bequeathed, some imposed, some chosen) through which, nevertheless, it brings to pass that transcendence unto Being which is proper to its self.167

C. EXISTENTIAL AND EXISTENTIELL - What is authenticity for There-being? We have been given two answers: to advance (Vorlaufen) in the comprehension of its own most

\[165\] SZ, pp. 287-288 (Bereitschaft für das Angerufenwerdenkönnen, Sichvorrufenlassen, Freiwerden, etc.).
\[166\] SZ, pp. 295-297.
\[167\] SZ, p. 299.
proper, exclusive, definitive potentiality, sc. its end (death); to let itself be called to a comprehension of its self in all negativity. Is there a discrepancy between the two?

Let us think the notion of re-solve through "to the end." Here, There-being by an existentiell comportment assumes its self in all of its negativity as long as it is, sc. up to its very end. But the end of There-being in the existential sense is always immanent within it: There-being is Being- unto-end. So it is that re-solve becomes completely itself when it comprehends There-being as Being unto-end. Re-solve, then, as an existentiell potentiality, includes within itself the existential dimension of Being- unto-end. There-being's guilt consists in the fact that its Being is permeated by negativity, sc. limitation. There-being's death, considered in the existential sense, consists in the immanent potentiality for non-potentiality, sc. in the "absolute negativity of There-being." Both formulae bespeak an essential Non-Being (Nichts) in There-being that is disclosed in anxiety. "... The Non-Being which anxiety discloses reveals the negativity which characterizes There-being in the ground [of its Being] which is itself as thrown-ness unto death." Re-solve, that, ready to accept this anxiety, chooses to assume itself in all its negativity, becomes inevitably "freedom unto death," for death is the seal of its ineluctable finitude.

If there are two formulae for authenticity, then not only is there no discrepancy between them but the two are correlative, insofar as they express the same phenomenon in two dimensions: in the existentiell dimension, authenticity consists in There-being's choice to achieve itself in its situation; this is structured in the existential dimension by the comprehension of its self as concern that is immanently unto-an-end. Briefly: There-being comes to its achievement in authenticity, insofar as it permits a strange uneasiness that steals upon it from time to time to estrange it from the ontic distractions that fill its every day, chooses to hearken to a voice that comes from within itself to tell it that it can transcend these beings unto Being but can never transcend its finitude.

168 SZ, p. 306 (schlechthinige Nichtigkeit des Daseins).
D. THE SENSE OF FINITE TRANSCENDENCE

1. Temporality

We are endeavoring to construct a fundamental ontology by discerning the ontological structure that renders possible the natural propensity in every man to metaphysicize. Thus far we have seen that this structure is the process of concern. But it is only a partial answer, for one still may ask: what is the radical sense of concern? Only when this question is answered will the analysis be complete.

Let us indicate more clearly what Heidegger understands by the “sense” of a being. It is the comprehensibility (Verstehbarkeit) of this being, not as grasped by an explicit concept and thematically understood, but as illumined by There-being, which in its fundamental project comprehends this being as that which it is, sc. in the Being-structure which makes the being to be what it is. Briefly: the sense of any being is its Being, insofar as this is comprehended by There-being. The question we are posing, then, is this: if the Being of There-being is concern, what is the Being - sc. the ultimate ground of possibility - of concern? Heidegger answers: temporality (Zeitlichkeit).170

We reach here the most original element of Heidegger's thought, and with it we begin to understand the title of the first part of SZ: “The interpretation of There-being in terms of temporality and the explanation of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of Being.” For if we can determine the sense of Being as such only by first discerning the sense of the Being of There-being, whose ultimate sense, however, is time, then time becomes the horizon of the question of Being itself, and the further problem of grounding metaphysics becomes not so much the problem of Being (Sein) nor of time (Zeit) but of the relation between them.

For Heidegger, this correlation of Being and time is not an invention of his own but is seized vaguely and indeterminately in that pre-conceptual comprehension of Being out of which arises all metaphysics. Indices of this comprehension of Being in the perspective of time may be culled from the philosophers

of antiquity. By way of example: how else explain the fact that the ἀντίκειται ἰν, sc. that being which is a being to the highest degree possible, is the ἄλη ἰν, where ἄλη implies a permanence and stability in time? Similarly οἷός and παρώνια. Again, would not τὸ τί ἐστι, taken according to the letter, imply a dimension of time? The task, then, for fundamental ontology is to thematize this correlation of Being and time that appears in our spontaneous comprehension of Being and endeavor to see its relationship to the problem of finite transcendence, so that "... temporality becomes visible as the transcendental structure of There-being as such." 171

For the popular mind, time is an indefinite series of "nows," where the "future" consists in the "nows" that have not yet come but some day will be, the "past" consists of the "nows" that once were but no longer are, and the "present" is the "now" which at the moment "is." This conception, to be sure, has its justification, which the author will not deny, but such is not the temporality of There-being. For There-being is not a mere entity, as such an interpretation would suppose, but, as transcendence, it is in the midst of other beings essentially an anticipatory drive-towards-Being by reason of which it is its own potentiality, sc. it already is what it can-be. Such a structure, when comprehended in its authenticity, implies a future, a past and a present, but of a sort that is proper to There-being alone.

As drive-towards-Being, There-being is constantly coming to Being, sc. to its self. This coming of There-being to its self, and therefore of Being to There-being, is There-being’s "coming," sc. its future (Zukunft). By reason of this coming (future), There-being comes to its self – but to a self that already is as having-been-thrown. The self that already is-as-having-been is There-being’s past (Gewesenheit). Note the reciprocity between future and past: There-being’s coming is to a self that already is-as-having-been to such an extent that its coming is a type of return; on the other hand, There-being is what it has been only as long as the future continues to come. How conceive the present? Remember that There-being exists in two dimensions: ontic and

171 "... Daß im Da-sein als solchem die Zeitlichkeit als transcendente Unstruktur sichtbar wird." (KM, p. 218). See KM, pp. 216–217. In the introduction to WM (1949), time is called the "first name" (Vorname) of Being (WM, p. 17).
ontological. It is engaged in commerce with other beings whose Being it comprehends. By reason of the authentic comprehension of its own transcendence, There-being renders possible the encounter with these beings as beings. It renders them present. This rendering-present of beings is the authentic present (Gegenwart) of There-being.

So it is that, in the structure of There-being’s transcendence, existence consists in the coming (future) of Being to a self that already is (past), rendering manifest the Being of beings with which it is concerned (present). Such is the authentic situation of There-being which re-solve discloses. “... This ... unified phenomenon we call temporality. ...” 172 And it is only insofar as There-being in its very Being is characterized by such a temporality that authentic existence is rendered possible. It is for this reason that “... temporality reveals itself as the sense of authentic concern.” 173

More precisely, concern consists in existentiality (the anticipatory drive-toward-Being), facticity (already-thrown-forth-and-still-to-be-achieved), fallen-ness (referentially dependent on and dragged toward other beings). All of these elements are rendered possible by There-being’s temporality: The anticipatory drive-toward-Being is grounded in the continued coming of There-being to its self, so that the “primary sense [of existentiality] is the future.” 174 On the other hand, the primary existential sense of facticity lies in There-being’s past, for the “already” character of thrown-ness is rendered possible only insofar as There-being has-been. And it is “... only because concern is grounded in [There-being’s] past [that] There-being can exist as the thrown-forth being that it is. ...” 175 Finally, fallen-ness, too, has its sense in the present insofar as an au-

174 “… Ihr primärer Sinn ist die Zukunft.” (SZ, p. 327). Heidegger italicizes.
175 “… Nur weil Sorge in der Gewesenheit gründet, kann das Dasein als das geworfene Seiende, das es ist, existieren. ...” (SZ, p. 328). The author distinguishes clearly two types of “past”: “Past” is that which has been and still is (Gewesenheit). This is the existential sense of the past, sc. a past that is-as-having-been (ich bin gewesen). Another sense of “past” is that which has gone by (Vergangenheit), sc. that which was once but no longer is. Hence the “former,” “previous.” Such is the past of mere entities.
authentic There-being presents, sc. renders possible the encounter with, the beings of its ontic experience as beings. This rendering-present of beings is interior to the coming of Being (future) to the self that is (past). The present, then, is included in future and past, whose reciprocity constitutes the unity of temporality.

Temporality is not a being so much as a process which temporalizes, its constituent moments not three parts so much as three different directions in which this process comes-to-pass: a direction toward Being (existence), a direction of return toward what-is-as-having-been (facticity), a direction out toward other beings (fallen-ness). Temporality is, then, by reason of these directions in which it comes-to-pass, essentially "outside itself," the ἐκστασις. Each of these directions will be called an "ecstasy" of temporality, and temporality itself "... is not first of all a being that goes out of itself, but its essence is the [process of] temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases. ..." 176

This unity of three ecstases in temporality, then, renders possible the unity of concern. Concern, however, is the structural unity of transcendence, sc. There-being as to-be-in-the-World. With the There of There-being the World also is disclosed. Now if the ultimate sense of concern is temporality, the World, too, must find its ultimate explanation in terms of time. Precisely how? Let us return for a moment to the notion of "ecstasy" as a direction of There-being. Direction implies a term, or horizon, toward which it is orientated. Each ecstasis (direction) of temporality, then, has its proper horizon and the unity of the ecstases a unified horizon. The unified horizon of the triple ecstasis of temporality is what Heidegger understands by the temporal sense of the World: "... The existential-temporal condition of possibility of the World lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has such a thing as a horizon. ..." 177

The unity of three ecstases does not exclude, of course, a differentiation among them. This in turn permits us to note a certain ontological priority in the ecstasis of coming (future)

176 "... Sie ist nicht vordem ein Seiendes, das erst aus sich heraustritt, sondern ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ekstasen...." (SZ, p. 359). Heidegger's italics.

177 "... Die existenzial-zeitliche Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Welt liegt darin, daß die Zeitlichkeit als ekstatische Einheit so etwas wie einen Horizont hat...." (SZ, p. 365). Heidegger italicizes whole.
over the other two, for it is the coming which precedes the self that is and renders other beings present in their Being.

It is for this reason above all that temporality is essentially finite. For the ecstasis of coming (future) renders possible that constituent of concern which we have called the anticipatory drive-towards-Being. This potentiality, however, is essentially unto-an-end. "... It does not have an end at which it merely ceases [to be], but it exists [as always] ending..." Consequently, the authentic future which primarily characterizes the temporality which renders possible this potentiality "... reveals itself, then, as itself finite..." And if this essential finitude, sc. negativity, characterizes the temporality of There-being, must we not conclude that it permeates the World as its horizon?

At this point, Heidegger proposes to repeat the entire existential analysis in the perspective of the newly thematized notion of temporality. Specifically, this will mean a reinterpretation of everydayness which will emphasize the temporal dimension of the various aspects of the inauthenticity in which There-being "first of all and for the most part" finds itself. We may be dispensed from following the author through most of these analyses but must pause for a remark of special importance.

Authentic comprehension is rendered possible by the ecstasis of the future, sc. There-being as anticipatory drive-towards-Being is continually coming to its self. Insofar as it comes to its self, There-being in its own potentiality continually takes-over its self (übernehmen), sc. assumes the self that already is. It "fetches" (-hält) its self all over again (wieder-), and this re-fetching, or "re-trive" (Wiederholung), is the achieving of There-being's authentic past, sc. of the self which already is-as-having-been. On the contrary, if this re-trive of the authentic self

176 "... Es hat nicht ein Ende, an dem es nur aufhört, sondern existiert endlich. ..." (SZ, p. 329). Heidegger's italics.
177 "... enthüllt sich damit selbst als endlich..." (SZ, pp. 329-330). Heidegger's italics.
180 SZ, pp. 331-350.
181 SZ, pp. 336-339. "Re-trive," derived from the French retrouver, seems more faithful to the sense of Wiederholung than the possibly misleading "repetition," from the Latin repetere. The authentic past is for Heidegger not so much a "seeking" as a "finding" again.
does not come-to-pass, the result is an inauthentic past, characterized by the forgottenness of the true self. The implications of this will appear as soon as we have considered the problem of the historicity of There-being.

2. Historicity

Since There-being is ultimately a temporal being, it is essentially historical as well. The analysis of the historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of There-being, then, is no more than an explication and further elaboration of what is already implied in the study of temporality. Our task will be simply to reexamine the process of temporalizing and explain in what sense it constitutes There-being as historical. "Historical," however, connotes in one way or another a reference to the past. Our explicitation of temporality as historicity, then, must elaborate more carefully the full meaning of the self to which There-being comes as a past which is a history.

In re-solve, There-being comes to the self that is-as-having-been. Essentially a comprehending, this advance toward self is not simply a theoretical speculation but a return toward self in all the facticity of its There. This return is the assuming by There-being of its self which already is as having-been-thrown-among-beings and as referentially dependent upon them. This self, so determined, that There-being thus assumes is an authentic "heritage" (Erbe). To assume is to "hand over" (überliefern) this heritage. The more authentically There-being in re-solve consents to be what it is in all its finitude, the more profoundly this heritage becomes its own in a "freely chosen discovery of

---

182 SZ, p. 376. In the following analyses, we translate: geschichtlich as "historical," Geschichtlichkeit as "historicity," Geschichte as "history," and Historie as "scientific history" or "history as a science."

183 SZ, pp. 378–379, 381. Heidegger gives four senses that the popular mind gives to "history": that which refers to the past as such; that which has its origin in the past and still is; the totality of beings which "in time" change (vs. nature); whatever is handed down by tradition.

184 SZ, pp. 381, 387. For the author, the term "historical" is applied primarily to There-being and only secondarily to those other non-There-beings which the historical There-being uncovers within the world (p. 381). Hence, a medieval castle is "historical" principally because of the There-being that no longer exists (p. 380), sc. dagewesenes. Such beings are designated "World-historical" (Weltgeschichtliche) (pp. 381, 388–389) in order to distinguish them from what is properly historical.

185 SZ, pp. 382–383.
the potentiality of its existence" that is always immanently ending. It is thus that There-being re-collects its self amid the multiplicity of ontic distractions and achieves an existential simplicity which Heidegger calls There-being's "fortune" (Schicksal). The term merely transposes into terms of history what is meant by re-solve.

In fortune, There-being hands over to its self its own heritage, sc. the matter-of-fact drive-towards-Being that it already is. Its comprehension of this heritage could remain implicit without compromising its authenticity, but if it is made explicit, then There-being expressly "finds" its potentiality "all over again," sc. re-treivies this potentiality. "... The re-trieve is the explicit handing over [of the heritage], sc. There-being's return to potentialities that already have been explicitated. ..."). This re-trieve is not simply a bringing back of an event that has definitively gone by. Much rather is it a returning (erwidern) of a potentiality that already has been exploited and is in the There-being that has-been.

But it is not this re-trieve of its own potentiality that makes There-being historical. On the contrary, it is only because There-being, as temporal, is already historical that by re-treiving its self it can assume its own history. Furthermore, even though There-being's historicity, as its temporality, has its origin in the future (There-being's coming to its self), still the fact that this implies a retrieving of the potentiality and the assumption of a heritage explains why an authentic interpretation of history must give a preponderance to the past. In illuminating this past, however, the retrieve, as the explicit handing over to its self of (part of) its heritage, plays a privileged rôle. "... The re-trieve makes manifest for the first time to There-being its own history. ..."

186 SZ, p. 384 (das wählende Finden der Möglichkeit seiner Existenz).
187 SZ, p. 384. This translation of Schicksal is only provisional. Later we shall translate as "commitment," but this belongs to the context of Heidegger II, when the corresponding Geschick has a sense which it does not have in SZ. The translation "fortune" rests upon the Latin fortuna. We wish to avoid the lugubrious overtones of "fate," and suggest by legitimate ambiguity that There-being's "fortune" lies in the heritage it freely chooses.
188 "... Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrückliche Überlieferung, das heißt der Rückgang in Möglichkeiten des dagewesenen Daseins. ..." (SZ, p. 385). Heidegger's italics.
189 SZ, p. 386.
190 "... Die Wiederholung macht dem Dasein seine eigene Geschichte erst offenbar. ..." (SZ, p. 386).
FROM THERE TO BEING

What we have said so far pertains to There-being as an individual. Such a perspective, however, is necessarily incomplete, for There-being is not just an isolated unit; its ontological structure includes a with-being with others. Hence the coming-to-pass, structured by historicity, is achieved with other There-beings, all of which constitute a community or a people. This coming-to-pass-with-other-There-beings as a community Heidegger calls "common fortune" (Geschick). Furthermore, the historical There-being can not achieve its own individual authenticity apart from the community. The heritage which There-being assumes in authenticity, then, is not simply its individual history but somehow the heritage of the entire people with which it is. The process of re-tieve will include the renewal of potencies of Being that concern all There-beings, and thus (an aspect of) the history of the entire folk is made manifest. It is the achieving of itself "... in and with its own 'generation' that constitutes the full authentic coming-to-pass of There-being." If these indications suggest more problems than they solve, the reason is that the analysis of with-being in SZ remains truncated. Their importance for the later Heidegger, however, should not be underestimated, as will appear in the development which follows.

Let us conclude all this with one word more about re-tieve. We find several senses in which the term (Wiederholung) is used: in a very general sense, where it scarcely differs from "handing over the self to the self"; in a more precise sense where it means the explicit handing-over by a There-being considered either as isolated or as a member of its generation; in a sense where the historian endeavors to re-tieve a potentiality-for-Being of a There-being that is gone, with such success that the full force of Being comes upon him as if out of his own future. We gain a clearer understanding of what Heidegger means by re-tieve, however, if we consider how he puts it to work.

191 SZ, p. 384. Use of Geschick here gives us a point of comparison when we meet the word in Heidegger II.
The entire analysis of SZ, for example, is an attempt to retrieve the sense of Being by examining the antecedent comprehension of Being in There-being in an effort to discover the source of its possibility. It is not simply a re-iteration of the problem but a re-working of it, the developing of it as a problem. By the re-trieving of a fundamental problem we understand the disclosure of its original potentialities that long have lain hidden. By the elaboration of the potentialities, the problem is transformed and thus for the first time in its intrinsic content is conserved. To conserve a problem, however, means to retain free and awake all those interior forces that render this problem in its fundamental essence possible.\textsuperscript{194}

Such, indeed, was the effort of SZ. Such, too, is the purpose of the Kant-interpretation, sc. to re-t\-ri\-ve in KRV the problem of grounding metaphysics.\textsuperscript{195} If a re-t\-ri\-ve, such as we find it in KM, appears to do violence to the original, the reason is that, more than a reiteration, it is a restoration and re-development of the entire problematic in all of its original freshness. It is a "thought-ful dialogue between thinkers."\textsuperscript{196} But with this phrase we jump more than twenty years of development in Heidegger up to 1950 and the preface to the second edition of KM. Let it suffice to indicate that what appears as "thought-ful dialogue" in the Heidegger of 1950 finds its roots in the existential analysis as re-t\-ri\-ve, by which the Being of There-being becomes explicitly open with regard to the past to such an extent that the full force of Being strikes There-being as if coming out of the future.

\textit{III. General Remarks}

\textbf{A. TRUTH}

Before bringing to a close our discussion of SZ, two remarks of a general nature will help us to see more clearly those per-


\textsuperscript{195} KM, pp. 15, 184. Since KM was intended as the first section of SZ II, which ambitioned a "destruction" of metaphysics, we see that this meant only an effort at retrieve. This is made explicit in SF (1953), p. 36. Cf. N, II, p. 415.

\textsuperscript{196} KM, pp. 5-6 (denkendes Gespräch zwischen Denkenden).
spectives in the work that have a bearing on foundational thought. The first remark concerns truth, and we content ourselves with only summary treatment, for the problem will soon be thematized for itself. We wish simply to indicate how the problem arises out of the existential analysis of There-being.

The process by which There-being transcends beings to Being is also a coming-to-pass of truth. This will become clear, however, only insofar as we succeed in comprehending the relationship between Being and truth. That the relationship is close appears in the fact that philosophy from the earliest days has associated truth and Being, as, for example, Parmenides and Aristotle testify. Yet how should the relationship be described? How precisely is truth rooted in Being?

The traditional concept of truth gives us no satisfying answers. This, of course, is not to deny its validity, but simply to say that it presupposes a more fundamental truth from which it springs as its source. For since Aristotle, according to Heidegger, philosophers have understood “truth” to mean a concordance between two mere entities (Vorhandene): intellectus et res. In logical truth, this concordance is expressed in the judgement, which therefore is the proper “place” of truth. The question we must ask, however, is: what is the full sense of this concordance?

All concordance is relation between one being and another, and, in the case of logical truth, this relation is of such a nature that the judgement so expresses that which is judged as it in itself is. What, however, is the guarantee of this “so ... as” relationship of conformity? Is it not the discovery that what is judged reveals itself as it is judged to be? Conformity of judgement to judged, then, implies a self-revelation of the known which the judgement discovers. A judgement is true, then, because it discovers the known in itself; it lets a being be seen in its discoveredness. Truth lies in discovering.

If truth lies in discovering, that which is most fundamentally true is There-being itself, for “with existence ... beings ... in
themselves, sc. as beings become manifest. . . ." 200 As for beings other than There-being, they are true only in a secondary sense. 201 There-being is essentially a discovering because it is transcendence. As transcendence, it is, phenomenologically speaking, to-be-in-the-World, and its in-being consists in the luminosity of There by reason of which the World is disclosed. The disclosedness of the World, however, is what renders possible the discovery of beings (instruments) which are encountered within the World. "... With and through [disclosedness], discovery is [made possible]. Consequently it is only with the disclosedness of There-being that the original phenomenon of truth is attained. . . ." 202

The consequences of this are enormous. To identify the disclosedness of There-being with the original phenomenon of transcendence is to transpose into terms of truth the entire analysis of concern (structural unity of disclosedness), which, therefore, is as much the coming-to-pass of truth as of finite transcendence. The process of original truth, then, will be characterized by the positivity of concern, inasmuch as this is transcendence. The author expresses this by saying "... There-being is 'in the truth' . . .," 203 sc. in virtue of its anticipatory drive-towards-Being. There-being is ontologically constituted as a projection of the Being of beings.

But the process of truth will be characterized by the negativity of concern as well. This negativity, we have seen, is its radical finitude: the anticipatory drive-towards-Being is thrown-down and fallen among beings upon which it referentially depends. The result of this fallen-ness is that There-being "first of all and for the most part" comprehends itself in terms of the "World" of its ontic intercourse. Consequently, every projection of
potentiality of There-being is, because of this finitude, perpetually out of focus. Every apprehension (ergreifen) is a mis-apprehension (vergreifen). Beings are discovered, to be sure, but inadequately so, and slip back immediately into their previous hidden-ness. To uncover (entdecken) is simultaneously to cover-up (verdecken). To disclose (erschliessen) is at once to close-over (verschliessen). This condition of inescapable, undulant obscurity Heidegger calls "un-truth." "... There-being, because essentially falling [among beings], is, by reason of its constitution, in the 'un-truth'. . . ." But the term should not be understood to connote an ontic evaluation of There-being, nor merely a characteristic of inauthentic everydayness. It is an ontological characteristic that is the ineluctable consequence of the fact that There-being's prerogative carries the seal of negativity. "... The full existential-ontological sense of the expression 'There-being is in the truth' says simultaneously 'There-being is in the un-truth'. . . ." because transcendence is finite.

The entire process of concern as the unity of disclosedness, then, must be understood as the coming-to-pass of truth. If the eminent mode of disclosedness is achieved in that free choice of There-being to accept itself as a finite transcendence, which we have called re-solve, then re-solve is the eminent mode of truth – and eminently permeated by the negativity of truth, sc. un-truth. For if, by re-solve, There-being accepts itself in all its negativity, then it accepts itself as negatived truth. "... [Concern] is simultaneously in truth and un-truth. This applies in the most 'authentic' sense to re-solve as authentic truth. [Re-solve] authentically makes this non-truth . . . its very own . . .," sc. accepts the inescapable finitude of existence.

Other consequences will follow upon the identification of original truth with the disclosedness of There-being. Heidegger
concludes: "... 'There is' truth only insofar, and as long, as There-being is. ..." Newton's laws, for example, were not "true" before Newton discovered them. Nor were they for that matter "false." They were simply undiscovered, and it was the discovery by Newton that made them, in the existential sense, true. This does not mean that the beings thus discovered had no entity before the discovery, but only that the discovery made them accessible to a There-being in their Being. What, then, of "eternal truths"? One would have the right to speak of them, according to Heidegger, only if one could first prove that for all eternity There-being was and will be. Given the radical finitude of There-being (Being-onto-end), this is manifestly absurd. However, to identify disclosedness and truth — is it not to make all truth relative to There-being? About this Heidegger leaves no doubt. But is not this the crudest kind of subjectivism? Certainly it is — if There-being be a subject. ...

B. SUBJECTIVISM

There-being is not a "subject." There-being is transcendence! To be sure, it is always a "human There-being." So close is the correlation between There-being and man that the second of its fundamental characteristics is its mine-ness, sc. it belongs to someone who says "ego." But the first of its fundamental characteristics is existence, hence this ego is existential as well as existentiell. Our task in the existential analysis is to discern the existential dimension of ego.

The ego is a "self." As long as we remain on the ontic level, this self appears as a principle of stable unity that abides amid the change and multiplicity of experience. It is that which lies at the basis of these experiences: it is referred to these experiences and they to it. It is that which "lies under" the experiences: the ὑποτετελεῖσθαι, subject. The traditional ontologies interpreted the Being of such a subject in terms of substance, which

---

207 "... Wahrheit 'gibt es' nur, sofern und solange Dasein ist...." (SZ, p. 226).
Heidegger italicizes whole.
208 SZ, p. 247. Many of the critics have accused Heidegger of relativism. His conception is no more a relativism in the ordinary sense than it is a subjectivism (see below). Yet it is not an absolutism either. The problem can be seen fully only later when we discuss the "rigor" of foundational thought.
209 SZ, pp. 114, 318.
meant that they conceived the ego-subject as a mere entity.\footnote{210} In this, Kant differed not at all from Descartes. For both, the ego was a conscious subject, whose entity as such was essentially no different from the entity of other substances. So it was that for Kant the term "existence" was applied indiscriminately to consciousness and to things. The ego-subject was in relation (of opposition) with its object as entity is in relation with another entity.\footnote{211}

But this is a purely ontic interpretation of the ego. The fact is - and the existential analysis has proven it - that the human There-being is not a mere entity like any other but enjoys a prerogative that distinguishes it from all other beings, sc. its comprehension of Being. "... The ontic excellence of There-being lies in the fact that it is ontological." \footnote{212} To interpret There-being as an entity like any other is to forget that its essence is existence.

To analyse this existence phenomenologically has been the task of SZ. Specifically, the laborious analysis of There-being as to-be-in-the-World exposed the nature of its transcendence. It is this transcendence, which (ontologically) precedes all ontic contact with beings, that renders the ontic encounter possible. Take, for example, one type of ontic encounter which traditionally is interpreted in the terms of a relation between subject and object, sc. knowledge (Erkennen). When we examine the ontological conditions of knowledge, we discover that they include a pre-cognitional intimacy of There-being with beings, a dwelling among them and dealing with them, out of which emerges the relationship of knowledge as a derivative and necessarily deficient mode.

... The process of knowing does not produce the initial "commerce" of the [knowing] subject with a World, nor does it arise out of the influence of the World upon a subject. This process is a mode of There-being that has its foundation in to-be-in-the-World. ... \footnote{213}

in transcendence.

\footnote{210}{SZ, pp. 46, 80-90, 174.}
\footnote{211}{SZ, pp. 203. See p. 42. Cf. WM, p. 14.}
\footnote{212}{"... Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, daß es ontologisch ist." (SZ, p. 12). Heidegger's italics.}
As to-be-in-the-World, There-being is not simply a mere entity, and for this reason, as long as we retain clearly in mind its double dimension, can not be conceived as a subject opposed to an object (v.g. the "World"). Nothing is closer to the center of Heidegger's intuition than this. He repeats it in SZ almost ad nauseam. The following is only a sample:

... [The "subjective" a priori of to-be-in-the-World] ... has nothing to do with a preliminary determination that is limited to a World-less subject.\textsuperscript{214}

... In-being is completely different from ... a simultaneous opposition of two entities, subject and object. ...\textsuperscript{218}

Anxiety, in disclosing There-being as a distinct individual, does not reveal it as an "... isolated subject-thing in the harmless void of a World-less occurrence, ..." but brings There-being ... before its World as World and thereby its self before its self as to-be-in-the-World.\textsuperscript{216}

... The anticipatory drive-towards - Being does not signify any such thing as an isolated tendency in a World-less "subject," but characterizes the to-be-in-the-World. ...\textsuperscript{217}

... The bracketing of the totality of [instrumental] references ... with that which is There-being's concern does not signify the welding together of one entity, a "World" of objects, with [another entity, sc.] a subject. ...\textsuperscript{218}

... One does not "presuppose" too much for the ontology of There-being but too little, if one "goes out" of a World-less ego in order to fashion for it an object and a relationship (without ontological foundation) to this object. ...\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{214} "... Das Apriori der Ausgerichtetheit auf rechts und links gründet jedoch im 'subjektiven' Apriori des In-der-Welt-seins, das mit einer vorgängig auf ein weltloses Subjekt beschränkten Bestimmtheit nichts zu tun hat." (SZ, p. 110).

\textsuperscript{216} "... Auch zeigte sich, daß das In-Sein alles andere als ein nur betrachtendes oder handelndes Gegenüberstehen, d.h. Zusammenvorhandensein eines Subjekts und eines Objekts. ..." (SZ, p. 176).

\textsuperscript{217} "... Dieser existenziale 'Solipsizismus' versetzt aber so wenig ein isoliertes Subjektding in die harmlose Leere eines weltlosen Vorkommens, daß er das Dasein gerade in einem extremen Sinne vor seine Welt als Welt und damit es selbst vor sich selbst als In-der-Welt-sein bringt." (SZ, p. 188).

\textsuperscript{219} "... Das Sich-vorweg-sein bedeutet nicht so etwas wie eine isolierte Tendenz in einem weltlosen 'Subjekt', sondern charakterisiert das In-der-Welt-sein. ..." (SZ, p. 192).

\textsuperscript{218} "... Die Verklammerung des Verweisungsganzen, der mannigfaltigen Bestüge des 'Um-zu', mit dem, worum es dem Dasein geht, bedeutet kein Zusammenschweißen einer vorhandenen 'Welt' von Objekten mit einem Subjekt. ..." (SZ, p. 194).

\textsuperscript{219} "... Nicht zu viel, sondern zu wenig wird für die Ontologie des Daseins 'vorausgesetzt', wenn man von einem weltlosen Ich 'ausgeht', um ihm dann ein Objekt und eine ontologisch grundlose Beziehung zu diesem zu verschaffen. ..." (SZ, p. 315-316). Heidegger's italics.
FROM THERE TO BEING

If disclosedness, then, is not the position of an object by a subject but the luminosity of transcendence, it will follow that the discovery of an instrument is not an imposition of a signification as if "... a merely entitative World-stuff were in this fashion 'subjectively colored'..." 220 For the same reason, the complex of relations which constitutes Total Meaningfulness is "... not a network of forms which is superimposed upon a matter by a subject that has no World..." 221

As a consequence, when the author says that the "sense" of a being is an existential characteristic of There-being, this, too, must not be interpreted subjectively. It is because of There-being's constitutive familiarity with Total Meaningfulness that There-being discovers the purposefulness of an inner-worldly being. The being which is thus discovered by the Being of There-being "... has come to be comprehended – we say, it has sense..." 222 What is comprehended, strictly speaking, is not the sense but the being itself as comprehensible. Sense is that which "... in the comprehending disclosure is capable of being articulated..." 223 by logos and therefore is the foundation for words and speech. But neither sense nor words nor speech is rooted in a being that is a mere subject. They are radicated in transcendence. Briefly: to say that truth is essentially relative to There-being is not to make it subjective but simply to affirm There-being’s transcendence.

If the human There-being is not a subject, may it legitimately be called a "self"? Certainly, provided that one understand that self and subject are not synonymous. The traditional concept of a subject characterizes not the selfhood of the ego as a self, but the identity and stability of a being that is always a mere entity. Who is it, after all, that really says "ego" in the human There-being? Is it not the entire phenomenon, existentiell and existential? "In saying 'I,' There-being expresses itself as to-be-

---

220 "... als würde zunächst ein an sich vorhandener Weltstoff in dieser Weise 'subjektiv' gefärbt..." (SZ, p. 71).
221 "Die Bedeutsamkeitsbezüge, welche die Struktur der Welt bestimmen, sind daher kein Netzwerk von Formen, das von einem weltlosen Subjekt einem Material übergestülpt wird..." (SZ, p. 366).
222 "... Wenn innerweltliches Seiendes mit dem Sein des Daseins entdeckt, d.h. zu Verständnis gekommen ist, sagen wir, es hat Sinn..." (SZ, p. 151). See pp. 87, 161.
in-the-World. . ."  224 In everydayness, however, There-being comprehends itself first of all and for the most part in terms of its ontic preoccupations, forgetting the ontological dimension. This is an inauthentic self. The self achieves authenticity by re-solve, sc. in There-being's free choice to accept itself as finite transcendence. The genuine sense of self, then, is not the stable identity of a subject but the unity of concern. 225 Taken in its totality, There-being is not a subject, but it is a self — a non-subjective, rather trans-subjective, or even pre-subjective self, sc. transcendence.

This self, however, even in the moment of its authenticity, always remains existentiell as well as existential. This is why we may legitimately speak of it as a "subject," provided we understand that this terminology is limited to the ontic level and does not include the ontological perspective which constitutes the genuine primacy of There-being. 226 But such a manner of speaking has nothing to do with subjectivism, if this term be understood to designate an interpretation that restricts itself to the purely ontic dimension of There-being as a subject.

"... If 'subject' be conceived ontologically as existing There-being, whose Being is grounded in temporality, . . ." then the term "subjective" has the same sense as "transcendent" and, in this sense, the World, too, is "subjective." "... But then this 'subjective' World, insofar as it is temporal-transcendent, is more 'objective' than any possible 'object'." 227

Transcendence, then, is more subjective than any subject and more objective than any object. There-being is not a subject in relation to an object but it is this relation itself, sc. that which is "between" subject and object. This "between" is not derived from, and therefore subsequent to, the juxtaposition of subject and object, but is prior to the emergence of this relation, rendering it possible. The problem of transcendence, consequently, is not to explain how a subject goes out of itself in

225 SZ, pp. 321–323.
226 V.g. SZ, pp. 310, 311, 227, 229, 382.
227 "Wenn das 'Subjekt' ontologisch als existierendes Dasein begriffen wird, dessen Sein in der Zeitlichkeit gründet, dann muß gesagt werden: Welt ist 'subjektiv'. Diese 'subjektive' Welt aber ist dann als zeitlich-transzendent 'objektiver' als jedes mögliche 'Objekt!'" (SZ, p. 366).
order to establish contact with an object, where object, understood as the totality of objects, is identified with the world, but how it comes-to-pass that There-being as to-be-in-the-World encounters other beings and then, once having discovered them, constitutes them as objects.\textsuperscript{228}

One consequence of the pre-subjective character of There-being as to-be-in-the-World is worthy of special note: the “critical” (erkenntnistheoretische) problem, so gravely posed by the Neo-Kantians, dissolves. By critical problem we understand the following: how does a knowing subject in the process of knowledge get out of its own interiority in order to establish contact with an object (or the “World”) exterior to itself and held to be real? According to the solution of the problem, philosophical systems have been classified as “realist” or “idealist.” If the problem dissolves, then the complete apparatus of the realism-idealism dichotomy disappears.\textsuperscript{229}

The entire problem, however, supposes that the knowing subject is merely an entity enclosed within itself that must go outside of itself in order to encounter another entity, or the totality of entities (the “real World”), in an act of knowledge. What, after all, is “reality” but the Being of inner-worldly beings (res) conceived as mere entities? But this passage from “inside” to “outside” is precisely what transcendence denies. There-being is always “outside” in intimate contact with beings because it is to-be-in-the-World. At the same time, this “outside” as to-be-in-the-World constitutes the “inside” of There-being, for such is the nature of the self. To pose the question about a passage from an “inside” to an “outside” is to have failed to comprehend the first datum of the existential analysis: There-being is to-be-in-the-World.

The question whether or not there is a World at all, and whether or not its Being can be proven, is for a There-being that poses it as a to-be-in-the-World – and who else poses it? – without sense. \textsuperscript{230}

\textsuperscript{228} SZ, pp. 132, 366. Heidegger discusses frequently the emergence of the subject-object relation out of original transcendence, but we are forced to omit detailed discussion. See pp. 59–62, 148–160, 223–225. For the existential structure of the scientific attitude, see pp. 355–364.

\textsuperscript{229} SZ, pp. 202–208.

The "scandal" of philosophy, which for Kant was the fact that no compelling proof for the "existence of things outside us" had hitherto been proposed, is for Heidegger the fact that such a proof is expected and sought.

Neither realist nor idealist, There-being, as existence, is characterized by theses that are proper to both these tendencies. With realism, the existential analysis affirms the "reality" of inner-worldly beings other than There-being; with idealism, the principle that Being cannot be explained by beings but only through what idealism calls consciousness but which Heidegger calls the comprehension of Being. The existential analysis, however, allies itself with neither tendency. It differs from realism insofar as it denies the necessity and possibility of proving the reality of the "World." It differs from idealism insofar as this fails to pose the question about the Being of consciousness itself.

Résumé

We have made our laborious way through SZ. Let us climb upon high ground and see how far we have come. We propose to trace the development of the notion of foundational thought. How much of this concept have we seen so far? Very little indeed. The term "to think" occurs but rarely in SZ and then only in a classical sense that does not call attention to itself. Yet all that we have seen has not been waste. Piecing it together in retrospect, we may state the matter thus:

Heidegger's purpose is to lay the groundwork for metaphysics by seeking to discern that ontological structure of man which is the source of his natural tendency to metaphysicize. Since metaphysics deals with Being structures and the metaphysician is intrinsically finite, the problem becomes an effort to explain the relation between Being and finitude. Solution: the comprehension of Being as such is intrinsically finite. The function of SZ is to discern phenomenologically this finite comprehension of Being and reveal its ultimate sense. This finite comprehension is the transcendence of beings to Being, not an entity enclosed

231 SZ, p. 207.
within itself but essentially an open-ness towards Being which is a process that comes-to-pass. Phenomenologically speaking, this process of transcendence is to-be-in-the-World, where -World is the horizon, projected by There-being, within which There-being "dwells" and encounters other beings, and to-be-in means the point, or moment, when this World becomes luminous, insofar as There-being, in virtue of existence (comprehension), renders manifest the Being of beings. So intimate is this correlation between the World (Being) and the There-being, which is its illumination, that only insofar as There-being is "is there" Being.

This luminosity of the World is constituted by a finite component of positivity (comprehension), which discloses There-being precisely as transcendence, and a component of negativity (disposition), which discloses this transcendence precisely as finite. Both are rendered capable of coming to expression by a third component, logos. Considered in its unity, the coming-to-pass of the luminosity of the World is concern; considered in its totality, it is concern-unto-end, sc. immanently ending, therefore intrinsically and insuperably finite. If There-being is "first of all and for the most part" lost amid its ontic preoccupations and forgetful of its prerogative of luminosity, this is but another mark of its finitude. One function of logos is to remind There-being of what it is and thus call it to the re-collection of its self. When There-being chooses to hearken to this voiceless admonition in the phenomenon of re-solve, it becomes transparent to its self in its situation and thus achieves its authenticity as the finite luminosity of the World. The coming-to-pass of luminosity (transcendence) is grounded in the fact that There-being continually comes (future) to the self that already is (past) and thus renders present (present) beings in their Being. What renders transcendence possible, then, is time; the process itself, because temporal, is historical. There-being's achievement of the authentic self will include an effort to render manifest (i.e. luminous) its past by the re-trieve of potentialities for Being that already have been exploited.

This coming-to-pass of luminosity is also the process of truth. Re-solve, as the achievement of authenticity, is the eminent mode of truth, though conditioned, of course, by the finitude and historicity of the process itself. And this finite, historical
attend-ing to logos by which truth is achieved in its most emi-

nent form remains a being that is not a subject which must

transcend itself toward "World"-as-object, but which is a non-

subjective, trans-subjective, pre-subjective self.

What then of foundational thought? All that we can say

about it now is what we infer from watching Heidegger at work.

He makes a phenomenological analysis of There-being. To be

sure, it is a phenomenology of a special sort, for in discerning the

sense of There-being, There-being itself is engaged. Hence, if we

consider in all its purity this hermeneutic interpretation by

There-being of its self, we may say that phenomenology comes
to its fullness when There-being achieves its authenticity. The

phenomenology of SZ, then, culminates in the moment of re-
solve. This does not tell us very much, one will say, but for the
present we cannot go any farther.
CHAPTER II

KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS

If the closing section of KM is the best propaedeutic to SZ, the rest of the book is the most authoritative interpretation of the major work. We wish now to examine it as such, and for several reasons. To begin with, since the author sees his own effort as merely a re-trieve of Kant's fundamental problematic, sc. the grounding of metaphysics, we find in KM the basic conception of There-being, which was elaborated phenomenologically in SZ, articulated in the more familiar context of Kant's thought according to a language that is more classical and (for most of us) more intelligible. This permits us not only to understand better what Heidegger is trying to say but also to see how we might incorporate his intuitions into other more traditional forms. We feel that this in itself justifies the length of the résumé, which hitherto has not appeared in English.

A second reason for the extensive treatment of KM lies in the fact that it is the classic type of what Heidegger I (1929) calls "re-trieve" and what Heidegger II (1950) calls "dialogue," one of the principal modes of foundational thought. Conceived and executed by Heidegger in the height of his powers, the interpretation lets us see his method in sharpest focus and find in it at the same time both its weakness and its strength. Unless we watch him go through the process at least once, we might be tempted to think that the "rigor" (Strenge) of which he will speak later is either platitude or sham. "Yes, yes, of course,"

one might very well say, "but what does it mean in the concrete?"

This is what it means in the concrete:

I. Kant and Finite Transcendence

Kant’s attempt to lay the foundation for metaphysics became, as we have seen, an effort to determine the nature of the ontological synthesis of the human mind, sc. that pre-ontic comprehension of Being-structure which renders it possible for a finite reason to know the beings of experience. As a type of knowledge, the ontological synthesis is primarily an intuition (Anschauung) – this characterizes all knowledge, even the divine – where intuition is understood to mean the immediate presentation of the individual being itself that is to be known. Yet in the case of the human mind, intuition alone does not suffice for an act of knowledge. A being is properly said to be known only when the knower can make it intelligible (in what it is and how it is) to himself and others. Hence, it must be determined to be such and such. This process of determining (Bestimmen) the intuitively presented being is itself a presenting of this being in what it is “in general” – not in the sense that its universal character as such becomes thematic, but simply in the sense that, with the universal character in view, the knower adverts to the individual and determines it accordingly. This universalizing representation, which comes to the service of the singular intuition, is more presentative than the latter, in the sense that it seize several individuals at once, and in virtue of this seizure is a concept that “avails for many.” Kant calls this universalized presentation “presenting in concepts,” so that it becomes a “presentation [concept] of a presentation [intuition].” This presentative determination of the being-to-be-known is a judgement, and it is brought-to-pass by that power of judging which Kant calls the “understanding” (Verstand). The process of universalizing presentation is what Kant understands by “thought” (Denken).
The process of human knowledge, then, involves the intimate correlation of (singular) intuition and (universalizing) thought. But it is of cardinal importance to realize (and Heidegger insists upon it) that the primacy in the process of knowing belongs to intuition: thought plays a subordinate rôle – it is a means to intuition. Profoundly diverse (as singular is diverse from universal), intuition and thought must nevertheless share a common bond which renders their correlation possible. This common denominator is the fact that both are a presentation (Vorstellung). A presentation, however, at least as it is understood here, is more than simply an act which indicates or announces another being. In this case, the act is accompanied by the consciousness of the knower, hence the knower is aware of the presented being as presented, with the result that the presentation of which there is question here is "... the self-orientation [of the knower] toward a being that is proposed to him in the act itself of presentation. ..." The act of knowing, then, composed as it is of two forms of presentation (intuition and thought) is itself a presentation of the being-to-be-known, and the purpose of Heidegger’s research is to determine what conditions render possible the correlation (synthesis) of the two types of presentation in man (intuition and thought) in the unified process of presentation called “knowledge.”

But we have not yet all the data of the problem. The task is to explain the act of human knowledge not merely as knowledge, but as human, sc. finite. In what does the finitude of human knowledge consist? Stated negatively, this means that the knower does not create the object known. More positively, let us consider the finitude of the two principal components of knowledge. Intuition as finite is referred to its object as already

---

6 KM, pp. 29-30. How best translate Vorstellung? The German would admit either “presentation” or “representation.” Neither one satisfies all contexts. Kant himself suggests “representation” (KRV, A 320, B 376), but this risks being interpreted as signum quod, and this is certainly not his intention. Besides, ”presentation” is less incongruous with regard to the knowledge of an infinite Knower. We incline toward the latter and will use the former only where the context favors it, writing it (re)presentation. Later (1942-43), Heidegger suggests the nuance: re-presentation connotes presentation (by the subject) to the subject (HW, p. 121).

6 "... Wird nun gar im Vorstellen von etwas durch etwas nicht nur das Vorstellen, sondern das in diesem Vorstellen Vorgestellte als ein solches vorgestellt, d.h. 'bewusst', dann ist solches Vorstellen ein Sichbeziehen auf das, was im Vorstellen als solchem sich darstellt..." (KM, p. 29). Henceforth we translate sichbeziehen auf as “orientation,” understanding always “self-orientation.”
existing prior to the act of intuition. It must be affected by the object; it must permit the object to give itself to the intuition knowner. "... The characteristic of the finitude of intuition lies consequently in its receptivity. ..." It will follow that the human knower must be equipped with those instruments that render it possible for him to be affected by the objects-to-be-known, sc. the senses. Hence, it is not true to say that human intuition is finite because it takes place through a structure of sensation, but rather that it has a structure of sensation because it is finite. "... The essence of sensate-ness consists in the finitude of intuition. ..."

But if the intuition-constituent of knowledge is finite, the thought-constituent is even more so. In the first place, thought (universalizing judgements) attains its object only through the mediation of intuition to which it is itself subordinate, if the process of knowledge is considered as a whole. Furthermore, the representation that takes place in thought implies a certain detour, sc. a view toward that universal character by reason of which several individuals may be presented by a concept. The need to universalize (Diskursivität) pertains to the very essence of the understanding and is the surest sign of its finitude. At the same time, one must concede that this universalizing character of the understanding is marked by a productive power that the purely receptive intuition cannot claim. Not, of course, that the universalizing judgement creates the universality of its object: the content of universality is fashioned out of the data of in-
tuition. What is produced by the understanding is the manner in which this content is rendered a unity that is valid for more than one individual. Such is the manner of representation that is proper to thought and the characteristic way in which it contributes to the total process of knowledge. This productive power of the understanding has been designated, though not perhaps very happily, by the term "spontaneity." 10

Human knowledge, then, is composed simultaneously of both singular intuition and generalizing thought, and in both these components, still more in their synthesis, is profoundly finite. Heidegger now approaches the problem of finitude from an entirely different (though not unrelated) point of view: not, as heretofore, under the aspect of the structure of the knowing process, but under the aspect of that which can be known.

What can a finite knower know? If it be granted that a fundamental consequence of finitude is the receptive character of intuition, then the finite knower can know only a being that reveals itself as a being-that-appears (Erscheinendes). 11 It is that which we commonly call the "object" (Gegenstand) of human knowledge, sc. that being which stands over and opposed to the knower, toward which the knower is ordered, and which the knower, in undergoing its influence, permits to reveal itself and thus appear. This is what the finite knower knows, then: beings-as-they-appear, sc. beings-that-are-opposed-to-him (objects). 12

The important point here, however, is that all this pertains only to finite knowledge. Neither the term "being-as-it-appears" nor "object" has any meaning if the knower is non-finite (infinite).
nate). For both imply an opposition, a distance between knower and known which the notion of infinity excludes. The intuition of the infinite knower, then, does not receive the self-revelation of the being-to-be-known that thereby stands in opposition to this knower, but rather this infinite intuition itself gives rise to the being-to-be-known, lets it come into being, creates it. The being-that-is-known, then, is manifest to the infinite knower as such and in itself (an sich), not as opposed to this knower but as taking-its-origin in Him (Entstand).\textsuperscript{13}

It is in such a perspective as this that the author interprets the famous distinction between “the thing in itself” (Ding an sich) and its “appearance” (Erscheinung).

... The double characteristic of a being as a “thing in itself” and as “appearance” corresponds to the two-fold manner in which this being can stand in relationship to infinite and finite knowledge: the being as taking its origin and the same being as an object.\textsuperscript{14}

One and the same being! “... The thing-in-itself is not another object but another [kind of] relationship (respectus) of a presentation to one and the same object.”\textsuperscript{15} If, then, Kant speaks of the “thing-in-itself” as “behind the appearance,” the sense is this: finite knowledge not only permits the object to manifest itself, but simultaneously and necessarily (because finite) conceals it, too, and this so profoundly, that the “thing-in-itself” is not only seized imperfectly but as such is essentially inaccessible. What is “behind the appearance,” then, is the same being as the being-as-it-appears. But because the being-as-it-appears presents itself only as an object, “... it fundamentally does not permit itself, the same being, to be seen as taking-its-origin. ...”\textsuperscript{16}

Again, to say that the human knower can know only a “mere appearance” is not in any way to impugn the actuality of the being in question but simply to deny with insistence that a

\textsuperscript{13} KM, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{14} “... Die doppelte Charakteristik des Seienden als ‘Ding an sich’ und als ‘Erscheinung’ entspricht der zweifachen Art, gemäß der es zum unendlichen und endlichen Erkennen in Beziehung stehen kann: das Seiende im Entstand und dasselbe Seiende als Gegenstand.” (KM, p. 37).

\textsuperscript{15} “... Das Ding an sich ist nicht ein anderes Objekt, sondern eine andere Beziehung (respectus) der Vorstellung auf dasselbe Objekt.” (Kants Opus postumum, dargestellt und beurteilt v. E. Adickes. 1920. S. 653 (c 551), cited with Heidegger’s italics, KM, p. 37).

\textsuperscript{16} “... Aber weil [die Erscheinung] das Seiende nur im Gegenstand gibt, läßt sie es, dasselbe, grundsätzlich nicht als Ent-stand sehen...” (KM, p. 38).
being grasped by a finite knower can ever be known in an infinite way. In this same perspective, we can understand the double sense in which a being-to-be-known is said to be “outside” of us: as being-in-itself, it is outside of us insofar as that which can be known only by an infinite Knower is as such inaccessible to a finite knower; in the sense of being-as-it-appears, it is outside of us in the same sense that the being-to-be-known is not the finite knower himself, although the knower has an access to this being. It is indeed this access of a finite knower to the objects of his knowledge, or rather the conditions that render this access possible, which are the theme of our (sc. both Heidegger’s and Kant’s) research.

Perhaps all this will seem an excess of detail, but it serves a purpose. This will appear, if we be permitted to interrupt the analysis to make two remarks. The first concerns the general sense of the problem. Springing out of the radical finitude of the knower, the problem supposes that the beings which are known are not and cannot be the result of his own creative activity. “... Our There-being is a finite one – existing already in the midst of beings and ordered to them. ...”\(^{17}\) Whatever must be said about the constructive character of ontological knowledge, it is never creative of the beings-to-be-known themselves. “... Our knowing is not ontically creative, it cannot of its own power produce the being that lies before it. ...”\(^{18}\) The whole problem is the accessibility of these beings to a knower in his finitude. If beings-as-they-appear and beings-as-opposed (objects) mean fundamentally the same thing, the reason is that they are variant formulae for: beings-other-than-and-accessible-to-the-finite-knower. That structure in the knower which renders it possible for these beings other than himself to be accessible (to reveal themselves) to him will simultaneously render it possible for the beings to appear, and, indeed, as objects. It will let them take up their stand as opposed to the knower, hence it will objectivate them (Gegenstehenlassen); indeed, it will constitute that which makes them to be objects, their objectiveness (Gegen-
ständlichkeit). But it will not create them. If the actual access of knower-to-known be called “experience” (Erfahrung), then we can see a preliminary sense that may be given the famous formula: “... that which renders possible experience as such is simultaneously that which renders possible the objects of experience, ...” 19 sc. what renders access to beings possible (therefore accessibility) is that which renders it possible for these beings to reveal themselves as objects. But such a formula takes us far beyond our present depth. Indeed, it expresses “the most inwardly unified structure of transcendence. ...” 20

The second remark concerns transcendence: “... that which makes a being in itself accessible to a finite [knower]. ...” 21 The problem of accessibility, then, is the problem of transcendence. The term as such is not Kantian but finds its justification in Kant’s use of “transcendental”: “... I call that knowledge transcendental which concerns itself in general not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects, insofar as this must be a priori possible. ...” 22 Transcendence here, then, is not simply the passage of knower (subject) to known (object), as if it were simply an ontic comportment between two beings, but that structure of the knower by reason of which such a comportment is possible. Transcendence and ontological knowledge are identical: “... ontological knowledge is nothing else but the original institution of transcendence. ...” 23 Consequently, to approach the problem of ontological knowledge through the pure synthesis (of pure intuition and pure thought)

19 “... die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung,...” (KRV, A 158, B 197). Kant’s italics. See KM, p. 111.
20 “... der Ausdruck der ursprünglichsten phänomenologischen Erkenntnis der innersten einheitlichen Struktur der Transzendenz....” (KM, pp. 111-112).
21 “... Transzendenz macht einem endlichen Wesen das Seiende an ihm selbst zugänglich....” (KM, p. 111).
22 “... Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, insofern diese a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt beschäftigt....” (KRV, B 25). Kant’s italics. See KM, p. 14. Kant also uses the term transzendent (vs. immanent), usually in a pejorative way to designate a type of knowledge (Begriffe und Grundsätze) that would pass beyond experience to something incapable of being experienced (Unerfahrbares), therefore to something completely supra-sensible, v.g. God. It is impossible to the pure reason, not however to the practical reason. See R. Eisler, Kant Lexikon (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1930), p. 157.
23 “... Wenn aber die ontologische Erkenntnis nichts anderes ist als die ursprüngliche Bildung der Transzendenz,...” (KM, p. 107).
is to face the problem of transcendence, sc. the rendering accessible to the knower of beings-to-be-known. And vice versa, the problem of accessibility cannot be solved without explaining the pure synthesis. To solve one of the problems is to solve both. Both may be reduced to a single one: the nature of what SZ called the pre-ontic comprehension of Being.\textsuperscript{24}

Before following Heidegger through Kant’s solution of the problem, let us see here in closer detail what the problem implies. For a clear, concise statement of it, one would be hard pressed to improve on the author’s own formulation:

A finite knowing essence can enter into comportment with a being other than itself which it has not created, only when this already existing being is in itself such that it can come to the encounter. However, in order that such a being as it is can come to an encounter [with a knower], it must be “known” already by an antecedent knowledge simply as a being, sc. with regard to its Being-structure. . . . A finite [knower] needs [a] fundamental power of orientation which permits this being to stand over in opposition to it. In this original orientation, the finite [knower] extends before himself an open domain within which something can “correspond” to him. To dwell from the beginning in such a domain, to institute it in its origin, is nothing else than the transcendence which characterizes all finite comportment with beings. . . .\textsuperscript{25}

Transcendence, then, is fundamentally the construction in its very origins by the finite knower of an open domain within which other beings can be encountered. At other times, it is called a “horizon of objectiveness,” or of “objects,” sc. within which beings may reveal themselves as objects, which must be from the very beginning open.\textsuperscript{26}

But a horizon of objectiveness as such implies that this ante-

\textsuperscript{24} KM, pp. 24, 128. See p. 70.


\textsuperscript{26} V.g. KM, pp. 82 (Horizont von Gegenständlichkeit), 128 (. . . der Gegenstände), 110 (im vorhinein offen).
cedently open domain within which knower and known meet, for all that it is constituted by the knower, is marked by a certain character of other-ness, as if it were an area of opposed-ness (Dawider) which offers itself to the knower. As such it is somehow or other discernible, offering the knower an a priori view of itself in its total unity. Transcendence is "... not only the relation of going-toward ... but the correlative relation of returning to . . ., and this constitutes opposed-ness . . ." 27 If we are to explain transcendence, then, we must account not only for its active character (spontaneity) by which the horizon is pro-posed by the knower, but also for its passive character, by reason of which the horizon is op-posed, thus rendering it possible for beings to reveal themselves as op-posed, sc. as objects. If spontaneity is what characterizes pure thought and receptivity pure intuition, then we have some intimation, even before we enter into the analysis proper, of how transcendence as the pure horizon will be structured somehow by the pure synthesis of both which is ontological knowledge.

It is worth noting, too, that the structure of transcendence in KM is never considered a being enclosed within itself and already achieved, but always an occurrence-that-takes-place, a process that is being instituted, built or constructed (bilden), indeed that institutes itself. It is essentially a coming-to-pass (Geschehen). 28 Finally, let us insist again that the entire problem of transcendence arises simply because of the finitude of the knower. Transcendence is essentially finite - indeed "... transcendence is ... finitude itself. . . ." 29

We take this much to be clear: finite knowledge is composed of receptive intuition and universalizing (spontaneous) thought - both indispensable but with intuition enjoying a certain primacy. What will interest us most is not this duality in the knowing process but its unity, sc. these elements are so intimately correlated that the correlation cannot be explained by a mere succession of thought to intuition or a juxtaposition of

27 "... das Gegenstehenlassen von solchem, was nicht nur eine Relation des Hin- zu-auf ..., sondern eine Korrelation des Zurück-zu-in ... ist und so das Dawider bildet . . ." (KM, p. 175). See pp. 72, 76 (Dawider), 86 (Angebotcharakter), 121 (Anblick).
28 V. g. KM, pp. 70 (bilden), 86 (Sich-bilden in seinem innersten Geschehen).
29 "... Nun ist aber die Transzendenz gleichsam die Endlichkeit selbst . . ." (KM, p. 87).
the two powers in man that account for them, sc. sensate-ness and understanding. What explains this correlation ("synthesis") must give rise to these two elements in their interdependence. So it is that Heidegger calls sensate-ness (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand) two "stems" springing from a common root. Our problem, then: what is the nature of this common root?

A. ONTOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: THE COMPONENTS

I. Pure Intuition

By intuition is meant the immediate encounter with a singular. This encounter is, on the part of the knower, a presentation. As pure, the presentation is prior to all experience, hence it is the permitting-of-the-encounter that antecedes (ontologically) actual contact. The two types of pure intuition for Kant are, of course, space and time. As finite, each of these is receptive. In order to receive that which it intuits prior to any contact with the beings-to-be-known, the pure intuition must give that which is intuited to itself. It is because the pure intuition gives to itself that which it intuits, hence intuitively receives, that the pure intuition can be both receptive and pure. Through this function of donation to self there is fashioned by the pure intuition a view (Anblick) of either space or time. This view is received by the intuition itself, but the reception is the very thing that constitutes the donation. Hence the pure intuition is an affecting of itself, sc. self-affection. Heidegger states the matter clearly with regard to time:

Time is pure intuition only insofar as of its own accord it constructs in advance the view of a succession and proposes this view as such to itself as that which it constitutes [yet] receives. This pure intuiting is engaged in Schema...
with the intuited which it constitutes, and, indeed, without the help of experience. Time in its very essence is the pure affection of itself. . . .

This donation-to-self of a pure view may be called "creative," if one will, but the word is poorly chosen. Kant uses the word "original" and Heidegger accepts it, interpreting it in the radical sense of "letting-spring-forth." Each of the pure intuitions is original, then, because it lets-spring-forth a view. Now this view that pure intuition fashions for itself is profoundly unified. It is in its own way a whole, yet not an empty one. Its parts are always but constrictions of itself, sc. the whole is completely in all its parts. The intuition which discerns the view (in fashioning it) is consequently itself unifying. It is for this reason that Kant speaks very justly of pure intuition as "synopsis." More precisely, however, how are we to characterize this unifying unity, intuited in the pre-experiential intuiting, which the two pure intuitions, space and time, give to themselves? Certainly it is not a being (object), for this is presented only in the complete act of knowledge, of which the pure intuitions are only a part. On the other hand, it is not purely nothing, even if these intuitions be called "forms by which to intuit." Something, then, is intuited, which is not, however, an object. Heidegger's explanation: what is intuited is the intuiting itself.

Before we move on, we should note that between the two types of pure intuition, time enjoys a distinct priority over space; for in all presentations the act of presenting is always a modifi-
cation of the interior sense, which takes its place in the succession of moments we call "time." Because of this greater universality, time must be more fundamental to ontological knowledge than space. That is why the author, in his analysis of pure intuition, feels justified in restricting himself almost entirely to the intuition, time.

2. **Pure Thought**

What constitutes thought in its purity? We have seen already that thought determines an intuited individual with reference to a characteristic which avails for many. More precisely, what is the nature of this universalizing process? Fundamentally, this process is the antecedent discerning by the understanding of the unity which more than one individual possesses in common and as it is possessed in common. This fundamental act of universalization Kant calls "reflection" (implying not only a comparison of the several individuals with the unity discerned but a disregarding of the differences that they bear to this unity). The result is a concept (Begriff), which, then, is always universal.

As to the content of such concepts, there is no problem when the concept is empirical, for then it would be derived from the intuition of beings-as-they-appear. But we are concerned with non-empirical (pure) concepts, which Kant calls "notions." In this case, deprived of all empirical content (since prior to experience), the concept is simply a function of unification. But in order that a function of the understanding have the power to unify, the process of reflection, by which this function is constituted, must itself be an antecedent presentation of that unity which guides the concept in its task of unification. The content of the pure concepts, then, is these unities antecedently presented in the essential structure of the understanding itself, which render all further unifying functions possible. They are not, then, the result of reflection but enter into its very constitution and are called "concepts which reflect." [39] These unifying functions of the understanding are also called by Kant "rules" (Regel). Insofar as they are pure, the rules themselves constitute (and, indeed, antecedently) that which is ordered by these rules.

Yet such rules are not presented as if they were beings in themselves which are consciously grasped, but rather, combining functions that they are, they are presented as combining, sc. in their combinative character as such. The total complexity of these unities (rules, notions) forms that system of predicates which permit the knower to know (judge) the Being of beings (therefore "ontological" predicates), designated in the tradition as the "categories." 40

What we have just said about pure thought has focused chiefly on the pure concepts as concepts. Now a word about the understanding, sc. the power in which they are found. These unifying functions, or categories, belong to the very structure of the understanding. Indeed, if it is the very essence of the understanding to seize the being-to-be-known in conceptual fashion, then the categories, as the systematic complex of pure concepts, must constitute the structure of the understanding in its pure state. The understanding, then, is a closed totality that contains within itself a manifold of ways (the categories) by which the data presented to it may be unified. If we consider the pure concepts as rules, then we may say that the understanding is the "power of rules," sc. the power "... to pro-pose to itself by antecedent presentation those unities which control every possible type of presentative unification...." 41

That the understanding with its manifold functions is itself a unified whole will be more apparent if we consider for a moment the rôle of consciousness in thought. We are concerned with the processes of knowledge, or rather with the conditions required for these processes. Now every act of knowledge is, as such, conscious. Restricting ourselves for the moment to a consideration of the thought-component of that knowledge, we may say that if the pure concept as such is the consciousness of a unity,42 then since every conscious act supposes someone who is conscious, every pure concept implies a consciousness of self (Selbstbewußtsein). As a result, the presentation of the unities (categories) in pure thought has necessarily the character of an

41 "Vermögen der Regeln" heißt aber: im vorhinein vorstellend sich die Einheiten vorhalten, die aller möglichen vorstellenden Einigung die Führung geben...." (KM, p. 137). See pp. 55-56, 73.
42 KM, p. 74.
"I think." Furthermore, this consciousness, which is aware simultaneously of itself and of the unifying functions (categories) of pure thought, is capable, even when these rules are not actually exercising their function, of becoming aware of them as functioning. Consciousness is not simply an act, then, but a power in the knower that is "transcendental apperception." 43

...The pure understanding in its original pro-positing of unity operates as transcendental apperception." 43

Heidegger presupposes that Kant's notion of transcendental apperception is known to his reader. For the sake of clarity, however, and in the interest of the analysis to follow, we resume the essentials of the Kantian doctrine. By apperception, Kant understands consciousness. As empirical, it is that awareness which accompanies each individual act of the knower and is as transitory as these acts themselves. Transcendental apperception, however, is that pure (pre-experiential), constantly identical awareness of self that, as an abiding "I think," accompanies and conditions all presentations and all concepts, for it is this that discloses them to be mine. Its principal characteristic is its stable unity, its one-and-the-same-ness (stehende und bleibende), which is designated therefore the "transcendental unity of apperception." 44 Without it, knowledge would be impossible, for there would be no common center to which all of the data that compose experience can be referred and by which they can be synthetized into the organized presentation which an act of knowledge implies. Apperception, then, in its unity is itself a power of the knower which in its synthesizing function is a condition of the possibility of knowledge itself. From the viewpoint of the object, the transcendental unity may be called "objective" in the sense that, by reason of it, all the manifold that is offered by intuition is unified into a concept of the object. 45 From the viewpoint of the knower, if the understanding is the power of constructing concepts, then the unity of transcendental apperception, in supplying the ultimate unification in consciousness of the multiple unifying functions (pure concepts, notions, categories, rules) of the understanding, is "the pure synthesis of the


44 KRV, B 132, 139.

45 KRV, B 139.
understanding," the ground of possibility of the categories.\textsuperscript{46} This transcendental unity of consciousness as self-consciousness is the awareness of an ultimate thinking unity, sc. an ego, which, because it is a condition of the possibility of knowledge, should be called transcendental.

3. \textit{Necessity of Pure Synthesis}

We have seen the components of knowledge in their pre-experiential state. But our problem is neither pure intuition, nor pure thought, nor their concomitant duality as such. Our task, in discovering the nature of finite ontological knowledge which grounds metaphysics, is to understand their correlation. For one of the indices of the finitude of all knowledge is the interdependence of these two elements, and this interdependence betokens some sort of union between them. To explain knowledge we must analyse this unity. If the knowledge under investigation is ontological, the unity in question is a unity of pure intuition and pure thought, hence itself a pure (\textit{a priori}) union, sc. "synthesis." This presentation which we call the "pure synthesis" is not simply a brute coupling of intuition and thought but a rich totality, which simultaneously as intuition and as thought achieves the harmonious cooperation between the two. This totality is a structural unity that discloses itself only in the obscure complexity of its functioning. If we are to understand it, we must analyse it in this functioning and thus discover the synthesis in the source that gives rise to it. The source which gives rise to this synthesis for Kant is the imagination (\textit{Einbildungskraft}), which, insofar as it is considered prior to all experience (pure), is designated as "transcendental."\textsuperscript{47} Our task now is to examine it in detail.

\textbf{B. ONTOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: THE SYNTHESIS}

1. \textit{Meaning of the Transcendental Imagination}

The decisive factor in Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation is his

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{KRV}, B 139-140.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{KM}, pp. 63-64, 70.
analysis of the transcendental imagination. The acceptance or rejection of his reading depends on this, and this alone. It is capital, however, to note that this interpretation is based on the first edition of KRV (1781), not on the second (1787), for reasons that will appear subsequently.48

What the term "transcendental imagination" means may be understood best, perhaps, if we examine separately what is suggested by the various ingredients of the term in its German form: transzendentale Einbildungskraft. Firstly, it is a power (Kraft) within the knower (not simply an act), and an indispensable one. It is that by which the knower is capable of, therefore "can" achieve, the pure synthesis. If we recall that this synthesis takes place in man, then we can understand why Kant calls it a "power of the soul," provided we take "soul" in the broad, anthropological sense as roughly equivalent to man in the supra-material dimension, and do not restrict this imagination to a "faculty" of the soul in the conventional meaning of that term, an interpretation that Heidegger in Kant's name expressly rejects.49 As a matter of fact, we can notice in this distinction how Heidegger reserves for the transcendental imagination from the very beginning a dignity all its own, which, when once precised, will enable us to determine "... in what sense 'soul' and 'spirit' may be used, and to what extent these concepts correspond in an original way to the ontologico-metaphysical essence of man. ..." 50 Not a faculty, then, this power which is the transcendental imagination in man is all the more basic for that. Since it renders possible the synthesis of pure intuition and pure thought, it is a founding-, or a "grounding-power," of ontological knowledge, sc. of transcendence. Hence Kant remarks: "We have, therefore, a pure imagination as a grounding-power of the human soul, which lies as the ground for all a priori knowledge. ..." 51

48 KM, pp. 146-156. Heidegger indicates that it was the second edition that chiefly influenced the German idealists (KM, p. 179). Whether or not this was true for all the idealists is not important. What is important is to note that any comparison between Heidegger and the idealists (Hegel in particular) must take full cognizance of the perspectives suggested here.

49 KM, pp. 124 (Vermögen), 128 (Seelenvermögen), 128 (Grundkraft).


51 "Wir haben also eine reine Einbildungskraft, als ein Grundvermögen der menschlichen Seele, das aller Erkenntnis a priori zum Grunde liegt...." (KRV, A 124).
If we ask how this grounding-power functions, we turn the focus from the suffix -kraft to the stem -bildung-, derived from bilden, itself the verbalization of das Bild ("image," "figure," "picture," "portrait," "effigy," "idea," "representation," "illustration," etc.). Bilden, then, will be that act or process by which any of these types of Bild is wrought in a being, hence it means to "form," "fashion," "shape," "compose," "organize," "improve," "cultivate," "train," "discipline," etc. The French translators reduce these variants to three basic senses: "to construct," "to give a form," "to create an image"—remarking very justly that Heidegger plays continually on these three different meanings. Common to all three of these senses is the notion of "setting up," or "establishing," which is the authentic sense of "to institute." Let us translate Bildung as "institution," intending this to mean "construct," "form" or "give an image," according to context.

The transcendental imagination, then, is a grounding-power in the sense of a power to institute. Functioning as the structural unity between pure intuition and pure thought, the transcendental imagination fits both of them together, institutes a center (die bildende Mitte) where both these components meet, serving as their common root, or, by another metaphor, as the common source which permits them to spring forth. Furthermore, since the unifying (synthetizing) function of the transcendental imagination is its unique task, then in instituting the structural unity between intuition and thought, the transcendental imagination also institutes itself. This is simply another way of saying that the transcendental imagination is not an accomplished fact but a process that takes place, a coming-to-pass that is continual.

The pure imagination, then, is a basic, grounding-power, a power to institute. More precisely, what is instituted? Heidegger's answer is clear and unequivocal: transcendence! Hence, for him, the name "transcendental." ... Insofar as it institutes

52 M. Heidegger, Kant et le problème de la métaphysique, intr. et trad. par A. De Waelhens et W. Biemel (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), p. 148, note 2. We choose "institution" in preference to "constitution," because the latter, for phenomenology, connotes rather intelligence than imagination.

53 KM, pp. 98 (Fügung), 127-146 (Wurzel), 129 (Entspringenlassen), 86 (Sich-bilden der Transzendenz).
transcendence, it is justly called the transcendental imagination." This appears all the more clearly, if we reflect on what is meant by the "pure synthesis," sc. the placing-together (syn-thesis) into an organic unity of the syn-optic of pure intuition and the syn-thesis of the pure concepts of the understanding. It is this pure commingling that institutes ontological knowledge, sc. that pre-experiential fusion of intuition and thought by reason of which the knower possesses an antecedent comprehension of Being-structures of beings-to-be-known, insofar as there opens up for him a horizon of objectiveness within which beings can reveal themselves as opposed to the knower and thus become known. Briefly, the transcendental imagination is the power of instituting ontological knowledge in the finite knower, hence the center where transcendence comes-to-pass.

2. Ontological Knowing

a. Discovery of the Transcendental Imagination — What we have said of the transcendental imagination is, to be sure, by way of summary, and represents in some respects the acquisition of Heidegger's analysis rather than its initial data. His argument for such an interpretation has two moments: the analysis of the "transcendental deduction of the categories," where the role of the pure imagination is first discovered; the analysis of "schematism," where it is examined in operation. We shall try to sketch briefly the main theses of the argument, abstracting as much as possible from detail.

The term "deduction" for Kant has not a logical sense but a legal one. In a lawsuit, one distinguishes easily the facts of the case (quid facti) from the legal principle involved (quid juris). The legal argument as such is not simply an interpretation of the facts but a justification of this interpretation, an attempt to establish a specified right or authorization based upon the law itself. Such an argument in Kant's time was called "deduction," and this is the metaphor suggested by his use of the term in KRV. In the transcendental deduction of the categories,
we are proceeding as if in a court of law, attempting to establish an "authorization" (or "title") of the categories (pure concepts, notions, rules) to "justify" their "legal" claim.56

Precisely what pretensions of the categories does Kant wish to justify? The claim that they present "objective reality." But we must beware here of an easy misunderstanding. For Kant, the term "reality" (Realität) did not mean "actuality" (Wirklichkeit), but rather the "whatness" of beings, and responds therefore more properly to the traditional notion of "essence" than of "existence." 57 To ask by what right we may legitimately claim that the categories present objective reality is to pose the question:

... To what extent can the content (reality) that is presented in the pure concepts be a determination of that [being] which stands over in opposition to finite knowledge, sc. of that being [which serves] as an object? ... 58

In other words, can we justify the categories of Being as antecedent seizures of the Being-structure of beings-to-be-known? We can see immediately that the question embraces more than the pure concepts described above in precision from their relation to pure intuition. Its scope includes the entire structure of the pure synthesis, for we cannot speak of beings-to-be-known-as-objects at all unless there be intuition as well as thought, sc. categories. To justify the objective reality of the categories, then, we must explain the unity (therefore interdependence) between intuition and thought, hence the structure of ontological knowledge (transcendence) itself. 59

Kant proposes two possible paths to follow in order to elucidate the structural unity between intuition and thought: the first "descending," sc. beginning with thought and examining its relational dependence on intuition (KRV, A 116–120); the second "ascending," starting with intuition and delineating its necessary orientation towards thought (KRV, A 120–128). If we follow both paths, we must necessarily pass in each case through that center which unites the two extremes.60
In the "descending" method, we start with transcendental apperception. This presupposes a point of fusion between the pure concepts (categories) and pure intuition. As the unity of consciousness of an abiding "I think," transcendental apperception polarizes the data of intuition and the unifying functions of the understanding in such a way as to present a unity in which the processes of both intuition and thought are woven into one. If we recall now that transcendental apperception was originally considered as proper to the understanding alone ("the pure synthesis of the understanding"), we see immediately that this function is impossible without concomitant polarization of intuition as well. Apperception (hence the categories) is somehow referentially dependent on intuition.

What is the nature of such a presented unity in the case of pre-experiential knowledge? Certainly it is not a being, much less the totality of beings in the sense of a *totum simul*, for the finite knower does not create the being(s)-to-be-known. Rather the presented unity is waiting for an encounter with some being-to-be-known. Let us say that what transcendental apperception presents is an "... essential tendency toward the unification of what has not yet been unified..." What transcendental apperception presents, then, is a unity whose very nature is to unify. Now in order for transcendental apperception to present a unifying unity, it must have caught previously a glimpse of unity, or synthesis, that somehow or other will serve as the model for its own unifying process. According to Kant, such a synthesis, sc. fusion of intuition and thought to serve as guide, must be "presupposed" by, or at least "included" within, transcendental apperception in order for it to function at all.

This point of fusion is the transcendental imagination. Heidegger cites here the following text of Kant:

... Consequently, the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination is before [vor] apperception the ground of possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience,

and argues that the authentic sense of *vor* here, like the

---

1. "... Diese Einheit trägt als nicht-ontische die wesensmäßige Tendenz auf ein Einigen des je noch nicht Gecoignten in sich..." (KM, p. 77).
2. "... Also ist das Prinzipium der notwendigen Einheit der reinen (produktiven) Synthesis der Einbildungskraft vor der Apperzeption der Grund der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis, besonders der Erfahrung." (KRV, A 118).
Latin *coram*, means literally "before" in the sense of "in the presence of" or "before the eyes of." Hence, the synthesis of the transcendental imagination would serve as the pattern for the polarizing function of the transcendental apperception.

The second (ascending) method of transcendental deduction begins on the sense level. We know that the senses offer the knower their data only in a manifold, disorganized fashion. Before the being-to-be-known can be experienced as such, these data must be bound together into connectedness. However, in order for the being that is arriving at the condition of being known to be encountered as connected together into a stable whole, the knower must antecedently have seized the sense of "connecting." To present antecedently to experience the meaning of "connecting" is effectively to constitute in presentative fashion relations as such. Now this power of constituting relations (binding power of the knower) is not the pure intuitions of space and time, but the transcendental imagination, conditioned in its function, of course, by the universal intuition, time. Furthermore, in this process the transcendental imagination is ordered beyond itself, for the combining power is of such a nature that it belongs itself to a stable, abiding self which is the ego of the transcendental apperception.

We have, therefore, a pure imagination, as a grounding-power of the human soul, which lies as the base of all a priori knowledge. Through this we bring on the one hand the manifold of intuition into connection and on the other this connected manifold into union with the condition of the highly necessary unity of pure apperception.  

Briefly: "... the transcendental imagination unifies at once the pure intuition itself, and this with pure apperception." Whether we start the analysis with the categories as unified in apperception or with sense manifold offered by pure intuition, we pass inevitably through a center where categories and intuition meet and are instituted as one. This center, prior to all

---

63 KM, p. 80.
64 "Wir haben also eine reine Einbildungskraft, als ein Grundvermögen der menschlichen Seele, das alles Erkenntnis a priori zum Grunde liegt. Vermittelt deren bringen wir das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung einerseits, und mit der Bedingung der notwendigen Einheit der reinen Apperzeption andererseits in Verbindung.  

..." (KRV, A 124), cited with Heidegger's interpolations, KM, p. 81.
65 "... die transzendentale Einbildungskraft einmal die reine Anschauung in sich selbst und diese mit der reinen Apperzeption einigt." (KM, p. 81, note 218).
experience (because transcendental), is what institutes the horizon of objectiveness, or domain of encounter, wherein other beings can arrive at an encounter with the finite knower. It is this horizon that we call transcendence.

b. Analysis: Schematism – Our task now is to probe more deeply into this process by which ontological knowledge is instituted. This Heidegger does by his analysis of the "schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding." When we recall how the author conceives KRV to be an effort to lay the groundwork for metaphysics by an analysis of the conditions of ontological knowledge (transcendence), and then realize that the power by which transcendence is instituted in the finite knower is revealed in its interior operation by a study of schematism, we can understand why Heidegger calls this chapter the "kernel" of Kant's entire book.66

Kant himself introduces the chapter on schematism by posing his problem as one of "subsumption."67 In the language of traditional logic, "subsumption" is understood to mean the use of concepts, sc. either, from the viewpoint of the knower, the application of concepts to objects, or, from the viewpoint of the objects, the bringing of these objects "under" concepts. In the present case, where his theme is the pure concepts of the understanding, Kant is concerned obviously with the first of these forms. The question is this: how are the pure concepts (categories) applied, or put to use?

For the application of the categories (pure concepts) is not as simple as that of empirical concepts. The content of the empirical concepts, after all, is derived from experience. To re-apply this concept to the objects of experience, then, presents no problem: concept and object are homogeneous. The content of the pure concepts, however, is not derived from experience and "... in comparison with empirical (indeed all sensate) intuitions, they are completely heterogeneous. ..."68 If circu-
larity, for example, can be verified by intuited a dinner plate, causality cannot. How are pure concepts applied? Such a question interrogates not only their application but their very essence, their constitution. And since the categories are the fundamental concepts of the knower, we touch here the structure of concepts as such.  

It will be clear that our problem here is not especially different from the problem of transcendental deduction, sc. how to justify the objective reality of the categories. Here, as there, we investigate the structure of that antecedent comprehension of Being-structure through the categories which we call ontological knowledge (transcendence). Here, as there, we proceed by examining the conditions which render possible the pure synthesis between these categories and pure intuition. The focus on the schemata enables us simply to explicitate further the operation of the transcendental imagination in this function. Let Kant himself state the matter:

Now it is clear that there must be a third element [besides category and that to which it is applied], which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category and on the other with the sensible apparition, and renders possible the application of the former to the latter. This intermediary presentation must be pure (without any empirical element), yet on the one hand intellectual and on the other hand sensate. Such an intermediary is the transcendental schema.  

We must see now more in detail what this transcendental schema is and how it is constituted by the intermediary power of the pure imagination.

We are now at the heart of the matter and must proceed slowly. The skeleton of the argument is a sequence of four propositions:
i. All concepts must be rendered sensate by means of a schema. That concepts, if they are to be put to use, must be rendered sensate derives from their referential dependence on intuition in order that they can apply to an object, hence have a "meaning." The reason is that it is by intuition, sc. by the modification of the knower's sensate nature, that an object is offered as a being-to-be-known.\(^71\) To render a concept sensate, then, means to transpose a unifying function of the understanding into a seizure of the being-to-be-known that is intuitive at the same time that it is conceptual.\(^72\) It is precisely this fusion of intuition and concept that is accomplished by a schema. It is the schema that renders it possible for a concept to have "objective reality," for the intuition to receive a universalizing determination, hence for the being-to-be-known to offer a view of itself, to reveal its visage to the knower. In this sense, it is the sensating of the concept through the schema that (in rendering possible the view of the object) may be said to fashion this view, sc. to constitute that visage which offers itself to the knower and thus stands over against him as opposed.\(^73\) This is the sense of the formula "to let a thing stand opposed" (Gegenstehenlassen).

What we have said here pertains to all concepts indiscriminately, therefore to pure concepts (categories) as well as to empirical. Kant himself underlines the point: "... therefore the categories without schemata are only functions of the understanding [destined for the formation of] concepts but do not present any object. ..." \(^74\)

ii. As seen in empirical concepts, a schema is the presentation of the rule by which a concept performs its function of unification. We have examined already in cursory fashion the nature of the concepts as universalizing functions of the understanding, whose task is to present a unity which may be applied to more than one individual, as applicable to this plurality, therefore in its unity. We also called these universalizing functions "rules." We

\(^71\) KRV, A 229, B 278.
\(^72\) KM, p. 88. French translators (p. 150) suggest transposition sensible for Versinn-lickung. We prefer to retain a single word, though the result is perhaps not very happy.
\(^73\) KM, pp. 86-88.
\(^74\) "... Also sind die Kategorien, ohne Schemata, nur Funktionen des Verstandes zu Begriffen, stellen aber keinen Gegenstand vor...." (KRV, A 147, B 187).
must examine now more closely the process by which these rules are put to work.

We can proceed best by way of an example that Heidegger himself suggests. Across the street is a house. I know it to be a house, for it is presented to me by an act of knowledge. By reason of this presentation, the house offers me a view of itself as an individual existing object encountered in my experience, but more than that, it offers a view of what a house (any house) looks like. This does not mean, of course, that the house has no individuality, but only that in addition to its own individuality the house as presented offers a view of what a house can look like, sc. the “how” of any house at all. It opens up for me a sphere (Umkreis) of possible houses. To be sure, one of these possibilities has been actualized by the house that I see, but it need not have been so.

What interests us is this sphere of possibilities itself. What constitutes this sphere? Is it not the fact that my act of knowing, in presenting this house, prescribes and traces out for me how something must appear, if it is to offer me the view of a house at all? And that prescription, or rule-for-a-house (Regel), is not simply a catalogue of “characteristics” that are to be found in a house, but rather the drawing up of a full sketch (Auszeichnen) of the totality of what is meant by such a thing as a “house.” This sketch gives me a pre-view (Vorbliek) of a house as such, and by reason of it the being which I encounter can manifest itself as a house, sc. offer me the view of some house in particular.76

It is this prescription, in the sense of a full sketch of a possible plurality, that is meant by a “rule.” But notice that the sketch itself is already a view of the beings-to-be-known. More exactly, the rule (prescription) implies not only a ruling (sketching) but a ruled (sketched). That which is ruled (sketched) is in its own way a view, sc. something viewed. It is only when the rule is presented as de facto regulating (i.e. regulating a that-which-is-regulated) that it can be presented as a rule at all. But the rule, we have seen, is the concept; that-which-is-rulled is the view of the possible object that intuition may present. A view is fashioned for the concept in its universalizing function, and unless this

76 KM, pp. 90–91.
view be fashioned, then the concept as ruled does not exercise its unifying function at all. It is this necessary fashioning of a view (sketch) for a concept operating as a rule that constitutes the fusion of intuition and concept. Here the concept is rendered sensate. Thus Heidegger:

... It is only in presenting the manner in which the rule regulates a design for the view of a possible [object] that the unity of the concept can be presented in its unifying function, sc. as valid for more than one. If a concept, in general, is that which serves as a rule, then conceptual presentation means the antecedent donation of a rule for the possible fashioning of a view in such a way as to be [itself] the designing of this view. By reason of its very structure, then, such a presentation is necessarily ordered toward a possible view and is consequently in itself a special kind of sensating.  

Note, however, that the view of which we are speaking here is as such neither the immediate (empirical) intuition of an actual singular object (for it connotes a genuine plurality), nor a view of the concept itself in its unity. The view we are speaking of is not thematized at all. It is that precise point of fusion where the unity of the rule (concept) is discerned in its unifying function:

... The rule is presented in the "how" of its functioning as a rule, sc. in the manner in which, when regulating a given manifestation, it inscribes itself in the view through which the manifestation occurs. ...  

Now the presentation of the rule in its function as a rule is what Kant means by a schema. By reason of the schema, the unity of a concept is referred to the plurality of possibilities which it unifies, without being restricted to any one. Kant's own example:

... The concept of a dog signifies a rule according to which my imagination can design the general form of a four-footed animal, without being confined to any particular form whatever which is offered to me in ex-
KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS

experience, or, for that matter, to any possible image which in a given case I can construe. ...  

Such a schema, then, is "on the one hand intellectual and on the other hand sensate."

iii. For the pure concepts (categories), however, the schemata are "transcendental time-determinations." In the case of the categories, we have to do with unifying functions in their pure, condition, structurally prior to all empirical contact with beings-to-be-known. If they are rules, then in their functioning they regulate a to-be-ruled. This to-be-ruled must be in its own way a view, yet, if we are to guard the purity of the whole process, a pure view, itself fashioned prior to experience with beings-to-be-known. Such a view as this would be that which is offered by the functioning of a pure intuition. The pure (universal) intuition, however, hence the pure view, is time, which for Kant is the continuous succession of nows (*Jetztfolge*). Through the transcendental schemata, the categories must be fused with time and thus made sens-ate.  

These schemata of the categories must have, then, their own special character. As schemata for concepts of the pure understanding, each schema presents a unity, and, indeed, in its function as regulating a possible view. As schemata for the pure concepts, however, the view-to-be-regulated is time. Time, however, different from empirical intuitions (such as dog, house, etc.), does not offer a plurality of possibilities but is itself a simple, unique unity. If, then, the various categories each find in time their pure sensating view, then the unity of time must admit at least a plurality of modes by which it can serve as the pure view for the various types of category. It is the task of the schemata to mediate the unicity of time and plurality of the categories. "... The schemata of the notions ... articulate the unique possibility of a pure view [sc. time] into a multiplicity of

---

78 "... Der Begriff vom Hunde bedeutet eine Regel, nach welcher meine Einbildungskraft die Gestalt eines vierfüßigen Tieres allgemein verzeichnen kann, ohne auf irgendeine einzige besondere Gestalt, die mir die Erfahrung darbietet, oder auch ein jedes mögliche Bild, was ich in concreto darstellen kann, eingeschränkt zu sein...." (KRV, A 144, B 180).

79 KM, p. 99.
views. . ." 80 In that sense, transcendental schemata "determine" time, sc. they are "transcendental time-determinations," and since all schemata are constituted by the imagination (schematism), they are its "transcendental product." 81

iv. The transcendental schemata constitute the pure horizon of objectiveness called transcendence. It is by reason of the transcendental schemata that the pure concepts are fused with intuition prior to experience and thus satisfy Kant's requirement:

. . . Pure concepts a priori, besides the function of the understanding in the category, must contain formal conditions of sensate-ness . . . which contain the general a priori conditions under which the categories themselves may be applied to any object whatsoever. . . 82

It is the transcendental schemata, then, that render possible the application of the ontological predicates to all possible objects. Hence it is they that bring-to-pass the pre-experiential orientation of the finite knower toward beings-to-be-known that renders it possible for these beings - not simply one, nor a few, nor a class, but "any being whatsoever" - to reveal themselves as objects offering a view of themselves to be known. They constitute, then, the horizon of objective-ness which we have called "transcendence," and this because they constitute the pure synthesis of thought (categories) and intuition (time), sc. ontological knowledge.

The point is capital! To have a concept of an object is to present it in its general nature, or, as we often say, "universality." If the categories as such, however, are not homogeneous with empirical concepts and hence require schemata of a special sort, then their "universality" is not simply of a higher degree than that of the ordinary universal concepts, as if they were simply a supreme genus in the ontic sense. The "universality," better "generality," of the categories must be of a different kind. How,

81 KRV, A 138, B 177 (transzendentale Zeitbestimmungen); A 142, B 181 (transzendentales Produkt der Einbildungskraft). See KM, p. 99.
82 "... reine Begriffe a priori, außer der Funktion des Verstandes in der Kategorie, noch formale Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit (namentlich des inneren Sinnes) a priori enthalten müssen, welche die allgemeine Bedingung enthalten, unter der die Kategorie allein auf irgendeinen Gegenstand angewandt werden kann. . ." (KRV, A 139-140, B 179).
then, characterize the generality of these ontological, sc. metaphysical, concepts? Such a question, however, asks no less than this: what does "general" mean when we call ontology "general metaphysics"? Such a question seeks to discover the ground of metaphysics. Hence, "... the problem of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding is the question of the innermost essence of ontological knowledge," sc. the structure of transcendence, the ground of metaphysics.83

3. The Ontological Known

In the analysis of schematism, we were concerned more with the structure of ontological knowing. Now let us see more in detail the ontological known. What is known in transcendence is instituted by transcendence. Yet transcendence is finite, indeed "... transcendence is ... finitude itself ...,"84 therefore radically incapable of creating the beings that it knows. Hence that which is "known" in ontological knowledge as a result of institution by transcendence is not and cannot be a being at all. Rather it is Non-being – not, however, absolutely nothing.85

Heidegger explains this Non-being by interpreting two passages where Kant speaks of the ontologically known as "X." In interpreting the first passage, the author supplies a clarity which the original does not possess: the being-as-it-appears reveals itself as opposed to the knower, and it is this which the empirical intuition gives. But the being-as-it-appears is the "object" of another presentation, for since it is not the thing-in-itself, sc. the being as it springs from its origin in a creative intuition, it reveals itself only in and for an orientation towards itself that is receptive. This antecedent orientation is likewise a presen-

---

83 "... Das Problem des Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe ist die Frage nach dem innersten Wesen der ontologischen Erkenntnis." (KM, p. 105). The difficulty of the matter is obvious, as the long controversies over conversion to the phantasm in the formation of universal concepts indicate. In all of Kant, schematism is one of the most difficult issues, and even Herr Beck could not make head or tail of it. Kant in last years (1797): "Überhaupt ist der Schematismus einer der schwierigsten Punkte. Selbst Hr. Beck kann sich nicht darein finden. – Ich halte dies Capitel für eines der wichtigsten." (Kants handschriftlicher Nachlaß, Band V, Nr. 6359, cited KM, p. 106).
84 "... Nun ist aber die Transzendenz gleichsam die Endlichkeit selbst...." (KM, p. 87).
85 KM, p. 71 (Nichts vs. nihil absolutum), 113.
tation that must have its own "object," better its "whereunto."
What is presented in this case, though, is objectiveness as such, which serves as the horizon within which the being-as-it-appears can appear. The term of this antecedent orientation, however, cannot be intuited by the empirical intuition, yet certainly it is not absolutely nothing. Kant calls it "non-empirical" (he could say as well "transcendental") object, which he designates as "X." 86

The second text speaks of the "X" explicitly as a "transcendental object," as the object of intuition as such, which can be described only as the "correlate of the unity of [transcendental] apperception," sc. consciousness. 87 But it is not known in itself; indeed, given the finite condition of the knower, it cannot be known as such, for it is simply not a being like other beings — it is Non-being. It is a "pure horizon," but somehow a discernible domain of opposedness, the necessary condition for an encounter with a being as opposed. "... Only if the process of enabling a being to reveal itself as opposed is a thrust into Non-being ..." is the encounter with beings, that takes place, indeed, within Non-being, possible. 88 Not a being, the pure horizon is necessarily un-thematic. And if by "knowledge" we understand a comportment between two beings, then Non-being, as pure horizon and necessarily unthematic, cannot be "known," and ontological knowledge is not "knowledge" at all. Its only proper name is "transcendence." 89

C. ONTOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: ITS ULTIMATE MEANING

1. Transcendental Imagination as Common Root

What renders ontological knowledge possible and therefore grounds metaphysics is, for Heidegger's Kant, the process of finite transcendence. We have now to see that for Kant, too, its ultimate meaning is time.

But before probing the relation between transcendental im-
agination and time, we must first see the imagination's relation to the two basic powers in man, reason and sensation. If the pure imagination is the center of transcendence, we must study its rôle precisely as center. Heidegger takes as his starting point the apparently inconsistent juxtaposition of two series of texts in Kant: one of these enumerates the transcendental imagination among the three essential elements of the ontological synthesis (along with the pure intuition and pure concepts of apperception), or as one of the three basic powers in man; the other insists that there are only two "stems" of knowledge (sensateness and understanding). The problem is resolved by recalling that this "instituting power" is at once a passive (receptive) and a constructive (spontaneous) institution. In this "at once" lies the genuine essence of its structure. If receptivity means the same thing as sensateness, and spontaneity the same as understanding, then the imagination falls in a unique way between the two, or better still is the "unknown common root" of the other two. In other words, we say that the pure imagination through the schemata constitutes the unity between the two components of ontological knowledge. But in order to do so, it must have been antecedently on a par (gewachsen) with both. This is possible only on the supposition that it is the origin of both, sc. that it lets both of them spring forth. In considering the transcendental imagination as "root," we consider ontological knowledge (therefore transcendence) in its very origin.90

a. Intuition – In what sense is pure imagination the root of pure intuition? When we discussed the latter, we saw that as finite intuition it must receive what it intuits, yet as pure (pre-experiential), it must give the intuited to itself. Furthermore, what is intuited is a unity, hence the intuition-that-gives-to-itself must be unifying. Heidegger argues that such a passive-active function must find its root in a power, or center, which is of its very nature institutive, and, indeed, synthetic (unifying). But the totality of pure intuition does not possess the unity of universality that characterizes concepts, hence cannot find its roots in the understanding. Its source can only be the pure imagination – all the more since it is this which is the origin of

90 KM, pp. 124-127, 139.
everything "synthetic" in the first place. The transcendental imagination is the root of pure intuition because it supplies the ultimate basis for the "syn"-character of the synopsis.91

b. **Pure Reason** – We can see how the understanding finds its root in pure imagination if we recall what was said, in the descending method of transcendental deduction and in the discussion of schematism, concerning the referential dependence of the transcendental unity of apperception upon the synthesis of the pure imagination. The transcendental apperception is polarized into the unified conscious ego of "I think (substance, cause, etc.)," which is the pure understanding. This unity is not instituted simply by the mutual affinity of the categories but by the absorption of the categories into the presentation by a conscious ego of a still more profound unity of a common horizon. It is in the presentation of this common horizon that consists the orientation of the conscious ego toward the being-to-be-known. But what constitutes the horizon? It is the pure imagination, by reason of the schemata, that gives to the categories their objective reality, hence makes the horizon instituted by the orientation to be properly speaking a horizon of objectiveness. It is the schematism of the pure imagination, then, that enables the understanding to perform its polarizing function, to be itself, and hence serves as ground of the understanding, its root.

From another point of view, transcendental apperception, in polarizing the categories, presents a unifying unity. But in order to do this it must have had previously a glimpse of unity which serves as guide in the polarizing function. This previously discerned unity which controls the polarizing function is the unity of the pure synthesis in the transcendental imagination through schematism. The only way to explain why the pure understanding has this antecedent glimpse is by saying that it has its source in this unity.92

But the transcendental imagination is root not only of the pure understanding but also of the pure reason (*reiner Vernunft*),

---

91 KM, pp. 151, 154.
92 KM, pp. 137–138. It is in this sense that the writer understands the passage which suggests the priority of self (sc. the institution of transcendence) to consciousness (transcendental apperception) which we shall examine soon.
understood here in the strict sense as the power of ideas, sc. the power of presenting the rules of the understanding in various modes of totality. However, the rules of the understanding bring-to-pass that regulating function only through the schemata of the imagination, and are therefore relationally dependent on them. Since the ideas organize these rules into different modes of totality, then the ideas, and the power which forms them, are no less dependent on the pure imagination than are the categories. If the transcendental imagination is the ground of the understanding, it is the ground of the pure reason as well.93

c. Practical Reason – The pure imagination is more than root of intuition and theoretical reason. Heidegger goes on to say that it is root as well of man’s “practical reason,” the power of human freedom. Before doing so, however, he notes that the theoretical reason itself possesses a type of freedom, provided one understand freedom in the Kantian sense as a “submission to a self-imposed necessity.”94 The “necessity” here is the objectiveness, or opposedness, of the horizon which is offered to the theoretical reason, or imposed upon it, as the view fashioned by pure intuition. It is self-imposed, because the pure intuition, fashioning this view, springs from the same source (sc. the transcendental imagination) as the pure reason, hence is ultimately one with it. The pure reason submits to this self-imposed “necessity,” because it is thus that it achieves its self-orientation toward the beings-to-be-known. Hence, the theoretical reason “... is not free because it has the characteristic of spontaneity but because this spontaneity is receptive, sc. because it is the transcendental imagination.”95

Coming to the practical reason, Heidegger argues that this, too, is rooted in the pure imagination, because it must stem from a root that is simultaneously spontaneous and receptive. To

93 KM, p. 141. All this considers the pure reason in the strict sense (Vermögen der Ideen), but to catch the full force of the argument, it should be extended to the pure reason in its broad sense, which includes both understanding and the power of the ideas, designating thus the complete power of higher knowledge in man. It is such an illation as this, not indicated in the text, which explains the title of this particular section, “No. 29. Die transzendentale Einbildungskraft und die theoretische Vernunft.”

94 KM, p. 142 (sich stellen unter eine selbstgegebene Notwendigkeit).

95 "... Der Verstand und die Vernunft sind nicht deshalb frei, weil sie den Charakter der Spontaneität haben, sondern weil diese Spontaneität eine receptive Spontaneität, d.h. transzendentale Einbildungskraft ist.” (KM, p. 143).
understand this, we must review briefly the main theses of Kant's analysis of the practical reason. To begin with, the practical reason is not to be understood as a different power in man than the theoretic reason but is rather the practical use of the pure reason as such in the sphere of the moral activity of man. The theoretic use of the pure reason is that by which the knower presents what is; the practical use is that by which he presents what should be (Sollen). Considered as pure, reason in its practical function presents what "should be" a priori to all experience, this "should be" being the universally binding moral law as enunciated in the categorical imperative. Yet because we are dealing with the reason in its structure prior to experience, reason itself must constitute the law, so that reason becomes its own lawgiver. The fact that the reason is its own lawgiver makes it autonomous, and in this autonomy lies its freedom. Morality consists in submission to the self-imposed law out of respect (Achtung) for it and the duty it imposes.

In structure, then, the practical use of pure reason is analogous to the theoretical use. To the horizon of objectiveness of the theoretical reason corresponds here the moral law, or necessity (categorical imperative), which is op-posed to, more exactly im-posed upon, the moral person. Corresponding to the self-orientation of the theoretical reason, we have here a submission to the law through respect. It is respect for the moral law that makes manifest the law and renders it possible for the law to impose itself. Yet this respect remains submission to the law and it is in surrender to the law that is achieved the freedom and dignity of the self as a moral person.

Both law and submission are one, then, as unified as the moral self they compose. Yet such a unity comprises both receptivity and spontaneity: "the submissive surrender to ... is pure receptivity, the free imposition of the law upon oneself is pure spontaneity. . . ." It can only be explained if it stems from a


97 KRV, pp. 144-145.

98 "Die sich unterwerfende unmittelbare Hingabe an ... ist die reine Receptivität, das freie Sich-vorgeben des Gesetzes aber ist die reine Spontanität; . . ." (KM, p. 146).
root that is both spontaneous and receptive, sc. the transcendental imagination. We conclude: the transcendental imagination is the common root from which stem both pure intuition and pure reason, practical as well as theoretical. In a word, it is the center of the entire man.

2. Transcendental Imagination and Original Time

Having established that the transcendental imagination is the center of all that properly characterizes man, Heidegger investigates more closely its relation to one of the components of the pure synthesis, sc. the pure intuition of time. If one accepts his interpretation of the pure imagination as origin of time, he wishes to show how radically this must be understood. The transcendental imagination is not simply the origin of time, understood as a pure intuition, but is itself original time.

The argument starts with time understood as a pure intuition, sc. where the intuiting gives to itself the intuited, and where the intuited is the pure succession of "nows." As we saw, however, this intuited succession is not seized as an object, but what is intuited is the intuiting itself in its function as originally instituting the succession in the manner of a donation to itself.

... Time as pure intuition means neither the intuited of a pure intuiting only, nor only an intuiting which is wanting an "object." Time as pure intuition is the unique process of an intuiting which institutes the intuited. ...

It is because of this self-instituting character, as we saw, that time finds its root in the center of institution in man, sc. the transcendental imagination.

Now this succession cannot be grasped as succession simply by the grasping of a single "now." In fact, the present "now," considered apart from the succession, sc. out of a relationship to a "now" that is to follow and a "now" that already was, is meaningless. Hence, even to grasp the present "now" as present, the intuition must look forward to the not-yet (therefore preview) and back to the have-been "nows" (re-view), sc. institute

99 KM, p. 160.
a horizon of "nows." If the transcendental imagination is the source of time as a self-instituting intuition, it must be the origin of the entire horizon as such, sc. it must be itself original time. How is this to be understood?

The author proceeds now to examine certain passages in Kant which give warrant for us to claim that time (as described above in its purity) is intrinsic to the transcendental imagination. The general lines of his argument will be these: There are three types of empirical syntheses which suggest the three dimensions of time: a. the synthesis of apprehension in intuition suggests the present; b. the synthesis of reproduction in (empirical) imagination suggests recall, sc. orientation toward the past; c. the synthesis of recognition in concepts of the understanding suggests anticipation, sc. orientation towards the future. These three types of synthesis in empirical knowledge presuppose a corresponding synthesis in pure knowledge that renders them possible. Yet pure knowledge is the ontological synthesis that comes-to-pass in the transcendental imagination. Hence, the transcendental imagination itself must possess this triple orientation toward present, past and future, and therefore it must be time in its very origin. We now examine this triple orientation at closer range.

**a. Pure Synthesis as Pure Apprehension** — By apprehension, Kant understands the bringing together into a unity, of the manifold data offered by the several senses. This unifying, however, is impossible unless there be an intuition of time which distinguishes the different "nows." For unless the knower can say "now and now and now," he cannot say "now this, now that, now both together," and therefore would not be able, in the amorphous welter of sense impressions, to distinguish unities at all. For the "now" itself is unifying, since whatever is seized in any given "now" (Augenblick) is necessarily unified. Apprehension unifies the manifold that is present here and "now."

But an empirical synthesis presupposes a pure apprehending synthesis, sc. the pure reception, hence the pure giving to oneself, of such a thing as "now" — the present as such. Now if the

---

synthesizing function of empirical apprehension is grounded in the (empirical) imagination – and such is the case, says Kant expressly – then the apprehending synthesis in its purity, sc. that which institutes the “now” (the present) antecedently to experience, must be a mode of the imagination in its purity. It is the transcendental imagination, then, that is the origin of the present as such.102

b. Pure Synthesis as Pure Reproduction – By reproduction, Kant understands that process by which the knower can render present to himself a being that was once known, but which no longer reveals itself to the knower here and “now.” It is the presentation of a being “now” as having been known “before.” On the empirical level, such a process supposes that the knower can bring-forth-(back)-again (re-pro-ductio) the being that has been known before, in such a way as to identify it with the being that is known now, hence a synthesis. It is worth remarking that such a reproductive (better, perhaps, “retentive”) synthesis is necessary even for apprehension, sc. in order that the elements of the manifold be retained long enough to be brought into the unity of “now.”

Passing to the a priori level, we must say that the conditions which render such a synthesis possible are that the knower can retain the being that has been known before as having been known before, and consequently that he distinguishes between “before” and “now”:

... Therefore in order that the empirical synthesis in the mode of a reproduction be possible, one must be able from the very beginning, before any experience, to bring back again the “now”-that-has-been as such and unite it with the “now” that actually is. ... 103

This, too, is a synthesis – but a pure one, one that establishes antecedently the horizon of the previous as such and keeps this horizon open. “... The pure synthesis in the mode of reproduction constitutes the past [having-been-ness] as such. ...” 104

102 KM, pp. 163-164.
103 "... Damit also empirische Synthesis im Modus der Reproduktion möglich wird, muß im vorhinein schon das Nicht-mehr-jetzt als ein solches vor aller Erfahrung wieder bei-gebracht und mit dem jeweiligen Jetzt geeinigt werden können ...." (KM, p. 165). We resume here KM, pp. 164-166.
104 "... Die reine Synthesis im Modus der Reproduktion bildet die Gewesenheit als solche ...." (KM, p. 165).
If the empirical synthesis of reproduction is brought-to-pass by the empirical imagination, the pure synthesis must be the work of the imagination in its purity, sc. as transcendental. Moreover, this process of constituting the pre-experiential synthesis of the "now"-that-has-been and the "now"-that-is fuses the horizon of the past with the horizon of the present into a structural unity. "... In this original unity of the two modes [of synthesis], [the transcendental imagination] can be, then, the origin of time (as unity of present and past)...."^105

C. *P U R E  S Y N T H E S I S  A S  P U R E  R E C O G N I T I O N* - By recognition here, Kant means that process by reason of which the knower discovers that the being which reveals itself in two presentations, or modes of presentation (v.g. reproduction and apprehension), is one and the same. Hence, it is a discovery of identity, an identification. On the empirical level, let us suppose the simultaneous synthesis of reproduction and apprehension. This double process is not haphazard but controlled, sc. regulated by a unity that is seized antecedently and whose function is precisely to control the coming-together of these two syntheses and guarantee that they present one and the same identical being-to-be-known. This antecedent regulating unity is a rule, sc. that unifying function which we have called the concept, the presentation of a unity, which in its identity is applicable to many. First to have grasped this regulating unity by anticipation and then to discover the other syntheses as achieving their union in and through it – this is to recognize identity: it is a synthesis of recognition.

Such an empirical synthesis supposes as a condition of its possibility a synthesis of identification that precedes all experience. Preceding all experience of beings, it can only open up the dimension of antecedent seizure as such; thus it is "... the original institution of anticipation, sc. the future...."^108 Since it comes-to-pass through the regulating function of the concepts as rules, which are the schemata, the "transcendental product"

^105 "... In dieser ursprünglichen Einheit der beiden Modi kann sie dann aber auch der Ursprung der Zeit (als Einheit von Gegenwart und Gewesenheit) sein...." (KM, p. 166).

^108 "... Ihr Erkunden ist als reines das ursprüngliche Bilden dieses Vorhabens, d.h. der Zukunft...." (KM, p. 169). We are resuming KM, pp. 167–172.
of the pure imagination, this institution of the future is the task of the transcendental imagination. The transcendental imagination, then, instituting future as well as present and past, is "original time."  

**d. Time as Origin of Transcendental Imagination** — The transcendental imagination is "original time" because, as we see, it is the root of time. Heidegger goes further. We have an equal right, he seems to say, to speak of time as the root of the transcendental imagination. His reason is that it is time which enables the pure imagination to perform its task of bringing about the ontological synthesis, sc. transcendence. For ontological knowledge is the perfect fusion of three component factors: pure intuition, pure thought and pure imagination. Now to each of these factors corresponds a synthesis, which, taken by itself, institutes one of the three dimensions of time: to intuition corresponds the synthesis of apprehension, which, taken in its purity, institutes the horizon of time-present; to imagination corresponds the synthesis of reproduction (for it is the presenting of an object without the presence of the object) which, taken in its purity, institutes the horizon of time-past; to thought corresponds the synthesis of recognition, which, taken in its purity, institutes the horizon of time-future. There are not three horizons of time, however, but one horizon with the triple dimension of past-present-future. The unity of these three syntheses, taken in their purity, is the unity of time itself in the very process of timing (Zeitigung). It is the unity of time, then, that renders possible the unification of these three modes of the pure synthesis, hence the three component factors of ontological knowledge. For:

... It is only because these modes of the pure synthesis in the triple unification of time are in origin one and the same [process], that they contain in themselves likewise the possibility of unifying in a common origin the three elements of pure knowledge. ...

---

107 KM, p. 170 (ursprüngliche Zeit). Furthermore, since synthesis of identification renders possible, hence in a sense precedes, the syntheses of reproduction and apprehension, though it is never independent of them, one has a right to say that time "temporalizes" itself out of the future. (See p. 170). Clear resonance of SZ.

And if the transcendental imagination is justly called the "center" in which this pure synthesis comes-to-pass, the reason can be only that it is rooted itself in the ultimate unity of time. "... It is only the fact that it is rooted in time that enables the transcendental imagination as such to be the root of transcendence." 109

Let us concede immediately that the point here is difficult. The analysis of the triple synthesis led us to accept the transcendental imagination as origin, sc. ultimate source, of the three dimensions of time. Now it is time itself which ontologically precedes the transcendental imagination and renders possible, by its own unity, the unifying power of the latter. Is there an inconsistency here? Or is there merely something unsaid? At any rate, for the present we see in what way Heidegger finds in Kant the main thesis of SZ: that which renders metaphysics (ontological knowledge) possible is the process of finite transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time.

II. General Remarks

We come now to certain general remarks which will let us see more clearly, perhaps, the implications of all that precedes in terms of foundational thought. In beginning, we advert once more to the fact that Heidegger bases his interpretation of Kant on the first edition of KRV, not the second. The reason is that it is only in the first edition that the pure imagination plays this radical rôle as the center of transcendence. In the second edition, on the contrary, transcendence is a function of the understanding alone. 110

Of course, Heidegger must explain the change. It was, he claims, because Kant saw darkly the consequences to which his radicalism would drive him, and retreated before them as one recoils before an abyss (Abgrund) whose obscure depths are unknown. Such consequences were, for example, these: from the theoretical aspect, the traditional primacy of reason and logic in man would be made subordinate to a power (the pure

109 "... Diese Verwurzelung in der Zeit ist es allein, kraft deren die transzendentale Einbildungskraft überhaupt die Wurzel der Transzendens sein kann." (KM, p. 178).
110 KM, pp. 146-150.
imagination) which always had been considered inferior to reason because essentially sensate; from the practical point of view, the origin of the moral order, personality, etc. would have to be ascribed to the transcendental imagination rather than to the pure reason, which, as pure spontaneity, should be considered in the proper sense free.\textsuperscript{111}

A. BEING

1. Being as Horizon

In our discussion of the ontologically known, we saw that the pure horizon of objectiveness, within which beings appear and by reason of which they can reveal themselves for what they are, is more, certainly, than absolutely nothing, yet cannot be called a being like the rest. It must be characterized as Non-being. More positively, what can we say? It is important to note that Heidegger clearly makes Non-being, in the sense of the pure horizon, equivalent with Being - not World, as the phenomenology of SZ demanded, but \textit{Being}. More than once he calls the coming-to-pass of transcendence, by which the pure horizon is instituted, “the comprehension of Being.” The institution of transcendence, then, is nothing more than the opening-up of the horizon “... in which the Being of beings becomes antecedently discernible....”\textsuperscript{112} for the horizon itself offers to the knower “antecedent opposedness.”\textsuperscript{113}

How understand this antecedence of the Being-horizon? Certainly it is not a temporal but an ontological one, sc. the horizon of Being antecedes the encounter that takes place within it, as condition antecedes the conditioned. It is in this sense that the transcendental imagination, in constituting the horizon of Being, is not dependent upon the fact that the being-to-be-known be present. Rather, through the (ontologically) prior construction of the pure schemata, the transcendental imagination constitutes the view of an abiding Presence (\textit{Anwesenheit}) as such, that renders it possible for the beings-to-be-known to

\textsuperscript{111} KM, pp. 152-153. All the critics found the explanation ingenious. Not all were thoroughly convinced.

\textsuperscript{112} “... in dem das Sein des Seienden vorgängig erblickbar wird....” (KM, p. 175). See pp. 24, 70, 128 (Seinsverständnis).

\textsuperscript{113} KM, p. 72 (Widerständlichkeit).
manifest themselves as present.\textsuperscript{114} It is in this horizon of Presence that they can arrive for the encounter. From another point of view, this antecedent Presence that we call the horizon of Being may be understood, if we recall that Kant calls it the "correlate of the unity of transcendental apperception" (consciousness), understood as a unity which awaits the being whose appearing it makes possible. Constituted by the pure union of the synopsis of the pure intuition (time) and the synthesizing functions of the categories, this unity that is presented by the polarizing function of the transcendental apperception, sc. the horizon of Being, contains within itself the tendency to unify that which has not been brought to an interior oneness as yet, sc. the being-which-is-to-appear (be known) as it will appear.\textsuperscript{115}

Yet this manner of speaking should not lead us to understand the horizon as "temporally" prior to beings, for this would be to forget that it is essentially the transcendental condition of the appearing of beings, and it is as such that it must play its rôle. To understand it as "temporally" prior to this appearing would give it an independence which it does not possess and, in the last analysis, would make it a being like the rest. As Kant himself remarks, ontological knowledge has only an "empirical use."\textsuperscript{116}

It is only when we comprehend the horizon of transcendence as both the unifying dynamism of sheer Presence and as Non-being that we understand it properly.

If we try to underline those characteristics of Being that are most important for us, we may say in the first place that Being is un-thematic. The horizon is never seized for itself and presented as if it were a being, for that is precisely what it is not. It may be discerned only as the condition of possibility of an encounter between man and other beings, hence cannot be thematized for itself as objectivized in any way. Furthermore, Being is temporal, for it is sheer Presence. The temporality of Being is implicit, as well, when the author insists that the horizon of objectiveness, because finite, includes time as an essential component. It may be inferred, too, from the analysis of

\textsuperscript{114} KM, pp. 118-119, 122. The word \textit{Anwesenheit} is significant, for it is principally a. \textit{Anwesen} that Being is thematized in Heidegger II. The conception appears already, as a matter of fact, in \textit{SZ}, v.g. pp. 25-26.

\textsuperscript{115} KM, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{116} KM, 125 ("empirischen Gebrauch").
the transcendental imagination as original time, whether we take the imagination as the root of time or time as the root of the transcendental imagination. But most of all, Being, as the horizon of finite transcendence, is intrinsically finite. The point deserves elaboration.

Recall that for Kant the problem is to determine what renders possible man's knowledge of a being which reveals itself as an object of experience. Such a problematic supposes necessarily the finitude of the knower, for only to a finite knower can a being be opposed (at a distance) as an object; an infinite Knower would intuit it not as an object but in its origin in the creative intuition. Now as we saw, Heidegger makes this distinction between the being as an object of finite intuition and the being as created term of infinite intuition equivalent to the distinction between the being-as-it-appears and the being-as-it-is-in-itself. Heidegger's interest in Kant, however, focuses on beings-as-they-appear and he asks simply how it is that they can appear. The answer, of course, is the transcendence of the knower. What is notable here is that if Kant is interested in the sphere of beings-in-themselves (Ding-an-sich) which are "transcendent" to pure reason, Heidegger is not. Some will say that he should be, but the fact is, he is not.

For Heidegger, the being-as-it-appears is the being-in-itself insofar as it is seized imperfectly (therefore concealed as well as revealed) by a finite There-being. In the context of the analysis of the World, a being-in-itself (an sich) is a being comprehended in its ontological dimension, sc. as an instrument inserted into the complex of relations which constitute the World. In both cases, the being-in-itself is accessible to the finite There-being. Heidegger needs no excursus through the postulates of practical reason, then, to put him in contact with the domain of beings-as-they-are. There-being is already in commerce with them, because it is to-be-in-the-World. Heidegger's whole problem, then, is concerned with explaining the

117 Compare SZ, p. 30 and KM, p. 38. In both cases, concealment is intrinsic to the revelation. In SZ, this concealment is conceived as proceeding from the being-to-be-known, in KM as from the knower. Since the being reveals itself only when the knower knows, there is really no discrepancy.

118 SZ, pp. 74-76. From our present perspective, we detect here clearly the po-lemic vs. the Neo-Kantians.
accessibility of beings-as-they-are-in-themselves-but-revealing-themselves-in-finite-fashion-as-objects to There-being (understood in KM as the human knower). Whether this be explained by the comprehension (project) of Being, as in SZ, or by the pure horizon of transcendence, as in KM, the solution is essentially the same. What renders beings accessible to finite There-being is Being, to which There-being in turn has access because it is transcendence.

With this in mind, we can understand, at least in terms of the problematic as it has developed thus far, why Heidegger is not concerned with where beings “come from” in the ontic sense, whether from God or from some nameless origin of the World (Weltgrund), etc. He is interested only in their accessibility, sc. in what he understands as their Being. How radically he bars himself from all access to what Kant would call a “transcendent” domain appears when we recall that the power in man which enables Kant to pass to this domain, sc. the practical reason with its postulates, is, according to Heidegger, rooted in, therefore subordinate to, the transcendental imagination, the power whose function is to institute Being as a sheer horizon of transcendence, sc. of accessibility and nothing more.

Finally, this perspective enables us to understand certain formulae used elsewhere, which at first reading seem enigmatic. For example, in SZ the function of There-being is to let beings “be”; yet this is not a creation by There-being; rather it lets beings already endowed with entity (je schon “Seiendes”) come to an encounter with There-being by reason of There-being’s discovery of their instrumentality (Zuhandenheit). Again, “a being is independently of experience, knowledge and conception by which it is disclosed, discovered, determined. But Being ‘is’ only in the comprehension [of There-being]. . . .”¹¹⁹ These texts, read in conjunction with the repeated insistence in KM that the finite knower, because finite, does not create the being-to-be-known but does institute the horizon of their accessibility, become far more intelligible.

2. Being and Truth

The intimate relationship between Being and truth we already discovered in SZ. In KM, the problem of truth is touched only obliquely. If we must wait for WG and WW before the problem is posed in all its force, the occasional remarks of KM are in their own way revealing nonetheless. To begin with, Heidegger takes it as self-evident that all genuine knowledge is true knowledge. As a consequence, he calls the process of knowledge the “veritative synthesis” – synthesis because all knowledge is a union of knower and known, veritative because, by reason of this union, the being-to-be-known becomes manifest, sc. true, simply because it reveals itself as it is. The veritative synthesis comes-to-pass in the synthesis of intuition and thought, for it is here that knowledge, hence experience, comes-to-pass. Knowledge is true, then, because it renders (beings-to-be-known) manifest. Clearly Heidegger’s conception of truth here as rendering-manifest presupposes the analysis made in SZ, by which truth as conformity is shown to be derived from a more fundamental truth, sc. truth-as-discovery, manifestation.

If truth is intrinsic to knowledge as such, then to the different types of knowledge correspond different types of truth. We distinguished in the beginning ontic knowledge (of beings) from ontological knowledge (of Being-structure, sc. of Being). We must distinguish, then, ontic truth, sc. manifestation of beings, from ontological truth, “the unveiledness of the Being-structure of beings,” or simply of Being itself. Hence, the entire interpretation of Kant, with its examination of the “... interior possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge [is] a question about the essence of the truth of ontological transcendence. ...” The laborious effort to explain how the categories possess their validity was fundamentally the question about the pre-experiential manifestation of the Being of beings in the essential unity of ontological knowledge which constitutes this transcendence.

120 KM, pp. 26, 110 (nur wahre Erkenntnis ist Erkenntnis), 34 (die wahr-offenmachende, veritative Synthesis).
122 KM, p. 84.
Once it is established that this transcendence is nothing else than opening-up and keeping open the horizon within which the Being of beings-to-be-known is discernible prior to empirical contact with these beings, so that it becomes possible for the knower to seize their Being-structure when contact actually occurs, then transcendence does not “have” truth but “... is truth in its very origin. ...” 124

But if transcendence is truth in its origin, sc. original truth, we must not forget that transcendence is finite, and that the finitude of truth is un-truth. What must be said now of un-truth? Heidegger recognizes the validity of the question and calls it “one of the most central problems of finitude,” but one which cannot be approached yet because we do not have the apparatus to handle it. 125 He does make one illuminating remark, however. When speaking of what Kant means by the phrase “behind the appearance,” he explains it by saying simply that human knowledge is finite and as such must inevitably “conceal” (verbirgt) its object. 126 “Conceal,” here, is used in implied opposition to the idea of the revelatory power of the cognitive process. In other words, the finite knower, because finite, is permeated with negativity: he is radically incapable of knowing another being exhaustively, sc. in the very origin of its being out of the creative intuition of an infinite Intelligence. The finite act of knowledge, then, does not exhaust the knowability of the known. If it may be called a “revelation,” then it is simultaneously a non-revelation (concealment), and finite truth is permeated by un-truth.

B. THERE-BEING

It is perfectly obvious that the center of transcendence, which in KM goes by the name of the transcendental imagination, is what in SZ is designated as There-being. The analysis of the former, then, permits us to gain a fresh look at the latter.
I. There-being as Project

In SZ, we saw that There-being's intrinsic comprehension of Being is to be interpreted in terms of a project of Being, whose anticipatory character plays an essential role in the subsequent analysis. In KM, the pure imagination emerged more as a power which brings about the pure synthesis, a center in which transcendence is instituted. The use of the term "project" (Entwurf) is relatively rare here, but when it does occur, there is no doubt that the institution of the horizon of transcendence may and should be considered as project. The transcendental imagination, for example, is a "freely constructing and projecting" power which, in the sense that we have explained, receives what it projects and submits to it. What is projected? We know already that it is the horizon of objectiveness, but Heidegger is still more precise:

... The transcendental imagination projects by an antecedent institution the totality of possibilities of which it has a "prospect," in order that thus it may propose the horizon within which the knowing self – and this is not all – comports itself. ... The institution of transcendence, then, here as in SZ, is the projecting not only of the horizon of Being but of the potentials of the self.

2. There-being as Center of Man

We saw, but did not develop, the fact that the transcendental imagination is the center of the entire man. Let us reflect on what this implies. The transcendental imagination, as that center in man where transcendence comes-to-pass, is the source that gives rise to the structure which renders possible his sensate, theoretical and moral life, sc. all that characterizes him as a man. Giving rise to these three dimensions, it is their fundament, their ground, hence ontologically precedes them all and enjoys over them a certain primacy. Granting that the pure

187 KM, p. 139 (frei bildenden und entwerfenden), 141 (Hinnehmens von Sichgebenden).
188 "... Die transzendentale Einbildungskraft entwirft bildend im vorhinein das Ganze der Möglichkeiten, in das sie 'hinaussieht', um sich dadurch den Horizont vorzuhalten, innerhalb dessen das erkennende Selbst, und nicht nur dieses, handelt..." (KM, p. 142).
imagination is equivalent to There-being, we can understand how There-being can be profoundly “human” without being identified in unqualified fashion with man as such.\footnote{Even at this point (1929), long before \textit{HB} (1947), we can see that a Sartrean interpretation of There-being is a distortion.}

By the same token, we can see that if we define There-being as “existence,” this characterizes man on a different and deeper level than that whereon the word \textit{existentia} in the tradition found its meaning, sc. as opposed (whether really or rationally) to essence. Would it not be possible, then, that the entire problematic of Heidegger, placed as it is on a different level, might leave intact the traditional questions concerning essence-existence, substance-accident, etc., and, if it succeeds, simply serve to lay the indispensable groundwork for them?

3. There-being as Subject

We saw in \textit{SZ} the insistence which Heidegger lays on the fact that There-being is not to be understood as a subject, although it is unquestionably a self — a pre-subjective self that precedes the dichotomy of subject and object and renders this dichotomy possible — sc. it is transcendence. Now we can see how this is articulated in a Kantian context.

For the transcendental imagination is more than a mere subject of knowledge. Its task is to institute the horizon within which two beings, knower and to-be-known, can encounter each other and become opposed as subject-object. It renders the subject-object relation possible. This horizon, for all its intrinsic unity, may be considered from two different points of view. On the one hand, it is a self-orientation of the knowing subject toward the being-to-be-known-as-object. This is the “subjective” aspect. In this sense, the horizon renders it possible for the knowing subject to \textit{be} a subject, sc. constitutes the “subjectivity of the subject.” On the other hand, however, the horizon, as the domain of objectiveness, renders it possible for the being-to-be-known to reveal itself as opposed to the knower, sc. to \textit{be} an object. This is the “objective” aspect: the horizon constitutes the “objectivity of the object.”\footnote{\textit{KM}, pp. 151, 157 (Subjektivität des Subjektes), 150 (Objektivität der Objekte).}
The horizon of transcendence instituted by the transcendental imagination, then, enables simultaneously the subject to be subject and the object to be object. It constitutes them as what they are, in their Being, if Being be understood as accessibility of one to the other. Transcendence, enabling as it does subject and object to be what they are, lies "between" them both, ontologically antecedes them both, and renders it possible for the relation between them (their encounter) to come about. The transcendental imagination cannot be called a "subject," because it is the center of transcendence.

Yet if the pure imagination is not a subject, this does not mean that it is any less the center of the self. On the contrary, what most radically characterizes the self of a finite knower as finite is primarily not his subjectivity but his transcendence. The transcendental imagination, then, in rendering possible transcendence, institutes the essence of the finite self.131

It is the virtue of KM to offer us some light on the relationship between transcendence, which characterizes the knower as a self, and the consciousness which characterizes him as a subject. The indications in SZ were cursory: there, too, in a Kantian context, Heidegger offered a brief sketch of the nature of transcendental apperception as a "transcendental subject," the "I think . . . " accompanying every act of synthesis, and suggested how this consciousness was conceived as lying at the base of all presentations, therefore as their subject. As a result, the subject is "consciousness in itself" ("Bewußtsein an sich"), sc. it is not itself presented, but is the formal structure of presentation as such. His criticism is that Kant interprets this conscious subject as if it were a mere entity, whose Being is understood simply as the reality of the res cogitans.132

In KM, the relation between self (transcendence) and subject (consciousness) is articulated in terms of the relation between transcendental imagination (center of transcendence) and transcendental apperception (transcendental unity of consciousness), expressed by the ego ("I think substance . . . etc."). Heidegger admits with Kant, as he had done for that matter in SZ, that the ego as unity of consciousness cannot be separated from

131 KM, p. 143. See pp. 145-146 for the problem in terms of practical reason.
132 SZ, pp. 319-320.
the processes it accompanies. Its essence lies therefore in "pure self-consciousness." We have already seen: how this transcendental apperception is the understanding in its purity; how, in the transcendental deduction, it referentially depends upon the synthesis which comes-to-pass in the transcendental imagination; how this dependence is so profound that "... the understanding, as pure apperception, has the 'ground of its possibility' in [the transcendental imagination]. ..." Now we have one significant passage where Heidegger explicates the dependence of consciousness (therefore subjectivity) upon transcendence (therefore selfhood). Let us cite it in full:

... In [the] presentative self-orientation-toward ... [a being-to-be-known], the "self" is carried along in the orientation. In such an orientation as this, sc. wherein a "self" is "exteriorized," the "ego" of this "self" is necessarily manifest. It is in this way that the "I present ..." "accompanies" every presentation ... The "ego" "goes along with" the pure self-orientation. Insofar as this "ego" is what it is only in this "I think," the essence of pure thought, as well as of the ego, lies in "pure self-consciousness." This "consciousness" of the self, however, can be illumined only by the Being of the self, not vice versa, sc. where the Being of the self is illumined by "consciousness" or even made superfluous by it.

What may we infer from this passage? We are dealing with the horizon of transcendence under its subjective aspect, as the self-orientation-toward ... of the knower, sc. toward the being-to-be-known. The orientation of the self as such establishes, by reason of the transcendental imagination, the domain of encounter with beings-to-be-known, sc. the horizon of objectiveness. At this point, we are dealing with the knower in the dimension of transcendence. Strictly speaking, then, it is the orientation that institutes the transcendence which characterizes the self.

---

133 "... Der Verstand hat als reine Apperzeption den 'Grund seiner Möglichkeit' in einem 'Vermögen', das 'in eine Unendlichkeit von selbstgemachten Vorstellungen und Begriffen hinauszieht'..." (KM, pp. 141-142).

in its finitude. But obviously there can be no orientation without that which is orientated, and in this sense the orientation carries the "itself" ("Sich") along with it. Now as the self is carried along in the orientation, the ego of this self becomes manifest and "in this way the 'I present' 'accompanies' all presentation." Here, then, we are dealing with the dimension of consciousness by reason of which the knower is designated as a subject. It is capital to note, however, that consciousness (therefore subjectivity) is, ontologically speaking, subsequent to the orientation (therefore transcendence) of the self which consciousness makes manifest. What is primary is the self, not as subject but as transcendence. That is why consciousness, ontologically subsequent, must be explained by that which is ontologically prior, sc. the Being of the self which consciousness manifests. To reverse the procedure – and here we may detect an undeniable, if unexpressed, polemic against the idealists – is to distort the whole problematic.

With this much to help us, we can understand, if we recall how Heidegger in SZ tried to explore the Being-structure of the self as transcendence (to-be-in-the-World), the significance of such a remark as the following: "In saying 'I,' There-being brings itself to expression as to-be-in-the-World. . . ." 135 We can understand, too, how Heidegger can claim that Kant, in failing to explore the self in terms of its transcendence, interpreted it, when all is said and done, as a mere entity. Finally, we can understand in what sense his own effort to interpret KRV in terms of what is left un-said, yet somehow lies hidden in Kant’s pronouncements, leads him to ground the unity of consciousness (therefore the specific character of subjectivity), not only in the transcendental imagination (instituting the self in its transcendence), but more radically still in the unity of time, where the pure imagination itself has its source.136 It is not so important for our purposes to follow him through the details of his argument here.137 Much more significant is the general

---

137 Perhaps the most striking part of the analysis comes when, having established that the receptivity that characterizes a finite subject as finite is rendered possible only by the pure receptivity (Selbst-affektion) of time as a component of transcendence (pp. 171–174), Heidegger proceeds to show that Kant characterized both time and consciousness by the same predicates, "stehende und bleibende" (pp. 174–177).
direction of his thought: the self as a subject, sc. rendered manifest by the transcendental unity of consciousness, is ontologically subsequent to and rendered possible by the self as transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time.

C. THOUGHT

In SZ, Heidegger went about discerning the sense of Being by means of phenomenological analysis. In KM, he thinks the Being-process by re-trieving a potentiality for Being that has been exploited already, sc. Kant’s essay at grounding metaphysics. The task is not simply to re-iterate the problem but to re-work it, to develop it as a problem, retaining “free and awake all those interior forces that render this problem in its fundamental essence possible.” In the present case, this process of re-trieve means something more than a mere exposition of what Kant said. Rather, it means bringing to light what he did not say, could not say, yet nevertheless laid before our eyes as unsaid in the formulae that he actually used:

... All this, however, Kant himself was no longer able to say. For that matter, what must become decisive [for us] in every type of philosophical knowledge is not what is expressed in explicit formulae, but what is laid before our eyes as still unsaid through the formulae that are used. 138

But does not such an interpretation do violence to the original text? Of course it does! No one sees this more clearly or concedes it more readily than Heidegger. “Obviously in order to wring from what the words say that which they want to say, every interpretation inevitably must do violence. . . .” 139 The point is made in the original text of KM. The author repeats it in another form twenty years later, justifying it only on the grounds that such are the demands of a “thoughtful dialogue” between thinkers. Briefly, it is essential to the method of re-trieve.

But this necessary violence is not sheer arbitrariness. It must be subject to the discipline of a controlling idea. Only the power

---

138 “... Dieses aber vermochte Kant selbst nicht mehr zu sagen, wie denn überhaupt in jeder philosophischen Erkenntnis nicht das entscheidend werden muß, was sie in den ausgesprochenen Sätzen sagt, sondern was sie als noch Ungesagtes durch das Gesagte vor Augen legt.” (KM, p. 181).

139 “Um freilich dem, was die Worte sagen, dasjenige abszwingen, was sie sagen wollen, muß jede Interpretation notwendig Gewalt brauchen...” (KM, p. 183).
of this idea can warrant the apparently presumptuous effort of surrendering oneself to the inner movement of a philosophical work in order to bring to expression that which was not and could not be said in the original. And through its capacity, thus proven, to do precisely this, the controlling idea reveals itself more and more in its inherent power.

Let us make the point once and for all, for the matter will recur. If, in evaluating the author's efforts, one accuses Heidegger of doing violence to "that which is said" (das Gesagte), he misses the point completely. He fails to grasp the whole sense of Heidegger's effort at re-tive, which is to say what an author did not say, could not say, but somehow made manifest. The only legitimate approach is to precise and evaluate the fundamental idea which commands this violence and gives it in a profound way its sense, sc. Heidegger's conception of Being itself.

Résumé

We take our bearings again. In our search to lay bare the foundations of metaphysics, phenomenology (SZ) showed us that the structure in man which enables him to metaphysicize is the process of finite transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time. As an historical process, There-being achieves authenticity with regard to its past by re-tive potentialities for Being that already have been exploited. One such potentiality is Kant's effort to ground metaphysics, and in KM Heidegger attempts to re-tive it. What in SZ was called the "comprehension of Being" is in KM the "ontological synthesis" and "transcendence," sc. the pre-ontic seizure of Being-structure that renders it possible for beings to be encountered.

As synthesis, transcendence is not only fusion of knower and known but, in the knower, of intuition and thought. As pre-ontic, sc. prior to sense experience ("pure"), it is the union of pure intuition (space and time) and the categories of the understanding, accomplished through the schemata of the transcendental imagination, which therefore is the center in man which institutes the horizon of transcendence. In this horizon: knower has access to known, because ontological knowledge is the ante-
cedent orientation of knower towards beings-to-be-known, enabling him to be a subject; known has access to knower, because the horizon enables the being-to-be-known to appear as itself, hence to be an object. Constituting, then, both the subjectivity (Being) of the subject and objectivity (Being) of the object, it is itself neither subject nor object but the domain of accessibility of one to the other. It is pure transcendence.

The horizon of transcendence is not a being; for the finite knower, because finite, cannot institute (create) the beings it knows. Therefore it is Non-being, or, more positively, pure Presence and ontological truth — in any case, ineluctably finite. As for the center of transcendence (the pure imagination), it is certainly a self, but, because (ontologically) prior to the subject-object relationship, it is a non-subjective, pre-subjective self, whose unity derives from the tri-dimensional unity of time.

Briefly: for (Heidegger’s) Kant as well as for Heidegger, the structure in man which enables him to metaphysicize is the process of finite transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time.

And yet, all is not well. 1. Granting that re-trieve necessarily comports violence in wringing the un-said from the said, how are we to discern this controlling idea that gives it warrant, so that we may be sure we are submitting to a discipline and are not prey to mere arbitrariness? 2. Granting the fact that Heidegger here has thought Being by re-trieving Kant’s problematic, in what sense is it a re-trieve of There-being’s past? What is the relation between Heidegger’s There-being and Kant’s? If it is the “same” There-being in both, then what is the relation between the individual thinker and There-being? What “is” an individual? What “is” There-being? What “is” thought?

At this point, these questions are not intended in any sense as a critique. They are meant merely to sharpen our vision as we proceed.
CHAPTER III

THE ESSENCE OF GROUND

I. The Argument

The Essence of Ground (1929) is one of the hardest diamonds in all of Heidegger's ample treasury.\(^1\) Appearing two years after SZ, it offers, together with WM, the first public explications of the major work. That Heidegger chose to publish a meditation on what constitutes the essence of ground should not surprise us. In KM, we saw how, faithful to the program of grounding metaphysics as delineated in SZ, the author analysed the transcendental imagination as the "ground upon which the inner possibility of ... general metaphysics is instituted," simply because it is the center where transcendence comes-to-pass. It is certainly plausible, then, that he articulate further the relation between transcendence and ground in language and perspective more properly his own.

It seems superfluous to include here a study of the word "ground" in SZ, for Heidegger's use of the word there does not call attention to itself, and an investigation of this kind would not advance us very much. Only two uses of the word seem to be particularly suggestive: the conception of guilt, which, as "ground of negativity," is applied to There-being inasmuch as There-being's own ground (Being) is permeated by negativity; the word "founding" (Begründen), which Heidegger uses sometimes with quotation marks to suggest a meaning foreign to his own (v.g. when used with regard to scientific research),

\(^1\) Vom Wesen des Grundes, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949). (Hereafter: WG). New printing (1955) in larger type (text unchanged) brings text to 54 pp. instead of 50 pp. For the correlated pagination of both editions, see "Index of Texts Cited."
sometimes without, to suggest the elaboration of the antecedent project of Being-structure which lies beneath the level of scientific investigation. The real affinity between WG and SZ, however, lies in the conception of transcendence as to-be-in-the-World. We come at once, then, to the text.

The author begins with a salute to Aristotle, recalling that the problem of ground arises for him under two forms: as ἐπίγεια and as ἀξίωσις. There are three forms of ἐπίγεια (that by which a being is, or becomes, or is known), which Heidegger interprets as the ground for its what-ness, its that-ness and its truth (Wahr-sein). On the other hand, there are four types of ground in the sense of ἀξίωσις, or "cause." The relation between these two general classifications of ground remains obscure, still more the common denominator of all these forms taken as one. In a general way, then, we may say that for Aristotle ground is that which enables us to answer the question: "why?"

The problem of ground reappears with Leibniz' formulation of the "principle of ground" (Satz vom Grund), or, as we translate in English directly from the Latin, the "principle of sufficient reason." It is here that Heidegger begins his own analysis, dividing the essay into three parts:

I. The Problem of Ground. Here he shows that the problem is essentially one of truth, and, since it is the transcendence of There-being that is primary truth, one of transcendence.

II. Transcendence as Domain for the Question about the Essence of Ground. This includes a positive explanation of transcendence and a historical survey (re-trive?) of the notion of the World, which is that whereunto There-being transcends. Special emphasis is given to Kant.

III. The Essence of Ground. This is an analysis of ground in the perspective of transcendence. Since this is the decisive part of our study, we resume Part I hastily, pass over Part II as already sufficiently handled for our purpose, and come as quickly as possible to Part III.

---

* SZ, pp. 283 (Grundsein), 362 ("Begründung,“ Begründung).
* WG, p. 7.
A. FROM GROUND TO TRANSCENDENCE

The function of Part I is to situate the problem of ground clearly in the context of the author's own thought, according to which, access to the meaning of Being is had in a being (There-being) whose nature is to transcend beings to Being. The bridge between the problem of ground and the transcendence of There-being is the existential notion of truth.

The reduction of the problem of ground to the problem of truth is quickly accomplished. To be sure, the principle of ground (sufficient reason) tells us nothing about the nature of ground, but it can serve as a starting point for the analysis, if we recall that for Leibniz this principle was based on what he considered to be the nature of truth. For him, truth is found primarily in the judgement, sc. in an identity of an S and P, where P is contained in (therefore identical with) the S. Every truth can be demonstrated, then, by an analysis of S, and the derivation of P from S in a proposition constitutes the sufficient reason of its truth, sc. the answer to: "why?" The reason why the principle of ground (sufficient reason) is valid is that if it were not, then there would be a proposition, presumably true, whose P could not be derived analytically from S, therefore necessarily untrue. Contradiction!

Heidegger now argues: a proposition is true only if it is conformed to that which it expresses and on the ground of which the proposition is said to be true. Truth as conformity pre-supposes another type of truth. It does not make its object accessible but pre-supposes its accessibility, sc. that the being-to-be-judged is already manifest, and it is by reason of this manifestation, sc. ontic truth, that the proposition may be called true or untrue. The truth of judgements, then, is grounded in ontic truth.

Yet even ontic truth is not absolutely primary, for it reveals itself only in the ontic comportment of There-being with other beings (because it is ontic). In order for beings to manifest themselves for what they are in an ontic comportment, There-being must have an antecedent comprehension of their Being-structure, sc. the Being of these beings. "... The unveiled-ness of Being

---

4 A position reversed in 1935, with no more discrepancy than exists between Heidegger I and Heidegger II. See SG, pp. 75, 84-86.

5 WG, pp. 10-12.
From There to Being

[in comprehension by There-being] first renders possible the manifestation of beings...,” and this unveiled-ness is the truth of Being, sc. ontological truth. Ontological truth renders possible (therefore grounds) ontic truth, which in turn is the ground for the truth of judgements on which the principle of ground (sufficient reason), as Leibniz formulated it, is based (grounded). The problem of ground, then, is transposed into the problem of truth.

Now the problem of truth is essentially the problem of transcendence. For ontic truth (the manifestation of beings in their Being) is rendered possible by ontological truth (the unveiled-ness of the Being of beings). These two types of truth presuppose, then, the distinction between Being and beings (the ontological difference), but how is such a distinction possible except by reason of a being, immersed among the rest, so constituted that, ontological as well as ontic, it can comprehend, sc. disclose or project, the Being of beings, including itself, and thus pass beyond beings to their Being? This, however, is the prerogative of There-being, for There-being is transcendence. If we are to understand ground, we must explore the nature of transcendence.

B. FROM TRANSCENDENCE TO GROUND

1. The Process of Ground: its Components

The task of Part III of the meditation is to explain in what sense transcendence can be called the essence of ground. The relationship between transcendence and ground Heidegger calls the “process of grounding,” or the “coming-to-pass of ground” (das Gründen). This unified process has three components whose characteristics we have seen already in the essential, but which receive now new designations, better adapted to sustain metaphorically the interpretation of transcendence as ground: “laying-claim” (Stiften), “taking-possession” (Boden nehmen), “founding” (Begründen). The terms are not, of course, self-evident and must be explained. For the moment, let us remark

7 WG, p. 41. For the sake of clarity, we omit all allusion to freedom in the general analysis of the argument, reserving to it a general remark all its own.
simply that each plays its own particular rôle, and, still sustaining the metaphor, we may speak of the three components as being scattered, or strewn-out (streuen), as ground. But they are coordinated into the unity of a single process, which consequently should be called the "threelfold strewing of ground." 8

a. Laying-claim and Taking-possession — The first component of the process by which ground comes-to-pass we have called "laying claim," but this is simply a new formula for what is already familiar to us, the project of the World: the passage of There-being beyond beings to Being, the establishing of its ontological dimension, that which we have called the positive moment of transcendence.9

But transcendence is finite. We have seen that this finitude consists primarily in There-being's facticity, suggesting both its referential dependence on other beings and its that-ness, and is disclosed by the ontological disposition. Hence, in WG the same themes, when they return, are quite familiar. The project of World is brought-to-pass by a being immersed among other beings, among which it finds itself and beyond which it must pass in the process of transcendence. That which is transcended (here: beings) belongs as essentially to the transcendence as that whereunto the transcendence is made (here: Being), for we must never forget that the Being of which there is question is always the Being of beings.10 This immersion among beings means that There-being is captivated (eingenommen) by beings, reverberates profoundly in attunement with them (durchstimmt), and this precisely in transcending them.11 This state of captivation is what we formerly called the referential dependence of There-being on beings and explains the other important phrase to the effect that There-being is just as essentially an ontic as an ontological phenomenon. Furthermore, the fact that There-being is so orientated towards beings is not of its own choosing, and There-being is powerless to change this condition, for it is

8 WG, pp. 46-47 (dreifache Streuung des Gründens). If the term "strewing" seems awkward to the English reader, let him find what comfort he can in knowing that it is just as awkward in German. In this case, at least, the translation seems to be philosophically, philosophically and psychologically exact.
9 WG, pp. 41-42.
11 WG, p. 42. For another statement of the sense of attunement, see WW, p. 28.
precisely unto such a state of dependence that There-being has been thrown.\textsuperscript{18} The dual implication of captivation by beings (thrown-ness and referential dependence), when considered in the context of the coming-to-pass of ground, is designated by Heidegger as "taking-possession" or the "winning" of ground.

The figure needs explanation. The positive component of transcendence is the project of World (Being), because it is positive and does not of itself connote any restriction of the possibilities it projects. This does not mean, of course, that the project in its purity is "infinite," for what is projected is not "infinite" but the complex of Total Meaningfulness which is a profoundly finite World. When we consider the project as untrammeled positivity, however, we think of it as the disclosure of the countless potentialities that There-being could have, if all of the situations latent in the matrix of the World were realized. But all of these situations are not – and cannot be – realized. There-being, in its finitude, exists always in one situation that necessarily excludes all others. If we may consider the project in precision from this contraction, in its positivity therefore, we may say that it "exceeds" (\textit{überschwingt}), or "over-reaches," itself, for the contraction must inevitably come. Yet in this untrammeled positivity, it scans the horizon of the World and, like Alexander, lays-claim to it all. It is in this sense that we understand the process of grounding in its positive moment to be essentially a "laying-claim."\textsuperscript{13}

But in the process of grounding as it actually takes place, this wide-ranging project is contracted into a given situation into which There-being is thrown, where it is captivated by beings that are all about and with which it must deal. Through this contraction, certain possibilities that could have been There-being's are as a matter of fact withdrawn, and There-being is left in that situation wherein it actually finds itself, sc. limited by its own facticity. It is through this withdrawal (\textit{Entzug}) of the unrestricted possibilities which could have been, that There-being enters into the possession of the restricted possibilities that are its own to assume, thus winning the ground of its actual

\textsuperscript{18} WG, p. 43. The contraction reduces the sphere of There-being's possibilities to those which it has chosen for itself, or which are imposed upon it or result from adaptation to milieu, etc. See SZ, p. 12.
matter-of-fact existence. It is in this sense, then, that There-being takes possession of a very restricted sphere of the possibilities to which its positivity had laid claim.

The component of positivity is that which projects the World; the component of negativity is that which contracts this project to the matter-of-fact situation. What is important, however, is the fact that the two are complementary, mutually dependent, simultaneous, unified. It is only in the withdrawal of the possibilities that could have been but are not There-being’s that the project becomes “actual.” In other words, There-being can be “actual” only if it is finite:

... That in any given case the over-reaching project of the World becomes the power of possession only by a withdrawal [of possibilities] is by this very fact a transcendental document of the finitude of the [transcendence] of There-being. ...  

b. TRANSCENDENTAL FOUNDING – But we have not yet considered the grounding-process in its totality. This process implies more than simply the passage beyond beings to Being, together with the thrown-ness among beings upon which There-being referentially depends and beyond which it passes. Up to this point, There-being’s reference to beings is of a very general type, characterizing its thrown-ness as such. With this, nothing yet is said about the comportment with beings that makes up There-being’s everyday commerce and into which, because of its structure as negatived project, it may now enter. There must be, then, a third component in transcendence as ground. The first component, project, renders possible the antecedent comprehension of the Being of beings but cannot explain completely this comprehension, inasmuch as, taken in its purity, it is not itself a relation between There-being and beings. On the other
hand, the second component, captivation, supplies a referential dependence on beings in general but is not itself existentiell comportment with any one being or with any given complex of them. The function of the third component will be, then, to render possible this comportment as such, sc. to enable There-being to enter into commerce with beings by making them manifest in themselves and as themselves. Briefly, the third component of transcendence as ground renders possible ontic truth. It must be given a designation all its own. Heidegger calls it by a term we translate as “founding.” It is the last of the components essential to the coming-to-pass of ground.

With regard to this third component of the grounding-process, sc. the founding of beings, there are several important observations to make:

\[i. \textit{Ontic and Ontological Truth} \]

Founding is concerned with There-being’s comportment with beings, to be sure, but it would be a mistake to think that we have ascended to the purely ontic level. The founding of beings, as we have described it, renders possible ontic truth (the manifestation of beings in their Being), but for that reason it is more than merely ontic truth. Insofar as we are dealing completely with the ontological dimension of There-being, the level of transcendence, the founding we speak of is a “transcendental founding.” It renders possible ontic truth because it unveils the Being and Being-structure of beings, but such an unveiling is precisely what is meant by ontological truth: “... in [the comprehension of Being], transcendence is, as such, a founding. Because in this comprehension Being and Being-structure become unveiled, transcendental founding is called ontological truth.”

Transcendental founding, then, lies at the “base” of all ontic comportment, permeating this comportment continually, and, by reason of its effulgence, enables beings to become manifest as beings, sc. in their Being. On the ontic level, however, every

\[\text{16} \text{ WG, p. 44. The prefix } \text{be} \text{ in German often gives verbs an active, transitive sense of } \text{“to give, render,” etc. Here the sense seems to be } \text{“to give ground” to beings in the sense of unveiling this ground, sc. ontic truth.} \]

\[\text{17} \text{ “... In ihm ist die Transzendenz als solche begründend. Weil darin Sein und Seinsverfassung enthält werden, heißt das transcendente Begründen die ontologische Wahrheit.” (WG, p. 45). Heidegger’s italics.}\]
type of illuminating comportment, whether it be the disclosure of There-being itself or the discovery of beings other than There-being, must be in its own way a “founding.” By this is meant that it must give an account of itself, sc. present its credentials (sich ausweisen). It is in the process of justifying beings in the ontic dimension of There-being that the question of “cause” or “purpose” arises. The problem of causality, according to Heidegger, poses itself, then, on the ontic level, and although this does not exclude the ontological dimension but rather supposes it, we can see in what way Heidegger feels justified in making his criticism of Aristotle’s initial presentation of the four causes as types of ground:

... It is the characteristic of the first exposition of the “four causes” that thereby there is not yet made the fundamental distinction between transcendental grounding and the specific ontic causes. ...  

In any case, let us retain that for Heidegger, the third component of transcendence as the grounding-process of There-being is transcendental founding, which as ontological truth renders possible all manifestation of beings in their Being, sc. ontic truth.

ii. The Question: “Why?” – It is the transcendental founding, sc. ontological truth, that ultimately renders possible the question: “why?,” the answer to which is what men spontaneously mean by “ground.” For all questions can be reduced ultimately to three basic types of “why?”: why is a being so and not otherwise? why is it this rather than another? why is it something at all and not nothing? (the ground-question). In each case, There-being, in order to pose the question at all, must have an antecedent comprehension of the how and the what of beings, of Being and of Non-being itself. “... It is this comprehension of Being that first renders possible the ‘why?’ ...”  

This means, however, that this antecedent comprehension, which we have seen to be the same as ontological truth, contains within itself the first and last answer to all questioning, and in this sense antecedent comprehension is the first – and last – founding of all beings.

19 “... Dieses Seinsverständnis ermöglicht erst das Warum....” (WG, p. 45).
It is worth adding that in its transcendental origin, the "why?" arises, according to Heidegger, out of the tension between the component of positivity and the component of negativity.

... In the project of World, there is given an excess of potentiality, and it is in view of this, together with the fact that [There-being] is permeated by surrounding beings (actuality) which the ontological disposition [discloses], that the "why?" arises.\textsuperscript{10}

Furthermore, since positive and negative components necessarily complement each other, the arising of "why?" is a transcendental necessity, sc. a necessary element of transcendence. The significance for us is simply to see that when dealing with the transcendental origin of "why?" (and the comprehension of Being-structure that it implies), we are groping to understand, however clumsily, the outbreak of the ontological difference itself. And we have here, besides, another testimony to the finitude of transcendence.

\textit{iii. The Triplex Unity} – If the coming-to-pass of ground is a profoundly unified process, if its positive and negative components complement each other and transcendental founding necessarily complements them both, then the last of the three components is equally as original as the other two, arises simultaneously with them both. In analysing this unified correlation of three distinct components, then, we have discerned the essence of ground. "... The essence of ground is the triplex strewing of the grounding process that arises in transcendence: the project of the World, the captivation by beings and the ontological founding of beings."\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{iv. Logos} – In SZ, the three components of transcendence as the disclosedness of the World were enumerated as comprehension, disposition and logos. In WG, there is explicit mention only of project and disposition. However, the third component

\textsuperscript{10} "... Im Weltentwurf ist ein Überschung von Möglichem gegeben, im Hinblick worauf und im Durchwaltetsein von dem in der Befindlichkeit umdrängenden Seienden (Wirklichen) das Warum entspringt." (WG, pp. 44–45).

of transcendence as the coming-to-pass of ground, sc. transcendental founding, is a component that is equally original with the other two, and its function is to make possible the manifestation of beings because by its effulgence it lets-be-seen the Being-structure of beings. \(^{22}\) Does the founding-process here correspond to logos?

There is nothing of an explicit nature to warrant such an identification. If the author had intended it, certainly he could have suggested it without distorting (or prolonging) his analysis. Hence we should conclude, perhaps, that the omission was deliberate and renounce any effort to force him to say what he chose not to say. On the other hand, if we do not see an intrinsic correlation between transcendental founding and logos, is there not a serious lacuna in WG which is difficult to reconcile not only with the closeness of the author’s reasoning in this essay but also with the clear and intimate coherence between the present text and SZ?

Let us leave the matter open and note only: that the analysis of logos as an existential of There-being is perhaps the most obscure and least satisfying section of SZ; that the reason for this quite possibly is that the full sense of logos has not yet crystallized for the author; that WG, because of its brevity, is restricted to a few bold strokes on the canvas, and a more detailed elaboration of the concept of transcendental founding would very probably have brought the author to grips with the problem of explicitation, sense, meaning, etc. – in a word the whole apparatus of hermeneutic interpretation; that an identification of founding and logos would permit us to see how logos articulates the negatived comprehension of Being (World), insofar as it would provide a relation in There-being between the project and beings-to-be-encountered; that such an identification would give to logos a still un-thematized but central rôle in the evolution of the problem of Being as the problem of truth; that this central rôle of logos, discerned as early as this, would explain why an effort to think the truth of Being will involve more and more a meditation on the nature of language, the articulation of logos. \(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\) WG, pp. 44–45.

\(^{23}\) What is said here was elaborated exclusively on the basis of a textual analysis of WG and SZ, pp. 160–161, 161. Subsequent publication of a private conversation (1953–54) seems to confirm the hypothesis beyond any serious doubt, and even to suggest the reason why Heidegger was reluctant to make the explicitation himself (US, p. 93).
2. The Process of Ground: its Finitude

Thus far, we have seen in some detail how Heidegger understands ground in terms of transcendence, both intrinsically united in the coming-to-pass of truth. But since transcendence is radically finite, so too must be ground (therefore truth). This is worth emphasis.

That the problem of finitude cannot be avoided is clear from the very fact that we are attempting a philosophical, hence properly human, explanation of the essence of ground. This means, however, that we must take into consideration the non-essence of ground, sc. the essence as permeated by a "not," as negativied, as finite. We saw above how the project of the World must be negativied by the withdrawal of possibilities that it could-have-been-but-is-not before it can be "actual," and called this a "transcendental document" of finitude, since it is here that we can see how transcendence as ground is radically permeated by a "not." But we may go further. Not only is the project of World negativied through captivation, but transcendental founding, which complements them both, is also negativied, finite. On the ontic level, therefore, There-being, founding individuals by letting them give an account of themselves, is quite capable of covering-up their "ground," or distorting it. If transcendental founding brings-to-pass ontological truth, then as negativied it must bring-about ontological un-truth, which renders possible the ontic un-truth that we saw in SZ.

The essence of ground, then, is profoundly negativied, implies a "not," comports with itself non-essence, and this simply because it springs from a transcendence that is finite: "... ground has its non-essence, because it arises out of finite [transcendence]. ..." Profoundly modified by "not," ground has not only its non-essence but is also non-ground (Ab-grund). "... As such a ground, however, [transcendence] is the non-ground of There-being. ..." And if we are to explain the

\[\text{24} \text{ WG, p. 8.} \]
\[\text{25} \text{ WG, p. 45.} \]
\[\text{26} \text{ "... Der Grund hat sein Un-wesen, weil er der endlichen Freiheit entspringt. ..." (WG, p. 49).} \]
\[\text{27} \text{ "... Als dieser Grund aber ist die Freiheit der Ab-grund des Daseins. ..." (WG, p. 49).} \]

Heidegger's italics. Like Geschick, Ab-grund will undergo an evolution in Heidegger II.
essence of the finitude of There-being, it is to this conception of transcendence as the non-ground that we must have recourse, before we begin to talk about the "nature" of man or to describe the effects of this finitude in his activity, or even, as far as Heidegger is concerned, to ask about his ontic origin.

3. The Process of Ground: its Temporality

We have one more step to make. In SZ, we saw that the ultimate origin of concern, "the structural unity of finite transcendence," is time. What is the rôle of time in the coming-to-pass of ground? Heidegger expressly avoids a thematic treatment of the question, yet suggests clearly enough its importance. His most explicit remark comes where the question is posed as to what explains the fact that the three components of the grounding-process, for all the profound differences between them, can nevertheless be called by the same name of "ground." There is, to be sure, an identity of sorts, he admits, for all three components: "... each in its own way arises out of concern ... which itself in turn is possible only as temporality." We are brought before the very same perspective, then, as in SZ.

For our present purposes, we may be content simply to indicate this fact. Its importance lies in helping us to see that here again, as in both SZ and KM, we are brought in the end before a question mark: what is the nature of time? And this is to be understood not as simply another question that ought to be asked but as the only question which really matters, for in asking it we are posing the Being-question itself. The Being-question, then, remains primary. All other analyses up to now are of a preparatory nature, and have as their purpose to open up "the transcendental horizon of the question of Being." When we are told that the temporal aspect of transcendence in WG is deliberately omitted, we infer that the Being-question remains paramount but cannot be constrained within the present limits. The question itself, however, is apparently more imperious than ever. At any rate, for the present we are still seeking access to

---

88 WG, pp. 42 (note 60), 47.
90 WG, pp. 44 (note 60), 47.
the question, and in the analysis of ground which leads us to a
meditation on truth, that access has turned out to be once more
the coming-to-pass of finite transcendence, whose ultimate
meaning is time.

II. General Remarks

A. BEING AND TRUTH

The preceding analysis speaks for itself to say that Heidegger's
principal preoccupation in WG, as already noted, is basically the
problem of Being, and, indeed, Being in the sense of unveiled-
ness, sc. truth. Insofar as the present meditation is a terse condi-
sation of the main theses of SZ, we can see again how profoundly
the problem of truth lies at the center of the first work. And the
author finds justification for the general orientation of his
problem in the example of the early Greek thinkers: "... The
earliest questioning about the essence of ground proved to be
entwined with the task of clarifying the essence of Being and
truth." Conversely, we see why his declared intention of
seeking the meaning of Being leads him to devote a separate
essay to the study of ground.

Does WG advance in any way our search for an answer to the
Being-question? There is no need to cull texts which re-state
what we already know, but we find one nuance worth noting:
the author's insistence that Being is always the Being of beings.
Even antecedent comprehension is never a seizure of Being as
such. However, even if inseparable, Being and beings are
nevertheless different:

... Ontic and ontological truth always pertain to different [dimensions]:
beings in their Being and the Being of beings. They belong essentially
together on the ground of their relationship to the difference between
Being and beings (the ontological difference). ... So far, so good.

81 See WG, p. 39 (note 39), where Heidegger insists that the Being-question is
primary throughout SZ and, by inference, WG.
82 "Und einzig deshalb erweist sich schon das früheste Fragen nach dem Wesen
des Grundes als verschlungen mit der Aufgabe einer Erhellung des Wesens von Sein
84 "... Ontische und ontologische Wahrheit betreffen je verschieden [:] Seiendes
Now we are told that "... the essence of truth, necessarily bi-furcated in this [double dimension], is only possible in the first place with the out-break of the ontological difference. . . ." \textsuperscript{35}

This, too, presents no great difficulty, especially if we recall that, when all is said and done, truth and Being for Heidegger are one. The important point comes when we are told that the ontological difference comes about only by reason of the power of There-being to differentiate between Being and beings. It is this that is meant by There-being's transcendence. We see immediately the poverty of the word "transcendence" itself, which is, after all, a metaphysical word. Soon Heidegger will drop it completely. Moreover, notice: that the "term" of There-being's transcendence is not Being understood as the being-ness of beings, but Being understood as the emergence of the difference between Being and beings; that this difference emerges with There-being's transcendence ("... we name this ground of the ontological difference ... the transcendence of There-being"); \textsuperscript{36} that there might be textual ground, even in 1929, for suspecting that the ontological difference as such has somehow a primacy over There-being: "... the power to differentiate, through which the ontological difference becomes a fact, must have struck the roots of its own potentiality in the ground of There-being's essence. . . ." \textsuperscript{37}

Reading this text, as we do, in the light of Heidegger II, it is all too easy to force the evidence. But even if in all rigor we cannot claim here an anticipation of Heidegger II, the text remains curious, nonetheless. This much is worth noting.

One last revealing remark comes when, having analysed ground, the author returns to consider the principle of ground (sufficient reason), from which he took his start. He argues thus: the principle of ground is a principle that has its application with regard to beings, sc. "every being has its ground"; the reason is that Being itself has the transcendental character of...
"ground," inasmuch as, when antecedently comprehended, it founds beings, sc. by its effulgence renders possible their truth; but this is possible only because Being occurs in and through and with the transcendence of There-being, which is, in the primary sense, the process of grounding. "... Ground belongs to the essence of Being because there is Being (not beings) only in transcendence as the World-projecting, dispositional coming-to-pass of ground." 38

B. THERE-BEING AND THOUGHT

Here, as in SZ, the author takes special pains to insist that There-being as transcendence is not a subject in the sense of that which is opposed to an object, v.g. the "World," as two beings on the ontic level. Transcendence is the ontological dimension of There-being. If one insists on calling There-being a "subject," then transcendence is the essence of this subject, sc. the ground-structure of "subjectivity," that which makes the subject to be a subject, its Being. Here, then, "... to be a subject means to be a being in and as transcendence. ..." The author's meaning is clear. In meditating transcendence, we have achieved the Being-level of There-being which first renders possible the subject-object dichotomy. Let us admit, however, that his formula "ground-structure of subjectivity" is disconcerting. We can notice how his language is victimized by the very subject-ism he is trying to overcome. The situation will soon change, and it is useful for us to see him in transition.

There is, too, the faintest suggestion of a possible type of thinking that is non-subjective (therefore foundational) because it is non-objective. It is significant to note this, though we must not give the matter an importance that it does not yet have for the author himself. When speaking of the pre-predicative nature of ontic truth, that grounds the truth of judgements, he remarks that "... the rendering manifest [of beings] never has

The Essence of Ground

primarily the character of a mere presentation (intuition) . . .

Primarily it is rendering the being accessible to There-being, whether this be by a disclosure, as in the case of There-being, or by a discovery, as in the case of beings other than There-being. Secondarily, of course, this rendering-accessible evolves into a subject-object relation, but this is only a derivation from the initial encounter. Now to assume that the rendering-accessible were a presentation of the being-that-is-encountered, even if this presentation were considered to be an intuition, would be to classify this being already as an object opposed to a There-being considered as subject — a conception that vitiates from the beginning the genuine sense of rendering-accessible.

Of course, it is understandable, Heidegger goes on to say, how such a conception could arise, if one assume unquestioningly that truth is found primarily, therefore properly, in the judgement, sc. in a conjunction of two presentations. In such a context, then, pre-predicative truth could easily be conceived as a presentation that is not yet conjoined with another to form a judgement, but it is a presentation nonetheless. The crux of the matter is, though, that even such a disclosure as this by There-being to There-being of the being-that-is-encountered necessarily presupposes that the being itself is already manifest to There-being. It is this manifestation (or accessibility) of beings prior to objectivizing presentation and rendering such a presentation possible that Heidegger calls ontic truth. When all is said and done, the entire polemic against presentative thought which we are about to see unfold is based on the fact that, even though it be natural to man, it forgets this pre-presentative openness.

Now it is this pre-presentational (ontic) truth of beings and the transcendental condition of its possibility (ontological truth) that is the focus of Heidegger’s attention in WG, for the whole essay is an attempt to meditate the coming-to-pass of ground that renders possible not only judgement-truth but all presentation, therefore objectivation, as well. Do we have the right to say, then, that the whole essay is an effort, perhaps not yet fully

---

self-conscious, at the non-presentative, foundational thinking of the truth of Being-structure, sc. of Being?

For the sake of completeness, and in order to contrast against the background of contemporary phenomenology Heidegger's effort to overcome subjectivism and subjective thinking through the notion of a pre-subjective self, one should include a brief word here about how he situates the question of intentionality in his problematic.

The indications are few but they are clear. Heidegger calls "intentional" all comportment of There-being with beings. Intentionality, for him, is possible only on the ground of transcendence, as ontic comportment is "grounded" in the ontological structure which renders it possible. Intentionality, then, is not identical with transcendence, much less the origin of it.

The transcendence which renders this comportment possible is the project of the World, negatived by captivation by beings, out of which arises the transcendental founding of beings. Transcendental founding is explicitated on the ontic level by the bringing-to-pass of ontic truth through the existentiell comportment of There-being, and this is the level of intentionality.41

We can see here sketched in brief outline how Heidegger himself would proceed to supplement his remarks (1927, the year in which SZ appeared, two years before WG) concerning Husserl's article on "Phenomenology" for the Encyclopædia Britannica. For Husserl, making no distinction among the ways by which different beings "are," all beings experienced in the world, including the philosophizing ego, were conceived to be what Heidegger would call "mere entities." When Husserl makes the epoché of the world and its facticity, the "factual" (matter-of-fact) character of the ego is likewise "bracketed," and he must resort to a "transcendental ego," somehow separated from facticity, to account for the "constitution" of beings.42 Heidegger, as we saw, insists upon a differentiation in the way beings "are," distinguishing between mere entities, instruments, and There-being whose essence is existence, sc. transcendence. The

41 WG, pp. 15, 44.
one and the same There-being is "transcendental" as well as "matter-of-fact," simply because its "ontic excellence lies in the fact that it is ontological," sc. it is existential (in Husserl's language, a "constituting self") and existentiell (for Husserl "matter-of-fact," for Heidegger "matter-of-fact"-"intentional") at once. With this in mind, one finds that Heidegger's remark to Husserl is lucidly clear: "... The Being-structure of the human There-being ... conceals within itself the potentiality for transcendental constitution. Transcendental constitution is a central potentiality of the existence of the matter-of-fact self. ... The question about the Being-structure of the constituting self is not to be side-stepped. ..."

What the Being-structure of There-being is we have seen already in close enough detail to suit our purposes. In analysing finite transcendence, Heidegger is trying to understand that which renders all intentionality possible by explaining the structure of that being which is simultaneously ontic (therefore intentional) and ontological (therefore "transcendently constituting"). This structure is essentially the process of transcendence that comes-to-pass in the profoundly unified fashion that is concern.

C. TRANSCENDENCE AND FREEDOM

1. Freedom in WG

What will strike the casual reader as the most audacious novelty of WG, perhaps, is the author's apparently arbitrary identification of transcendence and freedom. It is here that the problem of freedom, so essential to an understanding of WW and all that follows from it, first becomes thematized. We begin by collecting the data offered in WG. The first statement of the...
matter is, perhaps, the most decisive. It comes at the beginning of Section III of the text, where the author begins to analyse transcendence in terms of ground. Recall that in the analysis of the World There-being was described as "the ultimate whereunto" of reference for beings-as-instruments, because, insofar as it is so constituted as to be concerned with its own Being, it cannot be referred beyond itself, but exists in such a way as to be its own whereunto (umwillen seiner). The reason is that There-being's unique prerogative is to be a comprehension of Being, since its existence is fundamentally transcendence.

Now to arrive at the concept of freedom, Heidegger stresses, in a play on words impossible to retain in simple English translation, the "willing" that is implied in this umwillen of There-being, sc. in being its own whereunto. Now such a "willing" obviously cannot be an "act of the will," understood as a type of comportment of There-beings (like forming concepts, judging, etc.), for we are dealing with a far deeper level of There-being, where such comportment is first made possible. Yet a "will-ing" it is, that comes-to-pass in and as transcendence. It is this "will-ing" by which There-being comes-to-pass as its own whereunto that Heidegger calls freedom. "... The transcendence to the World is freedom itself. ..."

The author is aware that his thesis may surprise his readers, and defends it immediately by saying that his conception indicates the essence of freedom in its origin better than does the more normal description of freedom as "spontaneity," sc. a type of causality. "Spontaneity," he argues, understood in the sense of "beginning by oneself," indicates only a negative characteristic of freedom, sc. that there is no cause of a given phenomenon that is ulterior to the self. This presupposes, however, that the ontological structure of the self has been explained in such a way as to account for a possible phenomenon of "by oneself"; that the same explanation of selfhood describe the dynamic, or process-character, of the self so as to account for the fact that it can be a "beginning." His own thesis, he seems to say, satisfies

44 WG, p. 34.
45 "... Der Überstieg zur Welt ist die Freiheit selbst..." (WG, p. 40). Is it more than a play on words? The question should be posed, but its answer involves a whole problematic that cannot detain us now.
these two demands. The ontological structure of the self is the ecstatic nature of existence; it is essentially not a substance enclosed within itself but a process which comes-to-pass as finite transcendence. "... The self-hood of the self that already lies at the basis of all spontaneity is, however, transcendence. ..." Transcendence, then, is the origin of freedom in the sense of spontaneity, it is freedom in its very origin.

If freedom as spontaneity be understood as a cause, then this, like other causes, is thought according to a certain determined concept of ground, or is at least a "kind" of ground. Freedom in its origin as transcendence, however, is not a special "kind" of ground but the grounding process itself. "... Freedom is freedom unto ground." With this principle to guide us, almost all subsequent references to freedom in the essay offer a sense. For example: the process of grounding, sc. transcendence, is "the original relationship between freedom and ground"; the fact that the project of the World can become "actual" only if it is negatived is a transcendent document of the finitude of the freedom of There-being, and the author goes on to ask if we may discern here the finite essence of freedom as such; freedom unto ground is freedom in the manner of the triplex strewing of ground, its grounding unity, because transcendence (therefore freedom), as the coming-to-pass of ground, is the ultimate justification of the principle of ground (sufficient reason), - freedom is the "origin of the principle of ground," "the ground of ground"; grounding has its non-essence because it springs from finite freedom, and, as such a ground, freedom is the non-ground of There-being; finally, because There-being is transcendence, its freedom is limited, sc. it does not include mastery over its own that-ness - it is profoundly and irredeemably a being that is thrown.

All of these texts orchestrate the same theme, sc. freedom and
transcendence are but one. There is only one instance which suggests a less radical sense of freedom. After explaining transcendental founding and the possible articulation of it on the ontic level by letting individual beings give an account of themselves, Heidegger adds:

... To what extent the giving-an-account [of any being] will be pushed, and whether or not this accounting is understood as an authentic founding [of this being], sc. as the unveiling of its transcendental possibility, all this in any given case is left to the freedom of There-being. ...  

The implication here seems to be that the (ontic) process of founding individual beings is somehow under There-being's control, a charge which There-being can refuse, or at least can bring about negligently, failing to advert to the authentic ontological (Being-) structure of this being, its "transcendental possibility." Briefly, it is within the scope of There-being's power to choose. Is this simply a lapse on the author's part? Or must we nuance still more his conception of freedom? Is there any special significance to attach here to the word "authentic"? We must go further.

2. Freedom in KM

First a word about KM, for there is a sentence in WG which carries a distinct resonance of the Kant interpretation. The remark concerns the conception of freedom as transcendence. In first stating his position after affirming that freedom is essentially the project by There-being of its own whereunto, Heidegger adds:

... It is in this transcending holding-up-to-one's-self [one's own] whereunto that There-being comes-to-pass in man in such a way that in the essence of his existence he imposes obligation upon himself, i.e. he can be a free self. ...  

On the one hand, this is perfectly in context with what we have seen in WG. If the essence of the self is transcendence and trans-
scendence is freedom, then the self can be free insofar as it trans-
sceed. What is striking, however, is that the weight of the
sentence seems to rest not on freedom as transcendence but on
freedom as the imposition of necessity upon oneself. This, how-
ever, is not specifically a Heideggerean but a Kantian formula.
And the author underlined it in KM. Taking Kant’s interpret-
tation of freedom as the submission to a self-imposed necessity,
he applied it to both the theoretical and the practical reason. In
both cases, submission to self-imposed necessity through the
synthesis of the transcendental imagination, center of tran-
sendence, constitutes in a genuine sense the essence of the
finite self. If one wished to prove a Kantian influence on Heideg-
ger in the designation of transcendence as freedom, one would
certainly have some textual warrant.

These are the only explicit uses of the word “freedom” in KM,
but the author uses certain derivatives, and these, too, are in-
structive. We consider the two most important of them:  

a. TO LAY-FREE – This term (Freilegung) is used always in
connection with laying the ground(work) for metaphysics. To
determine that which renders metaphysics possible in man is to
lay free the ground of its essence. For Kant himself, according
to Heidegger, this meant an “analysis,” not in a sense of atom-
izing the pure reason, but in the sense of “loosening it up” and
of “laying free the seeds of ontology,” sc. those conditions that
render it possible. In this way, the Kantian analysis was an
effort to let-be-seen “the genesis of the essence of the finite pure
reason out of its own proper ground.” This effort to “lay free”
the ultimate origin of ontology brings metaphysics back to its
ground and foundation. Concretely, this process became a
laying-free of the pure synthesis that was simultaneously an
unveiling of transcendence.

In this congeries, it seems legitimate to observe the following:
The laying-free is brought about by the philosopher in his re-

---

82 Other derivatives, coherent with analysis but not especially significant: Frei-
wegigkeit (KM, pp. 119-120); freies Bilden (KM, pp. 122, 139).
83 KM, pp. 14 (Wesensgrundes), 45 (auflockerndes Freilegen der Keime).
84 “… Analytik wird so zum Sehenlassen der Genesis des Wesens der endlichen
reinen Vernunft aus ihrem eigenen Grunde.” (KM, p. 45).
85 KM, pp. 45, 129 (Grund, Boden), 123 (Enthüllung).
reflection. If we transpose this into the language of WG, one might say that the laying-free is brought about by a There-being that, as transcendence, is its own radical freedom. There-being, in laying-free metaphysics (a being) in the origin of its possibility, is letting it give an account of itself and thus is founding it. The lay-ing free, then, is a laying of ground(work), because it is a founding of metaphysics. The laying-free of ground is a letting-be-seen and an unveiling of the origin of possibility, sc. Being-structure of the being in question (metaphysics). The whole of KM, then, is this effort to lay-free a being (metaphysics) as revealed (to-be-seen) in its Being (ground). The source of its own possibility lies in the fact that the meditating philosopher, as There-being, is freedom . . . "unto ground."

b. To MAINTAIN-FREE – The foregoing exposition gives a fresh sense to Heidegger's definition of re-trive of a ground-problem in laying the ground(work) for metaphysics: "to maintain free and awake the inner forces [of a problem], which, in the ground of its essence, enable it to be a problem," sc. to be what it is. Note here that: that is maintained "free" which is rendered manifest in the ultimate source of its Being; one way of rendering-free is by re-trive.

3. Freedom in SZ

Let us come now to SZ, where the stem "free" plays a more important rôle than in KM, giving us a clearer, if more complicated, sense. We shall review its use in the various derivations and try to disengage what is common to them all.56

a. LAYING-FREE – We begin with a term just seen in KM, where it signified to "let-be-seen" the origin of possibility, or ground, of metaphysics. Heidegger is faithful to this usage all through SZ, using it always to describe his own effort to develop a fundamental ontology. The whole phenomenological analysis of There-being is an effort to "lay free the horizon for an in-

56 In making this investigation, the writer culled as many uses of the words for "freedom" as he could find and then sifted them, after the manner of the exegetes. In reporting the research, it seems sufficient to suggest one use of each meaning. We content ourselves with that, for what we are doing is not exegesis.
terpretation of the sense of Being itself,” by laying-free the existential, sc. ontological, structure of There-being, and, indeed, in the ultimate source of its unity, time. Heidegger’s mind is clear in this case, but how explain this tenacity to the word “free” when the same sense could be expressed apparently by some such neutral word as “explain,” “expose,” etc.? A hint as to the answer appears in the suggestive remark apropos of a certain “violence” intrinsic to the existential phenomenological method, to the effect that the laying-free of There-being’s Being involves a necessary “wresting it away” from the hiddenness which holds it captive. In laying a being free, there is a profound “liberation.”

This liberation can be explained if, recalling that all of SZ is a phenomenological analysis of There-being, we keep in mind the special sense that the author gives to the notion of phenomenology, sc. to permit that which of its own accord manifests itself to reveal itself as it is. Phenomenology, however, would not be necessary, unless that which is said to manifest itself were not apparent to the every-day There-being, and, in contrast to that which first of all and for the most part preoccupies us, were hidden from our gaze. Here, then, what lies hidden “... essentially belongs to that which shows itself first of all and for the most part, in such a way as to constitute its sense and ground,” and it is precisely the task of phenomenology to let come-to-view this hidden sense and ground of the phenomenon, sc. its Being. This, after all, is the radical sense of λέγω, to lift a being out of its hidden-ness and let it be seen in its un-hiddenness, to discover it as it is. Such discovery can only come-to-pass through the process of discovering, which is the primary sense of truth. The reason, then, that There-being can bring-to-pass any kind of phenomenological description, and therefore lay-free its own ontological structure, is that There-being, as disclosedness (therefore as transcendence), is original truth. But the coming-to-pass

---

57 “das Freilegen des Horizontes für eine Interpretation des Sinnes von Sein überhaupt” (SZ, p. 15).
58 SZ, pp. 180 (existenzialen Verfassung freigelegt), 303 (Freilegung der Zeitlichkeit).
59 "... aber zugleich etwas ist, was wesenhaft zu dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, gehört, so zwar, daß es seinen Sinn und Grund ausmacht.” (SZ, p. 33).
60 SZ, pp. 218 (entdeckendsein).
61 SZ, pp. 33 (λέγω), 218 (entdeckendsein).
of this discovery (disclosedness) involves, the author admits, violence. The truth of individual beings must be "wrested" (*abgerungen*) from them, sc. they must be "torn away from" the hiddenness that holds them prisoner. We must "rob" them from obscurity. After all, what else can be the sense of the alpha-privative in ἀ-λήθευσιν? 62

b. **Rendering-Free** – More frequent still than "laying-free" is the expression "giving free" (*Freigabe*) in the sense of "giving freedom to" or "rendering free." The principal difference from laying-free presumably consists in the fact that the former expression seems reserved for the most part to a context that considers the existential analysis itself as an effort at fundamental ontology, the latter to phenomena that are considered within the horizon of the research, principally in the analysis of the World.

It is the pre-disclosed World, itself, that, prior to all ontic contact with beings, renders them free to their Being. More precisely, when There-being discovers a purposeful being as purposeful, sc. inserted into the pattern of references which gives it its meaning, There-being lets this being be destined towards its purpose. This occurs in the ontic dimension, insofar as There-being permits the being to exercise its own particularity (v.g. lets it be a hammer), but in the ontological dimension, insofar as There-being lets the instrument be (be a hammer). Since the being that is thus discovered must be before it can be a hammer, the ontological letting-be antecedes the ontic.

c. **To be (Become) Free for** – The term "free," however, is applied to There-being itself, and here the matter is more delicate. We must be content to indicate the general lines, for usage is not always rigid. In fact, there is in the term "free for" a decided ambiguity.

The first sense in which There-being is said to be "free for . . ." appears when the author analyses anxiety as a form of disposition which, by means of a strange uneasiness that troubles There-being’s everyday complacency with the ontic, discloses to There-being that it is a drive-toward-Being (transcendence),

---

62 SZ, pp. 314, 222 (ἀ-λήθευσι).
a potentiality for its own authenticity. Now this disclosure manifests There-being as constitutionally “free,” sc. “transcendent.” As drive-toward-Being, this constitutional to-be-free of There-being contains within itself a dynamism that propels it toward achieving itself as transcendence, a propensity, so to speak, for authenticity. But the constitutional to-be-free is not authenticity – as such it is only the potentiality, sc. openness, for authenticity or its negation. But this potentiality lies within the power of There-being to fulfill and the fulfillment is itself a coming-to-pass of freedom that can only be described as a choice. Taking to-be-free in the sense of drive-towards-Being, we must distinguish it from the freedom in the sense of choice, by which the self is chosen (authenticity) or not (inauthenticity). This gives us the key to the statement that anxiety manifests in There-being its own drive-toward-Being, sc. its “...to-be-free for the freedom of choosing and seizing its self. . .”

There is another sense, however, in which There-being is said to be “free for” something. Hence the ambiguity. In this case, it is in the state of authenticity that There-being is “free.” Recall the essentials of authenticity. In its everyday condition, There-being, absorbed by its preoccupation with beings, has forgotten its ontological prerogative. Authenticity consists in re-collecting this prerogative and choosing to be what it is: finite transcendence. The coming-to-pass of authenticity has two dimensions: ontological and ontic. Its ontological structure would be a comprehension by There-being of its own potentiality in what is most properly, exclusively and definitively characteristic of this potentiality: its immanent ending (death), the ultimate seal of its finitude. Such a condition was called “advancing in potentiality.” In the ontic dimension, authenticity comes-to-pass by an existentiell choosing to hearken to the voice of conscience that tells of its guilt, sc. finitude – a choice we call resolve. The coming-to-pass of authenticity, seen in its bi-dimensional unity, is then “advancing re-solve.”

---

63 SZ, pp. 188 (propensio in . . .), 191 (Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit als Möglichkeiten).
64 “Die Angst offenbart im Dasein das Sein zum eigensten Seinkönnen, d. h. das Freisinn für die Freiheit des Sich-selbst-wählens und -ergreifens . . .” (SZ, p. 188). Heidegger’s italics.
assume that all this is familiar and wish only to underline the rôle of freedom in this bi-dimensional process.

i. Authenticity: Existential – The term "free for" occurs with regard to the existential dimension of authenticity when There-being, advancing in its own most characteristic potentiality, is said to render itself "free for" the definitive character of death as its own immanent ending. Here the sense of "free" seems to be openness toward death in the sense of an acquiescence to itself as Being-unto-end. There is no flight into distraction, but There-being’s acceptance of its finitude, i.e. a permitting of death, as the supreme form of finitude, to have its own way with There-being. There-being thus lets-its-self-be finite. Such an attitude is a liberation, for it frees There-being from its perdition in the ontic. This liberation, however, retains the tonality that characterized both "laying free" and "rendering free," sc. it is fundamentally an un-veiling. For if authenticity in its existential dimension is an advancing by There-being in the potentiality which characterizes it (sc. as finite), this advancing is a continual unveiling of the potentiality as potentiality-unto-end, hence makes this potentiality as such free. Free from what? From its perdition in onticity. There-being is torn away from its everydayness. "... In the advancing unveiling of this power-to-be, Then There-being discloses its self to its self with regard to its ultimate potentiality [sc. death]. ..." 66

We retain: that in the ontological dimension of authenticity, for There-being to be free means that its Being-unto-end is unveiled; that this Being-unto-end must be accepted as it is unveiled; that There-being is thus liberated from everydayness. All these elements find expression in the throaty cry proclaiming the acceptance of unveiled finitude as "freedom unto death." 67

ii. Authenticity: Existentiell – And now we come to the ontic dimension. Re-solve is fundamentally a choice that could be refused, hence we approach here more closely the classical notion

---

65 SZ, p. 264 (Freiwerden für... befreit von Verlorenheit).
66 "... Im vorlaufenden Enthüllen dieses Seinkönnens erschließt sich das Dasein ihm selbst hinsichtlich seiner äußersten Möglichkeit...." (SZ, pp. 262–263). See pp. 262 (macht sie als solche frei), 263 (entrimmen).
67 SZ, p. 266.
of freedom. The choice consists in choosing to be what conscience lets There-being see that it is, sc. finite – more precisely, negated ground (transcendence). What is chosen is not conscience itself (this is impossible) but what conscience reveals to There-being, sc. its guilt. For There-being to choose, then, is for it to render itself free for this guilt, or to acquiesce to it, to say "amen" to the finitude of its transcendence. It is by this choice that the self authentically is achieved, that There-being liberates itself from everydayness by (freely) willing to retract its former surrender to the ontic.58

This choosing that is re-solve is profoundly an act of freedom. It re-solves the potentiality for authenticity that is posed by There-being's discovery that its essence is to-be-free. Re-collecting its self, There-being hereby freely chooses to-be-free, its own (finite) transcendence, for its finite freedom genuinely "is" only when the choice has been made to assume the self that has been thrown-down-as-still-to-be-achieved. There-being renders itself free now for its own World, and its own self-in-the-World as it is in all facticity. It lets-its-self-be as it is in its matter-of-fact situation, thus achieving transparency to itself in this situation.69

Transposed into terms of temporality, this letting-itself-be in re-solve is the fortune (Schicksal) of There-being, whereby There-being, free for its own death, sc. open unto and acquiescing to its self as immanently ending, hands its self over to its self as a potentiality, sc. a to-be-free, that is not only bequeathed to it (therefore imposed upon it) but which is freely accepted. It is in this process of handing-over self to self through re-solve that re-trive of a potentiality-that-has-been is possible, for the choice that is re-solve makes There-being free for that which is to be re-trived. Notice here, however, that the freedom of There-being's choice extends only to acquiescing or not acquiescing to its finite to-be-free, sc. to being authentic or inauthentic, not to the fact that it be.70

58 SZ, pp. 287–288 (Gewissen-haben-wollen), 295 (Eigentlichkeit), 268 (Nachholen einer Wahl).
59 SZ, pp. 384 ("ist" im Gewählt-haben), 294 (Möglichkeit zu handeln), 399–300 (Situation), 307 (durchsichtig), 384 (hell-sichtig).
70 SZ, pp. 384–385 (Schicksal), 228 (Geworfenheit). WG, p. 50 (Daß).
To claim that all these texts to which we have referred give us an exactly uniform meaning of the word "free" and its variations is to overlook the subtleties of nuance which Heidegger's prodigious control of his language permits, and perhaps to force the evidence. No matter. It suffices for our purposes to underline the general tendencies, for we are, after all, still working in the oblique. Let us retain that in the coming-to-pass of re-solve, There-being is free: because it becomes transparent to itself in its situation; because this transparency simultaneously delivers it from its bondage to the merely ontic; because this resolution is achieved by a free choice which acquiesces to the finitude of its self, whose essence is to-be-free (transcendence). Let us add, by way of recall, that if primary truth is disclosedness, then re-solve, which is the authentic mode of disclosedness, is the most original form of truth, and the different types of freedom that are involved in the coming-to-pass of re-solve will be, each in its own way, various modalities of truth.

When, in the coming-to-pass of re-solve, the central rôle is played by a choice, one wonders naturally if, when all is said and done, this is not simply what the tradition calls an "act of the will," of liberum arbitrium. One must admit, of course, certain very clear similarities. For one thing, the choice of authenticity, like an "act of the will," can be refused or, once having been made, subsequently retracted. It is a process that comes-to-pass on occasion and must be repeated to remain effective. Hence, it has a very definite "act" character. Again, if one were to explain the phenomenon in terms of traditional psychology, one would be forced to have recourse to a "faculty of choice" and to use the terminology of "will." These similarities should not lead us, however, to forget the profoundly unique character of existential choice. An "act of the will" is always directed toward some being; here, that which is chosen is not a "being" but the transcendence of There-being beyond beings (including itself) to the Being-process itself, sc. its own constitutional to-be-free. Furthermore, we saw that an "act of the will" as "spontaneous" has its beginning in the already constituted self from which it proceeds; here the choice achieves the self in its ontological authenticity. In other words, existential resolution "wills" There-being's openness to Being and thus the
freedom of There-being's self in its source and its possibility, sc. its Being. To call it, then, an "act of the will" would be dangerously misleading.

4. Synopsis

Let us now try to disengage a common denominator for the word "freedom" that will serve as a basis for interpreting any later references to the problem. That may be called "free" in the most fundamental sense which has been wrested and torn away from the initial hiddenness which obscures it — whether this be the covered-up-ness of beings other than There-being that are un-covered by being rendered-free, or There-being's own forgottenness of its proper self, from which it is liberated by its own disclosedness. What is liberated from hiddenness is therefore un-hidden, and what is un-hidden is true (α-λήθεια). One may say, then, though the formula is not Heidegger's, that the essence of freedom is truth. If truth (therefore freedom) is fundamentally un-hiddenness, and the most original phenomenon of truth lies in There-being as disclosedness of the World (Being), then the original phenomenon of freedom is the disclosedness of There-being, sc. transcendence. "... The transcendence unto the World is freedom itself. ..." That which is free in the primary sense is There-being itself; that which is free in the secondary sense is what, by reason of the luminosity of There-being, is uncovered as the being that it is (in its Being), sc. beings other than There-being. Beings are rendered free by letting them emerge from obscurity, by letting them be (manifest) as they are. This is the proper function of phenomenology, as Heidegger conceives it. If we pose the problem in terms of knowledge, as Kant did, then letting-beings-be means letting-them-be-objects. The entire KM, then, is an interpretation of how Kant explains the nature of freedom as an effort to ground metaphysics, an effort which Heidegger, for his part, re-trieves.

In the case of There-being itself, to let be means to let its self be as the self that it is, to achieve in and as its self the phenomenology of its self. This self is not substance but process that comes-to-pass as transcendence beyond beings to Being (World)

11 "... Der Überstieg zur Welt ist die Freiheit selbst. ..." (WG, p. 40).
— a process that is finite. The supreme seal of finitude is the fact that it is Being-unto-death. To let its self be, then, is to let its self be both as transcendent and as finite (guilty). To let its self be its self is to liberate its self from its ontic perdition, to re-collect that its ontic excellence is to be ontological, to achieve the self in its authenticity. But There-being, that thus lets-its-self-be, is, when all is said and done, the ontological structure of man (je meines), which has within itself the power to choose. There-being must choose to let its self be, to-be-free. Furthermore, it chooses its self in its situation and therefore in choosing its self lets other beings be, too. It is in this way that letting other beings be, sc. letting them give an account of themselves in transcendental founding, is also subject to the conditions of There-being's choice of its own authenticity. This choice of self in its situation is the supreme mode of There-being's freedom because the most eminent form of truth. It is the consummation of phenomenology.

One last word. If to render beings free is to let them be as true (un-hidden), then the effort to discern the sense of Being must involve meditation on both freedom and truth. Conversely, meditation on freedom and truth must be the normal drift of an effort to comprehend the meaning of Being.

Résumé

We pause to take our breath again. WG crystallizes the principal theses of SZ in terms of the nature of ground. The unenunciated thesis is that we gain access to the sense of Being by meditating the sense of ground, for both are but one in the coming-to-pass of ἀ-ληθεύω. The existential structure of There-being (comprehension, disposition, logos) is orchestrated here in terms of laying-claim, taking-possession and founding, but the conception, as far as one can see, is identical. The three components are unified into a profoundly finite process called "the triplex strewing of ground" (concern), whose ultimate meaning is time. But the meaning of aboriginal time? Here we have only a question mark that will haunt us to the end.

72 WG, p. 46. Cf. SZ, p. 366.
73 WG, p. 47.
The principal newness of the essay consists in identifying the process of transcendence with the coming-to-pass of freedom. Meditating upon this notion makes it clear that there is a profound singleness of perspective that unites WG, KM and SZ, which is not principally the problematic of the World, or even specifically of transcendence, but of transcendence to World as freedom and as truth; that the explicitation which WG brings, two years after the publication of the major work, is to make clear that the dynamism of Heidegger's thought at this time finds its natural pole in a problematic that was always essential to the argument of SZ (in fact, prescribed its method) but was all too easily forgotten in the welter of detailed analyses, sc. that the question about the Being-process must be pursued in terms of freedom and truth.
CHAPTER IV

WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

The year 1929 saw, besides the publication of KM and WG, Heidegger's accession to the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg, left vacant by Husserl's retirement, a new distinction that furnished the occasion on July 24 for the inaugural lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" (WM). Here Heidegger crystalizes once more the essential elements of the thought so carefully elaborated in SZ, with the result that in a genuine sense we may say that WM offers no doctrine of importance that is new. And yet there is a profound difference of perspective from that of SZ, which must be noted and emphatically stressed, if we are to discern the evolution that already has begun.

What most especially characterizes WM is the question of Non-being (Nichts). To be sure, the problem had its place both in SZ and KM, but never before has it been thematized and made the unifying principle of an entire reflection as now. In the context of SZ, Non-being emerged as that which is not any being within the "World" but rather the World itself in all its indetermination. Non-being is not, then, total nothing but indeed a "something," sc. the World as World. In KM, on the other hand, Non-being is discerned as the "transcendental object," sc. not "absolutely nothing" but a pure horizon within

---

1 In order to retain the proper chronological perspective, we consider here only the text of the discourse itself, treating the Epilogue (1943) and Introduction (1949) in the context of the period in which they were written.
2 Only obliquely in WG (p. 45).
3 SZ, p. 189. Note recurrence of phrase "Non-being [which is] the World" (Nichts der Welt), v. g. pp. 276-277, and passim.
which beings-to-be-known-as-objects are always encountered. Likewise, There-being as transcendence is essentially a passage unto, or thrust into, Non-being, disclosed to There-being through the ontological disposition of anxiety.4

We find ourselves, then, completely at home with all that is most proper to the essay. It would be a mistake to look for great novelties. Let us content ourselves with a brief review of the argument that will sketchily indicate certain new precisions in the analysis. Then we shall offer some general remarks which may serve to suggest how, despite the familiar terminology, a new course nevertheless has been set. It should appear from this that WM, even if in more disguised fashion than WW, is clearly a work of transition.

I. The Argument

The author proceeds in three separate steps which we shall summarize: A. The Posing of a Metaphysical Question. B. The Elaboration of the Question. C. The Answering of the Question.

A. THE POSING OF A METAPHYSICAL QUESTION

The question Heidegger wishes to pose is simply this: "what about Non-being?"5 Addressing, as he does, the members of the University faculties whose common preoccupation, almost without exception, is, in one way or another, scientific research or scholarship, he must win their sympathy by suggesting at least the relevance of such a question to science and scientists.

The author concedes immediately that the question taken at its face value solicits no interest from the scientist, even repels him. Naturally! For the scientist examines beings — and nothing else; his research is guided by beings — and nothing besides; for he finds himself in the midst of beings — and nothing more. But it is significant, it seems, that in order to speak of what properly concerns him, he speaks of it in terms of something else, sc.

4 KM, pp. 71 (nicht das nihil absolutum), 214 (reiner Horizont), 71, 214 (Sich-hineinhalten in das Nichts), 214 (Angst).
5 "... Wie steht es um das Nichts?" (WM, p. 27). How profoundly the whole theme of the essay was influenced by the fact that the audience was composed largely of scientists we are told in 1955 (SF, pp. 37-39).
"nothing." What about this "nothing," then, sc. this no-thing, this Non-being? Surely the question is worthy of a scientist's interest.

B. THE ELABORATION OF THE QUESTION

The substance of this section deals with determining how one goes about answering the question: what about Non-being? For one cannot simply ask what (or how) "is" Non-being, expecting the answer: Non-being "is" such-and-such (a typically scientific approach), for both question and answer would assume Non-being to be something which "is," sc. a being. Contradiction! Yet such would be the spontaneous tendency of our normal thought processes, for to think is to think about something, sc. a being. If we restrict ourselves to the logical thought processes of the understanding, then we cannot answer the question: what about Non-being?, for the result is a contradiction that the (logical) principle of contradiction forbids.

The question of Non-being, then, doomed to logical contradiction, seems impossible. But perhaps the impossibility is only a formal one, for the question as a matter of fact has been posed, and this implies that somehow or other Non-being has been encountered already. How? By Non-being, we understand "the negation of the totality of beings," and to encounter it, we must encounter somehow not so much this totality as its negation.

At this point, Heidegger resorts briefly to the phenomenological technique of SZ. The totality of beings, he claims, is manifest to us in such phenomena as the thorough indifference of profound boredom, or joy in the presence of the beloved, each of them a mode of ontological disposition. The disposition that discloses this totality in its negation, however, is, as we saw in SZ, anxiety. For in this phenomenon, There-being is rendered
anxious not about some given being or other (as happens in the case of fear) nor even about beings-in-their-totality, but all beings seem to slip away from There-being's grasp. "Anxiety renders manifest Non-being." 9

C. THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION

The point of the third section of the lecture is to offer some positive comment on the nature of Non-being as disclosed in the phenomenon of anxiety, and this from at least three separate points of view. No claim is made for the completeness of the answer.

I. Non-being and Beings

Non-being becomes manifest in and through anxiety. Non-being is not revealed as if it were something "alongside of" beings-in-their-totality; nor does anxiety somehow annihilate the total ensemble in order that then Non-being may remain as residue. On the contrary, Non-being is revealed in anxiety "together" with the totality of beings. 10 How does this happen?

In the phenomenon of anxiety, there is in There-being a certain withdrawal before beings-in-the-ensemble that is by no means a flight from them but rather a spellbound tranquillity in their presence. Now this awestruck withdrawal seems to be imposed on There-being. Furthermore, it does not draw attention to itself but rather repels from itself, referring There-being to the totality-of-beings, which at that very moment seems to be slipping away. It is thus that beings-in-the-ensemble impress There-being with all of their startling strangeness as being other—other, that is, than Non-being. Here is born There-being's wonder at the marvelous fact that beings "are." 11 And in the "... effulgent night of Non-being [disclosed by] anxiety, there occurs for the first time the original open-ness of beings as such: that they are beings and not Non-being. ..." 12 It is by reason

9 "Die Angst offenbart das Nichts." (WM, p. 3a).
10 WM, p. 33 (in eins mit).
11 WM, pp. 34, 4x.
12 "In der hellen Nacht des Nichts der Angst ersteht erst die ursprüngliche Offenheit des Seienden als eines solchen: daß es Seiendes ist — und nicht Nichts...." (WM, p. 34).
of the original manifestation of Non-being to There-being, then, that There-being at once passes beyond beings (transcendence to Being and thrust into Non-being are but one) and can enter into comportment with beings. Briefly, "... Non-being is that which renders possible the manifestation of beings as such for the human There-being. ..." 13 We have here the key to an obscure remark in KM which serves at this point not only to illuminate KM but also to explain the present section of WM:

... Only when [the process of] letting arise [a horizon of] opposedness is a thrust into Non-being, can a presentation, instead of Non-being and within it, permit what is not Non-being, sc. such a thing as a being, to arrive at an encounter, provided such a being as a matter of fact empirically reveals itself. ... 14

2. Non-being and its Disclosure

The second theme in the author's analysis of Non-being is less important for us. It evolves as an answer to a difficulty: if only a thrust into Non-being (transcendence) renders possible comportment between There-being and other beings, then this thrust must be an abiding characteristic of There-being. Yet Non-being is disclosed originally by anxiety, which is only an occasional, even rare, phenomenon, sc. not-abiding. How explain this inconsistency? 15

Heidegger admits, of course, the irregularity of the anxiety phenomenon for a There-being lost in the superficiality of everydayness. But that does not mean that anxiety is not found in an abiding way in There-being; it means only that anxiety is "first of all and for the most part" suppressed.

"... Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. ..." 16 The slightest stimulus can awaken it at any time.

Besides, if anxiety is the most original phenomenon which discloses Non-being, sc. that phenomenon closest to the origins

13 "... Das Nichts ist die Ermöglichung der Offenbarkeit des Seienden als eines solchen für das menschliche Dasein...." (WM, p. 33).
14 "... Nur wenn das Gegenstehenlassen von ... ein Sichhineinhalten in das Nichts ist, kann das Vorstellen anstatt des Nichts und innerhalb seiner ein nicht Nichts, d. h. so etwas wie Selendes begangen lassen, falls solches sich gerade empirisch zeigt...." (KM, p. 71). Werner Brock's analysis of this phenomenon is admirable. See M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp. 229-232.
15 WM, p. 35.
16 "... Die Angst ist da. Sie schläft nur...." (WM, p. 37).
of There-being, it is not the only one. “Logical” negation (*Verneinung*), certainly an abiding characteristic of our normal thought processes, betokens some comprehension of Non-being. For it implies a pre-view of a “not” that can become manifest only if its origin, sc. Non-being in its very essence (*das Nichten des Nichts*), is itself freed from its hidden-ness. Nor is logical negation the only evidence of a revelation of Non-being that belongs to the essence of There-being. There are other types of negativing comportment: v.g. opposition, abhorrence, refusal, prohibition, renunciation – all in their own way indicating the revelation of Non-being to There-being.

3. *Non-being and the Problem of Metaphysics*

Heidegger closes his lecture by returning to his starting point, attempting at once to show the relevance of the problem of Non-being to metaphysics itself and to the scientists and scholars whom he addresses. The question of Non-being embraces the whole of metaphysics, chiefly because Non-being is not simply an undetermined “opposite” to beings, but reveals itself as somehow pertaining to the Being of beings inasmuch as it enables a being to reveal itself as such, sc. to manifest the fact that it “is.” It is in this sense that Heidegger justifies the formula: *ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit*, sc. it is by reason of Non-being that the totality of beings comes to itself.

The question of Non-being embraces, too, the Being of the enquiring There-being itself. For in the present situation the enquiring There-being is characterized most profoundly by its scientific effort. Non-being has its importance for science, however, because it is only inasmuch as Non-being is manifest that beings are accessible and can become the object of a research that discloses the truth both of nature and of history.

The question about Non-being, then, is a genuinely metaphysical one. Indeed, the passage beyond beings which a thrust into Non-being implies is metaphysics itself, and since such a

17 WM, p. 36. The term *Verborgenheit* here is of capital importance, as our subsequent study will reveal in more detail.
18 WM, p. 37 (Entgegenhandeln, Verabscheuen, Versagen, Verbieten, Entbehren).
20 WM, pp. 40–41.
thrust belongs to the essence of There-being (for it is transcendence), metaphysics is a coming-to-pass in the ground of There-being itself. To have investigated the problem of Non-being, then, is to have approached the problem of metaphysics from the inside, in all of its vibrant dynamism. The question “What is Metaphysics?” is not answered, however, in any more formal fashion than this. If one restricts oneself to the original text itself, one might infer that metaphysics, then, is simply letting come-to-pass with all possible luminosity the transcendence of There-being, There-being’s surrender to Non-being, so that it may pose once more the ground-question of all metaphysics: “... why are there beings at all, and not much rather Non-being?”}

II. General Remarks

A. NON-BEING, BEING AND TRUTH

It becomes swiftly apparent in the present essay – no matter what has been written about Heidegger’s nihilism, and independently of all his own self-interpretations – that he understands Being and Non-being to be one.\textsuperscript{22} We are well prepared for such a correlation. Anxiety, which in WM discloses Non-being, in SZ discloses the World, and we have seen already how the World of SZ gradually merges into the notion of Being. Furthermore, in KM the horizon of objectiveness designated as Non-being admits of a positive description in terms of Being itself. All this is to be assumed as the context in which the present reflection is elaborated. We are interested for the moment in what the text itself offers us.

The decisive passage in this regard occurs in the third section of the lecture, where Heidegger describes the function of Non-being in the manifestation of beings. Non-being repels attention from itself and directs There-being’s gaze, so to speak, to beings in their totality, which are thereby discovered again with a fresh appreciation for the fact that they are beings and not Non-being. It is Non-being, then, that renders possible the manifestation of

\textsuperscript{21} “... Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?” (WM, p. 42).
\textsuperscript{22} Cf. WM, pp. 45-47, 21-23; SF, pp. 36-40; US, pp. 108-109.
WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

beings as beings. This, however, is precisely the function of Being itself. "... In the Being of beings comes-to-pass Non-being in its very essence." 23 "... Non-being ... reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings." 24

The argument becomes more cogent when, recalling that the Being-process and έ-λήφθηκε are one, we see what rôle Non-being plays in the coming-to-pass of non-concealment. To be sure, the problem of truth does not appear as such in WM, and yet, despite its night-like obscurity, Non-being has a luminosity all its own, so that we may speak of the "'revelation'" of Non-being as well as the release of Non-being from its primal hiddenness, therefore its non-hiddenness. Furthermore, it is only because Non-being is manifest that the truth with which science is concerned, sc. of nature and of history, becomes accessible to the scientist. 25

At this point, Heidegger adds a short but significant paragraph, whose importance could easily escape us. It is because Non-being has been made manifest to There-being, he says, that there can come over There-being a new sense of the strangeness of beings and an appreciation of how wondrous it is that they "are." Thus it is the revelation of Non-being that lies at the basis of all wonder (Verwunderung), and, therefore, of every "why?" Heidegger's immediate conclusion, then, is to re-affirm the importance of the revelation of Non-being for a scientist as the ultimate origin of the "why?" that guides the research which seeks to interrogate and found the beings that come under his examination. The parallel with WG is clear. There, the transcendental origin of "why?" is ontological truth, sc. the revealed-ness of Being. Here it is the revealed-ness of Non-being. What else is there to conclude than that Non-being, inasmuch as it becomes manifest, is ontological truth? 26

Finally, it is in the thrust of There-being into Non-being, sc.

23 "... Im Sein des Seienden geschieht das Nichten des Nichts." (WM, p. 35).
24 "... Das Nichts bleibt nicht das unbestimmte Gegenüber für das Seiende, sondern es enthüllt sich als zugehörig zum Sein des Seienden." (WM, p. 36). One could argue, too, from the fact that: in terms of There-being, the formulae "thrust into Non-being" and "transcendence" are taken to be equivalent (WM, pp. 35, 38, 41); the question of Being and the question of Non-being have same scope — both encompass whole of metaphysics (WM, p. 40).
26 WM, p. 41. Cf. WG, p. 45.
its transcendence unto Being, that the truth of metaphysics resides. In making this last point, Heidegger adds that because There-being is a ground of metaphysics that is characterized by negativity (abgründiger Grund), the deepest kind of error dwells exceedingly nigh.\textsuperscript{87} It is the first mention of the problem of error. In itself, the remark is undeveloped and remains enigmatic in the context, but we interpret it thus: Taking the phrase "groundless ground" to mean that There-being is a ground that includes a non-ground, sc. negativity (finitude), then the truth of metaphysics which dwells in There-being as ground includes also non-truth, and non-truth (for it is thus that we understand "error") resides as truth's nearest neighbor. The point does not pertain to the central argument of WM and will make more sense in the context of WW. It is worth mentioning here only to show the drift of the author's thinking (1929) toward WW (1930).

Let us, conclude, then, that with the revelation of Non-being is disclosed ontological truth, and an effort to answer the question about Non-being is an endeavor, however finite, to meditate Being in its truth.

B. NON-BEING AND THE FOUNDING OF METAPHYSICS

That Heidegger's selection of the theme of Non-being for his inaugural address was directed by a prior concern for the problem of metaphysics itself is self-evident. It is significant, though, that the question about Non-being (Being) is conceived as an eminently metaphysical question, as if one could reach the ground of metaphysics from the inside.\textsuperscript{88} This is understandable enough, when we realize that the problem is still thought in terms of Heidegger I, who has gone about the question of Being by posing the question of There-being, that structure in man which renders metaphysics possible. He is still endeavoring to develop the "metaphysics of metaphysics," but the emphasis will soon change.\textsuperscript{29}

The difference will have become long since apparent by the time the prologue appears (1949), to insist upon the necessity of

\textsuperscript{87} WM, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{29} WM, p. 41; KM, pp. 13-24, 308.
going outside metaphysics, sc. beyond it into its ground, by interrogating the Being-process conceived as the coming-to-pass of the ontological difference. Is there really a discrepancy? Certainly the notion of "overcoming" will be new. But limiting ourselves to the text at hand, we discover that even here the author is probing the difference between Being and beings. The first indication of this can be found in the important passage of the third section which describes the function of Non-being in rendering manifest beings as beings. Non-being repels attention from itself and directs There-being's gaze towards beings. Beings, on the other hand, are revealed by reason of the effulgence of Non-being, as that which is not Non-being. How comprehend this mysterious reticence which is mutual to both Non-being and beings, each revealed by reason of what it is not? This "not" which separates beings and Non-being is difference, sc. the ontological difference. And it is precisely here, it would seem, that the full weight of the question mark falls.

Again, let us go to the conclusion of the lecture. Here, as often, Heidegger ends with a pregnant phrase: "... The ground-question of metaphysics is [one that] Non-being itself forces [upon us]: why are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?" 80 It is not the first time we have met this question, for it was proposed in WG as one of the fundamental modes of "why?" and, indeed, was underlined by the author himself, as if to indicate its primacy among the rest. Nor do we meet it for the last time now. Indeed it will assume a growing importance in the author's thought and become the theme of his university lectures in 1936, published subsequently as EM. 81 It seems self-evident that the question for Heidegger must have a completely different sense than for Leibniz. For the latter, the question concerns beings and is tantamount to asking "where do beings come from?", sc. what is the origin of beings in what Heidegger calls the "ontic" sense. Heidegger is not interested in beings – does not the thematizing of Non-being make it sufficiently clear? Nor is he interested in the being-ness of beings, if this be conceived (as in metaphysics) either as the abstraction of Being-in-general or

81 WG, p. 45; EM, pp. 1, 24-25.
as some ontic ground of beings. He is interested — and the question itself is sufficient evidence — in what it means for beings to emerge out of Non-being, hence to be differentiated from Non-being. He is interested in the ontological difference.

One final word. It is Non-being itself that "forces" the question upon us. Does not this mean that Non-being exercises a priority of sorts in the posing of the question? How explain this priority according to Heidegger I, where Non-being, Being, World are all the project of There-being itself? Or do we have here a presage of Heidegger II?

C. NON-BEING AND FOUNDATIONAL THOUGHT

As yet there is no mention of foundational thought, but if the effort to think Non-being (Being) does not yet have a name of its own, we can discern the essentials of it all the more surely, perhaps, simply because it has not yet become thematized.

I. Negatively

Negatively speaking, we know that Non-being is not an object. For an object is a being (-opposed-to-a-subject), and that is precisely what Non-being is not. The thinking of Non-being, then, is necessarily non-objective, just as the There-being which thinks is non-subjective, sc. it is a self that is essentially a thrust into Non-being (transcendence).

It is this non-objective character of Non-being that precipitates Heidegger's first open polemic against the dominion of "logic" over metaphysics in the philosophical tradition. There had been, to be sure, certain intimations of this in SZ in consequence of his analysis of the word λόγος, as well as in KM, where, however, it is easier to sense an attitude than to delineate a fixed position. Here in WM, however, the lines of battle are clearly drawn.

Heidegger's criticism rests basically on the fact that "logic" is necessarily concerned only with beings, "... for thinking is

---

* See e.g. SZ, pp. 33-34, 44, 158-159, 165, 219; KM, pp. 107, 135, 154, 220, etc. See, too, the suggestive remark in WG, p. 10 (note 10). The quotation marks for "logic" have a special significance that will appear later. Meantime, see WM, p. 47.
essentially thinking about something. ...” 33 Since Non-being is not a being, it cannot be encompassed by “logic.” To wish to consider it by purely “logical” thought processes is to doom oneself from the first moment to contradiction, for it is to make Non-being a being, sc. an object of “logical” thought. His entire analysis attempts to show that Non-being is nevertheless somehow accessible to There-being and plays an essential rôle in metaphysics. Thus we are to conclude that “logic” does not have the last word in metaphysics, which must, when all is said and done, be grounded in an experience which is pre-, or at least praeter-, “logical.” 34

As a case in point, Heidegger takes the example of negation, sc. of a “logical” judgement of the understanding which denies a P about an S, therefore affirms a “not.” If one were to try to preserve the dominion of “logic” over the present problematic, one could perhaps say that Non-being is simply the (“logical”) denial of the totality of beings by an act of the understanding which says “Non-being.” 35 But that is just the point at issue, he says. It is not a “logical” negation that is the origin of Non-being; rather the reverse is true, for unless There-being had a previous comprehension of Non-being, it could not form a negative judgement, sc. it could not affirm a “not” at all. “... The not can become manifest, however, only when its origin, Non-being in its very essence, and, therefore, Non-being itself, is delivered from hidden-ness ...,” sc. revealed in truth. 36 The disclosure, or revelation of Non-being, then, is prior to all “logical” negation, and, as a consequence, to all of “logic” itself. And if we are to answer the question of Non-being (Being), the purely rational approach to metaphysics must surrender to a more original type of interrogation than “logic” can provide. 37

33 “... Denn das Denken, das wesenhaft immer Denken von etwas ist,...” (WM, p. 28).
34 WM, pp. 30 (Grunderfahrung), 36–37 (ursprünglicheren Fragens).
35 WM, p. 28.
36 “... Das Nicht kann aber nur offenbar werden, wenn sein Ursprung, das Nichten des Nichts überhaupt und damit das Nichts selbst, der Verborgenheit entnommen ist....” (WM, p. 36).
37 WM, pp. 36–37.
2. **Positively**

What may be said more positively about the manner of this "more original interrogation"? Little enough, perhaps. If the whole essay be taken as an effort to think Being (Non-being), then we can see concretely that the ontological disposition somehow plays an important rôle in the process. More important, however, are certain indices, insignificant perhaps in themselves, which point toward a shift in perspective accomplished clearly a year later in WW (1930). Philosophy and metaphysics are one, and both come-to-pass in the process of transcendence called "existence." In order to found either one, There-being in its existence must yield, through a unique type of surrender, to beings-in-their-totality, and, by achieving a liberty from all of its ontic idols, abandon itself completely to Non-being. In practice, this will take the form of posing the question about the ontological difference.\(^8\)

**Résumé**

In WM, we find the same old preoccupation as heretofore, to lay bare the ground of metaphysics, this time articulated for scientists, whose day-in-day-out concern is the investigation of beings. If they are to be led to make the experience of Being, it can only be under the guise of Non-being, discovered through the experience of anxiety. But an effort to think Being in this way must repudiate the claims of "logic" to exclusive mastery over the laws of thought, for "logic" deals only with beings and can have no jurisdiction over Non-being as such. We must essay, therefore, a pre-logical thought, which achieves freedom from slavery to the ontic by a total surrender to Non-being in interrogating the ontological difference.

What is new in all this? We might mention certain traces that suggest how the conception of surrender of There-being may imply a certain primacy of Non-being over thought. But perhaps the most significant fact is that Non-being becomes thematic at all. All the interpreters admit a profound concordance between WM and SZ, but is there not a profound difference as well?

\(^8\) WM, p. 42.
Granting that SZ set down as its purpose the posing of the Being-question, the fact remains that the entire analysis was devoted to examining phenomenologically that being which gives access to Being, sc. There-being as transcendence (to-be-in-the-World). The entire work, for all its profundity, never gets beyond this preparatory stage. Likewise, KM is concerned almost exclusively with the problem of transcendence. And must we not say the same for WG?

In all of the first three works, then, the focus of attention is upon There-being. What we notice in WM is that the focus is no longer primarily on There-being as transcendence but has shifted for the most part to that unto which There-being transcends, sc. to Being (Non-being). The shift occurs gracefully, without calling attention to itself, but its importance is none the less noteworthy for that. From now on, Heidegger's attention will be absorbed more and more by the problem of Being as such, so that with the closing passages of WW a year later (1930) the transition to a Being-centered problematic will be apparent. It is important to note here, however, that the shift is perfectly coherent with the intentions of the earlier work and in a genuine sense is born out of fidelity to it.
PART II

REVERSAL

If circumstances lead me, I will find
Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed
Within the centre.

William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*
CHAPTER I

ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH

We come now to a decisive point in Heidegger's development. The effort to ground metaphysics (fundamental ontology) began as a search to illuminate the intrinsic correlation between the Being-process as such and the finitude of the being that comprehends it, sc. There-being. The first step (SZ) was to analyse There-being phenomenologically in order to find in the pre-ontic comprehension of Being some means of discerning the sense of Being. Subsequently the author has become more and more preoccupied with Being itself, but chiefly in terms of the problem of truth, since the sense of Being is its truth. The growing importance of the problematic of truth is discernible in all of the works that followed SZ and culminates now in the essay “On the Essence of Truth,” where Heidegger thematizes the problem, retaining as intrinsic to it the problem of finitude, sc. the negativity of truth which he calls “un-truth.”

Although published late (1943), the text dates initially from 1930.¹ The author admits to several subsequent revisions, which, however, left the point of departure, fundamental position and basic structure of the original work unchanged.² Taking him at


² From closing note of first edition, omitted in second, to be found both in French (p. 105) and English (p. 351) translations.
his word, we assume that the text represents his thought as of 1930, and, although the matter would be very illuminating, must leave to historians the task of disengaging what alterations were made when.

We are relatively well prepared for the study we are about to undertake and do not approach it in a vacuum. We know: that the truth of conformity (between judgement and judged) supposes a still more fundamental truth that resides in the being-to-be-judged and enables us to discern whether or not the judgement is conformed to it; that this truth of the being-to-be-judged is basically an un-hidden-ness, or open-ness, of that being to the knower; that beings become un-hidden to a finite knower because this knower has a comprehension of their Being-structure antecedent to his encounter with them; that this antecedent comprehension may be conceived as an open horizon, or domain of encounter, or the World (or, for that matter, Non-being), within which beings and There-being meet; that this sphere of open-ness is instituted by the transcendence of the finite There-being; that the transcendence of finite There-being is ontological truth, which, since it renders possible the encounter that occurs in There-being's comportment with other beings, enables the beings-to-be-judged to become manifest (ontic truth); that this transcendence liberates the beings which it encounters from the obscurity that initially enshrouds them by letting them be (manifest), hence must be called freedom; that this transcendence (freedom) is the primary sense of truth; that this transcendence is profoundly finite, therefore negativied, so that truth comports non-truth; that one consequence of the negativity of There-being as transcendence (freedom, truth) is that it is prone to become absorbed in its preoccupation with the beings that measure the truth of its judgements, and forget its true self; that it re-collects itself in re-solve, which thus becomes the eminent mode of truth.

All of these notions return now in the essay we are about to read, explicitated and developed, to be sure, but it is important to see that none of them are new in WW. Is there something new added here which we have not seen before? This is precisely the point that must engage our attention now.
I. The Argument

A. CHAPTER 1: THE CONVENTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF TRUTH

The author, in his introduction, sets down as his purpose to determine what it is that characterizes every type of "truth" as truth, but in the course of the exposition explains more clearly that by "essence" he understands the "ground of inner possibility." 3

The reflection begins with an analysis of the conventional notion of truth – not without a resonance of the phenomenological style of SZ. The author concludes quickly enough, for the point is obvious, that in the tradition of Western thought, the essence of truth lies in conformity of judgement and judged (adaequatio intellectus et rei). There is, of course, an ontological truth, where res conforms to intellectum, but more commonly we speak of logical truth, sc. where intellectus conforms to rem, and the proper place of truth is said to be the intellect’s act of judgement. In either case, the measure of truth lies in the exactitude or correctness (Richtigkeit) of this conformity, and non-truth will be simply non-conformity, or incorrectness. 4

This traditional notion has a genuine value that is not to be denied, but the further question arises: what conditions are required in order to render possible this conformity? For it is here, after all, that the essence of truth must reside.

B. CHAPTERS 2 AND 3: THE GROUND OF CONFORMITY

As soon as the author undertakes to explain the inner possibility of conformity, the analysis becomes minute and, because of the compression of the style, difficult to follow. The basic lines, however, are simple enough. We are already familiar with Heidegger’s thesis that the truth of judgements (therefore predicative) supposes a pre-predicative truth. Here in WW, Heidegger re-crystallizes all this.

3 WW, pp. 5 (jede "Wahrheit" als Wahrheit), 13 (Grund der inneren Möglichkeit).
4 WW, pp. 6–9.
There is an open horizon within which the "true" judgement comes-to-expression (Aussage), sc. the being-that-judges (There-being) forms its judgement after having encountered the to-be-judged \(^5\) "in the Open." \(^6\) In giving expression to its judgement, There-being completes the act of knowledge by which it has been made possible for the to-be-known to reveal itself as opposed to There-being. The expressed judgement, then, presents the to-be-known, sc. lets the to-be-known take up its position as the object of There-being's knowledge. The Open in which There-being has encountered the to-be-known that now is the object of its knowledge may itself be considered to be a horizon of objectiveness, or an open domain, that is opposed to There-being, which the to-be-known must somehow traverse (durchmessen) in order for it to appear to There-being and thus become the object of its knowledge.

But the open-ness of the Open is not constituted by the fact that the to-be-known appears to There-being by traversing it. On the contrary, the Open must be conceived as a matrix of relationships (Verhältnis) which constitute the sphere of potentialities of There-being, one of which potentialities is exploited when an actual contact takes place. This is the sense of the metaphor that the encounter takes place in the Open. This contact takes place when There-being enters into comportment with a to-be-judged (-known). What characterizes comportment is the fact that, while standing in the Open, it refers itself to something-that-is-open (das Offenbare), precisely inasmuch as it is open.

What we here designate as "something-which-is-open" was experienced in the earliest phase of Western thought, according to Heidegger, as "that-which-comes-to-presence" ("das Anwesende") before There-being, and was afterwards called "that-which-is," sc. a being. Notice here how intimately for Heidegger that-which-is (a being) is correlated with that-which-is-open,

\(^5\) At the risk of some awkwardness of expression, we avoid using the word "being" for the moment in order that we may savor better its Heideggerian sense.

\(^6\) WW, p. 11. Translation is literally exact but also idiomatic. English speaks of a concert or play being "in the open" (French: en plein air), and of relations between persons as being "in the open" when there is nothing to be ashamed of or to conceal. We reserve the word "Open" now to translate what in KM was Horizont or Spielraum and in SZ Welt.
both to be distinguished from the Open as such. It will be an easy step to say in a moment that what renders-open is that which lets-be.

All comportment, then, is a standing open towards that-which-is-open, sc. towards beings. It takes place in countless ways throughout the vast horizon of the Open. Only because such a comportment as this precedes all judgement does it become possible for judgements to express what beings are and how they are. And when the expression does take place, the being, laid open in comportment, must become the measure of the correctness of the judgement that is expressed. It is only because of the open-character of the judgement that the truth of the judgement, in the sense of correctness, becomes possible. Truth, then, does not rest primarily in the judgement but somewhere prior to it. Does it reside in the open character of comportment as such? Before we can affirm this, we must probe further into the ground which renders such comportment possible.

The answer to such a question, sketched first in bold lines, is this: what renders such comportment possible is that There-being is so completely open, sc. free, toward the Open as to accept any open being it may encounter within the Open for what it is, sc. to permit this being to be itself as open and thus constrain or direct There-being in the formation of its judgements by serving as measure, norm or rule for these judgements. This open-ness of There-being toward the Open and that-which-is-open we call "freedom." Thus freedom, the ultimate ground of possibility of truth-as-correctness, must now be called the essence of truth, so that we are forced to examine once more in this context the nature of freedom itself.

C. Chapter 4: The Essence of Freedom

Recall, to begin with, the results of our previous research: that is "free" in the most fundamental sense which has been

---

7 We are trying to suggest that what distinguishes that-which-is-open (das Offenbare) from the Open (das Offene) is precisely the fact that-it-is. This is the same difference as between being and Being.

8 The entire résumé here is an attempt to paraphrase as simply as possible pp. 11-12 of the text.

9 WW, p. 12.
liberated from concealment, and, since non-concealment is \( \delta \lambda \iota \chi \eta \iota \alpha \nu \), what is free is true. Primarily true, and therefore primarily free, is There-being itself. True and free in the secondary sense are all beings that by reason of There-being’s disclosedness are discovered or made manifest. To render beings free is to let-them-be-manifest as being what they “are.” We are going to hear now a new orchestration of these same themes. There are two aspects of freedom which interest us in this chapter: freedom in terms of the beings-that-are-encountered; freedom in terms of There-being itself.

1. The Freedom of Beings-encountered

“... Freedom unveils itself here as the letting-be of beings.” 10

Recalling the above correlation between “being” and “that-which-is-open,” we can see that to let-be is not something negative, as if it were simply a disregard of beings or an indifference to them. On the contrary, it is a letting-be that is a “letting-oneself-in-on” beings, as we speak of being “let in on” a secret. Here, the “secret” of the being-that-is-open is precisely that which previously was veiled (sc. what it is and how it is), but which now is un-veiled (Entborgenheit) by the fact that the being has been let-be (revealed). By letting-itself-in-on the secret of what (and how) beings “are,” There-being does not lose itself in them but rather withdraws before them in respectful reticence, permitting them to control as a directive norm its judgements about them. 11

2. The Freedom of There-being

That which renders it possible, however, for There-being to let-itself-in-on the beings it meets is the fact that by its very constitution There-being “… lets-itself-in-on the Open and its open-ness, within which all beings abide and comport them-
This process by which There-being lets-itself-in-on the Open is ec-static by its very nature, sc. by reason of it There-being stands outside of itself in the direction of the Open, is exposed (aussetzend), or, as we may say, simply open toward the Open. This is what is meant by the ek-sistence of There-being. It is profoundly a transcendence, for here There-being goes beyond that-which-is-open to the Open itself, sc. to that by reason of which the opened-up-being is open. On the one hand, There-being in this constitutional freedom is committed to attain the Open only in and through that-which-is-open as such. "... Freedom is before all else ... the condition of having-been-let-in-on the unveiling of beings as such....” sc. on that-which-is-open inasmuch as it is open. On the other hand, There-being does pass beyond these beings unto the Open, and, indeed, by reason of its self, for the "There" of There-being, which in SZ was called the "disclosedness," hence the “luminosity” (one could simply say "opened-up-ness"), of the World, is here called the very "open-ness of the Open" itself.

Now what we are calling here “the Open” is what is meant by “the Non-concealed” (das Unverborgene), that which in the early days of Western thought was designated as ἐκλαμβάνειν, sc. truth. That-which-is-open, then, is that which is true, or, more simply, that-which-is (a being). Hence it is that "... truth is that unveiling of beings through which an open-ness comes to presence...." and this because There-being is ek-sistence, sc. freedom. Hence, "... truth in its essence is freedom. ..."

Briefly: the essence of truth is freedom, sc. the un-veiling of beings in their what and their how; the essence of freedom is ek-sistence, sc. ex-posure unto the Open. In a single formula: the essence of truth is the opening-up of that-which-is-open by..."
reason of open-ness to the Open which comes-to-pass as ek-sistence, sc. *There*-being.

D. CHAPTER 5: THE PROBLEM OF NON-TRUTH

The essence of truth has been examined. What, now, of non-truth? If the essence of truth is not correctness, then the essence of non-truth (is it better to say the "non-essence of truth"?) is certainly not in-correctness. Since the essence of truth lies in freedom, sc. ek-sistence, must not the negativity of truth, sc. non-truth, somehow be grounded in the negativity that infiltrates freedom? If so, then non-truth must permeate truth as profoundly as negativity permeates freedom (ek-sistence, transcendence). But how is such negativity to be understood? It is to this aspect of the problem that the author will devote the rest of his essay.\(^\text{17}\)

But, curiously enough, he begins with a chapter entitled "The Essence of Truth" (curiously, because the whole essay, after all, deals with the "Essence of Truth"). The reason is not immediately apparent, for in it he prepares further the analysis of the non-essence of truth (the essence of non-truth). Would this be a plausible explanation? Heidegger assumes that truth in its essence necessarily comports negativity, hence in interrogating non-truth he interrogates the essence of truth as well.

There are two points of importance to be noted in Chapter 5. They concern: the un-veiling, or re-vealing (*Entbergung*), of beings-in-the-ensemble; the veiling, or concealing (*Verbergung*), of beings-in-the-ensemble.

1. The Revealing of Beings-in-the-ensemble

We have already seen how *There*-being enters into comportment with that-which-is-open, revealing it in what (and how) it is. This occurs in virtue of the ek-sistence of *There*-being. But the luminosity of *There*-being’s ek-sistence is not restricted to any single comportment with which at a given moment it may be preoccupied. After all, ek-sistence is that prerogative

\(^{17}\) Except for the chapter of conclusion (Chapter 8). The problem itself is posed in concluding paragraph of Chapter 4, p. 17.
by which There-being, thrown among beings, irrupts in their midst as that which renders manifest all beings, including itself. In every particular comportment, then, there is a certain resonance, or attunement (Gestimmtheit), by reason of which the whole ensemble becomes manifest. We recognize here, of course, the ontological disposition, disclosing, as it does, There-being’s essential reference to the World, which, if considered in the ontic dimension, may be called There-being’s orientation towards beings-in-the-ensemble.18

2. The Concealing of Beings-in-the-ensemble

But this resonance is only an intimation. The total ensemble itself remains vague. In fact, the more completely There-being is engrossed in any particular comportment, the more the ensemble appears incalculable, unseizable, undetermined, indeterminable and, for that reason, all the more easily forgotten. As a result, one might say (the metaphor is not Heidegger’s) that the glare of the particular obscures the whole. More exactly: in the very comportment by which There-being reveals a particular thing, sc. lets it be (manifest), There-being leaves un-revealed, therefore obscures or conceals, beings-in-the-ensemble. Hence, “...to let-be [revealed] of its very nature is simultaneously to conceal. In the ek-sistent freedom of There-being takes place the concealing of beings-in-the-ensemble, [i.e.] concealment is.”19

Notice: that to conceal is to fail to reveal, sc. to non-reveal, hence may be conceived as a negative component of the revealing process; that this negativity takes place in the coming-to-pass of ek-sistent freedom itself, to such an extent that we

18 WW, p. 18. There are certain privileged types of disposition that disclose the ensemble with special clarity (WM, p. 31), but here there is question of any disposition whatever that intimates There-being’s orientation toward the “World” of beings with which it is not engaged in the encounter of the moment.

19 “...Das Seinlassen ist in sich zugleich ein Verbergen. In der ek-sistenten Freiheit des Da-seins ereignet sich die Verbergung des Seienden im Ganzen, ist die Verborgenheit.” (WW, p. 19). Heidegger’s italics. We have here (1930) the first instance which calls attention to itself of sich erzeigen. Spontaneously we would translate as “comes-to-pass,” but, since hitherto we have used this to translate Geschehen, we use the new term “takes-place,” implying “-vent.” Eventually, the phrase will be reserved for Being itself, but this anticipates a later stage of the evolution we are watching unfold. For the present, sich erzeigen seems equivalent to the Geschehen of There-being.
may say that in this process concealment itself is, sc. concealment (negativity) is intrinsic to revealment; that if truth is revealment, then concealment must be non-truth. This whole section, then, is an approach to the problem of non-truth.

E. CHAPTER 6: NON-TRUTH AS CONCEALMENT

Chapters 6 and 7 are extremely difficult. To find an evident clarity in them is perhaps to impose it, and such, no doubt, is the risk of all interpretation. We must run the risk. We restrict ourselves to the bare essentials and try to discern the general orientation, leaving exegesis to exegetes.

The point at issue, at least, is clear: given the essence of truth as the letting-be of beings, how explain the non-essence of truth, sc. non-truth, insofar as it is intrinsic to truth? The titles of the two chapters, "Non-truth as Concealment" and "Non-truth as Errance" (die Irre), indicate that they are two different replies to the same question, or, better perhaps, a single reply under two different aspects. The two chapters, then, are profoundly unified, and we must understand them in their unity if we are to understand them at all.

The stylistic difficulties of the text are complicated by the presence of two theses which the author, at least at this point, does not enunciate: the problem of non-truth is intimately associated with the problem of finitude which negativity implies; the ultimate origin of truth is not There-being but something more fundamental still in which There-being itself abides and which somehow comes-to-pass in There-being. The latter is a major change from the perspective of SZ, and we are going to examine now in more detail the subtle chemistry that effects it. It is a point of supreme moment, for we are on the verge of Heidegger II. Stated even crudely as has been done here, the thesis already gives us a fresh meaning for the old formulae of SZ: There-being is "in the truth"; There-being is "in the non-truth."

Coming now to Chapter 6 proper, we polarize our remarks around the two following points: mystery; forgetfulness of the mystery.

220

This is a point of interpretation, of course, which already has been affirmed and must be justified, if not by citation, at least by the coherence of the exposition.
I. Mystery

Since the essence of truth is revealment, the non-essence of truth is non-revealment, therefore concealment. ("... If, then, truth be considered as revealment, concealment is non-revealment and consequently non-truth, which is not only authentic but most proper to the essence of truth. ...")

Now since only that can be revealed which hitherto has been concealed, concealment is prior – not "temporally" but ontologically – to revelation. In other words, the letting-be (manifest) that we have called revealment must take place within a horizon, sc. against a background, of obscurity that we are now calling concealment. Concealment, then, is prior to the freedom which comes-to-pass through a particular comportment between There-being and an individual being.

Furthermore, this comportment itself not only leaves concealed the remainder of beings-in-their-totality but itself enters into a special relationship with the concealing of what is concealed. This relationship to the concealment of the total ensemble of beings is of such a nature that the concealing itself remains concealed. We may speak, then, of a concealing of concealment, sc. what is concealed in There-being's liberating comportment is not only beings-in-their-totality but the fact that the ensemble is concealed and the import of this fact. This concealing of the concealed Heidegger calls "the mystery" (das Geheimnis) – the unique and primordial obscurity that enshrouds not individual beings severally but the entire There-being of man.

Hence the "first fruit" (erstlich) of concealment appears in the mode of concealment itself. It is this primal mystery that is non-truth in the most authentic sense. "... The authentic non-essence of truth is the mystery. ..." And it dominates (durch-wallet) There-being, inasmuch as There-being is what it is, sc. ek-sistence. "... There-being preserves, as long as it ek-sists, the first and broadest non-revelation, the authentic non-

---

21 "... Die Verborgenheit ist dann, von der Wahrheit als Entborgenheit her gedacht, die Un-entborgenheit und somit die dem Wahrheits-wesen eigenste und eigentliche Un-wahrheit..." (WW, p. 19). On this whole difficult passage, see introduction to French translation, pp. 43-48.

22 "... Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis..." (WW, p. 20).
truth. . .” 23 How else can this be explained except in terms of the fact that a “not” permeates There-being down to its very depths, sc. that it is negatived (finite)? We return here effectively to the formula, “There-being is in the non-truth.”

To be noted here is the priority (älter) of non-truth (concealment) to truth (revealment) and consequently a tendency, not yet explicit, to attribute a certain alterity to the mystery which dominates the There-being of man. At the same time, there is still implied a dependence of the mystery on There-being. What, then, is the relation between There-being and the mystery? And what does it mean to call non-truth “prior” to truth?

2. Forgetfulness of the Mystery

The mystery, however, easily evanesces for a There-being lost in the superficiality of everydayness. To be sure, There-being lets-be those beings with which it has to do, but often enough becomes absorbed in them, fascinated by its ability to make negotiable instruments of them for its daily traffic and to control them at will. Even if designedly it broadens the scope of its preoccupation, still the new sphere of interest is determined by its own ontic intentions and needs. In effect, however, this is to refuse to let the mystery hold sway over the very There-being which nonetheless, it dominates. In a word, the mystery slips into forgottenness. 24

But a mystery that is forgotten is not thereby dissolved. It abides by a presence of its own. It abandons man to his imprisonment in the ontic: he is allowed to fashion his “World” out of the intentions and needs which happen to be the most immediate, supplementing these with his own ambitions and designs. There-being comes to take such things as this to be the norm by which it measures itself (v.g. the ontic truth of its judgements), forgetting the ensemble of beings-in-the-totality, neglecting to reflect upon the ground which renders possible such measuring, sc. the essence of the measure. To do so would

23 “… Das Da-sein verwahrt, sofern es eksistent, die erste und weiteste Unentborgenheit, die eigentliche Unwahrheit. . .” (WW, p. 20).
ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH

be to re-collect the mystery which pervades all. If There-being's power to transcend beings unto Being is called ek-sistence, then its propensity to adhere ontically to beings, once the mystery has been forgotten, may be called "in-sistence." Hence, in the condition we have just described, "... There-being not only ek-sists but at the same time in-sists. ..." 25 But the mystery remains nonetheless, working its influence on the in-sistent ek-sistence. It is forgotten, however, and as such has become the "non-essential" essence of truth. Note that to mystery is attributed once more an alterity to There-being that seems to imply a spontaneity, even an initiative of its own: "... insofar as the mystery repudiates itself in and for forgottenness, it leaves historical man ... to his own resources. ..." 26 Again: "... the mystery holds sway even in in-sistent ek-sistence. ..." 27

F. CHAPTER 7: NON-TRUTH AS ERRANCE

The present chapter continues the thought-sequence of the preceding; that is why we must consider both as forming a unity. The mystery (concealment of concealment) is commonly forgotten, we are told, in the everyday state of ek-sistent in-sistence. Now we examine in closer detail this forgottenness of the mystery and give it a name all its own, sc. "errance" (die Irre).

... The concealing of the concealed ensemble of beings [sc. the mystery] holds sway in the revelation of a particular being at any given moment, [but] this revelation becomes errance insofar as it is a forgottenness of [the mystery].28

But why call it "errance"? To find a sense in the term, one must understand the phenomenon which it tries to express. Let us look for a moment at ek-sistence as it comes-to-pass in ordinary everydayness. By reason of its in-sistence, There-being

---

26 "... Indem das Geheimnis sich in der Vergessenheit und für sie versagt, läßt es den geschichtlichen Menschen in seinem Gangbaren bei seinen Gemachten stehen. ..." (WW, p. 21). Writer's italics
adheres to the beings which through ek-sistent freedom it reveals, and this very fact turns There-being away from the mystery, towards which, nonetheless, it has a constitutional orientation. The result is that There-being wanders from one being to another in a state of confusion, driven about hither and thither, looking for a satisfaction that no being can give, searching for a repose that no being, torn from the roots of ultimate meaning in mystery, can offer. This congenital wandering about of There-being in a condition that its equally congenital orientation towards mystery belies — this is what is meant by “errance.” If mystery is non-truth, so, too, is errance, and all of Chapter 7 deals with it as such.

The condition of errance is not occasional or accidental to There-being but intrinsic to its very structure: “… errance belongs to the inner constitution of There-being …,” “… an essential component of its open-ness ….” One may expect, then, to find its analogue in SZ, which undertook to analyse this structure.

The structural errance of There-being will be the ground of all error to which There-being falls prey. “Error” in this case, however, means more than just a single mistake; it signifies the whole entangled complex of ways and means by which There-being in its wandering can go astray. After all, every open comportment, insofar as it bears a relation to the total ensemble of beings (therefore to the mystery), will have its own way of wandering about in forgetfulness of the mystery. The kingdom
of error extends from such phenomena as a single mistake, oversight or miscalculation up to the aberrations and excesses in matters of supreme moment. What one ordinarily calls "error," sc. the incorrectness of a judgement or falsity of knowledge, is only one way — for that matter, the most superficial way — in which There-being goes astray.

All of these different ways of vitiating truth have their original abode, as we have said, in the errance which is intrinsic to There-being. Errance may be conceived as itself an open area wherein every modality by which truth is corrupted or contaminated may have free play. It is for this reason that if mystery itself may be called non-truth, then errance is a still more profound negation of truth. Let it be called by a stronger name. Call it not "non-truth" but "anti-truth"; "errance is the essential anti-essence of the originating essence of truth. ..." 33

Furthermore, the errance in which man walks is marked by a certain spontaneity all its own. "... Errance dominates man, insofar as it leads him astray. ..." 34 It "oppresses" man and by this oppression attains a certain domination over the mystery, insofar as it keeps the mystery a victim of forgottenness. Thus There-being must submit to what seems to be a double alterity: the oppression by errance and at the same time the domination of the mystery. The result is a tension in There-being in the form of a distress arising out of the constraint imposed upon it from this double source: errance on the one hand, mystery on the other. There-being oscillates endlessly between the two. 35 The non-truth which we call "errance" and the non-truth which we call "mystery" combine, and both together, forming as they do the complete non-essence of truth, help to constitute the full essence of truth itself, sc. that essence which includes within itself its own most proper non-essence, therefore negativity. "... The concealing of concealment [sc. mystery] and errance

33 "Die Irre ist das wesentliche Gegenwesen zum anfänglichen Wesen der Wahrheit. ..." (WW, p. 22). We are translating anfängliche by "originating" to distinguish it from ursprüngliche ("original"). The former has a much stronger implication of activity, or spontaneity, than the latter. Alternate translations: "initiating," "taking the initiative."
34 "... Die Irre durchherrscht den Menschen, indem sie ihn beirrt. ..." (WW, p. 22). Writer's italics.
35 WW, p. 23 (Bedrängnis, Not der Nötigung).
belong to the essence of truth, insofar as it takes the initiative. . . .” 36

What is important here, though, is not so much to see that errance and mystery are incorporated into truth itself, but to see that the alterity that has been assigned to the two former is now attributed to truth. Hence truth itself assumes a spontaneity with regard to There-being: “. . . the full essence of truth, which includes within itself its own most proper non-essence, retains There-being . . . in distress. . . .” 37 It is truth itself now that is somehow prior even to the freedom which we saw to be the essence of truth as correctness, for this freedom itself derives from originating truth:

. . . Freedom conceived in terms of the insistent ek-sistence of There-being is the essence of truth (in the sense of the correctness of a presentation) only because freedom itself derives from originating truth. . . . 38

But however intrinsic errance may be to There-being’s structure, and therefore however congenital its tendency to wander in onticity, it remains possible for There-being to resist being led astray, sc. “. . . to the extent that it experiences errance itself for what it is and no longer overlooks the mystery of There-being.” 39 More precisely, when There-being comprehends errance as such, it recognizes it to be but the reverse side of its own forgetfulness of the mystery, and this is ipso facto to re-collect the mystery. By this re-collection, There-being is already under way towards a surrender to domination by the mystery through authentic re-solve in its regard. This yielding to the mystery comes-to-pass in a manner analogous to that by which There-being, through its freedom, lets-be the beings it encounters in open comportment. As we saw, it is at that moment that the total ensemble of beings becomes concealed and in the concealing of this concealment the mystery (together

37 “. . . Das volle, sein eigenes Unwesen einschließende Wesen der Wahrheit hält das Dasein mit dieser ständigen Wende des Hin und Her in die Not . . . .” (WW, p. 23).
39 “. . . indem er die Irre selbst erfährt und sich nicht versieht am Geheimnis des Da-seins.” (WW, p. 23).
with errance) holds sway. To recognize errance for what it is and thus become open toward the mystery, There-being’s task is to let-be (manifest) not the individual beings of a particular comportment but the total ensemble of beings as such. This happens in the proper sense, however, only on condition that from time to time There-being assumes of its own accord the originating essence of the total ensemble.

This yielding to the mystery in re-solve, that comes-to-pass when There-being recognizes errance for what it is, does not destroy the mystery, of course. On the contrary, it permits There-being to meditate the mystery for itself and thus pose the supreme question about what beings as such in their totality "are." Such an interrogation "thinks" (denkt) the question about the Being of beings. "... The thinking of Being, whence such a question originally stems, is conceived since Plato as 'philosophy,' receiving later the title 'metaphysics.'"

G. CHAPTER 8:
THE QUESTION OF TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHY

The function of the essay is to analyse the essence of truth. In order that the analysis be complete, it must explain, too, the non-essence of truth, sc. the essence of non-truth. It is with these two aspects of a single problem that we have been occupied up to the present: Chapters 1–4 discussed truth, Chapters 5–7 non-truth. It remains now only to conclude the study by situating it with regard to the whole of philosophy. This is the function of Chapter 8. The essentials may be sketched quickly. The nub of the matter has been stressed already. For There-being, in its chronic condition of errance, to open itself up to the mystery in re-solve is effectively to pose a question about the truth of beings-as-such-(therefore in their Being)-in-the-ensemble. It is this, according to Heidegger, which has been the task of philosophy since Plato. Of its very nature, then, philosophy

40 What this means in the concrete we have some idea in Der Feldweg (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1953). (Hereafter: FW). See also G, pp. 25–26.
41 "... Das Denken des Seins, dem solches Fragen anfänglich entstammt, begreift sich seit Platon als 'Philosophie' und erhält später den Titel 'Metaphysik.'" (WW, p. 23).
strives to think the Being of beings, where “Being” signifies beings-as-such-in-their-totality, and “to think” means simply for There-being to let-be (manifest) this ensemble.42

So it is that the whole investigation has gradually led us from what might have appeared to be a peripheral problem, sc. the essence of truth (taken first in the sense of correctness) to the very center of philosophy, whose whole function is to pose the question about the truth of Being (as understood above). For having once established the essence of truth-as-conformity to lie in the freedom of There-being, which lets-be (manifest) the beings it encounters, we then passed to a study of non-truth. Here we saw that both modes of non-truth (mystery and errance) possess a certain alterity from There-being which renders possible a spontaneous initiative (albeit still very vaguely defined) in There-being's regard. Since both modes of non-truth constitute together the “complete” non-essence of truth which is (and must be) intrinsic to truth, then truth, too, is characterized by this same alterity and spontaneity, which give it a certain ontological (though not necessarily “temporal”) primacy over There-being. This truth, including within itself its own non-truth (mystery, errance) is the truth of beings-as-such-in-their-ensemble, sc. the truth of Being. Being, however, is that by reason of which beings “are” what (and how) they “are.” Now that by reason of which beings “are” what they “are” we call their “essence,” or (to avoid the impulse to conceive of “essence” as something general or abstract) their “essencing,” where this term now has a fully verbal sense. “To be,” then, means “to essence,” sc. “to come-to-an-essence,” or, more idiomatically, “to come-to-a-presence.” Such, Heidegger claims, is the sense of the old German word *Wesen*, and such an understanding of it enables the author to say that his research has forced us to ask ourselves “... whether or not the question about the essence of truth must not be at the same time, indeed before all else, the question about the truth of Essence...,” 43 where “Essence”

---

42 **WW**, pp. 24-25.
in the second position has the verbal sense of essenc-ing, coming-to-a-presence, Being. It is on this note that the essay comes to a close.

II. General Remarks

A. Heidegger I and II

1. Structure of the Essay

We wish now to assess the significance of this essay in the developing of the notion of foundational thought. Let us begin by remarking how very carefully conceived is the structure of the whole. Heidegger introduces his reflection by projecting it against a background of the prejudices of "ordinary common sense," and brings it to a conclusion by alluding again to these prejudices and defending not only his meditation but philosophy itself against them. One has the impression at the close, then, of having come full circle with the author and that the reflection itself constitutes its own defense.

But the thought process of WW is actually more of a spiral than a circle. Recall briefly the sequence. We begin by considering the essence of truth in its positivity. The conventional notion of the essence of truth is conformity. But what renders conformity possible (Ch. 1)? The pre-predicative open comportment with the being-to-be-known. What renders this possible (Ch. 2)? Freedom! What, then, is the essence of freedom (Ch. 3)? The revelation of beings by reason of ek-sistence (Ch. 4). With this much established, we consider the essence of truth in its negativity. The revelation of particular beings by freedom is simultaneously the concealment, therefore the non-revelation, of beings-in-the-ensemble. This concealment is already a non-essence of truth (Ch. 5). Furthermore, concealment conceals itself, and the concealing of concealment is the authentic non-essence of truth. This is the mystery (Ch. 6). But the mystery is often forgotten, leaving There-being to wander about among beings that have become meaningless because their genuine sense (buried in mystery) lies in oblivion. This is errance, another

44 WW, pp. 5-6, 24
modality of the non-essence of truth (Ch. 7). Conclusion: the essence of truth, which includes its own non-essence, is the truth of beings-as-such-in-their-totality, sc. Being, which since Plato has been the proper field of interrogation of philosophy (Ch. 8).

We have every right, therefore, to talk of a "sequence" of thought, for each chapter follows upon the preceding. But each successive step poses the problem on a new and deeper level, so that we can not say that the sequence is a strictly logical one. Non-logical (but not illogical), the thought process nevertheless has an organic unity, for it is itself the experience of the phenomenon it seeks to discern. We can sense, though the full import of the remark may for the moment escape us, with what justice Heidegger can say in a note added later (1943) to the text:

... The successive steps of the interrogation are in themselves a way of thinking which, instead of offering presentations and concepts, experiences itself and puts itself to the proof as the transformation of a relation to Being.45

2. WW and the Early Heidegger

By the early Heidegger (Heidegger I) we understand principally the Heidegger of SZ as interpreted by himself in KM and explicitated in the minor works of 1929. The principal task of SZ, as we saw, was to analyse There-being, the coming-to-pass of transcendence, which is fundamentally the coming-to-pass of truth. It is only plausible, then, that an analysis of the essence of truth (WW) will contain certain clear echoes of the analysis of that process by which it comes-to-pass (SZ). We wish now to gather together these elements of the present essay which clearly concord with the major work, in order that we may see all the more clearly in what way both works differ. The principal characteristics of There-being are these: it is transcendence, which is finite, whose ultimate meaning is time. Each of these elements plays its rôle in the essay under discussion.

a. TRANSCENDENCE AND TRUTH – By transcendence, we understand the passage beyond beings to Being. It implies

45 "... Die Schrittfolge des Fragens ist in sich der Weg eines Denkens, das, statt Vorstellungen und Begriffe zu liefern, sich als Wandlung des Bezugs zum Sein erfährt und erprobt." (WW, p. 27).
two dimensions: that of Being and that of beings (ontological and ontic). In Chapter 4, we saw that the essence of truth is the opening-up of that-which-is-open by reason of an open-ness to the Open which comes-to-pass as ek-sistence (There-being). It is this open-ness to the Open which is transcendence. Now the Open itself is what SZ called the World, the matrix of relationships (Total Meaningfulness) which constitutes the horizon of There-being’s potentialities – itself not a being but that within which There-being and other beings meet when one of these potential relations comes-to-pass as an encounter. In KM, the Open was called ontological knowledge, the horizon of objectiveness – the condition of encounter between beings, but itself expressly not a being and admitting only an “empirical use.” There is nothing new, then, in the notion of WW that the matrix of relationships (the Open) unto which There-being transcends is not a being in its own right but comes-to-pass in a given comportment, of which, nevertheless, it is the indispensable ontological condition and ground.46

We may draw two inferences from this. In the first place, if the matrix of relations (Verhältnis) never “is” except in particular comportment, we are prepared for the thesis that Being never “is” except in and as beings, and we are thus brought once more face to face with the ontological difference. Secondly, if the matrix never “is” except as the condition of possibility of There-being’s comportment with particular beings, then we can understand how There-being, despite its prerogative of ek-sistence, has a congenital tendency to adhere to the beings with which it has to do, sc. it is in-sistent. “... This adhesion has its support unbeknown to itself in [There-being’s open-ness to] the matrix of relations, with regard to which There-being not only ek-sists but at the same time in-sists. ...” 47 In other words, if There-being’s “ontic primacy consists in the fact that it is ontological,” one is tempted to add – though Heidegger does not do so – that its ontological debility consists in the fact that it is also ontic. At any rate, the two dimensions are always simultaneous. We have

46 WW, pp. 11, 20.
47 “... Dieses Beharren hat seine ihm selbst unkennbare Stütze im Verhältnis, als welches das Dasein nicht nur ek-sistiert, sondern zugleich in-sistiert...” (WW, p. 21). Heidegger’s italics.
here, no doubt, the basis for the subsequent remark that errance belongs to the interior structure of There-being.

b. FINITUDE AND TRUTH – Anyone for whom WW is the first taste of Heidegger will find it difficult to understand why the problem of non-truth should be put on equal footing with the problem of truth, and why “... the analysis of the non-essence of truth is not a subsequent filling up of a lacuna, but the decisive step in the adequate posing of the question about the essence of truth. ...” 48 All the research that we have made hitherto, however, has shown us how central to Heidegger’s intuition is the problem of negativity, sc. finitude. His insistence here upon the importance of the negativity of truth in WW is therefore the normal consequence of a constant preoccupation.

In KM, Heidegger saw the necessity of posing the problem of non-truth as part of the problematic of finitude:

But does not ontological knowledge, ... as essentially finite, possess, together with its truth, also a corresponding non-truth? As a matter of fact, yes. The idea of transcendental non-truth contains within itself one of the most central problems of finitude, which not only has not been solved but has not so much as been posed, since the basis of such a problematic must first of all be elaborated. ... 49

If in WW the problem of non-truth receives so much attention, the reason seems to be that Heidegger is trying to elaborate just such a basis. At any rate, finitude is as important to WW as to any of the previous works. The problem of non-truth, then, is the problem of the finitude of truth. We must try to see this clearly, for the import is tremendous.

In SZ, Heidegger touched the problem of non-truth briefly but clearly: the reason why There-being is determined by both truth and non-truth lies in the Being-structure of There-being, which is a project in the condition of thrown-ness. 50 We may interpret

49 “Aber hat nicht die ontologische Erkenntnis, deren Wesensgrund die transcendente Einbildungskraft sein soll, als wesenhaft endliche in eins mit ihrer Wahrheit auch eine entsprechende Unwahrheit? In der Tat, die Idee der transcendentalen Unwahrheit birgt eines der zentralsten Probleme der Endlichkeit in sich, das nicht nur nicht gelöst, sondern nicht einmal gestellt ist, weil die Basis für diese Problemstellung allererst erarbeitet werden muß ...” (KM, p. 128).
50 SZ, pp. 223, 284 (geworfenen Entwurf).
this to mean that There-being is “in the truth” inasmuch as it is project and “in the non-truth” inasmuch as it is thrown-among-beings-as-still-to-be-achieved, with all that this implies, sc. profoundly determined by a “not”: not the master of its own origin; not completely indifferent to other beings, but referentially dependent on them; not already a fait accompli, but still-to-be-achieved. Thrown-ness, then, symbolizes all of the “not”-ness (negativity) that affects There-being. There-being is “in the non-truth” because transcendence (truth) is negatived by “not,” it is finite. If this interpretation is valid, one could add (although in SZ this problematic is formally distinct from that of thrown-ness) that the deepest type of negativity to affect There-being is that it is not destined to ek-sist forever, it is Being- unto-end (death). Hence the deepest reason why There-being is “in the non-truth” is that it is (thrown) Being-unto-death.

This is made still more precise. Thrown-ness, strictly speaking, suggests a reference to There-being’s coming-to-be. The same indigence, when considered as characteristic of There-being’s abiding condition, is called “fallen-ness.” Here, however, There-being’s referential dependence on other beings receives the further nuance of an adhesion to them of such a nature that There-being has the tendency to lose itself among them, become fascinated by them and thus slip into the superficiality that characterizes everydayness. In such a condition, There-being has “fallen away” from its authentic self, for it does not comport itself in a manner becoming its transcendence. It has forgotten, or never re-collected, its great prerogative, has plunged into the ontic and lost itself.

This condition is expressly a negativity, a type of being by which There-being is not authentically itself. “... There-being plunges ... into the groundlessness and negativity of inauthentic everydayness ...;” 51 it is tossed about in perpetual com- motion, caught in the vortex of onticity. Now if There-being is “in the non-truth” because of its thrown-ness, how much more will this be the case when There-being continues to abide in this

51 “... Das Dasein stürzt aus ihm selbst in es selbst, in die Bodenlosigkeit und Nichtigkeit der uneigentlichen Alltäglichkeit ....” (SZ, p. 178). See KM, pp. 210-211 (Vergessenheit); SZ, pp. 178 (Absturz, Wirbel), 307 (Verlorenheit in das Man), 176 (Nicht-sein).
fallen condition among beings? Hence, "... because There-being by its very essence is in a fallen condition among beings, it is, according to its ontological structure, in 'non-truth'. . . ." 52

How describe now this condition of non-truth which characterizes fallen-ness? Beings are revealed, to be sure, sc. uncovered, but inadequately so and slip back immediately into their previous un-revealedness, sc. concealment. Hence, to uncover is simultaneously to cover-up; to dis-close is to close-over. In KM, we have an illustration of this negativing effect of finitude insofar as it affects the comportment of all "knowledge." "... Finite knowledge as finite necessarily conceals at the same time [that it makes manifest]. . . ." 53 In other words, finite knowledge reveals its object but not adequately, sc. as only the creative intuition can know it. Hence, the revelation that takes place in knowledge is also a non-revelation of that dimension in the being which surpasses There-being's finite capacity to reveal. Because of the finitude of the knower, therefore, a "not" permeates the revelation. There is non-revelation, concealment.

But this "not" which pervades every type of letting-be-manifest is interior to the manifestive process itself, hence has as the ground of its possibility the fact that the manifestive process takes place. To let-be-manifest and to not-let-be-manifest are simultaneous and correlative, because There-being itself carries its "not" within the depths of its Being:

... But only insofar as There-being is dis-closed is it also closed-over; and insofar as [other] beings ... are dis-covered with There-being, they ... are covered-over (concealed) or camouflaged.54

Briefly: There-being is "in the non-truth" because transcendence is finite.

What we have just said about non-truth as a consequence of fallen-ness regards There-being principally in its everyday condition of inauthenticity. We know that under certain circum-

54 "... Aber nur sofern Dasein erschlossen ist, ist es auch verschlossen; und sofern mit dem Dasein je schon innerweltliches Seiendes entdeckt ist, ist dergleichen Seiendes als mögliches innerweltlich Begegnendes verdeckt (verborgen) oder verstellt." (SZ, p. 222).
stances There-being is brought to comprehend its own bi-di-

mensional (ontic-ontological) structure and can consent, so to speak, to the fact that it be so, sc. transcendence permeated by a "not" (finite). It simply lets-itself-be as it "is," and this letting-

be of itself, sc. this taking-over, or assuming-of-its-own-accord its self as transcendent but as finite – this is what is called "re-

solve." Re-solve is the culminating moment of There-being in its There, and as such it is the culminating moment of truth:

... With the phenomenon of re-solve, we have been brought before the original truth of existence. In re-solve, There-being in its actual, matter-of-fact power-to-be is unveiled to itself, and, indeed, in such a way that it is itself both the unveiling and the unveiled. ...55

But in this self-endorsed luminosity to itself, the non-truth inherent to There-being does not disappear. On the contrary, it is only here that There-being makes it its very own, for, comprehending it, There-being accepts it for what it is, sc. the ineluctable consequence of finitude.56 Briefly: in re-solve, There-being, recognizing non-truth as the stamp of negativity upon its own transcendence, resigns itself to finitude and thus achieves its authentic self.

With these perspectives fresh in mind, we come again to WW and see how deeply they affect the thought of the later work. Even from the purely structural point of view, we can see now how Chapters 1–4 deal with truth as a problem of transcendence; Chapters 5–7 with truth as finite. In Chapter 5, we read:

... Precisely insofar as the letting-be that takes-place in a particular comportment lets-be that being with which There-being is engaged and thereby reveals that being, this letting-be conceals beings-in-the-ensemble. ...57

The similarity to what we have just seen in SZ is clear. The difference is that in SZ the finite revealing conceals the being itself which is revealed. Here it is rather the whole ensemble that is concealed. But note that the total ensemble has a depth of

55 "... Entschlossen ist das Dasein ihm selbst in seinem jeweiligen faktischen Seinkönnen enthüllt, so zwar, daß es selbst dieses Enthüllen und Enthülltsein ist...." (SZ, p. 307). Heidegger's italics.
56 SZ, p. 299 (eignet sich eigentlich zu).
57 "... Gerade indem das Seinlassen im einzelnen Verhalten je das Seiende sein läßt, zu dem es sich verhält, und es damit entbirgt, verbirgt es das Seiende im Ganzen...." (WW, p. 19).
meaning here that it did not have in SZ. It becomes clear very shortly that beings-in-their-totality, at least as they constitute the mystery, are the ground and essence of beings that are taken as measure in daily intercourse, and are eventually identified with Being itself. In bold lines, then, we may say that the non-truth that we are speaking of here consists in the fact that when beings are revealed, Being is concealed—a formula that concords perfectly with the phenomenon of referential-dependence-on-beings-become-fallenness as examined in SZ. The perspectives of SZ can give, too, a sense to the formula of Chapter 6: "... There-being preserves, so far as it ek-sists, the first and widest non-revealedness, authentic non-truth ...," simply inasmuch as There-being's ek-sistence, sc. its transcendency, is itself profoundly modified by "not," sc. its finitude.

But there is a still further negativity of truth, a negativity which springs from the fact that the primal non-truth, sc. the mystery which dominates There-being, is itself negatived, in the sense of being forgotten. The result is that There-being loses its self among the beings of daily commerce, takes up its abode among them, adheres to them, makes its "World" out of them, takes them in all their computable determination to be the measure of its activity. What else is this than what SZ called "fallenness"?

Errance is an essential component of There-being's open-ness (transcendence) for the same reason that There-being's disclosedness is simultaneously a closing-over, sc. because There-being is permeated by "not." Where fallen-ness was marked by commotion in the vortex, There-being in errance turns now this way, now that, from one unsatisfying being to another, as if driven about by superior forces. If in SZ every manifestive comportment of fallen There-being had its own way of going askew, so too here every comportment has its own way of going astray. Briefly: it is in the permeation of the mani-
ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH

feste process by a “not” that errance takes place. “... It is in the simultaneity of revealing and concealing that errance holds sway. ...” 63

Both the mystery and the forgetting of the mystery in errance, which, taken together, form the complete non-essence of truth, are consequences of the finitude of There-being’s transcendence. Now we know that “... the authentic non-essence of truth is mystery. ...” 64 May we infer that the inauthentic non-essence of truth consists in forgetting the mystery and wandering astray in errance? Heidegger does not say this in so many words. 65 At any rate, we know that: to remain the dupe of fallen-ness (errance) is to abide in inauthenticity; yet to overcome inauthenticity is not simply to suppress errance, which would be as impossible as to suppress finitude, but simply to recognize it for what it is and consent that it be so. This consent of There-being to finitude is an assuming of its self as finite and by that very fact the achieving of authenticity. Such in SZ was the sense of re-solve, and in analogous fashion it must be understood here, too, in WW. There-being refuses to be led astray by errance when it experiences errance “as itself,” sc. recognizes it for what it is. Thus There-being, despite the seductions of errance, opens itself (re-solve) for the mystery. This is the culminating moment of ek-sistence, when There-being acquiesces to the fact that mystery is filtered through finitude.

c. HISTORICITY AND TRUTH – There-being is ek-sistence that is finite, whose ultimate meaning is time. The analysis of time as the source of unity of There-being as concern had an important place in SZ, but the temporal aspect of truth remains on the periphery of WW. Yet it is there! We must take note of it, not only to indicate the deep concordance of the present reflection with SZ but also to prepare the way for a development that will be very pronounced in the later work.

Recall that There-being, because temporal, is historical, so that history, in the existential sense, begins when ek-sistence

63 “... Im Zugleich der Erstbergung und Verbergung waltet die Irre....” (WW, p. 23).
64 “... Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis....” (WW, p. 21).
65 Though perhaps the closing sentence of Chapter 6, p. 21, might give warrant for such an inference.
begins, sc. when transcendence first comes-to-pass. Transcendence is "primordial history." But when is this? When There-being first experiences the non-concealment (truth) of beings by asking what beings are as such. For Western thought, this took place, Heidegger claims, when the early Greeks asked this question with regard not to individual beings but to beings-in-their-totality. It was with them, therefore, that history in the existential sense began.

We can see, therefore, even if only in obscure fashion, that there is an intrinsic relation for Heidegger between truth and history, and consequently that truth will be of its very essence historical. We can understand, too, why the author permits himself several oblique references to the historicity of truth, why errance, too, has its historical aspects, and we are prepared, at least, to understand the important rôle that truth will play in Heidegger II. For the moment, it suffices to remark that the historicity of truth is a normal consequence of the historicity of There-being as delineated in SZ.

3. WW and the Later Heidegger

We have just seen in some detail how closely WW concords with SZ. The conclusion from this should be that it is clearly the same man who wrote both. And yet, if we claimed WW to be merely a restatement in more elaborate form of the truth-analysis in the earlier work, we would have missed its sense completely. There is a profound change, and it is out of this change that the contemporary Heidegger evolved. WW is, indeed, a pivotal work.

The characteristics of this change can be stated easily enough. The purpose of SZ was primarily to pose the Being-question, but in the event it proved to be principally an analysis of the Being-comprehension of There-being. The focal point, then, was There-being, and Being itself was seen in this perspective; Being (the World) was considered basically as the project of There-being. In WW, however, the focal point of Heidegger’s reflection passes subtly from There-being to Being itself. What difficulties this
shift poses will not be resolved in WW. Perhaps they will not be resolved at all – that is to be seen! All that concerns us now is to detect the shift, collating those indices of it that have already appeared in our analysis of the argument.

There are, to be sure, many obscurities in the text, but let us build our case on what is clear. Having followed the argument in its development, we may now prescind from the author's sequence and arrange the data synthetically as best fits the order of exposition. Perhaps the simplest method is to formulate a series of three propositions:

a. THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH IS THE TRUTH OF ESSENCE.

In this categorical form, the proposition does not appear in the original text but is first formulated in the note to the second edition (1949). Yet even if in the original it is suggested more reticently ("[The present effort] ... helps one to reflect upon whether or not . . ."), the author's intention is no less clear, his thought no less firm, for it crystallizes a development that has evolved through the entire essay and, shortly before, even came to tentative expression as the "intertwining of the essence of truth with the truth of Essence." 69

As to the sense of Essence in the second case, the author does not say explicitly until 1949 that it is to be taken as a verb, but there is no difficulty in seeing that this was what was intended also in 1930. He does say in the original, however, that in the concept of "Essence" (Wesen) philosophy thinks Being, "... which we have been accustomed for a long time to consider only as beings-[as-such]-in-their-totality." 70 Now to the concept of beings-as-such-in-their-totality corresponds what the early Greeks meant by φώς, sc. not any particular sphere of beings but the whole ensemble, "... and, indeed, in the sense of the process of emerging-into-presence. . ." 71 Being in the sense of Essence, then, means coming-to-presence, and a being, sc. that-which-is, or that-which-is-open, is that-which-comes-to-a-presence. What is notable here is not so much the correlation of

69 Cf. WW, p. 26 (das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens) with p. 25 (verhilft ... ob) and p. 23 (Verflechtung des Wesens der Wahrheit mit der Wahrheit des Wesens).

70 "... was wir das Sein nennen und seit langem nur als das Seiende im Ganzen zu bedenken gewohnt sind." (WW, p. 25).

71 "... und zwar in der Bedeutung des aufgehenden Anwesens..." (WW, p. 16).
See p. 11 (das "Anwesende").
Being with the process of coming-to-presence but rather the fact that Heidegger attributes to Being now an active character that a pure horizon does not possess. "... The question about the truth of Essence understands Essence verbally. ..." 72 Being is a coming-to-presence; it holds sway; it is an emerging-into-presence that is an "origin," that takes the initiative with which philosophy in the West began. 73

b. THE FULL ESSENCE OF TRUTH CONTAINS WITHIN ITSELF ITS OWN NON-ESSENCE. The negativity, however, which characterizes the essence of truth when attention is focused upon There-being remains equally intrinsic to the phenomenon when the focus shifts to the truth of Essence (Being).

"... The full essence of truth includes [its] non-essence and before all else holds sway as concealment. ..." 74

It is because Being as originating truth is essentially negativated that it holds sway as mystery and errance, for these are what constitute its negativity. Consequently "... the concealing of concealment [sc. the mystery] and errance belong to the originating essence of truth...," 75 and, indeed, so radically that this originating essence of truth itself may be called the "domination of the mystery in errance," "the self-concealing One-and-Only," soliciting, so to speak, the forgetfulness of itself. This errance is so inscribed in Being as a modality of its intrinsic negativity that, although interior to Being, it opens up as itself a type of open domain which is Being's anti-essence, where every possible fashion of contaminating truth has free play. Hence, negativity is not simply a privation but so penetrates Being as to permeate every modality of its emergence, negating revelation in the very process of revealment, guarding this enduring tension between positivity and negativity as Being's characteristic property. It is this which constitutes the mystery. 76

72 "... Die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens versteht Wesen verbal. ..." (WW, p. 26).
73 V. g. WW, pp. 24 (waltet), 14 (ursprünglicheren Wesen), 20, 23, 25 (anfänglich), 16 (das Offene ... eröffnet).
74 "... Weil aber das volle Wesen der Wahrheit das Unwesen einschließt und allem zuvor als Verbergung waltet, ..." (WW, p. 24).
75 "... Die Verbergung des Verborgenen und die Irre gehören in das anfängliche Wesen der Wahrheit ..." (WW, p. 23).
76 WW, pp. 23 (des Walten des Geheimnisses in der Irre), 20 (erschließt, Gegenwesen, Widerspiel), 25 (das sich verbergende Einzige), 22 (beirrt, Gegenwesen, Widerspiel), 19 (nicht στάρημα, Eigenste als Eigentum).
c. **The full (therefore negativated) essence of truth, sc. truth of Essence (Being), possesses an ontological primacy over ek-sistent freedom.**

For the moment, let us prescind from whether or not There-being and man may be identified without qualification, and speak of them both indiscriminately as that being in which truth-as-conformity is found. As we saw, the essence of this truth lies in the freedom of such a being. What we want to insist on now is the fact that such freedom does not have its origin in the being in question, but rather this freedom itself springs from a more original source:

... Freedom is only to that extent the ground of the interior possibility of correctness insofar as it receives its own essence out of the still more original Essence of the one-and-only essential truth. ...  

Hence, man does not so much "possess" ek-sistent freedom as he is possessed by it, sc. by freedom as flowing from its source in originating truth.  

But since the truth of Essence (Being) is permeated by negativity, ek-sistent freedom, too, is inevitably the victim of non-truth. In other words, the non-essence of truth does not arise subsequently to the simple powerlessness and neglect of There-being but rather derives from the primal negativity interior to its origin, sc. Being itself. One can see clearly at this point how far we have moved away from the perspective of SZ which saw non-truth as the inevitable consequence of the finitude of There-being. Now the ultimate residence of non-truth is Being itself. That is why Being in its negativity, sc. as mystery, "... the authentic non-truth, is prior to every manifestation of this or that being. It is prior to the letting-be [sc. ek-sistent freedom] itself, ..." preserving and dominating ek-sistent freedom in its relation to the mystery.

77 "... die Freiheit ist nur deshalb der Grund der inneren Möglichkeit der Richtigkeit, weil sie ihr eigenes Wesen aus dem ursprünglicheren Wesen der einzigen wesentlichen Wahrheit empfangt. ..." (WW, p. 14).

78 WW, p. 16. And ek-sistent freedom serves as the ground (be-freit: renders man free) for "freedom" in the normal sense of power to choose, because it is only by reason of ek-sistence that are let-be those beings (possible or necessary) which are the objects of "free" choice.

But Being in its negativity includes more than mystery, it includes errance as well. Hence, errance as well as mystery holds a mastery over ek-sistent freedom and thereby leads it astray. So it is that the complete essence of truth, including this double negativity, retains There-being in its abiding condition of distress.80

We have been speaking about ek-sistent freedom, referring to it sometimes as “There-being,” sometimes as “man.” Are they to be simply identified? True enough, the relation between There-being and man is sufficiently intimate that the two may receive identical predicates (v.g. insistent ek-sistence) and often seem to be used interchangeably. Yet there is a distinction to be made between them. There-being is not man as such but that “place” where the essence of man has its abiding ground, sc. the ultimate source out of which man comes-to-presence as man.81 It is the origin of man’s Being, rendering man free for all his ontic activity. There-being, then, is a coming-to-pass that is more fundamental than man himself. That is why Heidegger can say that There-being “possesses” (besitzt) man, and that man is “let in on” or “released-onto” (eingelassen) There-being.82

All of this leaves us, however, with two questions that the text itself does not answer, one concerning man, the other concerning There-being. In the first place, does Heidegger, when he speaks of man, mean the individual man, or humanity at large, or both? If both, what is the relation between the two? On the one hand, after the essay opens with a reflection upon the essence of truth as found in the individual human intellect (correctness), one is inclined to understand “man” as the individual, though in that which characterizes him universally as a man. On the other hand, Heidegger often makes man equivalent to humanity. What is the relationship, then, between man and humanity? And when he calls man “historical,” what history does he mean? When he speaks of “rare and simple decisions of history,” which “... arise out of the manner in which the origi-
nal Essence of truth comes-to-presence," 83 whence proceed these decisions?

With regard to There-being, what, more precisely, is the relationship between Being and There-being? Even after we have made the shift to the new perspective where Being enjoys the primacy in the latter part of the essay, there are moments when There-being still seems to take the initiative. "... In the ek-sistent freedom of There-being takes place the concealing of beings-in-their-totality, [sc.] concealment is." 84 Furthermore, although the mystery as such "dominates the There-being of man," and ek-sistent freedom stems from the "originating Essence of truth," nevertheless it is There-being that "... conserves, insofar as it ek-sists, the first and broadest non-revealedness, authentic non-truth..." so that the mystery itself is called "There-being's mystery." 85

4. The Problem of the Two Heideggers

WW is the breakthrough. Here (1930), Heidegger II emerges out of Heidegger I. How new is the new? It seems impossible to deny that there is something new. The shift of focus from There-being to Being is more than a change in terminology; it is a genuine transformation of thought. 86 The only question is whether or not this change is consonant with SZ, or whether it is a new approach forced upon Heidegger because of the bankruptcy of the old.

We do not as yet have sufficient data about Heidegger II to permit us to pass serious judgement on the matter, but we can cull the evidence to date. We find certain indices in the earlier work, which, if they do not announce, are at least coherent with, the shift. To begin with, we have the title itself of SZ to remind us that the existential analysis was never intended as anything more than a preparation to interrogate Being itself within the

83 "... Aus der Weise, wie das ursprüngliche Wesen der Wahrheit west, entspringen die seltenen und einfachen Entscheidungen der Geschichte." (WW, p. 17).
84 "... In der ek-sistenten Freiheit des Da-seins ereignet sich die Verbergung des Seienden im Ganzen, ist die Verborgenheit." (WW, p. 19). Heidegger’s italics.
85 "... Das Dasein verwahrt, sofern es ek-sistiert, die erste und weiteste Un-entborgenheit, die eigentliche Un-wahrheit. Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis..." (WW, p. 20). See p. 21 (Geheimnis des Daseins).
As the analysis proceeds, we find that even though Being is conceived as a project of There-being, the insistence is equally great upon its thrown-ness, and this leaves room, certainly, for the conception of Being as an "alterity" that exercises a primacy over There-being. And when in KM the analysis of the transcendental imagination brings us to a point where we see it as the origin of time, what happens? It disappears into a Source more profound than itself, therefore prior to itself, sc. the unity of an aboriginal Time. Even WG leaves one with the impression that if the problem of time (and, presumably, its priority to the grounding-process) is excluded from the analysis, the reason is only that the problem is too big for the compass of that little work and abides in it everywhere as a to-be-thought.\textsuperscript{87}

If we restrict our attention to the two minor works (WG, WM), we notice that, released from the exigencies of analysing There-being as to-be-in-the-World, the meditation finds its center of gravity more and more in the problem of truth (therefore Being) as such. This is particularly noticeable in WM. There the Non-being analysis, for all its profound accordance with SZ, nevertheless introduces a new element, sc. Non-being "forces" the question about the ontological difference on There-being and therefore must be credited with a certain primacy over it. The whole problem of founding metaphysics, too, at least as it takes its point of departure from Kant, is profoundly radicated in the finitude and negativity of man. Truth, too, is negatived. Given the undeniable drift toward meditating truth for itself, is it surprising that Heidegger poses the question about the negativity of truth in itself? It is precisely at this point that it becomes clear (at least as we follow the thought process of WW) how concealment precedes revealment, hence how the process of truth must be conceived as (ontologically) prior to There-being. Is not this coherent with Heidegger I – and the whole of Heidegger II?

In all this, we do not wish to imply that everything is very

\textsuperscript{87} WG, pp. 47, 42 (note 60).
obvious and therefore easily discerned, or that we ourselves would be perceptive enough to detect the new direction as clearly as we do now, if this were 1930. But it is not 1930. Given the direction that we know Heidegger to have taken since then, we maintain only that it seems possible, with WW as the point of reference, to see in these indices a certain warrant to say that Heidegger I and Heidegger II, for all their difference, are one.

B. THE NATURE OF BEING

The notion of Being in WW may be quickly delineated. There seems to be, in fact, a notable ambiguity. Being is most often conceived as beings-as-such-in-the-totality, hence the Being of beings taken as an ensemble. Insofar as this is negatived by compound concealment, it is called "mystery." But Being is also vaguely but unmistakably conceived as more than (or less than — in any case, different from) beings-as-such-in-the-ensemble. It is in this sense that it is called Essence, with the connotation of an emerging-into-presence. This, too, is negatived, and therefore it may be designated easily as "mystery," even if the explicitation is not yet made:

88 For the initiated, in any case, the "non-" of the originating non-essence of truth as non-truth points to the still unexplored domain of the truth of Being (not, in the first place, of beings).88

In this sense, Being is the One-and-Only which conceals itself. "... This self-concealing One-and-Only ... is what ... we call Being and for a long time have been accustomed to consider only as beings-in-their-totality." The insinuation, however, is clear that Being must be considered as something other than beings-in-their-totality and therefore is to be meditated for itself. Here the essay ends.

Is there a discrepancy? Waiving for the moment any question as to Heidegger's whole conception of Being, we may say that

81 WW, pp. 23, 25 (Sein des Seienden), 19–20 (Geheimnis).
82 "... Für den Wissenden allerdings deutet das 'Un-‘ des anfänglichen Un-wesens der Wahrheit als der Un-wahrheit in den noch nicht erfahrenen Bereich der Wahrheit des Seins (nicht erst des Seienden).” (WW, p. 20).
83 "... das sich verborgende Einzige der einmaligen Geschichte der Entbergung des ‘Sinnes’ dessen, was wir das Sein nennen und seit langem nur als das Seiende im Ganzen zu bedenken gewohnt sind.” (WW, p. 25).
at this point he is completely consistent with himself. Being for him is always the Being of beings, but it comes-to-pass in them after the manner of an e-vent, which we find suggested here by the verbal sense of Essence. We need only to read this in the context of ID to appreciate the coherence between the two.\textsuperscript{91}

C. THE CONCEPTION OF THOUGHT

1. The Nature of Thought

Our principal task is to trace the evolution of foundational thought as the thinking of Being, and up to the present the notion has not appeared formally as such. Like the primacy of Being over There-being, however, this concept, so characteristic of the later Heidegger, appears in WW explicitly for the first time in two brief but significant passages.\textsuperscript{92} We treat them in turn.

In the first case, the Being which is thought is understood in the sense of beings-as-such-in-their-totality. "... This interrogation [about what beings-as-such-in-totality are] thinks ... the question about the Being of beings. ..." \textsuperscript{93} From the citation and the passage which precedes it, we may infer: To think Being means to interrogate beings-as-such-in-their-totality. And yet, intrinsic to the ensemble of beings-as-such is its own negativity, sc. the non-revealedness which constitutes mystery and, when this is forgotten, errance. To think Being, therefore, is to think the ensemble as negatived, hence to re-collect the mystery by recognizing errance for what it is, gaining thus "a prospect of the mystery out of [the depths of] errance." \textsuperscript{94} To think (interrogate) the whole negatived ensemble of beings is simply to let-it-be (manifest), sc. to let it unveil itself as itself, to accept it for what it is, to surrender to its dominating power, to make it one’s own by opening up to it completely.\textsuperscript{95} Such a type of thought occurs

\textsuperscript{91} ID, pp. 10, 28–29, 59, 62–63.
\textsuperscript{92} There is a third use of the term Denken, p. 14 (einer Wandlung des Denkens), but it is not sufficiently pronounced to warrant special attention.
\textsuperscript{93} "... Dieses Fragen denkt die wesentlich beirrende und daher in ihrer Mehr-deutigkeit noch nicht gemeisterte Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden...." (WW, p. 23). Heidegger’s italics.
\textsuperscript{94} WW, p. 23 (Der Ausblick in das Geheimnis aus der Irre).
\textsuperscript{95} WW, pp. 20 (Nicht-waltenlassen), 23 (übernommen).
only from time to time, sc. at those precious moments of complete release and surrender which have been called re-solve. It becomes clear, then: that the thinking of Being takes place in the moment of re-solve; that whereas in SZ re-solve is the culminating moment in the coming-to-pass of There-being when it accepts itself, in WW re-solve occurs when There-being accepts the negatived ensemble of beings-as-such (as itself, sc. in its Being and as negatived); that common to both is the basic intuition: There-being must accept in a moment of re-solve the fact that the truth of Being is filtered through negativity (finitude). The difference: only one of focus. In SZ, it fell on There-being; now it falls on Being.

The second text to which we refer follows immediately upon the first but is separated from it by a chapter division. The identical formula, “the thinking of Being,” in both cases serves as transition between the main body of the text (terminated in Chapter 7) and the chapter of conclusion (Chapter 8). One would expect the same formula to retain an identical meaning in both instances, but is this really the case? The text reads:

In the thinking of Being, that liberation of man unto ek-sistence which is the foundation of history comes into word; this word [however] is not in the first place the “expression” of an opinion, but the well-conserved articulativeness of the truth of beings-in-their-totality. How many there are who have an ear for such a word is of no account. Whoever it is that can hear [it], he it is that decides man’s place in history.

In the former text, thinking was considered as having its origin in There-being, sc. it consisted in that supreme moment of ek-sistence called “re-solve.” If we were to retain the same sense here, we would have to take “the liberation of man for ek-sistence” as the equivalent of re-solve, a very awkward interpretation indeed: for “liberation” implies an activity (Befreiung), which in turn suggests an alterity that is little congruous with re-solve understood as the self-achievement of There-being; and ek-sistence here seems to be the term of the liberating process,

---

whereas re-solve is always conceived as the achieving of ek-sistence itself.97 We must probe further.

Let us simply try to explicitate the affirmations contained in this complex statement:

a. Man is liberated unto ek-sistence. We know that man and There-being are not unqualifiedly identical, that There-being, as ek-sistence, is the ground of man’s essence and in that sense possesses man. We know, too, that what characterizes ek-sistence is freedom: There-being is ek-sistent freedom. Now to “liberate” man is to introduce him into this privileged condition of ek-sistent freedom, to endow him with the prerogative of ek-sistence (transcendence). The “liberation of man unto ek-sistence” is the process by which There-being emerges-into-presence. Furthermore, if There-being receives its own essence out of the still more original emerging-into-presence of truth itself,98 then by “liberation of man unto ek-sistence” we understand the process by which There-being emerges out of a more original Source, which, as we have seen, is Being in the sense of emergent truth.

b. This emerging of There-being into presence as ek-sistence is the founding of history, because it is here that transcendence, primordial history, first comes-to-pass.

c. There-being’s coming-to-presence comes into word. Here we have apparently a new element in Heidegger’s analysis, sc. “word,” or rather “coming-to-word.” How is it possible for There-being’s emergence to take the form of word? For the moment, there is little to help us. Do we have a reappearance in a new form of the logos problematic of SZ? Yet there is clearly a difference, for just as re-solve, so, too, logos implies a There-being already present in the mode of a being. The present text, however, if our reading is accurate, deals with There-being not as a being-already-present but precisely in that ontologically prior moment when this being comes out of Being into presence.

---

97 If one pressed the matter, we could admit a very broad interpretation of “liberation” (Befreiung) that would minimize the implications of alterity and take it in the sense of There-being “liberating” itself in the sense of becoming-free (Freiwerden) for the call of conscience (v. g. SZ, p. 287). This would give an acceptable sense to the opening sentence of Chapter 8, but such an interpretation, as far as we can see, is without precedent in SZ, differs clearly from the sense of befreit on p. 16 and concords poorly with the priority of word over hearing in sentences 2 and 3.

98 WW, pp. 14, 23.
This would be the moment when the ontological difference breaks out, and it is this which comes into word.

d. The word of which we are speaking is certainly not the “expression” of an opinion, formulated in the thought processes of some knowing subject. It is much rather the articulativeness of the truth of Being, where articulativeness must be taken in the radical sense of a complex structure fitted together by joints (Gefüge), and Being is to be understood as beings-in-the-ensemble (SZ spoke of “Total Meaningfulness”). Therefore the emergence of There-being out of Being comes into a word that is grounded in the articulative structure of the truth of beings-in-the-ensemble (Being).

e. It is conceivable that this word, though uttered, may not be attended to by individuals. In order to hear this word, individual man must “have an ear for it.” But without such attentiveness, the word is simply not heard. How many there are who do attend to the word of Being need not concern us. Remark simply that the word as uttered must be ontologically prior to individual men, who may or may not attend to it.

f. Yet it is attention to this word that decides man’s place in history. There are some privileged individuals, to be sure, who attend to the word of Being. It is they who give a special character to the general mass of men and determine what place they have in history. However this be interpreted, the essential seems to be that attentiveness to the word of Being has a specifically historical dimension.

g. The coming-into-word is achieved through the thinking of Being. The question now is: who or what is the author (let us say rather “source”) of this thinking? It cannot be individual men, for the word is uttered (ontologically) prior to the men who attend to it. Nor can it be There-being as such, it would seem, for what is formed into word (according to our hypothesis) is There-being’s coming-into-presence as such. Have we not reason to suppose, then, that the source of thinking must be Being itself, and that the phrase “of Being” (“the thinking of Being”) is perhaps a “subjective” as well as an “objective” genitive? The suggestion is not preposterous, for the entire essay culminated in the transfer whereby Being itself becomes the primary focus of attention, since it is the ultimate Source out of which ek-
Reversal

sistent freedom (There-being) springs. To take Being as the Source of thought would be, then, to speak of thought in terms of its origin. The word (of the truth) of Being would be uttered by Being in thought.

Even if our interpretation is valid, there remain tremendous obscurities. How explain in detail the correlation between Being-truth-thinking-word? How explain precisely the origin of language and the historical relation between language and thought? What is the relationship between individuals who attend to Being and the rest of men? By what right is such a coming-to-pass called “thought”? What is the intrinsic relation between thought conceived as having its origin in Being and conceived as the achievement of There-being in re-solve?

2. The Properties of Thought

a. Pre-subjective – WW offers us no answer to any of these questions. Let us see what it does tell us about thought. However we understand the process, clearly Heidegger does not conceive it to be simply an operation of the knowing subject by which it “thinks” about, or upon, that-which-is-opposed to it, sc. an object. The entire analysis began by an effort to determine the essence of truth conceived as a subject-object relationship, sc. of conformity between subject-judging and object-judged. We saw: that the essence of such truth lies in ek-sistent freedom, which is ontologically prior to the subject-object comportment; that this in turn springs from the still more original truth of Being itself. We are engaged on a level far deeper than that on which the subject-object dichotomy makes any sense. It is the level of mutual presence between Being and There-being, the level of that original open-ness which renders it possible for two beings, one of them There-being, to address each other as subject-object, the level of non-, rather pre-, subjectivity.

Now Heidegger’s insistence upon the non-subjective character of the thinking of Being in WW, if only implicit, is unmistakeable. It is discernible under two forms: in the implied polemic against the domination of “common sense” in the thinking of Being and in the analysis of the forgotten-ness of mystery.
i. Polemic vs. "Common Sense" – After speaking of thought as that process in which There-being’s emerging-into-presence comes-into-word, Heidegger continues:

... At the very same moment in the history of the world, however, when philosophy takes its beginning, there begins as well for the first time the pronounced domination of the ordinary understanding (sophistry). This occurs by way of contrast ("however") to the thinking of which Heidegger has just spoken. It is a domination that perdures even to our own day under the form of "ordinary common sense." The whole essay from beginning to end is an attempt to overcome the simplism of ordinary common sense that seeks only what is "self-evident" and is both deaf and blind to what philosophy holds to be essential: to think Being itself, and, indeed, in its negativity.

More precisely, how does this domination of common sense manifest itself? Principally by a refusal to question the beings that common sense finds so obvious, accepting these beings of daily commerce at their face value and resenting the probing of philosophy into their hidden ground as an attack upon itself. What is this, however, if not to live on the assumption that the power of ordinary intelligence is sufficient to penetrate the core of beings and read there by its own light all of their hidden meaning? This is the fundamental impulse of a knowing subject to master the objects of its knowledge.

Philosophy (the thinking of Being), on the other hand, has a completely different style, simply because it does interrogate (Fragen) these beings, and, indeed, in their ground, for it refuses to limit itself to their limitations and lets-beings-as-such-in-their-totality, sc. Being with all its negativity. In a word, philosophy overcomes the subjective thinking of common sense because it probes the mystery of beings.

ii. Forgottenness of the Mystery – We have seen that thought, insofar as it is conceived as identical with the re-solve of There-

---

99 "... In demselben Weltaugenblick jedoch, den der Anfang der Philosophie erfüllt, beginnt auch erst die ausgerottete Herrschaft des gemeinen Verstandes (die Sophistik)." (W.W., p. 24). Heidegger’s italics.
100 W.W., pp. 5–6, 24.
101 W.W., pp. 24, 6.
being, is the interrogation of Being with its negativity, which by mutual complement, constitute the “full essence of truth.” By recognizing errance for what it is, thought overcomes the forgetfulness to which it has been prey and thereby re-collects the mystery.

Now what characterizes There-being in its forgetting of the mystery (errance)? Precisely the tendency to limit its interest to beings in their calculable determinations. It rests content for the most part with individual beings as it finds them, never goes beyond them to their unfathomed depths. And in dealing with these beings, what There-being seeks above all is to put them to use, to control them, fashioning out of them a whole “World” of its own, taking them at their face value as the measure of its activity without reflecting upon what ultimate ground renders both measure and measurement possible. To look for an “ultimate ground” of beings and of the relationships between them simply has no appeal for There-being, and even when it does try to broaden the scope of its interests, the new vision, too, is determined by There-being’s own intentions and needs, its own purposes and plans, which remain as before the standard of all utility. Such, as we have seen, is the condition of errance. The mystery of beings is gradually dissolved as There-being more and more exclusively takes itself for a subject, in reference to which all other beings have their meaning, sc. by which they are measured. Note that we have here a detailed delineation of what later receives the name of “technicity” (Technik). Briefly: There-being forgets the mystery of Being (is prey to errance) in direct proportion as it thinks of itself as a subject, sc. falls victim to subjective thinking. To re-collect the mystery, we infer, There-being must overcome subjective thought. This will take place when There-being recognizes its thinking as subjective, errance for what it is, sc. as the forgetting of the mystery.

One final word. The essay as a whole does more than grope for the meaning of pre-subjective thought; it is as such an effort (though not yet explicitated) to achieve it. If we return for a

102 WW, p. 23 (Das volle Wesen der Wahrheit).
103 WW, pp. 20–21.
moment to Heidegger's retrospective assessment (1943) of the original meditation, recalling that in the language of the later period presentations and concepts are taken to be characteristic of subjective thought, then the closing remark of the author's concluding note has a new and deeper resonance:

... The successive steps of the interrogation are in themselves the way of a thought which, instead of offering presentations and concepts, experiences and probes itself as the transformation of a relation to Being.  

b. **INTERROGATIVE** – The thinking of Being has primarily an interrogative form. To re-collect the mystery in the midst of errance is "... to pose a question in the sense of the only question [worth posing]: what beings-as-such-in-their-totality are. Such an interrogation thinks ... the question about the Being of beings. ..." This is to think-by-question. It is with such a question as this that the early thinkers for the first time experienced truth, and history began. It is just such a question, too, that ordinary common sense rejects as an attack upon itself, preferring instead the unquestionableness of everyday commerce. Must we not infer, then, that in order to think Being, the first step is simply to pose the only question worth posing, the Being-question itself?  

Such a mode of thinking will not try to dominate what it questions. When all is said and done, it is fundamentally an attend-ing (*Hören*). As such, it is at once both gentle and rigorous. Its gentleness consists in a tranquil release, in docility (*die Gelassenheit*) toward the dominating mystery; its rigor consists in the re-solve that does not destroy the mystery but does force it into the Open of its own truth, sc. lets it come-to-presence as mystery. This rigorous docility and docile rigor is what characterizes foundational thought. Remember: we are still on the thought level of 1930.

---

104 "... Die Schrittfolge des Fragens ist in sich der Weg eines Denkens, das, statt Vorstellungen und Begriffe zu liefern, sich als Wandlung des Bezugs zum Sein erfährt und erprobt.” (WW, p. 27).

105 "... ist das Fragen im Sinne der einzigen Frage, was das Seiende als solches im Ganzen sei. Dieses Fragen denkt die wesentlich beirrende und daher in ihrer Mehrdeutigkeit noch nicht gemeisterte Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden....” (WW, p. 23). Heidegger's italics.

106 WW, pp. 24 (Erfragen), 25 (das denkende Fragen), 15–16 (der erste Denker), 24 (Fraglosigkeit).

107 WW, p. 24 (milden Strenge, strengen Milde).
Résumé

The essence of truth as conformity lies in ek-sistent freedom as the pre-predicative disclosure of the Open in which judge and that-which-is-judged may meet. But ek-sistent freedom, in turn, resides in the originating truth of this Open itself which comports its own negativity (mystery, errance). This negatived Open we call Being (Essence): the essence of truth is the truth of Essence. Thought is conceived on the one hand as proceeding from There-being in re-solve, on the other from Being itself when the ontological difference comes to word. How (if) the two may be reconciled, we have as yet no idea at all.

How far have we come? Heidegger I becomes Heidegger II, and ... the thinking of Being ... at last!
The formal address, entitled "The Self-assertion of the German University," that Heidegger delivered when he became rector of the University of Freiburg in May, 1933, has achieved a renown beyond its philosophical deserts.\(^1\) We restrict our attention to its philosophical deserts. The theme is ordinary enough. The new rector urges his students and professorial staff to assume their responsibility before the nation in the service of science, explaining what is meant by science and how this service is to be performed. What concerns us is the notion of science as conceived in 1933.\(^2\)

**A. BEING**

For science in this discourse is not understood in the modern sense but is taken to be identical with philosophy itself. They have a common origin, sc. the outbreak of Greek philosophy, when Western man rises up in the midst of beings-in-the-ensemble, interrogating them, grasping them as the beings that they are. It is the moment of There-being's primal wonderment before the total ensemble of beings, which, despite a certain reve-

\(^1\) *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität* (Breslau: Korn, 1933). (Hetaisler: SU).

\(^2\) As to the "how" of the service, Heidegger suggests three ways: service by labor, service under arms, service through knowledge. Some find a philosophical parallel (therefore warrant) for this in Plato; others take it for a complete capitulation to the Nazis, who had come to power the previous January. We leave the matter to historians. In any case, no one denies that after the stern lessons of the intervening years these pages make unpleasant reading.
lation, remain couched in concealment that leaves them always uncertain, always questionable – buried in primordial obscurity.³

This is the moment when science takes its origin. It comes-to-pass, to be sure, as a process of There-being, but There-being must remain docile to a power that is already prior to it. The author makes his own an expression of Aeschylus' Prometheus, which he interprets to mean that all knowledge of things must surrender to the overwhelming power of fortune (Schicksal), whose might is prior to There-being.⁴ It is in virtue of this power of fortune that beings themselves open up before a receptive There-being in their inexhaustible immutability. Science comes-to-pass in There-being’s surrender to fortune’s dominating might – might that pervades not only the beings that There-being meets but There-being itself, might that has power of disposition over There-being. This all-pervading power contains within itself its own negativity, for the concealment of the total ensemble of beings-as-such is an enduring self-concealment of the totality. Taken in its dynamic complexity, the entire process may be called the essenc-ing of Being.⁵

B. THOUGHT

But despite the primal spontaneity of Being, it is as an achievement of (in) There-being that science comes-to-pass. How describe the process? To begin with, we must avoid conceiving it as an act – or series of acts – of knowledge, whereby a knowing-subject is opposed to an object-known and the knowledge gained serves the purposes of the knower. Rather it is an attitude which There-being assumes, characterized by a fundamental open-ness, or ex-position, toward the primal concealment, whereby There-being submits to the dispositions of fortune in a moment of resolve, thereby letting the Being of beings-in-their-totality come-to-presence, and, indeed, in its negativity (Verborgene). Science is a complete surrender, then, to the dominating power of fortune, and as such it is an occurrence which comes-to-pass in the very

³ SU, pp. 8, 12.
⁴ SU, p. 9. We retain the translation for Schicksal that we used in SZ, leaving open the question as to whether or not there is a change in meaning. Very soon the word in this context will be Geschick.
⁵ SU, pp. 9-11, 13.
THE SELF-ASSERTION OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY 257

ground of There-being’s Being as the supreme moment of There-being’s dynamic engagement with other beings. It is this dynamic engagement that Heidegger conceives to be what the Greeks fundamentally meant by ἑργαῖα, sc. “to-be-at-work (-with-beings).” He considers the attitude itself to be the genuine sense of ἐργαῖα. It corresponds, too, to what he described in WW as the thinking of Being.6

What can be said now of the thinking of Being as we discern it in this address? First of all, it is interrogative. It is a yearning to draw near to beings as such, to abide among them and feel the pressure of their presence.7 It is fundamentally a “meditative interrogation,” sc. it ponders the question about what beings as beings “are.” Such an interrogation as this is not simply a question that precedes an answer, which alone, in turn, is considered an act of knowledge, but the “... questioning itself becomes the highest form of knowing...,”8 unlocking in beings that by reason of which they come-to-presence, sc. their Being. Such an interrogation as this is an extreme simplification of view, shattering the departmentalization of science into separate disciplines, restoring this pluralized effort to the unity of a single pursuit, sc. the interrogation of the unique, ineluctable Source out of which all beings spring. This Source remains questionable, however, precisely insomuch as it remains hidden, undeterminable by exact and certain knowledge, sc. mystery.

Thought, too, is historical. The thinking of Being is an attempt to recapture the grandeur of that initial wonderment before Being with which science (philosophy) took its origin. But the origin of science (philosophy) is not to be identified simply with that moment of ontic history when it took place 2500 years ago, when it had its inception in Greece. In this sense it is over and done with, and cannot come again.9 On the contrary, this origin abides, it still is. “... It does not lie behind us as that—

---

6 SU, pp. 11, 13 (Kenntnisse), 10 (Standhalten), 12 (Ausgesetztes eins [cf. WW, p. 15]), 11 (uns fügen, Verfügung), 13 (Entschlossenheit zum Wesen des Seins), 12 (Verborgene, Ungewisse), 9–10 (ἐργαῖα, ἑργαῖα).
7 SU, pp. 9–10 (Bedrängnis).
8 “... das Fragen wird selbst die höchste Gestalt des Wissens...” (SU, p. 12).
9 What Heidegger here calls längst Gewesse we understand in the sense of “beginning” (Beginn), as distinguished from “origin” (Anfang): origin means emergence as such out of the primal source; beginning refers to the ontic moment when this took place.
which-has-been long ago, but stands before us..." as that which is still-to-come, for There-being to gather unto itself once more, sc. re-trive. Recalling the sense of "re-trive" and the rôle it played in the historicity of There-being as described in SZ, we may say now, it would seem, that in the present context, to think Being is simply to re-trive science (philosophy) in its origins.

Finally, the thinking of Being is correlated with language, for it is in virtue of his power of speech that man rises up to interrogate the Being of beings. Just how and why this should be so must remain for the present obscure. The author pursues the matter no further.

Résumé

Being in the essay is conceived as a fortune whose might dominates There-being, not only in its positivity but in its negativity, sc. in its abiding self-concealment that makes it mysterious and worthy of question. To think this Being-worthy-of-question (das Fragwürdige) is simply to question it. The interrogation of the Being of beings, however, is not the act of some knowing subject for which Being is an object, but the moment of supreme achievement in There-being’s total engagement with beings, when the primal ex-position of There-being by the process of re-solve surrenders to the dominating might of fortune and thus retrieves science in its origins. It is somehow correlated with the problem of language. Why?

The philosophical deserts of the essay: it is of clear but decidedly minor importance.

10 "... Der Anfang ist noch. Er liegt nicht hinter uns als das längst Gewesene, sondern er steht vor uns..." (SU, p. 11). Heidegger’s italics. Cf. wieder einzuholen (ibid.) and Wiederholung (SZ).
11 SU, p. 8 (kraft seiner Sprache).
INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

If in WW Heidegger becomes Heidegger II, it is in the lecture course of 1935, entitled “Introduction to Metaphysics,” that the main lines of the new position are firmly drawn. Here, amid changing terminology and a burgeoning problematic, the author remains faithful to his initial intention to ground metaphysics by posing the question of Being. For the question, “why are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?,” the ground-question of metaphysics, presupposes, in asking about the ontological difference, a preliminary question about the sense of Being. It is with this that he is still engaged.¹

The text is especially important for us, because here the problem of thought is made thematic for the first time. We see, too, how and why language assumes for Heidegger so important a place in posing the question (therefore in the thinking) of Being. And yet, the work was comparatively unknown to the early commentators, becoming available to the general public only in 1953. Reading it now from our present perspective, we can appreciate with what justice Heidegger could protest, in a letter to Jean Wahl (1937), that the anthropological interpretations given to the early work gravely misrepresented (with or without warrant) his own intentions.²

¹ EM, pp. 1, 24–25.
² Letter cited in De Waelhens, La Philosophie..., p. 3, note 1. Heidegger himself (1953) explains that of all the lecture courses he planned to publish, he chose this as the first simply because it would explain better than the rest the transition from SZ to the later publications, sc. from Heidegger I to Heidegger II. See “Letter to the Editor,” Die Zeit (Hamburg), Sept. 24, 1953, p. 18.
We should say first a word about the title — but only a word. We have seen already in what sense Heidegger conceives all traditional metaphysics, which investigates beings as such, as a type of "physics." He wishes to go beyond even metaphysical physics, to interrogate the Being-process as different from beings. It is to a meta-physics in this sense that he wants to introduce his hearers.³

The study begins with an analysis of the grammar and etymology of the word "Being," interesting enough in its way, but, when all is said and done, it does not take us very far.⁴ He then takes another approach and examines Being in terms of certain modalities which, formally speaking, seem to be distinct from it. We come easily, for example, by such phrases as "Being and Becoming" (Sein und Werden), "Being and Seeming" (Sein und Schein), "Being and Thought" (Sein und Denken), "Being and Obligation" (Sein und Sollen), and imply thereby that the second member of the phrase is distinct from the first, even if not separate from it, indeed if only another form of Being itself. The correlations are not arbitrary, in fact they are intrinsically dependent one on the other, controlled by a type of necessity, in some way not yet discernible, integrated into the truth of the coming-to-presence of Being itself.⁵

There follows, then, a series of four sections, in which each of the correlative pairs is examined in detail. The major part of the analysis goes to the correlation of Being and thought, which is precisely what interests us most. We rearrange the data thus provided, as best suits the order of our exposition. With these few remarks to serve as orientation, let us come at once to the heart of the matter.

---

⁴ EM, pp. 42-56.
⁵ EM, pp. 73-74 (Sein-Werden), 75-88 (Sein-Schein), 88-149 (Sein-Denken), 149-152 (Sein-Sollen).
I. General Remarks

A. Nature of Being

I. Being as ϕύσις

We know already that Being for the early Greeks was ϕύσις: emergent-abiding-presence. By reason of ϕύσις, beings become un-concealed, hence ϕύσις is equivalent to ἀ-κύκλωπα. Now as emergent-abiding-presence, ϕύσις is also overwhelming Power (Walten), the inscrutable unity of motion and rest which for Heraclitus was the aboriginal Discord (πόλεμος). It is the essential character of this Power that it hold sway in and through the total ensemble of beings-as-such. That is why we may call it simply “the Over-powering” (das Überwältigende).6

To consolidate this general interpretation of ϕύσις, it will be helpful to consider immediately two other terms which for the early Greeks, according to Heidegger, were closely allied to it:

a. Λόγος – The first of these is λόγος. Heidegger examines the use of the term as it appears in the classical fragments of Heraclitus. Despite the frequent translation as “word” or “speech,” the fundamental meaning of λόγος is rather “gathering” (as one gathers wood), or “bringing together” into a unity that, by reason of λόγος, abides. There is here, too, a connotation of order or arrangement, for a “collection” is not simply a piling together of the members of the collection into a disorganized heap; rather it is a laying of the members side by side according to some sort of pattern.7

In terms of our problem, λόγος is that by reason of which beings are gathered together and held fast, so that they may stand on their own as beings. In examining the last two fragments of Heraclitus, Heidegger finds that the term connotes both the activity of gathering-together and the term of this activity, sc. collectedness; then he formulates the sense of λόγος as the “… gathered-togetherness [of beings] that in [their] very origin constantly gathers [them] together and dominates [them]

6 EM, p. 115.
7 EM, p. 95. It is this side-by-side character that gives rise to the sense of λόγος as “relation.” See EM, pp. 97–103.
through and through."  As such it is simply the Being of these beings, so that we may now say that what characterizes a being is that it be gathered together in itself and contain itself in this collectedness. It is "a gathered-together coming-to-presence": φύσις and λόγος are one.

Φύσις and λόγος are identical, even when φύσις is conceived as Discord. For Discord is not dispersion. On the contrary, it is a contentious, sc. dynamic, unity, and the cohesive principle is λόγος: "... Πάλημος and λόγος are one ..." λόγος preserving the contentious elements of Discord in their correlative opposition, permeating them all, bringing Discord to its highest degree of tension.

Because of this intimate correlation with φύσις, which in turn is that by which non-concealment (α-λήθεια) comes-to-pass, λόγος, too, (or rather λέγειν) has the sense of opening-up and rendering manifest, revealing. We can see immediately how for Heidegger the problem of λόγος becomes inseparable not only from the question of Being but henceforth from the problem of truth as well.

b. Δίκη — Analogous to λόγος in its identity with φύσις is δίκη, which assumes an importance in Heidegger’s analysis of the first choral ode of Sophocles’ Antigone. He translates it as “organization,” or “arrangement,” and wishes to suggest a whole host of nuances: a manner of disposition (Fug), the articulativeness of the whole ensemble of beings (Gefüge), the process of organizing (Fügung) in the sense of the direction imposed by the Over-powering in the process of holding-sway, the articulative whole (Gefüge) which itself organizes (arranges) beings and forces these beings to dovetail (Einfügung), adapting themselves (Sich-fügen) to each other and to the articulated ensemble.

Do we have anything essentially new here? It seems not. Once we understand λόγος to mean the gathering-together into an

---

8 "... die ständig in sich waltende ursprünglich sammelnde Gesammtheit.” (EM, p. 98).
9 EM, p. 100 (gesammelt Anwesen).
11 EM, p. 130.
12 EM, pp. 133, 127. One would prefer to translate Fug as “disposition,” but the word has been reserved already to translate Befindlichkeit. It is used here simply as an alternative translation in a context where the intended sense is clear. For the rest, we retain “organization” or “arrangement.”
ordered collectness, then this gathering must be an arranging which likewise terminates in an arrangement that is an articu-
late whole, and we can see in all of the proposed nuances a dual
sense for “organization” that parallels the collecting-collectedness
dichotomy of λόγος: organizing (Fügung) and that-which-is-
organized (Gefüge). Hence, “... Being, φόνος, as the dominating
Power, is original collectness: λόγος; [and likewise it] is organ-
isation that organizes: δικτή.”

2. Being and Seeming-to-be

We cannot understand Being as φόνος, however, unless we see
it in its relation, rather correlation, with what one would be
inclined to think is its very opposite, sc. “appearing” or
“seeming” (Schein), for what “appears” or “seems-to-be”
somehow suggests something different from what “is.”

Heidegger begins by examining the use of “appear” in common
speech and discovers three fundamental senses: “appearing,” in
the sense of “shining-forth” (v.g. “the sun is shining, sc. appears
through the clouds”); “appearing,” in the sense of “self-revel-
ation” (v.g. “Being-as-it-appears,” discussed in KM); “ap-
pearing,” in the sense of “creating a false impression” (Anschein)
(v.g. “the sun appears, sc. seems, to revolve about the earth”).
These three senses are obviously not unconnected. The most
fundamental sense of all is the second, so that the essence of
“appearing” consists in a being’s “shining-forth” as what it is,
sc. in stretching-out, or in taking its stand, or in showing, or in
presenting itself before us. Now we have already seen that this
is the very meaning of Being in the sense of φόνος, sc. the coming-
to-pass of non-concealment. Insofar as Being is truth, it is an
appearing. Appearing pertains to the very essence of Being.

---

14 Because English (at least the writer’s) is not as flexible as German (at least the
author’s), we are fixing on the following terminology: we reserve “appearing” and
“shining-forth” to translate Schein in the most fundamental sense by which it is
identified with φόνος, and “seeming-to-be” to translate it in the third sense noted
above. On the one hand, “seems” implies the element of non-truth that is necessary
for this context; on the other, it is a quite desirable translation for δικτή, which the
author is trying to suggest. The problem, then: what is the relation between Being
and seeming-to-be?
15 EM, pp. 76–78 (Erscheinen, Vorliegen, Ausstehen, Sich-zeigen, Sich-dar-
stellen).
REVERSAL

But we must go further. If by reason of its Being a being appears, then of itself it offers its visage, sc. a view (Anblick) of itself, to whoever or whatever "sees" or "views" it. But the "seeing" ("viewing") can be unfaithful to what the being itself offers as to-be-viewed, with the result that the view covers-up and conceals rather than reveals that which offers its visage to be viewed. This is "appearing" in the sense of a "mere" appearance, and what we have chosen to translate as "seeming-to-be." To be sure, there is always some warrant for the seeming-to-be, because the being-as-it-seems-to-be does appear. But this appearing is always such that by its very essence it remains necessarily and permanently possible that it be misconstrued.16

But it is not enough to affirm this possibility simply as a possibility. Heidegger goes further. There is a dynamism within the being-that-reveals-itself-for-what-it-is to reveal itself as what it is not, sc. as a being-that-seems-to-be. Furthermore, this seeming-to-be is of such a nature that it conceals the fact that it is only a seeming and creates the impression rather that it is the Being of the being in question. It is because of this compound concealment that seeming-to-be is said to "deceive," and the realm within which this takes place is what Heidegger calls "errance."

There are several observations to make about all this. In the first place, one has the impression that there is a jump somewhere. The author began by saying that, because beings reveal themselves to some other being (There-being, of course), it is possible for There-being's view of them to be inadequate. Fair enough. But this implies (does it not?) that the reason for any given failure would be some deficiency in the There-being that views. When we advance into the matter further, however, we discover that the ground of this failure lies not only in There-being, if there at all, but in beings themselves, sc. in the fact that their self-revelation is at once and necessarily a self-concealment, indeed of such a nature that the concealment itself is concealed and this concealed concealment masquerades as the Being of beings. But why? This is supposed to be an intrinsic consequence of Being as ἀπόστασις, so that Being and seeming-to-be

16 EM, p. 79.
are inextricably intertwined. Yet how does it follow simply from the fact that Being is that by reason of which beings reveal themselves? One suspects another premise here that is as important as it is unannounced.

We can discern it perhaps when we see how Heidegger interprets Fragment 123 of Heraclitus: "Being inclines to conceal itself" (φύσις κρύπτει το ζει). Precisely because Being is an emerging from concealment, there can be no emerging unless there be concomitantly a concealment whence it comes. This is true not only for the primal obscurity that precedes emergence, but also for the process of self-revelation itself. Concealment impregnates it at every moment and in every way, in order for it to be what it is. Unless there is a veil, there can be no unveiling, re-vealing. This irremovable veil is the congenital concealment that permeates every self-disclosure, and concealment "... lies in the essence of Being, of self-revelation as such. ..." 18

This is partly an answer, to be sure, and concords nicely with what we have seen already in WW about the precedence of non-truth to truth. Yet something more should be said, for why does Heidegger not consider the possibility of some being of untrammeled luminosity, without shadow of darkness or concealment of any kind – transparent self-disclosure as such? The answer apparently is that such a being would not come within the compass of his problem, for he is concerned only with beings that are finite, and it is finitude that comports obscurity.

For a being is that which comes to stand on its own in abiding fashion by revealing itself in the light of truth. To take up a stand thus is to define the limits (therefore comports the finitude) of that being. Now this "finit-izing" of a being is not a constriction from without. Still less is it a deficiency in the being by reason of some detrimental defect. On the contrary, it is the being's restricting of itself to its own confines, its self-containment, hence the Being of the being by which it is what it is in distinction from what is not a being. For a being to come to stand on its own, then, means for it to establish a frontier for itself. It is the sense of "frontier" that the Greeks gave to the word "end" (τέλος), so that this "end" meant not simply the

17 EM, pp. 87, 146.
18 "... liegt im Wesen des Seins, des Erscheinenden als solchen...." (EM, p. 87).
point at which the being ceases to be, but the ending (*Endung*) of the being in the sense of coming-to-perfection (*Vollendung*).
So it is that the limit and end are not that point at which a being ceases but where it begins to be. It is from this point of view that one catches the import of that term which for Aristotle expresses Being in the noblest form: \( \varepsilon \nu \tau \iota \varepsilon \chi \varepsilon \tau \alpha \), sc. self-containment (self-conserving) within one's confines.\(^{19}\)

The point is clear: Being is that by which beings stand on their own in the light of truth; to take a stand is to be self-contained within one's limits, sc. to be limited. All emergence into non-concealment, therefore, is finite, sc. limited by continued concealment, and this in *virtue of Being itself*, by reason of which emergence takes place. The fundamental reason why \( \varphi \omega \sigma \zeta \) necessarily conceals itself *in* revealing itself, and therefore why Being is inextricably intertwined with seeming-to-be, is that the Being in question is finite.

**B. THE NATURE OF THERE-BEING**

Being, then, is emergent-abiding-Power that always hides itself in seeming-to-be, because it is intrinsically finite in its manifestation. Now if Being is to emerge out of concealment, sc. make an appearance, so that non-concealment (truth) comes-to-pass, then there must be some "place" (*Stätte*) where this happens, some breach in the darkness, some sudden irruption, or incident (*Zwischenfall*) where Being opens-up in light. This "place," where truth takes-"place," is precisely what Heidegger understands as the "There" of Being, and insofar as it is, sc. is itself a being, it is called with all justice "There-being."\(^{20}\)

It is our intention now to precise in more detail what the present analysis tells us about the There-being. The argument is tortuously elaborated in a series of interrelated text-analyses that are interspersed with reiterations, allusions and digressions. We shall follow an order of convenience and try to sift out what

\(^{19}\) EM, p. 46. Another use of *Grenze* suggests an interesting observation. What gives a being its *Grenze* is what gives it its "possible determination" (mögliche Bestimmtheit). (EM, p. 122). The scholastics made much of the distinction between mere "limitation," which connotes negativity, and "determination," which was something eminently positive in the sense of "perfection."

\(^{20}\) EM, pp. 124-125 (Stätte, Bresche, Zwischen-fall), 136 (Stätte, Da-sein).
best suits our purposes by formulating, as we have done before, a series of propositions:

1. The There is necessary for the sake of Being.

That the There is a necessity may be inferred from what we have just said. Here we need only insist on the fact that the necessity is dictated by the nature of Being itself. It is the Over-powering that “needs” (Not), sc. is “in want of” (braucht), the sphere of open-ness,\(^\text{21}\) that necessitates being-gathered-together in some place of disclosure, that forces the in-cidence of There. Why this should be so is a question that is posed parenthetically but not answered. One is left to infer that such is the nature of Being, and that ends the matter.

Now it is only one step further to say that, if the There is a necessity of Being, then it takes place for the sake of Being, in order that emergent-abiding-Power may come to presence as itself, sc. as the apparition of truth (δ-ληθευα). Here we may see in what sense Being, although it cannot come to presence without There-being, nevertheless maintains a certain primacy over it, dominating it through and through. Likewise we understand how There-being properly finds its self only insofar as it finds its self in the midst of the Over-powering, sc. the Being of beings-in-the-ensemble. Finally, we have, too, a sense in which Being may be said to throw-down (wirft) There-being into the condition in which it finds its self.\(^\text{22}\)

2. In the There of Being comes-to-pass the primordial struggle into truth.

The nature of There-being is elaborated principally in that section where the author endeavors to make the distinction between Being and thought. Now what modern philosophy calls “thought,” the science of which is “logic,” is generally taken to correspond to the Greek notions of νοειν and λέγειν. Such an

\(^\text{21}\) EM, pp. 124, 134–135, 146 (Not), 124 (braucht), 132 (Woher nötigt die Not?).

\(^\text{22}\) See EM, pp. 106 (Umwollen des Seins), 120 (Durchwaltende), 120 (fand sich selbst), 125 (Seiende im Ganzen: Überwältigende), 125 (Sein selbst wirft). With the notion of self-finding compare the SZ conception of transparency to self in authen-

\(^\text{icity.\footnote{22}}\)
interpretation, Heidegger claims, disregards the original sense of these terms, sc. the sense they had for the Greeks when philosophy took its origin. Let us return, then, to the origins of Western thought and determine, if we can, how the Greeks understood these two terms.

The author first examines λόγος, as found in Heraclitus, then νοείν, as used by Parmenides, endeavoring to show the fundamental concordance of the two. It is to explain the Parmenidean conception of There-being that Heidegger introduces the lengthy textual study of the first choral ode of Sophocles' Antigone. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the de-volution of the original conception of λόγος-νοείν into what is now the commonly accepted interpretation of the nature of thought. Let us try to disengage the essentials.

a. Presupposed: Aboriginal Discord — Heidegger's meditation on Heraclitus seems to have had an especially strong influence upon him, for the conception of πάλαιος, sc. some elemental conflict out of which beings emerge-into-presence (appear), permeates his thinking at this time. What is the nature of this conflict? In the lecture entitled "The Origin of a Work of Art," delivered in November of the same year (1935), the author explicitates by saying that the primordial struggle is the contention between positivity (revealment) and negativity (concealment) in the coming-to-pass of non-concealment (ἀ-λόγος). At any rate, most of the terminology in EM is derived from this dominant image. For example, Being itself must be overcome, subdued — subdued, indeed, by There-being, whose task is to do violence to the Over-powering. By reason of this struggle is made manifest the previously concealed Being of what appears as a being, a struggle that involves at the same time a battle against the power of mere seeming-to-be. By a strange paradox, still to be explained, the supreme triumph of the There over Being is to be no longer There.

26 REVERSAL

EM, pp. 97-103 (λόγος), 104-110, 126-128 (νοείν), 112-126 (Sophokles), 137-148 (Abfall).
23 HW, pp. 43, 49 (Urstreit).
22 EM, pp. 120 (bewältigen, bändigen), 115 (gewalt-tätig inmitten des Überwältigenden), 122 (Erkämpfen), 116, 146 (Macht des Scheins und Kampf mit ihm), 136 (Nicht-dasein höchste Sieg).
The conflict-character of Heidegger's conception of There appears rather strikingly in his initial explanation of νοεῖν. The term for Parmenides, he claims, means primarily "to accept" or "to receive" (Vernnehmen). This can be taken in a double sense: to accept the self-manifestation of some being-that-appears; to accept the word of some witness with regard to a being and in view of this testimony determine something about how the being is. Both senses are combined in "accept" as we are to understand it here: the acceptance of a being's self-revelation (connotation of passivity) and the taking of a position with regard to it (connotation of activity). It is in explaining the second nuance that Heidegger resorts to a military figure. When soldiers take a position in order to contain the enemy, their intention is to "receive" the enemy in such a way as at least to bring him to a standstill, if nothing more. Νοεῖν here, then, means to draw up a position of resistance to the Over-powering in such a way that a being-which-appears is brought to a standstill. We understand this in the above sense of giving a being its con-stancy, of enabling it to stand forth on its own as being (manifest for) what it is. With this, however, we are at the heart of the problem.

b. "TO-ACCEPT" AND "TO-BE": CORRELATIVE - Heidegger elaborates his conception of There by meditating the Parmenidean gnome (Fragment 5): τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε σαλί εἴη. He rejects, of course, the common translation, "thinking and Being are one and the same," insisting that Being is essentially φαίνει (emergence into non-concealment), that νοεῖν, as we have just seen, is essentially to accept or contain a being by helping it stand on its own as a being, that τὸ αὐτὸ here
means not sameness but cor-relation. His task is to examine the correlation. To do so, he undertakes the Antigone analysis, the keystone of which is the designation of man (we retain the term “There-being”) as τὸ δευτέρων, “the strangest of all beings” (das Unheimlichstes). Δευτέρων has a two-fold meaning, Heidegger claims: it says “awesome” or “aw-ful” (das Furchtbare), sc. “filling with awe.” In this sense, it pertains to the Over-powering (Being), which inspires anxiety and reticence, sc. “awe” (Scheu). Secondly, Δευτέρων says “awesome” in the sense of “filled with awe.” Here it pertains to that being which is open unto this awe-inspiring Power and takes up a position with regard to it in such a way as to gather it into open-ness. This taking of a position is a resistance, contentious in character; it brings force to bear; it does violence to the Over-powering.

When Sophocles calls There-being the “most awesome,” sc. the strangest, of all beings, then, we are to understand this for a double reason: because, by its very essence, There-being is in the midst of the total ensemble of beings and exposed unto Being, the awe-inspiring Over-powering mentioned above; because it does violence to the Over-powering by gathering it together into a place of open-ness. And this prerogative is unique in There-being. Briefly: There-being is the strangest of all beings because “... in the midst of the Over-powering it brings force to bear upon it. ...”

All three pairs of strophe-antistrophe in the choral ode articulate, each in its own way, this contention between the Over-powering and its There. In the first, the focus is on those beings which are completely external to There-being and surround it, v.g. the sea, the earth, the animal kingdom. In the second, the focus shifts to those beings which bear direct relation to There-being (v.g. language, comprehending, working or building,

---

29 EM, p. 114. Translation recommended by etymology (OF: estrange, fr. Lat. estraneus ["external," "foreign"], fr. extra ["on the outside"], which suggests nicht einheimisch and permits such overtones as “awesome,” “awful” (sc. filled, or filling, with “awe”), which concord nicely with the nuances of Angst (p. 114) and Scheu (p. 115) that are detectable here. Alternate translations: un-common, extra-ordinary. Neither one, however, comports the same air of mystery as “strange.”
30 EM, p. 115 (gewalt-tätig inmitten des Überwältigenden).
commerce with others, etc.). In both cases, the Over-powering holds sway over the There and is forced into manifestation by reason of the There. The difference is that, in the first type of being, the Over-powering is conceived as simply surrounding There-being, but in the second, it has the sense of permeating it as that which There-being, since it is the kind of being it is, must itself assume in its own right.\(^{31}\)

But what is essential to note is: that the function of the force which the There brings to bear consists in rendering-open these beings as such, sc. as being what they are as sea, as earth, as animal, etc.; that the beings of the first type mentioned above (earth, sea, animals) are disclosed by reason of the beings of the second type (language, comprehension, working, etc.), for the latter are the "... subduing and ordering of the Power by reason of which, insofar as [There-being] penetrates them, beings disclose themselves as such ...;" \(^{32}\) that this disclosure of beings is a power that There-being itself must master, sc. assume, if, through the force that it brings to bear in the midst of beings, it is to be completely itself.

The concluding strophe expresses again the same contention between Being and its There but in a new terminology. Here the Over-powering is \(\delta \chi \eta\) and that which forces it into open-ness, \(\tau \chi \eta\). We have already considered the former; our problem here is the latter. What does \(\tau \chi \eta\) mean? Heidegger describes it as not only a seeing-beyond (\(Hinaussehen\)) but a being beyond (\(Hinaussein\)) what lies at hand as a mere entity, setting it to work as a being, indeed setting Being itself to work in this being and as this being. So it is that \(\tau \chi \eta\) opens up the Being of beings by its victorious struggle against the concealment that previously enshrouded it, hence renders it possible for Being to shine forth in beings (that-which-appears), enabling them to take their stand as being what they are. Heidegger translates \(\tau \chi \eta\) as "to know" (\(Wissen\)).\(^{33}\) The Over-powering (\(\delta \chi \eta\)) and that which forces it to shine forth in beings (\(\tau \chi \eta\)) are in a state of

\(^{31}\) EM, p. 119 (zu übernehmen).

\(^{32}\) "... ein Bändigen und Fügen der Gewalten, kraft deren das Seiende sich als ein solches erschließt, indem der Mensch in dieses einrückt...." (EM, p. 120).

\(^{33}\) EM, p. 122. See VA, pp. 160 (identified with Hervorbringen, "to bring forth"), 21 (Weise des \(\delta \chi \eta\)). An affinity of \(Wissen\) here with \(Verstehen\) of SZ is unmistakable. Cf. \(Wissen\) and \(\delta \chi \eta\) (SU, pp. 9-11 and VA, pp. 52-53).
continual tension with one another in the sense that \( \tau\chi\nu \) "breaks out" against the Over-powering, which in turn dominates \( \tau\chi\nu \). It is this mutual interchange that is.

Now it is this mutual interchange (\textit{Wechselbezug}) which constitutes the correlation between to-be and to-accept (contain). For by \( \varepsilon\eta\alpha\iota \) is meant \( \varphi\omega\iota\varsigma \), emergent-abiding-Power, and by \( \varphi\alpha\varepsilon\iota\nu \) is meant that concentration by which this Power is forced into emergence (from concealment). They are correlative, for it is by reason of \( \varphi\alpha\varepsilon\iota\nu \) that this emergent-Power can be itself, sc. can emerge by shining-forth in beings-that-appear; on the other hand, it is by reason of this Power that the There can be itself, for dominating the There through and through, it enables \( \varphi\alpha\varepsilon\iota\nu \) to be what it is. It is in the dynamic tension between these two contentious factors that truth comes-to-pass.

3. \textit{Characteristics of There: Transcendence, Finitude, Temporality.}

We have just considered the function of the There of Being; we wish now to enumerate its principal characteristics as suggested by the present text. To facilitate the exposition, we shall polarize it around those characteristics which in \textit{SZ} we saw to be fundamental to There-being: transcendence, finitude, temporality.

a. Transcendence – On this point we need add little more to what has been said already concerning the function of There-being. For by transcendence Heidegger understands the passage beyond beings to Being, sc. the manifestation of beings as beings, therefore the disclosure of the Being of beings. How better describe the process of containment (\( \varphi\alpha\varepsilon\iota\nu \))? For it is a seeing-beyond and a being-beyond the mere entities that lie at hand, opening them up in their Being and keeping them open. The total ensemble of beings, then, discloses itself as such simply because the There (-being) penetrates them, abides in their midst. This is possible, insofar as the There, belonging by its very nature to Being, is exposed to Being.

It is because of this indigenous exposure to Being that the

---

\textsuperscript{34} EM, p. 136 (\textit{Wechselbezug}).

\textsuperscript{35} EM, pp. 136 (im \textit{Sein einbehält}), 127 (Geschehen der Unverborgenheit).
There (-being) is called the “strangest” of beings, sc. because it is estranged from the other beings with which it dwells. It is simply not “at home” among them. Its true abode is beyond them. It transgresses the ordinary boundaries which first of all and for the most part surround it, “... and, indeed, precisely in the direction of the awesome, in the sense of the Over-powering,” sc. of Being. There-being’s only proper function in dealing with beings is to break through them so as to break out in them the same overwhelming Power that dominates itself (Being). In an individual case, this happens when There-being projects for the first time the Being of a being hitherto unrevealed, sc. a being that has not yet come-to-presence as manifest. When this takes place, then, beings are disclosed for what they are, and, for that matter, Being as well. For in this process the total ensemble of beings as such is opened-up, and this opening-up is the coming-to-pass of truth.

It should be remarked that in all this the term “transcendence” has disappeared completely. Yet how else can we conceive it? And how better summarize it than with the author’s own formula which describes his conception of There-being at the beginning of the way:

... [There-being is] a being in the midst of beings in such a way that the beings which [it] is not as well as the beings which [it] self is have already always been manifest to it. This manner of Being ... we call existence.

With man’s existence ... comes-to-pass an irruption in the total ensemble of beings of such a nature that for the first time beings in themselves, sc. as beings, become manifest. 

b. Finiteude – In all of our previous studies we have insisted on the importance for Heidegger of the problem of fini-

---

37 EM, pp. 125 (hereinbrechen), 110 (Neues [noch nicht Anwesendes] entwirft), 127 (Geschehen der Unverborgenheit).
38 Presumably for the same reason that the formula “fundamental ontology” disappears (WM, p. 21).
39 “... Der Mensch ist ein Seiendes, das inmitten von Seienden ist, so zwar, daß ihm dabei das Seiende, das er nicht ist, und das Seiende, das er selbst ist, zumal immer schon offenbar geworden ist. Diese Seinsart des Menschen nennen wir Existenz. ... Mit der Existenz des Menschen geschieht ein Einbruch in das Ganze des Seienden dergestalt, daß jetzt erst das Seiende ... als Seiendes offenbar wird...." (KM, pp. 205-206). Heidegger's italics.
tude, and in SZ we saw how the phenomenological analysis offered certain indices of the principal ways in which the finitude of There-being manifests itself: There-being is thrown among beings and referentially dependent on them; it has a dynamic tendency to lose itself among these beings (fallen-ness); as a process it must inevitably come to an end which is death. All three of these aspects of There-being’s finitude return in EM with a striking correspondence to the first work.

i. Thrown-ness – That the There-being is thrown-forth, sc. not master of its own origin, will be clear from what we have said of it already as a necessity dictated by the nature of Being itself. Being “throws” (wirft), or “sets forth” its own There. It is for this reason that Being can never abandon its primacy over the There, dominating it in its very depths, preserving the There in the Being by which it is. That is why the There, for all that by its very structure it brings force to bear upon, sc. does violence to, the Over-powering, can never succeed in mastering it completely. When all is said and done, the Over-powering over-powers even its own There. We have here clearly in other formulae what the major work called “thrown-ness.” What distinguishes this present analysis from the earlier one is the primacy of Being over its There.

Perhaps this is the best time for an important parenthesis. There is thrown, to be sure, but we must remember that it is a thrown There, sc. disclosure of Being (ek-sistence). Now it is this disclosing of Being accomplished in the There by reason of the Being which permeates it that one may call project, for it is in illuminating the Being of beings that There-being “... projects something new (that which has not yet come-to-presence [as a being]). ...” The There enjoys the prerogative of luminosity because it is the There of Being, which penetrates it to its very depths, making it what it is; yet the There does not dispose of this prerogative, as if it were its source, simply because it is itself thrown.

40 EM, pp. 125 (wirft), 124 (gesetzt), 136 (umwaltet, durchwaltet), 123 (nie zu bewältigen).
41 “... ein Neues (noch nicht Anwesendes) entwirft, ...” (EM, p. 110). Note importance of the formula “thrown-forth project” (geworferner Entwurf) in SZ (1927), pp. 223, 284; WM (1949), p. 18; and HB (1947), p. 84.
ii. *Fallen-ness* – The There is the most awesome and strange of beings because, open to Being, it is constitutionally estranged from the beings amid which it dwells, sc. which “first of all and for the most part” are its habitual milieu. And yet, how often it fails to get beyond this milieu and appreciate Being, thinking “beings are only beings and nothing further,” taking what it most easily can put its hands on, sc. beings, as that which by its nature it is meant to grasp, sc. Being. This condition of immersion among beings is the natural habitat of the There, where Being itself lies hidden, and the seeming-to-be of all that is habitual, ordinary and vapid remains in command. Is not this what SZ spoke of as “everydayness”?

This spontaneous absorption with the beings about it is the inevitable condition of There, for it not only enjoys a privileged access to them, but it can never escape dealing with them. Not, indeed, as if There-being were fenced in by some external barrier, but in the sense that by its very nature the There is:

... continually thrown-back into the paths-of-access [to beings] that it itself has made, insofar as it becomes stuck in them, caught fast in [its own] beaten track, and in this captivity draws around itself the circle of its world, becoming [so] entangled in seeming-to-be [that it] shuts itself out from Being. 

Now this inability to escape the captivity, rather captivation, of beings that comes upon the There, whose nature is to be open to Being, is a “de-cadence” (*Verderb*). The affinity with There-being’s fallen-ness, as delineated in SZ, is clear. Yet it is equally clear that there is a new emphasis here. For de-cadence is not simply the result of some individual failure of There-being to reveal Being; in fact it is not grounded in the There as such at all. Rather this de-cadence itself “holds sway” and is grounded in the mutual opposition between the Over-powering and that
which forces it into manifestation. The author adds here, as if in explanation:

... The violence that is brought to bear upon the over-powering might of Being must be dashed to pieces upon it, if Being is to hold sway ... [as itself, sc.] ... as φύσις, emergent Power.45

The structural de-cadence of There-being is rooted in the same necessity that dictates its ultimate disintegration (zerbrechen). But how and why? Let us leave the obscurity for a moment and remark simply that here, as before, the chief difference from the problem of fallen-ness in SZ lies in the primacy of de-cadence over the There.

iii. Being-onto-death – In the existential analysis of death, we saw how the end (death) of There-being penetrates it thoroughly so that from its first moment There-being always is immanently ending. This is the eminent form of There-being’s finitude. The same theme returns here. The There is without escape from beings, to be sure, but the supreme form of its captivity is death, for this “... ends beyond all measure all ending, limits beyond measure all limits. ...” 46 And the inescapability of death does not affect There-being for the first time when it is on the point of dying, but constantly and by reason of its very essence. “... Insofar as [There-being] is, [it] stands before the ineluctability of death. ...” 47

Stated in this way, the remark seems natural enough and perhaps need not call special attention to itself. However, let us consider a similar remark made later, when discussing the inevitable necessity of There-being’s being dashed to pieces by the Over-powering, which we have mentioned already:

... There-being does not have this potentiality as an empty escape but it is this potentiality, insofar as it is; ... as There-being, it must, for all its violence, be dashed to pieces all the same by Being.48

45 “... Die Gewalt-tätigkeit gegen die Übergewalt des Seins muß an dieser zerbrechen, wenn das Sein als das wallet, als was es west, als φύσις, aufgehendes Walten.” (EM, p. 124). Heidegger’s italics.
46 “... Er über-endet alle Vollendung, er über-grenzt alle Grenzen....” (EM, p. 121).
47 “... Sofern der Mensch ist, steht er in der Ausweglosigkeit des Todes....” (EM, p. 121). Heidegger’s italics.
We infer that the immanence of death and the immanent necessity of being dashed to pieces represent for the author in different formulae one and the same characteristic of There.

Now what is significant here is that the necessity of the There’s ultimate violent disintegration is dictated not so much by the nature of the There as by the nature of Being:

... The violence that is brought to bear upon the over-powering might of Being must be dashed to pieces upon it, if Being is to hold sway ... [as itself, sc.] ... as ἐμφατική, emerging Power.49

We interpret this to mean: Being is emergent Power; but emergence as such implies concealment out of which, or within which, it takes place, so that this concealment (non-emergence, negativity, finitude) is intrinsic to the process, not only in its inception but in its duration; when the emergence comes-to-pass in a "place" of disclosure, therefore takes-"place" in a There, this, too, must be permeated by negativity (finitude) and therefore comes to an end which permeates it at every moment from the very beginning; this always immanent ending may be characterized as death (when There is considered in a more anthropological context), or as being dashed to pieces (if the context remain "ontological," where Being is considered as dynamic Power), and language varies accordingly. Briefly: the There is potentiality-unto-death (unto violent disintegration), because Being’s emergence unto truth, which takes place in it and through it, is ineluctably finite. What distinguishes this conception of death from that of SZ is simply the explicit primacy of Being over its There.

Let us now try to think together the different aspects of There-being’s finitude. The initial premise again is that Being needs a There as a place of disclosure in order for it to come-to-presence as itself, sc. as emergent Power. Being, of course, can never abdicate its dominion over the There, and reciprocally the There is irredeemably finite, for it is a place where Being emerges into truth, therefore where shadows are as essential as light. To be sure, the There does violence to Being, forcing it into openness, but this violence never comes-to-pass in such a way as to

49 "... Die Gewalt-tätigkeit gegen die Übergewalt des Seins muß an dieser zerbrechen, wenn das Sein als das waltet, als was es west, als φαντάμ, aufgehendes Walten." (EM, p. 124). Heidegger’s italics.
master Being completely, dispelling all shadows of concealment. Now it is this disproportion between the all-overpowering Being and its finite disclosure in There that ultimately grounds the de-cadence of There. Plunged into the midst of beings as capable of disclosing Being, yet radically impotent to master this Being which overwhelms it, the There, by the force that it brings to bear:

... which originally makes the paths of access [to beings], engenders in itself its own non-essence ... which per se is powerless to escape beings, and this so profoundly that [There-being] closes to itself the path of meditation upon seeming-to-be, within which it is itself caught up.  

Finally, it is the ultimate consummation of this disproportion between Being and its finite disclosure in There that the There comes to an end and breaks apart. This ultimate dissolution belongs to the very nature of the There of Being: “... There-being ... means: to be set forth as the breach in which the overwhelming power of Being breaks into appearance, in order that this breach itself be shattered on Being.”

We can see, then, that what characterizes the finitude of There (thrown-ness, de-cadence, dissolution) is grounded in the inevitably finite character of the emergence of Being into truth. It is subject, then, to the same law which dictates that Being necessarily conceal itself in revealing itself, sc. that Being be inextricably intertwined with seeming-to-be: all emergence is finite. The full import of this will appear as we proceed. For the moment, notice: we can see already why the forgottenness of Being will be able to be attributed sometimes to the withdrawal of Being, sometimes to the de-cadence of There-being, yet without inconsistency, for both express under different aspects the same phenomenon: the finitude of Being’s emergence. We can understand more clearly, too, what Heidegger means by errance. It is the realm that is opened up in the intertwining of Being and seeming-to-be in the coming-to-pass of truth, therefore

50 “... Die Gewalt-tätigkeit, die ursprünglich die Bahnen schafft, erzeugt in sich das eigene Unwesen der Vielwendigkeit, die in sich Ausweglosigkeit ist und das so sehr, daß sie sich selbst von dem Weg der Besinnung über den Schein ausperrt, worin sie sich selber umtreibt.” (EM, p. 121).

51 “... Da-sein des geschichtlichen Menschen heißt: Gesetz-sein als die Bresche, in die die Übergewalt des Seins erscheinend bereinbricht, damit diese Bresche selbst am Sein zerbricht.” (EM, p. 124).
simply the emergent power of Being as finite. If it be said to be intrinsic to the structure of There-being, the reason is that Being as finite emergence dominates its There through and through. And the There must suffer the consequences of this finitude, v.g.: the fact that Being yields itself only in its non-essence, sc. in negatived fashion, to the There; the fact that the There is tossed about hither and thither in this tension between Being and its negation, sc. by Being in all its finitude.52

4. To be the There of Being is the essence of man.

Up to now, we have spoken only of the There of Being and of the There-being, without calling it man. The reason should be clear enough: we wish to avoid as much as possible an anthropological conception of this phenomenon, growing gradually into what for Heidegger is a meta-physical interpretation of what is most profoundly proper to man.56 We must see, however, how Heidegger conceives here the relation between the two. That the correlation is intimate is again quite clear, for the author speaks innumerable times of the “human There-being” and the “There-being of man,” sometimes even simply of “man,” when the context warrants “There-being,” as we for the most

52 EM, pp. 83 (Irre), 120 (Unwesen), 123 (hin und her, cf. WW, pp. 22, 23).
53 V. g. EM, pp. 64, 157.
55 EM, pp. 130 (So ist Geschichte), 125 (Als Geschichte), 153-154 (Grundgeschehnis, geschichtliches Dasein).
56 EM, p. 107.
part have translated it. The most explicit formulation of this comes in the concluding summary: "... man is the There whose nature is to be open. . . ." 57 Yet once more it would be excessive to identify There-being and man without reserve. For to be There is not simply a property that man possesses but rather a coming-to-pass that possesses him, in which he appears and enters into history (comes-to-be), wherein he finds himself and which grounds his essence. That is why man may be said to "stand" in There-being and thereby, as we can see in the case of Parmenides and Heraclitus, to stand in the Being of beings, for it is in the There that the Being of beings is disclosed.58 What distinguishes man, then, is his relation to Being. More exactly, "... the essence of man manifests itself here as that relation which first opens up Being to man. . . ." 59 and can be characterized only in terms of Being as it comes to manifestation in its There. This relation to Being is what we have seen already as the seizure of Being which constitutes man’s ontological structure, sc. his comprehension of Being, by reason of which in the midst of beings he comprehends, sc. discloses, their Being and can enter into commerce with them as beings. It is his transcendence (eke-sistence) "... by reason of which beings disclose themselves as such, insofar as man penetrates into them. . . ." 60

It becomes clear, then, that the distinctive feature of man is the uniqueness of his appurtenance to Being: a profoundly Greek conception, Heidegger claims, of man. When philosophy comes to define man as "rational animal," it is already a sign of decline. When all is said and done, this definition is a zoological one. Man is animal like the rest, but better than all others because equipped with the faculty of reason. The originating sense of λόγος, however, is not "reason" but "gathering-together into collectedness" the emergent power of Being. The proper definition of man, then, understands φύσις as λόγος ἐνθρωπον ἐχων, sc. "... Being,

57 "... Der Mensch ist das in sich offene Da..." (EM, p. 156).
58 EM, pp. 106 (sich in Sein kommt), 120 (er fand sich), 134 (Menschsein gründet), 64 (in Dasein steht), 104 (sich ihm eröffnet), 110, 156 (ich ihm eröffnet).
59 "... Das Menschenwesen zeigt sich hier als der Besitz, der dem Menschen erst das Sein eröffnet..." (EM, p. 130). Heidegger's italics. Of course, we understand wesen here verbally.
60 "... kraft deren das Seiende sich als ein solches erschließt, indem der Mensch in dieses eintritt..." (EM, p. 120). See EM, pp. 106 (Eigenheit), 63-65 (Verstehen).
the over-powering process of appearing, makes necessary [a place where it is] gathered together, [a place] which possesses within it the Being of man [and thereby] grounds it."

But if it is this appurtenance to Being which grounds the essence of man, how are we to conceive his self-hood? It must be understood in the same terms. "... The self-hood of man means this: his task is to transform into history the Being which opens itself up to him and thus bring himself to stand [on his own as a being]. ..." In other words, self-hood consists in achieving transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time, therefore history. Now the Being which opens itself to man is not simply his own Being but the Being of beings as such. This is underlined in a remark inserted into the text dating from its final redaction (1953), where in language reminiscent of SZ he describes the There as "... concern for the Being that is ecstatically disclosed in this concern – for the Being of beings as such, not simply of the human being. ..." There-being is constituted as itself, therefore as a self, simply by this structural relation to Being as such (Bezug zum Sein).

What of the individual ego? or, for that matter, of the community of men? (for several times the author suggests that There-being belongs to a whole people). We are told quite clearly that the self-hood of the There is not primarily an "I," any more than it is a "we" (community), and, in explaining (1953) the "mine-ness" of SZ, Heidegger says that it is not be understood as if restricted to an individual. Who, then, is There? Is it some third estate that is neither singular nor plural? Or is Heidegger simply insisting on the fact that the ground of man's essence is prior to all consciousness, whether it says "I" or "we"? No explicit answer is forthcoming in EM. We must be

---

61 "... <pu<yu; —  X6f<>c Äv6pü)7rov &x<av: das Sein, das überwältigende Erscheinen, ernötigt die Sammlung, die das Menschsein (acc.) innehat und gründet." (EM, p. 134). See pp. 106 (Zugehörigkeit), 116 (griechische Definition), 108 (zoologische), 129 (Sichsammeln).
62 "... Die Selbstheit des Menschen besagt dieses: das Sein, das sich ihm eröffnet, hat er in der Geschichte zu verwandeln und sich darin zum Stand zu bringen...." (EM, p. 110).
63 "... Dasein aber heißt: Sorge des in ihr ekstatisch erschlossenen Seins des Selenden als solchen, nicht nur des menschlichen Seins...." (EM, p. 21).
64 EM, pp. 35, and passim (Dasein eines wissenden Volkes), 210 (Einzelsers), as (je meines). Cf. a similar remark in the Nietzsche course of 1937, N, I, pp. 275–276.
patient. But the question is not gratuitous, for we must know *who* it is that is to think *Being*.

We must content ourselves for the present with what is certain, sc. that the *There* is the coming-to-pass of truth that is to be achieved in man and by him. His concern for the *Being* of beings is such that he is to transform it into history by assuming it of his own accord. But what precisely does it mean for man to assume his *There*, or for the *There* to assume *Being*? How is it brought about? By original thought!

**C. NATURE OF THOUGHT**

Up to now, in examining the relation between *Being* and thought, we have focused our attention on *vöξν*, interpreting it to mean that process of receptive containment by reason of which *φωςς* is forced into the Open in a place of disclosure. In a word, it is the coming-to-pass of the *There* of *Being*, of the *There-being*, which grounds the essence of man, which it is his task to assume (*übernehmen*) and thereby bring to full, if finite, achievement. It is the achieving of *There-being*, then, which is the coming-to-pass of thought (*vöξν*). We wish now to explore the implications of this, determining first of all, however, in what way *λέγειν* corresponds to *vöξν*; we conclude the section with an enumeration of the methods by which such thought can be brought-to-pass.

**I. Thought as *λόγος***

In the discussion of *Being*, we have seen already how *λόγος* is to be interpreted as a gathering-together, implying both collecting and collected-ness. The author identifies it purely and simply with *φωςς*. So intimately are the two intertwined that the question arises as to how they could be separated, so that *λόγος* could be conceived as distinct from and opposed to *φωςς*. The differentiation, he concludes, must be as original as the identity.

The solution appears when *λόγος* is identified with *vöξν*, which,
recall, is necessary for the sake of Being, in order that it be able to emerge from concealment. Even for Parmenides, for whom λόγος plays far less significant a rôle than for Heraclitus, λέγειν "... is named along with νοεῖν as a coming-to-pass of the same character. ..." It signifies, therefore, that "... force that is brought to bear upon Being by reason of which Being in its gathered-ness is gathered-together. ..." Now to gather-together means to bring into some type of unity what was scattered. What is considered scattered in this case is the dispersion of the in-constant and the confounding wiles of seeming-to-be. To gather Being together, then, is to bring beings into constancy and let them stand forth as beings, sc. as what they are and not merely what they seem to be. This is the function of λόγος, as also of νοεῖν. If they are to be distinguished at all, then we are to see λόγος as the more primary of the two, giving to νοεῖν its cohesive power. However that may be, it is this function that grounds the essence of man, constituting him as fundamentally estranged from all the beings confounded with seeming-to-be that make up his everyday world. So it is, then, that "... the Being of man is in its very essence ... λόγος, the [process of] gathering-together and receptively concentrating the Being of beings. ..." As the collector of Being, "... he assumes and brings to its achievement [his] stewardship over the dominating might of the Over-powering," a task which consists in opening-up a domain of non-concealment for beings by forcing Being into disclosure, thus permitting it to be itself.

2. λόγος as Decision

To gather-together Being into disclosure means to illuminate Being, sc. what beings are amid what they merely seem-to-be.

67 "... Mit der Vernehmung ist das λέγειν genannt als Geschehnis desselben Charakters ..." (EM, p. 129). Writer's italics.
The coming-to-pass of truth comports with it inevitably this struggle vs. seeming-to-be. It is by this struggle that the aboriginal Discord is sustained in history as history.\textsuperscript{72} The struggle consists fundamentally in distinguishing Being amid seeming-to-be, hence in making a scission (\textit{Scheidung}) between them. It is, then, "de-cision" (\textit{Ent-scheidung}).\textsuperscript{73} How exactly describe it? Let us distinguish three components by resorting to the figure that the author takes from Parmenides (Fragments 4, 6) of three paths that the thinker must follow: the path unto Being, the path unto Non-being (\textit{Nicht-sein}), the path unto seeming-to-be.

\textbf{a. PATH UNTO BEING} – Heidegger does not explain this beyond saying: that it is the way unto non-concealment; that it cannot be by-passed.\textsuperscript{74} We interpret this to mean that this path represents the radical relation to Being that constitutes the There, sc. makes the process of There-being to be what it is, the coming-to-pass of truth. It is unavoidable, simply because it is the ground of man’s essence, and even if it be forgotten, nevertheless it is this alone that enables man to enter into comportment with beings as beings in the first place.

\textbf{b. PATH UNTO NON-BEING} – This path, as Heidegger reads Parmenides, is inaccessible but must be recognized as inaccessible, and, indeed, precisely because it does lead to Non-being.\textsuperscript{75} We interpret this to mean: Non-being is inaccessible to the ordinary processes of thought as they function in science, for these are always concerned with beings, sc. with precisely what Non-being is not; Non-being can be discerned, however, by There-being and meditated in itself as inaccessible to logical thought because it is Non-being; the true thinker, therefore, must make the poignant experience of Non-being.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{72} EM, pp. 116, 146 (Kampf, Erstreuung), 47 (getragen), 125 (Als Geschichte).
\textsuperscript{73} EM, pp. 84-86, 128.
\textsuperscript{74} EM, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{75} EM, p. 85. The reading \textit{Nichtsein} is slightly disconcerting, but the immediate context which identifies it with \textit{Nicht} and a parallel passage (EM, p. 18) which takes \textit{Nicht} clearly in the sense that it had in WM (Nicht-Seiendes) make the author’s intention clear. That he writes \textit{Nichtsein} might be explained by the fact that when he conceives Being as göng, he is clearly conceiving it as the Being of beings. What does not come-to-presence (Nicht-Seiendes) is therefore \textit{Nichtsein}.
\textsuperscript{76} EM, pp. 19-20 (unwissenschaftlich), 18 (nicht Erkenntnis des Seienden), 114–115 (Angst, Scheu), 86 (Schrecken).
c. Path unto Seeming-to-be – This path is, indeed, accessible to man, so much so that he may lose himself on it completely; his task is to recognize it for what it is, sc. to realize that seeming-to-be is a correlative of Being. We interpret this to mean: Being, as the process of emerging into non-concealment in its There, is insuperably finite, therefore negatived, therefore a non-emerging, or concealment, at the same time that it is a revelation; this law of concealment affects different beings differently—the beings with which There-being deals (so that they are hidden as much as they are manifested and therefore seem-to-be what they are not) and There-being itself (whose special prerogative is first of all and for the most part hidden from itself in its everydayness, so that There-being seems to be what it is not, a being no different from the rest) – but it is the same law of concealment, sc. of finitude, that pervades both; it is this law of finitude that accounts for seeming-to-be, and it is because Being as emergent Power is finite that seeming-to-be is a necessary correlative of Being; to experience seeming-to-be as such is to recognize this correlation of Being and seeming-to-be as necessary and inevitable, sc. to comprehend Being as finite; the true man of thought must achieve this comprehension, “... in order that amid seeming-to-be and despite [it], Being may be revealed”; the thinker, then, is he who “... has assumed the way of seeming-to-be as an abiding necessity [of Being].”

This, then, is de-cision (Entscheidung), not a judgement or arbitrary choice that man may make, “... but a scission in the forementioned complex of Being, non-concealment, seeming-to-be and Non-being.” Let us note at once that it was de-cision of this nature that the early Greeks understood to be the process of thinking. “... The opening-up and fashioning of these three paths is the process of thinking at the beginning of philosophy. ...”
More precisely, how does decision come about? Not without some violence, to be sure. There-being must be delivered from the entanglement of everydayness, dislodged from its normal habitat amid what is most close and most ordinary, wrested from the habitual compulsion of its preoccupation with beings. Briefly: it must be liberated from the consequences of congenital decadence. This does not mean, of course, that the There is delivered from all commerce with beings, but only that it recognizes its self for what it is; its normal habitat with beings is disclosed as such. Simultaneously, the Over-powering is disclosed as such; the whole ensemble of beings as such is opened-up; non-concealment comes-to-pass by reason of that awesomely-strange process of There.  

Yet for all the luminosity that decision brings-to-pass, it remains itself finite, bound by the inexorable law of seeming-to-be. The There simply cannot overpower the Over-powering; it cannot force Being to manifest itself exhaustively; the place of disclosure remains "closed-up" by its finitude, sc. permeated through and through by concealment. And There-being achieves the ultimate refinement of decision when it comprehends its own Being as finite. If this calls for a certain courage, the truth is that it is There-being's supreme acknowledgement of what it is. It simply says "amen" to the overwhelming might of the Over-powering, not because of any sense of inferiority but simply because There-being accedes to the fact that this is the manner in which the Being of beings is disclosed.

There is one portentous consequence to this, however. For There-being to consent to its own finitude is to consent to the negation of itself, yielding to the necessity of ceasing to be the There of Being. This potentiality of ceasing to be the There of Being does not face There-being for the first time at the moment of its dissolution, but There-being is this potentiality from the very first moment, because ultimate dissolution is simply the consummation of finitude. The There as a coming-to-pass is simultaneously a coming-to-end; in terms of man, whose essence There-being grounds, it is Being- unto-death, and the reason is

82 EM, pp. 128-129 (Ausrücken, abgerungen), 130 (Freiheit der Übernahme), 127 (Unheimlichkeit).
83 EM, pp. 135 (Anerkennung), 125 (Ja zum Überwältigenden).
that "... There-being ... must ... be broken to pieces on Being," because There is irredeemably finite. To comprehend this and to consent to it is the crowning moment of There-being's luminosity, the transparence to itself of a There whose whole essence is to be in contention with Being. "The supreme triumph over Being is to cease to be There. . . ." 85

3. De-cision as Re-solve

Such, then, is de-cision. It is for There-being, in complete transparency to itself, to consent to be what it is: the There of Being which is consummately finite. But is not this exactly what SZ called the achievement of authenticity as brought to pass by re-solve? De-cision and re-solve are one!

To re-solve is to will; it is to choose authenticity; it is for There-being to let itself be its self; it is to become free for the exigencies of what it is; it is to will its own congenital freedom by which it is There and to will it as finite; it is There-being's willingness to be open-undo-Being to the very limit of its power. "... Who wills, . . . he is re-solved. . . ." 86 To forestall any misconception, Heidegger adds to the original text (1935) an editorial remark (1953): "... the essence of re-solve lies in the non-concealment of the human There-being for the illumination of Being . . .," hence in There-being's acceptance of its relation to Being already characterized as freedom, letting-be.

But in the concrete, how does There-being go about this willing of its own (finite) open-ness to Being? By willing (not merely wishing) to know (Wissen-wollen). Knowing for Heidegger, however, has as radical a sense as thinking. We have met already this term in discussing his interpretation of περιστροφή, which he translates as "knowing." It means the power of setting-to-work (disclosing) the Being of beings, of standing within the revelation of beings. 88 If re-solve is There-being's willing of its own

84 "... Das Dasein ... muß in aller Gewalt-tat am Sein doch zerbrechen." (EM, p. 135).
86 "... Wer will, . . . der ist entschlossen. . . ." (EM, p. 16). Heidegger's italics.
88 EM, pp. 122 (περιστροφή), 16 (in der Wahrheit stehen können).
(finite) open-ness to Being, then it is a willing to stand within the revelation of the Being of beings; it is willing-to-know (Wissens-wollen). To will-to-know, however, is to question. "... To question is the forementioned willing-to-know: re-solve unto the power of standing within the revelation of beings ..." Resolve is accomplished, then, by asking a question. But what question? At this point, we move into another problem, which concerns itself not so much with the nature of thinking as with its method.

4. Methods of Thinking

a. INTERROGATION — De-cision, re-solve and, therefore, thought are brought about by the posing of a question. It can arise under different circumstances, but it is always the same. It is the question which gives warrant to the entire book: "why are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?" This is the first of all questions — not, to be sure, in time but in importance (the broadest, deepest, most original question of all) — so comprehensive that it even questions itself, sc. why (ask) "why?" (for the question itself is a being). For Heidegger, the posing of the question is the proper function of philosophy.

Now upon analysis, this question really asks why it is that a being is rather than that it not be at all, hence the fundamental meaning is: what about the Being of beings? Such a question forces us into the Open, sc. opens-up and maintains open the total ensemble of beings as such, sc. in their Being, indeed even in their instability that wavers between what they are and what they are not (Nichtsein und Sein). By questioning, There-being's comprehension of Being is delivered from its fallen condition of everydayness, sc. from the consequences of its finitude, the chief of which lies in having forgotten Being.

The question, however, is an eminently historical one, for "the posing of this question and its de-cision ... are the essence of
It is only when Being opens itself up through this question that history comes-to-pass. This will be evident when we recall that history, as time itself (of which it is but an explicitation), is the coming of Being (future) to a self that already-is-as-having-been (past), thus rendering present (present) as beings the beings with which it deals. Now the posing of the Being-question is this very process:

... for it opens up the coming-to-pass of the human There-being in its essential relationship, sc. to beings-as-such-in-the-ensemble, according to its uninterrogated potentialities, [sc.] those which are still coming-to-be. ...

[We interpret: The Being-question brings into the Open ek-sistent There-being’s open-ness to the Being of beings with which it continues to deal, and therefore whose Being continues to be disclosed, sc. to come (future) to There-being through the continual interrogation.]

... Thereby [the interrogation] immediately conjoins [There-being] again with its own origin that still-is-as-having-been, ...

[We interpret: The origin of the There, of philosophy and of history took place with There-being’s initial de-cision in the form of an interrogation of the Being of beings; it is by reason of this beginning that There-being is what it is, therefore is what it has been, therefore is as having begun to interrogate beings; to pose the question now is to assume itself as what it has been, as what it is-as-having-been (the past); this is the genuine sense of the assuming of the self in order to achieve the self as what it is, sc. the There of Being.]

... and thus makes more incisive and more grave its [comprehension of Being in the] present.93

[We interpret: It is because There-being guards its open-ness to Being (future) by continually assuming the open-ness to

93 “Unser Fragen der metaphysischen Grundfrage ist geschichtlich, weil es das Geschehen des menschlichen Daseins in seinen wesentlichen Bestigen, d. h. zum Seienden als solchem im Ganzen, nach ungefragten Möglichkeiten, Zu-künften eröffnet und damit zugleich in seinen gewesenen Anfang zurückbindet und es so in seiner Gegenwart verschärft und erschwert...” (EM, p. 34). For the full sense of “grave,” sc. where There-being gives to beings their full “weight” or “gravity” (Gewicht), their Being, see EM, p. 9.
Being which has made it what it is (past) that its comprehension of the Being of beings with which it deals (present) is all the more luminous.]

Evidently, the Being-question is an historical one in the deepest possible sense. It will be clear, too, that in this process of assuming the self, the return of There-being to its own origin plays a central rôle. This is exactly what is meant by the process of re-trive. "To ask: how about Being?, this means nothing less than to re-trive the origin of our historic-co-spiritual There-being in order to transform it into another origin. . . ." 84 This is, indeed, possible, not insofar as we simply re-iterate what we know already about Being, but "... insofar as the origin originates all over again more originally [than before], and, indeed, with all the bewilderment, obscurity and insecurity that genuine origination comports. . . ." 85 It is just such a "more original" beginning that Heidegger himself seeks. This explains why the major part of the present work attempts to make again with a new profundity the experience of Parmenides, Heraclitus, and, for a reason we shall see soon, Sophocles. It is all re-trive: historical interrogation, de-cision, re-solve, thought.

The words "more originally" should be underlined. The meaning is that re-trive seeks to get closer to the source from which the first beginning arose, sc. the concealment of Being. Only insofar as There-being continually seeks new light on the Being of beings, can it conserve its beginning – mute testimony to its own ecstatic nature. This has an important consequence: it suggests again why every interpretation, whether of a philosopher, a poet, or even of a word, must do violence to the original. It must throw light on what is "no longer present in words" and yet somehow or other uttered. This is simply to repeat in different context what was said about There-being itself: it does violence to the Over-powering and forces it into open-ness, so that what was unexpressed, or even un-thought, in the initial

---


text (and therefore did not appear) is brought to light by re-
trieve. 96

Of course, re-trive, like There-being itself, is subject to the
consequences of finitude, just as every origin (the self-disclosure
of Being) contains within itself its own end (Sichverbergen).
Hence the necessity of continually renewed re-trive. This, too,
is the fundamental reason why the question about the essence
of man, sc. about the process of There-being, inseparable from
the Being-question itself, never can be answered. It is and re-
mains essentially a question.

So it is that the fundamental way in which There-being brings
about de-cision (re-solve), which is, after all, the achievement of
the self, is by posing indefatigably the Being-question. For re-
solve is willing-to-know, and the "passion for knowing" lies in
questioning. That is why the author may say that the There-
being comes to itself and is a self only insofar as it poses the
Being-question, and why the Being-question is "... a hidden
ground of our historical There-being. . . ." 97 Yet even here we
must not forget that the spontaneity that opens itself in question
does not find its ultimate ground in There-being. The primacy
belongs uniquely and exclusively to Being. "... Only where
Being opens itself up through questioning does history come-to-
pass, and with it that Being of man by reason of which he ventures
to enter into contention with beings as such." 98 It is Being,
then, not There-being, that is the grounding process. It is
"... above all on this ground that historical There-being is con-
served in the midst of the total ensemble of beings that is
opened-up." 99

b. Analysis of Language – Clearly for Heidegger the
fundamental method of thinking is to question, sc. to question

96 EM, pp. 117, 145-146 (Verborgenheit, sich verbirgt), 124 (doch gesagt), 47
(Unsagte, Un-gedacht), 145-146 (bewahren), 107, 109 (sie Antwort).
97 "... ein verborgener Grund unseres geschichtlichen Daseins . . ." (EM, p. 71).
See pp. 122 (Leidenschaft des Wissens), 110 (zu ihm selbst).
98 "Nur wo das Sein sich im Fragen eröffnet, geschieht Geschichte und damit
jenes Sein des Menschen, kraft dessen er sich in die Auseinandersetzung mit dem
(Philosophie mit uns anfängt).
99 "... Sein ist das Grundgeschen, auf dessen Grunde überhaupt erst ge-
schichtliches Dasein inmitten des eröffneten Seienden im Ganzen gewährt ist."
the meaning of Being. All other "methods" are but variations of the same theme. We wish now to mention one modality which will play an important rôle in the subsequent Heidegger, even though reductively but a form of questioning: the analysis of language. That there is a profound relationship between the interrogation of Being and the origin of language will appear from an oblique remark in the opening chapter to the effect that the posing of the Being-question is a serious effort "to bring Being into word." 100 How is this to be understood?

Recall that the term λόγος, though conventionally translated "word" or "speech," is for Heidegger "collection" or "gathering-together." The author's problem is to show how λόγος "collection" is transformed into λόγος "speech." Discussing λόγος-collection, we distinguished gathered-together-ness, sc. Being, and the process-of-gathering, sc. There-being as acceptive containment (νοέων) that forces Being into disclosure. Now this process of the There, which as λόγος discloses the Being of a being, expresses that being (in its Being) as a word. "A word, the forming of a name ... [establishes] in its Being a being that is opening itself up and preserves it in this openness, constriction and constancy. ..." 101 The giving of a name (Nennen), then, is not something subsequent to the discovery of a being and therefore a purely arbitrary procedure which fashions a "conventional sign," but is itself formed in and as the very process of discovery. "... In original utterance, the Being of a being, in [all] its original collectedness, is opened-up ..." 102 Note that the original word that expresses a being, sc. its name, not only is integral to the process of discovery but preserves the being in its discovered openness. "... In words, in language, things become and are. ..." 103

So profoundly are the emergence of Being and the origin of language identified that, under the impossible supposition that

100 EM, p. 31 (zum Wort zu bringen).
101 "Das Wort, das Nennen stellt das sich eröffnende Seiende aus dem unmittelbaren überwältigenden Andrang in sein Sein zurück und bewahrt es in dieser Offenheit, Umgrenzung und Ständigkeit...." (EM, p. 131).
102 "... Im ursprünglichen Sagen wird das Sein des Seienden im Gefüge seiner Gesammeltheit eröffnet...." (EM, p. 131).
103 "... Im Wort, in der Sprache werden und sind erst die Dinge...." (EM, p. 11). See WD, p. 85. We translate the various Heideggerian terms thus: Sagen as "uttering," "utterance"; Sprache as "language"; Rede as "speech"; Gerede as "loquacity"; Nennen as "to give (form) a name (word)."
Being had no meaning and There-being had no comprehension of it, the result would not simply be one less word in our language but no language at all. For words and language name beings as beings in what they are, and unless Being had a meaning that opened itself up in and through language, it would be impossible for language to achieve its task. Likewise, unless There-being comprehended beings as beings and therefore their Being, it would be impossible for There-being to address beings or discuss them at all. The converse is also true: unless There-being had the power of speech, all beings as beings would remain closed to it.104

Language takes its origin, then, along with the irruption of There-being, for in this irruption language is simply Being itself formed into word. It follows that in the rise of language, as in the emergence of the There itself, Being retains its primacy. Language, as the Over-powering itself, is a might within which the There finds itself, that dominates the There through and through and must be subdued by it.105

It follows, too, that language will be subject to the same law of finitude, sc. of seeming-to-be, as Being and its There. From the point of view of Being, the dominating power of aboriginal Language is disclosed to There-being only in its non-essence, sc. in a coming-to-presence (-wessen) that is profoundly negatived (Un-) by finitude, i.e. the concealment of itself as dominating. The result is that language will seem to be at the disposition of There-being, when actually the reverse is true. There-being will seem to have invented language by itself, when the fact is that it has discovered itself only in and with language, for language transfuses There-being. From the point of view of There-being: the language of There-being is only a finite containment of the Over-powering; original utterance is contaminated by negativity that covers Being up at the same time that it discovers it, and therefore is irresistibly drawn to the inauthentic condition of mere loquacity. There-being's task is to walk the path of seeming-to-be and, by decision in its use of language, to find its way to authenticity.106

104 EM, pp. 62-63.
105 EM, pp. 131 (Wortwerden des Seins), 120 (erfand sich).
106 EM, pp. 120 (Durchwaltende), 67 (Sagen des Seins), 132 (Gerede), 132-133 (Ent-scheiden).
But the speech (Rede) of There-being in everyday living can come to the truth that is proper to it only when talking and listening are orientated toward the λόγος out of which, as the gathered-ness of Being, language first springs. "... λόγος is the determinative criterion of the essence of speech ..." 107 This orientation is called, in connection with the interpretation of Heraclitus, "attending" to λόγος.

Heraclitus, the author claims, distinguishes between "attending" (Hören) 108 and a mere "listening" (blossen Hören, Herumhören) to words. Genuine attending has nothing to do with the listening or talking of ordinary everydayness but signifies "... docility toward which is λόγος; the gathered-togetherness of beings themselves. ..." 109 Talking and listening are authentic only when there has been an antecedent attending to Being; and it is only when Being has disclosed itself that verbal sounds become a word. If anyone cannot grasp Being, he is "... incapable of enabling his own There-being to take its stand in the Being of beings ...," 110 sc. cannot authentically achieve itself as the There. Only those who can do so are really masters of the word. These are the poets and the thinkers. 111

The essential here is: λόγος (Being) is a coming-into-the-Open that can and must be attended to; it is only by attending to, therefore docility toward, λόγος that the There-being can be authentically itself as the There of Being (λόγος); it is only this docility to λόγος that grounds the authentic use of words; the true poets and the true thinkers achieve this docility. Note in passing that in this conception of attending to λόγος through

---

107 "... Darum wird der Logos die maßgebende Wesensbestimmung der Rede. ..." (EM, p. 141).
108 We translate thus because of the nuances in English which suit the fundamental intention well. To begin with, the etymology (Lat. ad-tendere, "to stretch forward") suggests the ec-static nature of the phenomenon. Possible English senses of the intransitive use: "to apply the mind," "to pay attention," "to listen" (v. g. "attend to these directions"); "to apply oneself" (v. g. "attend to business"); "to take charge of, or look after" (v. g. "I'll attend to it"); "to be ready for service, to wait" (v. g. "to attend upon the committee"). All of these nuances suit our purpose admirably and are perfectly congruous with the concept of man as the "shepherd" of Being (Hirt des Seins).
111 EM, pp. 133, 141 (Verwahrt).
talking-listening, we have all the elements of what will appear later as "dialogue" (Gespräch).

There are two major consequences to draw from what we see here about the origin of language. In the first place, since language comes-to-presence along with the disclosure of beings and preserves in itself this disclosure, then There-being, by properly discerning the original sense of words, may interrogate Being itself, sc. that which renders possible all disclosure. This Heidegger does in EM by examining the sense of "is";¹¹² this will become more and more characteristic of his method as he unfolds after 1935. We should keep clear from the very beginning: that there is never a question of engaging in mere philology for its own sake from the "scientific" point of view; that the process is an effort to re-trive the primal freshness of language "more originally" than before; that therefore a certain violence is necessary in the interpretation of the meaning of words in order that it be an interpretation, sc. a de-cision (resolve) that brings language from the ineluctable concealment of everyday de-cadence.¹¹³ Secondly, if language in its essence is the coming-of-Being-into-words, There-being's primal orchestration of these words enjoys a privileged affinity with Being. This orchestration Heidegger calls a "primordial poetizing" (Ur-dichtung), whereby a whole people captures Being in song. This is the wellspring of poetry. It is the first great utterances of poetry that give a language its initial cast. For the Greeks, this original experience of Being in language came-to-pass through the poetry of Homer.¹¹⁴

We shall not pause here to remark the reappearance in this context of a familiar problem: what is the relation between Homer (presumably an individual) and the whole Greek people (a plurality) in the coming-to-pass of the There which first gave rise to the language of the Greeks? Let us simply note: that since the language of a genuine poet discloses Being as authentically as the writings (therefore language) of a genuine thinker, then poetry is as legitimate a domain for the interrogation of Being as philosophy; that henceforth the poets whom Heideg-

¹¹² V. g. EM, pp. 67–70.
¹¹³ EM, pp. 124 (wissenschaftliche Interpretation), 120–121 (Gewalt).
¹¹⁴ EM, p. 131.
ger considers authentic (v.g. Pindar, Sophocles, Homer, Hölderlin, etc.) have as much authority for him as the great thinkers (v.g. Parmenides, Heraclitus, etc.); that this explains why it was possible for us to glean the data of the foregoing research without distinguishing whether or not they came from poets or philosophers; that we find affirmed here clearly the close affinity between philosophy and poetry, and the problem from now on is to see how they are distinguished; that we understand long before they appear that the interpretations of the poets in general and of Hölderlin in particular pretend no more to be literary criticism than the etymologies pretend to be scientific philology: both are profoundly philosophical efforts to re-trive the aboriginal questioning of the Being of beings with which philosophy began.

Résumé

With EM, Heidegger II has taken full possession. To be sure, he is as much concerned about grounding metaphysics as ever (the title itself makes this clear), but if the essential elements of SZ are still unmistakable (structure of There-being: transcendence, finitude, temporality), the accent is different, for now Being maintains the primacy over There. To think Being thus conceived is to bring-to-pass what the early Greeks meant by λόγος and νοεῖν.

The There is opposed to Being, but is not separated from it in subject-object fashion. Its function is to gather into concentration the overwhelming power of Being and thus contain (νοεῖν) its dynamic advance in such a way as to force it into the disclosure through which the non-concealment (truth) of beings comes-to-pass. The whole process is permeated with negativity, whether we consider this negativity in terms of Being (as comporting a seeming-to-be) or of There-being (the finite There of finite Being, sc. Being-onto-death), and, in forcing Being into disclosure, There-being must let-be (manifest) the negativity as well. With regard to beings, this will consist in wresting Being from seeming-to-be; with regard to its self, it means freedom-onto-death. That process may be called de-cision, re-solve, willing-to-know or thought, but the structure is always the
same: There-being assumes itself as the finite There of finite Being – Being in its negativity.

But in all this we have been considering thought in its most authentic form, sc. as it was in its origin when philosophy took its origin. If philosophy no longer considers it in the same way, the reason is that thought has been separated from its source and has fallen into decline. As to how far this decline affects Western man, perhaps Nietzsche is the best witness. How is the situation to be ameliorated? ‘... The misunderstanding and misuse of thought can be overcome only by a thought that is genuine and original, and nothing else ...,’ 115 sc. by a thought that is foundational. We have more here than a succinct statement of the later section of EM. In these simple theses Heidegger strikes the fundamental chords that through all of Heidegger II unfold into full diapason.

We wish now to follow this development. As the same chords return again and again, one will be tempted to say that it is always the same old tune. But who will criticize a fugue of Bach by saying that it is “nothing but the same old tune”? “... Every thinker thinks but a single thought...,” 116 we are told, and the difficulty of his task lies in being faithful to this thought, in finding adequate ways to express it. Some may find unsatisfying this single thought that possesses Heidegger, but as we watch him develop through the succeeding years, few will deny the prodigious virtuosity with which he restates his theme.

The nature of the problem with which we now must deal warrants a slight change in method in order to avoid tedious repetitions. We propose to divide Part III of our study into two sections: the first will deal with Heidegger’s critique of thought in its decline; the second will examine his own effort to re-trive a foundational thought. In Section A, we disregard the order of composition and follow the order dictated by the history we are meditating. All evidence points to the fact that since SZ there has been no basic change in Heidegger’s conception of the history of metaphysics, beyond, perhaps, preciseness of expression. In Section B, we return to the method we have followed thus far.

116 ‘... Jeder Denker denkt nur einen einzigen Gedanken...’ (WD, p. 20).
PART III

FROM BEING TO THERE

Section A
The De-volution of Thought

I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me.

T. S. Eliot, "The Waste Land"
For Heidegger, the de-volution of Western thought began with Plato, for it was with him that νοεῖν ceased to have the sense of containing the advance of over-powering φῶς and began to assume the special relation to δῆξα, which evolved into what the tradition would call "reason" (Vernunft).\(^1\) We discern the transition best, however, by examining not Plato’s use of νοεῖν but rather the implications of δῆξα, for it was thus that he understood the Being which his predecessors had understood as φῶς. It was Plato’s conception of Being rather than of thought which was decisive in the birth of metaphysics. If we recall that φῶς (emergent-abiding-Power) was for the pre-Socratics the process of truth, then the transformation of φῶς into δῆξα may be discerned by examining what Plato understood by truth. This the author disengages by an essay upon the famous metaphor of the cave (Politeia VII, 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7).

A. TRUTH AS NON-CONCEALMENT

I. Metaphor

The details of the story are familiar. Socrates imagines with Glaukon a situation with four successive moments:

a. **World of shadows:** A group of men dwell in a cave. Daylight does not penetrate the long passage leading from the outside

entrance and the only light comes from a fire kindled in the cave itself. But the men themselves cannot see the fire, know nothing of its existence. They are chained facing the rear wall, with no freedom of movement even to turn their heads. All that they see are shadows cast upon the wall by figures of various description that move to and fro upon a small, wall-like proscenium in front of the fire but behind the men. Inevitably the cave-dwellers would take the shadows to be the only beings that are true, sc. un-concealed.

b. World of fire: If one of the group were freed from his chains and allowed to look at the forms which had cast the shadows, the forms would seem so strange that the man would feel at first that the shadows to which he had been habituated all his life were more true (un-concealed) than the forms. If forced to look directly into the fire, the pain of the unaccustomed light would make him yearn for his shadows again, which would be, after all, clearer to his feeble vision than a light which blinds.

c. World of sun: Socrates then postulates that a cave-dweller be led up the long passage to daylight illumined by the sun. It would take a period of adjustment before he could accept the beings on earth, illumined by the sun, as genuinely true (un-concealed). It would take still longer – and a gradual pedagogy of looking at the sun first in reflections (v.g. in water, etc.) – for him to be able to look upon the sun itself and recognize it as the source of all that he had experienced in the cave. But once the adjustment had been made, he would be glad of his liberation and prefer immeasurably the new experience to life in the cave.

d. World of shadows: Once he returned to the cave, readjustment would be necessary, for the sudden darkness would leave the cave-dweller’s eyes incapable of seeing anything at all. He would be a laughing stock to those he had left behind, who would jeer that he left the cave only to return with worsened eyesight. They would say it was pointless to go up into daylight and would kill anyone who tried to free them.²

² PW, pp. 6–19 (Greek text and Heidegger’s translation).
2. Interpretation

Plato's own interpretation of the metaphor is clear enough. The world of shadows is the world of everyday experience, whose illumination comes from a fire enclosed within the cave itself. The world of Ideas is the world of essences that are encountered in daylight, themselves illumined by the sun, the supreme Idea. The important point, however, and Heidegger insists upon it, is not so much this parallelism as the passage from one sojourn to another and the adjustment that is thereby made. This adjustment is what Plato calls παιδεία.3

Now Heidegger claims that, according to the first interpretation of the metaphor, παιδεία can be conceived as a schooling in the nature of non-concealment. For in each of the four moments of the narrative there is question of an open-ness in that which comes to presence. In the first stage, that which is open (un-concealed) to the cave-dweller is the shadows themselves.4 In the second stage, although the light of the fire should make the parading figures more un-concealed, the fact is that it so blinds the cave-dweller that the shadows still seem clearer to him, sc. more un-concealed, than the figures. In any case, that is more true which is more un-concealed.

We come now to the third stage. The things that are seen in the light of the sun are the Ideas themselves which constitute the essences in whose light individual beings manifest themselves as what they are. It is in this self-manifestation that the beings are un-concealed and accessible. But since it is by reason of their essences (the Ideas) that this manifestation in beings takes place, it is the Ideas themselves that must be considered un-concealed in an eminent way.5

The Ideas derive their own power of illumination from the Supreme Idea, which in the present context is expressed by the sun. How are we to understand the sense of τὸ ἀγαθόν (Supreme Idea), rendered ordinarily in easy, but perhaps misleading, translation as “the Good”? For the Greek mind, τὸ ἀγαθόν is that

---

3 PW, pp. 19–22 (Ideen), 23 (παιδεία).
4 PW, p. 27.
5 PW, pp. 29–30.
which is or makes "efficacious." Of course, every Idea performs this function for those beings of which it is the Idea, but whence does the Idea itself derive its own efficacy? What is the Idea of the Ideas? What is it ultimately that "... renders it possible for everything that comes-to-presence to appear in all its visibility ..."? It is that power-which-renders-efficacious pure and simple: τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Τὸ ἀγαθόν is "ultimate" (τελευταία) because in it, ultimate source of all efficacy, the essence of Idea achieves its fulfillment and therefore takes its origin. It may be called "Supreme Idea" simply because it grounds the possibility of all other Ideas, because, too, catching a view of τὸ ἀγαθόν is for man the most difficult task of all. Yet in another sense, τὸ ἀγαθόν is everywhere and always in view, wherever any being whatsoever manifests itself, for it is the ultimate Source of all luminosity. This is the case, even for those beings that are encountered in the world of shadows where daylight does not penetrate, for the fire that projects the shadows on the wall is itself only a shoot (Spross) of the sun. "... Within the cave the sun remains invisible, and yet even the shadows feed upon its light. ..." The eminently un-concealed, then, (the Ideas) are themselves grounded in the Idea of the Ideas (τὸ ἀγαθόν), which is the most luminous and most un-concealed of all.

In the fourth stage of the narrative, we have no mention of non-concealment as such. Here the cave-dweller is back again in the world of shadows. Heidegger interprets this to mean that the entire doctrine on truth is to be taken from the cave-story

---

8 PW, p. 38 (tauglich). Taugen, deriving from the stem dūg, with the fundamental meaning of "capable," "useful," etc., shares common parentage with the current Tugend and tüchtig. The German stem is closely associated with the Anglo-Saxon dōhtig, which gives us the current English form of "doughty," meaning "able," "strong," or "valiant." Purism would insist on "doughty" to translate tauglich, but the humorous connotation makes it incongruous.

9 PW, p. 40. Heidegger translates ursache by Ur-sache, interpreting it as "Source" (Ursprung) of all things (Sachen) and their thing-ness (Sachheit). The hyphenation suggests that he intends it to be understood as "ultimate Source," but not necessarily as First Cause.

10 PW, p. 38 (ἀληθεύματος).
as an ensemble, and the final stage of confinement in the world of shadows is as intrinsic to the coming-to-pass of non-concealment as the experience of light. For the dark world of the cave symbolizes the privation of light, the negation of non-concealment. Non-concealment is negatived by concealment, not only initially but throughout the entire process. Perhaps we should say that non-concealment means simply privation of concealment. Once more we are told that the force of the alpha-privative in δ-ληθεία is that the non-concealed must be wrung (torn away by an act of robbery) from concealment, which, indeed, may be of many kinds (v.g. any type of occlusion, elusiveness, dissimulation, dissemblance, obscuration, disarrangement in beings) and always remains referred to, therefore permeated by, the negativity from which it is liberated. In all this, Plato remains faithful to the original experience of truth which the early Greeks had had, sc. that the very essencing of Being is penetrated by concealment (self-concealment) with the result that every being is affected by an abiding concealment both in its presence and in its accessibility.11

We understand Heidegger to mean here that if we take the four stages of the cave-metaphor as a whole, the essence of truth does not consist in man’s dwelling forever in a world of light, but rather in his dwelling in a world of darkness, endowed, however, with an antecedent comprehension of light, so that man is able to discern the beings that are accessible to him as accessible, and, indeed, by reason ultimately of the Source of light. According to such an interpretation, the fourth stage is as essential as the other three. "... That ‘privation,’ the laborious wresting of the non-concealed away (from concealment), belongs to the essence of truth, the fourth step of the ‘metaphor’ suggests in a manner all its own. ..." 12

11 PW, pp. 32 (Verschließung, Verwahrung, Verhüllung, Verdeckung, Verschleierung, Verstellung), 33 (auf Verborgenes bezogene).
12 "... Daß die 'Privation', das abringende Erringen des Unverborgenen, zum Wesen der Wahrheit gehört, dahin gibt die vierte Stufe des 'Gleichnisses' einen eigenen Wink..." (PW, pp. 32–33).
I. Truth and Idea

All this is very well, and one would think that Heidegger could accept the whole of it, interpreting τὸ ἀγαθόν as ontological truth (Being) and the Ideas as ontic truth, identifying them somehow with the beings of daily experience so as to suppress the cleavage in Plato between shadow and Idea, and with it, presumably, the whole problem of participation. But the decisive point has not yet been made. This consists in the fact that what dominates the conception of Plato is not that the Idea must be conceived as non-concealment (truth), but that non-concealment is conceived as Idea.¹³

It was suggested already in EM that Idea is a form of appearing (Schein). Here the matter is elaborated. Heidegger makes appeal to the importance of light in the cave-metaphor: fire, daylight, sunlight, sun. "... Everything is concerned with the shining-forth of that-which-appears and with the rendering-possible of its visibility. ..."¹⁴ The different levels of non-concealment are distinguished only in order to explain what makes accessible as such that which appears, visible that which manifests itself. This is the function of Idea. "... The ἰδέα is pure shining-forth in the sense of the expression 'the sun shines'... "¹⁵ Hence the essence of Idea lies in appearing and visible-ness, and it is thus that it accounts for the coming-to-presence of beings as what they are. Coming-to-presence, however, is precisely what is meant by the essencing of Being. That is why for Plato Being consists properly speaking in what-ness, the quidditas of which the schoolmen spoke, hence essentia rather than existentia.

What-ness (Idea) is the visible-ness of beings. It renders beings accessible insofar as it makes them able-to-be-seen. Actual access, however, is had only by a seeing (ἰδοῦ), to which the accessibility (non-concealment) is therefore intrinsically referred. Here the subtle chemistry is at work. The Idea, offering

¹³ PW, p. 46.
¹⁴ "... Alles liegt am Scheinen des Erscheinenden und an der Ermöglichung seiner Sichtbarkeit...." (PW, p. 34).
¹⁵ "... Die ἰδέα ist das reine Scheinen im Sinne der Rede 'die Sonne scheint'. ..." (PW, p. 34).
a view, ordered thereby toward a viewing, is for this viewing the non-concealment of what is viewed. Thus it happens that the non-concealed becomes understood as that which is perceived in the perceiving (Vernehmen) of the Idea, as what is known in the process of knowing. It is here for the first time that νοεῖν and νοσῖν assume an essential reference to Idea. Henceforth this reference to the Ideas determines the essence of perceiving and subsequently the essence of reason (Vernunft). Even the Supreme Idea, although it is itself the yoke that couples both viewing and viewed and therefore not only grounds the visibility (luminosity) of the Ideas but grounds the power of vision to respond to them by perceiving this luminosity, is still Idea, something seen, something viewed. Briefly: non-concealment has become Idea, something seen (ἰδέαν, ἱδόν) by a view.

To be sure, see-ability is an intrinsic consequence of Being-as-non-concealment, but in Plato, Heidegger argues, this see-ability is more than a consequence, it is the unique sense of Being. The next step follows immediately. Once the essence of a being’s Being consists in its Ἰδέα (its what-ness), then it is the what-ness of the being that most authentically is. Hence the Ἰδέα is raised to the level of what alone authentically is (ὅπις ὃν). The things of experience properly speaking are not, they only “participate” in that being which is pure what-ness.

2. Idea and Conformity

Henceforth all comportment with beings is grounded ultimately in vision (ἰδέαν) of the beings which are Ideas (ἰδόν). Hence it is of supreme importance that the vision be the “right” one. As the liberated cave-dweller passes from one stage to another, his vision becomes more and more “right,” sc. correct. “... Upon ὁφθότος, the correctness of the viewing, everything depends. ...” 18 The viewing takes its sight from that which is to be viewed, sc. beings insofar as they shine forth by reason of the Ideas. The result is that the viewing conforms (ὁμομοιωτάς) to

---

16 PW, pp. 35 (Zugang durch “Sehen”), 35-36 (Joch), 39 (ὁφθότος, erblickt). With “coming-to-presence” we translate Anwesung, which in turn translates here ἰδόν (p. 46).
17 EM, pp. 158-159 (Wesenfolge), 140-141 (das Seiendste am Seienden).
18 "... An der ὁφθότος, der Richtigkeit des Blickens, liegt alles..." (PW, p. 41).
the viewed, and truth becomes not the non-concealment of what appears but conformity between viewing and viewed.

"... Thus springs from the primacy of ἱδέα and ἰδεῖν over ἀλήθεια a transformation of the essence of truth. Truth becomes ὑπόθεσις, correctness of perception and expression."¹⁹ And not only is the essence of truth changed but its proper domain as well. As non-concealment, truth resides in the being itself. As correctness of viewing, it becomes a characteristic of human comportment with beings. If in Plato a certain ambiguity remains, so that "truth" suggests sometimes the non-concealment of beings, sometimes conformity, sometimes both, this is only another proof of the subtlety of the transformation. A case in point is the situation where τὸ ἀγαθὸν is the Source of possibility for both the luminosity of the Idea and the power of vision in man, therefore ground for truth both as non-concealment and as correctness. Decisive is the fact that here non-concealment is subordinate to τὸ ἀγαθὸν, which is itself Supreme Idea.²⁰

RÉSUMÉ

In Plato metaphysics in the traditional sense takes its rise, for it is he who first conceives of thinking Being as a going "beyond" the beings of experience to their being-ness, which he conceives as their what-ness, their see-ableness, their Idea. Such a conception is possible only because a consequence of φῶς (process of shining-forth) is taken to be the essence of it. Hence φῶς itself becomes for him that-which-is-to-be-seen, a being (ἐἶδος). Being thus becomes conceived as a being. Likewise truth, no longer non-concealment, becomes correctness of view, conformity with the Ideas.

²⁰ PW, p. 41 (unter das Joch).
CHAPTER II

ARISTOTLE

Since Being is for Heidegger the process of truth, then the thinking of Being and its de-volution from the original ὑπερστός is inevitably intertwined with the thinking of truth. We have just seen how Heidegger understands Plato to have thought the nature of truth. Knowing that Aristotle has influenced him more profoundly than any other thinker, we are led to suppose that he has meditated this problem in the Stagirite at great length. And yet, he has given us no "Aristotle's Doctrine on Truth." If we are to understand Heidegger's conception of Aristotle in this regard, we must piece together into unity many indices, all of a minor order. If we do this, however, we are fully aware of how provisional our conclusions must remain.

Perhaps the sharpest formula that the author has given us comes at the conclusion of a seminar (1940), "On the Essence and Conception of Φύσις [in] Aristotle's Physics B, I." In itself, the remark is parenthetical and, presumably, not intended for the members of the seminar. Perhaps it was only a hasty draft, to be elaborated in one way or another later. Be that as it may, the remark is more than ordinarily enigmatic, and if we are to make any sense out of it all, we must first familiarize ourselves with the principal themes that the seminar had brought to light.

Aristotle’s Physics is for Heidegger a work of cardinal importance, not only because it serves as the fundamental book of subsequent philosophy in the West, but because in its own

way it is the consummation of all previous Greek thought. Especially significant, of course, is the conception of φύσις itself. Admittedly, Aristotle’s use of the word is not always uniform: sometimes it is used to designate the being-ness (οὐσία) of beings-in-the-ensemble (Meta. IV, 3); more often the being-ness of one particular domain of beings, sc. those which have in themselves the source of their moved-ness (ἀρχή κινήσεως) (Phys. II, 1, 192 b 14).

The first sense returns later when φύσις is interpreted in terms of beings-in-the-ensemble, and in this case it is a clear echo of the earlier conception of φύσις in Heraclitus as Being itself. The second sense, although more restricted in compass, retains none the less more clearly than the first the genuine sense of the word in Heraclitus, for whom φύσις is “inclined to conceal itself,” sc. it is a coming-to-presence (Anwesung) that is negatived (Abwesung). It is to this meaning of φύσις that the author devotes his attention in the seminar. Aristotle’s understanding of φύσις, then, is clearly a transition between the conception of the early Greek thinkers and that of subsequent metaphysics. It is as such that we wish to understand it.

A. AMBIVALENT NATURE OF ΦΥΣΙΣ

I. ΦΥΣΙΣ AS ΑΡΧΗ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ

The seminar culminates in the analysis of the “ambivalent” nature of φύσις, and it is this which most concerns us. In a first delineation, we are told that φύσις is the ἀρχή of κινήσεως in individual beings which have this ἀρχήν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς (Phys. II, 1, 192 b 13–14). Here: ἀρχή must be understood as suggesting both origin and domination over that of which it is ἑαυτή; κινήσεως is not simply “movement” but rather “moved-ness,” sc. that by which the κινούμενα (beings-that-are-moved) are as moved. Hence it comports not only movement but the repose of that movement when the movement is gathered up in the end (τέλος), sc. residing in this being as having arrived at its end (ἐν-τέλει-ἔχει:...

---

As a matter of fact, movement continues only until this point of repose, sc. end, is reached (ἀπελής), hence repose is the culmination of movement. As for the phrase “in themselves” (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς), this is what distinguishes beings whose ἀρχή is φύσις from those beings which have the origin of their movement outside themselves (πουώμνα). For the beings we are considering, “... the self-unfolding emergence is in itself a returning into itself. ...”

The essential in all this is to realize that the moved-ness of beings-that-are-moved is the manner in which they come-to-presence, hence characterizes the being-ness of these beings. And since φύσις is the ἀρχή of moved-ness, it is φύσις that is this being-ness (ὁσία) itself, that by which beings take-their-stand (ὑπόστασις) or lie-forth (ὑποκείμενον) in the presence that we call non-concealment.

2. Φύσις as μορφή

a. μορφή-δύναμις — Aristotle offers a second delineation of φύσις, sc. as μορφή (Phys. II, i, 193 b 18). Correlative with μορφή, of course, is δύναμις, both of them complementary components in the single process of presenc-ing called φύσις, but μορφή enjoys a certain primacy, for it brings the presencing-process to fulfillment more fundamentally than δύναμις. Why? Because δύναμις connotes a certain reserve, a not-yet-unfolded character of the being’s emerging-into-presence. Μορφή, however, connotes precisely this emergence, for μορφή must be understood as posing the individual being in its εἶδος (Phys. II, i, 193 a 31).

We see here at once Aristotle’s continuity with Plato, yet the radical difference between them. For Plato, the εἶδος is, of course, a shining-forth that offers its visage to be seen, but is conceived as somehow coming-to-presence for itself as a being in the authentic sense and as common (κοινόν) to all the individual beings. Aristotle explains οὐσία by ὑποκείμενον, which Heidegger claims, has the same ambiguity as ὑπόστασις, hence permits interpretation as Being (here being-ness) or being.

---

6 P. pp. 137 (ἀρχή), 138, 140, 275 (Bewegtheit, Ruhe), 276 (ἐντελέχεια), 277 (ἀπελής).
7 P. pp. 147–149 (Anwesen). Aristotle explains οὕσια by ὑποκείμενον, which Heidegger claims, has the same ambiguity as ὑπόστασις, hence permits interpretation as Being (here being-ness) or being.
entities of experience, which entities, therefore, could not be called “beings” in the authentic sense at all. For Aristotle, however, individuals are authentic beings simply inasmuch as they take their place (Gestellung) in the radiance of this shining-forth by reason of which they are what they are. It is μορφή that places a being in the sphere of radiance, hence poses the being in the shining-forth-process (ἐνδοὺς) by which it appears as what it is. Consequently, if we consider the being-that-shines-forth in terms of μορφή, we see that it is precisely by μορφή that it is constituted as shining-forth, whereas if we consider it in terms of ὃντος, the shining-forth must be considered in that moment when it has not yet taken place. Now since it is by shining-forth as what it is that the being comes-to-presence, μορφή plays a more fundamental rôle in the presencing-process than ὃντος, indeed to such an extent that the presencing-process itself (φύος) may be designated by that component, sc. μορφή, which makes the being come-to-presence as what it is.

b. στέρησις – Of course, the presencing is a moved-ness, and in the context this moved-ness is thought of as generation, sc. movement that is still under way toward repose in the ἐνδοὺς that already has begun to shine-forth in the being but has not yet reached its fullness. At this point another element appears in the presencing-process, sc. στέρησις. The Latin translates it as privatio, but by association with negatio (“saying no”), this risks interpretation as simply a type of “saying,” hence a judgement about the process. At all costs, we must understand στέρησις as not simply a judgement about the process but an element in the process itself. The English “privation” permits this sense very clearly (v.g. “the flood victims suffer great privation”), and we may retain this translation of the Latin (which Heidegger presumably rejects) to translate the German Beraubung.

What is important for the argument, however, is to understand in what sense στέρησις is a type of ἐνδοὺς (Phys. II, 1, 193 b 19–20). As Heidegger sees it, the reason is that every coming-to-presence (Anwesung) through μορφή, sc. through placement in ἐνδοὺς, involves ἐπος facto a going-from-presence (Abwesung), as,

---

* P, pp. 278 (noch zurück- und an sich haltenden), 269 (Gestellung in das Aussehen), 278 (erfüllt mehr).
for example, the appearing of the fruit necessarily comports the
dis-appearing of the blossoms on the fruit tree. This dis-appearing,
interior to the process of appearing through εἴδος, is what
Heidegger interprets Aristotle to mean when he says that
privation is "somehow or other" (πως) εἴδος. We understand
this in the sense that privation is Aristotle’s term for describing
the negativity intrinsic to the process of coming-to-presence as
such. This, then, is why μορφή, as the placement of the being in
the radiance of εἴδος, is ambivalent: it comports negativity as
well as positivity. And the same must be said, of course, for
φύσις.\(^{10}\)

3. Φύσις as ἀρχή-μορφή

If by way of conclusion we endeavor to think both deline-
ations of φύσις together, sc. as ἀρχή κινήσεως and as μορφή (in
generation), we discover a profound unity between them that
gives us what for Heidegger is the definitive sense of Aristotle’s
φύσις: “... μορφή is the essence of φύσις as ἀρχή, and ἀρχή is the
essence of φύσις as μορφή. ...”\(^{11}\) We understand this to mean
that the origin and dominating force (ἀρχή) of the moved-ness
of beings whose nature it is to be moved (κινώμενα) consists in
their placement in the radiance which lets them shine forth as
what they are (εἴδος). Moreover, the process is intrinsically
"negatived," for every moment of the self-unfolding com-
ports a privation proper to itself.

B. Φύσις AND TRUTH

All this is very nice, but what has it to do with truth? Let us
come at once to the closing remark, to which we have referred
already. In all its tortuous convolution, it reads:

Because φύσις in the sense of the Physics is a type of φύσις, and because
φύσις itself in its essence derives from the original [sense] of φύσις, there-
fore ἄληθες pertains to Being, and therefore the presencing in the Open
of the Ἑξα (Plato) and of the εἴδος κατὰ τῶν λόγων (Aristotle) discloses

\(^{10}\) P. pp. 279, 281, 283 (γένεσις), 284–285 (στάρτημα), 286–287 (σωφρονίστα)\).

\(^{11}\) “... Die μορφή ist das Wesen der φύσις als ἄρχη, und die ἄρχη ist das Wesen
der φύσις als μορφή...” (P, p. 287).
itself as one character of ωςία; therefore for Aristotle the essence of ωςία as ἐντέλεσις and δηφύς becomes visible.12

What we understand Heidegger to mean is this: The "original" sense of φόςις, as we find it in Heraclitus, is that of Being-as-truth, comporting negativity (concealment) as well as positivity (non-concealment). Φόςις in this sense is also called ωςία. With Plato, Being comes to be conceived as εἶδος (a being that is see-able), when truth-as-non-concealment becomes truth-as-conformity. But the original sense of φόςις as non-concealment perdures in Plato to the extent that the see-ability of εἶδος consists precisely in its shining-forth, sc. in its radiance as a domain of open-ness (Offene). In Aristotle, the meaning of εἶδος changes, to be sure, in accordance with the new conception of μορφή, but what remains constant in εἶδος is the notion of a radiance that can be seen, in which the being is so placed by μορφή that the being becomes visible as what it is.13 Here, too, then, to the extent that εἶδος is an open-ness in which beings come-to-presence (appearance), Heraclitus' sense of φόςις-as-non-concealment persists. Moreover, although Heidegger does not mention the fact in the remark we are discussing, we can see how in Aristotle the negativity of this non-concealment also comes to expression under the guise of privation (a "no-longer-"), and one wonders, although the author does not explicitate, if we might not say the same of ὅλη, insofar as it is a "not-yet-." These, then, would be the Aristotelian forms of the negativity that for all the Greeks, as Heidegger reads them, permeated the process of emerging-into-presence.14

In all of this, the essential for us is to see: that in meditating the notions of φόςις and ωςία even in Aristotle, we are still at grips with the problem of truth-as-non-concealment; that even though the negativity of the process still has its essential place

---

12 "Weil φόςις im Sinne der 'Physik' eine Art der ωςία und weil ωςία im Wesen selbst entstammt der anfänglich entworfenen φόςις, deshalb gehört zum Sein dήφύς, und deshalb enthält sich als einen Charakter der ωςία die Αναλύσις ins Offene der Ἰδέα (Platon) und des εἶδος κατὰ τὸν λόγον (Aristoteles), deshalb wird für diesen das Wesen der κίνησις als ἐντέλεσις und δηφύς sichtbar." (P. p. 289). Heidegger's italics.
13 P. p. 269. In this respect, the κατὰ τὸν λόγον is also significant, given Heidegger's interpretation of λόγος (pp. 271-272), but this problem returns in the λόγος analysis of VA (1944), and we do not attempt to retain it here.
14 P. p. 156. Heidegger recalls here that the whole problem of seeming-to-be (Schein) is the problem of negativity of truth. Cf. p. 121.
in the problematic under the guise of μορφή and στέρησις, the negativity is not attributed to truth as truth. This can be expressed only when we speak of διάλεκτα as a self-concealing. We grasp the force of this, if we examine another piece of evidence.

In The Principle of Ground (1955-56), Heidegger returns in a completely different context to the notion of φύσις as negated truth. He speaks of Aristotle’s conception of Being under the guise of φύσις and of beings as τὰ φύσει δινα (Phys. I, 1, 184 a 16 ff.). Aristotle distinguishes τὰ χρυσά σαράτερα and τὰ σαράτερα τιν φύσει. The sense is that beings are more manifest to us, Being (φύσις) more manifest in itself (τὰ ἄπλος σαράτερα), therefore less manifest to us. The way of philosophy leads from a comprehension of the former to a comprehension of the latter. As a result, we never get a view of Being with complete immediacy. What is decisive is the reason why all this is true: it lies not in the nature of φύσις but in the nature of man. "...It lies in the fact that our eyes are not able without further ado to glimpse Being, therefore by no means in the fact that Being withdraws. ..." Now for Heidegger, it is precisely the nature of φύσις as διάλεκτα to withdraw, sc. to conceal itself, and even to conceal its own concealment (mystery). To the extent that Aristotle conceives φύσις as that which makes itself manifest, he remains faithful to the original sense of this word, but to the extent that he ignores the law of φύσις by which it conceals itself and conceals its own concealment, sc. the intrinsic negativity of φύσις, he is oblivious to the genuine meaning of διάλεκτα.

If Aristotle forgets the sense of truth as non-concealment, how does he conceive it? To understand this, we must turn our attention from φύσις to λόγος and see how this word has been transformed when it emerges in him. We saw how originally λόγος, as the gathering-together of beings, opens these beings up and simultaneously forms into a word the name by which they are to be called. This is the origin of language, which in turn preserves in itself the primal open-ness of beings. Now what is uttered initially in language can be said again and repeated over and over, so that the original truth (open-ness of beings) can be

---

16 "...Dies liegt daran, daß unsere Augen nicht ohne weiteres zum Erblicken des Seins taugen, also keineswegs daran, daß das Sein sich entzieht...." (SG, p. 113).
communicated from one speaker to another without any experience of the being itself in question. But there is a risk involved, for the expression-by-repetition can get farther and farther away from the original openness, until it becomes mere hearsay and loquacity. In this case, the decision about what is true depends upon distinguishing authentic utterance from mere hearsay. This means that the place where truth resides is not, as originally, in the being-that-is-rendered-open, but in the expression. The place of truth has changed from beings to expression; with it the essence of truth has changed once more from non-concealment to correctness.

RÉSUMÉ

In all this, the essential is clear. If traces of the Heraclitean conception of φως remain in Aristotle, its δόξα-character is forgotten. Through the transformation of λόγος, truth comes to reside in the expression, or in the understanding (reason) that articulates the expression, and consists in the conformity of judgement (expressed) to judged (expressed). If presentative thought as such does not evolve until Descartes, certainly the seeds of it are planted in Aristotle.

TRANSITION: MIDDLE AGES

Between Aristotle and Descartes, however, there is a long period of maturation when western thought passes through the epoch of mediaeval scholasticism. For Heidegger, the most significant characteristic of this period is the recurring question about the relation between essence, sc. that in beings which accounts for the fact that they are what they are (their Wassein), and existence, sc. that in beings which accounts simply for the fact that they are (their Daß-sein). To understand how Heidegger interprets the significance of this problematic, we must remain for a moment with his analysis of Plato and Aristotle.

17 EM, pp. 141-142. The term "expression" (Aussage) for Heidegger includes not only the verbal locution but the judgement that is thereby expressed.
With Plato, as we saw, Being comes to be conceived as Idea, sc. as a being. By that very token, an Idea is the only being that genuinely is (ἐντὸς ὑπ’), so that what a being is and the fact that it is are hardly to be distinguished. The world of Ideas, then, is the genuine ("true") world. What of the world of sense experience? It is the non-genuine world, the world of "seeming," wherein the phenomena of sense participate in and manifest the genuineness of the Ideas but in themselves are not genuine beings. Yet beings of some sort they are, even if non-genuine ones (μὴ δὲν). Thus it becomes possible to distinguish in such beings the fact that they are at all, no matter in how non-genuine a fashion, from what they are through participation in the Ideas.  

In Aristotle, the dichotomy of what-ness and that-ness emerges out of an ambiguity in the sense of "being-ness" (ὅσια) when this is understood as ἐνέργεια. We have seen already how in the case of a being-that-is-moved its being-ness is conceived as the repose that comes after the movement is gathered up into a fullness within the being when it has reached the end of its movement (ἐντέλεσις). Now a being that has thus achieved a certain fullness of movement is a "work" (ἔργον). Its being-ness consists in its coming-to-presence, in its shining-forth in the radiance of some Idea as a work, in its "work-hood": ἐν-ἔργεια. "... ἔνεργεία, ἐντέλεσις δὲν says the very same thing as ἐν τῷ εἶδεν εἶναι..."  

The Being of beings (ὅσια) for Aristotle, then, consists in their ἐνέργεια. But in the fifth chapter of his tract on the Categories (V, 2 a π. ff.) Aristotle distinguishes a double sense according to which ὅσια can be understood: primarily it is to be taken as the concrete singular being in all of its individuality (v.g. this man); secondarily it may be taken to mean that refulgence itself by reason of which singular beings offer their visage to be seen as what they are (v.g. man as such). The primary sense connotes beings in terms of their that-ness (existence); the secondary sense suggests rather the what-ness (essence) of beings. But in each case the word signifies only a different manner in
which the presencing of a genuine being takes place. "That-ness and what-ness reveal themselves as ways in which [beings] come-to-presence, [but] the basic structure of this [process] is ἐνέργεια."

So far, so good. But when Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια is translated into the Latin actus or actualitas, there is a transformation in the meaning of it as well. Whereas Aristotle understood the ἐνέργεια (whose Being-structure is ἐνέργεια) as that which shines-forth and offers its visage to be seen, the Latins conceive it as something which is produced by work, as the result of a doing, as the result of activity:

... The essence of a “work” is no longer “work-hood” in the sense of the special process of coming-to-presence in the Free [Domain of the Open], but the “actuality” of the actual that is controlled by the activity of work. ...

The Being of beings, then, becomes conceived as their actuality, and a being can be genuinely a being only insofar as it is actual. Correlative notions, v.g. potentiality (in fact even the notion of necessity), would have to be understood in terms of actuality. At this point, it is easy – even natural – to conceive actuality as esse actu (existence), and to distinguish it from esse potencia understood in the sense of essence. Notice, however, that, whereas for Aristotle, according to Heidegger, essence and existence had been two different manners in which the Being-process (ἐνέργεια) comes-to-pass in beings, now, with the transformation of ἐνέργεια into actus, the Being-process comes to be interpreted in terms simply of existence alone.

But actuality (actus) implies activity (agere), and Heidegger finds a close correlation between Being-as-actuality and the notion of cause. This accounts for the importance of causality

20 "Daß-sein und Was-sein enthüllen sich als Weisen des Anwesens, dessen Grundzug die ἐνέργεια ist." (N, II, p. 407). To the extent that Aristotle, even in admitting as legitimate the secondary sense of ἐνέργεια, is always concerned with the concrete singular, he is closer to the original Greek experience (griechischer denkt), Heidegger claims, than Plato. See p. 409.


22 N, II, pp. 413, 415.

23 It remains true, however, that the translation of ἐνέργεια by existentia could have been quite legitimate if the latter had been understood more literally according to certain suggestions that Aristotle gives. See N, II, pp. 412-413, 416-417.
in the mediaeval problematic, he claims, both in terms of man and in terms of the Uncaused Cause, who is at the same time Pure Act and Sheer Existence (*Ipsum Esse*), sc. "Being" itself. \(^{24}\) Now the mediaeval philosopher is, of course, profoundly a man of faith, and this conception of Being-as-actuality, together with that of the Supreme Being as the Uncaused Cause of all finite actual beings, enables him to articulate in metaphysical language certain elements of doctrine, such as the creation of the world, that he already has accepted by faith. \(^{25}\)

But as Heidegger reads the evidence, there is still another way in which religious faith profoundly influenced the mediaeval mind. This is to be found in the slow metamorphosis of the conception of truth. For mediaeval man not only possesses what he considers to be the truth but this truth carries with it a certain guarantee, and guaranteed truth is what is meant by certitude.

The guarantee could be considered both as "supernatural" and as "natural." From the supernatural point of view, one could say that Supreme Actuality (Pure Act) has endowed man with a special kind of actuality, completely gratuitous, which is supernatural life, and which may be called in a general way "faith." Now the nature of faith demands that the believer accept not only the truths of salvation but the guarantee of these truths, hence certitude with regard to them, from revelation. So it is that, because of the certitude that the faith offers, the mediaeval thinker gradually begins to think of truth itself in terms of certitude. \(^{26}\)

The second guarantee of truth might be called a "natural" one. By this Heidegger means that mediaeval man has supreme confidence in the "natural light" (*lumen naturale*) which illuminates his mind in thinking about God and the rest of the created universe. Such confidence, rooted ultimately, of course, in the acceptance of God as the creating Cause, guarantees to mediaeval man the reliability of his thinking faculty and thus gives him

---

\(^{24}\) See N, II, pp. 413-416. For a brief discussion of Suarez’ contribution to the conception of existence in terms of cause, see N, II, pp. 418-419.

\(^{25}\) N, II, p. 414 (Glaubenshaltung). In explaining the importance of cause, Heidegger suggests a significant continuity between Plato’s conception of the Good as Source (alres: Ur-Sache) and the Thomistic notion of God, the Uncaused Cause, as *Summum Bonum*. Cf. PW, p. 40 and N, II, pp. 413-417.

\(^{26}\) See N, II, pp. 425-426.
that confidence in his possession of the truth that we call certitude. In more than one way, then, the notion of certitude colors the mediaeval conception of truth.

RÉSUMÉ

During the Middle Ages, Aristotle's ἐνέργεια, which for him still guarded traces of the original experience of Being as non-concealment, is translated by the Latin actus or actualitas, sc. that which is the result of some activity (agere) or work. Thus the Aristotelian sense of ἐνέργεια is completely lost. A genuine being is that which possesses esse actu, and Being itself comes to mean primarily existence.

Correlative with this development is an evolution of the problematic of cause, wherein the Uncaused Cause is conceived as Pure Actuality, Sheer Existence, Being itself. Such a metaphysics finds strong confirmation in religious faith. Since faith, too, can not only articulate truth (understood, of course in the sense of conformity) but guarantee it, mediaeval man begins to think of this guarantee as characteristic of truth as such and thus begins to conceive truth in terms of certitude. Enter Descartes.

---

87 Mediaeval scholars may have some questions to ask and perhaps a distinction or two to make with regard to this rather summary treatment of the scholastic period as an epoch of Being-as-history (Seinsgeschichte). One thing should be clear, however: that one must be extremely cautious in seeing a correlation between what Heidegger means by Being and any sense that the scholastics, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, gave to the term.
CHAPTER III

DESCARTES

A. THE ORIGIN OF SUBJECT-ISM

With the advent of modern times, the conception of both thought and Being is profoundly influenced once more by the conception of truth. Truth for Descartes is more than simply conformity between knower and known, it is a known conformity, sc. certitude. The Discourse on Method makes this abundantly clear. How this triggers a philosophy of subject-ism we can see best, perhaps, by formulating three propositions.

I. Descartes, by his effort to discover the fundamentum inconcussum veritatis, seeks to determine the absolutely primary subject of certitude for modern man.

By "modern man," we understand man as he begins to conceive himself with the advent of modern times. What characterizes him most properly, perhaps, is the vindication of his own liberty, whereby he makes his declaration of independence from the ties of faith that bound his mediaeval forefathers. The universe becomes for him, by and large, an anthropocentric rather than a theocentric one, or, as Heidegger expresses it, "... he frees himself unto himself. ..." This has momentous implications, of course, not least of all for the problem of truth.

1 "Modern times," in turn, are conceived as beginning with Descartes. This, as we state it, is something of a circle. The problem is far too complicated for us to discuss it here. It is thus that Heidegger conceives the matter, and this is no time to take issue with him.

For mediaeval man, as we saw that Heidegger maintains, received his certitudes, whether the teachings of dogma or the assurance of eternal life, from the faith. Once he chooses independence in the name of liberty, how is he to replace these vanished certitudes? It can be only in and through himself. "... This is possible only to the extent that self-liberating man guarantees for himself the certitude of the knowable. ..." The new liberty, then, must be a self-determination that is certain of itself and by itself. The ground of certitude must be self-certitude.

What does this imply? It means that man must decide for himself what for him is knowable, what is knowledge and what is certitude. It is the proper task of Descartes to elaborate the metaphysical ground of the new anthropocentric liberty by suggesting an answer to this triple question. The ground obviously must be itself certain. What is more, it must bear its own "credentials," justifying in itself the basic (sup)position that the freedom in question lies in self-certitude. Finally, it must ground other certitudes.

Now a certitude that grounds itself and other certitudes is obviously the fundamentum inconcussum veritatis. What is more important for us, though, is that it is also the sub-jectum of certitude. For sub-jectum (ὑπο-κεφαλή) is that which of itself underlies all modalities of any phenomenon. In this case, fundamentum and sub-jectum are one.

2. This he accomplishes with cogito ergo sum.

In what sense is the cogito this fundamentum (sub-jectum) inconcussum? In the first place, it is itself certain. Here, at least, knowing (sc. that "I am") is known to conform to known ("I
am"), for both knowing and known are simultaneously present to each other in and during the act of cogitation.

But the cogito also justifies the (sup)position of the newly declared freedom that certitude is grounded in and by man himself, sc. that it is self-certitude. In the first place, it implies a decision as to what is human knowing, for knowing, too, is included in the "thinking" of which Descartes speaks. Like "thinking," knowing too must be a process of proposing to itself what is known. "... Proposing is the pro-gressive, controlling process of objectivising...." Secondly, it implies a decision as to what is humanly knowable. For the sense of cogitare is expanded to include the whole gamut of man's relationships. The terms of these relationships are op-posed to him and therefore pro-posed by him, inasmuch as the relation is the pro-posing. The humanly knowable becomes understood as whatever could be a term of this pro-posing, therefore any "object." Finally, it implies a decision as to what is certitude. For it suggests that conformity of knowing to known can be gained by controlling at once both knower and known, hence by closely calculating (Rechnen) their correspondence, as, for example, the correspondence between pro-posing and pro-posed. Certitude, then, comes to be understood not only as truth that is guaranteed but as truth whose guarantee is an exact calculation.

How does it happen, now, that the cogito grounds all other certitudes? Insofar as it is not only a model but a condition for them! For one cannot think at all, sc. pro-pose an object to oneself unless one know oneself to exist as the self-proposer of what is pro-posed. This pro-posing of the self to the self by the self, which we normally call self-awareness or consciousness, is interior to a pro-posing of any kind that can be called "true." That is why the cogito is the fundamentum in concussum of all truth and for that very reason the subjectum of all certitude.

---

6... Vor-stellen ist vor-gehende, meisternde Ver-gegen-ständlichung...." (HW, p. 100).
3. And the presentative subject, as consciousness, determines the Being of beings.

Now Descartes is certainly not the first to recognize that any conscious act includes an awareness of the self which performs it. What is distinctively new with him is the fact that this self-awareness plays a decisive role in determining how the Being of beings in question, whether the one that pro-poses or the ones pro-posed, is conceived. For the "therefore" in the Cartesian formula does not signify that a conclusion is being drawn but serves simply as an expletive. As Heidegger reads it, the formula means: "I think - and of itself this means [or: and therein consists the fact] that - I am." Thus the Being of the pro-posing (or present-ative) self is considered precisely in terms of the function of pro-posing (or present-ing). Correspondingly, since the beings that the conscious self renders present are a correlate of this present-ative function, their Being, too, is considered in the same terms. "... The Being of that being which in the very process of present-ing [objects] to itself certifies [this self] is the measure of the Being of the [objects] presented, and, indeed, as such. ..." 11

We understand, then, how it happens that for Descartes consciousness becomes the domain within which all beings find their significance, for consciousness is "... the present-ative collocation of what is objective together with man who does the present-ing, both in a single compass of present-edness which man himself sustains. ..." 12 As far as Heidegger is concerned, the Cartesian formula says effectively that: "... the presentative function, which essentially is rendered present to itself [in self-consciousness], poses Being as present-edness. ..." 13

All beings "are," sc. have a meaning and "present-ness"

10 See N, II, p. 155 (Maßstabsrolle).
12 "... Diese ist die vorstellende Zusammenstellung des Gegenständigen mit dem vorstellenden Menschen im Umkreis der von diesem verwahrten Vorgestelltheit...." (HW, p. 162).
13 "... Der Satz sagt: das Vor-stellen, das sich selbst wesenhaft vor-gestellt ist, setzt das Sein als Vor-gestelltheit...." (N, II, p. 164).
(Präsenz),\textsuperscript{14} only insofar as they have a place within this compass of present-edness. So it is that every being is such only insofar as it is magnetized by this subject-object polarity: it is either an object or that-which-objectifies. This objectifying relates the being-as-object to the conscious ego, and in this relating the ego recognizes itself, at least implicitly, as lying at the basis of the relation, sc. as \textit{sub-ject}. The recognition takes place in a process of reflection. The reflection, sc. the reflecting ego, must be taken as the ground for the relation posed, sc. the (re)presentation of the object. "According to [its very] essence, representation is grounded in reflection. . . ."\textsuperscript{15} That is why the Being of beings is determined in terms of object-ness only with the new trend toward reflection that begins with Descartes.

Every being, then, is either object of a subject or "sub-ject" of a subject: in either case it is what it is only in reference to the self-conscious subject. This subject-reference of all beings whatsoever is henceforth designated "subject-ness" (\textit{Subjektität}) and constitutes the objectivity of objects as well as the subjectivity of subjects, sc. the Being of beings as such. Now "subject-ness" for Heidegger – and this is important – means something different from "subjectivity" (\textit{Subjektivität}). The latter word implies that the present-ative subject is the individual human ego, as we have seen to be the case with Descartes himself.\textsuperscript{16} But the present-ative subject need not necessarily be conceived in this way. All that subject-ism requires is that the human phenomenon pro-pose to itself the beings with which it deals. How the human phenomenon is interpreted, whether in terms of an individualism, collectivism, absolutism, etc., is for the present argument a matter of indifference. Strictly speaking, subject-ism in this radical sense has been latent ever since metaphysics began when Plato first conceived Being as something-to-be-seen by a someone-who-sees. With Descartes it only becomes explicit, but

\textsuperscript{14} Heidegger uses the word \textit{Präsenz}, as far as we can see, to designate that "presence" which a being has within the compass of the subject-object relationship, as distinguished from "presence" in his own sense as emergence-into-non-concealment. To avoid confusion, we reserve "presence" for the Heideggerian sense of \textit{Anwesenheit} (though sometimes, especially in the Hegel analysis, he uses even this word very broadly) and translate \textit{Präsenz} by "present-ness" (that by which a being-as-object is present to a subject). See HW, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{15} "Dem Wesen nach gründet die repraesentatio in der reflexio. . . ." (VA, p. 85).

\textsuperscript{16} "Dem Wesen nach gründet die repraesentatio in der reflexio. . . ." (VA, p. 85).
the explicitation is important enough to give man himself a new 
status in metaphysics: he no longer thinks of himself as a 
"creature"; now he is a sub-ject. As far as Heidegger is 
concerned, subject-ism is the decisive characteristic of all modern 
philosophy and reaches its consummation in Nietzsche.17

B. CONSEQUENCES OF SUBJECT-ISM

We understand, then, what the author takes to be the entire 
difference between mediaeval and modern man. For the former, 
all beings were interpreted in terms of their relation to a creating 
God, and man himself had only a privileged place among the 
rest of creatures. With the rise of subject-ism, however, man 
himself – not God – becomes the point of reference in terms of 
which beings have sense and meaning. The import of this is far-
reaching. For example:

1. The "world" becomes a "picture" (Weltbild).

The world is conceived as the ensemble of beings pro-posed to 
man-as-subject, which, like a picture, he can behold. Op-posed 
to man and pro-posed by him, the world has its sense only with 
regard to him, and his task is to conquer it, to reduce it to sub-
mission. "The fundamental movement of modern times consists 
in conquering the world-as-picture. . . ." 18 Beings are submitted 
more and more to man's control, made victims of his calculations, 
his designs, his cultivation. Scientific research becomes an indis-
pensable form of the general conquest.19 This is the drive of 
technicity, whose origin may be found in Descartes.

2. Philosophical anthropology is born.

By "anthropology," Heidegger means that philosophical 
analysis " . . . which explains and evaluates the whole ensemble

17 N, II, p. 452; HW, pp. 236, 242. What differentiates the various modern philo-
sophers from Descartes and from each other, according to Heidegger, is simply the 
manor of conceiving the subject, whether in terms of monads (Leibniz), the trans-
cendental ego (Kant), the infinite Ego (Fichte), Absolute Spirit (Hegel), Freedom 
(Schelling), etc. See HW, pp. 101, 85, 91, 102.
18 "Der Grundvorgang der Neuzeit ist die Eroberung der Welt als Bild . . . ." 
(HW, p. 87). Cl. HW, p. 82 (Weltbild).
19 HW, p. 87 (Berechnung, Planung, Züchtung).
of beings by taking man as both starting point and center of reference," sc. as subject.\textsuperscript{20} It is no accident, then, that "humanism" comes in the wake of the new subject-ism, he claims, for "humanism" can pretend to be nothing more than the moral and aesthetic dimensions of anthropology. The eighteenth-century quest for a \textit{Weltanschauung} is likewise consequential, for what else can one expect, once the "world" has become a picture, than that man should seek a way-of-looking-at-it, sc. a world-view? Coming to the nineteenth century, we find the emphasis placed upon a philosophy of "Life-force," but the basic pattern is still the same. A being attains status as a being only to the extent that it is absorbed in some way or other into man's life, sc. becomes a living-experience. In all this struggle of man to find for himself a place in the world, he is locked within the circle that he himself describes, for he continues to conceive of himself as a sub-ject. And the only weapons at his disposal to win for himself a \textit{Weltanschauung} that would satisfy serve to confirm him all the more in the very subject-ism from which he suffers, sc. his own calculation and endeavor. It is in such a favorable climate as this that science in the sense of "research" burgeons and technicity comes to full flower.\textsuperscript{21}

3. \textit{Man begins to seek "values."}

When beings become objects-of-presentation, their Being becomes mere objectiveness, and Being itself, as the process of emergent truth, is lost to thought. Man compensates for this by ascribing "value" to beings in such a way that it is the "value" that becomes the goal of all intercourse with beings. Soon this intercourse is understood as "culture," the "values" as "cultural values," the goal of all human creativity, which, in turn, is placed at the service of man himself in achieving self-certitude as a subject. From here, it is not a very far step to reduce "values" themselves to the level of mere objects, sc. present-ed

\textsuperscript{20} "... die vom Menschen aus und auf den Menschen zu das Seiende im Ganzen erklärt und abschätzt." (HW, p. 86).

\textsuperscript{21} Obviously, there can be no such thing as an anthropology or a \textit{Weltanschauung} that in any proper sense can be called either Greek or Christian (HW, pp. 86-87). As far as Heidegger is concerned, part of the emptiness of nihilism has been that Christianity has made itself precisely that (HW, p. 70). See HW, pp. 86 (Er-lebnis), 87, 88 (technicity).
by man himself as the goals necessary to sustain his own activity in establishing his place in the world-as-picture. At this point, they become as feeble and shallow as the mere objectiveness that they mask. Thus begins to toll the death-knell that one day Nietzsche will hear.

C. POST-CARTESIAN SUBJECT-ISM

I. Leibniz

It was only to be expected that Descartes' conception of subject-as-consciousness would be precisied according to characteristic modes of conscious activity, such as perception, appetition, etc., and Leibniz soon takes the inevitable step. But he takes another step as well, for he so expands the notion of subject that it can apply not only to man but to any being whatsoever in which the process of pro-posing comes-to-pass. "... Since Leibniz, beings come-to-appearance in such a way that every ens qua ens is a res cogitans and in this sense a subject. ..." 23

For Leibniz, every monad is a subject, for it pro-poses to itself in the manner of perceptio and appetitus operations that constitute the essence of life itself. But it is not necessary that this be a conscious life in the sense of an individual conscious ego. Perceptio is understood in a broad, indeed metaphysical, sense, for it signifies any interiorly spontaneous expression or representation of the universe, even if this be in the form of a correspondence with the universe of a purely structural, therefore non-conscious, order. The appetitus, on the other hand, is the tendency of the monad to pass from one perception to another in the quest of more and more adequate (sc. clear and distinct) perception of the universe. Both are types of presentation, of pro-posing: perceptio pro-poses, sc. (re)presents, the universe; appetitus pro-poses the perfection of life toward which the monad strives. Both are profoundly unified in a single dynamism. Here we have the Cartesian conception of a pro-

22 HW, p. 94.
23 "... Das Seiende aber erscheint seit Leibniz dergestalt für das Denken, daß jedes ens qua ens eine res cogitans und in diesem Sinne Subjekt ist..." (HW, p. 122). Heidegger's italics. The author's most detailed treatment of Leibniz will be found in N, II, pp. 436-450.
posing subject expanded to the whole universe of beings. Remark, too, although we cannot go further into the matter here, that Leibniz' conception of truth-as-conformity is not independent of his monadology. 24

But these remarks see Leibniz in relation to Descartes. Heidegger sees him, too, as having a special affinity with Nietzsche, for the Nietzschean Becoming (Werden) corresponds, he claims, to the movements that Leibniz calls in the Monadologie (II) the changements naturels which permeate ens qua ens, sc. ens perci-

piens et appetens. 25 The precise point of contact between the two can be seen in the correlation of Will-unto-Power with ens qua appetens, for in meditating appetition, Leibniz is the first to discern the Being of beings as essentially a willing, even where the willing does not reach the level of consciousness in a human ego. Nietzsche's Becoming can be called "Will," then, because in its essence it is an appetitus. Every appetitus, however, presents to itself that for which it is an appetite. If every being is appetitive, sc. determined by a drive to come forth, to manifest itself and to achieve thus its fullness, then every being proposes, or poses (setzt), for itself that toward which it tends. In (pro)posing thus, the being "sees" the direction of its progress. What is seen is an "aspect" (Gesichtspunkt), therefore an object, of its vision. 26 How this will be transposed into Nietzschean terms we shall see subsequently.

2. Leibniz to Hegel

The evolution from Leibniz to Nietzsche is slow, but its direction can be discerned clearly. With Kant, as we know, metaphysics becomes transcendental philosophy, which in turn evolves into a theory of knowledge. For since, after Descartes, the being-ness of beings-to-be-known consists in their object-

ness, the function of transcendental philosophy is to interrogate the conditions which render it possible for beings to be objects

24 See HW, p. 226.
25 HW, p. 212.
26 HW, pp. 212 (changements naturels), 226 (das Willenswesen des Seins des Seienden), 211 (Gesichtspunkt). N.B. That toward which the being "tends" need not (and in Nietzsche's case, at least, should not) be considered as its "purpose." See VA, pp. 88–89.
for a subject. This is tantamount to investigating the conditions by which objects can be known, hence a θεωρία of (meditation upon) knowledge. But "theory of knowledge," or even "metaphysics of knowledge," is a term that easily misleads. "... In truth, [Kant] is concerned with a metaphysics of objects, sc. of beings-as-object, of objects for a subject." 27

Furthermore, we know that this metaphysics of objects, once the first critique has thrown light upon the inadequacy of pure reason to ground it, evolves into a metaphysics of will, sc. of practical reason. Fichte carries the philosophy of willing still further than Kant. As for Schelling, whatever his later evolution, at least in the early years he can write (1809) "... in the last and highest instance, there is absolutely no other Being than willing. ..." 28 Hegel is for Heidegger the culminating point of modern subject-ism, if, that is, we may distinguish between culmination and consummation (Nietzsche). As a matter of fact, the one introduces the other. For Hegel, too, the metaphysics of Absolute Knowing (Wissens) is also a philosophy of Spirit-as-Will. But Hegel warrants a chapter all his own.

Résumé

When with Descartes truth becomes certitude, only that is true which can be verified in a manner analogous to the knowing subject's certitude of itself, sc. by guaranteeing the conformity between presentation and presented. All beings have sense, then, sc. "are," only in terms of the subject-object relationship, and the Being-process as emergence-into-truth (non-concealment) is profoundly forgotten.

27 "... In Wahrheit handelt es sich um die Metaphysik des Gegenstandes, d. h. des Seienden als des Gegenstandes, des Objekts für ein Subjekt." (VA, p. 75).
28 "... Es gibt in der letzten und höchsten Instanz gar kein andres Seyn als Wollen...." (F. W. J. Schelling's philosophische Schriften, I. Bd., Landshut 1809, S. 429, cited VA, p. 113). See also VA, pp. 89 (Kant), 114 (Fichte), 76 (Hegel) and WD, pp. 35-36.
CHAPTER IV

HEGEL

I. The Argument

A. ABSOLUTE AWARENESS

Perhaps the simplest access for us to Heidegger's interpretation of the Hegelian Absolute is to reflect for a moment upon a text uttered by Hegel in one of his lectures on the history of philosophy (WW XV, 328). After speaking of Bacon and Böhme, he continues:

Now we come for the first time properly speaking to the philosophy of the new world and begin with Descartes. With him we enter upon a philosophy that stands on its own feet, a philosophy which knows that it comes independently from reason, and that self-consciousness is an essential moment of the true. Here we can say that we are at home, and, as sailors after a long voyage upon stormy seas, we can cry 'land'. . . . In this new period, the [fundamental] principle is thought, thinking that proceeds from itself. . . .

For Hegel, Descartes' discovery of the subjective constituted a new beginning for philosophy. We recall from the previous chapter how Descartes had sought a philosophy which stands on its own feet, a fundamentum (sub-jectum) inconcussum (absolutum) veritatis. Yet Descartes never fully explained the absolute character of the certitude (ego-cogito-sum) at which he

arrived. "... The absoluteness of this absolute [*fundamentum*] is neither doubted, nor interrogated, nor even in its essentials so much as mentioned...." 2 Heir to the medieval tradition, Descartes still took the ego to be a "creature," and he felt compelled to ground the absoluteness of its certitude by going through what Heidegger calls a "back door," sc. by first proving the existence of a creating God.3 But was this not effectively to abrogate the declaration of independence with which he had begun?

The most that can be said for the Cartesian achievement is that, having once engaged himself in the search for an absolute knowing, Descartes succeeded in discovering the type of presentation that admits of absolute knowing, sc. consciousness of the self. Since truth means certitude, he saw that self-consciousness plays an essential rôle in attaining the true. After him, Kant explored the nature and limitations of consciousness, but it is left to Hegel to probe the absoluteness of this knowing, the Absolute as such. Heidegger sustains the Hegelian metaphor by saying that, if Descartes sighted new land, Hegel takes full possession of it.4

Taking possession of the new land consists in exploring the absolute character of knowing (*Wissen*). Yet how are we to understand the term "absolute"? Heidegger returns to the word’s Latin origin (*ab-solvere*) to give it the radical sense of that which has been "loosened," therefore released from another, whose bonds of dependence upon the other are dis-(sc. ab-)solved. In terms of the Hegelian problematic, from what is "absolute" Knowing released? From dependence upon objects in assuring itself of its truth.

The plausibility of such a conception is clear enough, if we recall the conception of truth that came into philosophy with Descartes. As long as truth was conformity of knowing to known, the object played an indispensable rôle in it, for the knowing subject depended on its object in order to be true. But once truth is conceived as certitude, then the focal point of concern becomes the knowing itself which verifies itself to itself

---

2 "... Aber die Absolutheit dieses Absoluten wird weder bezweifelt, noch befragt, noch auch nur in ihrem Wesen genannt...." (HW, p. 139).
3 HW, p. 123 (Hintertür eines Gottesbeweises).
4 HW, pp. 118 (Kant), 118, 121 (Besitz).
and for itself. In order to be true, the knowing depends not only on its object but on its own assurance of itself. Thereby the knowing is loosened (ab-solved) from its complete dependence upon the object in the process of truth. The more we explore the nature of self-assurance, the more the object, if it remains part of the process at all, becomes a matter of indifference. To the extent that knowing is released from dependence on the presentation of objects and becomes more aware of itself as knowing, the knowing becomes absolute.

We may distinguish three aspects of the process: absolvence, sc. the general tendency of knowing to release itself from dependence on objects; absolving, sc. this tendency in its dynamism, striving to make the release from objects complete; absolution, the actual freedom from objects that is thus achieved in the process of knowing. The distinction is Heidegger’s, not Hegel’s, and its value is only expository. Heidegger claims “... it is the unity of absolvence (releasing from the relation [to an object]), absolving (the completeness of this releasing) and absolution (liberation by reason of this completeness) that characterizes the absoluteness of the Absolute. ...” 5 How successive absolvence in the coming-to-pass of Absolute Knowing proceeds, beginning with the spontaneous certitude of the sense order and continuing through sense-perception, understanding and the unconditioned Self-awareness of Reason (Spirit) – this it is the principal function of the Phenomenology of the Spirit to elucidate.

Such is the genuine sense, according to Heidegger, of the “absolute” in Knowing, of Knowing as Absolute: the dissolution of dependence on objects in Knowing’s knowing of itself. If we recall that, for Hegel, Knowing (Wissen) and Being-aware (Be-wußtsein) are but one, 6 it is perfectly understandable how the search for Absolute Knowing is elaborated in terms of Being-aware and Being-self-aware.

Before we proceed, however, we must add two explications to the interpretations of “absolute,” not mentioned as such by the author, but having their warrant in the text. In the first

5 “... Die Einheit von Absolvenz (Loslösung aus der Relation), Absolvieren (Vollständigkeit des Loslösens) und Absolution (Freispruch aus der Vollständigkeit) kennzeichnen die Absolutheit des Absoluten...” (HW, p. 125).
6 HW, p. 133 (Selbe).
place, Knowing that is absolved from dependence is not conditioned by objects. Whatever conditions are imposed upon it are imposed by its own nature. Absolute Knowing is therefore unconditioned; unconditioned Absolute Knowing is absolved from dependence on objects. Further, there is a sense – and this is essential to comprehending speculative thought – in which we must say that it is absolved, sc. prescinds, from the individual human ego. For what is essential to the process of knowing is simply knower and known, subject and that which the subject presents to itself. Knowing subject comes-to-presence as subject by reason of its relation to an object which comports also a relation to the subject, for subject presents the object to itself. Since Leibniz, however, it is possible to conceive this subject-object-subject relationship as characteristic of the Being of beings as such, without restricting it to the conscious psychological process of any given human individual. In this sense (though only in this sense), unconditioned Knowing must be said to be absolved from dependence upon the individual human ego. Hence it is an essential way in which Knowing is absolute. "Unconditioned Self-knowing is, as the subject-ness of the subject, the absolute-ness of the Absolute. . ."?

Let us admit quite readily, however, that this last remark opens up a problem rather than solves one, for there is a relationship, indeed an essential one, between the Absolute and human individuals, which will enable us to say that the Absolute could not shine-forth as itself without them. In fact, it will be the function of the entire *Phenomenology of the Spirit* to discern this relationship. We shall return to the matter presently. For the moment, however, we must be content with this tentative description of the nature of Absolute Knowing, of the Absolute as Knowing, of Knowing as Absolute, insisting again that unconditioned Self-Knowing is not only the subject-ness of the Subject but the absolute-ness of the Absolute. "The absolute-ness of the Absolute, the absolvent, absorbing absolution, is the effort of self-seizure in unconditioned self-certitude. . ."?

8 "Die Absolutheit des Absoluten, die absolvirt sich absolvirende Absolution, ist die Arbeit des Sichbegreifens der unbedingten Selbstgewißheit..." (HW, p. 127). "Self-seizure" (Sichbegreifen) suggests already the sense in which Hegel will understand "concept" (Begriff).
I. Knowing as Presence

To know is to be aware, sc. self-aware. To the extent that Knowing knows itself, it is a self-knowing, it is to be self-aware, it is self-awareness. Whether we speak in terms of knowing or of awareness, the problem is the same. When we say that knowing and awareness are equivalent, it is more precise, perhaps, to say that to know is to be (-sein) aware (Bewußt-) in the sense of to be in the state of having-come-to-know, where the state of knowing is the condition in which a knowing subject is.

We must understand the meaning of "to know." Heidegger returns to the Indo-Germanic form of vid to see a correlation between the Latin vidi and the German Wissen which permits him to interpret the fundamental meaning of Wissen as "to-have-seen." To see, however, is to render-present; what has been seen is present to the seer because rendered-present by the process of seeing. In this case the sense of "to see" is broadened out to include any type of present-ation, so that the knowing of Hegel, like the thinking (cogitare) of Descartes, embraces any process by which the subject renders-present to itself, whether this be of the sensible, rational, volitional or affective order. To know, then, is to-have-seen, to-have-rendered-present.9

We are concerned, however, with Absolute Knowing (presentation). Who is it in this case that presents? Clearly the Absolute itself as present-ative Subject. But what is it that is present-ed? Not any particular object, for we are dealing with Absolute Knowing, in precision (absolution) from particular objects. What is present-ed can be only present-edness as such.10 Now present-edness as such is, to be sure, a "presence," but the presence of what is rendered-present (or re-presented) by, to and for the Absolute Subject. Being-aware, then, considered as Absolute, means to be in the state of having rendered present present-edness as such. "... Conscientia is a gathering together into Presence, [but] in the manner of Presence of something represented. ..." 11

9 HW, p. 133.
10 HW, p. 134 (in Zustand der Vorgestelltheit).
11 "... Die conscientia ist die Versammlung in die Anwesenheit von der Art der Präsenz des Repräsentierten..." (HW, p. 133).
So it is, then, that "... present-ation is the fundamental characteristic of Knowing in the sense of Self-awareness of the [Absolute] Subject. Presentation is an essential form of Presence (prăpouota). ..." 12 In other words, present-ation characterizes the Being of the Absolute Subject as such, whose Being "... is Presence [if only] in the manner of representation. ..." 13

Awareness, therefore, means gathering together into Presence, but the Presence of present-edness. For reasons of clarity, we call this represented Presence "present-ness," but the author himself is often content to call it by a term proper to himself, sc. "Presence" (Anwesenheit), and gives it, besides, the Greek term παρουσία. But we must always understand this as the presence of present-ation.

2. Presence as Shining-forth

From all this follows an important consequence. If the Being of the Absolute Subject is that of an Absolute Present-ation, then it is the most elemental characteristic of this Subject to make manifest (because present-ation is manifest-ation) itself (because Absolute). Self-manifestation is a coming-to-appearance, a shining-forth (Erscheinen). "... To shine-forth ... means: to come-to-presence in the full effulgence of a representation that renders itself present. The shining-forth is, properly speaking, the coming-to-presence itself, the παρουσία of the Absolute. ..." 14 Shining-forth in Absolute Present-ation, then, is the manner in which Absolute Awareness itself comes-to-presence. The shining-forth is simply the way in which this coming-to-presence (παρουσία) announces itself. "... Awareness as such is in itself that which comes-to-appearance. ..." 15 This permits us to say that since unconditioned Self-knowing (therefore Awareness) constitutes the subject-ness of the Subject, sc. its Being, then

14 "... Das Erscheinen aus diesem Scheinen des Strahls bedeutet: Anwesen im vollen Glanz der sich präsentierenden Präsentation. Das Erscheinen ist das eigentliche Anwesen selber: die Parusie des Absoluten...." (HW, p. 130).
15 "... Das Bewußtsein ist als solches in sich das Erscheinende...." (HW, p. 134).
the Being of the Absolute Subject consists in Shining-forth as such.

3. Shining-forth and παρουσία

Our meditation has taken us from Absolute Knowing to Awareness as Absolute Present-ation in the guise of a Shining-forth as παρουσία. To be παρουσία and to come-to-presence belong to the very nature of Absolute Awareness. If the stem ςις be taken to signify the being-ness of Absolute Awareness, the prefix παρ- suggests an essential correlate. For this shining-forth does not take place by itself but "by us," sc. "by the side of us," therefore by, through and in us, in union with us (humans). Furthermore, this coming-to-presence in union with men is necessary to the Absolute. "... This coming-to-presence in conjunction with us (παρουσία) belongs to the Absolute in and for itself. . . ." 16 Two remarks are in order:

a. The Absolute as Will — The παρουσία (the coming-to-presence of the Absolute in conjunction with men) is necessary to the Absolute, and with a necessity of its nature. This necessity of nature in the Absolute is expressed as "Will," by which is meant simply the absolute-ness itself of the Absolute, but considered as dynamic compulsion, taking itself into its own hands by gathering itself into the fullness of its own nature, thus achieving the full coming-to-presence of itself. This Will is absolutely efficacious and the process of execution is an irresistible power that knows no rest until the παρουσία is completely achieved. In the simplest terms, the Absolute conceived as Will is simply the dynamic necessity of the Absolute to be itself, therefore to achieve the process of Absolute Self-awareness through παρουσία, sc. by shining-forth with and in men. Without men, the Absolute would be prisoner of its own solitude, unable to emerge into the truth of itself. 17

16 "... Dieses Bei-uns-an-wesen, die Parusie, gehört zum Absoluten an und für sich...." (HW, p. 120).
17 HW, pp. 124, 125, 149, 177, 187 (Wille), 187 (Sich-zusammen-nehmen), 175 (anwesend), 148 (Walten der Unruhe), 177 (Notwendigkeit), 187-188 (wäre Einsam).
b. The Absolute as Antecedence – Absolute Awareness comes-to-presence in men. This is its παρουσία. Hence the futility of trying to conceive it as "outside" of men, and human knowing as a means to attain the Absolute, as if the Absolute were on one side and the human knower on the other. An "Absolute" that is on "one side," separated from man by an intermediary, would be no Absolute at all. For as παρουσία, it is already coming-to-presence in-by-through man. In fact, this presence-with-man is itself the light which illumines man and renders it possible for him to discern the Absolute. Human knowing of the Absolute, on the other hand, means standing forth in this light, as if knowing were a point where these rays are returned or re-reflect upon themselves, so that this point of reversion, which is human knowing, finds in the radiance of the παρουσία the source of its own Being. Man's task is not to attain the Absolute but, already interior to it, simply to elucidate his relationship to it.18

To have realized that in order to meditate the Absolute he must begin in absolute fashion, sc. to the extent of the possible he must "re-construct" a fundamental structure that already exists – this is one of Hegel's master strokes.19 But it also accounts for the special difficulty of Phenomenology of the Spirit for the ordinary reader, whose "natural" thought processes, orientated toward objects, do not permit him to thematize the Absolute. It also explains why Heidegger can claim that the so-called "Introduction" to the Phenomenology (nos. 1-16) is in fact a misnomer, simply because there can be no introduction into the παρουσία, which from the very first moment holds sway. Finally, it explains why any analysis of παρουσία is necessarily circular in structure. "What is true is the Whole ...;" at every moment the whole of Hegel's thought is contained in any particular enunciation of it.20 The affinity with Heidegger's own conception of the "hermeneutic circle" is apparent. But it makes exposition

18 HW, p. 123 (in keinem Fall Absolute), 120 (schon die Weise, Strahl des Lichtes), 126-127 (innerhalb der Parusie).
19 HW, pp. 139 (mit Absolutheit beginnt), 189 (schon in Parusie).
20 "Das Wahre ist das Ganze...." (G. W. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hofmeister [Hamburg: Meiner, 1952], p. 21). We know, for example, that when Hegel comes to formulate the System in its completeness in the Enzyklopädie, Logik precedes the Phänomenologie, for it is, after all, the more absolute of the two.
difficult, and we must be content to proceed in concentric circles.

Let this suffice for a tentative delineation of the nature of the Hegelian Absolute: it is an Absolute Knowing (Awareness), whose Being consists in a Shining-forth that must take place in-by-with-through man, already somehow manifest to him before he begins to thematize it. Our task now is to discern more precisely the process of thematization.

B. THE EXPERIENCE OF ABSOLUTE AWARENESS

1. Experience in General Terms

The specific focus of Heidegger's Hegel-analysis is not so much Absolute Awareness as rather the rôle of Experience (Erfahrung) in its coming-to-presence-with-man. Because we must proceed in concentric fashion, let us first state the whole of the thesis in general terms, so that we may then discern more readily what is true in the necessarily partial examination of details.

Quite simply, Experience for Hegel is not some act of human cognition, but it designates the entire process by which (already) Absolute Knowing comes to know itself as absolute. Since Knowing is Awareness and the essence of Awareness is to shine-forth in conjunction with man, Experience is the process by which Awareness in its παρουσία successively absolves itself from dependence on objects by gradually realizing its own rôle in the constitution of these objects, thereby becoming more and more aware of its Self, sc. Absolute (because completely ab-solved) Self-awareness.

More precisely, Awareness is always that process by which the knowing subject presents an object to itself. Now the object (as such) is present to the subject only by reason of the present-ing process that proceeds from the subject, but initially, and according to the "natural" way of looking at things for ordinary common sense, the knowing subject does not advert to this. The subject presumes that the object is completely autonomous, existing in itself (an sich). It is not known as an object, sc. as

21 HW, p. 166 (Erkennen).
opposed to the subject, for the initial naiveté does not permit even that much sophistication. But the fact is that as an object it can exist only for present-ative Awareness (für es). What we have called absolvence consists in the process by which Awareness becomes aware of this fact, sc. recognizes the cleavage within itself that permits it to consider the object as “other” than itself, yet nevertheless for itself by reason of a still more profound unity that combines the two. At this moment the object is known “in and for itself” (an und für sich).

This is the moment, properly speaking, when absolvence takes place, for here Awareness absolves itself from dependence upon the object and comes to know itself better, sc. it becomes more absolute than before. As the process continues, the absolute-ness becomes more and more complete. Awareness comes to be aware of itself as absolute. We can discern a double aspect in absolvence: negative, by which Awareness frees itself from its initial conception of the true and therefore becomes other than it was; positive, by which in becoming other than it was it comes gradually to the realization of itself, sc. Self-awareness.

This process of Self-absolvence is what Hegel means by Experience. Who has the Experience? Awareness itself, sc. the Knowing Subject. In the phrase “Experience of Awareness,” the genitive is “subjective” more than it is “objective.” If it is “objective,” too, the reason is that the Absolute Subject has the Experience of itself. The genitive is “objective” only because it is “subjective,” because the Subject in question is Absolute. Now let us examine all this more in detail.

2. Three Principles of Awareness

Heidegger disengages from the Hegelian text three “principles” that govern the process of absolvence: I. “Awareness is for itself its own concept.” II. “Awareness supplies of itself its own norm.” III. “Awareness puts itself to the test.”
These principles polarize the argument nicely, so we examine them in turn.

a. Principle I: "Awareness is for itself its own concept." We know already that the absolute-ness of the Absolute consists in the process by which it seizes itself in unconditional (Self-)certitude. This process is a Self-seizure that is, after all, an Absolute Knowing, and Hegel calls it by a term that is congruous with the entire context that knowing comports, sc. "concept."

To understand the full import of this we must meditate the distinction which Hegel himself makes between concept as (Self-)“seizure” and a “mere concept” ("nur Begriff"). The distinction derives from the difference between concrete and abstract knowing, but these terms understood in the Hegelian sense. For Hegel, that is “abstract” which is in any way one-sided or incomplete; that knowing is “concrete” which knows the known completely. Knowing is abstract to the extent that it is relative, sc. dependent on its object. It is concrete to the extent that it is absolved from this dependence and knows itself as constituting the knowability of the object, sc. becomes absolute. Now according to the language of traditional logic, that type of knowing which seizes its object abstractly (universally) is called a “concept” (Begriff). Hegel accepts the term, but insists that, to the extent that it remains abstract, the knowing is relative, sc. it is a “mere concept,” hence not yet a completely authentic seizure of the known because not yet a seizure of it in all its knowability. When the knowing seizes the known authentically, comprehending it as constituted by the Knowing Subject, then the knowing is concrete and absolute, simply because it is an adequate seizure of itself.

It is only at this point that one may say that the knowing knows the known with “unconditioned certitude,” for the certitude consists in the fact that the “what” of the known and the "how" of the knower are conjoined in the absolute unity of unconditioned Knowing as such. In any case, the Knower has an adequate seizure of the known simply because it achieves unconditioned seizure of itself:
... "Seizure" means now: the process by which Awareness shines-forth unto itself in truth. Its essence consists in unconditioned certitude. In these terms, an [object-] known is not yet seized when it is merely presented in a general way [sc. abstractly]. Much rather must the known in its known-ness be referred back to the corresponding process of knowing and be presented in relation to [this process] itself. Only thus is the known [seized] from every side [by] the process of knowing which has thereby ... become at once both comprehensive and unconditioned. . . .

We are in a position now to understand the important distinction between "real" and "natural" Knowing. For Hegel, that is real which is true (Wahre) and that is true which is certain, sc. known with certainty. From what we have seen above, it is clear that the being that is known with certainty is comprehended in that by which it is known, therefore in its being-ness as a known, sc. as a coming-to-presence (therefore deriving its Being) in and through the process of Knowing. Knowing is "real," then, when it knows the known in that by which it is real, sc. in its reality, its Being:

... Real knowing is that knowing which renders present in any given case and everywhere a being in its being-ness (reality), that which comes-to-appear in that-by-which-it-appears. A knowing of the reality of the real is for this reason called real knowing. . . .

We infer, then, that Knowing is real when it is an authentic seizure (concept) of the known, sc. as such, in its Being.

Opposed to real Knowing is non-real knowing. This does not mean that it is no knowing at all, but only that it does not know the real as real (sc. in that by which it is real, as such, in its Being). It is called "natural" knowing. This knowing "hangs upon," therefore depends upon (hence relative, non-absolute), the superficies of the object and does not penetrate clearly to that dimension in the being by reason of which it is (known),


16 "... Das reale Wissen ist das Wissen, das jeweils und überall das Seiende in seiner Seiendheit (Realität), das Erscheine in seinem Erscheinen, vorstellt. Das Wissen der Realität des Seienden heißt darum das reale Wissen...." (HW, p. 138).
Spontaneously it takes the \textit{superficies} of the beings it encounters as the only dimension in them, confidently holds this to be the "true" being, and any explanation of the being that is offered is always in terms of this \textit{superficies}, never of what is "behind" it.\footnote{\textit{HW}, pp. 144 (Einseitigkeit), 137 (Meinen), 160, 164 (Dahinter).}

Yet this does not mean that natural knowing has no cognizance of the Being-dimension of beings whatsoever. If this were the case, it could not know beings at all. But it does not advert to this knowledge. This leaves natural knowing in a condition of ambiguity: on the one hand it knows Being; on the other hand it does not know Being because it does not know its own knowing, sc. itself. It presents Being only in general, hence knows the objectiveness of the object (the reality of the real, the Being of the beings-encountered) only abstractly, implicitly, non-absolutely, never as such.\footnote{\textit{HW}, pp. 136 (achtet nicht), 160 ("als").}

This situation of ambiguity Heidegger describes in a language admittedly his own and with all the necessary reserves. Natural knowing that clings to the superficial dimension of the beings it meets, taking them for beings and nothing more (in Hegelian terms, "objects" that are "real" or "actual") – this Heidegger now calls "ontic" knowing. On the other hand, Knowing that gathers (\laey\zeta\nu) beings (\delta\ve) together in terms of what makes them to be such, therefore seizes them in their objectiveness, reality and actuality, sc. as what they are (in their Being) – this is "ontological" Knowing. When this ontological Knowing is possessed but not adverted to, it is called pre-ontological. Awareness in the condition of natural knowing is simultaneously ontic and pre-ontological.

Now the whole process of absolvence consists in the passage from the initial condition of natural knowing to the state of real Knowing, from ontic-preontological to ontological Awareness (of the objectiveness, reality, actuality — hence Being) of the known, sc. to the Awareness of itself as absolute. It is in Self-awareness thus achieved that the authentic seizure (concept) of the known consists. We interpret the first principle of Awareness to mean, then, that what Awareness grasps, when it seizures the
known in its Being, is itself. Two supplementary remarks are in order.

Firstly, it is clear from all we have seen that Awareness "itself" is neither natural (ontic-preontological) nor real (ontological) Awareness, nor, for that matter, a coupling of the two. Rather it is the original unity of both. Furthermore, as the original unity out of which both natural and real knowing arise, Awareness itself is also the differentiation between the two. When Awareness shines-forth as itself, this unity and differentiation appear. "... [Awareness itself] is neither mere natural Awareness in itself, nor mere real Awareness for itself, but the antecedent and original unity that is in and for itself. ..." 29

Secondly, the progress of Awareness as such from the ontic to the ontological condition is a passage, sc. it must make its way (Weg) from one to another. Of necessity it means being-under-way (Be-weg-ung), sc. a movement. It is a coming-and-going: the Being of the known comes-to-light; simultaneously, the known itself, insofar as in the state of natural knowing it appeared as true, "goes away," sc. is seen in a new light. The differentiating unity, then, is dynamic. "... This coming-and-going that is unified within itself is the movement by which Awareness itself is. ..." 30 This movement is the steady advance forward toward ever more luminous Self-awareness. But at any given moment it is always particularized in some form of presentation, the succession of these forms constituting the history of Awareness, sc. the history of its "formation" by which it slowly "becomes" itself in truth, sc. Self-awareness. These forms are successive moments in which Awareness seizes itself. This gives Heidegger warrant to say that in the first of the three principles of Awareness ("Awareness is for itself its own [Self-] seizure") the emphasis falls on "is." The sense is that Awareness achieves for itself its own shining-forth in itself, and, indeed, in such a way that in this shining-forth of Self it establishes the domain wherein that shining-forth takes place which is proper to its own...
b. **Principle II: “Awareness supplies for itself its own norm.”** The second “principle” that governs the process of Absolute Awareness finds its sense in terms of what we have said already about the absolute-ness of Knowing. Because the Knowing with which we are dealing is absolute, it is impossible to speak of human knowing as a “means” by which we attain the Absolute conceived as an object, a means which, like any other means, can be examined critically and put to the test (*Prüfen*). Absolute Knowing is in some way prior to human knowing and interior to it. This is the sense of παρουσία. But then the question arises: in what way is human knowing a “way” to Absolute Knowing as the process by which Awareness comes to an adequate seizure of itself? Progress of such a type implies Self-discovery that would be impossible if Knowing were not put to the test. Even in Absolute Knowing, then, there must be a testing. But what is its nature? By what standard, or norm, is it conducted? The second and third principles of Awareness deal with these questions. Principle II is concerned with the norm, Principle III with its application.

Let us take the situation of natural, non-reflective Knowing, where a known which Awareness initially holds to be true comes-to-presence through a knowing. If this process is to be put to the test, then this process of appearing (*Erscheinende*) must be examined in terms of that by reason of which it takes place (*Erscheinen*). When this is accomplished, then the known that is held to be true appears in its truth, as also, for that matter, does the Knowing Subject itself. All this takes place, however, only on the condition that Awareness returns upon itself through a process of reflection for which the initial duality of knowing and known becomes itself an object whose truth is to shine-forth by reason of the reflective discernment.

What is to be measured here? The original process of knowing in which the known shines forth. What is the standard by which

---

31 “... So findet das Bewußtsein sich selbst in seinem Begriff.” (HW, p. 148).
See HW, pp. 140 (Bildung), 164 (Werden).
32 HW, pp. 129, 126, 150 (Mittel), 127, 151 (Prüfung).
33 HW, p. 158 (Wahr, Wahrheit).
it is measured? That by reason of which this known does shine-forth, hence the Being of the knowing process, the objectiveness of the object, sc. Awareness itself, whose nature is to shine-forth. Finally, who is it that does the measuring? Again, it can be only Awareness itself through the process of reflection. Hence, the formula, “Awareness that shines-forth is of itself the to-be-measured and the measure...,” 34 means that: the to-be-measured is Awareness as ontic knowing; the measure is Awareness as ontological knowing. This duality finds expression in Principle II: “Awareness supplies of itself its own norm.” The “of itself” (an ihm selbst) here is intentionally ambiguous. It can mean “to itself,” as the above explanation suggests; it can mean, too, that this condition springs from the very essence of Awareness as such, for we might infer as much from Principle I, to the effect that when Awareness makes a genuine seizure of a known, what it seizes is itself.

**c. Principle III:** “Awareness puts itself to the test.” If the to-be-tested is ontic knowing and the measuring standard is ontological knowing, what is the testing itself? Nothing else than the process by which Awareness discerns the ontological dimension of ontic knowing. Hence, Principle III: “Awareness puts itself to the test.”

Furthermore, it must be so. Principle III means: “Awareness, insofar as it is Awareness, is a [Self-] testing...” 35 For it is the nature of Awareness to present the known to itself. Both known and Self are different, sc. mutually other. The known is differentiated from the knowing Self by and through the knowing which simultaneously is, at least implicitly, a Self-knowing. This differentiating belongs to the very nature of Awareness, whose own unity makes it from another point of view no differentiating at all:

... Awareness is in itself a differentiating which is none at all. As this difference that is no difference, Awareness is in its essence ambiguous. This ambiguous condition is the essence of presentation... 36

This ambiguity (better: bi-dimensionality) of Awareness characterizes it in its essence. This ambiguity can be expressed in other terms: as the bi-dimensionality characteristic of the very structure of Awareness, whereby Awareness already is (ontologically) what it not yet is (ontically). In any case, it is of the nature of Awareness to compare its knowing of the object with its knowing of itself. Now this continuous comparing is precisely what we understand by Awareness' "putting itself to the test." "... This comparing is the testing...." 37

In other words, what is compared is ontic knowing (the immediate presentation of some object) with ontological knowing, the simultaneous presentation of this object as object, therefore the Awareness of its objectiveness, or Being. In the moment of ontic knowing, ontological knowing also comes to pass but is not adverted to, sc. it is pre-ontological. The comparison that we now call "testing" consists in the adverting of Awareness to this pre-ontological comprehension of the Being of its object. Because Awareness, or more literally To-be-aware (Bewußt-sein), means to be this differentiation between ontic and ontological knowing, "... therefore Awareness of its very nature is a comparing of what is ontically and ontologically presented. As this comparing, Awareness is [continually] in the process of [Self-] testing. In itself, its process of present-ing is naturally a process of putting-itself-to-the-test." 38

By reason of this comparison, ontic knowing is not completely obliterated, of course, but rather it is now seen in its truth, sc. in its ontological dimension. Awareness returns upon itself to discern in itself the original unity of these two dimensions. It comprehends itself better. Through such a process, Awareness shines-forth unto itself in itself, illuminating itself as that whose nature it is to shine-forth, illuminating, too, the manner in which this shining-forth takes place. Awareness comes-to-presence unto itself. It is. "... Awareness is insofar as it comes to itself in its truth." 39

37 "... Dieses Vergleichen ist das Prüfen...." (HW, p. 159). Heidegger's italics.
3. The Nature of Experience

This process of comparison by which Awareness discernes its own ontological dimension in ontic Knowing – this is for Hegel “… the dialectical movement … that is called Experience. …” 40

a. Experience – Experience designates the dynamic integration of the three principles of Awareness coalescing in a single movement. “… Experience is the manner in which Awareness, insofar as it is, moves forward toward a seizure of itself as what it is in truth….” 41 It is the process of ab-solvence. By reason of Experience, that which shines-forth in ontic Knowing is known in that by reason of which it shines forth (Erscheinen), sc. in its relation to Awareness itself as bi-dimensionally present-ative. Hence Experience achieves a double clarity: the being-presented-as-object (6v) is known as (8v) what it is in relation to Knowing; Awareness comes to a fuller comprehension of itself as that whose nature it is to shine forth in and through this bi-dimensional present-ation. “… Through Experience, Awareness-that-shines-forth comes-to-presence in its own proper [Being] as that [whose nature it is to] shine-forth. …” 42

Through the shining-forth that takes place in Experience, Awareness itself comes-to-presence in its own Being, sc. as a shining-forth in the manner of Knowing. If it is by Experience that all beings – not only the object-known but the Subject-knowing (Awareness itself) – come to shine-forth in Awareness as what they are (in their Being), it follows that Experience itself is the Being or being-ness (Seiendheit) of beings. “… Experience is a manner of coming-to-presence, sc. of Being, …” 43 (of the Being proper to Awareness as such). “… Everything

40 “… Diese dialectische Bewegung … was Erfahrung genannt wird….” (Hegel, Phänomenologie, p.73). See HW, p. 165. Hegel’s italics.
41 “… Das Erfahren ist die Weise, wie das Bewußtsein, insofern es ist, aushärt nach seinem Begriff, als welcher es in Wahrheit ist….” (HW, p. 170).
42 “… Durch die Erfahrung west das erscheinende Bewußtsein als das erscheinende in sein eigenes Anwesen bei sich an….” (HW, p. 170). See HW, p. 166 (6v 7v 6v).
43 “… Das Erfahren ist eine Weise des Anwesens, d.h. des Seins…” (HW, p. 170). Heidegger italicizes whole.
depends upon [our] considering the Experience discussed here as the Being of Awareness. . .” 44

b. DIALECTICAL MOVEMENT — Experience is essentially a movement, for through Experience Awareness is continually under way towards the full realization of itself. Hence, for Awareness, Experience can be conceived as the process of making-its-way, sc. of expending sufficient effort (auslängend-) to strive after (-erlangende-) and attain (-Gelangen) Self-awareness. 45

Hegel calls the movement “dialectical,” with no immediate explanation. This leaves Heidegger free to offer his own interpretation in terms of the present context. The movement of Awareness toward Self-awareness is a continual comparison in and by Awareness between its ontic and ontological dimensions. This comparison can be conceived, if one will, as a dialogue: the ontic-preontological appeals to the ontological dimension as an explanation of itself; the ontological dimension replies by claiming to be the truth of the ontic. It is this interchange (δια-) of appeal and reply (λέγεσθαι) that is the dialogue of Awareness with itself. “. . . In this dialogue, Awareness articulates to itself its own truth. . .” 46 This is the first sense that can be given to the term “dialectical.”

There is a second sense that extends and includes the first. The dialogue is not confined to one single moment or restricted to one form of the movement toward Self-awareness. Rather it runs through (δια-) the entire manifold of forms through which Awareness passes in its advance towards itself. By reason of this sustained dialogue it gathers itself (λέγεσθαι) into its fullness, sc. into the truth of its own essence. This thorough-going (δια-) gathering of itself (λέγεσθαι) unto itself offers another sense of “dialectical.”

It is these two senses taken in their ensemble that constitute for Heidegger the full meaning of “dialectical.” “Awareness is Awareness as the dialogue between natural and real Knowing,
a dialogue that achieves the gathering-together of its own essence in and through its forms. Insofar as the formation of Awareness comes-to-pass simultaneously with both the self-collective dialogue and the self-expressive collecting, the movement of Awareness is dialectical."  

Such a conception of the dialectical character of Awareness is more original and more comprehensive than the classical interpretations in terms of thesis-antithesis-synthesis or of endless negativity, for "... it is grounded in the [process by which] Awareness thoroughly gathers unto itself the forms of its dialogue [with itself] [in the advance] toward the absolute [Self-] seizure that is, once its truth is fully achieved..."  

It is the very nature of Experience, then, to be dialectical in this way. "... Hegel does not conceive Experience dialectically but thinks the dialectic out of the essence of Experience..."  

Experience is a movement that goes forward insofar as it goes before itself (in the pre-ontological dimension of ontic Knowing), yet proceeding thus it returns upon itself. "... As returning upon itself, it unfolds itself in this coming-to-presence of Awareness and, as a coming-to-presence, becomes abiding. The absolved [and] abiding process of Awareness is the Being of the Absolute..."  

4. Experience and Man  

Thus far we have been dealing with the Experience of Absolute Knowing as παρουσία, hence as coming-to-presence in conjunction with men, yet somehow prior to human knowing. How are we to conceive, then, the relationship between
Experience and man? The problem is not a simple one, but we have already met its analogy: we must somehow correlate on one hand the priority of Absolute Awareness and on the other a genuine spontaneity in man.

We have already stressed the priority of Absolute Awareness over man in speaking of the irresistible Will of the Absolute to shine-forth in him. Now that we have seen how the Being of the Absolute consists in Experience, we can understand how Will, Experience and Being are in essence but one, sc. they all designate the coming-to-presence of the Absolute. "... It is as Experience that the Absolute’s Will to be conjoined to us, sc. to shine-forth for us as that which is shining-forth, holds sway. ..." But who precisely is this “us”? How does it come-to-pass that it is “for us” that Absolute Awareness shines-forth?

The “us,” sc. “we,” are men who are endowed with a view, with the abiding condition of having-seen (Gesehen-haben), with a σκέψις into Awareness as such. This congenital affinity with Awareness can be expressed in terms of the metaphor of light. If the παράστασις is a light that shines upon us, then the σκέψις may be considered as man’s taking-a-stand in that light. Furthermore, it is a view that is absolutely primary (Davor) in man, anteceding all the processes of natural Awareness, discerning that which lies behind (Dahinter) all such processes.

What is it that “we” see in the σκέψις? Awareness itself, insofar as it constitutes the Being of beings. Σκέψις discerns "... what and how beings as beings are; ... [it] has seen antecedently the Being of beings. ..." and thereby the reality of the real. It is a σκέψις into the absoluteness of the Absolute. Heidegger describes it indirectly when trying to identify it with Aristotle’s ἐπιστημήν: it is a having-seen that takes place “before” any single being comes-to-presence, and views Presence itself.

The antecedent σκέψις into the whole ontological dimension of Awareness is not a static thing, however, but dynamic, pro-

---

51 "... Als Erfahrung waltet der Wille des Absoluten, bei uns zu sein, d.h. für uns als das Erscheinende zu erscheinen...." (HW, p. 175). Writer’s italics.
52 HW, pp. 120, 140, 164 (steht), 141, 164, 176 (Davor, Dahinter, im vorhinein).
53 HW, pp. 141 (Erscheinen des erscheinenden Wissens), 147 (Ziel schon in Sicht), 176 (in die Absolutheit), 178 (ἐπιστημήν).
54 HW, pp. 141 (Erscheinen des erscheinenden Wissens), 147 (Ziel schon in Sicht), 176 (in die Absolutheit), 178 (ἐπιστημήν).
peled toward the achievement of itself. Initially, man finds himself in the \( \pi\alpha\rho\omicron\omega\nu\sigma\alpha \) of the Absolute according to the thought-habits of natural Awareness, oblivious to his native \( \sigma\kappa\epsilon\phi\varsigma \) into the ontological dimension of the real. At this point the \( \sigma\kappa\epsilon\phi\varsigma \) is genuine but unachieved because still latent, unaware of itself as such. The \( \sigma\kappa\epsilon\phi\varsigma \) achieves itself to the extent that it ad-verts (\textit{Umkehr}) to itself, puts aside the initial persuasions and convictions of natural Awareness and brings to light the Knowing that constitutes it, sc. becomes aware of itself as ontological.\(^5\)

This ad-vertence to the antecedent \( \sigma\kappa\epsilon\phi\varsigma \) is something that lies within our power to achieve. We must collaborate (\textit{Zutat}) in the process. This is done by an act of willing on our part, sc. by willing what the Absolute wills, hence by responding to Absolute Will precisely insofar as it wills this collaboration (\textit{Zutat}). This collaboration may be conceived on the one hand as a turning-away-from the ontic and on the other as a turning-toward the ontological by “letting-shine-forth as such that which shines-forth.” To the extent that this collaborating ad-vertence in man is necessary in order that Experience come-to-pass, we may say that it opens-up and de-limits the domain in which Experience takes place, sc. where the process of shining-forth shines-forth unto itself in the dialectical movement that is intrinsic to its nature.\(^6\)

Note, therefore, a double polarity. On the one hand, the Absolute is prior to the human knowing and thereby enjoys a primacy over man; on the other, it needs man as the domain in which to shine-forth as itself, so that it is somehow dependent upon him. The process of Experience taken in its totality implies the collaboration of both Absolute and man. When the process is complete, the result is an absolute human knowing, which may be considered as the rays by which the Absolute, the light of truth itself, shines upon us.\(^7\)

Who are “we,” then? Men. But which man? Apparently not the individual. The \( \sigma\kappa\epsilon\phi\varsigma \) which achieves itself:

\(^5\) HW, pp. 189 (Gewohnheit des natürlichen Bewußtseins), 181 and passim (\textit{Umkehr}), 157 (Einfälle und Meinungen), 190 (vollziehen).
\(^6\) HW, pp. 174-175 (Weglassen, Lassen), 176 (öffnet und umgrenzt), 177 (\textit{Διαδε-γραφη}).
\(^7\) HW, p. 130 (Licht bescheint).
... is not a comportment of an individual human subject.... [The \sigma\epsilon\phi\zeta\zeta], insofar as it views that by which the Knowing that shines-forth does shine-forth, sees the entire compass of [such a] Knowing. The individual \textit{ego cogito} that presents its objects to itself remains captive within this compass. 

It would seem, then, that the individual awareness abides within the domain constituted by \sigma\epsilon\phi\zeta\zeta, which in turn views the Being of beings. Is \sigma\epsilon\phi\zeta\zeta to be conceived as the essence of man? If so, then the captivity of individuals within the compass of \sigma\epsilon\phi\zeta\zeta would constitute the essential relation between individual men and the Absolute, and ad-vertence would be an activation of this relation. "... Then our essence itself belongs to the \pi\alpha\rho\omega\sigma\alpha\zeta of the Absolute. ..." 

But does all this, despite its unquestionable value, solve the problem of the individual man? After all, who is it that wills the ad-vertence which brings \sigma\epsilon\phi\zeta\zeta to its fulfillment, and with it the Absolute's Experience of itself? And how? Does the Experience take place not only for us but in us? Is it we who must bring about the absolution of the Absolute? If so, what happens to "us," once the absolution is accomplished and the Self-seizure complete? These are classical Hegel-questions, no doubt, but, in the present context, we surmise that if we could answer them, we would understand much better Heidegger's conception of the relation between Being and its There.

5. Experience and Philosophy

Experience is the process by which Absolute Awareness comes-to-presence as itself, sc. as the Being of beings. But when Being is conceived as Absolute Awareness, this presence is rather a present-ness, sc. the present-ation of present-edness. This Self-presentation (presentation-to-Self) is effectively an exposing of Awareness to itself, or, if we speak in terms of a shining-forth and the metaphor of light, it is an e-lucidation of...
itself. Let this elucidating exposition of Awareness be called now an "exposé" (Darstellung). It follows that Experience of its very nature includes this exposé of Awareness. "... It pertains to the shining-forth of the Knowing which shines-forth to represent itself in its presence, sc. to make an exposé of itself. This exposé pertains to Experience, and, indeed, to its very essence. ..." 60 Exposé and Experience cannot be unqualifiedly identified, but the relation is so close that we may say that Experience is the movement by which the exposé of Awareness is brought-to-pass, and the exposé is that process in which the Experience is elucidated. Like Experience, the exposé, too, supposes man's willing effort to collaborate in bringing-to-pass through ad-vertence the σχέσις into the ontological dimension of the real. "... Ad-vertence turns and for the first time brings Experience into an exposé. ..." 61

What does the exposé elucidate? Awareness, to be sure, but this insofar as it is that by which everything that shines-forth does shine forth. The exposé, then, elucidates beings as beings (6v ἡ 6v), and inasmuch as the precise point at which the elucidation comes-to-pass is the moment of ad-vertence, then "... properly speaking, ad-vertence lets ἡ come-to-pass in relation to ἔν. ..." 62 Since Aristotle, however, the elucidation (interpretation) of ἔν ἡ ἔν is what men have called philosophy.

Philosophy for Hegel is the exposé of the Knowing-that-shines-forth in terms of that by reason of which it shines-forth. It is itself a type of Knowing (Wissen), for in making the exposé of itself Knowing knows itself. It is eminently a Knowing-ness (Wissen-schaft). This state of Knowing-ness would be called in Latin scientia, but we shall retain the usual translation of "Science," provided it be made clear that "Science" as designating the Hegelian notion of philosophy does not mean "research" or any procedure that has the normal conception of "science" as a model; it means rather that philosophy becomes

60 "... Zum Erscheinen des erscheinenden Wissens gehört, sich in seiner Præsenz zu repräsentieren, d.h. sich darzustellen. Die Darstellung gehört zur Erfahrung und zwar in ihr Wesen. ..." (HW, p. 172).
61 "... Die Umkehrung kehrt und stellt die Erfahrung erst in das Darstellen. ..." (HW, p. 174). See pp. 140, 150, 168, 177 (Bewegung), 130, 147 (vollziehen, Mitvollzug).
62 "... Die Umkehrung läßt eigens das ἡ in Beruf auf das ἔν geschehen. ..." (HW, p. 174).
with Hegel so permeated with the Cartesian ideal of self-certitude that it is conceived as unconditioned Knowing that is interior to the Knowing of Self-certitude. "... Philosophy has become thoroughly at home in Knowing as such. The whole essence of philosophy is fashioned out of the unconditioned Self-knowing of Knowing. Philosophy is the Science. ..." 63 Thus the function of philosophy is to make an exposé of the Knowing-that-shines-forth (δν) as shining-forth (ἡ δν). "... The exposé presents the Being of beings. This is the Science of δν ἡ δν. ..." 64 To the extent that this exposé is identified with the self-achieving σκέψις, the Hegelian concept of philosophy corresponds to the Aristotelian notion of διέρωθι, sc. a beholding.

We are in a position now to appreciate the full sense of the initial title that Hegel gave to the Phenomenology of the Spirit: "The Science of the Experience of Awareness," where Science means essentially the exposé, and Experience means the Being of beings, sc. that by which the Knowing-that-shines-forth is what it is (in its shining-forth). The Phenomenology is in an eminent way philosophy: the elucidation of beings in their Being. If the title of the work eventually changes, the sense does not, and the new title remains faithful to the initial one: "Spirit" corresponds to what we have called up to now "Awareness"; "Phenomenology" corresponds to what we have called "Experience." "... The essence of Experience is the essence of Phenomenology. ..." 65 σκέψις, because it is the process by which Spirit (Awareness) shines-forth in and unto itself; λόγος, because of its very nature the shining-forth is dialectical.
II. General Remarks

A. HEIDEGGER WITH HEgel

Up to this point we have tried to be faithful to Heidegger, who presumably has tried to be faithful to Hegel. Now we must try to disengage the critique that is implied in all this, for critique there is. There is much in Hegel, of course, that Heidegger can endorse:

1. Being

Although Hegel himself uses "Being," at least in the early stages of the *Phenomenology*, in a completely different sense from Heidegger, sc. to designate beings as known by natural Awareness prior to the discerning of them in their truth, Heidegger feels justified in using the term to designate what Hegel calls "Absolute Awareness," on the grounds that language that has grown out of one type of thinking, sc. his own, can serve to bring into its own light another man's thought in order to liberate this thought into the fullness of its own essence.66

What is the nature of Being as Awareness? It is an emerging-into-presence (non-concealment), sc. that by which beings appear, shine-forth in truth. It is Presence itself. Furthermore, this emergence is dynamic, indeed dialectical, and through this movement founds history.67 Because absolute, Being enjoys a certain primacy, yet its nature is such that it must come-to-presence in conjunction with man in order to emerge at all. It needs a domain that it fashions itself (in the fashioning of which it maintains the primacy), wherein it may shine-forth, for such a domain pertains to its very essence.68 We interpret this domain to be the There of Being-as-Awareness, hence the There-being.

2. There-being

The There of Being is correlated with the essence of man. From the very beginning, man stands in the light of the παρουσία.
sc. is favored with a pre-ontological comprehension of (σκέψεως into) the Being of beings, sc. transcendence. Yet despite this constitutional affinity with the ontological dimensions of the real, man finds himself first of all and for the most part victimized by the spontaneous convictions of natural Awareness and by the tyranny of what "people" think and say. In terms of SZ, man is initially in a state of inauthenticity.69

Immersed amid the ontic yet comprehending the ontological, There-being has the task of fully achieving the σκέψεως by which it is constituted. This it does by comparing the ontic and ontological dimensions of beings that it meets, sc. the known, a function made possible by the fact that the There itself is the difference between ontic and ontological, between natural and real Knowing, sc. the ontological difference. This achievement is brought about by the active cooperation of There-being with the process by which the Being of beings emerges into truth, sc. Experience. This cooperation takes the form of turning away from the ontic and toward the ontological, ad-verting to the Being-dimension of the beings-known — not destroying ontic Awareness but simply discerning in it the ontological dimension and endorsing its own situation.70

This coming-to-pass of ad-vertence is an active effort on the part of There-being, implying the process of will, by reason of which There-being lets the ἐν of ἐν ἑαυτῷ take place (lets Being be itself). Thus There-being yields in docility to the Will of the Absolute (Being) to come-to-presence in the προσωπία, thereby doing its part to open-up the realm of disclosure in which Being shines-forth. At the same time, by ad-vertence There-being fully comes-to-presence itself, determined as it is by the relation of its essence to Being.71

In all this we feel at home. There-being achieves its own Being by responding (ad-verting) through re-solve (willing) to the exigency of Being for a There. All of the principal theses of SZ

69 HW, pp. 189 (schon in Parusie), 146 (über sich hinaus), 189 (nach Gewohnheit des natürlichen Bewußtseins), 149-150 ("trockene Ich").
70 HW, pp. 159, 160, 163 (Unterscheidung), 174-175 (Weglassen, Erscheinenlassen), 190 (Aneignung seines Aufenthaltes).
71 HW, p. 175 (Erscheinenlassen des Erscheinenenden, will Willen des Absoluten, stellt in Wesen zurück).
are here, except, perhaps, the insistence upon finitude. This being so, what possible criticism of Hegel can Heidegger make?

B. HEIDEGGER VS. HEGEL

I. Being and Subject-ism

The nub of Heidegger's critique of Hegel, as it may be disengaged at this point, lies in the fact that the sense of Being (Awareness) for Hegel, though indeed it may be called a "presence" (Anwesenheit), is rather "present-ness," sc. the presence that characterizes the relation between a subject and an object. In other words, Hegel's conception of Being is determined through and through by the subject-ism with which he starts.

We know already that the "new land" which Descartes discovered but Hegel explores is the unconditioned Self-certitude of Self-awareness, whereby that which fundamentally (subjectum) comes-to-presence as true (certain) is Self-awareness. Hence, Self-awareness becomes a subjectum; the subjectum becomes aware of itself. The fundamental structure of a subject-become-aware-of-itself is this: it comes-to-presence by reason of a relation it bears to an object that it proposes to itself. Insofar as this relation renders the object present, it is a present-ation; insofar as it renders the object present to the subject, it is a re-present-ation; insofar as in the representation the subject becomes aware of itself as such, the representation presents not only the object to the subject, but the subject to itself, sc. the subject as subject becomes the object of its own reflection. This relationship in all of its complexity is what makes the subject to be what it is. "... The Being of this subject-object relation that reflects upon itself is called subject-ness. ..." 73

Obviously what characterizes the Being of this subject is the present-ness that present-(represent-)ation implies. "... [This

72 The point is not insignificant. Any thorough study of the relation between Hegel and Heidegger would have to examine carefully the radically different interpretations of the problem of finitude. This may well prove to be the fundamental difference between them.

73 "... das Sein des Subjekts als der in sich reflektierten Subjekt-Objektbeziehung heißt die Subjektität..." (HW, p. 134). See pp. 121-122.
Being] is presence [but] in the manner of representation..."
74
It is in this sense that we must understand the προσώπος, and
when the Being of the Absolute Subject is interpreted as Experi-
ence, then Experience itself remains radically, ineluctably
a present-(represent-)ation. "... In Being, in terms of which
Experience comes-to-presence, there lies, as the characteristic
of [its] shining-forth, the process of pro-posing in the sense of
present-ing..." 75 All this is crystallized in the key-word of all
post-Cartesian philosophy: Awareness, sc. Being-aware (Bew-
wußt-sein); for Being (sein) means "to be" in the manner of a
"knowing" (Bewußt-), sc. of a cogitatio, of a pro-posing (re)pre-
sent-ation. 76

In what sense is this a critique? To interpret Being as subject-
centered present-ness is to bring to a culmination the conception
of truth-as-certitude, for, when all is said and done, this whole
conception expands Absolute Certitude (Self-awareness) into
Being itself. 77 But in doing so, Hegel forgets the original sense
of truth-as-φάσις, sc. Being (φόσις) as the process by which
beings emerge into non-concealment. To overlook this is to
disregard the ontological difference as it rises out of this emergent
truth; it is to be victimized in the Being-being ambivalence of
δν without taking full cognizance of its import.

That such is the case with Hegel, there is reason enough to
claim. Witness, for example, the abiding confusion between
Absolute Awareness conceived as Being (the process by which
beings shine-forth) and as a being (the Absolute Subject itself). 78
More convincing still is the interior correlation, as Heidegger
sees it, between the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic. In
the System of Absolute Science, the Science of Logic does not
come after the Science of Experience, or even before it, nor,

74 "... Sie ist die Präsenz in der Weise der Repräsentation..." (HW, p. 134).
Heidegger's italics. See p. 122 (προσώπος).
75 "... Im Sein, als welches die Erfahrung west, liegt als Charakter des Erschei-
nens das Vorstellen im Sinne von Präsentieren..." (HW, p. 171).
76 HW, pp. 139 (Grundwort), 135 (Bewußtsein). It would be possible to show
that the whole problematic of putting-knowledge-to-the-test (Prüfen), which plays
so central a rôle in Hegel's conception of Experience, arises out of the present-ative
character of Awareness which, conditioned as it is by the conception of truth-as-
certainty, must verify the presentation. See v.g. HW, p. 127.
77 HW, p. 141. What is said here is confirmed by a more thematic treatment of
Hegel and δ-λήθεια in 1959 (HG, pp. 52-57).
for that matter, are they two coordinate Sciences either. They are but one Science (metaphysics), one interpretation of \( \delta \nu \not\in \delta \nu \). The Phenomenology would meditate \( \delta \nu \) in its general characteristics and in effect constitute this Science as an onto-logy; the Logic would meditate \( \delta \nu \) under the guise of a supreme being (Absolute Spirit) and in effect constitute the Science a theo-logy. Phenomenology and Logic are one Science because concerned with but a single problem: \( \delta \nu \not\in \delta \nu \). But because \( \delta \nu \) is ambivalent, it gives rise to an ambivalent (onto-theo-logical) structure within the Science itself.\(^79\)

To have overlooked the ambivalence of \( \delta \nu \) is perhaps not so much Hegel's fault as the weakness of metaphysics itself.\(^80\) But weakness it is, and even if he brings metaphysics, in all the complexity of its onto-theo-logical structure, to the point of its highest achievement, he does not – can not? – lay bare its ground.

**Résumé**

Hegel culminates post-Cartesian subject-ism, insofar as he thinks the implications of truth-as-certitude through to the level of Absolute Certitude in the Self-awareness of the Absolute Subject, thus forgetting all the more profoundly the genuine sense of truth-as-\( \delta \lambda \delta \theta \varepsilon \alpha \).


\(^80\) HW, p. 161.
For Hegel, Absolute Spirit, the Being of beings, was also Absolute Will, whereby "Will" suggests the intrinsic necessity by reason of which the Absolute unfolds into the complete seizure of itself. In this respect, Hegel’s dialectical idealism was no less a philosophy of Will than Kant’s, Fichte’s or Schelling’s. Between Hegel and Nietzsche stood Schopenhauer. We have only to advert to the title, *The World as Will and Presentation*, to realize on the one hand how deeply immersed he is in the subject-ist tradition, as Leibniz had stamped it after Descartes, and on the other how close he stands to Nietzsche, whose debt to him, according to personal testimony, is long since a commonplace. As we come, then, to Nietzsche’s philosophy of universal Willing, we are somewhat prepared for the thesis that Nietzsche is the "consummation" of metaphysics in the West. Somewhat! Before we can appreciate the full import of this, however, we must first see it in some detail.

The main lines of Heidegger’s Nietzsche-interpretation appeared first in the essay entitled, "Nietzsche’s Word ‘God is dead’." Its theses can be stated in general terms quite simply:

---

1 VA, pp. 114, 83. The preface of *Wille zur Macht* remarks that it was written on Schopenhauer’s birthday.
2 "Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’,” HW, pp. 193-247. This essay resumes an interpretation that had been elaborated in five university lecture courses between 1936 and 1940, which were crystallized first in a public discourse in 1943. In addition, WD (1951-52), pp. 1-78, adds an important supplement, but “Überwindung der Metaphysik” (VA, pp. 71-99) and “Wer ist Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” (VA, pp. 107-126) add only precisions. The two volumes on Nietzsche that appeared in 1961 give full text of original lectures, together with some supplementary essays. For our present purposes, we consider all as a unit.
“God” for Nietzsche is what he takes to be the God of Christianity, but interprets in a non-Christian way. For Nietzsche, God is the symbol of the entire supra-sensible world of Ideas and Ideals, and, as we shall see, of values, for He is the ground and final end of these Ideals, which in turn are the goal of earthly life, determining it, so to speak, from above and from without. Such a world, for a tradition as old as Plato, constitutes the true, authentic, genuinely actual world, while the order of the sensible and the changeable is only an apparent, non-actual world. If we take this “merely apparent,” sensible world in the broad Kantian sense of the “physical” world, then the ideal, supra-sensible world of the Platonic tradition is clearly the supra-physical, sc. meta-physical world. “God” for Nietzsche, therefore, symbolizes the “world,” sc. the order, of metaphysics.3

To say that God is dead is to say that this metaphysical world has lost its vitality, has lost all power to offer man something to which he can hold fast or by which he can find his bearings, has come to mean nothing at all. Such meaningless- (therefore “nothing”-)ness is a nihil-(sc. “nothing”-)ism (“ness”). Nietzsche’s word, “God is dead,” according to Heidegger, is but a simple declaration of fact, sc. it describes in a striking formula the metaphysical nihilism to which Nietzsche is witness. And this nihilism is not simply a single phenomenon of history among others, such as the Renaissance, Humanism, the Age of Enlightenment, etc. It designates for Nietzsche, Heidegger claims, an entire historical movement, indeed the basic movement of history in the West since Plato, which Heidegger identifies here with the history of metaphysics.4

There is no need to recall the fact that metaphysics is an interpretation of beings in their being-ness. Nietzsche’s special insight is to perceive that the interpretation of beings prevalent in his time is value-less, for it is an interpretation that has recourse to values that are precisely without any value at all. The reason: the supreme values, sc. “God” and the ideal, supra-sensible (metaphysical) world, can not be translated into the

3 HW, pp. 199-200, 203-205.
4 HW, pp. 206, 214 (Gott tot), 200, 201 and VA, p. 79 (Geschichte). The formula itself is found in the young Hegel’s Glauben und Wissen in a sense different from that of Nietzsche, to be sure, but not completely unrelated to it (HW, p. 197). Cf. N, I, pp. 452-458; II, pp. 31-71, 272-282, 399-457.
actual world of daily experience. Nietzsche's task is on the one hand to proclaim the emptiness (de-valuation) of all traditional values, thus soliciting a rejection of them, and on the other to propose some new interpretation of beings in their Being that could be accepted along with this rejection as a feasible way of overcoming valueless-ness (nihilism). The first part of the program could be called "negative" nihilism, the second "positive," both having their parallel in Schopenhauer's "pessimism of weakness" and "pessimism of strength."

But positive nihilism must not be content with merely replacing the old values by new ones, v.g. by filling the place left vacant by God and the hierarchy of supra-sensible values with some cheap ersatz such as socialism or Wagnerian music. Rather the entire fabric of values must be re-woven. De-valuation can be overcome only by re-valuation. There must be some new principle of values, not to be sought, however, in the lifeless world of the supra-sensible. Let it be something alive that is not supra-sensible. Let it be Life itself.

Nietzsche's own metaphysics becomes thus the philosophy of Life-force, claiming to overcome the metaphysical nihilism of the times by a nihilism of a higher sort, a positive one. But it remains a nihilism! And Heidegger will argue that it fails completely to vindicate its claims simply because it remains metaphysics. The nub of the matter is that for Heidegger all metaphysics is a nihilism. For the essence of nihilism consists in the fact that the Being-process itself, as emergent truth, means nothing, "... to such an extent that the truth of beings-as-such counts as Being, because the truth of Being [itself] retreats....."

That is why "... in its essence, metaphysics is nihilism. 

sc. a forgetfulness of Being. Obviously the only way effectively to overcome such nihilism is to pass beyond metaphysics in

---


7 "... die Wahrheit des Seienden als solchen für das Sein gilt, weil die Wahrheit des Seins ausbleibt. ..." (HW, p. 244).

8 "... In ihrem Wesen aber ist die Metaphysik Nihilismus..." (HW, p. 245).

order to meditate the Being-process itself. This is what Nietzsche
does not do – can not do – as long as he remains within the
confines of metaphysics.

Let us now see how Nietzsche attempts to determine a new
set of values, whose principle is an all-pervasive Life-force. We
wish to understand how this Life-force is to be understood and
how it founds the new values. In the most general terms we may
say that this Life-force is understood as having its ground in a
Becoming, not simply in the sense of endless change, but in the
sense of a universal dynamism that embraces all beings whatso-
ever and determines them as beings, constitutes them in their
Being. Heidegger makes use of the classical terms of essence and
existence to distinguish in the Nietzschean Becoming two cor-
relative principles: Will-onto-Power (Wille zur Macht) as the
essence of its progressive dynamism; "the eternal recurrence of
the selfsame state of affairs" (ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen) as
the form of its existence:

... The two key-words of Nietzsche's metaphysics, "Will-onto-Power" and "eternal return of the selfsame," determine beings in their Being under those two aspects which since the earliest days have been guidelines for metaphysics, [sc.] ens qua ens in the sense of essentia and existentia. We let these two aspects of Nietzsche's universal Becoming polarize our analysis.

A. WILL-UNTO-POWER

1. Life-force and Will

"... Will-onto-Power, Becoming, Life-force and Being in
the broadest sense mean, in Nietzsche's language, but one
['thing']. ..." Why the first of these formulae enjoys a primacy
over the others we have already some idea and we shall


understand it better as we proceed. For the moment, let us be content with recalling that once Leibniz expanded the notion of subject so that it embraced not only the human ego (Descartes) but all beings, insofar as they are dynamic, sc. have an appetitus ("will") for further dynamism, the entire drift of modern thought was to conceive Being as the dynamism of dynamic beings, in one way or another as Will. It is only normal, then, that Nietzsche should meditate Being as a universal Becoming (Life-force) and conceive it as Will. For our part, we must be on our guard from the beginning against conceiving universal Will in purely psychological terms. It is essentially not a striving after what is not yet possessed, born out of a feeling of want. Nietzsche's conception is a purely metaphysical one, and we must interpret it metaphysically, if we are to understand it at all. It is an interpretation of the Being of beings, whose internal dynamism, however, is of such a sort that it can be expressed best in terms of what human experience calls "willing."

We comprehend this metaphysical reality by asking: what does it mean, even in human terms, to "will"? For Nietzsche, it means "to be a master." "To will is to-will-to-be-a-master...." It implies a domination (mastery) over what is willed, hence is essentially neither a wishing nor a striving-after something but a commanding, which implies a knowledgeable power of disposition over the possibilities of any given action to be performed. What is commanded in the command is the exercise of this disposing power. In a command, he who commands accedes to this power to dispose of an action and thus accedes to (obeys) himself. Genuine commanding, then, is different from simply shouting orders to others; it is a submission to oneself, hence a self-submission, a self-conquest.

If to will is to command by submitting to one's own power to dispose (one is tempted to say, though Heidegger does not introduce the terminology here, by letting one's own disposing-power be itself), then what the will wills is its own willing. "... The will wills itself...." It is a will-onto-willing (Wille zum Willen). By this very fact, it passes beyond itself, sc. on the one hand brings itself under its own control and on the other

---

12 "... Der Wille will sich selbst...." (HW, p. 216).
continues to will further, to surpass the immediate moment of self-conquest by willing to grow, to become stronger, to become more and more itself in further willing.

There is a duality here, and the point is worth insistence. The will is a life-force, and growth is a law of life. But the law of growth implies a constancy (Erhaltung) as well as advance, sc. further growing (Steigerung). The whole vitality of a rose-bush, for example, is in a certain sense brought to a center of concentration in the first bud. In it, this vitality achieves a "degree" of unfolding that may be considered as attained, a moment of rest, a tentative permanence, a constancy that may be considered as assured. Yet this is not a static thing. On the contrary, this assured constancy is alive only to the extent that it is already being surpassed by reason of its own internal dynamism, is becoming already in-constant, hence overcome by the progress of life. The rose-bud is in the process of unfolding into the flower.

These two moments are correlative components of a single movement, deriving from the unified essence of the living process. The component of constancy (the moment of consolidating the hitherto evolution) renders service to the component of "surpassment," for it is the level of achievement already attained that serves as basis for further achievement. On the other hand, the component of surpassment renders service to the verifiable constant by preserving it interior to the process of growth. Both components of growth are necessary for the living process, if it is to be itself. They are conditions of life; in the case of universal Will, and insofar as they flow from its essence, they may be said to be "posed" (Setzen) by Will itself.¹³

Now the moment of consolidation comes-to-pass when Will submits to, and thereby overcomes, itself, sc. acts as its own master. We may say that in the moment of constancy, Will exercises power (Macht) over itself. Likewise, the Will's surpassing of itself in its drive to become stronger and more itself is a movement toward more and more power. In this context, the surpassing is an "overpowering" of self which the very nature of willing renders possible, sc. empowers (ermächtigt). In the

¹³ HW, pp. 211-212. Cf. N, I, p. 219 (Zwiespalt); II, pp. 96-109. Because of the awkwardness of "surpassing" as a translation for Steigerung, we are permitting ourselves a neologism and will translate occasionally as "surpassment."
formula "Will-unto-Power," then, the word "Power" designates only the manner by which the Will wills itself, insofar as its nature is to command. "... Will and Power consequently are not conjoined for the first time in [the formula] Will- unto-Power, but the Will as Will- unto-Willing is the Will- unto-Power in the sense of an empowering unto Power. ..." 14 Whatever the formula, the two components of constancy and surpassment are intrinsic to its very nature. "... The Will- unto-Power must pose simultaneously conditions for the constancy and the surpassing of Power. It is the nature of the Will to pose these correlative conditions." 15

2. Will- unto-Power and Re-valuation

We said that Nietzsche’s nihilism is not only negative but positive, and that the metaphysics of Will- unto-Power is re-valuation as well as de-valuation. How explain this re-valuation? What is the relation of value to Will? To delineate the Nietzschean conception of value, Heidegger analyses a definition that Nietzsche himself offers. Value is "an aspect of the conditions of constancy and surpassment with a view to the complex structures of Life [that have a] relative duration within [the process of] Becoming." 16 Many of the terms here are clear from what has been said already: the Being of beings is conceived as a process of Becoming, Life-force, Will, within which certain complex structures form, that for a temporary duration enjoy consolidation but are soon surpassed and swept up into the dynamic progress of Life (Will). We must understand now in what sense value is an "aspect" of all this.

An aspect (aspectum) is that which is seen by a seeing (aspicere). The seeing sees the seen and makes what calculations it must accordingly. But the aspect is seen only insofar as it is

posed (gesetzt) by the seeing itself. For whether we speak Kantian-fashion of an a priori, or scholastic-fashion of the formal object of sight, the sense is the same: a seeing takes place only on the condition that the seer is antecedently so structured that what is see-able in the seen can affect him. This a priori structure which constitutes the seer in his affinity with the to-be-seen as such is itself a type of "seeing," a seeing-structure that antecedes the functioning of this structure. The structure, rendering possible the function, so determines this function that we may say that the seer sees (act) because he already has seen (a priori) by reason of his structural affinity with the seen, sc. has already "... pro-posed the seen as such to himself, that is to say posed it. ..." It is this pro-posing pos-ition that antecedes all seeing which makes the to-be-seen (aspect) seeable, sc. capable of guiding the function of seeing and whatever activity follows upon sight.

Now if value, Nietzsche claims, is an aspect (something seen), it follows that "... values are not first of all something in themselves which subsequently at the opportune moment can be seized as an aspect." They are what they are only because they are (pro-)posed by and for a seeing. But in the case of value, what precisely is seen (posed) and who (what) is it that sees (poses)?

Heidegger's answer in Nietzsche's name is clear. What is posed is the necessary conditions of the growing process of all-encompassing Life, sc. the conditions of sustaining and increasing, of constancy and surpassment, which are demanded by the essence of universal Willing. What is it that poses? The living principle itself, sc. Will-unto-Power. It is as if the Being of beings (universal Will) is also a process of Self-awareness, seeing itself as evolving. "... To Will belongs consciousness...." In these terms, its vision is necessarily bi-furcated, so that it sees the two indispensable conditions of itself as growing: the form of its attainment at any given moment, constant and verifiable, which must be surpassed; and the scope of those possibilities toward

---

17 "... das Gesichtete als ein solches sich vor-gestellt und so gesetzt hat...." (HW, p. 210).
18 "... Werte sind also nicht zuvor etwas an sich, so daß sie dann gelegentlich als Gesichtspunkte genommen werden könnten." (HW, p. 210).
19 "... Zum Willen gehört Bewuβtsein...." (VA, p. 88).
which it is still to advance.\textsuperscript{20} This seeing by which Will sees itself as itself (Life in growth) is the seeing which poses the necessary conditions of itself as Life in growth. What is thus seen and posed is "value."

It is Will unto-Power that poses all values, for values are nothing more than the self-posed conditions of its own unfolding. "...The Will unto-Power is, according to its very essence, a value-posing Will..."\textsuperscript{21} and this value-posing we call "e-valuation" (Schätzen). Will, as the Being of beings, is therefore the ground and domain of all values, and, conversely, if metaphysics interprets beings in their Being as Will unto-Power, it cannot help becoming a philosophy of values. By way of example, let us remark the two fundamental values in the Nietzschean system, truth and art. Both are posed by Will unto-Power as necessary conditions of itself.

\textbf{a. Truth} – We saw that one component of dynamic progress is the consolidating and sustaining of what has been gained already. By this is meant some sphere of concentration to which Will can at all times in perfect confidence return in order to win reassurance (Sicherheit) of its gain. This sphere circumscribes for Will that constant element in whatever comes to presence that can be subject to the disposition of Will. The constant, thus posed, abides, and what abides Nietzsche calls indiscriminately "being," "Being" and "truth."\textsuperscript{22} Truth as value is what is seen when Will poses as necessary condition of its own Becoming what we have called the moment of constancy, or consolidation, of what has been achieved hitherto in the Will’s unfolding as the actuality of what is actual. It is the "...constant assurance of the constancy of that sphere out of which Will unto-Power wills itself."\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20} HW, pp. 218–219.
\textsuperscript{23} "...die beständigende Bestandsicherung des Umkreises, aus dem her der Wille zur Macht sich selbst will." (HW, p. 222). If the moment of constancy, inasmuch as it is part of a process of Becoming, is constantly being surpassed, sc. is essentially in constant, then truth-as-value is un-truth, error (Irrtum). This poses again the whole problem of "seeming." See N I, pp. 619–625; II, pp. 314–318.
b. **Art** — Correlative to the component of constancy, however, is the component of augmentation by reason of which Will at any given moment of achievement in beings (truth) is already in movement toward more achievement, more power, because new possibilities are opened up to it. What Will sees in posing this second condition of its continued Becoming is the value Nietzsche calls "art." "... Art is the essence of all willing [insolar as] it opens up perspectives and takes possession of them ...," 24 so that it is art that stimulates and goads Will-unto-Power to come to itself by willing beyond itself. Art, as value, is grounded in Will's vision of itself as surpassing itself, sc. as surpassing the present moment of its Self-achievement. And, since in the dynamism of Life the component of increase enjoys a certain primacy over the component of constancy, art as value is superior to truth as value. 25 In both cases, however, value is not something in and for itself but is posed by universal Will.

3. **Will-unto-Power and Truth**

Of the two principal values which Will-unto-Power poses, the more significant for us is the value of truth. We wish to see now more in detail how truth-as-value derives from the more fundamental conception of truth-as-certitude. We recall from the Descartes-analysis that the certitude which is the essential characteristic of a present-ative subject consists in the subject's guaranteeing itself as present-ative, sc. assuring itself to its own satisfaction both of itself (present-ing) and of what it pro-poses (present-ed). This self-assurance which constitutes certitude is a derived form of truth-as-conformity (of present-ing to present-ed), which we ordinarily call "correctness" or "rightness." According to the new formula, truth consists not first of all in conformity but in the accommodation of every object-to-be-proposed to a standard imposed by the pro-posing subject itself, a standard dictated by the nature of the subject, sc. its exigency for clear and distinct ideas. When any given presentation satis-

24 "... Kunst ist das Wesen alles Wollens, das Perspektiven eröffnet und sie besetzt: ..." (HW, p. 222). For a full development of this theme, see "Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst," N, I, pp. 11-254.
fies this standard, then it is held to be correct (true) because it is certain.

A presentation thus certified is "right," and the certification renders "right" (recht-fertigt). Now when something is "rendered-right" (in this case a presentation), all is as it "should be." One may say that the situation is "just," for justice prescribes what is "right." If this terminology is acceptable, then the process of certification (of 'rendering-right') is a "justification" (Recht-fertigung). A subject justifies its presentations inssofar as it certifies them, sc. certifies the relation between itself and what it presented. "Justification" and "certification" are in this case synonymous.26

In Nietzsche, it is under the guise of "justification" and "justice" that the theme of certitude (certification) appears. Here the presentative, self-assuring subject is not an individual ego as in Descartes, but the Being of beings conceived as universal Will. Will-unto-Power sees itself as posing values through its Becoming, certifies this position and thereby justifies it. We have here, Heidegger argues, simply a new terminology to express what we have seen already as the self-certification of a presentative subject, where Will-unto-Power is the subject and the values are that which the subject (pro-)poses. "Justice, as conceived by Nietzsche, is the truth of beings [whose Being is conceived] as Will-unto-Power. . . ." 27

The words "justice" and "justification" for our purposes are not important. What is important is to see how Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's Will-unto-Power is but the elaboration and extension to a general ontology of Descartes' conception of a presentative subject that becomes certain of itself.28 This takes


28 Heidegger even thinks from Nietzsche back to Descartes. The reason why Descartes' individual ego can assure, sc. will, itself in certitude is that the Being of beings (Will-unto-Power as universal Self-certifying Subject) has a relation to the individual ego in the light (by the power) of which the individual wills its own certitude (VA, p. 86).
place in the certification of any given moment of attainment in the process of Becoming, a moment which is verifiable precisely because it has become a constant. This renders service to the component of augmentation in growth, for "... the certification of any given level of power is a necessary condition for an increase of power. ..." 29 The certification consists in holding-this-level-for-true (Für-wahr-halten), sc. for constant, definitively (once and for all) achieved. To certi-(veri-)fy as a constant that which Will itself proposes is to control this constant and submit it to the disposition of Will. 30 This rigorous certification Heidegger also calls exact "calculation" (Rechnung). "... Will-unto-Will is the supreme and unconditioned state of Awareness in the [process of] rigorously certifying [constants] through calculation."

Through this process of certification (calculation), the Will exercises dominion over what is constant, and to the extent that the plurality of constants constitute the "earth" on which man dwells, the universal Will, as the self-certifying Becoming that constitutes the Being of beings, is a process through which dominion-over-the-earth (Erdherrschaft) comes-to-pass. We can see here more clearly than when we first approached the problem in what sense willing is an exercise of power. For to exert dominion over the already achieved constant through continued certification of it is to exercise power, and the Will exerting that dominion wills power. To the extent that Will wills its continually augmented Becoming by successive moments of dominion over successively posed and successively overcome constants, the universal Will wills more power, sc. it is Will-unto-Power. 32

Before we proceed further, it is worthwhile insisting, if we are to keep our bearings, that up to the present we have considered always the present-ative Will as the Being of beings in the ensemble. In other words, beings for Nietzsche are the constants posed by universal, self-certifying Will, and their Being
Nietzsche consists precisely in their certifiable constancy, sc. their "truth," which is at once their value. Even at this point we can appreciate the sense of the critique which Heidegger makes of the whole process. On the one hand, Nietzsche is trying to overcome the nihilism of values which, for Heidegger, is the nihilism of metaphysics itself. On the other, he has gone about it by founding another philosophy of values, and this by resorting to conceptions that are themselves profoundly metaphysical: Being as a universal presentative subject (Will); truth-as-conformity-become-certitude. In his very struggle against metaphysical nihilism, then, Nietzsche has fallen prey to it in its purest form: the forgetfulness of Being (φαντάσει) itself. He has ignored the fact: that Being is the process by which beings emerge into non-concealment; that this non-concealment is the genuine meaning of truth (ἀλήθεια). His thought, then, far from being the overcoming of nihilism, is actually the supreme fulfillment of it, for the same reason that it is the consummation of metaphysics itself.33

But we are not yet at the end of our pains. If the Being of beings is Will-unto-Power, what must be said about the nature of man? His task is to assume his proper place among the ensemble of beings according to the nature of Being which permeates them all. More precisely, this means to respond to Being in beings (himself included) as Will-unto-Power, hence endorse with his own will this dominion-over-the-earth of universal Will by assuming the responsibility of achieving to the limit of his possibility the global certification in which the truth and value of all constants consist:

... Man certifies the material, corporal, psychic and spiritual constants, but [only] for the sake of his own certification that wills dominion over [all] beings insofar as they could become objects, so that [thus] he may respond to the Being of beings [as] Will-unto-Power.34

It is to achieve his own self-certitude, hence to achieve the truth that is proper to himself (and therefore to be true to himself), that man undertakes to dominate the earth:

34 "... der Mensch die stofflichen, leiblichen, seelischen und geistigen Bestände sichert, dies aber um seiner eigenen Sicherheit willen, die die Herrschaft über das Seiende als das mögliche Gegenständliche will, um dem Sein des Seienden, dem Willen zur Macht zu entsprechen." (HW, p. 242).
When Will-unto-Power..., as principle which poses value, is willed, then the domination over beings as such in the form of dominion over the earth passes over to man's new kind of willing, determined [as it is] by Will-unto-Power. ...35

This effort of man to dominate the earth is crystallized in the word "technicity" (Technik). All beings, even man himself, are objects of which he can dispose. Thus the Being of beings is no deeper than what man can certify (calculate), so that once the possibilities opened-up by calculation have been explored, the beings themselves have been completely exploited and used up, reduced to a dull and indistinctive uniformity.36 Such is the condition that characterizes contemporary society.

B. THE ETERNAL RETURN OF THE SELFSAME

The correlation between Being (universal Will) and man, however, Nietzsche experiences more surely than he explains.37 We see this better, perhaps, if we pass from the order of essence to the order of existence and consider the process of universal Becoming under the guise not (as hitherto) of Will-unto-Power but of the "eternal return of the selfsame."

In striving to overcome the nihilism of the times ("the desert grows"),38 Nietzsche wishes to discern how man may pass from his present condition to a new comprehension of Being and him-


36 HW, p. 237 (Vergegenständlichung); VA, pp. 96 (Verbrauch, Vernutzung), 97 (Gleichförmigkeit). See also VA, pp. 72, 80-81, 91-98. Cf. N, II, pp. 20-27 (Similärität). The word "technicity" applies, too, in a larger sense to Will-unto-Power itself and describes its fundamental form of appearance to modern man (v.g. VA, pp. 80, 87, 98). As for the import of "calculate," Heidegger insists on its essentially arithmetical connotation (rechnen: "reckon"). A reckoning thought, strictly speaking, is one that regards beings-to-be-known only insofar as they are capable of numeration. They are measured in terms of quantity, and since calculation of this type in measuring the largeness or smallness of beings can be extended indefinitely, a reckoning thought easily gives the impression of productivity (WM, p. 48).


38 WD, p. 11 and passim ("die Wüste wächst").
Nietzsche

self wherein this nihilism of values is dissolved. He wishes to find some “bridge” between man as he has been up to now and man in some better, sc. superior, condition. Nietzsche calls man as he has been hitherto the “last” man, and man as he should be the “superior,” or “super-,” man (Übermensch). The reason why man up to the present (let us simply say the “modern” man) is lost in the morass of a value-lessness (nihilism) is that he has not yet really entered into himself so that he could come to a proper appreciation of his own nature and assume it accordingly. The super-man is superior precisely in this, that he has comprehended himself in terms of his relationship with Being (conceived, of course, as Will-unto-Power). “... The super-man is he who first brings the essence of man as he has been up to now into the truth [about himself] and [then] assumes this truth [accordingly]. ...”

The difference between the two is not quantitative but qualitative, and seems to correspond exactly to what in Heidegger’s SZ context would be called the difference between the inauthentic and the authentic man. Effectively, then, Nietzsche’s problem as Heidegger sees it is this: how does man in the context of Will-unto-Power overcome his present fallen condition and achieve authenticity, sc. become super-man?

The answer is elaborated in Thus Spake Zarathustra (Also Sprach Zarathustra), the “book for everyone and no one”: for “everyone,” sc. for every man as man who seeks to comprehend the sense of his own essence; for “no one,” sc. for no man so victimized by the nihilism of values that he gives no thought to authenticity (such a one would find it unintelligible). Zarathustra is the form under which Nietzsche describes the passage unto authenticity. Zarathustra is not the super-man already achieved but super-man in the state of becoming. Zarathustra propounds the doctrine of super-man, and, indeed, principally by example. Hence the pedagogical value of Zarathustra’s self-interrogation: “... Does my will respond to that Will which,

as Will-unto-Power, dominates the totality of beings?" 40

Clearly, Zarathustra teaches here that the function of super-man
is a responding to Will-unto-Power as the Being of beings. Now
curiously enough, Zarathustra not only teaches the doctrine of
super-man but "the eternal return of the selfsame" as well. The
problem becomes: what is the relation between the achieving
of authenticity as super-man and Being conceived as "eternal
return"?

We must proceed in roundabout fashion. Let us take as guide-
line what seems to be an unlikely text from the second part of
Nietzsche's work, where Zarathustra remarks: "That man may
be delivered from [the spirit of] vengeance: this is for me a
bridge to the highest hope, the rainbow after a long storm." 41
In terms of what we have said, we take the text to mean that:
what characterizes modern man, victimized by the nihilism of
values, is a "spirit of vengeance"; what characterizes super-man,
Zarathustra's "highest hope," is freedom from this spirit; the
achieving of authenticity, the "bridge" from one to the other,
consists precisely in the liberation from this spirit of vengeance
as such. Let us see now more in detail what this implies. We pro-
ceed by formulating once more a series of propositions.

1. What characterizes the nihilism of modern man is "the spirit of
vengeance" (Geist der Rache).

We begin with the fact that modern man for Nietzsche has
not yet learned to appreciate his own nature. What is this
nature? Man is for Nietzsche, as the metaphysical tradition has
always conceived him to be, a rational animal. If we name the
animal element in man "sensible" and the rational element
"supra-sensible," then he is the sensible-supra-sensible being.
If we name the sensible "physical," then supra-sensible means
metaphysical. Man is the being, then, who accomplishes in him-
self the passage from physical to meta-physical; he is the meta-

40 "... entspricht mein Wille dem Willen, der als Wille zur Macht das Ganze des
Seienden durchherrscht?" (VA, p. 104). See WD, pp. 20-21 and VA, p. 101 ("für
Alle und Keinen"); WD, p. 27 and VA, p. 105 (werdende); WD, pp. 44-45 and VA,
p. 103 (Lehrer der ewigen Wiederkunft).
41 "Denn daß der Mensch erlöst werde von der Rache: das ist mir die Brücke zur
höchsten Hoffnung und ein Regenbogen nach langen Unwettern." (Nietzsche, Also
Sprach Zarathustra, Part II, cited with italics WD, p. 33).
physical being pure and simple (das Meta-physische selbst). For Nietzsche, Heidegger claims, man has not yet learned to appreciate the full sense of this fact.42

Now metaphysics has always interpreted the ratio of this rational animal as the power by which man renders beings present to himself, calculating them in terms of purpose, ends and means, causes and effects, etc., regulating his comportment with them accordingly, so that it is only the present-ational level of the beings encountered that has any value for him. So profoundly is present-ational thinking identified with the ratio of man that we might translate animal rationale as "the present-ative animal." 43

But the present-ational character of metaphysical thought has taken on for Nietzsche a special cast that is to be understood, Heidegger claims, when he speaks of the "spirit of vengeance." We must take the term very broadly and need not understand it at all in the ordinary sense of a "retaliation." Rather we are to understand more the sense of "doing violence," and, indeed, with a certain implacable vehemence that we find suggested in the phrase "with a vengeance," both of which nuances might be suggested, perhaps, by the single word "persecution." Now modern man for Nietzsche, as Heidegger reads him, not only pro-poses beings but "persecutes" (verfolgen) them, sc. pursues them, does violence to them, reduces them more and more to his own control, decom-poses them by his analyses, dis-poses of them at will. These various modalities of posing are derived from the fact that the original pro-posing has become distorted, we might almost say has become a de-posing. All of these modalities are to be understood when we speak of the "persecution" of beings, for the author suggests them all by the word nachstellen. At any rate, this is how he understands the "spirit of vengeance" from which the modern man must be delivered, if nihilism is to be overcome. We discern here once more the essential characteristics of technicity.44

42 WD, p. 25.
43 WD, pp. 27–28, 30 (ratio), 64 (Zielen, Zwecken, etc.).
44 WD, pp. 32–33, 36, 37 and VA, pp. 112–113 (verfolgen, nachstellen, herabsetzen, widersetzen).
2. The reason modern man remains inauthentic is that the "spirit of vengeance" is not compatible with an authentic response to Being as Pure Will.

... Insofar as man in his very essence ... is related to beings in their Being, hence to Being [itself], and by this very fact is [himself] determined by Being, then, in accordance with this relation of Being (sc. now Will) to the essence of man, man must also appear in a special way as a willing.\textsuperscript{45}

Now the manner in which man's Being as a willing comes to expression in his activity indicates how man himself understands not only his own Being but also the Being of beings as such. That modern man's activity is marked by the "spirit of vengeance" betrays the fact that his comprehension of Being as Will-unto-Power is very faulty, his response inadequate. For when we understand the full import of Being as Will-unto-Power, we see that the "spirit of vengeance" is completely foreign to it and man must be delivered from this spirit completely.

The "spirit of vengeance" is foreign to Will as Will. Why? Because it implies that whatever it is to which violence is done somehow resists Will, hence, initially at least, would seem to lie beyond its power and need to be subdued. But it is repugnant to universal Will that anything resist it in any way. The reason is that willing in its purity implies a domination over what is willed. The only "subduing" is a self-subduing, as, for example, when Will poses and then overcomes the conditions of its own unfolding. In the process of willing as such, the Will wills itself and nothing outside of it can "resist." As we saw, this is the way in which Nietzsche establishes a new set of values, whose function is to replace the old "metaphysical" values which had pretended to be "absolute" precisely inasmuch as they "resist" any such evolution which is the essence of Being-as-Will.\textsuperscript{46} The "spirit of vengeance," then, is repugnant to Pure Will, hence no response to Being-as-Will that is marked by this spirit is authentic.

\textsuperscript{45} "... Insofern aber der Mensch seinem Wesen nach als das denkende Tier vorstellenderweise auf das Seiende in seinem Sein und damit auf dieses bezogen und dadurch vom Sein her bestimmt wird, muß diesem Bezug des Seins (d.h. jetzt des Willens) zum Menschensein gemäß auch das Menschsein auf betonte Weise als ein Wollen erscheinen." (WD, p. 36). See VA, pp. 114-115.

\textsuperscript{46} VA, p. 117.
3. To achieve authenticity, man must respond to the universal Will as the "eternal return of the selfsame."

Nothing is so independent of the process of pure Willing that it "resists" Will – not even time. What is time for Nietzsche? Like everyone before him since Aristotle, Nietzsche conceives time as an endless succession of "nows," whereby the not-yet-"now" (future) passes by the present "now" to become immediately a no-longer-"now" which we may call a "was" ("es war"). The past "resists" universal Will, which, as pure Will-unto-Willing, is always facing forward toward more Willing. If there were ever anything that could "resist" pure Will so that Will could pursue and subdue it in the "spirit of vengeance," it would certainly be the immutable past.47

But that is just the point. Nietzsche so conceives pure Will(ing) that the immutable "was" of time is dissolved in a "now" that abides, a nunc stans. Does time remain for Will unto Power? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the movement of successive "nows" remains. No, in the sense that the movement never passes into the irretrievable "was" but keeps coming back upon Will, circle-fashion, so as constantly to be willed again. Time remains, if one will, for how can we speak of Being in a human way except in terms of time? But it is purified of that which makes it "merely temporal," sc. makes it become a "past." If it makes any sense, we might even say that time for Nietzsche becomes "eternalized." However this may be, let us designate the movement of which we speak here as a "return" and its per-durance as "eternal." Then we understand how Nietzsche conceives "the eternal return of the selfsame": it is "the supreme triumph of the metaphysics of Will," whereby "...Will eternally wills the eternity of willing...." 48

To respond to Being-as-Will in all its purity means to comprehend and acquiesce to Will as "eternal return." By such a response, modern man achieves authenticity, sc. becomes superman:

47 WD, pp. 42, 36–37, 43. Cf. p. 43, where Heidegger suggests an interesting analysis in terms of hate.
48 "...Das ist er, wenn er als Wille die Ewigkeit des Wollens ewig will...." (WD, p. 77). See VA, pp. 102–103 (Kreis); WD, p. 43 (der höchste Triumph der Metaphysik des Willens). Cf. N, II, pp. 11, 284–287.
The super-man becomes superior to man as he has been up to now, inasmuch as he enters into relation to Being, which, as [the] Will[ing] of the eternal return of the selfsame, eternally wills itself and nothing else besides. . . .

4. Hence Zarathustra leads the way to super-man by teaching the "eternal return."

The bridge to authenticity is the liberation of man from the manner of thinking characterized by the "spirit of vengeance." It is the task of Zarathustra to preach this liberation:

Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? He is the teacher whose doctrine would liberate [man's] previous [manner of] thinking from the spirit of vengeance unto a yes to the eternal return of the self-same, which is a yes to the e-valuation by which nihilism is overcome. Zarathustra preaches the super-man because, and only inasmuch as, he preaches the eternal return. He proclaims both at once, for they are correlative: the Being of beings and the nature of man. Indeed, "... Zarathustra is himself in a certain way this correlation..."

But farther than this Nietzsche cannot go. To go farther would be to think the correlation between Being and the nature of man as such. "This . . . relation of Being to man's essence as the relationship of this essence to Being is, in terms of the essence of this [relationship] and the origin of this essence, not yet thought. . . ." To think it means to go beyond metaphysics with its interpretation of man as rational animal. It means to pass from present-ative thinking unto foundational thought. Nietzsche, slave to present-ative thinking, could not take this step. That is why Heidegger feels he has the right to ask if this . . .


"bridge to the highest hope" does not in fact lead to a desolation still more profound, the desolate nihilism of remaining oblivious to the Being-process itself.

RÉSUMÉ

Nietzsche seeks to salvage nineteenth-century Europe from its nihilism of values (the dead "God") by a philosophy of universal Becoming which would render possible a re-valuation. If we consider this Life-force in terms of essence as Will-unto-Power, we see that it simply evolves to their ultimate consequence the implications latent in metaphysical subject-ism with its conception of truth as certitude. For, once Descartes's subject-ism of the individual ego has been so expanded by Leibniz that all beings become present-ative subjects, and once the interior dynamism which propels the present-ative activity of each subject is conceived to be a drive toward perfection which may be interpreted quite legitimately as "will," subsequent forms of subject-ism become in one way or another a metaphysics of will, whether will be interpreted as reason (Kant), freedom (Fichte), love (Schelling), Absolute Spirit (Hegel), etc. When at last subject-ism in Nietzsche becomes a philosophy of will simply considered as will, sc. of Will- unto-Power, the last possibility of metaphysical subject-ism has been exploited. This is the sense in which Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's thought is the "consummation" (Vollendung) of metaphysics in the West.

But, for the same reason, this thought is the consummation — not the overcoming — of nihilism, too, for it is metaphysics itself that is nihilism, inasmuch as it is oblivious to the Being-process. Nietzsche can not think the essence of nihilism (metaphysics) until he re-collects that Being is the process of emergent truth.

If we consider the Life-force in terms of existence as the eternal return of the selfsame, we discover under the guise of Zarathustra that Being and man are correlative, yet the corre-

83 VA, p. 124 and WD, p. 74 (Denken); WD, p. 76 (Verwüstung); VA, pp. 121, 122.
85 VA, p. 91; N, I. pp. 469, 476–481.
lation cannot be explained as such. For Nietzsche's man is only "rational animal" — the man of traditional metaphysics itself. Nietzsche can not think this correlation until he conceives man as more than a rational animal, sc. in terms of his relation to Being as such.

In each case, the mark of Nietzsche's failure is that he remains prisoner of metaphysics. To succeed at what he attempts to do, one would have to go beyond metaphysics into its ground. One would have to think Being (ἀ-λῆθες) as the process out of which the ontological difference arises, and this in its intimate correlation with the essence of man. This is what Heidegger himself has tried to do — to overcome metaphysics in grounding it through the achievement of foundational thought.56

56 See HW, p. 243.
We have traced what Heidegger considers to be the de-
volution of Western thought from Plato to Nietzsche under the
guise of metaphysics. We wish now to review the same history
from two particular points of view which are for our problem
especially important. The first deals with the science of logic,
the second with the problem of humanism.

We know already, at least in a general way, how λόγος in the
sense of a gathering-together comes to mean the expression of
a judgement, which becomes thus the proper place of truth. It is
but one step further to say that the expressed judgement becomes,
too, the tribunal which decides upon the nature of beings and
Being. For an expression is always about something (κατά τινος). This something can be expressed in different ways: according
to its quantity, its qualities, its relationships. These different
manners of declaring (κατηγορείν) the something with which
expressions deal are the categories (κατηγορίαι) and are taken to
be the determinations of Being.¹ Henceforth, the doctrine of the
categories will have an unchallenged place in all ontology, the
"science of beings." Let it suffice here simply to underline the
fact that the categories are basically forms of declaration, sc. of
expression, hence of thought, that assume unto themselves the
determination of Being.

As the meaning of λόγος was transformed, so, too, was that
of νοεῖν. The latter no longer signifies the containment of the

¹ See P, p. 142. Cf. N, II, pp. 71-78. For another development of the relation be-
tween logic and metaphysics in the West, see N, I, pp. 327-333.
Over-powering but comes to signify that seizure of the to-be-known which penetrates it through and through, and which, when clothed in words, forms the complete expression. This perceptive seizure that comes to expression is what essentially characterizes the understanding in the sense of a presentation-in-form-of-judgement.\(^2\) \(\text{Noētiv}\) thus becomes understanding and reason, which thereby come to the place of primacy, of domination over Being.\(^3\)

The domination of man’s reason over Being reaches its culmination, according to Heidegger, in the science of logic, which, as the “science of thought,” is just such a tribunal before which Being must stand.\(^4\) The term “science of logic” translates the Greek \(\text{ἡ ἐπιστήμη λόγος, “the comprehending [Verstehen] which concerns λόγος,” where λόγος is the substantive form of the verb λέγειν. In this case, λέγειν means to speak or say something about something, λέγειν περί κατά πνοής. That about which something is said “lies underneath” (ὑποστήμενον) the whole saying, supporting it, hence is called the “subject” (sub-jectum) of the saying; what is said about the subject is called the “predicate,” the whole operation a “predication.” This predication is what we have been calling an “expression.”\(^5\)

The thought with which logic deals is a thought that is articulated by expression and is interpreted in terms of expression. Hence, only that is thinkable which is say-able. Now it is conceivable that we try to formulate a proposition where \(S\) and \(P\) are incompatible, because they cannot be “said” together, v.g. “square” and “circle.” Both “circle” and “square” can be said (-dictio) individually but not together, for they oppose (contra-),

\(^2\) EM, p. 142. Heidegger sees the origin of ratio (ratio) in the Greek ἥμα, “to speak,” “talk over or out” (Durchsprechen), hence to thoroughly explore (Durchnehmen) and thus enter into the possession of something. This taking unto oneself he understands as essentially a pro-posing (WD, p. 27).

\(^3\) EM, pp. 136-137. Cf. p. 35, where the author characterizes the domination of the intelligence to the detriment of the “spirit” thus: intelligence has become mere intellectuality (Verständigkeit), whose function is reduced to reflection upon (Überlegung), calculation about (Berechnung) and contemplation (Betrachtung) of the things that are given to it, their possible modification and multiplication.

\(^4\) EM, p. 19.

\(^5\) See WD, pp. 99-101. Aristotle’s διάλεξα played a decisive rôle in the development of logic. Heidegger understands the word literally as a “tool” for gaining and assuring correctness (EM, p. 143). However this may be, he makes it clear that the science of logic, in the pejorative sense by which he usually refers to it, is not to be attributed to Aristotle himself but to his disciples (EM, p. 92).
therefore contra-dict, each other. Because two contradictory terms cannot be said together, sc. identified by a copula, the corresponding concepts cannot be thought together. That is why, according to Heidegger, the "principle of contra-diction" becomes the first law of (logical) thought. It is an easy step to see how such a law of thought immediately dominates the Being of beings. Whatever cannot be thought cannot be, whatever can be thought can be, where can-be and cannot-be always pertain to that which is (beings), sc. that about which the expression is made.

With time, it becomes clear that this simple pattern does not satisfy all possible situations, so that the conception of λόγος has to be broadened. After all, simple expressions often have more than one meaning. For example, if we take the expression, "God is the Absolute," the sense changes according to emphasis. If we say "God is the Absolute," this means that God alone is the Absolute. If we say "God is the Absolute," this means that it is the nature of God to be absolute. The simple expression "says" both these meanings, hence for its full sense to be articulated the expression must be thoroughly (δια-) explored in itself for all possible implications (λέγεισθαι). Such exploration is a dia-lectic (διαλέγεισθαι), and the thought that is embodied in it is "dia-lectical." 6

The essential here is not that logic necessarily becomes a dia-lectic but that "... even in a dialectic, thought is determined by the expression, λόγος ..." 7 The clearest proof of this is Hegel, for, after the ground has been prepared by Kant's "transcendental logic," Hegel thinks the dialectic through to its ultimate consequences and brings it to definitive expression as the dialectic of the Absolute Subject in his master work, the Science of Logic. When Hegel's dialectic of consciousness becomes with Marx one of "reality" (Realdialektik) as dialectical materialism, the matter is no different, for even in a dialectic of "objects," the "objects" are at least implicitly objects of some

6 WD, pp. 101, 119–120. The term διαλογισμός for Heidegger has a sense analogous to διαλέγεισθαι, where νοεῖ has become perception by a ratio, hence the term suggests dialectic as considered from the viewpoint of the reason or understanding. See WD, pp. 146, 138.

7 "... Auch in der Dialektik wird das Denken von der Aussage, vom λόγος her bestimmt..." (WD, p. 101).
knowing subject, hence such a dialectic is in one form or another a dialectic of Self-awareness, hence ultimately a form of logic. When logic under still another form becomes for contemporary thought "symbolic" logic, this is simply the ultimate deterioration of logic-become-expression.\(^8\)

Out of all this, let us retain that Heidegger's polemic vs. logic (the "domination of reason") is not a repudiation of its rights but a protest against its aggrandizement. For the presumption of reason to arrogate to itself the right to pronounce judgement upon Being is, when all is said and done, a usurpation by which Being itself is impoverished and constrained to the narrow limits of man. There is something "more original" in man than his reason, for the *lumen naturale* of his intelligence presupposes the lighting-process of Being. Foundational thought, as Heidegger conceives it, is merely an effort to allow to Being (the lighting-process) its full rights. That is why "... foundational thinking begins only when we have experienced the fact that reason, glorified [as it has been] for hundreds of years, is the most stubborn adversary of thought."\(^9\)

**RÉSUMÉ**

Once \(\lambda\gamma\omicron\sigma\) loses the sense of "gathering-together" and comes to mean the expression that embodies thought, then the laws of expression become the laws of thought and the science of logic is born. Since expressions always refer to beings (\(\chi\alpha\tau\alpha\pi\gamma\omicron\sigma\)), logical thought can not deal with the Being-process as such. Heidegger's polemic vs. logic is fundamentally a protest against the tendency of logical thought to pronounce upon Being itself and thereby to dominate it.

\(^8\) WD, pp. 145, 146 (Kant, Hegel), 170 (Marx), 102, 145 (Logistik). In 1955, symbolic logic is seen as evidence of man's flight from the necessity of interrogating his own metaphysical situation (SF, p. 13).

The word "humanism" is a specifically Roman phenomenon, insofar as it derives from the republican era when the word *humanus* was used to distinguish the *homo romanus* from the *homo barbarus* by reason of the Roman's cultural superiority. This was based upon the Roman's appropriation of the Greek *παιδεία*, interpreted in the Platonic schools of the later period as *erudītio et institutio in bonas artes*.

What *παιδεία* meant for Plato himself we can gather, to some extent, from the story of the cave-dwellers, for this pretends to delineate, after its own fashion, the nature of *παιδεία*. This pretension explains the importance in the metaphor of the transition from one place of sojourn to another. *Παιδεία* is the conversion of the entire man in the depths of his Being. It is not simply an accumulation of mere knowledge but a complete transformation by reason of which man is transferred from the domain of beings that he first of all and for the most part encounters (v.g. the shadows) into another realm where beings in their essence shine-forth. To make an adaptation to this new realm and consequently to assume an orientation toward that which shines-forth as supremely un-concealed (the Ideas) – this is the essence of *παιδεία*. There is an intrinsic relation, then, between *παιδεία* and the conception of truth. And as truth in the sense of non-concealment is essentially negated, so, too, is *παιδεία*. Until the very end, it continues to be a struggle to overcome non-*παιδεία* (*ἄπαιδευσις*): such is the meaning of the fourth stage of the story.¹

¹ PW, pp. 24-25 (Höhlengleichnis), 23 (Umwendung), 25-26 (Versetzung), 23-24 (ἄπαιδευσις).
All this could be given an interpretation that would correspond with Heidegger's conception of the essence of man as a relationship to Being. But Plato understands it otherwise and the difference is revealing. Whoever is to have commerce with a world determined by Ideas must have an antecedent vision of those Ideas. The essence of πνεύμα, then, is to render man free and steadfast for the intuition of essence. Henceforth there will be a striving after the "truth," sc. correctness, of intuition. The "right" glimpse of the Ideas is all-important. The sense of πνεύμα is correlative with the sense of truth.2

As the author sees it, the dichotomy in πνεύμα between seeing and seen contains within it already, even if still undeveloped, the fundamental pattern of present-ative thought which the subjectivism of modern metaphysics will only unfold. Such is the πνεύμα, in its very essence metaphysical, that Rome, through the Middle Academy, proudly makes its own. When the Renaissance proclaims a renascens romanitas (therefore humanitas) to liberate itself from what it considers to be the barbarism of the "gothic" Middle Ages, its ideal is ultimately the πνεύμα of the Neo-Platonic academies. So, too, the humanism of the Enlightenment. Thus it happens in each case that one returns to the study of classical (Roman and Greek) antiquity.3

If humanism is taken out of this purely historical context, however, and examined for itself, it may be described as the liberating of man unto the dignity that is proper to his nature. This gives the term a broader meaning that can apply to any type of philosophical anthropology, such as Marxism, Sartrean existentialism or even Christianity, if this be considered in its purely human dimension. The form of humanism differs, of course, according to the way one conceives "liberation" and the "dignity of man," but there is one common denominator: "... the humanitas of homo humanus is determined with a view to some already established interpretation of nature, history, the world, ground of the world, sc. of beings in the ensemble." 4

2 PW, pp. 40 (frei und fest), 46-47 (Wandel des Wesens der ἀληθεύα).
3 HB, pp. 62-63.
But any interpretation of beings in the ensemble as such, sc., in their Being, is clearly metaphysics. That is why "every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or itself becomes the ground of one. . . ."⁵ Metaphysical in its historical origin, metaphysical in its form, humanism shares the same destiny as metaphysics. For example, when we are told that Marxist humanism experiences the alienation (Entfremdung) of modern man, this is but an ulterior form of Nietzschean nihilism, sc. the forgottenness of Being. The essence of materialism, for Heidegger, lies not in the fact that it reduces all reality to matter but that it is only another form of technicity, sc. obliviousness to the ontological difference. The same may be said of all forms of nationalism, for that matter of internationalism – collectivism of any kind⁶ – for this is simply the subjectiveness of man taken as a totality. None of these forms of modern man's homelessness can be cured simply by a humanism of another sort. It is metaphysics (therefore humanism) itself which must be overcome.

What is the fundamental conception of man for the humanistic tradition? Animal rationale! This is more than simply a translation of Aristotle’s ζῷον λόγον ἔχων. It is a metaphysical interpretation. Now Heidegger is at pains to insist that he does not consider this definition false and to be rejected, but only that it is locked within metaphysics and unable to escape its limitations.⁷ What is the essence of his criticism? We have seen it before: the definition interprets man in relation to animals, even when it distinguishes him from them by a specific difference. To speak of him subsequently as subject, person, spirit, etc. does not deliver him from the horizon of animality in which the original definition has fixed him.

But such an interpretation sells man too short, leaves the true value of his humanity, sc. his relation to Being, unthought. It does not even do justice to man's body, for this is essentially different from an animal organism, no matter how similar in structure, for, after all, is not every part of him in one way or another geared to that which is unique in him, the uttering of

---

⁵ "Jeder Humanismus gründet entweder in einer Metaphysik, oder er macht sich selbst zum Grund einer solchen . . ." (HB, pp. 65–64).
⁶ HB, pp. 87 (Heimatlosigkeit), 88 (Wesen des Materialismus), 89 (Kollektivismus).
⁷ HB, pp. 64, 66, 73, 89.
language? However this may be, the author's position is clear. "... Metaphysics thinks man from [his] animality, not to his humanity." 8

So much for the metaphysical definition of man – now let us say a word about his structure. Metaphysics normally speaks of man as composed of essence and existence. For the scholastics, existence means "actuality" in distinction from essence understood as "possibility" (in the sense of the shining-forth of a being in its "Idea"), but the same duality perdures in one form or another through all metaphysics. It matters little if existence be called in Kant the "objectivity of experience," in Hegel the "Self-knowing Idea of Absolute Subjectivity," or in Nietzsche "the eternal return of the selfsame." the terms remain always a manner of expressing the metaphysical conception of rendering actual an essence that in one way or another precedes. When Sartre reverses the formula but retains the original terms of it, saying that existence precedes essence, it may be that he reverses the sense of metaphysics that since Plato has always thought essence as somehow prior, but (whatever his personal sympathies) he remains himself all the more profoundly metaphysical. "... The reversal of a metaphysical principle remains a metaphysical principle..." 9 and with the reversal Sartre in our own day has simply calcified metaphysics further in the forgottenness of the truth of Being.

How Heidegger breaks the circle we already have some idea, for he conceives man on a level deeper than that of the traditional essence-existence dichotomy. He interprets man purely out of his relationship to Being – as transcendence, as existence. How this is interpreted in terms of humanism we shall see in due time. For the moment, it suffices to remark – and let this serve as résumé – that since metaphysics and humanism are so intrinsically related, the effort to go beyond metaphysics in order to ground it comports a new notion of the nature of man.10

9 "... Aber die Umkehrung eines metaphysischen Satzes bleibt ein metaphysischer Satz..." (HB, p. 72). See pp. 70 (Verwirklichung), 69 (Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche).
10 Wm, p. 9 (Wandel des Wesens des Menschen).
We have seen in its essentials how Heidegger considers the history of metaphysics to be a de-volution of authentic thought as discernible in the λέγειν-νοεῖν of Parmenides and Heraclitus. We are prepared to appreciate the sense of Heidegger’s effort to re-trive the original sense of these terms under the guise of foundational thought. By way of transition, let us see briefly how the author interprets the lyric poet R. M. Rilke. For Heidegger, Rilke is the poet par excellence of metaphysics in its consummation as we saw it in Nietzsche, having experienced and expressed in words the Being of beings as universal Will, whose nature is simply to be itself as Will. “... The [universal] Will comes to presence as a Will unto Willing.”¹ Yet there is something genuine in his experience of how it was to be overcome, and this entitles him to be called a “poet for needy times.”² We polarize our résumé around these two points.

A. RILKE AND NIHILISM

I. Being as Will

Will- unto-Power can be discerned in all the metaphors which Rilke uses in order to describe the Being of beings. Consider the

¹ “... Der Wille west als der Wille zum Willen.” (HW, p. 258). As with Nietzsche, we must make an effort to realize that “Will” here is not a psychological phenomenon but a manner in which to speak of Being.

² The phrase “needy times” refers to Hölderlin’s “Brod und Wein”: “... and whereunto the poet in needy times?” The sense: the times are needy because of the nihilism which Nietzsche observed; what, then, is the function of a poet as such in overcoming this nihilism? Heidegger cites the Hölderlin text and uses it to give a title to his essay (“... und wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?,” cited HW, p. 248).
most important ones. Being is conceived as "Nature." After the fashion of Leibniz' *Natura*, Nature for Rilke is the universal force that permeates all beings, "lets them loose" from one point of view, "gathers them into themselves" from another. The result is that beings are, not simply because they are willed but because they *are-willing*, sc. are *as* willing, by reason of the Will that makes them be. In the same sense, note Being as "Life," "Venture," "Ground," "Center." ³

This last metaphor has a double sense. Being is to be understood as a sort of gravitational force drawing all beings unto their true selves, giving them "weight" *as* beings. By the same token, however, it draws them unto itself, therefore unto one another, gathering them thus unto a single unit. This drawing power of Being is a "Traction" (*Zug*, *Bezug*), which works its influence in beings, each in its own way, by "attraction" (*Anziehung*).⁴ All of these terms say the same thing: they designate the ensemble of beings as such, sc. in their Being, interpreted as universal Will.

Rilke's most significant term for Being, however, is "the Open." Being is the Open insofar as it admits of no enclosures within itself. It is the universal drawing power of pure Traction that encompasses all beings, drawing them into a Whole that dissolves all barriers between them. Obviously Being as the Open is another form of Being as universal Will. We must be careful, however, not to let a similarity in terminology lead us to think that we are dealing with the same conception of the Open that we have met in Heidegger. Far from it. Heidegger's Open is that which renders beings open, hence accessible one to another, able to encounter each other. But *en-counter* implies opposition, therefore enclosures that separate the two beings that meet. These, however, are just the sort of barriers between beings that Rilke's Open excludes. Where there is a genuine meeting of beings or opposition between them, this takes place outside the Open as such.⁵

⁴ *HW*, pp. 260–261 (Zug, Bezug), 261 (Anziehung).
⁵ *HW*, p. 262 ("das Offene").
2. Man

This being the case, we see immediately that we must distinguish beings according to the relation they bear to each other and to the Open. Beings other than man are found "in" the Open, propelled by blind drive into the pure Traction of the Whole. Man, however, because he is endowed with the power to encounter beings, sc. to enter into comportment with them as opposed to him, is to this extent outside the Open as Rilke conceives it.

What is it that distinguishes man from other beings? It is this power to deal with that which stands opposed to him, sc. that peculiar psychic structure that we call consciousness, by which man pro-poses to himself the objects with which he deals. What distinguishes man from other beings is that he enjoys a higher level of consciousness (another Leibnizian thesis), founded more ultimately still on the Cartesian principle that what properly characterizes the ego-cogito is the power to pro-pose objects.

This power of consciousness is that special property of man which characterizes his at-traction as a being. Consciousness is what most profoundly characterizes man in the depths of his Being. It is the specifically human "activity," if we may use this ambiguous term simply in its broadest sense to suggest man's Being in action. If Being is a Willing, then human consciousness, too, is a willing, the manner in which man is (willing) as a being. That is why the pro-posing power of human consciousness and all the comportment that it implies is a willing.

Because of the privileged nature of the Willing that constitutes him as a being, man is not absorbed into the universal Traction the way other beings are, but is endowed with an independence (liberty) by which he can go along spontaneously of his own accord with Being, pro-posing beings for and to himself. The power to pro-pose we have seen before. Here the theme re-

---

6 HW, p. 263.
7 HW, pp. 265, 282.
8 HW, p. 266. The scholastics distinguish voluntas ut natura and voluntas ut facultas. To the extent that the language is acceptable, one might say that the present conception corresponds to voluntas ut natura. The observation, however, has only illustrative value.
turns with an insistence not only upon the pro-posing of individual objects but of the whole ensemble of beings, sc. of Nature, the Open as the World. Because man pro-poses the Open to himself, he is excluded from it, takes his de-parture (*Abschied*) from it, rather stands before it, lets it stand before him as an object related to him as subject.⁹

All that is new here is another word to describe the pro-posing, sc. "com-posing," or, as we prefer to translate in the present context, "contra-posing," which is intended to suggest a whole manifold of nuances, the common denominator of which is that man not only pro-poses objects but controls (or tries to control) these objects, so as to suit his own disposition.¹⁰ The essential is that man becomes the center of reference for beings to such an extent that in objectivizing beings, sc. pro-posing them as objects and entering into comportment with them accordingly, he imposes himself upon them by referring them to his own purposes. Here we find the command character of Will in the comportment of man's consciousness:

... In a willing of this sort, modern man presents himself as the one who in all his relations to everything that is, hence even to himself, rises up as the self-imposing com-poser of them all and establishes this ascendancy as an unconditioned domination over [all beings]. ...¹¹

The result is that, if beings still have a presence, it is only the presence of (re)present-ation in and for a consciousness that is by nature calculating. This pro-posing present-ation does not have any intuitive contact with beings-to-be-known. The visage of beings themselves is no longer viewed immediately but is sacrificed to the projects of pro-posing, present-ing consciousness. Hence beings owe their present-ness to the activity of man's pro-posing power and "... the sphere of the objective-ness of

---

⁹ HW, pp. 265, 266 (mit), 271 (Abschied), 262 (vor die Welt), 265-266 (in den Stand gebracht).

¹⁰ We are trying to render *Herstellen*, which in itself would be translated better as "pro-duce," but which we render as "com-pose" ("contra-pose") for reasons that appear as we proceed.

¹¹ "... Der neuzeitliche Mensch stellt sich in solchem Wollen als den heraus, der in allen Beziehungen zu allem, was ist, und damit auch zu ihm selbst, als der sich durchsetzende Hersteller aufsteht und diesen Aufstand zur unbedingten Herrschaft einrichtet..." (HW, p. 266). See pp. 265-266 (vorsätzlichen Sichdurchsetzens der Vergegenständlichung. Befehl).
objects remains inside of consciousness. . ."  

Hand in hand with all this goes the supremacy of man's reason (the power of calculation par excellence) and, of course, the domination of logic over man's interpretation of beings.

The consequence of all this is clear: technicity. As we know already, the word does not designate simply technology, sc. the mechanical techniques of contemporary civilization that scientific progress has made possible. Rather it is the fundamental attitude in man by which all beings, even man himself, become raw material for his pro-posing, contra-posing, (self)im-posing comportment with beings. Technology is simply the instrumentation of this attitude, the organization of man's de-parture from the Open.  

B. RILKE'S ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME NIHILISM

1. Theory

Now Rilke is aware of this situation, which corresponds to what Nietzsche called nihilism. He knows that something must change. What then does he propose? On the one hand, man must overcome the consequence of the subject-object polarity and the de-parture it implies (in a word: technicity); on the other hand, he cannot abandon his own nature as a conscious (therefore pro-posing) being. Is reconciliation possible? Yes, replies Heidegger for Rilke, provided that man find in himself a deeper level of consciousness: the interior world of the heart. There and only there can he accomplish his return into that totality which is the Open. What does this mean?

As long as man remains exclusively on the level of the subject-object opposition, his de-parture from the Open is irreversible. Even if he tries to set up some sort of barrier to protect himself from technicity, the barrier itself would be separative, would widen the distance between man and the Open. But if man were to recognize his de-parture as a de-parture, would not the recognition itself, without removing the dichotomy, be nevertheless


13 HW, pp. 267 (Sichdurchsetzeng), 268 (Instrument der Einrichtung), 271 (Organisation des Abschieds).
a type of return? In this case, man would see the danger of technicity as threatening his own fundamental belongingness to the Open which, after all, constitutes him in his Being. "... Once we have seen the danger [of technicity] as a threat to our own essence, inevitably we have accomplished the reversal of the departure from the Open..."  

This supposes, however, some contact with the Open that permits man to see that this subject-object opposition is only one form of his dealings with it. He must experience the many-sidedness of Being. For Being is a sphere, like the moon, only one side of which can be "seen" by calculating present-ation. For present-ational thought, only what it can (re)present can be considered positive. But the other side of the sphere is equally positive. If the sphere of Being were taken as life, for example, then death would be a side of it that is turned away from man, whose calculating reason would consider it as something purely negative. To experience the totality of the Open in this case would be to experience death as a positive side of Being. The essential is that these positive sides of Being, that are, however, "turned away" from man, are inaccessible to present-ational thought.

But they are not altogether inaccessible. The level of objectivizing present-ation is only one level of man's conscious life, and, indeed, a superficial one. There is another level, more profound: the interior world of the heart. Did not Pascal, almost contemporaneously with Descartes, proclaim the "logic of the heart"? Here in this invisible center, man discovers how and what to love. This inner world of the heart remains immanent, to be sure, but within it the barriers of calculating present-ation dissolve, and beings are free to flow together in union with the common Traction of the Open. Such is the reversal of man's departure from the Open that Rilke suggests as antidote to technicity: "... the reversal of consciousness is a re-collection of the immanence of objects of present-ation into a presence within the realm of the heart."  

14 "... Mit dem Gesehenhaben der Gefahr als der Wesensgefahr müssen wir die Umkehrung der Abkehr gegen das Offene vollzogen haben...." (HW, p. 277).
15 HW, pp. 279-280 (Tod).
2. Practice

Even if we grant all this, the essential question remains: how does Rilke intend to effect the re-collection (Er-innerung)? The poet himself does not say, but Heidegger replies in his name: by poetry. Such is the function of the poet in time of need. The argument: Rilke speaks of the re-collection being achieved by the more “venture-some” among men. Recalling that “Venture” is one name for Being as Will, Heidegger suggests that he is “more” venture-some who is endowed in an extraordinary way with access to Being, sc. he who has access to “more” than Being, if this be considered from the point of view of beings. Now how does man fundamentally have access to Being? Here Heidegger speaks for himself: by language. We have seen in EM how such a thesis becomes plausible as soon as we re-tieve the authentic meaning of λόγος. For the present, let us (provisionally) accept the thesis without further comment, for the sake of the present analysis. If language is the privileged means of access to Being, then how can anyone be called “more” venture-some except in terms of language? Every man, of course, has the power of language, but the more venture-some (Being-full, if one may say so) among men will be those endowed with a special gift for language. These are the poets.17

Rilke, the poet, attempts to accomplish the reversal of man’s departure from the Open by means of language. Each level of man’s conscious life has a language proper to itself. On the level of present-ative objectivation and calculating reason, language is merely the expression of a judgement to be used as an instrument of human intercourse. In the realm of the heart, language yields (without reflecting upon itself and making itself an object) to what is to-be-said, simply because it must be said. It is this latter type that Rilke ambitions – the language of the heart. He will have nothing to do with the language of proposing, contra-proposing, (self)im-posing thought. He will bring the pure Traction of the Open in its undiminished totality into words, and this means to belong himself completely to the domain of beings. Yet there is no “forcing” into words. On the contrary, the poet must receive what is to be said, must accept it as coming from a

17 HW, pp. 274, 287 (wollender, wagender), 291 (Sagenderen).
Source and, having accepted it, must let it unfold unto its fullness. The true poet does not compose, he fulfills.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{C. HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF RILKE}

1. \textit{Debit}

What is Heidegger’s own judgement of Rilke? As with the Hegel analysis, there is no explicit critique as such and we must disengage it from occasional remarks that slip into a more general exposé. We can crystallize it in terms of what we have seen about the de-volution of Western thought under the guise of subject-ism in general and of logic in particular.

a. \textbf{ Subject-ism} – Despite his efforts to overcome technicity, Rilke remains locked in the subject-ism of which technicity is but a consequence. To be sure, he tries to overcome the present-ative objectivation of the subject-object polarity. But how? By a subject-ism still more profound. The inner world of the heart is simply a deeper level within the conscious subject, but it remains within it. If Rilke comes to speak of the Being of beings as “worldly present-ness,” or even as “existence” (\textit{Dasein}), this presence remains referred to the present-ness proper to consciousness ([re]present-ation), even if consciousness be understood as the inner world of the heart which has complete access to the Open. That is why it does not occur to Rilke to interrogate further the nature of this inner realm:

\ldots Rilke does not meditate any more closely the spatiality of this inner world, nor does he, moreover, ask whether or not this inner world, since after all it gives sojourn to worldly presence, is itself, together with this presence, grounded in a temporality whose essential time, in conjunction with essential space, forms the original unity of that time-space domain in terms of which Being itself comes-to-presence.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} HW, pp. 291 (sich in die Sage einläßt), 294 (In andere Weise als … Sichdurchsetzen), 292 (in den Bezirk des Seienden selbst), 275 (empfängt).

\textsuperscript{19} A bit of a day’s work for a poet. “… Auch Rilke bedenkt weder die Räumlichkeit des Weltinnenraumes näher, noch fragt er gar, ob nicht der Weltinnenraum, da er doch der weltischen Präsenz Aufenthalt gibt, mit dieser Präsenz in einer Zeitslichkeit gründet, deren wesenhafte Zeit mit dem wesenhaften Raum die ursprüngliche Einheit desjenigen Zeit-Raumes bildet, als welcher gar das Sein selbst west.” (HW, p. 283). See HW, pp. 283, 288 (innerhalb der Sphäre der Subjektität), 281-282 (Immanenz), 286-287 (Sphäre der Präsenz). For an illuminating comparison of the Heidegger-Rilke conceptions of the Sphere of Being, see HW, pp. 277-278.
b. Logic – All this becomes clearer when we consider the matter from the viewpoint of logic. Rilke could inveigh as well as Heidegger against the excesses of logical thought, if this thought be considered as a function of an objectivizing, calculating reason. He, too, could say that logic has not only developed a set of rules for manifestive predication but that it has become itself “...the organization of the domination of purposeful (self-)imposition over what is objective. ...” Yet what does he offer in its stead? Pascal’s “logic of the heart”! But is it not still a logic? If the poet reverses man’s de-parture from the Open by a language of a deeper sort than that of mere expression, with which the logic of predication has to do, the language of reversal none the less remains something that man of his nature “has,” hence a possession, an implement of his comportment. It remains an ἄργυρον, then, and still requires organization by a logic. Logic remains inevitable as long as language is conceived as possessed by man rather than possessing him, sc. as long as we remain within the compass of metaphysics that forgets to think Being as distinct from beings. “... Only inside of metaphysics is there logic.”

2. Credit

The ledger has its credit side, however. It must be said for Rilke that he recognizes the menace of technicity, sees it for what it is, sees it in all its unwholesomeness. But to recognize the unwholesome as unwholesome, is this not already an orientation toward what is wholesome, whole, the Holy? This is itself a major service.

More than that, however, Rilke discerns that salvation from the unholy, thus understood, is somehow or other to be found in a return to the authentic use of language. True enough, his reflection upon language is an interrogative one that puts to question the sense of the poetic vocation. But interrogative thought, if the question is genuine, is already under way towards

---

20 “... die Organisation der Herrschaft des vorsätzlichen Sichdurchsetzens im Gegenständigen....” (HW, p. 289).
22 HW, p. 294 (das Heilige). See pp. 253, 291. As we shall see in the Hölderlin interpretations, Heidegger considers the Holy as another term for Being.
an answer. That Rilke is at least under way toward a comprehension of the Holy entitles him to be called a “poet for needy times.” 23

RÉSUMÉ

Distilled into its simplest form, Heidegger’s thesis is this: the nihilism (nothing-ness) to which Nietzsche (and Rilke) testify is but the last consequence of metaphysics itself, for which Being itself means ... nothing. To overcome nihilism, we must overcome metaphysics (and with it both logic and humanism) by thinking Being as the process of $\Delta \lambda \delta \beta \varepsilon \alpha \zeta$ out of which the ontological difference arises. The process is somehow correlated with language. To think Being thus is to ground metaphysics by foundational thought.

23 HW, pp. 295, 251 (Dichterberuf), 294 (unterwegs).
I am on the same ancient thoroughfare
That I was on that summer, on that day and hour.

Boris Pasternak, "Explanation"
CHAPTER I

THE ORIGIN OF A WORK OF ART
HÖLDERLIN AND THE ESSENCE OF POETRY

Let us return now to 1935 and resume the chronological method, in order to watch Heidegger as he moves step by step toward a delineation of foundational thought. We must be patient with provisional obscurities, content if only we can comprehend the whole. EM was delivered as a course for the university students from May to July, and in November Heidegger delivered in Freiburg a lecture which, after having been expanded into three lectures during the following year, comes to us as "The Origin of a Work of Art."1 During the course of that year (April), "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry"2 was delivered in Rome. Contemporary and complementary, the two texts should be thought together.

I. The Argument

By "origin," Heidegger understands the source whence something springs, sc. that which renders it possible for a thing to rise up (entspringen lassen) as what it is and how it is. Whence does the work of art arise? From the artist? Yet an artist is such only by virtue of the work of art he produces. The work, then, is as much the origin of the artist (as artist) as the artist of the

1 "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," HW, pp. 7–68. In editing these researches, we often omit or merely refer to what already has been made clear, sometimes anticipate a subsequent explicitation, provided it be merely explicitation and not a step in advance. The working principle has been to be faithful to the author's thought level as he slowly makes his way.
work. Both must spring from a source more primary still: art itself. Yet what is art "itself," as distinct from the work in which it is found and the man who produces it? Do we have a right to speak of it thus at all? The only way to approach the answer to such a question is to examine that being in which, beyond doubt, it holds sway: the work of art.3

A. THING AND WORK

Let us begin by trying to discern what is proper to a "work" of art as such, sc. as distinct from any other "thing." This presupposes that we know exactly what makes a thing to be a thing. Philosophy has given three principal answers: for some, a thing is a composition of substance and accident; for others, the unity of a manifold of sensible properties; for still others, the fusion of matter with form. Yet none of these explanations does complete justice to either the depth or the polyvalence of the phenomenon. We sense more in things than mere substance and accident; things are closer to us than the sensations that announce them; matter and form do not explain the thing-ness of things but suppose it, for such concepts derive their meaning first in the order of human artifacts and are only transferred to the entire order of "things." None of these explanations tells us satisfactorily what a thing is.4

We must try again. Artifacts are more similar to works of art than things are, insofar as human artifice has contributed to their production, yet distinctly different from the latter, for, characterized as they are by their adaptability to human service, they lack a certain self-sufficiency. Perhaps we can discern what a work is, then, if we can distinguish it from a mere artifact.5

Let us compare one of Van Gogh's paintings that depicts a pair of farm-shoes with the shoes themselves. The former is a work of art, the latter clearly an artifact. The adaptability of the artifact (the shoes) is grounded in some still more fundamental structure rendering possible adaptability, which Heidegger calls

---

3 HW, pp. 7-8, 64. Cf. P, p. 270.
4 HW, pp. 12-14 (Substance-accident), 14-16 (manifold of sense properties), 16-19 (matter-form).
5 HW, pp. 18-21. Henceforth, when writing "work" in this chapter, we understand work of art.
“reliability.” It is this reliability of the shoes that makes them what they are for the farmer and enables him, at least in a limited way, to discover the world and play his rôle in it. This reliability, however, is something that the farmer discerns without advertence, for simply to experience the reliability of the shoes is to comprehend what they in truth are. But we? We comprehend what the farmer’s shoes are, not by reason of wearing them but by reason of Van Gogh’s depiction of them. It is the painting that reveals these beings to us in what and how they are. “. . . In a work of art, (then), comes-to-pass this opening-up, sc. the revealing, sc. the truth, of beings. . . .” 6 Art is that process by which the truth of beings sets-itself-to-work, comes-to-pass in a work, the work of art.

B. WORK AND TRUTH

“. . . In a work, truth is at work . . .” – but a negatived truth. 7 The nature of this negativity appears when the author explains how the lighting-process by which beings emerge from concealment comports at the same time a concealing as well. This concealing can take two forms. It can be simply a “renege” (Versagen), as if the effulgence refused to transgress its own limits. The sense here is that the effulgence is limited by a circumscribing frontier, hence a border at which effulgence from one point of view ends, from another begins. A second form of concealment not only pertains to the periphery of effulgence but permeates the whole. This we may call “dissimulation” (Verstellen). Here the effulgence does not simply renounce further diffusion but continues to shine, in such a way, however, as to make beings to shine forth as what they are not. This is the phenomenon we have called “seeming-to-be,” and it renders possible every single oversight, mistake, aberration, transgression – in a word, all our maladroit dealings with beings. We recognize at once the pattern of “errance.” Furthermore, included in the process of dissimulation is the camouflaging of concealment it-
self: "... concealing conceals and dissimulates itself. ..."  
Clearly this is what WW (1930) called "mystery." Errance and mystery, which in WW constituted the "full non-essence of truth," are assumed now under the single term "dissimulation," which, together with the simple renege (peripheral limitation), constitute fully the concealment which negatives in this double fashion the coming-to-pass of effulgence. They constitute the non-truth which is essential to truth. Furthermore, truth and non-truth are in constant contention as original Discord, and the battle-ground of this struggle is that place of open-ness in the midst of beings where negatived truth comes-to-pass.

Up to this point, we have been considering the negatived lighting-process as such. Now let us consider more precisely that being which in the present case serves as the battle-ground of this struggle: the work of art. We are told, on the one hand, that in the work of art the World is "opened-up," on the other, that this World "reposes" in the "earth," sc. the material elements (v.g. pigments, marble, musical notes) out of which the work is fashioned. Both are complementary. "... The World is grounded on earth and earth permeates the World. ..." What sense can this have?

The text here is difficult and we are forced to interpret. Let us recall from WG: that There-being's finite project was conceived as a laying-claim to the entire expanse of the World; that this project is always thrown among beings which captivate it and which constitute the matter-of-fact situation in which There-being finds itself. The project implies positivity, the constriction negativity. Now we find a clear analogy to this correlation of positivity and negativity in There-being when in terms of a work of art the author speaks of the correlation between World and earth. To be sure, the focus has shifted from There-being to the art-work, but when we realize that There-being (as the There of Being) is simply that place among beings where negatived truth

---

8 HW, p. 43 (Verweigern). Cf. WW, p. 23.
10 HW, pp. 41 (offene Mitte), 43 (Streit), 49 (Lichtung und zwiefacher Verbergung). See EM, p. 47 (μέλανος).
comes-to-pass in beings, and that, conversely, the art-work is a
being in which truth is at work only inasmuch as Being lights up
through its There, we understand that we have here a different
emphasis but no fundamental change in conception of the
process of truth as delineated in WG. In any case, World and
earth, though complementary, are in continual contention, with
the result that in a work of art the struggle between the positivity
and negativity of truth takes place.¹² "... The earth permeates
World, World is grounded in earth, only insofar as truth, the
primordial Dis-cord between effulgence and concealment, comes-
to-pass. ..." ¹³ And truth here, we are told, is not simply the
truth of the being(s) depicted by the individual art-work (v.g.
the farmer’s shoes) but the truth of the entire ensemble of beings.
At any rate, it is the unity of this struggle that gathers together
the art-work into the dynamic tranquillity of its own interior
unity.¹⁴

C. TRUTH AND ART

In a work of art, (negatived) truth is at work, sc. working,
coming-to-pass. But a “work” implies a worker, in this case the
artist. It is his creative effort that produces the work. How are
we to understand this relationship of creativity between artist
and work? Only by a further meditation upon the work itself,
since it is only by the work produced that the artist is artist.
What characterizes the art-work insofar as it is produced by
creative effort?

The author suggests two characteristics. In the first place, the
 elemental contention between World and earth is stabilized and
made manifest under the guise of the work’s form. Secondly, the
work itself continually bears testimony to the fact that it is,
surprises us with the startling revelation of itself as itself, sc. as
the coming-to-pass of (finite) truth. The creative effort is that
human process by which this double character is set-to-work in
the artistic masterpiece.¹⁵

¹² See HW, pp. 33-34 (Welt), 35-37 (Erde), 43-44 (Welt-Erde-Wahrheit), 51-52
(Riss).
¹³ "... Erde durchdringt nur die Welt, Welt gründet sich nur auf die Erde, sofern
die Wahrheit als der Urstreit von Lichtung und Verbergung geschieht...." (HW, p.
44).
¹⁵ HW, pp. 51-52 (Gestalt), 53-54 ("Daß").
Yet truth-at-work in the art-work implies still more. For if the masterpiece is said to "startle," there must be someone other than the artist who is jolted out of the ordinariness of everyday routine and plunged into the open-ness that pervades the art-work. He abides in this open-ness the while; he "whiles" (verweilen) there. It is by reason of this whiling that the work becomes completely itself. Therefore, to while in the open-ness of the work is to let the work be what it is and simultaneously to let truth come-to-pass. It cannot be called the "creating" (Schaffen) of art; let it be called "conserving" (Bewahrung). In order for truth to come-to-pass in a masterpiece, conservation is as essential as creation, and even if the conservers of truth in art are nowhere to be found, the masterpiece remains oriented toward them, waits upon their arrival in order to be completely itself.16

At this point, the process of truth that takes place in the art-work may be conceived as a confluence of three different movements: truth as the contention of World and earth establishes itself in the work; the artistic creator stabilizes this contention in a form; contentious truth, thus stabilized, must be allowed to come-to-pass by the conservers of art. The masterpiece emerges as itself when these three movements fuse into dynamic unity. If we return now to the original question about what is art itself when conceived as the origin of the work of art, we must answer in terms of this unity and define it thus: "...the creative conservation of truth in a work...." 17

From this point on, Heidegger tries to think this unity. In order to do so, he synthetizes the movements of creation and conservation into the still more fundamental notion of "projecting," which is already familiar to us. The art-work comes-to-pass when truth advances from one direction and is met by a project advancing from the opposite direction. The point is difficult, but we understand it thus: EM spoke of Being, the

16 HW, pp. 54 (verweilen, Bewahrung), 55 (bezogen). We translate verweilen as "to while" because: of the obvious affinity with the German ("while" derives from the AS hwil); of the temporal connotation of the English. Frequently "while" is followed by "away" and suggests a pleasant passage of time. The complement, however, is not absolutely necessary. In using "while" intransitively, we utilize an unusual but perfectly orthodox sense.

17 "... die schaffende Bewahrung der Wahrheit im Werk...." (HW, p. 59).
Over-powering, as "contained" (völlig) in its advance through the violence done to it by There-being, and we have every right to conceive of this containment as the concentration of Being in some "work" or other, sc. in some being other than There-being. In the present instance, the work is a work of art. Since There-being itself is simply the There of Being thrown among beings as that being among the rest through which all (itself included) are lit up as beings, then we may conceive of the project that brings advancing truth to containment in the work of art as proceeding itself from There, and, indeed, in its condition of having-been-thrown in the first place by Being. This permits us to give a sense to the following enigmatic text: "... The opening-up of [Being-as-]the-Open and the lighting-up of beings [in this case, a work of art], takes place only insofar as the open-ness which advances unto a thrown-forth [There] is projected..." In other words, Being advances unto the There which has been thrown-forth by Being itself and is met by the project of There-being which forces it into disclosure as the given work of art.

Three points are worth noting: that the essential structure of the process here is exactly the same as in EM; that we see here with distressing clarity the difficulty of reconciling Heidegger II with Heidegger I, sc. the primacy of Being in the coming-to-pass of truth with a genuine spontaneity in There-being (project); that the problem presumably would have been just as acute in SZ, if we had been treated to an explanation of how a project of Being (World) can be thrown.

But our troubles are just beginning. Now we are told that this confluence of truth advancing from one direction and project proceeding from another is the process of "poetizing" (dichten). If this is comprehensible, then it is but an easy step to say that "... all art, as the letting-come-to-pass of the advent of the truth of beings as such, is in essence poetry. ..." But what sense can this have?

18 EM, pp. 47 (bannen), 120 (Bündigen).
19 "... Vielmehr geschieht die Eröffnung des Offenen und die Lichtung des Seienden nur, indem die in der Geworfenheit ankommende Offenheit entworfen wird. ..." (HW, p. 59). Cf. "... Entwerfen ist das Auslösen eines Wurfes, als welcher die Unverborgenheit sich in das Seiende als solches schickt...." (HW, p. 61).
20 "... Alle Kunst ist als Geschehenlassen der Ankunft der Wahrheit des Seienden als eines solchen im Wesen Dichtung..." (HW, p. 59).
First of all, it does not mean that poetry in the ordinary sense is the source of all the other arts, even though it may have a place of privilege among them. But it does mean that all artistic creation bears a profound relationship to language, for the primary sense of language, according to Heidegger, is not to be simply an instrument of communication, but "... to bring beings as such for the first time into the Open..." Language lets beings be (manifest) as what they are simply insofar as it gives them a name, for authentic utterance projects a light "... by reason of which is declared what kind of beings they appear to be as they come into the Open..." Now it is this projective utterance (entwerfendes Sagen) that Heidegger understands to be the fundamental sense of the poetic, designating it as "poetry in the essential sense," as distinct from "poesy," or "poetry in the narrow sense," the sort of thing that poets write. It is only because language as such is the primordial poetizing that poesy, which uses language as its medium, enjoys a primacy among other forms of art.

So it is that we are forced to conceive the coming-to-pass of an art-work as essentially a poetizing, simply because setting-truth-to-work is essentially the process by which language takes its origin. We are prepared for this step, to be sure, once we recall that the containing (voetv) of the Over-powering is also the process of λέγειν. But let us admit candidly that the whole business is far from clear. The most that can be said for our present situation is that we feel at home in obscurity. We must be patient. It is still only 1935-36, and the author himself seems still to be groping. Be this as it may, we must move forward.

We are told that the process of poetizing is the "origination" (Stiftung) of truth and may be considered from three points of view: as a "bestowing" (Schenken), as a "grounding" (Gründen) and as a completely "originating" event (Anfang). It is at this

---

21 HW, pp. 60-61.
22 "... die Sprache bringt das Seiende als ein Seiendes allererst ins Offene..." (HW, p. 60).
23 "... Solches Sagen ist ein Entwerfen des Lichten, darin angesagt wird, als was das Seiende ins Offene kommt..." (HW, p. 61).
24 HW, p. 61. For the sake of clarity, we use the following terminology: "poetizing" designates poetry in the broad sense and "poesy" in the narrow sense as explained here, whereas "poetry" should be considered as prescinding from (hence encompassing) both.
point in particular that “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” is helpful.

D. ORIGINATION OF TRUTH

This short essay may be taken as a further treatment of the third part of the discourse we have been examining. We have just seen that the essence of all art is poetry. Now the question becomes: what is the essence of poetry? As a matter of fact, all of the Hölderlin analyses attempt to answer this question. We omit here elements of the problem that return more fully later and limit ourselves to what clearly serves as a complement to what we have just seen.

The proper domain of poetry is language, hence the essence of poetry can be grasped only when we comprehend the essence of language. The essence of language consists in “the origination of Being through words.” For language in its source consists in giving a name to beings. Hence, naming (language) discloses the Being of beings and in this sense “originates” Being, sc. truth.\(^{25}\)

The origination of Being is at one and the same time (from the point of view of Being) pure gift and (from the point of view of There-being) a process of grounding. It is gift, insofar as it cannot be commanded, cannot be derived from mere entities or forced out of what lies under There-being’s control. Rather it proceeds from Being’s own bounty – a free bestowal. Origination is a grounding, insofar as There-being, in letting things be by naming them in their Being, illumines the entire situation wherein the gift of truth (Being) is bestowed. This means that both World and earth are disclosed: the World that holds sway by reason of There-being’s relation to the non-concealment of Being, the earth that tends to obscure the World and conceal it in beings. If we try to correlate this with WG, we notice that here “project” is used in a sense broad enough to include both “laying-claim” and “taking-possession.” The essential, however, remains the same, sc. that through this project (broad sense) the grounding-

\(^{25}\) HD, pp. 32–33, 40 (Wesen der Dichtung aus Wesen der Sprache), 38 (würdige Stiftung des Seins). See HW, p. 62 (Stiftung der Wahrheit).
process of There-being comes-to-pass in the sense that There-being is gathered-together into the ground of its own Being. 26

A third aspect under which to consider the originating of truth lies in the "origin-ality" (Anfang) of the "event." 27 The sense is that, when Being is originated, truth breaks out with a new freshness, as if for the very first time. 28 We have here an early form of what will soon be called the "mittent" character of truth. But let us not anticipate.

II. General Remarks

A. BEING

In these essays, Being is essentially negatived and comes-to-presence as the dynamic tension between positivity and negativity, truth and non-truth: clearly it is \( \delta\gamma\omicron\varphi\omicron\varsigma\alpha \). In terms of beings, the contention emerges as the struggle between World and earth that is fought out in a given being, which in turn renders manifest the struggle. Now the struggle here does not mean a dissolution of all unity in Being or in the art-work where Being is disclosed. On the contrary, it signifies the inner cohesion of contentious elements that are essentially complementary. The discordant components, positivity and negativity, are "gathered-together" in a work of art and, thus correlated, they constitute its unity, its dynamic tranquillity. EM spoke of the cohesive principle in primordial Dis-cord as \( \lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma \). We infer: that what correlates positivity and negativity in dynamic unity is \( \lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma \); that, when World and earth are stabilized in the form of a work of art, it is actually \( \lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma \) that holds sway. 29

26 HD, pp. 38, 39 and HW, p. 62 (Schenkung); HD, pp. 39, 42 and HW, pp. 62, 63 (Gründung). To be sure, there is nothing in all this which explicitly corresponds to "transcendental founding" (Begründen). If this third component corresponds to the existential component (SZ) of logos, then it permeates the whole problematic here. The obscurity itself is revealing.

27 We deliberately use "event" here in order to call attention to the fact that the word occurs significantly as early as 1935-36 (v.g. HW, pp. 53, 61 and HD, p. 35, etc.).


29 HW, pp. 38, 37 (Sammlung der Bewegtheit). See EM, pp. 47, 102. We do not attempt to retain here the problematic of historicity. Because truth (Being) is a process that comes-to-pass (Geschehen), art is essentially historical (HW, pp. 36, 64-65) and so, too, of course, is poetry (HD, pp. 34, 37, 39).
What is more, Being holds the primacy in the coming-to-pass of art, "setting itself" to work, "establishing itself" in work.\(^{30}\) When all is said and done, no amount of efficacy in the materials or virtuosity in the artist, provided his work be restricted to the level of cause and effect, can succeed in producing a work of art. This comes-to-presence only through the emergence of Being itself, which cannot be forced out of mere entities (Vorhandenes) but must bestow itself spontaneously in pure bounty as gift (Schenkung).\(^{31}\) Primacy, therefore, – but an indigent one! For Being is drawn toward the beings in which it must emerge in order that it be itself. "... It belongs to the essence of truth to establish itself in beings in order that thus it may first become truth..."\(^{32}\) Clearly we are dealing with the problem of the ontological difference.

**B. THERE-BEING**

There-being is not thematized in the essay, but when we are told that in the midst of beings in the ensemble "... there comes-to-presence an open region. An effulgence is..."\(^{33}\) and that this domain of open-ness is equivalent to the luminosity of There, surely we are to understand the open region as the There of Being.

But the important thing to note here is that the There cannot be simply identified with the individual man. This open region, insofar as it comes-to-pass in the art-work, is the confluence of movements from three different directions: the gratuity of Being, the creative activity, and the effort to conserve the truth that is at work. If the two latter help to constitute the There, they nevertheless do not take place in the same individual, ex-

---

\(^{30}\) HW, pp. 25 and passim (Sich-ins-Werk-setzen), 31 (richtet sich ins Werk).

\(^{31}\) HW, pp. 59 (nicht Wirken), 41-42, 62 (schenkt).

\(^{32}\) "Weil es zum Wesen der Wahrheit gehört, sich in das Seiende einzurichten, um so erst Wahrheit zu werden..." (HW, p. 50). Writer's italics. See p. 49. This need of Being for beings in order to be itself explains the strange phrase that truth "wills" to be established in work (HW, p. 51). Is this a lapse into a subject-ist formulation for the conception of Being? We must understand the term, it would seem, in the sense that EM spoke of the "need" in Being for the There and suggest as hypothesis to explain the usage of "will" the author's preoccupation at this time with Nietzsche, who will engage his attention for the next ten years.

\(^{33}\) "... Inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen west eine offene Stelle. Eine Lichtung ist..." (HW, p. 41). See p. 49 (Lichtung des Da).
cept, of course — but it is not Heidegger’s sense — insofar as the artist conserves the truth-in-work that he has already produced. In fact, creator and conserver, taken in the ensemble, may be said to constitute “the historical There-being of a people.”

How characterize the process that takes place in creator, in conserver and in truth-at-work? The creator’s task is to produce the work. This he does insofar as he leads it forth, out of the concealment in the bare materials with which he deals, into non-concealment (the openness of truth). But so dependent is he upon the bounty of Being itself that his “leading” is more properly a “letting-go-forth,” a receiving and an accepting of what Being bestows. The method of the poet is a case in point. He acknowledges a summons, receives a directive to which he then accedes. The conserver, for his part, whiles in the work produced, responds to it as the coming-to-pass of truth.

Both creator and conserver of art have this much in common: both render themselves (though in different ways) tractable, docile to Being, open unto it, free for its exigencies in the work of art. It is this common denominator that Heidegger assumes under the single term “project,” which is to be understood as a counterpoise (Auslösen) to the Self-emitting of Being. We interpret this to mean that authentic freedom unto Being in both creator and conserver of art gathers (therefore χορός) its (negatived) luminousness into single focus, receptively concentrates (νοεῖν), therefore stabilizes, its light in the tranquil, throbbing unity that is a work of art.

C. THOUGHT

The term “thought” appears with relative infrequency in these essays, yet it plays an essential rôle in the analysis. For in EM we saw that thought is essentially the achieving of There-being in re-solve, and it is the same concept that is introduced here to explain the conserving of truth-at-work in the art-work.

84 HW, pp. 64–65 (das geschichtliche Dasein eines Volkes).
85 HW, pp. 48 (Hervorbringen), 49 (Hervorgehenlassen), 50–51 (Empfangen, Entnehmen); HD, pp. 42–43 (Empfangen, Winke).
86 HW, pp. 54–55. Note first significant use of “respond” (entsprechen).
87 HW, p. 61 (sich schickt).
Our task here is to try to precise what the analysis of conservation can tell us about the nature of re-solve.

Recall that re-solve is the achievement of authenticity and is brought-to-pass amid the ordinariness of everyday captivation by beings in the World-about. In the conserving of a work of art, there is a corresponding severance of the ties with the ordinary, but the essential is that the conserver is caught up in what is happening in the work: the coming-to-pass of truth. He responds to it. He whiles in the process and the whiling lets the work be what it is. To conserve a work of art, then, means to take (deliberately) a stand within its open-ness. To take a stand, however, means to know the truth-at-work, and, indeed, to will to know it.  

Now this knowing that is at the same time a willing of truth is re-solve, "... the opening-up of There-being out of captivation by beings unto the open-ness of Being..." by which man, in virtue of existence, ecstatically lets himself in on the non-concealment of Being in beings. In the present case, to conserve the work of art means to achieve the re-solve by which There-being "... exposes itself to the open-ness of beings [insofar] as this is set in work. ..."  

The knowing that is willed in re-solve is of the same order of knowing, though different in manner, as that by which the artist produces (πέρατος) his masterpiece. In both cases, to know is to have-seen. What the artist knows-as-having-seen is that which comes-to-presence as such, and it is this that he reveals in his work. What the conserver knows-as-having-seen is the struggle between World and earth (hence between truth and non-truth) that has been stabilized in the work. In taking his stand within the open-ness of truth, it is a negatived open-ness that he knows, sc. he wills to ex-pose himself to a truth that is essentially finite. Now to will to know-as-having-seen truth (Being) in its finitude is already to have achieved de-cision. "... To-have-seen is to have made decision. ..." 

---

38 V.g. HW, pp. 62 (Gewöhnlichkeit, entrücken), 55 (Wissen).
39 "... die Eröffnung des Daseins aus der Befangenheit im Seienden zur Offenheit des Seins..." (HW, p. 55).
40 "... das sich der Offenheit des Seienden als der ins Werk gesetzten aussetzt. ..." (HW, p. 55).
This re-solve that is de-cision brings There-being itself to its fullness as a being, coming as it does to take its stand amid the truth of beings. That is why the author can say “... the authentic accomplishment of man's Being comes-to-pass through the freedom of de-cision. ...” 42 It is especially in this sense of There-being's coming-to-its-fullness-in-freedom that we understand the obscure passages which speak of the process of art as an origination of truth that is at once the grounding of There-being.

Before we conclude, let us collect certain other references to the nature of thought, even though they be casual and undeveloped. In the first place, thought is essentially interrogation, and, indeed, the interrogation of Being. To think Being is to give a name to Being in its question-ableness. 43 Furthermore, thought's proper concern is the ontological difference. The circle in which the entire meditation moves (the essence of art is discerned in a work of art, but the work is such only because of the essence of art; truth is discerned in what is true, but this is true only by reason of truth) is imposed fundamentally by the necessary correlation of Being and beings: Being is found only in beings; beings are what they are only by reason of Being. To enter this circle and meditate it is to meditate the difference between Being and beings, the ontological difference. This is the only thing that gives solidity to our thought. 44 Finally, from the purely negative point of view, it hardly seems necessary to insist that the coming-to-pass of truth in the work of art can not be explained in terms of the subject-object relationship. Hence such terms as “esthetic experience” – for that matter, even the term “’esthetics’ – are, since they imply this relationship, totally unacceptable. 45

42 "... Die Bezeugung des Menschseins und damit sein eigentlicher Vollzug geschieht aus der Freiheit der Entscheidung ...." (HD, p. 34). See HW, pp. 55 (Innenstehen), 62.
43 HW, pp. 50, 58. (Fragwürdigkeit, Frageschritten). See EM, p. 16 (Fragen ist Wissen-wollen).
44 HW, pp. 7-8, 39 (Kreis), 8 (Fest des Denkens).
45 HW, pp. 55, 64 (Subjekt-Objekt), 66 (Erlebnis), 56 (Gegenstand), 41 (Nie-mals nur Vorstellung). We reserve the single term “experience” to translate Erfahrung, hence translate Erlebnis as “esthetic experience” to avoid confusion.
Résumé

In analysing a work of art, we find that we are still inside the hermeneutic circle of which SZ spoke, but we have reached a level that is attainable only by Heidegger II, where Being has assumed the primacy over There-being. As in EM, Being is a primordial Dis-cord, sc. the process of negatived truth, bestowing itself on There-being which, in turn, functions as a counterpoise by projecting Being in a work, sc. in a work of art. Hence, in the art-work truth is at work; the art-work originates both Being and truth. But the originating of truth is simultaneously original poetizing, for this is precisely the function of language. That is why “... all art ... is in [its] essence poetry....” Thought emerges under the guise of preserving the truth-at-work in the work, and, indeed, through the process of re-solve: willing-to-know truth in its finitude as it takes-place in art.

How far have we come? Thought as νοεῖν clearly pervades the notion of counter-poise, but thought as λέγειν is more fundamental still in the unmistakable drift toward thinking Being-as-truth in terms of language. But much remains unsolved. How conceive this event of truth where Being maintains the primacy yet There-being retains its power to project? How conceive the origination of truth as essentially the process of language? How conceive the relation of the thinker to “the There-being of an historical people”?

46 “... Alle Kunst ist ... im Wesen Dichtung....” (HW, p. 59).
THE TIME OF WORLD-AS-PICTURE

The major value of "The Time of World-as-Picture" consists in the analysis of Descartes, which we have examined already. What it says about foundational thought is, as far as the essay itself goes, of secondary importance, but for us it is no less real for that. Particularly illuminating are the passages where the author contrasts the Cartesian version of presentative thought with what he understands to be the Greek οὐκήν.

The author returns to Parmenides' correlation of οὐκήν-όμνακ, which he interprets to mean that it pertains to Being (because demanded and determined by Being) that beings, or rather Being in beings, be brought to containment. The pertinent text reads:

... A being is that which emerges and opens itself up, and which, insofar as it comes-to-presence, comes over a man who likewise is coming-to-presence, sc. over him who of his own accord opens himself up unto what is coming-to-presence, inasmuch as he brings it to containment. ...

From this we infer: that the emergent-abiding-Power in beings comes-over (therefore over-comes, dominates) man who accepts these beings by forcing them to containment; that this mutual

1 "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," HW, pp. 69-104. The essay, delivered in lecture form in Freiburg, June 9, 1938, as conclusion to a series of discussions on the grounding of the World-picture of modern times, bore the title "The Grounding of the Modern World-picture through Metaphysics" ("Die Begründung des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes durch die Metaphysik"). Supplementary passages, not delivered publicly but composed at the same time, we treat as belonging to main body of text.

8 "... Das Seiende ist das Aufgehende und Sichöffnende, was als das Anwesende über den Menschen als den Anwesenden kommt, d.h. über den, der sich selber dem Anwesenden öffnet, indem er es vernimmt...." (HW, p. 83). See p. 100. Cf. SG, p. 140 (überkommt).
coming-to-presence of beings and man is achieved when man of himself opens himself unto beings as they come-to-presence; that it is this opening-up of man that is containment.

A being is not a being, then, insofar as a man perceives it, sc. has a presentation of it in the sense of a percepiio (Descartes). In that case, man would hold the initiative. Here the initiative belongs to beings, sc. in their Being. Therefore it is more exact to say that man is per-ceived by beings (vom Seienden Ange-schaute), where the word has its original Latin force (per-capio) of “seize,” “lay hold of,” “take possession of.” We understand this in the sense of the above-mentioned “over-come” and try to suggest it by taking a liberty with idiomatic English in making “per-cept” into a verb. Man is per-cepted by beings as they open themselves up; he is himself gathered up in the process of coming-to-presence as such; he is drawn into the Open within them, retained and sustained there. It is Being that maintains the initiative in the coming-to-presence of beings. And yet man, if acceptive, is not thereby passive, for he must of his own accord open himself up unto the process that is taking place.

“... In order to bring his own essence to its fullness, he must gather together (λέγειν) in its open-ness that-which-is-opening-itself-up, preserve (σωζειν), collect, conserve it. ...”

All this receives another formulation when Heidegger contrasts Descartes’ subject-ism and the famous dictum of Protagoras, “man is the measure of all things.” Protagoras, he claims, remains faithful to the Parmenidean-Heraclitean conception of man. Heidegger must explain how for Protagoras man can be a “measure” for beings without being opposed to them as a “subject.” The argument runs as follows:

When beings emerge-into-presence in any given instance, the domain of non-concealment is limited to a certain compass, for the emergence, after all, is finite. The domain of disclosure thus has “measure.” It is the confines of this (measured) compass that separate what comes-to-presence from what does not. Now any given man whiles within this compass; whiling there, he assumes it; assuming it, he, for his own part (to the extent that

---

3 “... Deshalb muß dieser Mensch, um sein Wesen zu erfüllen, das Sichöffnende in seiner Offenheit sammeln (λέγειν) und retten (σωζειν), aufspanen und bewahren. ...” (HW, p. 84).
it lies within his power to do so), conserves it. It is in assuming, conserving this \textit{measured} domain of non-concealment that he accepts (contains) whatever comes-to-presence in it \textit{as} being, and at the same time recognizes the limits of its emergence. It is in this sense, and this sense only, that he is the measure of what comes-to-presence and what does not. By no means is man-as-measure for Protagoras a self-conscious ego that sets down standards which beings in their Being must meet. On the contrary, for Protagoras man \textit{receives} and guards the measure by which he is measure; he is open unto Being-as-finite, he is its There. His fundamental attitude is one of acceptance, of self-unveiling-for, of opening-himself unto the self-revelation of beings in their Being, whereby man himself in his own way comes-to-presence with these beings and thus achieves himself.\footnote{HW, pp. 96-98, 101. It is in this context that we understand the difference between beings-as-across (Gegenüber) from man, sc. as the Greeks experienced them, and as opposed (Gegenstand) to a subject. See SG, p. 140. Cf. N, I, pp. 135-141.}

In contrast to this conception of the acceptive containment of beings – a conception which Heidegger considers to be genuinely Greek – is the attitude of subject-ist presentation that dominates modern thought. Instead of simply opening itself up for beings, presentative thought tries to put its hands on them, to seize them in concepts (\textit{Begreifen}) in the sense of dominating them and submitting them to its control. What matters \textit{”... is not [that] what comes-to-presence holds sway, but [that] an attack [on the being] succeeds. ...”}\footnote{”... Das Vorstellen ist nicht mehr das Sich-entbergen für..., sondern das Ergreifen und Begreifen von.... Nicht das Anwesende waltet, sondern der Angriff herrscht....” (HW, p. 100). See SF, p. 22 and WD, p. 228. Cf. N, II, pp. 168-173.} We see here clearly what Heidegger understands by “concept” and will not be surprised if the polemic vs. subject-ism brings conceptual thought under fire. Obviously it would be a mistake to take this as a denial of all value in concepts; it is simply an insistence on the necessity of meditating on a pre-conceptual thought.

All of this adds up to saying that foundational thought is pre-subjective. We close our remarks by enumerating briefly other characteristics of thought that may help fill out the picture. In the first place, thought brings to containment truth in its negativity, for when man is per-cepted by beings in their Being and drawn into the Open in which they come-to-presence, he is tossed
about amid their contrarieties, scarred by the contention that is interior to themselves. If he is to achieve himself, he must do so by remaining exposed to all the divisive confounding that is intrinsic to the full coming-to-pass of truth.⁶

More important, perhaps, is the fact that thought is historical, at least to the extent that we can disengage its nature from what Heidegger himself has tried to accomplish in this essay. For he has meditated on the past, sc. upon There-being as having been affected by the subject-ism of Descartes. This comports meditating on the modern era in its essenc-ing, yielding as much as possible to the forces at work within it, sc. to Being in its truth as it holds sway. This means opening oneself up, however, to Being as still in ad-vent (future), hence it is “ad-ventive” thought.⁷ What constitutes the dimension of “present” in this process we are left to infer, but let us do the inferring later on when we have more to work with. We see clearly enough, however, from watching Heidegger at work that foundational thought in this case has been a species of re-tieve.

A final word. To the extent that such thought succeeds, it transfers man who is open unto the ad-vent of Being out of the confounding obscurity of everydayness into the luminous clarity of that situation which constitutes what may be called an in-between area, a mediation between Being and beings, sc. There-being, “... the ecstatic domain of the revealing and concealing of Being.” ⁸ By reason of There-being, man dwells with beings, to be sure, but always as a stranger among them, because he himself appertains to Being. It is thus that through There-being the ontological difference takes place.⁹

---

⁶ HW, pp. 83 (in Gegensätzen umgetrieben), 84 (Wirrnis). Cf. WW, p. 22. Once certainly (HW, p. 89) and twice probably (HW, pp. 70, 95) the author uses the term “de-cision” in the strict sense he gave it in EM, where it is equivalent to re-solve, understood as freedom unto truth in its negativity. Other uses of the word are loose and of no help to us, suggesting the assuming of any attitude towards beings that corresponds to the prevailing conception of their Being.

⁷ HW, p. 89. Henceforth, we translate (zu)künftig as “ad-ventive,” intending a double meaning thereby: “ad-ventive” in the sense of open-ness to the ad-vent of Being which determines (bestimmt) this open-ness; “ad-ventive” in the sense that an essentially ek-sistent There-being continually comes to (therefore ad-vent) itself, sc. achieves itself as long as it remains ecstatically open to the Being that comes to (ad-vent) it. Both senses are, of course, correlative.


⁹ HW, p. 88 (dem Sein zugehört, ein Fremdling bleibt).
The present essay helps us to understand the non-subjective character of thought, orchestrating in new terms what it means for thought to let beings (and Being) be. Effectively it means to let itself be over-come by Being in beings – to yield to Being in its negativity.
CHAPTER III

"AS WHEN UPON A DAY OF REST . . ."

The second of Heidegger's Hölderlin-interpretations stems from an oft repeated lecture in 1939-40 and treats of a poem without title that begins "As when upon a day of rest . . ."1 Written in 1800, the poem is composed of seven strophes, and in it Hölderlin orchestrates again the meaning of the poet's task. It offers another reason for calling Hölderlin "the poet of the poet" and explains Heidegger's interest in the poem. For us, the essay is only of secondary importance, for the author speaks of thought only by indirection, yet we cannot afford to ignore it, because of the close analogy which Heidegger sees between poetic and philosophical thought.

There seems no point in trying to resume an argument that is little more, in form at least, than a close analysis of the Hölderlin text, so we shall pass immediately to three remarks of a general nature, which will examine the principal themes of the essay: A. Being, B. There-being as Poet, C. Thought.

A. BEING

Throughout the essay, Being receives many designations, according to the fluctuations in Hölderlin's imagery, but the sense remains the same. Initially it is called "Nature," but not in the sense that we ordinarily give to the word as something opposed to "art," "history" or the like (sc. as a sphere of beings), but rather in the sense of the Greek φόντος: a going-forth, an emergence,

1 "Wie wenn am Feiertage . . ." HD, pp. 47-74.
an opening-up that enables all beings to be present, hence an Omni-presence. The Open which thus opens-up is the lighting-up of that light by which beings shine-forth and manifest themselves. We are familiar with these notions. There is new insistence, however, upon φῶς as the source of light. It is the hearth and abode of light, hence may be called metaphorically a fire, sc. source not only of brightness but of warmth. None of this is very new, but the author introduces several suggestive nuances.

1. **Being as Immediate**

Being functions as the mediation between beings, establishing among them their mutual relationship, and they, since they are mediated by Being, may be called "mediate." But Being, the Open itself, as source of this mediation, is itself not mediated, sc. rendered present by reason of another. It is the "immediate." The point seems to be a double one: that Being, as the source of presence by which beings are present to each other and to There-being, is absolutely ultimate and needs no further mediation between itself and the beings which it renders present (it is the immediate mediation between them); that it is because Being is the immediate that it is inaccessible. We have here another form, it would seem, of the interpretation of Being as Non-being.

2. **Being as Advent**

Being as φῶς is essentially Presence, but "... the manner of the Presence is a coming. ..." By this is meant that Being is to be understood as advancing toward the poet. To the extent that Being abides, it is not a mere entity that simply endures but a coming that is always new, always origin-al.

This permits us to understand the essentially temporal character of Being. Because Being is a continual coming to beings, it is older than the time-spans (Zeiten) that are measured by beings...
such as man, people and things. But it is not older than time, for it is time in its origin. "... 'Nature' is the oldest time – not at all that which is 'beyond time' in the metaphysical sense and certainly not the 'eternal' as Christians understand it..." The "oldest" time, it is also the "youngest" time, for perpetual coming never grows old. What bearing this has upon history we shall see subsequently. For the moment, note only how congruous this is with the problem of temporality as seen in SZ. The only difference: focus here is on Being rather than on There-being.

3. Being as Spirit

The needs of the analysis bring Heidegger to speak of Being in terms of Spirit, but since the reason is fundamentally the Hölderlin text, we need not see in the term any latent influence of German idealism on Heidegger himself. Yet his use of the word is interesting. Nature is Spirit, and insofar as it renders all beings present, it be-spirits them all. This be-spiriting Spirit is the unifying unity that holds sway over all and lets the whole ensemble of beings appear in its collectedness, drawing all beings-that-appear into the unity of its own Omni-presence.

This unification of all beings into unique Presence is a dynamic process that arranges all beings into a pattern of relationships that Heidegger calls "essential thought." Why is the term used here? Possibly because of the spontaneous tendency to associate Spirit with thought which is commonly taken to be the characteristic of Spirit. If this surmise be valid, then the unifying arrangement will be the Spirit's "thinking" and the pattern of relationship its "thoughts."

From another point of view, note the similarity between the thought which proceeds from Spirit as suggested here and the anticipated intimations of Nature when in repose. Repose is not

---


Heidegger uses the term _wesentliche Denken_ but we translate it as "essential" rather than "foundational," since clearly we are considering the pattern of the to-be-thought, before thought itself comes-to-pass in There-being.
simply inertia, but Nature's gathering of itself together for that self-disclosure which is both an origin and a coming. As such, it contains already within itself the pattern by which it will unfold in beings. In terms of man, thought of this kind is a pre-thought.

Closely allied to Being as Spirit is the designation of Being as Law. For the unified pattern of Presence which Spirit arranges by thought becomes a matrix of relationships in the Open by reason of which beings can encounter each other. We have seen this already in terms by which Being, itself immediate, serves as the mediation between beings. Now this same structure of mediation is called "Law" in allusion to the Greek νόμος as seen in Pindar, and, because continually origin-al, "steadfast" Law.  

4. Being as the Holy

The most striking designation of Being, however, and one that will pervade the author’s entire analysis of poetry, appears when with Hölderlin Heidegger calls it the "Holy." At this point, there is no question of making a phenomenological analysis of the Holy in order to discern through it the sense of Being. Heidegger accepts the term as one that is imposed by Being itself and enunciated by Hölderlin out of docility to this exigency.

The first reason for calling Being the Holy is that it is "older" than the gods, for it is that by which they, too, are. Holiness is not the borrowed property of a single god. "... The Holy is not holy because it is divine, but the divine is divine because it is 'holy' in a way proper to itself. ..." Being is not only that by which the gods are but that by which they are holy. That is why it is itself the Holy. Again, Being is the Holy because it is a continual coming and an endless origin, hence itself undefiled and wholesome (heil). From another point of view, it is the Holy insofar as it is unapproachable because of its very immediacy.  

Two characteristics of the Holy are worth special mention. Firstly, it is de-ranging insofar as it dislodges by its coming all

7 HD, pp. 59 (Besitz), 60-61 ("vaste Gesetz"). Being-as-law may be interpreted also as νόμος, provided this word be given its full Greek sense (p. 61).
8 "... Das Heilige ist nicht heilig, weil es göttlich, sondern das Göttliche ist göttlich, weil es in seiner Weise 'heilig' ist; ..." (HD, p. 58). See pp. 56 (nistigt), 58 (über "die" Götter).
experience from the ordinary patterns of everydayness. We understand this in the sense of Being as the Awe-some as seen in EM, by reason of which, when There-being is opened unto it, There-being is estranged from its ordinary milieu. Such dislodging is a de-rangement. Secondly, the Holy is the "eternal heart" of beings: "heart," because it is the innermost source of their presence; "eternal," because it is original time, sc. it is perpetual beginning that lets all abiding (Bleiben) be, hence the "eternity of the eternal." 11

Briefly, Being considered as the Holy includes the other characteristics of Being we have mentioned. For it is the Holy, always in advent, that is the steadfast Law of be-spiritng Nature through which the relations between all beings are mediated. "... Everything is only because [it is] gathered together into the Omni-presence of the Undefiled. ...." 12

B. THERE-BEING AS POET

To the Holy that advances toward him in Omnipresence, the poet's unique task is to "respond." How conceive this responding? In general terms we may say it is a docile "readiness for the Holy," hence a deliberate openness unto the Holy with which he, by reason of his very essence as a poet, already has a profound affinity. For since it is the very essence of the poet to be drawn into the compass of the Holy, this induction itself already has educated him to his task. He belongs to the Holy, stands open in the Open, is essentially "spirit-full" because he essentially thinks omnipresent Spirit. The very heart of the poet is that center within him where his own most proper essence gathers to a fullness, in the "... stillness of his belonging-ness within the compass of the Holy. ...." 13 Since the Holy is pro-

---

10 HD, p. 62 (ent-setzend). There is a play on words impossible to retain in English between ent-setzend (de-ranging) and das Entsetzliche. Closest equivalent for the latter would be "the Terrible," which would correspond well enough with "Awe-some" but would not suggest "de-ranging." Cf. die Schrecknis des Unmittelbaren (HD, pp. 68, 70).
11 HD, p. 71 (Herz, Ewigkeit).
12 "... Alles ist nur, weil es in die Allgegenwart des Unversehrten gesammelt ... ist:..." (HD, p. 71).
13 "... die Stille der Zugehörigkeit in die Umfängnis des Heiligen...." (HD, p. 69). See pp. 54 (Ent-Sprechenden), 74 (Bereitschaft für das Heilige), 53 (Einbezug), 62 (zugehören, "geistig"), 54 and passim (Künftigen).
foundly a coming, sc. an ad-vent (Kommen), the authentic poet, by reason of his essential affinity with the Holy, is himself adventive, responding, as he does, to the Holy in its ad-vent. Let us look now at this ad-ventive responding more in detail.

1. Prior to Self-disclosure of the Holy

How is one to conceive the situation that prevails prior to the poetic moment? In the present case where the emergence of the Holy is conceived as a daybreak ("But lo, the dawn is come!") the moment prior to it is understood as the darkness before dawn. Apparently Nature is asleep, the poet a solitary – both share a common mourning. Yet in Nature's repose, there is an immanent anticipation of the disclosure that is on the verge of coming, and the poet, for all his apparent isolation, surmises these incipient intimations because of his constitutional affinity with the Holy. "... Because [the Holy] educates the poets of ad-vent, inducted, as they are, into its compass, they themselves know the Holy. Their knowing is a surmise. ..." 14 What is called here "surmise" we take to correspond to what SZ called the "pre-ontological comprehension of Being."

2. Poetic Moment

"But lo, the dawn is come!" (Jetzt aber tags!) Thus the poet cries out as the Holy discloses itself to him. Just as the new insight of a man of thought is soon reflected in his eyes, so light begins to radiate in the soul of a poet as the Holy reveals itself. But this precedes the articulation of the poet's song, and the poet's outcry but gives a name to this glowing radiance. 15 The several elements involved in this process should be considered separately.

14 "... Weil dieses jedoch die künftigen Dichter erzieht, wissen sie als die Einbezogenen das Heilige. Ihr Wissen ist das Ahnen...." (HD, p. 62). See pp. 56 (Dunkel, Nacht), 53 (scheint zu schlafen, Trauer, Vereinzelung).
15 HD, pp. 62 (Entwurf des sinnenden Mannes), 56-57 (Ausruf). The author makes much of the fact the Holy's disclosure to the poet takes place in silence (v.g. HD, pp. 57, 65, 66, 69) and we recall how in SZ silence was a mode of logos (SZ, pp. 164-165). See also US, p. 262.
a. THE HOLY – The poet “cries out,” to be sure, but it is rather a calling to what is already in ad-vent, an address toward Nature that enunciates what the poet has surmised already by reason of his antecedent affinity. It is the Holy itself that determines what the poet is to say, and it never surrenders its initiative. The poet’s word (song) arises together with the awakening of the Holy. Hence it is the Holy itself that in the poet’s song becomes a word, sc. is transformed into the poet’s song, so that “… the Holy [not only] bestows [the poet’s] word [but] passes itself into this word. …” 16

b. POET – Yet for all its primacy, the Holy needs the poet if the word is to be enunciated, for “… there first must be a poet in order that the word of a song be formed. …” 17 Orientated toward the Holy which opens itself up to him, and completely attuned to it, the poet must take his stand wherever the Holy discloses itself. His work succeeds to the extent that it expresses a word that only the Holy, conserved within him, may utter.18

But the poet’s success (“good fortune”) is not easily attained; he must first overcome the danger of mis-fortune. We see here that the problem of negativity again appears. For the Holy, since it is the absolutely immediate, is not as such directly accessible to the poet, he cannot name it in itself. “… The poet, however, can never of himself name the Holy immediately. …” 19 It reveals itself to him mediately, sc. through the beings for which it is the mediation.

This mediation can be considered from three points of view. Firstly, it comes through that which is “about” the poet, sc. that which he finds in the world about him. For “… the openness of the Open articulates itself into that which we call ‘a

---

16 “… Das Heilige verschenkt das Wort und kommt selbst in dieses Wort….” (HD, p. 74). See pp. 56 (nötigt), 64 (entstammen), 70 (das Wort wird), 69 (gewandelt) and WD, p. 85. It is in this sense that the coming-to-pass of the poetic word is an “event,” sc. has the Holy as Source.
17 “… Und erst muß ja ein Dichter sein, damit ein Wort des Liedes werden kann….” (HD, pp. 65-66).
18 HD, pp. 67 (zugekehrt, Sich-öffnen), 65 (Durchstimmt), 69 (übernehmen), 66 (glückt).
19 “… der Dichter vermag dennoch nie von sich aus unmittelbar das Heilige zu nennen…” (II), p. 66).
World'..." From another point of view, mediation comes from what is "above" the poet, some being superior to the poet (therefore closer to the Holy, source of light), a god, if one will, but not itself the Holy (because itself only a being, though a superior one). Such a being gathers the light of the Holy into a single luminous ray that sets the poet on fire. Finally, the word itself that the poet forms is a being through which the Holy is revealed.\(^{21}\) Does it not seem that we have returned here to the bi-dimensional perspective of SZ, where beings are rendered accessible to There-being only by reason of Being, but Being itself is never found by itself (as a being) but only in the beings it illuminates? In effect, is not this the ontological difference? However this may be, there is a negativity implied here, for when the Holy is mediated through the gods or the things of the world, sc. when Being is mediated through beings and vice versa, there is some sort of contraction and limitation. With this comes the menace that the Holy be mistaken for a god (Being for a being). In other words, if the ontological can come to us only through the prism of the ontic, the inevitable consequence is a risk that it be taken for ontic, sc. forgotten completely.

But when a poem succeeds, the poet has the good fortune to give expression to the Holy for what it is. He does so, however, only insofar as he avoids the mis-fortune that would allow him to be so captivated by the god through whom the light of the Holy comes as to forget the Holy itself. This would be mis-fortune, simply because it would be to lose the sense of what it means to be a poet, namely not to be favored by a god but to be encompassed by the Holy.\(^{22}\) To recognize the Holy as mediated through the beings with which he is engaged and to accept, in fact assume, this situation for what it is -- this is the achievement of the poetic task. "... Poets must leave to the immediate its immediacy...", sc. must respect the unapproachability of Being in itself as itself, "... and yet accept its mediation as the unique one...," \(^{23}\) sc. must accept it as the unique means of access to all other beings.

\(^{20}\) "... Die Offenheit des Offenen fügt sich zu dem, was wir 'eine Welt' nennen. ...",(HD, p. 62).

\(^{21}\) HD, pp. 66 (Entündung), 70 (Gesang).

\(^{22}\) HD, p. 67 (nicht Empfängnis sondern Umfängnis).

\(^{23}\) "... Die Dichter müssen dem Unmittelbaren seine Unmittelbarkeit lassen und doch zugleich seine Vermittlung als das Einzige übernehmen..." (HD, p. 69).
In other words, the poet must accept and assume the Holy (Being) for what it is, and this implies the reciprocal dependence between Being and beings as well as the consequences of Being's contraction to beings (the menace of being forgotten completely). This is the ideal response of a poet. It implies de-cision on his part, indeed the supreme de-cision, insofar as he is a poet. For, giving thus a name to the Holy in its essence, he distinguishes it from its negativity, sc. its non-essence. He recognizes the Holy for what it is. Essence and non-essence (positivity and negativity) of the Holy are in strife, and the poet's "scission" (scheidet) between the two, sc. his assuming of the Holy as negativized (in the consequences of its contraction into beings) de-cides (entscheidet) this strife in any given poem. "... The word is a [de-cisive] weapon. ..."  

The poet's de-cision, so conceived, is perfectly consequent upon de-cision as conceived in EM and which we saw then to be re-solve.

C. THOUGHT

The problem of thought is not thematized in the essay. Only in two places is it even suggested: where Being-as-spirit is conceived as having "thoughts"; where history is said to come-to-pass only when the essence of truth is de-cided.  

We have no right, then, to force the evidence. Yet we know that the Holy is equivalent to Being, and poetry analogous to thought. If we made the corresponding substitutions we would have the following results.

Being as φως, heart and abode of light, is absolutely immediate to all beings but cannot be grasped itself except mediately, sc. in and through beings. It is essentially temporal, a continual advent to There-being. It is the gathering-together of beings into collectedness within themselves and with each other. Therefore it is a λόγος that is at once an arranging of a pattern of relationships (διάνοια), a fixed law, within the matrix of which all beings have their place. The disposition of this primordial λόγος is a complex of incipient intimations that may be called "thought," understood in the sense of a to-be-thought. Being

25 HD, p. 58 (das wesentliche Denken), 73 (Wesen der Wahrheit entschieden).
discloses itself in silent fashion in the thinker, and the thinker's response to the revelation is to transform it into word.

The task of the thinker as thinker is to respond to Being that completely permeates him and thus discloses itself in and through him. For, by reason of his very essence, he has a privileged intimacy with Being and its "thoughts." Thus he enjoys a comprehension of these intimations of Being antecedent to any moment of special revelation. His response consists in uttering a cry toward Being advancing to him through beings, that at once forms into verbal expression the revelation itself. It is thus that Being passes into a word. (The primacy, however, remains with Being, for the event has Being for its source.) This word is decisive, hence the response is decision. For the thinker must make a scission (hence a decision) between Being in its positivity and in its negativity. This negativity consists, at least partially, in the fact that Being always must be contracted (therefore negatived) to beings, hence comports the risk of being considered only as a being and thereby of being forgotten completely.

In this case, Being is submitted to the disposition of man and made an object of thought. The true thinker will recognize this situation. He will discern Being for itself (even if not by itself) and will comprehend that, since it is absolutely immediate and in continual advent, it can never be an "object" of either thinking or doing. Furthermore he will discern Being as negatived, with all the consequences of negativity. This non-objectivizing acceptance of Being in both positivity and negativity is the full sense of decision. It is also what we have called "resolve."

Résumé

The second Hölderlin analysis rejoins the first in attempting to delineate the essence of poetry, which we know to be the origination of Being-as-truth. It advances the problem to the extent that it precises the nature of the originating process as comporting both the dimension of future (the Holy is in continual advent) and the dimension of present (the Holy is transformed into word once dawn has broken upon the poet). The
dimension of past is implied, for what is-as-having-been is the beings through which the Holy flames forth. This aspect of the problem will become clear soon enough.

How far have we come? We have a clearer conception of the poetic process with probable application to thought, and beyond that, further testimony to the effect that the drift of Heidegger's reflection is more and more toward the problem of language. If we surmise from EM the reason for this, the full force of it has not yet appeared.
CHAPTER IV

NIETZSCHE’S WORD “GOD IS DEAD”

The summer semester of 1940 brought the study of φόνος in Aristotle. It included one illuminating remark on λόγος and the problem of language, but since the whole matter will be treated fully in 1944, we defer comment until later. We come, then, to the Nietzsche analyses. It was 1950 before these reached the public in the form of the essay, “Nietzsche’s Word ‘God is dead’.” 1 The essay was based on the university lecture courses of 1936–1940. 2 In 1961 the full text of these lectures themselves appeared, together with certain essays that date from 1941. 3 For the sake of simplicity, we consider the latter as forming a unity with the essay itself. The following remarks, then, should be taken to represent the author’s thought up to and including 1941.

A. BEING

1. Mitteness

We recall the conclusion that we have seen already: Nietzsche’s nihilism is the nihilism of metaphysics itself, insofar as it has

forgotten Being. Heidegger is attempting to overcome both by thinking the essence out of which they spring, sc. Being as negated truth. What we are told here about Being (still more about thought) is said only by indirection, but it is no less significant for that.

In arguing that subject-ism is correlative with truth-as-certitude, Heidegger insists that truth-as-non-concealment and the Being-process are one. But we know this already. What is new in the essay is an important precision with regard to the primacy of Being. For the first time the word Geschick is used significantly with the sense that it will have for the rest of Heidegger II. In SZ, we translated this as "common fortune," but now we must resign ourselves to a neologism, if we are to do the author justice, and call it "mittence." In arguing that subject-ism is correlative with truth-as-certitude, Heidegger insists that truth-as-non-concealment and the Being-process are one. But we know this already. What is new in the essay is an important precision with regard to the primacy of Being. For the first time the word Geschick is used significantly with the sense that it will have for the rest of Heidegger II. In SZ, we translated this as "common fortune," but now we must resign ourselves to a neologism, if we are to do the author justice, and call it "mittence." We understand thereby that event in which Being is disclosed, when this event is conceived as proceeding from the initiative of Being.

We might add that the word "event" (Ereignis), too, will now be used in the same context and henceforth will become more and more significant in the author's thought. What is important in the essay is the fact that now metaphysics and nihilism are conceived as proceeding from just such an event. For Being bestows itself in such a way that it simultaneously withdraws, sc. mittence is negated because Being cannot bestow itself except in a finite way. If we thought the problem through in terms of Being-as-mittence, "... it would be due to the essence of Being itself that it remains un-thought, [simply] because it withdraws. Being itself withdraws into its [own] truth. . . ."? We understand "into its own truth" here to

4 Along with the German words for "sending" (schicken), for "history" (Geschichte) and for "fortune" (Schicksal), the word Geschick derives from the verb "to-come-to-pass" (Geschehen). For Heidegger it designates an event (Ereignis), hence a coming-to-pass, by which Being "sends" (sich schickt) itself unto man. We call the sending an "e-mitting." Considered as proceeding from Being, the sending is a "mittence." Considered as coming-to-pass in man, it is a "com-mitting," or "commitment" (Schicksal). Henceforth, the latter replaces the SZ translation as "fortune." The collectivity of mittences constitutes Being-as-history (Geschick-e, Geschichte), and we translate as "inter-mittence." All this becomes clearer in the meditation on Hölderlin's "Re-collection."
5 V.g. HW, pp. 243-245.
6 V.g. HW, p. 244; N, II, pp. 483, 485, 489, 490.
mean that in disclosing itself in beings as their truth, Being withdraws behind the finitude of this revelation. The author continues: "... it hides itself in this [disclosure] and conceals itself [as] thus hiding." 8 This concealing by Being of its own concealment is what we have seen already to be the "mystery" of Being "... according to which the truth of Being comes-to-presence." 9

In these terms, metaphysics, as the forgetfulness of Being, is the forgetfulness or, if one prefer here, unawareness of the mystery. Such a phenomenon we have called "errance." Metaphysics is marked not simply by the failure on the part of man to pose the Being-question, nor can it be called in any proper sense human "error." Fundamentally it is a mittence of Being, so that "... metaphysics in its essence is the un-thought, because still withheld, mystery of Being itself. ..." 10 If such is the essence of metaphysics (and the essence of nihilism as well), it is clear why neither can be thought in its essence until we have thought the mystery of Being itself, sc. Being in its negativity.

2. The Ontological Difference

But precisely what is the nature of mittence - any mittence of Being? More explicitly than hitherto, Heidegger now indicates that it is any special way in which the ontological difference issues forth (Austrag). For as a result of mittence, man comports himself in any given way with beings simply because of his relationship to Being itself.11 Hence the comportment is grounded in the difference between Being and beings, sc. in the ontological difference.12 For example, metaphysics itself arises out of the fact that Being emits itself to man in such a way that man tries to comprehend beings as beings. That is why the entire
history of metaphysics for Heidegger is an event in which this difference has issued forth,\textsuperscript{13}

But the differentiation is not the result of some extrinsic “act,” which, so to speak, divides Being from beings. Rather “... in its origins the differentiation is the presenc-ing process of Being itself, the originating power of which consists in the fact [simply] that the event takes place. ...” \textsuperscript{14} That is why, when all is said and done, “Being-as-history is neither the history of men and of humanity, nor the history of man’s relationship to beings and Being. Being-as-history is Being itself and nothing else. ...” \textsuperscript{15} All of these themes will be fully orchestrated as Heidegger II develops.

\textbf{B. THOUGHT}

Since man comports himself with beings in accordance with his relationship to Being, man finds himself to be that “place” where the ontological difference takes place. “... We take our stand in the differentiation between Being and beings. ...” \textsuperscript{16} Since the ontological difference issues forth out of the event in which mitense comes-to-pass, to think Being will be to think Being-as-mitense.

\textit{I. Thought as Re-trive}

In trying to think Being-as-mitence, Heidegger has mediated Nietzsche after the manner of re-trive. As such, his analysis is an elucidation of the genuine sense of Nietzsche’s insight. It does not pretend, however, to repeat simply what Nietzsche said. For when we go the full way with Nietzsche, there appears

\textsuperscript{11} N, II, pp. 208-209. Cf. p. 408. That is why, since metaphysics is for Heidegger ontology, the effort to ground metaphysics, sc. to develop a fundamental ontology, has led him to explore more and more thematically the ontological difference as such. Note how here in 1940 the author takes special pains to show the continuity between his present reflection and the problematic of SZ. See N, II, p. 210.
\textsuperscript{14} “... die Unterscheidung ist anfänglich das Wesende des Seins selbst, dessen Anfängnis das Er-eignis ist....” (N, II, p. 489). See also p. 485.
something in his thought that he himself was unable to think further, and this is what Heidegger ambitions to think through.\textsuperscript{17}

In the concrete, this may seem to do violence to the written word. But it would be a mistake to claim that the procedure is purely arbitrary:

\ldots The right kind of elucidation never understands the text better than its author, but it does understand the text otherwise. Now this other wise must be of such a nature that it deals with the identical "thing" that the elucidated text reflects upon.\textsuperscript{18}

In this sense, it is faithful to all that is truly essential in the thought.

Delineating in greater detail the nature of such re-trive, the author uses certain formulae which will be developed more fully as Heidegger II unfolds. Metaphysics, for example, is to be overcome by a process of "re-collection."\textsuperscript{19} This will take the form of an "attentive answer" to the "noiseless voice" of Being as it makes its "claim" upon man.\textsuperscript{20} The formulae will return. For the present, what is interesting is only the fact that they have fully matured in the author's mind by 1941.

2. Thought as Preparation

In making the re-trive, we must remain docile to Being. That is why, when all is said and done, the human effort at thought is essentially a preparation that disposes man for the disclosure that Being alone can bestow. The task, then, is \ldots to light up the domain within which Being can seize once more in an origi-
nating relation man in terms of his essence. . .” In other words, the thinker prepares himself to be seized by Being. “. . . To be preparational is the essence of the thought we have described.” 21

More precisely, in what does the preparation consist? It means learning how to overcome that presentative thinking which characterizes the philosophy of Will-unto-Power. It means letting Being come to thought as mittence in the beings with which thought deals. Such preparation is ad-ventive (historical) thought, and since it perseveres in posing the question of Being, it is also an interrogative thought.

With regard to the beings themselves, such a thought will seek not simply to use them for its own purposes; rather it will try to receive the earth as a blessing bestowed upon it and make itself at home on earth according to the exigencies of this acceptance, sc. in such a way that it stands guard over the mystery of Being.

Note: that “to receive the earth as a blessing” is fundamentally the same process as to respond to Being bestowing itself as mittence (hence the task of thought is to let Being be itself); that the proper response is made not simply to Being, but to Being as negatived, sc. in its mystery; that in the terms “to stand guard over,” “to watch over” and “shepherds,” we have all the ingredients for the famous “man as shepherd of Being” metaphor of HB (1947). 22

RÉSUMÉ

The primacy of Being-as-overpowering (EM) now comes to expression under the guise of mittence, the issuing forth of the ontological difference in that event wherein Being bestows itself. The bestowal is made, however, in finite fashion and therefore Being simultaneously withdraws, remains mystery. The task of foundational thought is to think Being-as-mittence by doing everything in its power to prepare for such a bestowal through the accomplishment of re-trive.


22 HW, pp. 239 (das Sein sein läßt), 233 (künftiges); VA, pp. 98 (Segen empfangen, Geheimnis hüten), 97 (Hirten).
The next important delineation of foundational thought comes in 1943 with two more Hölderlin interpretations. In the meantime we have the Plato and Hegel analyses which touch our problem only indirectly. We speak briefly of each in turn by way of transition.

I. Plato's Doctrine on Truth

The Plato-interpretation, published in 1942, is clearly another re-trive that disengages what Plato did not — could not — say, sc. that with him the conception of truth was transformed from non-concealment to conformity and thereby Being reduced to a being (existent). It is the un-said in a thinker which is his true "doctrine," his "supreme gift," sc. that in his thought which is most truly "creative," because this is the still withheld mystery of Being, to which, indeed, he was ex-posed but which he could not bring adequately into words. Re-trieving Plato thus in his abiding nearness to us, we re-collect truth in its origins more profoundly than before.

Truth in its origins obviously is αληθευμα, and the task of thought is to recognize what is "positive" in the essence which the "privative" form expresses. But to recognize the privative as positive is to recognize the positive as privative, sc. truth in its mystery. That truth even for Plato is negatived is clear, the

1 PW, pp. 5, 40-41 (Ungesagte, Lehre), 50 (nichts Vergangenes), 51 (anfänglicher). Cf. WD, p. 72 (höchstes Geschenk) and VA, p. 122 (Schöpferische).
author claims, inasmuch as all four stages of the cave-metaphor must be thought as an ensemble. He insists that we may infer as much, too, from the fact that Plato chose a cave as his metaphor. For a cave is at once an open domain that is nevertheless shut off from the ultimate source of light, sc. enclosed (finite):

... Only the essence of truth conceived in the original Greek sense of ἀ-λήθεια [where] non-concealment [is] related to something concealed (disarranged, disguised) - this and only this has an essential relation to the image of a cave [hidden] from the light of day. ... 

II. Hegel's Concept of Experience

As with the Plato study, so too in the seminar on Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit (1942-43), the author is engaged in a retrieve which endeavors to "liberate" Hegel's thought unto its own most proper essence. The value of the essay consists in the Hegel-interpretation itself, and what it says about thought is to be found only in the oblique.

There are some indications of a negative sort that it might be worth-while to cull, principally with regard to the conception of τὸ οἰκεῖον as it has been interpreted in the metaphysical tradition. For we understand Heidegger to hold Hegel's distinction between natural and real Knowing as equivalent to Plato's distinction between δόξα and τὸ οἰκεῖον, where δόξα perceives the ontic, τὸ οἰκεῖον the ontological, dimension of ambivalent ὑπότιμον. There is no question that Hegel as well as Plato sought to achieve a τὸ οἰκεῖον by meditating the Being of beings, but it is equally clear that he did not meditate Being as different from beings, sc. the ontological difference as such. This is what Heidegger himself endeavors to do in interrogating the truth-process through which it breaks out.

This unannounced preoccupation with the ontological difference as such accounts perhaps for a strange remark that otherwise would be disconcerting: "... The being-ness of beings ... 


4 HW, pp. 162, 180, 137. Cf. EM, p. 79.
is for us only one manner of Being, albeit a decisive one, that by no means necessarily shines-forth only as the presence of that which is present. . . .” We interpret the remark to mean that although Being cannot be except in beings, it can manifest itself sufficiently as itself to permit us to discern it in its difference from beings. A case in point would be the Non-being analysis of WM. The sense of the remark, then, would be to insist on the possibility of thinking the ontological difference as such.

At best, however, this tells us what thought is not. For a more positive statement of what it is, we have a remark that introduces the discussion of δόξα-νοεῖν:

... When we use the words δόξα and "being" thoughtfully, it is presupposed from the beginning that we think of, sc. that we pay heed to, the extent to which for a [certain] time the meaning keeps changing, then eventually, with the process of history, becomes settled. . . .

We interpret this to mean: that genuine thought meditates the ambiguity of δόξα, therefore the ontological difference; that thought examines this ambiguity as a historical process, hence it must be a historical thought; that the Hegel-analysis itself is an attempt at just such a historical thought; that this process is a "paying heed" (achten). But our precise problem is: what is the nature of this "paying heed"? On this we have no light at all.

III. "Homecoming," "Re-collection"

What this "paying heed" may mean might be disengaged in some fashion from the analysis of Hölderlin's "Homecoming/To the Kinsmen" and "Re-collection." They date from the same period of Heidegger's development (1943), commemorate the same event (the hundredth anniversary of Hölderlin's death)

---


6 "... Wenn wir die Worte δόξα und 'Seiendes' denkend gebrauchen, ist als erstes vorausgesetzt, daß wir denken, d.h. daß wir darauf achten, inwiefern jeweils die Bedeutung sich wandelt und wie sie jeweils geschichtlich festlegt. . . ." (HW, p. 161).

7 "Heimkunft / An die Verwandten," HD, pp. 9-30; "Andenken," HD, pp. 75-143. We are concerned, of course, only with what Heidegger is trying to say for himself. For an admirable study of the relationship between Hölderlin and Heidegger, see Beda Allemann, Hölderlin und Heidegger (Zürich: Atlantis, 1954).
and, except for certain stylistic differences (one composed for the lecture platform, the other for a commemorative volume), both deal with the same problem in fundamentally the same way. The common theme (the same that dominated "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" and "'As when upon a day of rest...'": what is the essence of poetry? more precisely, of the poet? The present essays are the term of a long fruition, the first lecture course on Hölderlin having been given nine years previously (winter semester, 1934-35), prior even to EM (summer semester, 1935), a second the previous summer (1942). They manifest an abiding interest in Hölderlin, "the poet of the poet," that we can explain, perhaps, only when we have appreciated the full import of what it means to re-trieve the original sense of λέγειν in order to achieve foundational thought.

The two essays we are about to examine are sufficiently complementary to be taken as a unit. Both describe the poet as a wanderer returning home. This is not simply the recounting of a personal experience on the part of Hölderlin but delineates the essence of poet as poet. "'Homecoming'" treats the theme with bolder strokes, "'Re-collection'" examines more in detail the necessity of the journey, its meaning, the exact nature of the homecoming. Taken separately, "'Homecoming'" could serve as a guide to "'Re-collection'," the latter as commentary upon the former. We shall take them as one, trying to disengage in coherent unity the fundamental theses of both. Obviously, our unique concern is with the thinking of Being and we examine the essence of poetry only to understand thought. This gives us three points of reference: A. Being, B. Poetry, C. Thought.

A. BEING

I. The Characterization of Being

a. THE GLAD-SOME – We have become accustomed from the beginning to conceive of Being in terms of the metaphor of light. Here the metaphor is enriched by a further nuance when the author characterizes it as the "Glad-some." This suggests not only the brightness which is proper to light, but also a se-
renity and even light-heartedness that we associate with joy.\(^8\) Source of joy, the Glad-some is the Supremely Joyous itself. Distillation of joyousness and light, the Glad-some imparts to the homeland the benign splendor which welcomes the wanderer when he reaches port, opens things up in the exhilaration of their presence, lights up the disposition of men so that they may be open unto all that is noble in their fields, their cities, their homes.\(^9\)

b. **THE HOLY** – In the light of the Glad-some, the “‘nature’ of beings (man and things) is maintained in wholesome integrity (heil) as unimpaired and sound. To be the ultimate Source of the conserving power that guards beings in the integrity of their Being, this is what makes the Glad-some “the Holy.” The Glad-some and the Holy are one. The Holy here is clearly neither God, nor the gods; it is, as Heidegger interprets it, beyond both gods and men, guaranteeing to both the integrity of their Being, opening up the domain in which the gods and men may come-to-presence. It opens itself up when the marriage-feast takes place, wherein poet as poet is born. The Holy is a law unto itself, far different from any human law, whose articulation constitutes the unique primordial poem that the poet must fashion into words. The primordial poem is also conceived as the “‘thoughts’ of Being-as-spirit.\(^10\)

c. **ORIGIN** – Being-as-origin (Ursprung) is understood best, perhaps, as an overflowing Source which gives rise to beings. It is essentially an abundance, rather a superabundance, a continual overflowing. It is as if Being in its exuberance continually surpasses itself, then flows back upon itself to make the experience of its own inadequacy to itself. This self-surpassing self-inadequacy is the very nature of Being-as-origin. Now what

---

\(^8\) HD, p. 18 (das Heitere). Scott (in *Existence and Being* ..., pp. 291–316) translates “the Serene,” but this suggests only one element in das Heitere. We choose “Glad-some” because it may be taken to suggest the brightness of a smiling face (hence claritas) born of joy (hence hilaritas) that is tranquil, free from violent outburst (hence serenitas).

\(^9\) HD, pp. 18 (das Freudigste), 14 (freundlichen Scheinen), 19 (heilt das Gemüt).

\(^10\) HD, pp. 17 (heil), 18 (Unverstörten, Heilen), 116, 108 (über den Göttern und den Menschen), 139, 99 (Fest), 99 (Gesetz), 107, 116, 139 (unvordichtbare Gedicht), 86 (Gedanken des Geistes). The whole thesis of “‘As when upon a day of rest...’” is crystallized on p. 86.
properly characterizes the homeland to which the poet-wanderer returns is its proximity to Being-as-source. "... What is most proper and most precious in the homeland consists simply in the fact that it is this nearness to the Origin – and nothing else besides. ..." 11

d. Ground – There is a certain steadfastness in Being-as-source, for in giving rise to beings it nevertheless does not lose itself in what has thus sprung forth but remains completely itself as Source. This self-retaining of the Source in the very process of giving rise to what is not itself is a "holding fast" to itself that enables it to be a "fast" support to what derives from it. This fast support may be conceived more clearly if we change the metaphor and consider Being, the steadfast Source, as "Ground." Then "... the process by which the Origin holds itself fast is [at once] the making-fast of Ground. In this process alone of making-fast [-Ground] consists the steadfastness that is proper to the Origin. ..." 12

2. The Priority of Being

Whatever the metaphor used, it is perfectly clear in each of the present essays that Being enjoys a primacy over There-being (poet). The Open opens-up, and upon a great festival day lets the poet in his essence spring forth. How are we to understand this "birth" of the poet? The Holy itself is the Song to be sung, the primordial Poem that the poet must bring into words. The Holy imparts itself to the poet, therefore, as a mittence. Considered in its term, this mittence is the essence of the poet himself as poet, which he, for his part, must bring to fullness by forming the Song into words. It is his "com-mitment" (Schicksal).

When the Holy bestows Being upon the poet, it "hails" him – the mittence is the hailing. "... To let come-to-presence that

12 "... Das Sichfestigen des Ursprungs ist ein Erfestigen des Grundes. Im Er festigen allein besteht das dem Ursprung eigene Feste...." (HD, p. 138). As to what occasioned Hölderlin's conception of "origin" that permits interpretation as "ground," see HD, p. 75.
which comes-to-presence in its presenc-ing – this is the original hailing. . . .” 13 To be sure, Being’s hail may be brought to the poet by means of emissaries that serve, so to speak, as intermediaries. But it is Being itself, whether as the Glad-some or the Holy, that is the origin of the hailing and in the hailing appears. In any case, the hail is more than a simple greeting. It is a summons as well, for the Holy “bids” the poet accomplish of himself that to which he is com-mitted. Through its emissary, the northeast wind, Being “. . . ‘bids’ the poets find themselves in the mittence by which they come-to-presence in historical fashion. . . .” 14

3. The Finitude of Being

It is perfectly clear from these two essays that, when Being comes-to-presence in beings, it does so in a finite way. We can understand best the sense in which Heidegger interprets Hölderlin to mean this if we return for a moment to the characterization of Being-as-source. We miss the point completely if we conceive of Being merely as a spring hidden in the earth that sends forth its waters into the unhidden world. The implication here is that if we could penetrate far enough we could solve the mystery it comports. What is important to realize is that the Source as such is self-concealing. We have seen already the reason: in giving rise to what springs from it, the Source does not lose itself in it but remains itself as Source, hiding itself in what has sprung from it, withdrawing into obscurity – and all this in order to remain completely itself, sc. Source and nothing more. This self-withdrawal in giving rise to beings, this bestowal that is also a withholding, is Heidegger’s explanation of why Hölderlin calls Being “re-served.” It is in this that consists its

13 “... Solches Wesenlassen eines Wesenden in seinem Wesen ist das ursprüngliche Grüßen....” (HD, p. 99). See p. 142. There is much to recommend Grüßen as “hail.” Deriving from the Middle English heil, it obviously has a parentage with das Heilige (the Holy) which now hails (grüßt) the poet. The two standard meanings of “to greet” and “to call after” concur nicely with the undertones of dialogue (Gespräch) and vocation (gerufen, HD, p. 142), as well as com-mitment to a task-to-be-achieved (Aufgabe), that are clearly discernible here.

14 “... Dieser Wind ‘heißt’ die Dichter sieb in das Geschick ihres geschichtlichen Wesens finden....” (HD, p. 82). We take the northeast wind here, the “angels” and “gods” (HD, p. 19) all to have function of intermediary between Holy and poet, which we saw in “As when upon a day of rest....” under the guise of “god” (HD, p. 66). As to the nature of the mediation, see HD, pp. 16-17, where various functions of “angel of the house” and “angel of the year” are distinguished.
mystery. Furthermore, the poet, as hailed by negatived Being, is also prey to its negativity. The There-as-poet is an open domain that closes itself up, that reveals and conceals at once.\textsuperscript{15}

B. POETRY

I. Nature of the Poet

The poet is a “half-god.” This means that he is endowed with a special prerogative by which he is more than a man but less than a god, for he dwells in a privileged domain that lies in-between ordinary humanity and divinity. He is eminently the in-between-being whose prerogative is to be the There that is exposed unto the Holy which opens itself up as the Open. Endowed with this privileged access to the Holy, the poet enjoys an in-between-ness (between gods and men) that is founded in the in-between-ness between beings and Being. The poet’s vocation is to yield to the Holy as it hails him into poetic Being and bring into words the primordial Poem, already formulated (articulative) in the Holy itself but not yet articulated. Let this yielding be called a hailing in turn, a perseverance in ex-position, a counterpoise, a mutual viewing, a recollection, a tranquil whiling, an appropriation of what is proper to the poetic nature, an abiding, a dwelling in the Open which the Holy opens up – the sense is always the same: it is a docility to the Holy, a readiness to respond to its bidding, an assuming of the commitment to a poetic destiny to make manifest the Holy. In a word, we may call it There-being’s response to Being.\textsuperscript{16}

2. The Nature of Poetry

More precisely, how are we to understand the law of the poetic nature? We consider the matter from two distinct but comple-

\textsuperscript{15} HD, pp. 138 (sichverbergendes, Sichentziehen), 14 (Gesparte), 23 (Geheimnis), 99, 109 (Offene verschließt sich, entbergen-verbergen). See also HD, pp. 16-17 (Spiel des Lichtes), 104 (Nacht gleich ist dem Tag).

\textsuperscript{16} Sample: HD, pp. 98 (Halbgott, zwischen), 118 (über den Menschen, unter den Göttern), 122 (Ausgesetzten), 139 (Dies Offene), 142 (gerufen), 107 (Gedicht), 91-92 (Grüßen), 27 (harren), 99-100 (Ausgleich), 15 (blickt-angeblickt), 92 (Einkehr), 100 (Weile), 129 (Aneignung des Eigenen), 137 (Bleiben), 138 (Wohnen), 82 (Bereitschaft), 109 (Zeichen).
mentary points of view: according to the nature of Being's address (hail) to the poet; according to the nature of the response which the poet must make to this hail.

a. BEING AND THE POET — Being in its manifestations is necessarily finite. Hence it withdraws behind the beings to which it imparts presence, concealing itself in its own revelations. This self-concealing revealment is precisely what Heidegger understands by the mystery of Being. If the poet's task is to form Being into words, this means that from the beginning he is endowed with the comprehension of Being, but precisely because Being in its mystery is so elusive, he must be schooled to the use of his prerogative, disciplined to discern the ontological difference. This pedagogy comports three moments: initially, the poet, although endowed with an antecedent and constitutional ("pre-ontological") seizure of Being, is nevertheless preoccupied with the ontic dimension of beings; he must in time experience Being for itself; then, having come to his maturity, he weaves his Being-comprehension into words by bringing to light the Being-dimension in the beings of which he sings. It is thus that he articulates the Holy. In the two essays under discussion, these three moments are thematized in terms of one basic metaphor, sc. of Being-as-source. This is complemented by another metaphor, whereby the poet's own proper homeland is that domain where this Source is to be found. "... What is most properly characteristic about the homeland ... consists uniquely in being this nearness to the Source — and nothing else besides. . . ."¹⁷ Let us try to trace the poet's pedagogy in terms of these two concomitant metaphors.

**Moment I** — In his youth, the poet grows up close to the Source without knowing it as Source, familiar with his native surroundings without appreciating what is really most proper to them: nearness to Being-as-source. To be sure, he has some awareness of Being. As a poetic spirit, he is from the very beginning "open unto the Open," but this awareness is obscured ("pre-ontological") — and, indeed, through no fault of his own.

¹⁷ "... Das Eigenste und das Beste der Heimat ruht darin, einzig diese Nähe zum Ursprung zu sein, — und nichts anderes außerdem..." (HD, p. 23).
The Source, insofar as it gives rise, is known only through the beings that spring forth from it, while it itself withdraws into concealment. In his youthful naiveté, the poet, dimly aware of the Source as such and desiring to penetrate its mystery, seizes upon these beings about him in hopes of thus being able to fasten upon something that will satisfy his unexplained longing. But it is all in vain, for the more he seeks to fasten Being thus, the more it evades him. He is doomed to frustration. He is for the time oblivious to the difference between beings and their Source (the ontological difference), but since the reason for his forgetfulness is less his own negligence than the self-concealing character of Being itself (hence has its source in the Source), it is less true to say that he has forgotten Being than that Being has forgotten him.\(^{18}\)

What can he do? Only be faithful to the demands of the voiceless longing within! The poetic spirit, still “open to the Open” despite this initial state of forgetfulness, remains orientated to the Source, so that this very orientation awakens the will in him to leave home, to go abroad to seek that which can bring him closer to what is properly his own at home, nearness to the self-concealing Source.

The situation of the German poet (for it is only this that Hölderlin pretended to be) suggests comparison with that of the Greek poets, although it is antithetically different. Both have a native gift proper to themselves. For the Greeks, it was the “heavenly fire,” sc. exposure to Being; for the Germans, it is “clarity of exposition” [sic], sc. the power to seize upon the matter of poetry, to organize it, schematize it, divide, control it. Both have correlative weaknesses: the Greeks risked the failure of being able to capture the fire in disciplined form; the German risks a complete forgetfulness of the fire, and a preoccupation with the ontic dimension of poetry. The ideal, of course, is to achieve the perfect balance of fire and form, for it is only thus that either becomes completely itself and the poets of the respective lands attain full freedom in the use of what is proper to them. Both Greeks and Germans must learn something foreign to their native temperament. The Greeks succeeded, and this

\(^{18}\) HD, pp. 87 (schon offen), 88 (Fassenwollen), 89 (Vergessen). For the sense of Vergessen as used here, cf. VA, p. 264 and SF, p. 34.
accounts for their greatness. The German poet, master of form, will succeed only to the extent that he experiences the heavenly fire that the Greeks knew so well. To do this, he must have the courage to leave his native homeland, so that after the journey and by reason of it he can return home and at last be genuinely "at home" there.\textsuperscript{19}

One thing, however, is certain: homecoming and becoming-at-home near the Source are impossible, unless the journey be made. A journey is the condition of return. "... For [Hölderlin], the journey abroad remains essential for the return home to the proper law of his poetic song. ..." \textsuperscript{20} In fact, the journey as such is from the first moment a returning, for it is only thus that the poet learns to make his own what is authentically his.

In all this, note that the initial state of the poet, described here as "open to the Open" but first of all and for the most part lost in a state of ontic preoccupation, corresponds perfectly with what we saw in SZ as the transcendence of There-being in its everyday state of fallen-ness. But this condition is determined by Being itself, which, on the one hand, accounts for the poet's fallen-ness because of its self-withdrawal, and, on the other, impels the poet to make the voyage as the means to overcome this fallen-ness:

\ldots The yearning [of the poet] for what is alien-to-home for the sake of becoming-at-home in what is proper to [his homeland] is the essential law of [Being-as-] mittence by which the poet \ldots is com-mitted. \ldots \textsuperscript{21}

to his poetic destiny.

\textit{Moment II} – To know the Source as Source, the poet must first follow its streams down to the sea, there to discover for the first time its affluence. In fact, the Source becomes an affluence only when it is experienced as Source. To appreciate his native soil as a homeland because it is close to the Source (\textit{Nahe zum Ursprung}), he must first know the land of the Greeks and there

\textsuperscript{19} HD, pp. 83–84. Cf. p. 89 (tapfer Vergessen).
\textsuperscript{20} "... denn es ist ein Grundzug des Dichtens dieses Dichters, weil ihm die Wanderschaft in die Fremde wesentlich bleibt für die Heimkehr in das eigene Gesetz seines dichterischen Gesanges. ..." (HD, p. 79). See pp. 87 (Heimischsein), 89 and passim (Aneignung des Eigenen).
\textsuperscript{21} "... Die Liebe zum Unheimischsein umwollen des Heimischwerdens im Eigenen ist das Wesensgesetz des Geschickes, durch das der Dichter in die Gründung der Geschichte des 'Vaterlandes' geschickt wird. ..." (HD, p. 83).
be "almost burnt up" by the fire of Being. But at every point of
the voyage, Being remains near, guiding his journey, and what-
ever attracts him abroad does so because of its affinity with
home, helping him to understand more and more what is proper
to his nature. Finally, the heavenly fire itself lets him under-
stand that it must be brought back with him, if the native land
is to be really home:

... The fire has let him experience that it itself must be brought back
from abroad into the homeland in order that there this proper en-
dowment, the facility for clear exposition, can release its native powers
in relation to the fire, ...

and produce poetry of proper depth.22

Note that we have here an experience of Being that is domi-
nated and determined by Being itself. The poet only submits to
it. On the other hand, the fact that the poet is almost consumed
by the fire indicates that he is not meant for sheer exposure to
Being as such but must return to the shade of the homeland
where a gentle coolness, which comes with beings that by their
limitation temper Being, protects the poet from its blazing
heat.23

Moment III - It is not the journey abroad as such that brings
the poet to maturity but rather the return home enriched by his
experience. It is just such a return that "Homecoming" describes,
for now "... the homeland opens up and gestures toward what
is its proper possession, so that [now] it can be made [the poet's]
own. . ." 24 He realizes that what he sought all along is already
at home, but now is comprehended for itself. It is now that the
poet understands that if on his journey, when no longer near to
his Source, he was almost burned up by the fire of Being, never-
theless, without this experience of fire, even his native en-
dowment for facile exposition would not have been liberated

22 "... Das Feuer bat ihn erfahren lassen, daß es selbst aus der Fremde in die
Heimat zurückgebracht werden muß, damit dort das Eigene, das Vermögen der
klaren Darstellung, im Bezug auf das Feuer seine Wesenskräfte löse, um sie in das
Darzustellende zu binden..." (HD, p. 89). See HD, pp. 137-138 (Reichtum der
Quelle als Quelle), 78-79 (Land der Griechen), 90 (fast verbrannt), 88 (nur die Mutter),
129 (Widerschein des Eigenen).
23 HD, p. 90 (der milden Kühlung).
24 "... In der Befreiung des Eigenen öffnet sich die Heimat und weist in ihr
completely unto itself. Only when the experience of what is foreign, sc. fire, and the exercise of his native propensity for disciplined style are discovered in the unity that is grounded in a common essence – only then is the poet’s poetry mature.\textsuperscript{25}

If we are to understand clearly the full sense of the poet’s homecoming, we must realize that it does not mean taking possession of his homeland, as if it were personal property to have and to hold. Rather, it must be conceived as belonging to the order of movement: it is a passing unto the place of nearness to, a following of, the Source. But it is a passage that must be content never to penetrate to the Source and dissolve its mystery, for insofar as the poet appreciates it as Source, he understands that it is necessarily self-concealing and therefore continually evasive. That is why he can never get “at” the Source. As near as he comes to it, he remains essentially “far.” This is the mystery of Being and the proper disposition of the poet in its presence is a reverential awe (\textit{Scheu}), born of the realization that he can never experience the Source immediately.\textsuperscript{26}

We see here a correlation of nearness and farness that permits Heidegger a play on words of which he never tires. We understand the terminology in the following way: Being is “far,” simply because it is not a being and can never be fastened by There-being in, for or by itself. This is the same thing as saying that it conceals itself behind the beings to which it gives presence. Hence, Being-as-source “... remains to that degree far-off as there belongs to itself an essential self-withdrawal. ...”\textsuperscript{27} Being is “near,” because it is that by which beings that are near (and, therefore, are near), and, as the Source of all nearness, is nearer to There-being than anything that is near, even its self. That is why the Gladsome is nearer than any of the beings that appear in it. This double aspect of Being-as-source permits us to resolve the paradoxes with which Heidegger loves to play. For example: “... the essence of nearness appears now to be that it brings near that which is near insofar as it holds it afar...”.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} HD, pp. 14 (begegnet dir schon), 109 (Wesenseinheit, reif).
\textsuperscript{26} HD, pp. 113 (zurückgehende Gehen), 138 (Folgen), 124 (Scheu).
\textsuperscript{27} “... Dieses bleibt in dem Grade ferner, als zu ihm selbst ein wesentliches Sichentziehen gehört...” (HD, p. 138).
\textsuperscript{28} “... Jetzt dagegen erscheint das Wesen der Nähe darin, daß sie das Nahe nahebringt, indem sie es fernhält...” (HD, p. 23). See pp. 16 (Nahender und näher), 23 (Geheimnis).
for the nearness of Being is always re-served, self-concealing. This paradoxical fusion of nearness and farness is precisely what is meant by Being in its mystery.

However all this may be, one thing is certain: the following, passing unto, drawing near to the Source is not an act accomplished once and for all but a process that continues as long as the poet is poet. The homecoming itself is simply the first moment of return. It must be sustained by a continued effort to learn to be “at home” at home, an effort that consists not only in the initial passage unto a place of nearness to the Source but in abiding (Bleiben) there in an indefinite whiling, making it a place of dwelling (Wohnen). “... Indeed, even homecoming is only the beginning of the return to what is the proper domain [of the poet]. ... Therefore upon arrival he longs ... to be able to abide [there]. ...” 29

To abide thus in nearness to the Source, the poet must keep always fresh before him what he learned on the long voyage into the southland, sc. an appreciation of the sense of Being. He should keep aware of the beginning, the brief sojourns, the turning-points and the return trip of his voyage:

... The one condition of becoming-at-home in his proper domain, sc. the journey abroad, has been fulfilled. But this fulfillment remains fulfillment only on the condition that what has been experienced (the glare and heat of the heavenly fire) is preserved. ... 30

But how can it be preserved? Only if the poet re-collects it. “... Abiding comes-to-presence as original re-collection. ...” 31

b. THE POET AND BEING — In order to understand the import of “re-collection” (Andenken), we are going to use during the following exposé the expanded form: “thinking-upon-what-is-past.” Although it is a thinking-back, it must not be conceived as if that which is thought were something that was once

31 ‘... Das Bleiben West als das ursprüngliche Andenken...” (HD, p. 141). Heidegger’s italics.
and is no more, simply made present by the act of remembrance and nothing more. Such a thought must be understood in terms of its three different dimensions (directions): past, future, present.

i. The Past – The past upon which the poet must think in order to abide near the Source is a past that still comes-to-presence and works its influence upon him. It is a past that still is-as-having-been. In the present case, the past is the experience of the heavenly fire (Being) that the poet made on his journey into foreign lands. By reason of his thinking upon it, the experience is as vital to him now as when he made it.32

"The thinking-upon-the-past is a hailing. . . ." 33 It is through this metaphor of "greeting," "saluting" that Heidegger in Hölderlin’s name elaborates the sense of what it means to think upon what-is-as-having-been. For if we meditate the essence of what it means to "hail," we discover a certain self-surrender on the part of the one-who-hails to the one-who-is-hailed. Hail-er enters into the hail only enough to say that he defers completely to the hailed. He lets the hailed shine-forth in the light proper to its own essence and unfold in the nobility proper to itself. In a word, he lets it be! Furthermore, there is a reciprocity in authentic (echte) hailing. Hailed accepts the hail and the very acceptance is reply. " . . . The hailed as the hailed now hails the hail-er in turn. . . ." 34

Now if the poet hails the past as his way of thinking-upon-it, the same reciprocity takes place. When the poet turns his thoughts to what-is-as-having-been, then in these thoughts themselves the past flows back, becoming warp and woof of his thought, even as he thinks it. Hence, by reason of his thinking-upon-that-which-is-past, the past imposes itself upon him under the guise of his own thinking itself. " . . . The heavenly fire imposes itself on him who hails it as [his own] thought and abides near him as that which comes-to-presence in . . . what-is-past. . . ." 35

32 HD, pp. 79–80, 91, 110 (Gewesene).
33 "Das Andenken ist ein Grüßen. . . ." (HD, p. 91).
ii. The Future – If what-is-past still comes-to-presence in the poet’s thinking-upon it and as this thinking, is it not something still-to-come as well as having-been, perhaps even an abiding past because it is a future?

... If the thinking-upon-what-is-past allows the past [to follow the law of] its own essence ..., then we experience that what-is-past, in its return through [our] thinking upon it, swings out over our present and comes to us as a future. All at once our thinking-upon-what-is-as-having-been must consider this past as something-not-yet-unfolded. ...88

What is it that is thus the poet’s future, still coming to him as he thinks upon what-is-past? It is the Holy itself (Being) in continual ad-vent. The Holy is clearly the poet’s past, for it is by reason of the Holy’s hail to him that he emerges-into-presence as a poet and is now as having thus come to be on the great festal day. That is why to think-upon-the-past is to think upon this festal day. According to a different metaphor, it is the light of the Holy ‘... that bestowed itself upon the poet through his journey to foreign lands, and as this bestowal still comes-to-presence in the poet’s hailing of what is past. ...’ 37

But the Holy is also the poet’s future, for it was on the festal day when he was born to his poetic destiny that ‘... the Open lit itself up for him so that he saw that coming to him which his [own] word must utter: the Holy. ...’ 38 The Holy comes to him as the primordial Poem that is before and for his own poetizing, Poem which he must then fashion into human words. It imposes itself upon him as the pattern of poetical thoughts that he himself must think. For the poet, to think-upon-what-is-past is to think upon what is coming to him as future, and, conversely, to think upon what is coming is to think upon what is past. The


38 ‘... das Offene sich lichtet, so daß der Dichter das kommen sieht, was sein Wort sagen muß: das Heilige.’ (HD, p. 98). Heidegger’s italics.
poet's task is to think upon both what is coming and what is past, or rather upon the Holy itself which is the unity of both.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{iii. The Present} – Heidegger speaks about the poet's past and future but never explicitly about his present. We are left to conjecture what this could mean, but there seems little doubt as to how it must be understood. For when the Holy as primordial Poem continues to come (future) to the poet who is poet precisely as having-been-hailed into his poetic Being by the Holy itself (past), the poet's task is to render present (present) the Holy in the words of his song. This he does to the extent that he learns in an abiding way to be at home near the Source.

More precisely, for the poet to be "at home" in what is properly his own means that he learns to use his native propensity for clear exposition with an authentic freedom of spirit. Now in his initial situation close to the Source, but where he was unable to appreciate it as Source and was, therefore, prone to regard what proceeds from the Source as the Source itself, the poet tended to make use of such beings in his poetry with a freedom that was not authentic, treating them as mere entities of which in his poetry he could take possession by forcing them into patterns at will. Through the experience he has had of the heavenly fire of Being, however, which still comes to him out of the past, he has discovered a new depth in these beings and a new dimension for his poetic creativity. He understands now that to achieve his poetic essence and give full value to his native endowment, this clarity of exposition must be suffused with the glowing warmth of the heavenly fire itself. This is a great liberation for him, because it frees his talents from their slavery to the ontic and releases them unto their authentic fullness, which consists, indeed, in clearly exposing that alone which warrants exposure: the heavenly fire of the Holy. "... [The poet] exercises [his] native endowment, the clarity of exposition, 'freely' only then, when what is clear in his utterance is permeated by the open experience of that which is exposed. ..." \textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39} HD, pp. 107-108 (vor, für), 116 (zudenkt), 133 (Gewesene im Künftigen), 100 (Ankunft [im] Gewesene), 115 (einemütigen Denken an das Gewesene ... Kommende), 141 (von wo aus, wohin zurück).

\textsuperscript{40} "... Das Eigene, die Klarheit der Darstellung, gebraucht er nur dann 'frei', wenn das Klare des Sagens bestimmt ist durch das offene Erfahren des Darzustellenden...." (HD, p. 112). Cf. HD, p. 112 (den freien Gebrauch).
In this liberation of his proper gifts, the homeland itself opens up to the poet and points to its treasures so that now he may assume them as his own. "... Now our flowers and our woodlands bestow upon him the joy that consists essentially in sheltering what is true [in these things]. ..." 41 Now the truth-sheltering joy is entrusted to the poet, who by the genuinely free use of his native talent lets them appear as what they are.

Letting beings appear as what they are means exposing them in their truth, their beauty, in the Beon (Seyn) by which they are. 42 This is done by the poetic word. The poetic word must fit the dazzling light of the Holy which comes to the poet out of the past and shines in the things he meets upon his homecoming. As such, it is a word of "hailing," inasmuch as it greets what is past; at the same time, it is a "prophetic" word, inasmuch as it articulates that which is coming; and both for the same reason, because it seeks to utter past and future in their original correlation, the Holy as such. Such a word can be uttered only if the poet has learned to use his native talent with a freedom that is genuine. This means that, in casting his poems into form, he "... more and more exclusively adjusts himself to the state of being open to what is intimated to him, of being alert for that-which-is-coming. ... The sober, observant openness for the Holy is at the same time ... the power to abide in what is proper to himself. ..." 43

c. SCHOLIA – There are some general observations to be made in the light of what we have just seen, which, despite a certain inner coherence, do not admit readily of logical sequence.

i. The Poetic Dialogue – One special form that thinking-upon-the-past takes is worth special mention: the poetic dialogue (Gespräch). This is conceived as taking place between the poet

41 "... Jetzt schenken unsere Blumen und unsere Wälder die Freude, deren Wesen es ist, das Wahre zu behüten...." (HD, p. 89). Heidegger's italics.
42 HD, p. 127. Heidegger uses occasionally the older German spelling Seyn (as does Hölderlin). We render it by the AS form of Being: Beon. Alternative: Beyng. The import appears later.
43 "... Den freien Gebrauch des eigenen Vermögens lernen, heißt, sich immer ausschließlich fügen in das Offensein für das Zugewiesene, in die Wachsamkeit auf das Kommende. ... Die nüchtern aufmerkende Offenheit für das Heilige ist ... das Bleibenkönnen im Eigenen...." (HD, p. 112). See HD, pp. 119 (im freien Gebrauch des Wortes), 111-112 (sich fügen), 96 (Grüßen), 108 (prophetisch).
and his “friends,” but it is of such a nature that it can take place in him alone. For what characterizes dialogue as such is not that one person listens to what another says. This is the case only in a spoken dialogue, and the duality is conditioned by the fact that the physical organs of hearing and speech happen to be separated. When dialogue is considered in its origins, hearing and speaking are seen to be unified.

For the fundamental structure of the dialogue is identical with the process of the poetical thinking-upon-the-past. After the Holy hails the poet into Being, the Holy continues to come (future) to the poet who has-been-hailed (past). When the poet, in turn, hails the Holy, he hails the still-coming-past, whereby the past, thus hailed, returns upon him in his thoughts themselves, imposing itself upon him as the texture of these thoughts. This situation where the poet is turned toward (ad-tendere) Being, hailing it inasmuch as he is hailed by it, we have called already the power of “attending” (Hörenkönnen) to Being, the origin of all “hearing.” But the Holy as past and future becomes present only insofar as the poet utters it in words. This is the origin of utterance (Sagen).

The ultimate unity of attending and utterance which constitutes dialogue in its origin derives from the unity of past-future-present in the unity of time. Authentic dialogue between “friends” is the encounter between two different spirits which permits both to think upon that which all thought should think, sc. what-is-past. Their thinking-upon-the-past, then, is accomplished together, so that what is attended to and what is uttered are but one. But what happens when the “friends” are no longer together? Does dialogue become impossible? Not at all, we are told, but it does take a different form. What this different form will be we are left to surmise. Let us leave the matter for a moment and return to it below.

**ii. Poetry and Ground** – We have seen that Being-as-source enjoys a certain steadfastness that is best conceived if we consider it under the metaphor of ground, provided we remember that Being-as-ground is not a static but a dynamic thing, simul-

---

44 HD, p. 117.
46 HD, pp. 119 (Gesagte und Gehörte das Selbe), 130 (andere Art).
taneously entitled to the name "Source." We know, too, that it is by thinking-upon-what-is-past that the poet "abides" near the Source. We wish now to understand more clearly the relation between the poet's abiding and the Source when it is conceived as Ground.

When we say that the poet abides near the Source, we mean that having traced the streams back to their origin he keeps following the Source, even though he keeps realizing that he cannot get "at" it completely, for it is of such a nature as always to evade him. Now to abide by such a Source means not to dissolve its mystery but to follow the Source in such a way that the nearer he comes to it, the better he comprehends and manifests the fact that the distance between himself and the Source as such never can be traversed. This is not to unveil the mystery but to guard and preserve it as mystery.46

"Pure" nearness to the Source as Source means sustaining this essential distance (its mystery). It means entering into the process of self-concealment by which Being remains steadfast as Source. Now when the poet abidingly makes himself one with the mysterious process in which Being remains steadfast by reason of continued self-withdrawal, his own steadfastness makes common cause with the steadfastness of Being, becomes "stuck fast," so to speak, in Being-as-ground. In other words, he plays a part in the process by which Being-as-origin becomes manifest, and in this sense he does what lies within his power to let Being be Origin, sc. to "origin-ate" Being. This phenomenon we already have called "origin-ation" (Stiften). We must insist, however, that this origin-ation does not "make" Being-as-source in any sense that idealism can give to this term. But on the other hand, it does not find Being before it either, as some ready-made entity. Origin-ation means to let Being appear as Source-Ground. But since Being is Ground because it is a (continually recessive) Source that lets beings emerge-into-presence (appear), then to the extent that the poet lets the Source of all appearing appear as itself (as mystery), he helps it come-to-pass as Ground, therefore according to his measure "grounds" it.47

46 See HD, p. 23.
47 HD, pp. 138–139 (Erfestigung, Stiften, Zeigen), 135, 139 (Festmachen, sich erfestigt, festhalten).
How does the poet achieve this? Recall what it means to "abide": it means for the poet to render continuous his homecoming by constantly thinking-upon-what-is-past. In other words, it means thinking upon the Holy as still coming to him (future) whom the Holy itself already has hailed (past) to articulate the Holy now (present) in words. The poet thus achieves perfect liberty in the use of his native talent by suffusing form with fire. When all is said and done, the poet origin-ates Being-as-ground when he achieves authentic utterance. As the half-god inhabiting a privileged domain in-between the gods and men:

... the poet manifests the Open of this in-between [-state] wherein he himself first must dwell, insofar as his utterance, by manifesting the Source, [thereby] follows it and thus [comes to] abide [near it], an abiding that becomes steadfast in the Holy that [now] must come into words. ...

We must add to this an important supplementary remark. Through all this discussion of the coming-to-pass of Ground, one is struck by the constant resonance of the language and perspectives of WG, which, as we saw, were fundamentally faithful to the principal themes of SZ. In SZ, the fundamental structure of There-being, the coming-to-pass of truth, consisted in the three existential components, unified in the single process of concern, whose own well-spring is the unity of time. In WG, the problem of ground was seen to be the problem of truth, and the coming-to-pass of ground was composed of a three-fold dynamic (the "triplex strewing of ground") whose unity likewise arises out of the unity of time. In the present essays we have the following data:

In the first place, we have seen how, by this abiding near the Source in manifesting it as mystery, the poet joins forces, so to speak, with Being-as-origin so as to help origin-ate it, and, indeed, to help ground (ergründen) Being-as-ground. As such, this is a thinking upon the Holy and its primordial Poem. Does not this concord substantially with the sense of the project of World that is a laying-claim to untrammelled possibility? If the two

48 "... Der Dichter zeigt dieses Offene des Zwischen, worin er selbst zuerst wohnen muß, dadurch, daß sein Sagen zeigend dem Ursprung folgt und so das Bleiben ist, das sich in das Heilige festigt, das in sein Wort kommen soll..." (HD, p. 140).
contexts are completely different, the author's word for both phenomena is the same: *Stiften*. For a man such as Heidegger, who uses language with such rigor, this fact alone, even with allowances for the Hölderlin original, is not unimportant.

Furthermore, the second component of WG's grounding-process is suggested quite clearly, not so much in terms of the poet's captivation by beings as in terms of the open-ness to Being in the order of affectivity. In *SZ* we called this the ontological disposition. The same problematic appeared in *WW*, where "attunement" in There-being is seen to be a mode by which beings-in-the-ensemble are disclosed. Furthermore, this affective disposition has been seen to disclose the negativity of There-being, so that we could call it the "component of finitude" in There-being. In analysing the process of poetizing now we find once more the fundamental importance for the poet of "attunement," plus a correlation between this attunement and Being as negatived.

The poet's attunement takes different forms according to the different ways in which Being is conceived: joy in the presence of the Joyous; dread in the presence of Being as the Extra-ordinary or as the Non-actual, discerned by the poet in his in-between condition; wonderment and awe before the Extra-ordinary; reverence and awe in the presence of Being as the Holy and Source. The sum total of such dispositions constitutes the affective temper of his poetic soul. Whatever the form that attunement takes, it seems clear that what ultimately determines it to be what it is is not the poet but Being itself that is thus disclosed in it. It is Being, by virtue of the fact that it hails the poet, that "calls the tune" of his attunement, and his function is to reverberate accordingly.49

What strikes us, however, is that the attunement of which there is question here discloses Being in its negativity, sc. in the mystery of its self-concealment. This is particularly apparent in the two most important forms of attunement that we find mentioned in the essays: joy and awe. "... Joy in poetizing [consists] in knowing that in every joyous being that already is encountered, the Joyous hails [the poet] insofar as it holds itself

If a poet knows sorrow, this is a correlative of joy, inasmuch as it derives from the reserved character as such of the Holy. "... Awe [consists] in knowing that the Source does not admit of an immediate experience. ..." In both cases, the attunement discloses Being, but in its finitude. In the same sense and more explicitly still, we are told that the condition of poetic intoxication (Trunkenheit), which is the most sublime form of attunement, brings the poet to that lucidity "... wherein the depths of concealment are opened up and darkness appears as the sister of clarity. ..." We infer that, if attunement plays an essential rôle in the process of poetizing, one reason is that it discloses in a special way the properly mysterious (negative) character of the Being that must be brought into words.

The third component of the coming-to-pass of ground likewise may be disengaged from the text. For if the sense of the existential, logos, is to let-be-seen, and if this may be interpreted as a founding of ontic truth by letting beings be seen in their ontological dimension, is this not precisely what happens when the poet manifests the Holy in words, once he becomes "at home" in what is proper to himself: disciplined form suffused with celestial fire? Slowly the logos of SZ is being transformed into the power of authentic speech.

Finally, the three components of poetizing, when interpreted as the coming-to-pass of ground, are gathered into the unity of the single process which is the poet's concern. Whether we describe it now as a thinking-upon-the-past whose attunement is awe, or as an abiding in joy by putting into words his nearness to the Joyous that is always re-served, the sense is always the same: to guard the mystery of Being by giving it an authentic utterance. This is the only concern of the poet:

51 "... Die Scheu ist das Wissen, daß der Ursprung sich nicht unmittelbar erfahren läßt...." (HD, p. 124).
52 "... Die Trunkenheit hebt in die lichte Klarheit, in der die Tiefe des Verborgenen sich öffnet und die Dunkelheit als die Schwester der Klarheit erscheint...." (HD, p. 153).
So it is that the joy of the poet is in truth the concern of the bard whose song guards the Joyous in re-serve and lets what he has sought be in [its] nearness to him, [though] in a nearness that is [to be sure] re-served. ...

Such a concern, however, identified as it is with thinking-upon-the-past (unity of past, future and present) has its ultimate Source in time.

If this correlation that we have suggested between the process of ground in the Hölderlin interpretations and in SZ-WG is valid, is there any difference between them? Of course: the difference between Heidegger I and Heidegger II.

iii. Poet and People – The present essays make abundantly clear that the poet is never poet for himself alone – he is essentially a "man of the people." For every man, and this is a fundamental thesis of Hölderlin that Heidegger makes his own, has a poetic nature: "... in poetic fashion/Dwelleth man upon the earth." Provisionally, we take this to mean that every man, despite the fact that he is first of all and for the most part preoccupied with beings that he can control, remains nevertheless open unto Being in such a way that he can and should respond to it by authentic utterance, and this as an abiding state in which he dwells. We take this to be the sense of "in poetic fashion," or simply "the poetical" as such. But the difference between the poet of vocation and ordinary men – the "sons of earth," his "countrymen" – is this: ordinary men need someone to show them the way to be "at home" in the homeland, someone to go abroad and seek the experience of the heavenly fire and, returning, open-up for them the sense of their own nearness to the Source. The poet is a "sign" before his fellow men.

Obviously, if the poet is to help the "sons of earth" comprehend their poetical nature, he must at first become "at home" in the law of his poetic task, hence learn to abide in a place of nearness to the Source where he makes a permanent dwelling.


54 "Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch wohnet/ Der Mensch auf dieser Erde." (Hölderlin, "In lieblicher Bläue blühet"...). Cited HD, p. 84.

55 HD, p. 116 With the whole present treatment, cf. pp. 43–44.
In this dwelling-place he joins in the process of the coming-to-pass of ground, thereby origin-ates, after his fashion, the Origin and thereby accomplishes in himself an authentic poetizing. This poetic Ground that he thus has gained for himself becomes accessible to his countrymen simply because he is one of them. "...The dwelling of the poet that origin-ates [Being-as-origin] points out and consecrates the Ground [on which] the sons of earth poetically may dwell...." 56

iv. Poet and History – Insofar as the process of poetizing involves a thinking-upon-what-is-past that comports the three directions of past-present-future, clearly the process is a temporal one. Time is the foundation of history, and therefore the process of the poet's concern is as profoundly historical as it is temporal. The law, too, which dictates this tri-dimensional structure of his poetic function, sc. which demands that he voyage abroad to experience what is foreign to his initial situation, then return, then learn to be "at home" in his native land by thinking in abiding fashion on his experience – this law is the "law of [his] historicity." 57

What is the ultimate source of the poet's historicity and history? It is the Source itself, the Holy, which hails him to his poetic charge on the festal day when he is born, Being-as-mittence, whose emitting bids him fulfill the commitment, dictated by the law of his poetic destiny, to form Being into words. When the poet responds to his vocation and helps to ground Being-as-ground, origin-ating the Origin as best he can by letting it become manifest, he grounds thereby his own history. Yet he does not do this for himself alone, since he is essentially a man of the people. Just as he establishes the Ground on which other men may dwell in poetic fashion, he grounds, too, the history of his people:

... The festal day emitted by the Holy remains the origin of history. ... If, however, the festal day is the origin from which the essence of a people's history derives, and if the poet proceeds from this day, then the

57 HD, pp. 90, 110 (Gesetz der Geschichtlichkeit).
Poet becomes he who grounds the history of a people. He makes ready that *poetical condition* whereon a historical people dwells as upon its own Ground. . . .

What is history in the sense that the natural manner of thinking conceives it, sc. as the history of peoples? Here Heidegger achieves a subtlety impossible to translate. The German uses the prefix Ge- to suggest plurality gathered into unity: v.g. where *Berg* means "mountain," the *Ge-birg* means a "range of mountains." Now *Geschichte* ("history"), Heidegger says, is *Geschicht*, where we are to understand a gathering-into-unity (Ge-) of those moments wherein Being e-mits ([sich] schickt) unto poet and folk the com-mitment to achieve the poetic destiny. We translate this (*Geschichte-Geschicht*) as "inter-mittence."

From all this, we infer: that the process of poetizing is original time and original, origin-ating history; that for the poet himself, his history is grounded insofar as he grounds himself in the Ground that is Being, by joining in the process that lets Being be manifest as Ground; that for his people, their history is grounded insofar as through his example and with his help they achieve their poetic destiny by learning the authentic use of language as a people; that the history of a people taken as a whole is the gathering into sequential unity of the various manners in which Being has disclosed itself to a folk (poet plus people). The consequences of this are, of course, obvious. All authentic poetry must be historical; a people's language plays an essential röle in this people's history. Being maintains its primacy in the coming-to-pass of history. Such variations of the poetic process as authentic dialogue are likewise profoundly historical.

v. Poet and Re-solve — We have spoken much of the function

---


58 Does the authentic use of language exhaust the ways in which Being discloses itself? See HD, p. 83, where the Greek *πολιτικ* is designated "... der vom Heiligen bestimmten Wesensstätte der Geschichte. . . ." This poses the problem of the relation between language and other beings, but we are not yet in a position to discuss it.
which the poet as poet is committed to fulfill. We know that he is hailed into this function by Being, that the song he must sing is formulated already in Being itself and imposed upon him as that which must be uttered. Thus far, everything proceeds from Being. We wish now to bring into sharper focus the exact nature of this function, insofar as it proceeds from the poet. To be sure, it comes-to-presence as a profoundly temporal thinking-upon-the-past, but what precise attitude in the poet himself sets the process in motion?

In the simplest terms, it is a willing by which the poet consents to the law of his poetic destiny. We find the first evidence of this consent in the poet's (Hölderlin's) opening address to the north wind as "the most beloved wind of all." Heidegger understands this "love" to consist in "willing" that this wind be, and that it be the kind of wind that it is. The poet accepts the north wind according to its nature and makes his own will one with it.61

But what is the nature of the north wind? It is the emissary that bears Being's original hail to the poet that commits him to his poetic nature. "... By standing forth in the blowing of the north wind, the poet [becomes] hailed by the hail of the Holy..." In hailing him thus, the north wind illumines for him his situation, assuring him of the nature of his commitment. This hail to the poet comes by a noiseless voice that bids him achieve his poetic destiny. And all this transpires in the poetic essence itself (though obviously not of itself) and constitutes the law of this nature, inscribed in it by Being as coming to the essence through its emissary and dictating the terms according to which this nature can achieve itself.62

The poet accepts these terms in endorsing with his own will the law of his nature. He wills to accept the commitment to which Being-as-mittence has committed him. His will, in this case, is the "... deliberate readiness for [his] appurtenance to the mittence [of Being]..." He wills, then, what Being, still

---

61 HD, p. 81 ("Der liebste unter den Winden / Mir,...")
63 HD, pp. 94 (aufheiterl), 82 (Wesensschickung), 117 (lautlose Stimme), 82 (sich in das Geschick finden, Wille "des" Kommenden).
64 "... die wissende Bereitschaft für die Zugehörigkeit in das Geschick...." (HD, p. 82).
coming to him, bids *(heißt)*. This deliberate readiness to fulfill the com-mitment to which Being has destined him Hölderlin expresses chiefly by a familiar metaphor, sc. that of “hail.” If Being com-mits the poet to his situation by hailing him into Being, the poet expresses his readiness to appertain to the process by a hail of reply. He has recognized the time of Being’s coming. If the north wind has brought Being’s hail, it is the north wind he hails in turn, but as already having constituted him in what he is. In the poet’s responding hail to the north wind, then, he greets his own past. That is why the same emissary that serves as Being’s emissary to the poet (by which Being comes to him as his future) becomes in turn the poet’s emissary by which he hails the past.\(^65\)

Now we are in the position of considering the poet’s hail to the past as proceeding from him. But we have seen already how the past, when thus hailed, swings back upon the poet, imposing upon him what thoughts and affective dispositions he must have. Coming to the poet in this fashion, the past is once again the future. We see clearly how complete is Being’s primacy in the whole process: Being-as-hailing is the poet’s future; Being-as-hailed is the poet’s past, which imposes the thoughts he must think. The intermediary between Being-as-future and Being-as-past is the emissary of Being itself, the north wind. What comes from the poet? Only the \textit{willingness} that it be so.\(^66\)

Such is the structure of the poet’s thinking-upon-the-past. We can discern it again in that privileged form of re-collection which is the poetic dialogue. For through this are uttered the thoughts that lie deep in the poet’s heart. These thoughts are what the heart “desires” by reason of the determination within its very essence. Such thoughts as these are the primordial Poem of the Holy, disclosed to the poet on the great festal day as that which he must bring into words. Such was his com-mitment. Through the dialogue, he thinks upon this visitation that still perdures (past) in him, and for his part he wills that it be so. He acquiesces in his destiny and, consenting to it thus, he brings into words (present) that which is still coming to him (future):

\(^{65}\) HD, pp. 90 (Zeit ... anerkannt), 101 (läßt das Gewesene grüßen).

\(^{66}\) HD, p. 94 (“geht” fort).
What the poet wills is that which is willed [by the Holy] in the desires that spring from the foundations [of his heart], sc. his commitment. This commitment does not come to the poet [simply] because he wills it, but ... because [this] is the still unarticulated Poem ... of the Holy. [That is why] he must desire [it] poetic-wise [as] that-which-is-[still-]coming ...67

Past, future and present fuse into the single structure of the poetic dialogue, because the poet lets it be so.

There is one more important point to make. The nature of the poetic destiny to which the poet consents is such that he must show forth Being-as-source insofar as it continually recedes and thus becomes steadfast Ground. By thinking-upon-the-past, he abides near the Source without ever hoping to traverse the measureless distance that separates him from it. It is thus that he respects the mystery of the Source and, according to his means, articulates the mystery in words.68 For him to consent to his poetic nature is to consent to this law of Being’s disclosure that is fulfilled in him, law dictated to Being by reason of its own negativity.

May we not discern in all this the fundamental structure of what we have learned to call “re-solve”? Reduced to its essentials, this may be understood as that freely adopted attitude of There-being by which it consents to its own situation that it be a process in which Being becomes manifest, but according to the law of finitude. This consent achieves authenticity. In SZ, There-being is transcendence, because it is the power to project Being; here the poet is a power through which Being is originated. In SZ, the complete negativity of There-being is symbolized by its thrown-ness; here the poet is com-mitted to a poetic destiny insofar as he is “thrown” by Being. In SZ, the voice of conscience calls There-being to achieve itself; here the noiseless voice of the north wind bids the poet achieve his poetic task. In SZ, response to the voice of conscience consists in There-being’s willingness to be called; here the poet’s response to Being’s hail is his willingness to be hailed. In SZ, There-being’s achievement

68 HD, pp. 138–139 (Grund), 23–25 (Geheimnis).
of itself is the attaining of authenticity; here the poet's achieving of the poetic function consists in making his own what is genuinely proper to him. In SZ, the process of concern is grounded in original time which founds history; here the process of poetizing is tri-directional time, which grounds history for both the poet and his people. In SZ, the principal method by which There-being achieves authenticity as a historical process is through re-trive; here the principal method by which the poet achieves authentic utterance is through thinking-upon-the-past, sc. re-trive. In SZ, the whole process of There-being is the coming-to-pass of truth in the midst of beings, so that they may be manifest in their ontological dimension; here the process of poetizing, taken as a whole, is the coming-to-pass of language in such a way that form is suffused with fire.

If in all this we were asked to explain how the north wind metaphor fits into the earlier pattern, would it be possible to explain it simply by taking it to represent the relation between Being and There-being as such? Perhaps this is forcing the evidence. In any case, the general parallelism seems clear. What would be the principal difference between re-solve in the earlier work and now? The difference between Heidegger I and Heidegger II.

C. THOUGHT

All this is very interesting, but what has it to do with thought? The problem is hardly thematized in the two essays; references are relatively rare. With one major exception, we are forced to work largely in the oblique, but the results are worth-while. The analysis of the poetic process had central to it a type of thought, a thinking-upon-the-past, which now we can call once more "re-collection." Yet a poet's thought must be distinguished carefully from that of the thinker:

... The Extra-ordinary [sc. Being] opens itself up and opens-up the Open only in poetizing (or in "thinking," but in a manner separated [from poetry] by a chasm of difference, and in a time all its own)...

69 "... Das Ungewöhnliche öffnet sich und öffnet das Offene nur im Dichten (oder abgrundig davon verschieden und zu seiner Zeit im 'Denken')..." (HD, p. 97).
Our task, then, is to try to understand how this "chasm" is to be understood and what is the "time" proper to thought.

The poet is a man of the people, but he cannot accomplish his task without help. Even when an authentic word is uttered, as we know already, there is a risk that in thoughtless repetition it may lose its power to disclose the Holy and become a "mere" verbal expression. But once the poet utters it, it becomes common property, and he can no longer keep it under his protection. He needs, then, assistance — someone to guard the full import of his words and help the people comprehend it. Those who help him thus are his true "kinsmen." They are the thinkers.

The thinker apparently is dispensed from that specific aspect of the poet's concern which consists in uttering the mystery, but not from all concurrence in the process. If the thinker need not utter the mystery, he must at least attend to the poetic utterance so that thereby he may be the first to learn from the poet the essence of the homeland, sc. what it means to abide near the Source in its mystery. The thinker, then, must heed the poetic word, think upon it, so that it be given its proper sense, that this sense be retained, that it be made perceptible to his less discerning countrymen:

But because the word, once uttered, slips away from the protection of the poet in his concern, it is not easy for him, if he remains alone, to hold fast in its truth the knowledge he has uttered with regard to ... the near-ness of Being that is continually in re-serve. That is why he turns to others who by [their effort at] re-collection help [his] poetical word to be understood, so that by this comprehension the homecoming of every man may come-to-pass, [although] for each according to the manner of his own [individual] com-mitment.

In the foregoing, we should note in the first place that the thinker's task, like the poet's, is a re-collection, hence re-trieve. The past in this case is that disclosure of the Holy that still is-as-having-been captured in words by the poet. The structure of such a thought will likewise be temporo-historical and, as such,

90 HD, pp. 28–29 (Verwandten).
concerned with the future that is still coming to himself and to his people through the poet. All that we have said about the structure of re-collection as a thinking-upon-the-past can be applied now in a proper way to thought.

Secondly, we should note that what is common to both the poet’s and the thinker’s re-collection is that the concern of both is identical: Being-as-negatived (mystery). What differentiates them, apparently, is that the poet’s principal concern is to utter Being in words, the thinker’s to attend to Being thus revealed in poetic utterance. This helps a little toward clarity. But when we realize that the poet, too, must attend to Being before he can utter it and that the thinker as well must bring it to utterance after having attended to it, the waters are muddied again. However this may be, the uttering and attending to Being is what we have called the original dialogue.\(^{72}\) We infer, then, that the kinship that exists between poet and thinker is the same as that between two partners in the same dialogue. That the thinker for his part may utter his comprehension of what the poet has said, as Heidegger has done in these essays, and thus open up the possibility of extending the dialogue to others (v.g. ourselves) does not alter the fundamental structure of dialogue between poet and thinker.

The poet-thinker relation suggests comparison with the creator-conserver relationship in terms of a work of art. We find the same duality suggested in a completely different context with the distinction between the making-fast and holding-fast of Ground. “... To be sure, holding-fast is something different from making-fast. ... Neither can replace the other. That is why when it comes to holding-fast what has sprung forth, art must step back. ...”\(^{73}\) and yield its place to another. May we understand “art” here to signify “creation” and “other” to signify “conservation,” sc. thought? Yet such a hypothesis hardly squares with the following: Recall that the poet must pass through a condition of expatriation before becoming re-patriated

\(^{72}\) HD, pp. 28 (Hingebung zum Selben), 117 (das ursprüngliche Gespräch).

in his native land, where he then abides near the Source as Source. Now:

... the thinker thinks on the condition of ex-patriation which for him is not a state of passage but the condition in which he is "at home." The thoughtful interrogation of the poet on the other hand poetizes the condition of re-patriation. ... 74

Résumé

In "'Homecoming'" and "'Re-collection'" we find fully elaborated the conception of poetizing that was discernible already under a different metaphor in "As when upon a day of rest ...." In effect, poetizing is a process in which the Holy (Being) addresses the poet and he responds by forming this address into words. From one point of view (that of Being), the address is a mittence in which the Holy conceals itself even in revealing itself, sc. is mystery. From the viewpoint of the poet, the response is a re-collection (re-trive), temporo-historical in structure, where Being comes (future) through what is-as-having-been (past) and is made present in words when the poet accedes to the hail. This acceding has all the characteristics of re-solve. The pattern of recollection avails for thought as well as for poetizing, a fact that accounts for their affinity, even if it cannot as yet adequately explain their difference.

There are other difficulties, too. How are we to understand a domination of Being that is nevertheless dependent on There-being in order to be Ground, Origin, etc.? How explain the structure of with-being (SZ affirmed but did not analyse it; HD supposes but does not explain it) that permits poet-thinker to ground the history of a people? How explain philosophically the nature of the experience of Being essential to the poetic process and here described only in metaphors (voyage, fire, etc.)? How explain precisely the difference between the authentic language of a people which is uttered "in poetic fashion" and the language of the poet himself as formed into poems, sc. the difference between original poetizing and poesy?

1943 was a prolific year. Besides the concluding part of the Hegel seminar and the interpretations occasioned by the Hölderlin centenary, the fourth edition of WM appeared with an important Epilogue, WW (maturing since 1930) reached the public for the first time and the university lecture courses were concerned with the pre-Socratics. Of all these, the most significant for our purposes is, perhaps, the famous Epilogue.¹

Fifteen years had passed since WM was delivered and first published. During this time, the author's thought had matured and become clarified; there could no longer be any doubt (the foregoing analyses make it abundantly clear) as to the fundamental direction of his own search for the sense of Being. On the other hand, criticism born of "misunderstanding" (sc. based upon an interpretation of the early work that did not correspond to the direction he himself actually had taken) had been abundant. Yet what had the critics to guide them since WM, except PW, published in war-torn Berlin (1942), and the first two Hölderlin interpretations, which, taken alone, could present little more than a riddle? It was time for a *mise au point*. The Epilogue clarifies WM just as the "Letter on Humanism" will clarify SZ. In fact, we have every right to consider the present essay as the first draft of HB.

A. THE ARGUMENT

The Epilogue is structured as a reply to the critics, who, in one way or another, had claimed: 1. that meditation on Non-being, as that alone which gives sense to metaphysics, is in effect a pure nihilism; 2. that an acceptance of anxiety as a privileged disposition is to raise cowardice to the level of a philosophical virtue by which Being (sc. Non-being) is disclosed; 3. that the critique of logic is a renunciation of all rigorous thought.²

If we strip the author's reply down to its essentials, it may be summarized thus:

1. Non-being is not an Absolute Nothing but Being itself, considered, however, as Other than beings, when beings are taken as the starting point of the consideration. "... This completely Other to all beings is Non-being. ..." and "... Non-being as the Other to beings is the veil of Being. ..."³

2. The anxiety in question is not an emotional state on the ontic level of some psychological subject but the most fundamental modification of the ontological disposition that forms part of There-being's structure. By reason of this modification, Being is disclosed in There-being as Non-being, so that There-being learns to experience Being in, through and as Non-being. Once we learn to experience Being for itself, as the Hölderlin interpretations tried to do, sc. without taking beings directly as the starting point, the fundamental disposition in There-being becomes less anxiety than awe. In any case, acquiescence to anxiety thus understood, far from being a surrender to pusillanimité, constitutes that stout-hearted open-ness unto Being that alone can found genuine valor.⁴

3. The critique of logic is less a denial of value than an insistence upon limitation, for at best logic is equipped to deal with beings, not Being. And it is gratuitous to assume that, because logic can make claim to exactitude in thought, it has a monopoly

² WM, p. 45.
⁴ WM, pp. 46 (das Sein im Nichts erfahren), 47 (Scheu, Tapferkeit). The phrase heimisch bleibt im Bleibenden sets the entire passage in the context of the Hölderlin analyses.
on all rigor.\textsuperscript{5} It is with non-logical but rigorous thought that we are concerned.

Such is "foundational thought," and now in 1943 – let us note it with due solemnity – the formula in its characteristic sense finally appears. Clearly in the present text "foundational thought" designates the effort to "overcome" metaphysics, and Heidegger insists that such was the purpose of the question that gave \textit{WM} its title in the first place. "... [The question 'What is Metaphysics?'] arises from a thinking that already has entered into the overcoming of metaphysics. ..." \textsuperscript{6} To the extent that it poses the Being-question, the statement is obviously true; to the extent that it suggests by innuendo that \textit{WM} already was engaged in the thinking of Being in the sense that this conception is elaborated in the rest of the Epilogue, the statement is misleading, for such thought implies the reversal of 1930: the passage from Heidegger I, who wrote \textit{WM}, to Heidegger II, who writes the Epilogue. By the same token, the Heidegger of 1943 perceives much more clearly than the Heidegger of 1929 that the grounding of metaphysics can not be achieved from the "inside" but only from the "outside," sc. through a complete conquest. The Nietzsche-analyses had made this clear. Between the text and the Epilogue there is continuity, to be sure, but the continuity of growth. Let this suffice to indicate how misleading it is to read \textit{WM} in its present form as a "book," without adverting to the difference of level that separates text (1929) from epilogue (1943) and both from the introduction (1949).

One more point is worth stressing before we go to the problem of thought itself. The entire drift of the Epilogue is toward an analysis of that type of thinking which overcomes metaphysics by meditating Being-as-truth, where truth is, of course, the process of \( \delta\lambda\varepsilon\pi\alpha\). By implication, Being-truth has a sense \textit{in} itself, can and must be thought \textit{for} itself. This need not imply that Being can ever be \textit{by} itself, or that the ontological difference as such is any less important to the author now than before. On the contrary, it is out of the coming-to-pass of \( \delta\lambda\varepsilon\pi\alpha\) that the ontological difference arises. But as in \textit{EM} (1935), so, too, here, 

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{5} WM, pp. 47-48 (Strenge).
  \item \textsuperscript{6} "... Sie entspringt einem Denken, das schon in die Überwindung der Metaphysik eingegangen ist..." (WM, p. 43). Cf. p. 49 (das \textit{wesentliche} Denken).
\end{itemize}
the author speaks of thinking Being as if this were a preliminary question to the interrogation of the ontological difference. Being, as the Source of all beings (and such certainly is the sense of the Hölderlin interpretations we have just seen), is conceived as encompassing them all, therefore as including and giving rise to the ontological difference. This explains such phrases as: “... In Being, every mittence [unto] beings is in its origin already complete,” 7 and the similar remark that appeared in the early pages of SZ: “... Being is the absolutely transcendent. . . .” 8 This permits us to understand the following remark: “... It pertains to the truth of Being that Being indeed [wohl] comes-to-presence without beings, [but] that a being never is without Being. . . .” 9 where “comes-to-presence” is taken to be the domination of all beings by Being-as-truth, which it is the task of thought to interrogate. Given the context, is there anything surprising about the remark? Certainly not! The surprise comes in 1949.

B. THOUGHT

1. *The Address of Being*

We restrict our remarks to the problem of thought. What distinguishes Heidegger I from Heidegger II, hence the level of WM (which also attempted to think Being) from that of the Epilogue, is the fact that in the latter it is Being that clearly holds the primacy in disclosing itself. The difference becomes apparent as soon as we examine the author’s treatment of anxiety.

In WM, anxiety was a disposition by which There-being discovers itself in the midst of the ensemble of beings as already having been attuned to them. It revealed a state of accomplished fact, There-being’s thrown-ness, nothing more. Here anxiety is an attunement in There-being of which Being itself, so to speak, calls the tune. For Being has (better, perhaps, is) that noiseless voice which makes itself heard in There-being, attuning it so with the attunement of anxiety that There-being may learn, if

---

7 “... Im Sein hat sich anfänglich jedes Geschick des Seienden schon vollendet.” (WM, p. 53).
9 “... Zur Wahrheit des Seins gehört, daß das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende, daß niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein.” (WM, p. 46).
it will, to experience Being itself, though under the guise of Non-being. It is through anxiety that Being lights up in man its own relation to man’s essence. This noiseless voice is a call to There-being, an appeal that comports its own exigencies but proceeds from the bounty of Being as an event of great moment. Yet this bounty is not free from all indigence, for Being needs its There in order that “...it find its domain in historical humanity...,”\textsuperscript{10} where its truth can be preserved. From this need arises Being’s bestowal of itself on There-being in the self-disclosure through attunement. The function of the bestowal, then, is to appeal to There-being to take upon itself the charge of playing watchman to Being-as-truth. The event of truth, then, is that coming-to-pass by which “...Being directs its appeal to [There-being] for the sake of the truth of Being [itself]...”\textsuperscript{11}

But is all this disclosed to There-being by anxiety? We need not interpret the author so. Being-as-truth, -bounty, -graciousness (\textit{Gunst}), -grace (\textit{Huld}), -appeal, etc. are, after all, more than Being simply as Non-being. Let us retain: Being’s self-disclosure to There-being takes the form of a voiceless appeal that is made manifest through There-being’s attunement; the attunement corresponding to Being under the guise of Non-being is anxiety; to other types of disclosure correspond other forms of attunement, chief among which is awe; yet even anxiety, in disclosing Non-being, reveals inestimable wealth, for it manifests “...the wonder of all wonders: that beings are. ...”\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} “... daß es im geschichtlichen Menschentum seine Stätte findet...” (WM, p. 50). See WM, pp. 31 (Genstimmtsein), 46 (Stimme des Seins), 47 (in gelichteten Bezug), 46 (in Anspruch nimmt).

\textsuperscript{11} “... des Ereignisses, als welches das Sein den Menschen für die Wahrheit des Seins in den Anspruch nimmt...” (WM, p. 50). See p. 49 (Wächterschaft). We translate \textit{Anspruch} as “appeal” because: it is a close etymological neighbor to \textit{Ansprech} (\textit{Ap-pellare}, An sprechen). Its ordinary sense is convenient: “to call upon another to decide a question, to vindicate one’s rights, conduct, taste, etc.,” “to call upon one earnestly for aid, support, sympathy,” “to call forth sympathetic response, to prove attractive, etc.” We wish the word to imply: an address to There-being of which Being is the author; a request, the fulfillment of which makes heavy demands on There-being; an exigency (\textit{Not}), which, however, leaves There-being eminently free.

\textsuperscript{12} “… Einzig der Mensch unter allem Seienden erfährt, angerufen von der Stimme des Seins, das Wunder aller Wunder: Daß Seiendes ist...” (WM, pp. 46-47). Heidegger’s italics. See p. 47 (Scheu). The negativity of Being’s bestowal is not emphasized here except for the fact that awe (Scheu) carries the nuance of an attunement proper to Being-as-reserved (HD, p. 124), therefore as negatived. As for the translation of \textit{Huld} as “grace,” the reason is that Heidegger himself uses \textit{Huld} for the Greek \textit{χάρις} (VA, p. 204), and the word in English has a perfectly legitimate non-theological sense.
2. The Response of There-being

Being’s appeal to There-being is made manifest not in any of man’s faculties but in the depths of his essence, in fact it is the decisive characteristic of this essence. There-being’s response must be equally profound, equally complete, and come-to-pass in this essence itself. The coming-to-pass of this response is foundational thought.

In the most general terms, foundational thought can be described as an acquiescence. Let us examine the author’s formulae separately before trying to say anything more precise:

a. Thought is experience. Thought finds its wellspring in an “experience of the truth of Being,” in which attunement (v.g. anxiety) plays an essential rôle. Further analysis of the nature of the “experience” is not given. Presumably it is to be inferred from the other characteristics which follow.

b. Thought is consent. When Being as Non-being makes its appeal to There-being through the mediation of anxiety, There-being’s response should be a “readiness for anxiety,” a willingness to undergo its rigors that by fulfilling all of Being’s exigencies effectively says “yes” to its appeal thus expressed.

c. Thought is self-diffusion. When Being addresses There-being in more positive fashion than simply as Non-being, There-being’s response is likewise characterized more positively. There-being “pours itself out” completely in the task Being demands of it, sc. to give Being a place of disclosure among men. “… [Thought] pours itself out in Being for the sake of the truth of Being.…” as this becomes manifest in beings.

d. Thought is self-surrender. There-being surrenders its entire essence to Being’s need for this place of disclosure.

e. Thought is self-assumption. Being entrusts itself to There-being in order that There-being assume the charge of watching
over its truth. But this guardianship comes-to-pass by reason
of There-being's relation to Being, which Being itself has es-
established and which constitutes the very essence of There-being.
For There-being to assume this charge, then, means to assume
itself as the ek-sistent relation to Being. It is self-assumption.¹⁷

f. Thought is an echoing of Being. The proper answer of There-
being to Being's muted voice is to let it reverberate with such
fidelity that There-being's thought is but an echo of this voice,
endorsed, however, by There-being's liberty so that it can be
called There-being's own thought.¹⁸

g. Thought is docility. Such faithful echoing of Being's voice is
a docility to it that is both observant and heedful of its
demands.¹⁹

h. Thought is assistance to Being. It alleviates Being's need for
a place of disclosure in historical humanity and thereby helps it
to be itself.²⁰

i. Thought is an offering. This self-diffusive surrender to Being
is a gift to Being that belongs to the order of sacrifice. Part of
this sacrifice is the foregoing of attachment to the ontic in order
to be at home in the process of truth that Being is bringing-to-
pass. That is why foundational thought is so foreign to the
reckoning of calculative thinking. That is why, too, it can bring
no tangible success as evidence of its efficacy. Such accoutre-
ments pertain to the order of beings, not Being. For the same
reason, we can speak of thought as a type of noble poverty, be-
cause the Being with which it deals is so supremely simple and
intangible. Yet this looks at Being still from the point of view
of beings. In itself, Being is a genuine wealth that thought
possesses only in self-surrender. This paradox of poverty and
wealth is proper to thought as offering.²¹

¹⁷ WM, pp. 49 (Wächterschaft des Seins), 46, 47 (Bezug zum Nichts, Bezug des
Seins zum Menschen).
¹⁸ WM, p. 49 (Widerhall).
¹⁹ WM, pp. 50 (aufmerksam, gehorsam), 46 (Achtsamkeit).
²⁰ WM, p. 50 (Stätte, hilft).
²¹ WM, pp. 49–50 (Opfer, Abschied vom Seienden, keine Erfolge, Adel der Armut,
dem Einfachen).
j. Thought is commerce. Despite its great poverty, thought never becomes so detached from the ontic level of There-being that it has nothing to do with beings. On the contrary, it is achieved in continual intercourse. After all, it is by thought that the truth of Being is preserved for beings. 22

k. Thought is freedom. The self-surrender involved in There-being’s offering to Being, though solicited by Being’s need for a place of disclosure among men, is made completely without constraint, for There-being simply lets Being be in and through itself. Such letting-be is freedom. What is more, this freedom in There-being derives from the abyss of all freedom, which is the non-concealment of Being-as-truth. All that There-being adds is consent that it be so. The consent suffices to make thought belong to There-being, yet in another sense we can say that Being itself, since it is the Source of There-being’s freedom and holds the initiative in the disclosure of truth, is the origin of thought. “... Foundational thinking is an event of Being.” 23

l. Thought is thanks. This liberated, liberating self-surrender of There-being to Being as it comes-to-pass in the event of truth is more than simply a response to Being’s appeal, it is a profound and total gesture of gratitude – the only fitting one – for this marvelous bounty. Thought thus understood becomes the well-spring of all gratitude in man. To think in foundational fashion, then, is to thank: in both cases, There-being accepts; There-being reciprocates. 24

m. Thought is a historical process. The point is not thematized, but it is latent everywhere, insofar as the essence of man, on whom Being bestows its bounty, is “historical.” One sentence, however, suggests at least that thought here is discerned as having the same temporal structure as in HD: “... Founda-
dational thought ... heeds ... [Being] ... and knows in it the arrival, not yet thought-out, of the Ineluctable. ...”

n. Thought is interrogation. WM was essentially the posing of a question and, as such, it was moving already in the direction of foundational thought. Interrogation, then, can be an important form of thinking. Thought as interrogation is a step-by-step advance towards an answer which, in turn, contains within it a momentum toward further interrogation, and which imposes the responsibility of probing deeper and further into origins. A better example of such spiral interrogation than WM would be WW. The concluding note to WW (1930), added in the same year as the text we are now examining (1943), remarks:

... The successive steps of the interrogation are in themselves a way of thinking that, instead of offering presentations and concepts, experiences and proves itself as a transformation in the relation to Being.

Interrogation of such a type is a form of the experience of (the relation to Being that is) foundational thought.

If we put all this together and reduce it to the bare essentials, what do we have? Being, in order to be itself (to come-to-pass as the truth of beings), needs a There in which to disclose itself. In disclosing itself to There in There, Being bids There achieve itself as There and thus help Being bring-to-pass the disclosure in all its fullness. The There (There-being) achieves itself and this disclosure by thinking Being. There-being thinks Being to the extent that it achieves itself (self-assumption) as the There of Being. This is done by collaborating in the event by letting Being have its way, hold sway in it (therefore consent, self-diffusion, self-surrender, echo, docility, offering). The process is temporo-historical in structure and achieved in commerce with beings, but the fundamental sense of it is simply the process of liberty by which There-being, as the There of Being, lets itself

25 "... Das wesentliche Denken achtet auf die langsamen Zeichen des Unberechenbaren und erkennt in diesem die unvordenkliche Ankunft des Unabwendbaren...." (WM, p. 50).
26 "... Die Schrittfolge des Fragens ist in sich der Weg eines Denkens, das, statt Vorstellungen und Begriffe zu liefern, sich als Wandlung des Bezugs zum Sein erfährt und erprobt." (WW, p. 27). WW, then, because of the reversal that it accomplishes, is the classic example of the passage from logical to foundational thought. See WM, p. 44 (Verantwortung, ursprünglicher). We understand this “responsibility” in the context of “need” and “freedom” as discussed above.
(and therefore Being) be. Now if we make allowances for the fact that Being is profoundly negatived (a thesis that will regain the center of the stage very soon), this process is exactly what SZ called "re-solve."

3. Thought and Language

Insofar as foundational thought is an "answer" to the call of Being, it may be conceived as a "word" of response, which gives rise to enunciation in articulated words. The thinker's docility to Being comports a careful concern for the use of words, if by these words the truth of Being is to come to expression. But between the "word" of response and the external enunciation of language, there may be a long period of incubation when the thinker, despite his foundational response to Being, in fact because of it, remains externally "speechless"; yet it is only "... from the long-guarded speechlessness and the careful clarification of the domain that is illuminated thereby that the utterance of a thinker comes. ..." 27

But is not this exactly what we have called "poetizing"? Indeed! "... Of similar origin is the naming-process of the poet. ..." 28 For all their similarity, poetizing and thought, however, are separated by a chasm of difference. Thinker and poet may enter into dialogue, yet they "... dwell near one another on mountains far apart" (Hölderlin). But once more we ask: what precisely is the difference? We are told: "... the thinker utters Being. The poet names the Holy. ..." 29 But this is a help only if we know the difference between Being and the Holy, and everything we have seen so far leads us to identify them. Heidegger sees the problem and deliberately leaves it open.

28... Von gleicher Herkunft ist das Nennen des Dichters..." (WM, pp. 50-51)
29... Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige..." (WM, p. 51). Hölderlin ("nahe wohnen auf getrenntesten Bergen") cited WM, p. 51.
If there is continuity between text (1929) and Epilogue (1943) of WM, there is clearly development, too. Non-being is but the veil of Being, which discloses itself as Non-being through anxiety in There, for which it calls the tune. But there are other types of attunement (v.g. awe) by which Being can disclose itself as Bounty, Bestowal, Graciousness, Grace. Being, then, is conceived much more "positively" than in 1929.

Furthermore, thought is response to Being, thus disclosed, complete acquiescence in its initiative, and the appeal-response theme places us clearly in the context of the reciprocal hail of the Hölderlin analyses of the same year. Thought is the process by which There-being freely lets itself be as Being's There and retains the same structure as re-solve in SZ. Chief difference: passage from Heidegger I to Heidegger II.
In the same year that *WM: Ep* appeared, Heidegger devoted his lecture courses to a study of the pre-Socratics: "Parmenides" (winter semester, 1942–43) and "The Beginnings of Western Thought," sc. Heraclitus (summer semester, 1943). These crystallized later, at least partially, in edited form in the Heraclitus (VA) and Anaximander (HW) studies. In content, both come from the same level of Heidegger's development, though in form the Anaximander analysis was not edited until 1946. We understand all three of these texts, then, to form an integral whole.

That the author should entitle his essay on Heraclitus "'Αλήθεια" is noteworthy, for the text to be analysed (Fg. 16) does not contain the word, nor does the author emphasize the fact that his theme is specifically the problem of truth. But the point is obvious, for the essay deals with the lighting-up process of beings, and the point is to make clear that the lighting-process is never undiluted revealment but comports shadows, concealment, therefore non-light as well. It is an essay on truth, but truth in its *negativity* (finitude). Hence, there is a close affinity between the present work and *WW* (published 1943), meditating as it does the negativity of truth (mystery, errance). Furthermore, since truth and Being are one, the Being-to-be-thought by foundational thinking (*WM: Ep*) is always *finite*.

The fragment in question (Fg. 16) reads: το μη διωνν ποτε πως αν τις λαθοι; and Heidegger interprets it to mean: how could

---

1 "Aletheia" (Heraclitus, Fg. 16), VA, pp. 257–282.
anyone remain concealed from the process-of-light which never disappears into concealment because always emerging from it? 2  

The justification of such a reading does not matter very much, as far as we are concerned. We dispense with a résumé of the argument and pass immediately to the general remarks: A. Being, B. There-being, C. Thought.

A. BEING

The author appeals once more to φως to explain Heraclitus' conception of Being. As before, the key phrase is: "φως tends to conceal itself," sc. necessarily comports negativity. "... Self-revealment not only never puts concealment aside but needs it in order to come-to-presence as [itself], as revealment. ..." 3  

Revealment and concealment are, then, mutually correlated in such a way that they constitute but one identical process. This is the sense that the author gives to μή δὴν νῦν ποιεῖ of Fig. 16. He finds a special nuance in μή. Où expresses simply a negation, absence. Mη, he claims, suggests what another terminology would call a privation, sc. that which it negatives comes-to-presence, but always as other than itself. This is important for the proper conception of seeming-to-be, but the point is not developed here. An interesting corollary: Heidegger claims that it is the self-retracting, self-retaining character of Being that is the original meaning of reticence (awe). Are we not to infer, then, that the reticence in There-being, which is one fundamental type of attunement that may serve as a means of summoning the thinker to his task and may, indeed, accompany foundational thought, has its origin in Being itself as reticent, inasmuch as it is intrinsically finite? 4  

Of special importance in the present essay is the manner in which the author finds this reveal-conceal-ment of Being as the common denominator of all the words that most significantly characterize Heraclitean thought. "Εν: If self-concealing and self-revealing constitute complementary movements in one identical process, the uniqueness and unity of the process are

---

2 VA, p. 276.
3 "... daß das Sichentbergen das Verbergen nicht nur nie beseitigt, sondern es braucht, um so zu wesen, wie es west, als Ent-bergen...." (VA, pp. 271–272).
4 VA, pp. 267, 272 (μή δὴν νῦν ποιεῖ), 269 (μη-οὐκ).
what Heraclitus means by the One. Ἀμοινή: In this unique process, there is a perfect complementation of positive and negative, a meshing of both into the common pattern of a single comprehensive arrangement. These terms, “mutual complementation” and “pattern of arrangement,” anticipate the analysis of these words in the Anaximander study, where they receive their full resonance. Ζη: From the stem Ἰα-, this word has, prior to the sense of “living,” a more primary meaning that can be identified with φῶς. Πῦ: The fire which characterizes the κόσμος is to be understood in the same sense as that dominating Power that gathers its force together (therefore λόγος) into the process of coming-to-presence that comports congenital negativity. Πόλεμος: The aboriginal Discord through which both gods and men come-to-presence is the harmonious contention between positivity and negativity in the coming-to-pass of truth. In all of this, what is essential is to realize that “... Heraclitus, in the multiplicity of different names: φῶς, πῦρ, λόγος, Ἀμοινή, πόλεμος, ἐρις, (φόλια), ἐν, thinks the fullness of the essence of [what fundamentally is] identical,”5 sc. the process of emergence that endures as Being that is negatived.

B. THERE-BEING

Clearly There-being is not a subject in any sense that modern philosophy in general and idealism in particular have given the term, whereby man in one way or another is the radiating center of non-concealment. Here the opposite is the case. As Heidegger sees it, Heraclitus meditates the relationship between man and Being, and thinks man in terms of this relationship. How is the relationship to be understood? “... [There-being’s] relationship to the lighting-process is nothing else than the lighting-process itself, insofar as it gathers-in ... [There-being] and retains it.”6 In other words, the relation of There to Being is the relation of Being to its There.

6 "... Weil ihr Verhältnis zur Lichtung nichts anderes ist als die Lichtung selber, insofern diese die Götter und Menschen in die Lichtung einsammelt und einbehält." (VA, p. 278). Heidegger speaks (p. 278) of the "e-vent" (Ereignis) of truth as "appropriating" (vereignet) There-being. This terminology will be thematized very soon.
But when all is said and done, does this add anything to what we know already? No. What does advance the problem, however, is an explicitation, still rather obscure, of the relation between There-being and Being as negated. We are told that the ultimate Source of There-being's fallen-ness – and the point is important – is not primarily There-being's own laxity but the concealment intrinsic to Being itself. That is why the Greeks thought of “forgetting” (λῶθθεν) as in its origins a condition of Being-as-mittence, where the self-emitting is simultaneously a withdrawal, so profound that it obscures both emitting and withdrawal, sc. Being both in its positivity and negativity. This is the primordial obscurity (ληθη) whence truth emerges.7

It becomes more clear and more explicit than ever: that the finitude of There-being's comprehension of Being, and all that this implied in the perspectives of SZ, is founded more originally in the finitude (self-concealment) of Being itself whose There it is; that Being must be thought in its negativity, if it is to be thought at all; that the thinking of Being, the total acquiescence of There-being (WM: Ep) to Being-as-negated ("'Αλήθεια") is clearly the process of re-solve, thought through to the level of Heidegger II. To endeavor to think Being in such a way – this is the genuine sense, Heidegger claims, of Heraclitus' question: how is it possible for a being whose nature it is to be enlightened to be oblivious to the light? 8

C. THOUGHT

1. Interrogation

Fundamentally, this is Heidegger's question, too. No wonder he finds it so congenial. This gives us the occasion to signal the first characteristic of thought insofar as it can be disengaged from the essay. Heidegger's thought, as Heraclitus's, is interrogative. We must put aside the impetuous self-assurance of everydayness in order to become at home in experiencing a genuine question. Why? Because it is by a question that we best express

8 See VA, p. 281.
the primal wonderment that most characterizes authentic thought. This wonderment is familiar to us as the astonishment before the "wonder of wonders" that beings are. Now it takes on a new cast. What is wonder-ful here is the fact that the process by which they are comports negativity as well as positivity, sc. the mystery as such of Being. Is the wonderment here consciously a translation of the Aristotelian $\delta \nu \mu \alpha \zeta \varepsilon \varphi \iota \nu \delta \varepsilon$? This is quite plausible. In any case, our task is to yield to Heraclitus' wonderment and thus think Being. At every step of the way, our own reflections are but extensions of the original question. This attitude of releasing ourselves unto wonderment by posing the question of Being-as-negatived is in complete concord with that attitude of open-ness, docility and free surrender that characterizes foundational thought.

2. Dialogue

This effort on Heidegger's part to enter into the Heraclitean question is clearly a thought-ful dialogue. We recognize the structure of the dialogue as analysed in "Re-collection." The author thinks upon what-is-as-having-been (past), which in this case is Heraclitus' fragment. He receives it as still coming (future) with perennial freshness:

... The [present] effort limits itself to abiding close to the word of the Heraclitean utterance. This could help, perhaps, to direct an ad-ventive thought into a [whole] domain of intimations to which [we] have not yet attended. Having attended to such intimations, the author tries to render them present by formulating them in language, as Heraclitus did before him.

This brings us to a critical point. Heidegger is quite ready to admit that he may be hearing more in Heraclitus' words than they say. But that is precisely the function of ad-ventive thinking, to let the Being that Heraclitus brought into words continue to

---

9 VA, p. 259 (Frage, heimisch werden, Erstaunen, das denkende Erstaunen); WM, pp. 34, 41, 46 (Verwunderung, Wunder); HD, p. 142 (das Wunderbare); VA, p. 279 (Wege-Fragen).

come now to the thinker who again expresses it in language. No one thinker can express by what he says the inexhaustible abundance which Being imparts to him in the moment of experience. Even Heraclitus was forced to express Being as it disclosed itself to him. There remains hidden in what a thinker says the entire wealth of Being that he does not say, can not say, yet which remains present in what he does say, in mysterious, submerged fashion. We have here in another form the law of Being's concealment-in-revealment. It is the un-said that is interior to Heraclitus' utterance that Heidegger has sought to express, and thus the whole essay is another example of re-tieve.\textsuperscript{11} That the interrogative method is especially adapted to this type of thought is worth remark.

\textbf{RÉSUMÉ}

Another re-tieve! Heidegger seeks to disengage the un-said from a fragment of Heraclitus to the effect that the common denominator of all Heraclitus' most characteristic terms lies in the fact that the Being-to-be-thought in foundational thinking is negatived. Such a re-tieve is no relativism and has its own rigor. But what is the nature of that rigor?

\textsuperscript{11} VA, pp. 279 (unabhängig, Ungesprochenen), 262 (der ihm gewährten).
That Heidegger should devote a formal study to λόγος in Heraclitus is not at all surprising. What is surprising is that it took him so long to do so. The indices in EM were, after all, only incidental to another problematic and deserved elaboration for themselves. The fact is that the problem of λόγος has been with him since the beginning, if only under the guise of “logic.” We have only to look at the list of the author’s lecture courses and seminars at Freiburg to realize how frequently he recurred to the theme.

Of all these titles, perhaps the most significant for our present purposes is the lecture course of the summer semester of 1934. Prior to EM, prior even to the first of the Hölderlin courses, it must be considered as part of the movement of “reversal” to which WW (1930) bears first witness. According to the students who followed the course, Heidegger declared that his purpose was not to explain conventional logic but to shake it to its foundations in an attempt to develop a new and more original type

1 “Logos” (Heraklit, Fig. 50), VA, pp. 207–229. Composed in 1951 as contribution to a commemorative volume for Hans Jantzen (Berlin, 1951) and delivered as a lecture (Bremen) in the same year, the essay is based on the University lecture course with the same title in summer semester, 1944. Hence we insert it here.
2 Restricting ourselves to those titles which explicitly mention logic or its principal themes, we find that the author treated logic in: 1916 (seminar, Aristotle’s logic), 1922 (course, Aristotle’s logic and ontology), 1925–26 (course on logic and seminar on Hegel’s Logic), 1926–27 (seminar, construction of concepts), 1927 (seminar, Aristotle’s ontology and Hegel’s Logic), 1928 (course, logic), 1928–29 (seminar, ontological principles and the categories), 1930–31 (seminar, construction of concepts), 1932 (seminar, principle of contradiction), 1933 (seminar, the essence of language).
of thought. This could be done by probing the essence of language, for although logic as a science deals with the laws of "thought," this thought crystallizes fundamentally in judgements which are expressed in the language of predication. The laws of language and the laws of thought are, from the beginning, inseparable, and the term "logic," the science of "thought," derives from λόγος in the sense of language. If logic is to be "shaken to its foundations" (and the necessity of such an effort was made abundantly clear in WM), the most effective method is to probe the nature of language. Hence:

... Because traditional logic, as a science of thought processes, vaunts itself as the supreme and authoritative norm for all determination of Being, this claim must now be examined in its origins and relentlessly renewed in terms of an original conception of the essence of language....

How this was to be done we have some inkling already in the lectures of the following year (1935), published as EM. We recall that there the λόγος of Heraclitus was identified on the one hand with φόσις and on the other with νοεῖν. We recall, too, that the process of λέγειν was also the coming-to-pass of language. The present essay does nothing but elaborate these themes.

As before, we are engaged here in another re-trieve, this time of Fg. 50. The convolutions of the argument are less important for us than its general sense, which is to explain how λόγος passed from the original meaning of "gathering" to mean "language." This enables us to see more clearly the relation of thought both to Being and to language. Let us pass immediately, then, to the general remarks: A. Being, B. There-being, C. Language, D. Thought.

A. LOGOS AS BEING

Λόγος, we are told, must be understood in terms of λέγειν, whose original sense, according to Heidegger, is to "lay," whether in the sense of "to-lay-down" or "to-lay-before." To lay-down-side-by-side is to lay-together, hence to bring together

3 "... Und weil diese bisherige Logik als Lehre von den Denkakten beanspruchte, als oberste und maßgebende Regel aller Bestimmung des Seins zu gelten, deshalb muß dieser Anspruch ursprünglich gefaßt und rücksichtsloser erneuert werden aus den ursprünglichen Begriffen des Wesens der Sprache...." Cited from students' lecture notes with Professor Heidegger's approval.
in the sense of gathering or collecting. Such a gathering or collecting, if we consider it closely, is not simply a transient accumulation but suggests a permanence by reason of which what is gathered-together is preserved and guarded in its collectedness.

The process of laying may be considered, of course, from the point-of-view of that which is laid, as a lying-forth. In this case, the lying-forth and the laying which lets it come-to-pass are correlative in a single process, which we may describe as a "letting-lie-forth-in-collectedness." It is with this formula that Heidegger describes the genuine sense of πληρέων. Notice in passing (we shall return to the point presently) that this single process may be conceived as proceeding from two directions at once: from that which lies-forth, as if it were emerging of itself; from that which lets it lie-forth, therefore lets it be, in the sense that it lays the being down.

It is an easy step from here to see that the lying-forth in question is an emergence into non-concealment, hence the coming-to-pass of truth in that-which-lies-forth. But we are not allowed to forget that non-concealment is permeated with negativity, for λήθη not only is prior to ἀ-λήθεια but remains intrinsic to it at all times. However this may be, the process of truth which takes place in λήρων is the coming-to-presence, therefore the Being of beings. Hence to let beings lie-forth-in-collectedness is to let them be. Such a conception of λόγος perseveres in Greek thought even as late as Aristotle and accounts for the fact that there, as we saw in SZ, λόγος can mean ἀποφαίνεσθαι, sc. the process that lets-shine-forth in illumined self-revelation beings-that-appear, sc. which come-to-lie-forth in the Open.

Up to this point we have been speaking of λήτειν. What, then, of Αὐτός? We understand it as the absolutely original Source out of which the entire gathering-process proceeds. Heidegger claims that Heraclitus' formula Ἐν - Πάντα (one-in-many [-beings]) describes the manner in which Αὐτός functions. As Ἐν, Αὐτός is the One, the Only, that unifies all beings in them-

---

4 For the two preceding paragraphs, see VA, pp. 208–211 (legen, nieder- und vorlegen, zusammenbringen, Verwahren, beisammen-vor-liegenlassen).
selves, insofar as it gathers them into themselves, letting them lie forth in non-concealment as themselves. Because Ἄροσ is "Ἐν, it may be called the utterly Simple. "Ἐν is likened to a lightning-bolt, by reason of which beings are lit up in their Being. ""Ἐν Πάντα tells [us] what Ἄροσ is. Ἄροσ tells [us] how "Ἐν Πάντα comes-to-presence. Both are but one." 6 Briefly, Ἄροσ is the Being of beings-in-the-ensemble. "... The word ὁ Ἀροσ names that which gathers all [beings] into [Being] and thereby lets [them] lie forth. ..." 7 An important annotation: the event by which Being thus collects itself in beings is also called "mittence." 8

Two observations are in order. In the first place, the implicit supposition here is that "Ἐν and Πάντα are inseparable. Unless something is gathered-together (beings), there simply is no gathering (Being). Secondly, the gathering-process of Ἄροσ may be considered as a letting-lie-forth of beings in the sense of supplying for them a firm ground, that whereon they may rest firm. 9 It is a simple inference from the first observation to add that just as no beings can be grounded unless Ground (Ἀροσ) comes-to-pass, so, conversely, Ground cannot come-to-pass except in and through the beings that it grounds. Ἄροσ, Being, Ground: but one!

B. THERE-BEING

Ἀροσ, the One, comes-to-pass in a λέγειν. Let us return now to λέγειν as a letting-(beings)-lie-forth and a preserving them in collectedness. The gathering-together which is in question here implies that the gatherer is itself gathered together in and through the very process of gathering. We understand this to mean that the gathering-process supposes a certain point of concentration (the term is not Heidegger's), which itself must ipsis facto be constituted in order that the gathering-into-unity

---


7 "... Das Wort ὁ Ἄροσ nennt Jenes, das alles Anwesende ins Anwesende versammelt und darin vorliegen läßt. ..." (VA, p. 227).

8 VA, p. 218 (Geschickliches), afterwards passim.

be accomplished at all. What can we call this gathering-point "itself"? Heidegger does not give it a name. We venture to call it simply a "self," understanding by the term the There of Being, which, as we saw in SZ, is a self simply inasmuch as it is transcendence (ek-sistence), a unified place of open-ness unto Being among beings. At any rate, when we think of There-being as achieving its self, we understand this in the sense of fulfilling the function of a gathering-point.10

What may be said now about the nature of this gathering-point (There), through which the unifying process of $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$ is achieved? In the first place, it takes place in the essence of man. Furthermore, it is itself constituted as a self by $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$, for it is part of the gathering-process as such. In this sense, we have every right to say that the gathering-point of There "belongs" to $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$.11 $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$, then, will always dominate its own gathering-point. Yet for all its primacy, $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$ has want of this gathering-point in order to be itself, by reason of the very exigencies of the gathering-process as such. The There, then, in "belonging" to $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$, serves its needs. We might call it an "attend-ant" of Logos.

How does the gathering-point of There function? Its task is simply to enable the gathering-process of $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$ among beings to proceed. The There is the "place" wherein the process takes place. It must let the process (and therefore itself) be. We have mentioned already that the unified process of lying-laying-out of beings may be imagined as proceeding from two different directions. On the one hand, as a lying-forth it seems to proceed from the beings themselves. From this point of view, the movement may be considered as proceeding ultimately from $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$. On the other hand, the laying-down seems to proceed from the gathering-point of There (though ultimately, of course, the There, too, derives its collecting-power from $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$). The There must lay-out ($\lambda \gamma \epsilon i \nu$) the very same ($\delta \mu o$) beings that $\Lambda \gamma \sigma$ lets lie forth in the Open, and in the very same way. When this happens, the $\lambda \gamma \epsilon i \nu$ of the There as a gathering-point "corre-
sponds” (ὁμολογεῖν) with the λέγειν of the aboriginal Ἄργος. Correspondence comes, however, at a price. The There must acquiesce to Ἄργος, must so comport itself as effectively to commit itself (sich schickt) to Ἄργος and for Ἄργος. But There’s acquiescence brings fulfillment, and, indeed, of a double sort: by acquiescence to Ἄργος, There fulfills its own commitment to be the gathering-point of Ἄργος among beings and thus achieves itself, sc. its own authenticity as a self; by acquiescence to Ἄργος, There helps fulfill this gathering-process as such, for it lets Ἄργος bestow itself as mittence upon beings and thus come-to-pass as what it is.12

From all this, observe: that the process of correspondence with Ἄργος concurs in its essentials with the process of resolve in Heidegger I and at the same time with the notion of “fulfilling” Being as it unfolds in Heidegger II; that if Ἄργος be conceived as Ground, then the function of There, simply because it is There, helps bring Ground (the grounding-process) to pass.

C. LANGUAGE

Heidegger’s purpose in this essay is not explicitly to probe the nature of thought so much as the nature of language. From this point of view, it is extremely valuable. His thesis is radical and unequivocal: the sense of ᾧτεῖν, which unquestionably means “to speak,” “to say,” as it always has been translated, does not pass from one meaning (sc. “letting-lie-forth”) to another (sc. “to speak,” etc.), but the original sense of “speaking” is nothing less than “to-let-lie-forth”:

... Uttering and speaking come-to-presence as [the process of] letting-lie-forth-in-collectedness everything that comes-to-presence [precisely inasmuch] as [it is] laid out in non-concealment. ...18

The thesis is elaborated less clearly than it is enunciated, and we are often forced to conjecture. The principal difficulty arises once more from the obscurity as to the relation between Ἄργος and its There. Making the most of what indices we have, we

12 VA, pp. 215 (liegt aus einem Legen, ἐμολογεῖν), 217-218, 221 (Geschick, das-Geschickliche, vollbringen).
18 "... Sagen und Reden wesen als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen, was, in der Unverborgenheit gelegen, anwes..." (VA, p. 212).
understand the author to mean: wherever we find λέγειν in the above exposition, we may read "to utter" (Sagen). This will mean that we may understand the Λόγος to be the aboriginal Utterance (Sage), sc. the utterance of Being, or Being-as-utterance, and human language as having the same relation to aboriginal Utterance as the gathering-point (among beings) has to the gathering-process as such, or as There-being has to the Being (of beings) to which it belongs. Presumably, authentic language comes-to-pass when There-being acquiesces to Being-as-utterance and, true to its com-mitment, achieves its own authenticity.

There are several things to underline here. Firstly, we must insist that for Heidegger the essence of language is not to be sought in terms of sound or meaning, but in the complete identity between uttering-in-language and letting-be-manifest. We see this conception clearly when the author explains what he understands by "name" and "naming." To name, he claims, is to call-forth, in the sense of laying a being out in the Open, in such a way that the being can shine forth as what it is:

... The process of naming (δώμαι) is not the expressing of a word-signification but letting-something-lie-forth in that light wherein it takes its stand [as a being, simply] inasmuch as it has a name.

Furthermore, we must realize that authentic utterance takes place only insofar as There-being achieves its own authenticity. In this respect, the author was more explicit in an aside during the Physics seminar (1940) than in 1944, at least according to

---

14 We translate Sagen as "utter" because Heidegger finds an affinity between Sagen and Zeigen (to show-forth, let-appear-in-the-Open, in the same sense that we are using λέγειν, and the word "utter" derives from the comparative of AS ut, meaning "out," hence may be taken to mean "to give or bring out," sc. into the Open. (See US, pp. 145, 200, 214, 252). Where it is necessary to distinguish, we use "Utterance" for Sage, and "uttering" or "to utter" for Sagen. Incidentally, we sense here the importance of the word Zeigen in describing the poet's function (v.g. HD, pp. 138, 139).

15 VA, pp. 212, 228 (φανῇ, σημαίνει). Heidegger does not deny, of course, the correctness (richtige) of conceiving language as φανῇ σημαίνει, or, for that matter, as expression (Aussage). He merely denies that such a conception is the ultimate explanation of its origin (Wesen). See VA, p. 229.

the text we have at our disposal. In 1940, he remarked that
λέγειν-λόγος signifies that relationship

... on the ground of which [beings] as such gather themselves for the
first time around man and for him. And because man is only insofar as
he comports himself with beings as such, revealing them and concealing
them, man can and must have the "word," sc. utter the Being of
beings. The words, however, that [daily] language uses are only the left-
overs of the [original] Word, [and] on the basis of these man never finds
his way back again to beings except on the ground of λέγειν. ... 17

Such a λέγειν as this occurs when human language concurs
(δομολογεῖν) completely with the aboriginal utterance of Being
(sc. with the Being-of-beings-as-utterance). 18 By letting beings
lie-forth in the Open as what they are, There-being concurs with
the process of Δόγος, which is the process that gathers these
beings at once unto themselves and unto itself as aboriginal
Utterance. In concurrence, authentic language comes-to-pass.
Notice that in this moment, language, insofar as it proceeds
from There-being, is fundamentally an attending to the still
more original Utterance of Δόγος (Being) itself as articulated in
the beings that now come-to-presence insofar as this concurrence
lets them be. 19 By such an attending, There-being surrenders to
its com-mitment as an attend-ant of Being, in complete acqui-
escence in Being's intimations.

So it comes about that Heidegger, re-trieving as he does the
original sense of λέγειν, thinks "... the essenc[-ing] of language
in terms of the essenc[-ing] of Being, indeed as this essenc[-ing]
itself,” and from now on, to “bring something into language” means always “to guard Being in the coming-to-presence of language,” sc. by letting Logos shine-forth in, through and as words. To the extent that Logos is Ground, then to bring Logos into language is to join in the “grounding” of Ground. This helps us to give a sense to the theses: that poetizing is an origin-ating (grounding) of Being-as-origin (-ground); that every work of art, because an origin-ating of truth (Being, Origin, Ground), is in its essence a poetizing.

D. THOUGHT

What the essay tells us about thought is minimal, but what it shows us by way of example is important. We have a right to understand άμολογείν to be not only the coming-to-pass of language but also the process of thought, for insofar as the -λογείν of άμο- is conceived as proceeding from There in a direction opposite to the movement of Λόγος and bringing it to a point of concentration, there is no other way to understand it except in terms of νοητόν.

What does the essay permit us to say of thought, once we interpret thought as άμολογείν? Firstly, that thought belongs to Λόγος as an attendant, insofar as it proceeds from Λόγος. Hence, what it lays-out in the Open, sc. lets-be (manifest), does not have its origin in thought as such but ultimately in the Λόγος wherein thought “reposes.” In this sense, the coming-to-pass of thought is always an event of the primal Λόγος itself, by which Λόγος appropriates for itself that domain among beings of which it has want. Proceeding thus from Λόγος, thought is clearly the thinking “of” Λόγος.

20 “... das Wesen der Sprache aus dem Wesen des Seins, ja sogar als dieses selbst gedacht.....” (VA, p. 228).
21 “... Sein in das Wesen der Sprache bergen.....” (VA, p. 228).
22 The word “repose,” both as verb (beruht) and noun (Ruhe), suggests still another nuance for άμητον, this time when used in the middle voice in the sense of “laying-onself-down-to-rest,” sc. the tranquillity of complete (self) re-collection (VA, p. 204). The word will occur frequently in the later works and we must always understand it with these overtones. In the present case, thought reposes in Λόγος insofar as it is itself gathered-together into what it is by reason of aboriginal Λόγος.
23 VA, pp. 224 (er-eignet, vereignet), 226 (braucht). The fusion of ereignen and vereignen constitutes the phenomenon of Ereignis, as it will be explained later in ID (1957). It is important to note here simply how early the terminology crystallizes (1944). See ID, p. 28.
Furthermore, thought not only belongs but attends to Λόγος, and it is precisely by attending that thought achieves the task of attendance in all its authenticity. For the attend-ant itself gathers There-being into its own fullness in endeavoring to respond to the demands and intimations of Λόγος coming to it through beings. How is authenticity achieved? By a comportment through which thought commits itself completely to Λόγος. And this comportment is described not only according to the metaphor of hearing but also of sight, anticipating thus the double modality of thought that we shall find in WD. It is important here to note only that both metaphors fuse into the conception of that complete abandonment and docility which we saw to characterize thought in the Epilogue to WM. Proceeding from Λόγος and attending to it, thought is the thinking "of" Λόγος in a two-fold fashion.  

The coming-to-presence of thought is profoundly a historical process. On the one hand, Λόγος emits itself among beings. On the other, There-being, through thought, commits itself in free surrender to Λόγος thus bestowed, thereby fulfilling its own commitment as a There. This fusion of the emitting of Λόγος and the (self-) committing of its There through thought is what constitutes the coming-to-pass of mittence as such, which is the structural unity of inter-mittence (Being-as-history). Notice: that the primacy in the process belongs clearly to Λόγος; that the correspondence of thought is, however, necessary to the process; that thought is genuinely historical, not by reason of itself but by reason of the Λόγος to which it does no more than respond; that the mittence takes place as the coming-to-presence of beings in their totality, "Ευ-Πάντα."  

Now what Heidegger is trying to do is to retrieve the mittence of Being to Heraclitus that took place at the beginning of...
Western thought. But notice that despite his apparently meticulous care to expound the original sense of Λόγος, he does not really claim to be saying what Heraclitus said, but rather what he did not say. That is very clear when it comes to explaining the correlation between Λόγος as the process of letting-lie-forth in the Open and as the coming-to-pass of language. Λόγος does not lose one meaning and gain another, but language in its origin is the process of letting-be (manifest). The Greeks, he claims, experienced this identity but did not—even Heraclitus did not—think it as such. “... Nowhere do we find [any] trace of the fact that the Greeks thought the essence[-ing] of language immediately out of the essence[-ing] of Being...” 27 On the contrary! From the very beginning, language was always interpreted in terms of phonetics and expression. Yet even if no one comprehended it as such, nevertheless the genuine sense of language comes into the words which Heraclitus used when he thought Being in terms of Λόγος. We have here a classic example of a mittence of Being bestowed upon a thinker and uttered in his words, yet with such re-serve that it withdrew from the thinker himself even in the bestowal, hiding, indeed, its own withdrawal. 28

Heidegger’s task has been to re-trive this mittence precisely in its withdrawal and thus achieve in his own historical moment an authentic response to a mittence of Being. Such a re-trive, of course, does not dissolve the essential mystery that accounts for the entire process, but it does recognize it as such and thereby preserves it in its original freshness. Briefly: Heidegger’s own interpretation of language is not attributed as such to Heraclitus but results from his own free-wheeling effort to think Being that only takes its lead from what Heraclitus said and then proceeds to think the un-thought. 29

With regard to Being as the to-be-thought in foundational thinking, there is one point which strikes a new note that will re-echo later. Up to this point we have underlined the fact that the search for the sense of Being has been an effort to understand it as the process of truth out of which the ontological

27 “... Nirgends finden wir eine Spur davon, daß die Griechen das Wesen der Sprache unmittelbar aus dem Wesen des Seins dachten...” (VA, p. 228).
28 VA, pp. 229 (der Blitz verlosch jäh), 213 (aufspart).
29 VA, pp. 208 (Rätsel als Rätsel), 207 (im freien Überlegen am Leitband).
difference arises. But the emphasis has been given to Being itself, on the grounds, as EM said explicitly, that this is a necessary preliminary to interrogating the ontological difference as such. Heidegger poses the question of the relationship between Λόγος (Being) and its gathering-point (There), or, as we may say now, thought, and then declares:

... Not only what comes-to-presence in the λέγειν of ὁμολογεῖν but also what comes-to-presence in the λέγειν of Λόγος has at once a [still] more original derivation in the simple middle [-point] between them. Is there for human thought a way to reach this middle [-point]? 30

Notice: that the question presupposes the complete correlation, therefore inter-dependence, of Being and beings; that this "middle point" is really the ontological difference as such, which now emerges unequivocally as his principal theme (confirmed by the otherwise inexplicable phrase, "difference as difference"); 31 that the question whether or not the ontological difference as such is thinkable is posed but not answered; that the question is purely Heideggerean and bears testimony to his relentless pursuit of an always more fundamental, always receding Source.

RÉSUMÉ

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the step we have accomplished here, and only the development that follows will enable us to see that in these few pages we touch the heart of Heidegger’s whole endeavor. Being (Λόγος) is at once aboriginal Truth, Ground, Utterance. There-being, as the concentrating point of the gathering-process, is ὁμολογεῖν. Whether under the guise of poetizing or of thought, There-being corresponds with Λόγος and thereby helps it come-to-pass as Truth, as Ground, as Utterance. Since Being in its truth is at once aboriginal Utterance, we may discern the sense of Being-as-truth by interrogating language. That is why the Hölderlin analyses, in groping for the sense of poetizing, are an unswerving interrogation of ἀ-λόγθεια. The suggestion of some "middle-point" between Λόγος and its There suggests a new aspect of the Being-process, which it is the task of foundational thought to think.

31 VA, p. 227 (Unterschied als Unterschied).
TOWARDS AN ANALYSIS OF RELEASE
NIHILISM IN TERMS OF BEING-AS-HISTORY

The dialogue on the nature of thought between scientist, savant and master reached the public only in 1959 but dates from 1944-45.¹ Who the scientist and savant are we are not told, but who the master is there can be, indeed, no doubt. From the same period (1944-46) comes as well another essay on Nietzsche, entitled “Nihilism in Terms of Being-as-History,” which appeared in 1961.² The latter, however, is so clearly a complement to the former that it seems best to treat them as one.

I. Towards an Analysis of Release

A. BEING

We come to the heart of the matter at once when we say that Being is conceived here as an open domain, or as a broad expanse that is utterly free, wherein beings may while, and whose special magic consists in “...gathering together every being unto itself and all beings unto one another in the whiling-process of repose within themselves. ...”³ Clearly, Being is still understood as a gathering-process (Δύος), even if now it goes by the name of “Expanse” (Gegnet). It is that domain “... which in

towards an analysis of release 503

gathering beings together opens itself up in such a way as to establish and maintain the Open which permits every being to emerge and repose within itself [as what it is]. . . ." 4

Especially valuable in the present essay is a precision about the relationship between Being (Δόγος, Open, Expanse), in the sense that we speak of it now, and Being-as-horizon-of-transcendence, in the sense that we spoke of it in KM. The difference is this: to speak of Being-as-horizon implies, no matter how we nuance it, that we take man as the center of reference and horizon as man’s field of vision, within which beings appear as objects to man-as-subject. "Horizon and transcendence are experienced therefore in terms of objects and of our presentation, and determined only with a view to objects and our presentation [of them]." 5 This is true, even when with Kant we speak of "things in themselves" as distinguished from "beings-as-they-appear," for things-in-themselves are thought in reference to beings-as-they-appear by a thought that is equally representative in either case. 6

This does not mean, of course, that man himself constitutes the field of vision as such, but it does mean that the effort to get beyond the subject-object relationship by resorting to terms such as "horizon" and "transcendence" remains itself inescapably conditioned by a subject-centered thinking that it strives to renounce. The passage from the Heidegger of KM (1929) to the Heidegger of WW (1930) seems to have consisted, then, in the discovery that even the horizon-of-transcendence was in itself "open" before it could function as a field-of-vision. "... The field-of-vision is therefore an open domain, whose open-ness does not come to it [simply] because we behold it," any more than the shining-forth of beings-as-objects that we discover there is completely our own doing. 7 Being-as-horizon, then, is

4 "Die Gegnet ist die verweilende Weite, die, alles versammelnd, sich öffnet, so daß in ihr das Offene gehalten und angehalten ist, jegliches aufgehen zu lassen in seinem Beruhen." (G, p. 42). Familiar notes: G, pp. 61, 64-65 (das verborgene Wesen der Wahrheit); 42, 45, 61 (Entbergung-verborgen); 44, 45, 68 (Nähe-Ferne).
5 "Der Horizont und die Transzendenz sind somit von den Gegenständen und von unserem Vorstellen aus erfahren und nur im Hinblick auf die Gegenstände und unser Vorstellen bestimmt." (G, p. 39).
6 See G, pp. 54-55.
only "... the side of the encompassing Open that is turned toward us. [In this case] the Open is filled with our gaze upon the visage of what shines forth to presentative thought as objects," so that we may say that in revealing itself as horizon Being conceals itself as the Open. What interests Heidegger II is precisely the Open as such. "... What is this Open itself, when we prescind from the fact that it can shine forth also as horizon of our presentation?" 9

The dialogue, however, has as its theme the nature of thought, sc. the thinking of Being-as-expanse. If we keep the focus for a moment on Being, we discover that once more Being maintains the initiative in the process. For thought comes about only because Being has want of it, indeed to such an extent that "... without [thought] it cannot come to presence as it does." 10 That is why Being appropirates to man his own proper nature, which consists in the fact that he is "released" (Gelassenheit) unto Being. Thus it is that from the very beginning, sc. according to the very origins of his nature, man belongs to Being as its own. We may even say, although Heidegger does not put it into these words, that in appropirating to man his nature, Being appropirates him to itself, and it is this double appropiration that we try to suggest by saying that man by nature is an attend-ant of Being, whose proper task is to attend to it. 11

This whole process Heidegger characterizes by a new name. If we try to follow his word-play, then (recalling that Being has been called here a free "Expanse") we may suggest this appropiration of man to Being-as-expanse by calling it the "expanding" of man. The awkwardness of the expression is redeemed to some extent if a very radical (expandere) reading of

8 "Das Horizontale ist somit nur die uns zugekehrte Seite eines uns umgebenden Offenen, das erfüllt ist mit Aussicht ins Aussehen dessen, was unserem Vorstellen als Gegenstand erscheint." (G, p. 39).
9 "... Was ist dieses Offene selbst, wenn wir davon absehen, daß es auch als Horizont unseres Vorstellens erscheinen kann?" (G, p. 40).
10 "... dieses Wesen so wesenhaft der Gegnet gehört, daß diese ohne das Menschenwesen nicht wessen kann, wie sie west." (G, p. 64). The same must be said, of course, for Being-as-truth. This does not mean that truth ceases to be "independent" (unabhängig) of man, for Being always maintains the primacy, but it does mean that the process-of-truth does not come-to-pass except in relationship to man. See G, pp. 65-66.
11 G, pp. 51-52 (gelassen, ge-eignet, gehört), 63-64 (Herkunft seines Wesens, vereignet), 52 (Gegnet-vergegnet), 52 and 64 (geeignet, vereignet). Cf. N, II, p. 482 (eingelassen).
the word detects the suggestion of an opening-up to the Open. In this case, we may interpret the expanding to mean the constituting of man as ek-sistence, which, if we resort to the language of Heidegger I, we may understand as the “throwing” of the There. In any case, this expanding of man by which Being “throws” or, according to the present terminology, “releases” man into ek-sistence, is what we mean by the relation of Being to man. That the whole process of expanding should assume the guise of a hail, or an address to man, is natural enough after “Re-collection,” but the conception will not be elaborated until WD (1952).12

B. THOUGHT

Up to this point we have considered thought from the viewpoint of the Being that it thinks. When we shift the focus to man himself, what does the essay tell us? Briefly this: that thought, to the extent that it proceeds from man, is in reciprocal relation to thought as it proceeds from Being. This and only this. The relation must be comprehended in all its purity, and this means that it must be considered as sustained in its own essence as a relation by the term to which it refers.18 More precisely, how is this to be understood?

Thought in man as relation-to-Being may be conceived in two distinct moments, both of which have Being as origin as well as term. The first is the basic structure of man as ecstatic openness to the Open, as expansion to the Expanse. This we may call thought in the broad sense and understand it to be simply ek-sistence as such. The second moment we call thought in the strict sense, whereby the structural relationship is brought to its authentic fulfillment. In the present essay, this second moment of thought is called “waiting,” and we shall examine it in detail presently. Here we wish only to insist that thought-as-waiting is grounded in a still prior moment, sc. in the ek-sistent structure of man as the There of Being. “As a matter of fact, [thought-as-] waiting, provided it be foundational, sc. a

12 G, pp. 52–56, 59 (Gegnet, vergegnet, Vergegnis), 32–33, 52, 73 (angesprochen, angerufen).
18 G, p. 51 (gemäß Verhältnis).
thoroughly decisive waiting, is grounded in the fact that we [already] appertain to that for which we wait." The first moment of thought is what the writer understands now by the antecedent comprehension of Being that places man from the very beginning inside the hermeneutic circle, sc. it is man's constitutional appurtenance to Being, by reason of the fact that Being-as-expanse has expanded him to make him its own. As we understand it, the reciprocal relation between Being and man is the hermeneutic circle.

However, it is the second moment of thought which is the theme of our research. Heidegger characterizes it as "waiting." By this we are to understand a deliberately assumed attitude of attentiveness to Being, which simply lets Being come-to-presence as itself, sc. as the Expanse. It is the supreme moment of thought and in the last analysis all that man brings to the process. Asked what man must "do," the author replies: "We must do nothing but wait." He insists that we speak of "waiting," for we can wait only a being that we have proposed already as an object. Thought waits, indeed, for "something," but this "something" does not come to it in the form of a (representation). "When we wait, we leave that for which we wait open ... because the waiting releases itself unto the Open itself ..." This non-presentative waiting comports a double aspect: a liberation from presentations, even from Being-as-horizon-for-presentation; a liberation for Being, a resignation, a release unto the Open. A liberation, thought is the achieving of freedom.

The same double form of liberation in thought is articulated

---

14 "In der Tat gründet das Warten auf etwas, gesetzt daß es ein wesentliches, und d.h. ein alles entscheidendes Warten ist, darin, daß wir in das gehören, worauf wir warten." (G, p. 52). The terms "strict"-"broad" and "structural"-"functional" are not Heidegger's but are introduced by the writer for purposes of clarity. They seem harmless enough, provided "structural" be understood not statically but dynamically, as we saw in the analysis of concern (Sorge) in SZ.

15 "Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten." (G, p. 37). Later Heidegger will suggest that the waiting is also a hoping. See US, p. 100.

16 "... Das Warten hat eigentlich keinen Gegenstand." (G, p. 44). Note affinity between waiting for and attending-to (attentiveness).

17 "Im Warten lassen wir das, worauf wir warten, offen.... Weil das Warten in das Offene selbst sich einläßt...." (G, p. 44). It is as attent-ive waiting that we understand thought to be "preparational" (G, p. 33).

18 V.g. G, pp. 46 (loslassen), 59 (transzendentalen Vorstellen), 46 (überlassen), 58 (Gelassenheit).
in somewhat different terms when the release is described as a "passage unto" the Open, as if the thinker were antecedently outside of it. If "outside" be taken to mean that the thinker has no relation to the Open prior to thought (strict sense), this is certainly untrue, for, as we just said, his very structure is such that from the beginning he ek-sists only by reason of his ec-static relationship to Being. The very fact that beings-as-objects are always proposed to him within the horizon of Being (that "side" of the Open that is turned toward presentative thought) bears testimony to this antecedent relation to the Open as such. But if "outside" be taken to mean that initially the thinker adverts only to his presentations, or at best to the horizon within which they appear, forgetting the Open itself as such, then it is perfectly legitimate to say that "first of all and for the most part" he ek-sists outside of the Open and must "enter into" it by way of release. Note, however, that here we rejoin with remarkable exactness the ontic-ontological structure of There-being in SZ, where There-being, despite its unique (ontological) prerogative, is "first of all and for the most part" lost in everydayness. And when we read now (1944-45) that (thought-as-) waiting sojourns in the "hither and thither" which this "yes and no" character of man's appurtenance to the Open implies, have we not every right to interpret this as the "vortex" of his fallen condition?  

The thinker's task in waiting, then, is to free himself from the constrictions of his (re)presentations and abandon himself with full freedom to the Open as such. It is to bring to fulfillment, as far as lies within his power, his structural relationship to Being, sc. that by which he himself is as man. In a word, he must achieve authenticity. By what gesture is this accomplished? Not, we are told, by sheer willing. With this, Heidegger parts company with his German predecessors for whom thought was fundamentally a willing. This was true, he claims, even for Kant, insofar as Kant conceived thought as a "spontaneity."  

19 G, pp. 50-51 (sich einlassen), 53 (Hin und Her zwischen Ja und Nein). Cf. WW, p. 22 (Hin und Her, Umgetriebenheit) and SZ, p. 176 (Wirbel).  
20 G, pp. 51, 53 (eigentliche Gelassenheit, gemäße Verhältnis, wahrhaft), 31-32 (Kant). Since waiting is a non-willing, Heidegger refuses to call it an "activity" of man, for activity and passivity, he claims, are in one way or another categories of willing. Not an activity, it is nonetheless an "achieving" (Tun), and, indeed, the highest of which man is capable (G, p. 35).
by willing, then by a non-willing! This must be properly understood, however. The expression itself may be taken to mean either that foundational thought must be the willing renunciation of willing, or that thought has nothing to do with any type of willing at all. Heidegger prefers the first sense, and we understand him to mean this renunciation as an effort to refrain from imposing conditions of human origin upon Being as to-be-thought. The classic example, for Heidegger, of thought which imposes its own conditions on the to-be-thought is that which unfolds in the scientific experiment, which, he claims, is essentially an "attack" upon its object.  

But the effort at non-willing must be a deliberate one, hence a willing non-willing. If these two terms seem hard to reconcile, the sense is that

...the beginnings of [man's] self-resignation unto [his] appurtenance to the Expanse require a touch of willing, that disappears, however, in resignation and is completely extinguished in release.

We detect here the same "touch" of willing that we had to suppose in SZ in order to speak of There-being's docility to the voice of conscience as a willingness to be called to authenticity. In both cases, it is an acquiescence to Being that is sufficiently voluntary for man to have the power to refuse it. Acquiescence constitutes man's free endorsement of his own freedom as it rises out of its origin in Being, itself the ultimate Freedom, the open Expanse that can by no means be conceived as a willing. This liberation is man's simple acceptance of himself as expansion unto Being-as-expanse, where the expansion, proceeding from Being, is in turn another form of his liberation.

In SZ, this moment of authenticity, as we know, was called "re-solve." What is it called here, when conceived as the culmination of thought? The very same thing, sc. "re-solve" — and

21 G, pp. 32–33 (des erst genannten), 71 (Angriff).
23 G, pp. 60 (schwerlich als Wille), 61 (Empfängnis), 33 (Sammlung zwingt, ohne Gewalt). In the rejection of Being-as-Will, we recognize, of course the critique of Nietzsche. For Heidegger, willing means a working (Wirken), or an acting, whose proper element is actuality (Wirklichkeit). He wants to get beyond the pale of actuality and non-actuality, and into the realm of sheer openness.
understood in the very same way: "as the self-assumed self-opening of There-being for the Open..." 24 At this point, Heidegger formulates explicitly the thesis which all of the previous research had led us to infer: "The essence of thought, sc. release unto [Being], is re-solve unto truth in its presencing." 25

This is the essential. What else the essay tells us about the nature of thought is merely supplementary. In particular, note:

1. Thought as "In-stance"

The attitude of re-solve, when achieved, is not attained once and for all. The thinker must persevere in it by striving again and again to make it more pure. If by re-solve authenticity is achieved, by perseverance it is sustained, and it is only when the thinker sustains authenticity that he may be said to repose in himself as what he is. To express re-solve as it continues into an abiding state of repose, the author suggests the term: "in-stance." 26

2. Thought and Language

Re-solve which acquiesces to Being can never "describe" that to which it yields, for any type of description is already an objectification. What it can do, however, is bring it to expression in language by giving it a name. The process of bringing-into-words, then, comes-to-pass in the same way that thought-as-re-solve lets the Open be open. It has its origin not in man but in Ἀόρατος, or, as it is now called, "Being-as-name-able." All that man does is articulate the name which the Name-able discloses to him, inasmuch as he attends to its uttering. Soon (1946) we shall be told that thought utters the "dictation" of Being in its truth. The principal example of this naming-process in the

24 "... als das eigene übernommene Sichöffnen des Daseins für das Offene...." (G, p. 61). Heidegger's italics.
25 "Dann wäre das Wesen des Denkens, nämlich die Gelassenheit zur Gegnet, die Entschlossenheit zur wesenden Wahrheit." (G, p. 61). Writer's italics.
26 G, pp. 61–62 (Inständigkeit). Cf. N, II (1940–41), pp. 29, 485; WM (1943), p. 50; and HW (1946), p. 322. In re-solve thus sustained, Heidegger finds the genuine sense of what Kant called the "spontaneity" of thought. Incidentally, note how the lines of verse (p. 62) resonate (for better or for worse) with all the principal themes of Heidegger II. In the prologue to WM (1949), in-stance seems to be taken in a broader sense than here, as identical with ek-sistence (WM, p. 13).
present essay is the designation of thought as “release,” with minor specimens galore: Being-as-expanse, the expand-ing of man, re-solve as in-stance and, in the final pages, release as Heraclitus’ \( \text{"ΑΥΣΙΣ} \).\(^{27}\)

II. Nihilism in Terms of Being-as-History

The Nietzsche essay tells us very little that is new.\(^{28}\) Its sig-
nificance consists largely in the precision of certain notions that appear in “Towards an Analysis of Release,” and, like the latter, it anticipates the further development of WD. Our treatment may be brief.

A. BEING

In the essay on “Release” we have just seen how man in his essence is “released” or “expand-ed unto” Being-as-expanse. Now the same process is described in terms of the negativity interior to the process. For every time that Being, as the process of non-concealment, renders beings manifest, it simultaneously “retreats” (Ausbleiben), sc. finds some way to hide itself as itself, and thereby abides (Bleibe) in concealment.

Now “the retreating of non-concealment as such and the abiding of concealment come-to-presence in a [single] abode which serves as shelter for the proper nature of both [positivity and negativity]. . . .”\(^{29}\) But the “shelter” (Unterkunft) is not something distinct from this negatived process. On the contrary! The shelter for the Being-process comes-to-presence along with this positive-negative process itself in the very moment of its arrival among beings. In fact, “. . . this arrival of Being is in itself the arrival of a shelter for [Being]. . . .”\(^{30}\) And where pre-
cishly is the shelter for Being among beings? In the nature of man! This explains the intimacy between Being and man. "... This 'where' as the There of the [aforementioned] abode belongs to Being itself, 'is' Being itself. That is why it is called There-being." 31 The There, then, is clearly the There of a negated process.

We have another indication of the importance of negativity in Heidegger's conception of the There. By reason of its negativity, Being itself may, indeed, retreat, or rather withdraw, but in this withdrawal (Entzug) Being draws-with (Bezug) it the nature of man so as thereby to constitute that relation by which man becomes the shelter among beings where Being arrives. 32 This conception of Being as drawing There-being with itself as it withdraws will return for significant development in WD. There, too, we shall find fully thematized the note that returns again here as a special sign of Being's indigence, namely that Being is in want of its There. 33

B. THOUGHT

There are special overtones of negativity, too, in the way the present discussion conceives of thought. As in the preceding essay, here, too, thought is interpreted in the first place as the structural relationship between man and Being as it has just been described:

The ecstatic in-stance in the Open of that place where the Being-process (comes-to-pass) is, as the relationship to Being (whether to beings as such or to Being itself), the essenc-ing of thought. . . . 34

But precisely because this presenc-ing of Being always comports a retreat within beings, it is easy for thought in its functioning to forget the Being-process. Such is the case with the thought that is proper to metaphysics:

32 N, II, p. 368.
33 See N, II, pp. 390–394 (Brauch, Not).
... It does not reject Being itself, but at the same time it does not hang on to [an appreciation of] the retreating of Being as such. Thought [of this kind] does not out of itself respond to the withdrawal of Being. 35

We recognize here the same pattern of negativity that characterized man’s fallen-ness in SZ. If thought is to be true to itself and achieve authenticity (the author does not use the term here) and thereby overcome the nihilism that metaphysics implies, the thinker must respond to Being in both its positivity and its negativity: in its positivity, for Being always gives a “promise of itself” even when it retreats; 36 in its negativity, sc. in its withdrawal, for inasmuch as it is a “... withdrawal as such of Being, [it] remains a manner in which Being [comes-to-presence] – an arrival. ...” 37 In other words, authentic thought must step back (Schritt zurück) from metaphysical thought and simply let Being in both its positivity and its negativity be. 38 It must also recognize and accept the negativity of itself as Being’s There. Such thought, then, is a “dangerous” thought, for the thinker must acquiesce in the danger that his own essence find its term in negation, sc. be annihilated. 39 Thought that is true to itself, then, is a thorough-going acceptance of Being as the negatived process of truth. Notice how clearly one can detect here resonances of SZ, where authenticity is achieved in re-solve by acquiescing in the finitude of one’s transcendence in complete freedom unto death.

RÉSUMÉ

In “Release” we are told that Being (Λόγος, Expanse) releases (expands) man unto ek-sistence as an attend-ant of Λόγος. As an attend-ant, man’s task is to wait upon (attend to) Λόγος by releasing himself unto Λόγος in turn. The achieving of this reciprocal release is the full functioning of thought. It is re-solve.

But we must never forget – and “Nihilism in Terms of Being

---

35 “... Es wehrt das Sein selbst nicht ab, aber es hält sich auch nicht an das Ausbleiben des Seins als solchen. Das Denken entspricht von sich aus nicht dem Entzug des Seins.” (N, II, p. 359).
36 V.g. N, II, pp. 369, 383, 390 (Versprechen seiner selbst).
38 N, II, pp. 368, 370, 380, 390 (Schritt zurück); 371, 389, 397 (läßt).
39 N, II, pp. 392–394 (Gefahr, Gefährdung).
as-history" reminds us again – that re-solve is a release unto Being-as-negatived, even though this may mean acquiescing in the eventual annihilation of the thinker as Being's There. Only by a thought such as this can Nietzsche's nihilism as a mittence of negatived Being be successfully overcome.

Briefly: the two essays are at once an explicitation of the "Αϝος" essay and the first draft of WD.
CHAPTER X

THE SAYING OF ANAXIMANDER

"The Saying of Anaximander" is another dialogue, sc. the retrieve of a gnome that comes down to us from one of the earliest thinkers in the West.\(^1\) Committed to writing during the enforced retirement of the de-Nazification period (1946), the essay deals with a theme that had been treated in the Freiburg courses as early as the summer semester of 1932 under the title "The Origin of Western Philosophy." Only the latest version of the author's reflections is available to the public. If this does not permit us to trace textually any development in Heidegger's thought, we know, at least, that what is said here is the result of long maturation. Hence the text, more than ordinarily obscure, is to be interpreted in terms of what we know of the development between 1932 and 1946. In this perspective, much of the inscrutability disappears. We polarize the content of the essay around two general remarks: A. Being, B. Thought.

A. BEING

We have been told often enough that Being is the process of negatived truth. This conception was last developed in the Heraclitus-analysis (1943) and we are going to see that in the present essay it is orchestrated again still more elaborately. We are interested in what the analysis adds by way of precision and, more particularly, in what way it advances our understanding of the problem. Our treatment falls naturally into two parts: 1. The Text, 2. The Advance.

\(^1\) "Der Spruch des Anaximander," HW, pp. 306-343.
I. The Text

The present study orchestrates the same theme three separate times with different materials and increasing complexity but without destroying the unity of the whole.

a. θέναις-φθορά — The Anaximander fragment as given by Diels contains two full sentences: εξ ὧν δὲ ή θέναις ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τὴν φθοράν εἰς ταῦτα γίνονται κατὰ τὸ χρόνον. διδόναι γάρ αὐτὰ διενέχει καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλους τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν.2

Burnet, however, rejects the major part of the first sentence on critical grounds and Heidegger accepts Burnet's reading, though not completely his reasons. There are two words in particular, θέναις and φθορά, which, even if they do not pertain to the original text, nevertheless bear faithful testimony to Anaximander’s thought, the author feels, and the opportunity to explain them offers him the first occasion to develop the theme of Being’s self-concealing-revealment.

In the simplest terms, Heidegger takes θέναις-φθορά to be correlative and their unity to be understood in terms of φτως, interpreted as the self-illuminating process of universal emergence and submergence:

... θέναις is the coming forth and arriving at the [condition of being] non-concealed. Φθορά means for that which has [thus] arrived to leave the non-concealed [condition] and pass into a concealed [state]. ..3

Important here is to note that θέναις and φθορά are not to be understood as taking place successively in time but as complementary moments of the same dynamic movement by which beings come-to-presence as such. Such a dynamic conception of Being, of course, gives the author warrant to reject the traditional dichotomy of Being-Becoming which implies that Being is purely static.4

b. The Nature of εν — The second thematic development is more elaborate and comes in the analysis of what the early

---

2 Full text cited according to Diels in HW, p. 296.
4 See HW, p. 316. Cf. EM, pp. 73-74 and VA, p. 182.
Greeks understood by ὅν, an analysis which the author makes by re-trieving the word in Homer. In the beginning of the Iliad (I, 68-72), Homer speaks of Calchas as wisest of the seers because he comprehends all that is, was and will be. The word for "what is" is ὅν (therefore ὅν), sc. "that which is present," whether this be future (ἐσοφύμων) or past (πρὸ ἑόντα). The non-present, however, is equally well known to the seer as the present, for in this lies his superior comprehension. Now Heidegger explains "present" by a play on the German gegen (gegenwärtig), which normally means "against" and to the everyday mind suggests that which in a "now" of time stands "against" the knower in the sense of an object (Gegenstand). Here, that is by no means the case. Gegen must suggest for us Gegend, sc. "domain." That which is present means that which has . . . arrived at [the condition of] whiling within the domain of Non-concealment. . . ." That which is non-present is that which is not found in this domain, either because it has not yet arrived at non-concealment (ἐσοφύμων), or because it has passed out of the domain into concealment again (πρὸ ἑόντα). But in either case, the fact that it can be spoken of at all means that it is related to the domain and in this sense is illumined, if only conversely, by its light.

We understand now why the seer in seeing "what is, was and will be" sees beings insofar as they are both present, sc. non-concealed, and non-present, sc. concealed. In other words, he sees them as they are, inseparable mixture of revealment and concealment. We must introduce a refinement in terminology, then, which is more than a nicety: beings are, insofar as they come-to-presence; they come-to-presence, insofar as they emerge into non-concealment, become present; but non-concealment cannot escape negativity, nor can the beings that become present through it - they remain in some way or other non-present, sc. concealed; therefore that which comes to presence is a mixture of the present and the non-present; insofar as that which comes-to-presence is negatived, sc. non-present, it is that

"... angekommen in der Weile innerhalb der Gegend der Unverborgenheit . . ." (HW, p. 319). See pp. 317-320. The word "whiling" (Weile, Verweilen, etc.) we met in "Origin of a Work of Art," and it occurs frequently here. We take it to mean "is" with a strong connotation of time. It takes on a new richness of connotation by reason of the essay itself.
THE SAYING OF ANAXIMANDER

which does-not-come-to-presence. What is important here is to see that we are simply refining the terminology of what we have known for a long time. In any case, who will deny that, if the seer sees this all at once, he is very wise indeed?

c. The Saying – The received reading of Anaximander’s saying runs as follows: κατὰ τὸ χρῆσιν. διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δικαιο τινων ἀλλήλων τῆς ἀδικίας. This compound sentence has two clearly distinguishable parts: in the first, according to Heidegger, the focus is on Being; in the second, on beings. The theme of both is identical: the process by which beings come-to-presence in non-concealment. The relation between the two clauses suggests the relation – and the distinction – between Being and beings: the ontological difference. Since we have been thinking the problem so far in terms of beings (ἐννέα), let us retain the same perspective now and begin, as the author does, with Clause II.

i. Concerning beings (in their Being) – αὐτὰ: We are dealing with beings in the sense that we have just discussed them (ἐννέα), therefore with that which comes-to-presence through a mixture of what is present and non-present, sc. that which emerges into negatived truth.

ἀδίκια: The word denotes literally the privation (ἄ-) of ἀκι, hence can be understood only in terms of ἀκι. What, then, is ἀκι? What is its privation?

We have met the word ἀκι in EM as it appeared in Sophocles, and translated it basically as “organization” or “arrangement.” Let us retain the latter word now, for it is sufficiently flexible to allow the legalistic connotation the conventional translators have found in the term (which Heidegger, of course, rejects) and at the same time permits us to understand the author’s own sense, the complete meshing of positivity and negativity, of revealment and concealment, in the coming-to-presence of beings. The process of negatived emerging he calls the “whiling” of these beings. It is supremely important to keep clearly in mind

6 Based on HW, pp. 319-320. In this paragraph, we use “that which comes-to-presence” for das Anwesende; “that which is present” for gegenwärtig; “that which is not present” for ungegenwärtig; “that which does not come to presence” for das Abwesende.

7 The author calls beings the Je-Weilige, a play on words, whereby he suggests that any given being (je-) is as a being, insofar as it whiles (-weilige) by coming-to-presence in negatived fashion. See HW, pp. 323-325, 327-329 and passim.
that the whiling of beings is a dynamic movement, and that at
the very moment that beings are emerging into revealment, they
are submerging again into concealment. For beings are never
completely static. Nor are they to be understood merely as
proceeding out of darkness and returning into darkness, but
themselves as undiluted light separating the two darknesses.
Darkness remains at all times interior to the light, helping to
constitute it as light – as light that is finite. This intermingling
of light and darkness is the whiling of beings that we now call
their dynamic “arrangement” as beings (διά). “... Whiling
comes-to-presence in [this] arrangement.”

So far, so good, but the real question is not arrangement so
much as the privation of arrangement (α-διά). What sense can
this have? The author suggests that, despite the intrinsic dyna-
mism of the process by which beings emerge, there remains
interior to the process a certain “drag,” an inertia that is subject
to some hidden law of gravity which gives it the tendency to
impede the movement, diminish or destroy its fluidity. The result
is that within every being there is the impulse to freeze into
rigidity, to instigate an insurrection against the law of dynamic
movement and perdure in some given form that is completely
static. The sense here is that beings somehow strive to refuse
the negativity that is proper to them and to become constant in
their revealment, as if this were possible. This is what is meant
by “mere” constancy. It is completely different from what we
might call “authentic” constancy, by which we mean simply the
abiding character (φόντο is emergent-abiding-Power) of the
whiling process, in which positivity and negativity play coordi-
nating rôles. Such a tendency to negate the whiling process
(arrangement) as such may justly be called “dis-arrangement”
(α-διά). How it is possible for beings, that at all costs must not
be conceived anthropomorphically, to “refuse” or to “accept”

8 “... Weile west in der Fuge.” (HW, p. 327). If forced to look for analogies to
describe this phenomenon, could we say, perhaps, that beings are not like actors who
step before a curtain, then disappear behind it, but rather they are as if fashioned out
of turbulent quicksand which is in the process of disappearing at the very moment
that it becomes visible? This is not Heidegger’s terminology, however, and has many
disadvantages.

9 HW, pp. 328 (beharrt, versteift sich), 331 (Sucht, Neigung, beständige Andauern),
328 (bloßen Beständigkeit).
their negativity we are not told. Still less are we told why there
must be such a tendency in the first place.

διδόναι . . . δικοινονία: But this drag toward dis-arrangement is
only the tendency toward rigidity, nothing more. The fact is
that arrangement maintains the upper hand over dis-ar-
10

rangement. But how? By maintaining the proper mixture of
negativity in the process through which beings emerge. "... What
comes-to-presence is present insofar as it lets itself belong to
[sc. be negated by] the non-present. . . ."

εἰσιν ἄλλοις: All that we have said so far pertains to beings
as such. The beings we are dealing with are not simply an arbi-
trary plurality, however, or even a given region of beings. They
are all beings, coming-to-presence as they do in and as an
ensemble. Within the ensemble, there is, of course, a manifold
of relationships that bind individual beings to one another and
to the ensemble as such. Each being, in order to be itself, must
not only maintain the upper hand over its own tendency to dis-
arrangement, but must retain, too, its place in the general
pattern, maintain the relationships which bind it to other beings
and to the whole. There prevails among beings a sort of mutual
deference to one another which we may call less anthropomorphi-
cally "com-patibility." 12 The dynamic process by which beings
come-to-presence in negatived fashion is the process by which
they while in com-patibility with other beings within the do-
main of non-concealment.

καὶ: But com-patibility between beings supposes first of all the
harmony of revealment-concealment within the beings them-
selves. The one follows as a consequence upon the other. 13

10 HW, p. 333 (Verwindung). Why does the author use Verwindung rather than
the more usual Überwindung (v.g. Überwindung der Metaphysik)? Perhaps to suggest
that, since the drag towards dis-arrangement continues in beings, it must be mastered
continually, not conquered once and for all and then put aside, as Überwindung might
suggest. The more precise sense of Verwindung, then, would be "maintaining the
upper hand over."

11 "... Das gegenwärtig Anwesende ist das gegenwärtige, insofern es in das
ungegenwärtige sich gehört läßt..." (HW, p. 330). It is worth noting that for
Heidegger it is in terms of such a process as this that we must seek the essence of
tragedy (HW, p. 330). Wouldn't it be a delicious irony to take this as the point de
départ for another study of Heidegger I considered as the philosopher of "tragic
existence," as seen by Heidegger II?

12 HW, pp. 304, 315, 323 (Seiende im Ganzen), 331-332, 333, 335 (Rücksicht,
Ruch).

13 HW, p. 333.
With this we absolve Clause II of Anaximander’s saying. If it be taken as a totality, what can be said of it? It enunciates in obscure language a thesis that rings familiar: beings-in-the-ensemble (αὐτὰ) come-to-presence insofar as, in compatibility with each other (τίσιν ἄλληλοις), they overcome (διδόναι ... δίκην) the tendency within themselves to deny the negativity (ἀδικίας) that is a very condition of their presenc-ing. It is thus that they while in presence according to the law of arrangement (δικην). All of this is plausible enough, perhaps. In any case, this much is clear: the saying deals with beings in their Being and the law of negativity is essential to the process.

ii. Concerning the Being (of beings) ~ If Clause II thinks from beings up to Being, Clause I, as Heidegger reads the three words that compose it, thinks from Being down (κατὰ) to beings. The essential word is τὸ χρεών, and the author claims that this is the earliest formula for Being that we have, "... the oldest name by which thought brings the Being of beings into language." 14

What does the word say? We must re-tieve the sense of it by going beyond the conventional meaning of "necessity" to its origin in χρᾶω, χράομαι, meaning "to handle" something (cf. χεῖρ: hand). Heidegger translates it by Brauch, a word that conventionally means "use," whose re-tieved sense is likewise a "handling." In giving to Being the name τὸ χρεών, Anaximander would suggest that Being "... hands something to its own essence and keeps it in hand, preserving it in its truth as coming-to-presence in this way." 15 The author claims that Anaximander conceives of Being as handing to beings their essence, more precisely as handing-out beings in that by which they come-to-presence, as imparting to them their part in the process of whiling. The whiling is the whole dynamic movement of negated presenc-ing that we have called arrangement. Curiously enough, the author speaks in such a way as to imply not only that Being hands essence to beings but that it hands beings over to (their) essence, as if beings were manu-ducted by Being into

14 "... der älteste Name, worin das Denken das Sein des Seienden zur Sprache bringt." (HW, p. 334).
the process of coming-to-presence that clearly holds the primacy over them.\textsuperscript{16}

The word χρέω says something, too, about the problem of finitude. The arrangement that fuses in beings positivity and negativity is that which establishes these beings within their limits (περικό). "... The arrangement of whiling puts-an-end-to and de-limits that which comes-to-presence as such..."\textsuperscript{17} Now if Being hands beings out and thereby hands out to beings their part in the whiling process, then it imparts to them their limits (περικό), their finitude. Furthermore, since Being is not that which it hands out, Being is without limits: ἀπέρικτον. If Being (ἀρχή) is limit-less (ἄπερικτον), however, does this not mean that it is non-finite? Not necessarily. Only that it is Non-being!

2. The Advance

All that we have said thus far, however, is simply a more complicated orchestration of the same theme that we have heard many times before. Does the essay hold anything new? It would seem so. The problem of the ontological difference becomes thematic and for a brief but significant moment assumes the center of the stage.

The importance of τὸ χρέων is not only that it is a name for Being but that it expresses the relation between Being and beings. What this relation is we have seen already in its essentials when we examined τὸ χρέων as a hand-ling of beings (hand-ing them out, keeping them in hand). Τὸ χρέων, we repeat, names this relation but it does not name it as such. On the contrary, "... in the process of coming-to-presence as such, the relation to that which comes-to-presence is announced, and, indeed, in such a way that coming-to-presence comes into words as this relationship,"\textsuperscript{18} and, conversely, this relationship finds expression in and as the process of coming-to-presence as such.

\textsuperscript{16} Perhaps it is straining out gnats, but it is interesting to note that Heidegger (HW, p. 339) conceives the process of im-parting (erteilt) to beings part (Anteil) in the whiling-process, when the conception of "participation" as manner of speaking about the emergence of the ontological difference presumably would be (because a relapse into metaphysics) anathema.

\textsuperscript{17} "... Die Fuge der Weile be-endet und be-grenzt das Anwesende als ein solches. ..." (HW, p. 339).

\textsuperscript{18} "... Wohl dagegen mag sich im Anwesen als solchem die Beziehung auf das Anwesende bekunden, so zwar, daß das Anwesen als diese Beziehung zu Wort kommt." (HW, pp. 336–337). Heidegger's italics. See p. 354 (Beziehung).
We see more clearly Heidegger's relationship to the early Greeks and his own task, as he sees it, with regard to them. Being bestowed its light upon them through a privileged experience, and they, in response, brought Being into words. They named Being as such and, implicitly, its relationship to beings, but the (ontological) difference between Being and beings remained as such forgotten. What is made clear now is that even the pre-Platonic thinkers were oblivious to the ontological difference as such. For Heidegger, their superiority to Plato and his successors seems to have been their awareness of Being as ἄληθεία and their corresponding docility to its bidding, but to the extent that they did not name the ontological difference as such, they too were victims of forgottenness, for "... the forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the difference between Being and beings." Yet this was not simply a forgetfulness, hence a weakness, on their part. The true origin of their forgottenness was Being itself, which, in disclosing itself to them in their epoch of history, concealed itself (and inevitably so) as well.

We conclude by adverting to two texts which, typographically speaking, are almost perfectly juxtaposed on opposite pages of HW, and which we now wish to confront with each other so that we may see clearly the paradox:

... In ἐπισκόπεια, when [we] think it as the [Being of beings], somehow or other the relationship of [Being] to [beings] is thought, especially if the relation of Being to beings can only come from Being and rest in the presenc-ing of Being.

Add to this in the same sense a later remark:

... The handling process [of Being] hands out ... [beings] in such a way that it antecedently contains within itself the [beings that are] handed out, gathers them into itself and guards them as [beings] in their [Being].

20 "... Einmal, daß es das Anwesen des Anwesenden nennt, zum anderen, daß im ἐπισκόπεια, wenn es das Anwesen des Anwesenden denkt, irgendwie die Beziehung des Anwesens zum Anwesenden gedacht ist, wenn anders die Beziehung des Seins zum Seienden nur aus dem Sein kommen und im Wesen des Seins beruhen kann." (HW, p. 334).
21 "... Der Brauch händigt Fug und Ruch in der Weise aus, daß er das Ausgehändigte sich im vorhinein vorbehält, zu sich versammelt und es als das Anwesende in das Anwesen birgt." (HW, p. 139).
In both of these texts, the complete primacy of Being over beings is emphasized. Both name the ontological difference, but neither as such. To meditate either is to think Being but not the ontological difference. In this perspective, the statement of WM: Ep (1943) seems the most obvious thing in the world: "... Being indeed comes-to-presence without beings. ..." 22

But on the opposite page of HW, we read: "... It is the business of Being to be the Being of beings." 23 The implication is that Being, for all its primacy (and the genitive would indicate the genesis of beings from Being), can not come-to-presence without beings. This implication is confirmed when we learn that when beings, by resisting the drag to dis-arrangement, maintain the arrangement in themselves, they do not maintain this arrangement precisely for themselves but for Being, granting to Being the arrangement which, as a process of arranging, Being needs in order to be itself.24 "... The [Being] of [beings] is such a process of maintaining the upper hand [over the drag toward dis-arrangement]. ..." 25 This text thinks the ontological difference as such. We are prepared already (1946) to give a sense to the unannounced change of the original Epilogue text (1943) to its direct opposite (1949): "... Being never comes-to-presence without beings. ..." 26

Finally, this latter perspective permits us to surmise the answer to two questions raised above: how can beings be said to resist, refuse the drag toward dis-arrangement? how explain the necessity of this drag? We are left to our own resources here but propose the following hypothesis:

We begin with the second question. Since it is the business of Being to be the Being of beings, it cannot be itself without them. But since beings are intrinsically limited because of the negativity interior to them, Being, too, even if limit-less (because Non-being), is as intrinsically finite as the beings it hands out.

---

22 "... das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende..." (WM, p. 46). Writer's italics.
24 Argument: compare "... Wem aber lassen die Anwesenden den Fug der Fuge gehören?" (HW, p. 335) with "... Der Fug gehört dem, dem entlang Anwesen, und d.h. Verwindung west..." (HW, p. 335).
26 "... das Sein nie west ohne das Seiende, ..." (WM, p. 46). Writer's italics.
So profound is the negativity of Being that it has the tendency to negate itself. We have seen already the tendency of self-concealment to conceal itself, which we call the mystery of Being. This is one evidence of this self-negating negativity. The tendency of beings to dis-arrangement would be another, for this drag would be imparted by the self-negating of Being that brings them to presence. "... This hand-ling [of Being] in itself is at once the process of handing out [Being] to dis-arrangement. The hand-ling mani-pulates the dis..." 27

The drag toward dis-arrangement is the tendency of beings to become frozen in the "renunciation" of Being as the coming-to-pass of truth. It is the tendency of beings to fall away from their true ontological dimension and treat themselves and each other as mere entities. Insofar as There-being is one of these beings, we have now in 1946 an echo - faint, if one will, but quite sure - of the whole problematic of fallen-ness and inauthenticity in SZ. If this surmise is legitimate, then what the present perspective would add is a clearer insistence that such a condition is not due primarily to the ineptitude of beings (There-being) but to the finitude (negativity) of Being itself.

B. THOUGHT

1. The "Shepherd of Being"

The structure and function of the thinker we discern in the present essay principally under the guise of Calchas, the seer. What does he see? "What is, was and will be," sc. the entire ensemble of beings, insofar as they emerge out of the Being-process in its positivity and negativity, sc. out of the presencing of ἀ-ληθεία.28 Our concern for the moment is with the seeing itself.

Strictly speaking, Calchas' seeing is a having-seen, which in Latin would be vidit, (in German Wissen) and which in English we might suggest by "wisdom" or, more precisely, by "knowing" in the sense that we have been using the word "comprehend."
Calchas is the wisest of the seers, then, because he has a comprehen-
sion of Being in its negativity. Having seen the to-be-seen, the seer "stands in view of it" (\textit{steht im Angesicht}), but this view
is not primarily a vision that proceeds from the seer. He sees be-
cause the lighting-up of Being has been visited upon him. He
stands himself inside the process of truth. What is more, his
knowing can be called a form of thinking, and in this comprehen-
sion-become-thought the process of truth is fulfilled.
"... Knowing is the thought-ful preservation of Being as it con-
serves [its own truth]."  All at once, the seer has become not
only a viewer of the process but an essential part of it. The
process of truth incorporates, so to speak, the seer into itself, so
that non-concealment takes place only inasmuch as the seer
sees.

Taking the seer's seeing to symbolize There-being's thought,
we discern in the essay the same double aspect of thought that
we have noticed before. Sometimes it is conceived as the structure
of There-being, so that thought is considered as coming-to-pass
insofar as There-being ek-sists. For example: "... [thinking] is
insofar as Being comes-to-presence....";  \textsuperscript{31} "... the essence
of man rests in thinking the truth of Being."  At other times,
thought is considered as the full functioning of ek-sistence in
achieved authenticity. "... Man can [preserve the truth of
Being] only within the \textit{re-solve} of There-being."  More striking
than this, however, is the fact that in both senses, man helps
conserve and guard the truth of Being. To express this, the
author introduces a metaphor which will become famous in HB:
There-being is the "shepherd of Being."  \textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{... Wissen ist das denkende Gewahren der Wahrnis des Seins.} (HW, p. 322).
\textsuperscript{31} HW, pp. 323 (Anwesende in der Beziehung auf das Sehen).
\textsuperscript{32} "... Es ist, insofern Sein west..." (HW, p. 325).
\textsuperscript{33} "... Wenn das Wesen des Menschen im Denken der Wahrheit des Seins beruht?" (HW, p. 343). In this connection, note how the seer's comprehension-as-thought is called \textit{Gedächtnis} of Being (HW, p. 322), clear anticipation (1946) of thought-as-
record in WD (1954).
\textsuperscript{34} "... Beides vermag der Mensch nur innerhalb der Ent-schlossenheit des Da-
\textsuperscript{34} HW, p. 321 (Hirt des Seins, cf. Hut).
2. The Historicity of Thought

That thought is historical is clear enough from the author's practice. At this point, it is worth mentioning, perhaps, only that the dialogue with Anaximander takes the form of "translating" his saying into another language. The saying to be translated here is obviously a "past." Future and present are suggested by the intentional ambiguity of "translate." The German, as the English, permits a double use of this compound: when the prefix (über: "over") is used inseparably with accent on the stem (setzen: "to set"), the sense is figurative, signifying the transferring of something said from one language to another (v.g. to "translate" a book); when the German stem is used separably with accent on the prefix, the sense is literal and suggests movement from one place to another (v.g. the remains of the soldiers were "translated" back home). Now to translate the saying of Anaximander, sc. render it present in another language (present), we must trans-late ourselves into what he truly uttered, make a spring, so to speak, into Being, and, releasing ourselves unto it by attend-ing to it and heeding it, we so open ourselves up to it as to let it come all over again (future).35 Briefly: by dialoguing with Anaximander, we let Being come once more into words.

RÉSUMÉ

By another process of re-trive, this time in dialogue with Anaximander, we discover how profoundly the law of negativity permeates every aspect of Being's emergence as the truth of beings-in-the-ensemble. Gradually, this process comes to be considered as the outbreak of the ontological difference as difference. In any case, this is the process which There-being, the shepherd of Being, must think, if it is to achieve authenticity in re-solve.

35 V.g. HW, pp. 318 (Übersetzung in Übersetzung beruht), 303 (Sprung), 306 (einzulassen, hinhörend auf), 312 (achten, öffnen uns), 300 (Kommende). Cf. P, p. 136.
As for the Rilke study contained in the essay "Whereunto the Poet?" (1946), composed to help commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the poet's death, we have seen already the essential: Rilke fell prey to Nietzsche's metaphysical nihilism but comprehended that it was to be overcome somehow through the authentic use of language.\(^1\) The present general remarks may be brief.

A. BEING (Αὑγος)

Heidegger's own conception of Being appears on several occasions where he compares himself, at least implicitly, with Rilke. We have noted already how radically different is the interpretation of Being as the Open. More illuminating, perhaps, is his comment upon the metaphor of Being as a sphere. For Rilke, this is meant to suggest the many-sidedness of Being, conceived as a conglomerate whole. For Heidegger, however, Being is a sphere because it is Parmenides' "One" ("Ev"), which he understands, of course, as the process of coming-to-presence in all beings which is everywhere the same, hence a circle whose center is in every being, lighting it up from the inside as what it is. "... The spherical element of the One and the One itself have the character of a lighting-up process that reveals [beings]. Within this process [beings] can come to presence. ..." \(^2\)

\(^1\) "Wozu Dichter?," HW, pp. 248-295.
\(^2\) "... Das Sphärische des Einens und diesen selber haben den Charakter des entbergenden Lichten, innerhalb dessen Anwesendes anwesen kann...." (HW, p. 275).
The lighting-process for Heidegger takes place through language. Now that we have seen how Being must be conceived as aboriginal Λόγος in the most radical sense of that word, there is no special difficulty in understanding language to be the domain of Being which Being itself "cuts out" (τέμπεσθαι). The author, in a few dense phrases, does much with this Greek word. On the one hand, he recalls its association with tempus (time), as if to suggest by a wave of the hand the temporo-historical character of Being. On the other hand (and, for the moment, this is more important), he recalls the relation between τέμπεσθαι and templum (a "place cut off," sc. temple) and promptly calls language the "temple," then the "house" of Being. And so is born the famous formula of HB: "... Language is the house of Being, ..." 3 The sense is that since Being makes beings accessible, we cannot gain access to beings except by passing through the house of language. Being "dwells" in the words by which beings are named:

... If we go to a spring or stroll through the woods, we are passing already through the word "spring," through the word "woods," even when we do not express these words or think of anything linguistic. ... 4

So radically must we understand Λόγος! We can understand now why the Greeks, given their abiding experience of Λόγος, may be said to have "dwelt" in the essenc-ing of language, even if they never thought this essenc-ing as such. 5

B. THOUGHT

Once this much is said, there is hardly need for us to develop at length another remark about the nature of thought, beyond underlining the fact that since Being "is" Λόγος, we cannot think it except in terms of the coming-to-pass of language. "... That poetizing, indeed, should be likewise the business of thought we must first learn in this present moment of [the history of] the World...," 6 and the essay itself demonstrates the thesis.

---

3 "... Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins..." (HB, p. 53).
4 "... Wenn wir zum Brunnen, wenn wir durch den Wald gehen, gehen wir schon immer durch das Wort 'Brunnen', durch das Wort 'Wald' hindurch, auch wenn wir diese Worte nicht aussprechen und nicht an Sprachliches denken..." (HW, p. 286).
5 Cf. US, p. 166.
6 "... Daß freilich Dichten auch die Sache eines Denkens sei, müssen wir in diesem Weltaugenblick erst lernen..." (HW, p. 256).
Résumé

It is because Rilke somehow experienced Being in terms of Λόγος and therefore comprehended the sense of language that, despite his metaphysical nihilism, he was at least “under way” toward the authentic exercise of language. That is why, he is a poet for the time of need — and a worthy ally in the overcoming (grounding) of metaphysics.
Heidegger's reply in letter form to the question posed by Jean Beaufret (Paris), how it would be at all possible, given these new perspectives, to restore a meaning to the word "humanism," represents, despite the occasional nature of its motivation and the informality of its tone, a culminating moment in his development. Without any doubt, the "Letter on Humanism" is the most important of his writings since EM, not so much for what it offers that is new but for a crystallization of the entire development we have seen him undergo. The letter in its published form dates from 1947. Since 1945, Heidegger had been living in enforced retirement, and Beaufret's query gave him the opportunity (probably a welcome one) to expose in fuller scope the mise au point suggested in WM: Ep, bringing into clearer focus the relation between Heidegger I and Heidegger II. It is especially valuable, therefore, for the author's self-interpretation, although this aspect of the letter is less important for us who, thanks to subsequent publication of several works from the 1929-1947 period, are more familiar with the course of his development than his readers could be at that time.

As a matter of fact, Beaufret's question was a triple one: 1. How restore a sense to the word "humanism"? 2. How precise the relationship between ontology and an eventual ethics? 3. How preserve the element of adventure which all research
comports, without making philosophy mere venturesomeness? 4
Heidegger proposes to discuss only the first at length, leaving
the discussion itself to throw light on the other two. We follow
his example, omitting (with regret) all reflections on the second
question as not sufficiently germane to the problematic of
thought, sufficiently complex in itself.

We recall from the analysis of humanism as testimony to the
de-volution of Western thought that the metaphysical con-
ception of man as a rational animal fails to take into account
the relationship of man’s essence to Being. We know, too, from
the Nietzsche analysis how essential it is to interrogate this re-
lationship, if we are to overcome (ground) metaphysics. Heideg-
ger has been occupied with this problem from the first pages of
SZ, and the value of HB consists in thematizing this effort in the
light that Heidegger II sheds upon it. In a word, the author con-
ceives man as ek-sistence, sc. ec-static open-ness to Being.
“... The standing in the light of Being is what I call the ek-
sistence of man. ...” 5 We can see with what justice he can dis-
avow any responsibility for Sartre’s existentialism and claim that
he is dealing with the level, not where there are principally men,
but where there is principally Being. 6

With such a conception, we pass beyond the traditional in-
terpretations of the nature of man – therefore beyond humanism.
Do we still have the right to use the term to describe an effort
of this type? If humanism be identified with metaphysics,
certainly not. In this sense, Heidegger’s thought is anti-human-
ist, better pre-humanist, simply because humanism of this sort
estems man too low. Man is immeasurably more than a rational
animal. But if Heidegger thinks the nature of man in terms of
its exclusive relationship to Being, is his thought not in its own
way a humanism after all? Does he not “restore” a meaning to
the word? Or is it better to drop the word completely, with the
danger of being taken for anti-humanist, rather than run the

4 “Comment sauver l’élément d’aventure que comporte toute recherche sans faire
de la philosophie une simple aventure?” (HB, pp. 117–119).
5 “... Das Stehen in der Lichtung des Seins nenne ich die Ek-sistenz des Menschen.
...” (HB, pp. 66–67). The author insists again on the difference between ek-sistence
and the existencia of the tradition, for he attempts to get to a point prior to the
essence-existence dichotomy (HB, pp. 68, 72).
6 HB, pp. 73 (nicht das geringste gemeinsam), 79–80 (principalement l’Etre).
532 FROM BEING TO THERE—THE RE-TRIEVE OF THOUGHT

risk of having a subject-ist interpretation read into the notion of ek-sistence? 7

We come at once to our general remarks and polarize them in the usual way: A. Being, B. There-being, C. Thought. The fact is, however, that the essay is so fluid that it is not easy to strain out different elements for separate discussion. We must make an effort from the beginning to realize that these three approaches to the problem actually must be thought together.

A. BEING

1. Mittence

We have seen often enough that Being for Heidegger is fundamentally a lighting-process by which beings are lit up as what they “are.” This supposes, however, that among them there is a domain where this lighting-up process takes place. This is the There of Being. Now in this coming-to-pass, Being maintains the initiative. It is Being that gives itself unto the There with the There and, imparting itself thus, continues to dominate its There. This is the mittence of Being. Yet mittence takes place for the sake of Being, and the There, thus brought-to-pass, sustains the process, guards it, stands watch over it so that in the light of Being beings may appear non-concealed—such is the concern of the There. Being, for all its spontaneity, is still in need of its There.8

Yet the primacy of Being is inalienable. Whether the process takes place and how it takes place is not for the There to decide. If in SZ it could be said that “only insofar as There-being is, is there Being,” this must be understood in the sense that only insofar as the lighting-process comes-to-pass in a There does it come-to-pass at all. That it comes-to-pass, however, does not depend on the There but on the spontaneity of Being which thus emits itself among beings. The There is “thrown,” and it is Being that does the “throwing.” We understand this in no

7 HB, pp. 66 (zu gering), 75 (eigentliche Würde), 89 (mehr), 93–94 (selsamer Art), 95 (Missdeutungen ertragen).
8 V.g. HB, pp. 80 (es gibt), 81 (waltet), 84 (Nähe), 85 (Schickung des Seins), 111 (Wahrnis), 75 (hüten, Hirt des Seins), 94 (Wächterschaft), 100 (Sorge).
ontic sense, of course, but only as an insistence on the fact that Being maintains the primacy in an event that \textit{de facto} takes place.\footnote{HB, pp. 75 (ob und wie), 83 (Daß), 71, 75, 84, 100 (Wurf, etc.).}

The word that most characteristically crystallizes all these notions in the essay is Being-as-mittence. It is the mittence of Being in its truth that constitutes the process of history. Hence, it is the history of Being that sustains and determines every aspect of our human situation.\footnote{HB, pp. 83 (Geschick), 81 (Geschehen der Geschichte), 53 (Wirken beruht im Sein).}

2. Negativity

But Being, as the coming-to-pass of non-concealment through mittence unto a There, is a negatived process. We have met it before as the "primordial Discord" between positivity and negativity. Here it is called the Contentious, and we understand this in the sense of the original contention between positivity and negativity in the process of truth.\footnote{HB, p. 12 (das Strittige).} In the essay it takes two forms:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{a. INTER-MITTENCE} – Every mittence of Being is negatived because it gives rise to beings but is not a being, and it must withdraw at the very moment that it reveals itself. For Being to give itself, it must refuse itself as well, and therefore Being remains hidden as mittence. When this is considered in terms of history, then the various phases of thought are each a mittence of Being as truth. The supreme example, of course, is the history of metaphysics, which can now be seen in its totality. Within this movement we can discern subsidiary moments, each of which can be considered in its own way a mittence of Being: mediaeval scholasticism, Hegelian absolutism, dialectical materialism, Nietzsche’s nihilism, contemporary technicity – each in its own way is a mittence of Being in its truth. Each comports negativity, self-concealment founding the errance whose essence is obliviousness to Being-as-mittence.\footnote{V.g. HB, pp. 82 (versagt sich), 86 (bleibt verborgen), 87–88 (Heimatlosigkeit, Technik), 73 (Mittelalter), 82 (Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche). Cf. HW, pp. 245 (Metaphysik), 310 (Griechische, Christentum, Neuzeitliche, Planetarische), 312 (Irre).}
\end{itemize}
Now since the assemblage of mittences constitutes intermittence, sc. Being-as-history, an individual mittence constitutes an “epoch” of history. This notion is not very carefully elaborated and we are never told the precise difference, for example, between metaphysics as an epoch and Hegelianism as an epoch. We understand the matter thus: any single mittence constitutes an epoch, but this may be understood in a broad sense, including many phases of development (v.g. the mittence/epoch of metaphysics), or in a narrower sense, as referring to a single phase within such a scope (v.g. the perennial essence-existence problematic), or in a strict sense, as referring to an individual thinker who characterizes an epoch (v.g. Anaximander, Parmenides, Hegel). But even with this, the matter remains obscure.

At any rate, we must see clearly that the forgottenness of Being is due primarily to Being itself, hence not in the first place to the failure of man. Yet even what we call “negativity” must not be thought too negatively. It is no lack (Mangel) in Being but rather its own withheld treasure. This explains why it can still come to us across the past. When we are told that metaphysics not only does not interrogate the truth of Being but cannot do so, the reason is partly that Being so withdraws in the mittence of metaphysics that metaphysics is not sufficiently aware of it to interrogate it, partly that it is this withdrawal which makes metaphysics what it is, and to interrogate its own essence would be to pass beyond itself into its own ground. It simply does not lie within the realm of metaphysics to interrogate the relation between Being and the essence of man. Conclusion: if we are to think Being, thought must be historical; thought must heed (achtet) the negativity as well as the positivity of the mittences of Being. This for Heidegger is the only chance of “salvation.”

b. NON-BEING – Let us prescind from truth as an historical process and consider it from the viewpoint of a non-historical negativity. What do we find? Since Being is not a being but con-

---

13 HW, p. 311 (Epoche).
14 HB, pp. 73 (Versäumnis), 77 (Mangel, vorenhaltene Schatz), 65 (Wesen des Menschen), 118 (auf Geschick des Seins achtet); HW, p. 343 (Rettung). Cf. WM, pp. 10–12.
ceals itself in revealing itself, there is no way for There-being to grasp it by itself except as Non-being. But the necessity does not spring originally from There-being; it is rooted in Being itself simply because Being comports this negativing element as intrinsic to its nature. "The negativing element in Being is the essence of what I call Non-being. . . ." 16 We have here an explanation of the puzzling phrase that Non-being is the "veil of Being." We have, too, an illuminating comment on why the "most profound finitude of transcendence" is a thrust into Non-being, sc. because it is the There of Being that is intrinsically negatived. 16 Conclusion: the thinking of Being must meditate Non-being.

3. Language

In the Rilke dialogue, we saw how language was described as "the house of Being." Here the thesis moves to the center of the stage and the formula is repeated several times. The nearness of Being (\(\Lambda\nu\gammao\gammaoc\)) dominates all beings unobtrusively, and " . . . nearness comes-to-presence as language itself. . . ." 17 " . . . Language is the illuminating-concealing arrival of Being itself." 18 Hence language is an event that has Being as its ultimate origin, a house that is arranged according to a pattern inscribed in Being and prescribed by it. " . . . Being is always underway toward [language]. . . ." 19 Once it arrives in words, then " . . . language is the language of Being in the same way that the clouds are the clouds of the sky. . . ." 20 If at the same time that we speak of Being as coming into language we add that it must be "brought" into language, this is only another way of saying that Being has need of its There in order to be itself. Conclusion: the thinking of Being must go the way of language.

---

15 "Das Nichtende im Sein ist das Wesen dessen, was ich das Nichts nenne. . . ." (HB, p. 114).
16 WM, p. 51 (Schleier des Seins); KM, p. 214 (tiefste Endlichkeit).
B. THERE-BEING

I. Nature of Ek-sistence

Being throws its There. "... The There-being itself, however, is as that which is thrown-forth. It comes-to-presence in the throwing of Being which takes place as the e-mitting of mittence. ..." 21 Now it is the nature of man to be this There of Being. "... Man comes-to-presence in such a way that he is the 'There,' sc. the lighting-up of Being. ...," and it is this special character of man's nature that Heidegger has called "ek-sistence": "... This 'Being' of the There, and only this, has the fundamental structure of ek-sistence, sc. taking a stance ec-statically within the truth of Being. ..." 22 How understand, then, the relationship between Being and ek-sistence? Being is not just a term of the relation but itself is the relationship, "... insofar as it sustains ek-sistence in its existential, sc. ecstatic, presenc-ing and gathers it unto itself as the domain of the truth of Being in the midst of beings. ..." 23

It is worth noting that in all this Heidegger wishes to emphasize that Source whence the essence of man derives, its distinctive characteristic. This leads us to believe that he is dealing with human nature as such, not with the individual man. In such a humanism, "... not man but the historical presenc-ing of man in his origin out of the truth of Being ..." is in question. 24 Insofar as his nature proceeds from Being and stands forth as exposed unto Being, we may say that he stands "in" the light of

---

22 "... der Mensch west so, daß er das 'Da', das heißt die Lichtung des Seins, ist. Dieses 'Sein' des Da, und nur dieses, hat den Grundzug der Ek-sistenz, das heißt des ekstatischen Innestehens in der Wahrheit des Seins ..." (HB, p. 69). Cf. WM, p. 12. Terminology: Ek-sistence at this point has a double nuance: ex-εστάσεις (or ec-stance) suggests that man as a being stands outside of himself (therefore transcendence); ευ-εστάσεις (or in-stance: Innenstehen, Instandigkeit) suggests that man stands within the light of Being (v.g. HB, pp. 70, 74). Both are complementary: the former is redolent of Heidegger I, the latter of Heidegger II.
23 "... Das Sein selber ist das Verhältnis, insofern Es die Ek-sistenz in ihrem existenzialen, das heißt ekstatischen Wesen an sich hält und zu sich versammelt als die Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seins inmitten des Seienden ..." (HB, p. 77). Cf. WM, p. 12.
Being. This is the sense of "in" in the old formula "to-be-in-the-World," for Heidegger here makes explicit the identification of World and the lighting-up of Being. It is by reason of this in-being that man dwells in the near-ness of Being as Being's neighbor.  

2. Structure of Ek-sistence

How are we to understand the structure of ek-sistence? At this point, Heidegger recalls the basic elements of the existential analysis of SZ:

a. Project – Obviously, project is not to be understood as a presentative position of Being by There-being, but simply that component in ek-sistence by reason of which it is ec-static, sc. the ec-static relation to the light of Being, for it is by reason of project that Being lights itself up in There-being. That is why it is identified with There-being's comprehension of Being, and ultimately founds the rationality of man – for that matter, his animality, too. Since, by project, it is ultimately Being that throws light on itself, we may speak of ek-sistence as a counter-poise to Being. But if project throws light on Being, it by no means fashions it, for is it not thrown-forth by the very Being it illuminates?

b. Thrown-ness – The thrown-ness of SZ appears clearly now as an affirmation of the primacy of Being in the coming-to-pass of truth. Obviously, we must avoid any ontic interpretation in terms of a "creation" of sorts. We are still dealing with an "emerging-into-presence." It is singularly important to realize that Heidegger never abandons the phenomenological attitude that seeks only to let the phenomenon manifest itself. For example: "... man alone is released unto mittence of ek-sistence, as far as our experience [can say]. ..."
The throwing sometimes goes by different names: an appeal to There-being, a claim made upon it, a call.28 Is there an interior connection between them? To answer that, we would have to know more about this emergence of the There, and this is precisely what is in question. The author goes no further, but one wonders if we should not understand that there is in Being a certain adhesiveness to itself, by reason of which the throwing down as such is a call to There to achieve its self.

Strictly speaking, thrown-ness is not a component of the structure of ek-sistence so much as a general condition of the There, disclosed by the ontological disposition. The third component (along with project) is logos, which we interpreted to be that element which lets There-being see its ontological condition. When Heidegger identifies here the throwing and the “call,” is he implying these two components, without wishing to go that far into the existential analysis? Possibly. If so, then we might be warranted in interpreting the text, “… Being itself is the relationship [of Being to ek-sistence] insofar as it … gathers ek-sistence unto itself as the place of truth in the midst of beings. …,” 29 in such a way as to mean that: between Being and its There is a relationship, which Being itself is; if we think of this relationship dynamically as a passage of Being to There, we may conceive it as the throwing of There; if we consider it as passing from There to Being, we may speak of it as a gathering of There unto Being, in the sense of logos. Would not this be the meaning of “call”? If so, we are on the verge here of the whole problematic of conscience as explained in SZ, it would seem. We must wait until WD (1952) for further precision.

c. Fallen-ness – If ek-sistence is the domain of luminosity in the midst of beings, it is nevertheless of such a nature that it tends to become preoccupied with these beings and forget the Being-dimension by which they are disclosed. We are told once more that this is the sense of fallen-ness. It is according to the attitude which There-being adopts towards this tendency

28 HB, pp. 60, 74 (ansprechen), 90 (Ruf).
29 “… Das Sein selber ist das Verhältnis, insofern Es die Ek-sistenz in ihrem existenzialen, das heißt ekstatischen Wesen an sich hält und zu sich versammelt als
that we may speak of it as authentic (recognizes the tendency and accepts it) or inauthentic (does not recognize the tendency, or, having recognized it, refuses to accept it). But in SZ, the tendency is described simply as a situation of fact. Here, we are told explicitly its foundation:

... This relation [between Being and There] is such as it is, not on the basis of ek-sistence, but the essenc-ing of ek-sistence [comes] ec-statically (in the existential sense) out of the essenc-ing of the truth of Being.\(^{30}\)

We interpret this to mean that the reason why There-being is victim of fallen-ness is that it is the *finite* There of *finite* Being, that hides itself even from its own There.

d. **Concern** — But the There does not achieve its function simply by the fact that it is thrown-down. It is a dynamic process, the coming-to-pass of truth among beings, and entrusted to the nature of man to accomplish. It is the process of truth that constitutes man’s concern (*Sorge*) as man. Insofar as his concern is the bringing-to-pass of truth according to his measure, he guards (*hütet*) truth, serves as watchman (*Wächterschaft*) to it. “... Man is the shepherd of Being. ...” \(^{31}\)

But if such is the nature of man, it is nevertheless possible, given the drag of his fallen condition (and, conversely, the domination in him of errance) that he is unable to experience the genuine nature of his concern as such and therefore to assume it in his own name. Such we understand to be his everyday condition. But if he acquiesces in concern, thereby assuming it, he goes along with Being’s demands upon him. This means that at one and the same time: he responds to Being’s appeal to be authentically its There; he willingly “stands with” his own ec-static nature, insofar as he stands (-static) outside (ec-) himself and within the light of Being, sc. he with-stands the There.

“... As the being which ek-sists, man with-stands the There-being, insofar as he makes his ‘concern’ the There as the lumi-

\(^{30}\) “... Aber dieser Bezug ist so, wie er ist, nicht auf Grund der Ek-sistenz, sondern das Wesen der Ek-sistenz ist existential-ekstatisch aus dem Wesen der Wahrheit des Seins.” (HB, p. 78).

\(^{31}\) “... Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins....” (HB, pp. 75, 90). See HB, pp. 77 (sorgend übernimmt), 75 (hütet), 91 (Wächterschaft) and WM, p. 15.
nostity of Being..." 32 We take this to mean: that the concern for Being is man's nature; that it lies within his power to endorse this nature, sc. make it his "own," or not; that to make Being "his own concern" is to assume himself as the There and thus achieve authenticity — to fail to do so is to be victim of inauthenticity. "... Man as ek-sistent takes his stand in this relationship through which Being e-mits itself, insofar as he ec-statically with-stands it, sc. [for his own part] assumes it out of concern. ..." 33 It is only this that lies within man's power to accept or reject. Whether the process of truth comes-to-pass in the first place is not for him to decide. The only question is whether or not he himself will discover the genuine sense of his own commitment corresponding to the mitteness of Being imparted to him. 34

e. Historicity - Ek-sistence is of itself an historical process, not because it takes place "in" time but because the process of concern in its own way is time.35 The sense is that There-being's playing shepherd to Being comports the triple dimension of future-past-present that constitutes original time. How this is to be understood we shall see shortly.

3. Ek-sistence and Language

If language is the house of Being, how are we to understand the relation between language and Being's There? It is in the nature of man (There-being) to be a lodger in this house, simply because by reason of ek-sistence he guards Being in its truth. As a result, language is proper to man, not simply because along with his other faculties man also "has" the power of speech, but because he has a privileged access to Being. By the same token, the function of his language is simply to let Being be itself. Conversely, it is because other beings do not have this special

32 "... Als der Ek-sistierende steht der Mensch das Da-sein aus, indem er das Da als die Lichtung des Seins in 'die Sorge' nimmt...." (HB, p. 71). See HB, p. 75 (entspricht) and HW, p. 311.
33 "... Weil der Mensch als der Ek-sistierende in dieses Verhältnis, als welches das Sein sich selbst schickt, zu stehen kommt, indem er es ekstatisch aussteht, das heißt, sorgend übernimmt...." (HB, p. 77).
34 HB, p. 75 (ob Schickliche findet).
35 See HB, p. 82 (Ek-sistenz geschichtlich).
access to Being that they cannot talk. If the use of language for modern man has become banal, we must not seek the reason in moral or esthetic grounds but in the fact that the genuine nature of man and his essential relationship to Being remain in oblivion.  

A case in point! The power to articulate a negation in language does not derive originally from the power of man to reject a P with regard to some S of predication, but from the fact that the nature of man, sc. There-being, appertains to Being which itself is intrinsically negatived. “Yes” and “no” are uttered in speech, then, out of attend-ance (therefore response) to Being itself. We see here explicitated Heidegger’s reply to the question raised in WM as to the foundation of the “not” in speech, indeed of all negativity in human comportment. It is Non-being, sc. Being itself as negatived. It is fundamentally “… Being [that] negates – as Being. …”

C. THOUGHT

The ec-static nature of man, which lodges in the house of Being (language), accomplishes the guardianship over Being and its truth when it assumes itself in concern. But by what gesture on the part of There-being does this take place? In SZ, it was the supreme liberation of re-solve. Now it is by thought.

I. Thought as Fulfillment

By reason of thought, Being comes to its fullness, for thought is the achieving of the There among beings which Being needs in order to be itself as the lighting-up of these beings. The fundamental sense of thought, then, is that it lets Being be. It yields to Being’s demands upon There-being to bring truth to expression. Such is the attitude of foundational thought. “… Thought accomplishes this letting [-be]. …”

86 HB, pp. 53 (Behausung), 79 (besitzt), 66 (das Ekatatische wahrt), 70 (kehrt Sprache), 59 (aus einer Gefährdung). This is why Heidegger feels justified in taking Aristotle’s ζωον λόγον λέγον to mean: a being endowed with the power of language. See P, p. 271 and WD, p. 66.
88 “… Das Denken vollbringt dieses Lassen ….” (HB, p. 54). See p. 111 (läßt das Sein – sein).
It is perfectly clear, however, that in the process of thought Being itself maintains the initiative. We are told that Being is the "element" of thought, just as water is the "element" of a fish. Element here is to be understood as that which renders something possible, therefore enables an essence to emerge, or, if one will, an essencing to take place. More simply still, it lets-be. Being has the primacy over thought, simply because it gives rise to it. To say that Being renders thought possible means for Being "... to preserve [thought] in its essencing, to retain it in its element." 39 We see once more that the phrase "thinking of Being" has a fundamentally ambiguous sense. It implies: that thought belongs to Being (as Being's attend-ant), for it is brought about by Being; that thought attends to Being because it comes about in There-being. The genitive "of Being," then, is at once both "subjective" and "objective," if these words at this point still have any sense.40

But if the There in its thinking process is fundamentally receptive, it is not for that reason passive. It makes a contribution to the event of truth simply by acquiescing in it. It brings the event to fulfillment, for to fulfill means "... to unfold or lead forth something into the fullness of essencing, pro-ducere. ..." 41 What is fulfilled in this case is the relation between Being and the nature of man. Thinking does not fashion this relationship but only unfolds it; it lets this relation be (manifest) as having been imparted to the There. Thus rendered manifest, "... Being is as the mittence [unto] thought. ..." 42

This entire process can not be called an activity, if the word be taken to imply any ontic comportment or to pertain merely to the order of the actual. Hence, it never brings "results." It has no "effects," no "success" to which it can point, for all these terms suggest ontic efficacity. "... [Thought] is sufficient unto its own essence, insofar as it is. ..." 43 For this reason, we cannot say that it is a "practical" comportment of man, for πράξις is...
restricted to the ontic. But it is not for that reason “theoretic” either, for it is concerned with that lighting-process that first makes a \( \delta \varepsilon \omega \varepsilon \varepsilon \) possible. Neither “practical” nor “theoretic” in the strict sense, the thinking of Being surpasses these categories and can be described perhaps only as a “dynamic accomplishment.” It is this non-ontic character that accounts for the tremendous simplicity of thought – the poverty of the shepherd. And it accounts for the strangeness, the difficulty as well. We must take a “step in reverse” and descend from the ontic level, discover Being in its unseizable nearness.  

2. Thought and Language

a. FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE – By reason of thought, the relation of Being (\( \Lambda \gamma \nu \zeta \)) to man is brought to its fullness. For Being is by nature non-concealment, and it is through thought as the culminating moment of There that the manifestation of Being as Being takes place. Now this manifestation comes-to-pass insofar as “... through thought Being comes to [expression in] language. ...”  

Like thought itself, language must be considered in terms of a response to Being and as this response. It is thus that in the history of Being, the event by which Being discloses itself to and in man comes to expression in the words of foundational thinkers. And if, when all is said and done, thought has nothing to “show” for its efforts, the reason is that it needs no ontic results in order to recommend it. “... It meets the exigencies of its [own] essence, insofar as it is. But it is, insofar as it gives utterance to [Being]. ...”

It is thus that There-being takes up its lodging in the house of Being. There-being’s task is not to fabricate this house but, by thought, to play its rôle in bringing the house to completion. For Being (\( \Lambda \gamma \nu \zeta \)) of itself, because self-illuminating, is already under way toward expression, and “... ek-sistent thought, for its own part, brings [Being that thus] advances [to it] through

---

44 HB, pp. 53, 115 (Handeln, Tun), 78 (Einfaches), 90 (Armut des Hirten), 116 (Befremdliche), 91 (Schritt-zurück), 103 (Abstieg).
45 “... daß im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt...” (HB, p. 53).
utterance into language. . . ."

Hence thought supplies words for Being's self-disclosure, while Being, in turn, diffuses its light on and through these words. Completing the house of Being in this way, There-being by this very fact takes up its lodging within it. "... Thought pays heed to the lighting-up process [that is] Being, insofar as it encloses its own utterance of Being in language, as [if this were] the lodging of ek-sistence. . . ."

If thought is a responding to Being in and through language, it follows that the thinker must remain profoundly docile to Being as he brings it into words, even if this means that he speak but seldom and have little to say. It is only thus that he restores to words what is precious in them, and to man himself an appreciation of what it means to lodge in the house of Being.

b. THOUGHT AND POETRY — That there is a fundamental similarity between the function of thought as described here and the poetic moment is obvious. The poet, as well as the thinker, is a watchman over the house of Being. Hence the old problem: what is the relation between thought and poetry? Perhaps the following will help. We know from WM: Ep that "... the thinker utters Being. The poet names the Holy. . . ." and we raised the question: how distinguish between Being and the Holy? The present essay does not answer the question, but we are told at least that Being, imparting itself to man, declares itself through poetry but remains hidden as such, sc. as Being. If the poet "names the Holy," may we infer that the Holy designates Being in its positivity, while Being as such comports both positivity and negativity, revealment and concealment in the coming-to-pass of ἄλλημα? That would explain, perhaps, why "... the essence of the Holy can be thought only in terms of the

---

47 "... Dieses Ankommende bringt das ek-sistierende Denken seinerseits in seinem Sagen zur Sprache. . . ." (HB, p. 116). Observe affinity between There-being's lodging (Behausung) in the house of Being and becoming "at home" in the homeland (heimisch, Be-hausung), in near-ness to the Source. See also HB, p. 112 (baut).

48 "... Das Denken achtet auf die Lichtung des Seins, indem es sein Sagen vom Sein in die Sprache als der Behausung der Eksistens einlegt. . . ." (HB, p. 115). Hence the force of the phrase "to bring into language" (HB, p. 116; VA, p. 228).

49 HB, pp. 53 (läßt sich), 60 (wenig oder selten), 61 (Kostbarkeit seines Wesens).

50 HB, p. 53 (Wächter).

51 "... Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige. . . ." (WM, p. 51).
truth of Being. . . ." 52 Thus the poet’s task would be to give a name to Being in its positivity (as the Holy), the thinker’s to comprehend that Being is negativated as well and is, therefore, the coming-to-pass of ἀ-ὑπόθεσις.

3. Thought and History

The thinking of Being thinks Being as it imparts itself in mittence. Since the plurality of mittences constitute inter-mittence (history), to think Being in and as mittence is to think historically. "... That is why thought which thinks upon the truth of Being is as thought historical. . . ." 53

The word "historical," however, has a double sense. Thought is historical simply if the mittence of Being, itself the origin of history, is formulated into words. "... The history [of the mittence of Being] comes into language through the words of the foundational thinker. . . ." 54 But it is also retained in words and can be re-treived there. This re-treiving of thought which thinks upon the mittence of Being as already cast into words of previous thinkers is another reason for calling thought "historical." Both these senses are complementary, however, and manifest the same structure in the coming-to-pass of non-concealment: Being comes (future) to the thinker as having-been-already in what is (past) and is rendered manifest (present) through the articulation of words. The fundamental structure of thought, consequently, is that of re-collection: "... Insofar as thought is, it is the re-collection of Being and nothing else. . . ." 55 But a re-collection of this type is the process by which Being becomes manifest, sc. by which it is itself as the process of ἀ-ὑπόθεσις. That is why we may say that at the same time that thought, as bringing to a culmination the There, is com-mitted (thrown-

54 "... Dessen Geschichte kommt im Wort der wesentlichen Denker zur Sprache. . . ." (HB, p. 81). Hence, history in the West took its origin when the Being of beings became thought-worthy. See VA, p. 227.
forth) by Being, "... Being is as the mitte of thought. ..." 58

All foundational thinkers are engaged in the identical task, even though they accomplish it differently. That is why "progress" in foundational thought is impossible. "... If we heed the essence of philosophy, it makes no progress at all. It remains in place, in order always to think [that which remains] identical. ..." 57 To discern the identity of theme amid diversity of expression, however, we must yield to the necessity of following these thinkers in thought. If we do so, we soon discover that the divergences among them arise from the intrinsically contentious character of Being itself, which discloses itself to each of them in negatived fashion. Hence, their mutual disputes help one another to comprehend the disclosure of Being that is imparted to each of them and to respond (each in his own way) to the mitte thus comprehended. But if this is the case, we can see immediately that it is impossible to refute a genuine thinker, provided that thought remain historical. All that we can do is accept him for what he is by removing the truth to which he gives expression from the realm of merely human opinion and by comprehending it as the (negatived) truth of Being itself. "... All refutation in the field of foundational thinking is absurd. ..." 58

We touch here a delicate point. Does not thought of this kind become a complete relativism? Heidegger recognizes the difficulty himself, and his answer is that relativism makes sense only on terms of the subject-object polarity, where the truth of the object is considered as "relative" to the knowing subject. Once we pass beyond the subject-object relationship, "relativism"
has no meaning. If relativism be understood thus, certainly Heidegger is no relativist.

But if he is not a "relativist," is he therefore an "absolutist"? Does he admit an "absolute" truth? The matter is difficult, and conventional terminology is laden with overtones. If "absolute" be taken to mean "eternal," and if this be understood in the sense of "praeter-historical," certainly not, for Heidegger's Being is essentially a history. But if "absolute" may be understood simply as equivalent to "constant," then the problem of "absolute" truth rejoins the problem of unity in Being-as-history. Here the author's position is quite clear – or at least quite explicit. We must distinguish ontic and ontological history. If we consider history in the ontic dimension, we have no right, as long as we restrict ourselves to Heidegger's perspectives, to speak of a "continuity" between one epoch and another, for the mittence in each is different. "... The epochs never permit themselves to be derived one from another and, indeed, reduced to the sequence of a consecutive process. ..." If we consider history in its ontological dimension, however, there is undeniably a simplicity and a constancy that pervades every epoch:

... But it does not run between the epochs, like a cord connecting them. Rather, the tradition comes each time out of the concealment of mittence, just as different rills arise from a [single] Source [and] feed a stream that is everywhere and nowhere.

Is it possible to speak of this truth of Being-as-source in itself and as such as (although historical yet) "absolute" truth? For the present, we must leave the matter open.

However all this may be, it is only by an historical thinking such as we have described that we can overcome the nihilism of the times, which consists in the forgottenness of Being. One form of this nihilism is Marx's dialectical materialism. Marx's experience of the alienation of man explores an essential dimension

80 VA, p. 26: (Relativismus). See pp. 258–261, where the problem is posed with regard to the various interpretations of Heraclitus' thought by the great thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Clement of Alexandria, Hegel, etc.).
81 "... Die Epochen lassen sich nie auseinander ableiten und gar auf die Bahn eines durchlaufenden Prozesses schlagen...." (SG, p. 154).
82 "... Aber sie verläuft nicht zwischen den Epochen wie ein Band, das sie verküpf, sondern die Überlieferung kommt jedesmal aus dem Verborgenen des Geschickes, so wie aus einem Quell verschiedene Rinnale entspringen, die einen Strom nähren, der überall ist und nirgends." (SG, p. 154).
of the history of Being. Now if we take Husserl or Sartre as representing prevailing types of contemporary thinking, then since neither one nor the other (apparently) comprehends this essentially historical character of Being, neither (Husserlian) phenomenology nor (Sartrean) existentialism – this, at least, is the way Heidegger sees it – can offer us ground for a fruitful dialogue with Marxism. This can be had only through a historical thought, sc. one which comprehends Marx in terms of the mitten of Being (of Being-as-history).\(^62\)

But we must be sure to understand what it means to comprehend such phenomena as Marxism, Hegelianism, the essence-existence tradition, etc. as a mitten of Being. It means not only that we interrogate these movements as the disclosure of Being in its negativity; it means as well that we pose the question why precisely this question was never posed before, and why it could not be posed before.\(^63\) We already have an intimation of the direction in which Heidegger thinks the answer is to be found. The negativity of Being is such that it is not only negated in any single disclosure, but it conceals this negativity and even conceals the concealment. To interrogate Being in this compound negativity is to think Being in its mystery. Such thought meditates the forgottenness of Being as the forgottenness of Being and by this very fact overcomes it. It is thus that we overcome metaphysics and thereby lay the groundwork for it.

4. The Rigor of Thought

The thinking of Being, since non-ontic, is necessarily non-logical. The fact remains, however, that for the natural way of looking at things, it is only by the rules of logic that we have a guarantee against sheer arbitrariness in thought. Heidegger must face squarely a double question: since logic defines the laws of human reason (\textit{ratio}), is not a non-logical thought necessarily ir-rational and therefore the plaything of caprice? if not, then how explain rigor in thought which refuses to have logic for its canon?

\footnote{\textit{HB}, p. 87.}

\footnote{See \textit{HB}, p. 73. Heidegger later gives us specimens of this himself, v.g. with regard to the problem of ground (SG), and with regard to the problem of technicity ("Die Frage nach der Technik," VA, pp. 13-44).}
With the author's answer to the first question we have already some familiarity, and the present essay crystallizes his attitude nicely. The thinking of Being is non-logical, but this means only that it is pre-logical (pre-rational). If someone is to be charged with irrationalism, he retorts, should it not rather be they who, in the name of logic, refuse to meditate λόγος insofar as it is the ground of reason and therefore the foundation of logic? 64

The second question is more serious. Pre-logical thought, however, is by no means law-less, nor is it wanting in respect even for the laws of logic. All that Heidegger insists upon is that prior to the laws of logic (or, for that matter, of ethics) there is a law of Being which first intimates to man the pattern of arrangement that subsequently can be transformed into the laws of human thought and activity. If this were not so, then all laws would be "... the fabrication of human reason. More essential than all prescriptions of rules is for man to discover that he sojourns in the truth of Being. ..." 65 By reason of this sojourn, the first law of thought is the law of Being, "... not the rules of logic, which only by reason of the law of Being can become rules [at all]. ..." 66

What is the law of Being that is the "first law" of thought? For Heidegger, it is the historical character of ἀληθεία. This means: from the point of view of Being, that Being imparts itself to man by mitente; from the point of view of thought, that the There responds by re-collection. But how explain the rigor of such a law? By the fact that thought, if it is to be true to itself, must be bound only by Being in continual advent toward thought. It must persevere in docility to this continual arrival. It is thus that thought responds to Being's appeal, yields to Being's demands upon it:

... Thinking in its essence as the thinking of Being is requisitioned by [Being]. Thinking is referred to Being as that which is in a continual state of arrival (l'aventant). Thinking, as thinking upon the arrival of Being, is bound by Being [understood] as arrival. ... 67

64 HB, pp. 98–99 (Einwände zurückgeben). See pp. 95–98 (Logik).
66 "... nicht die Regeln der Logik, die erst aus dem Gesetz des Seins zu Regeln werden können...." (HB, p. 118).
67 "... Das Denken ist in seinem Wesen als Denken des Seins von diesem in den Anspruch genommen. Das Denken ist auf das Sein als das Ankommende (l'aventant) bezogen. Das Denken ist als Denken in die Ankunft des Seins, in das Sein als die Ankunft gebunden...." (HB, p. 117).
This is how “... thought, insofar as through historical re-collection it heeds the mittence of Being, has bound itself already to the [historical movement] that is proper to mittence. ...” 68 It is because thought is ad-ventive that it is an enduring “ad-venture” (aventure).

The ad-venture of thought is saved from mere venture-someness (aventuribre), if there is a total fidelity to Being as this is imparted to thought. (We answer here Beaufret’s third question). And this fidelity itself must complete the historical process, insofar as the thinker, responding to the ad-vent (future) of Being as having been in what already is (past), renders it present in his own language. “... [The rigor of thought] repose therein, that [its] utterance remains pure in the element of Being and lets the simplicity of [Being] in its manifold dimensions have its way. ...” 69 In the concrete, this fidelity to Being demands that the thinker pay strict heed to what he must utter and how he must utter it. More precisely, it requires that he reflect upon whether or not Being may be brought to expression on any given occasion, and if so, then to what extent and in what moment of the history of Being this may be done. Briefly, it means “... rigor in reflection, meticulousness in expression, economy in words.” 70

Such is Heidegger’s answer to Beaufret. But the difficulty is a major one and the author returns to it again in 1950 in the form of a letter to another student who had asked about the “warrant” for foundational thought. We introduce the letter here for the sake of an integral exposition. 71 Since thought is bound by the mittence of Being to which it responds, Being itself is the warrant of this thought; besides this, thought has

---


71 “[Das Ding:] Nachwort. Ein Brief an einen jungen Studenten,” VA, pp. 172–185. “Warrant” translates Weisung. Here the formula for thought is “responding to the appeal” of Being (dem Anspruch seines Wesens entsprechen), where “appeal” signifies Being-as-mittence. Hence, the conception is effectively identical with that of HB.
no credentials. But does it really need any? Who ever asks Plato by what "warrant" he thinks Being as ἡσσα, or Kant by what "warrant" he calls Being a position (Gesetzeit) or the transcendental dimension of objectivity? Their "warrant" consists simply in their docility to the mittence of Being. Is not foundational thought as such, hence Heidegger’s exposition of it in particular, entitled to the same prerogatives? 72

If ligation to Being accounts for the stringency of thought, however, it explains its frailty, too. The more thought binds itself to Being, the more it submits to its negativity, hence the more surely it risks falling prey to errance. That is why "... the possibility of going astray in this type of thinking is very great. ..." 73 This can be understood from two points of view: the appeal comes from Being-as-errance, hence a response to such an appeal also goes astray; the responding achieves the negatived There of negatived Being and by reason of its own negativity is prone to lose its way. From both points of view, thought cannot escape the danger of errance, can never pretend to be in its own right a way of salvation (Heilsweg).

Foundational thought, then, for all its excellence, is always an indigent thing. And for that reason, it never can be anything more than tentative. If the "pathway" of this thought demands complete surrender to Being, then included in the renunciation is the pretence of being a "doctrine" in its own right, whose affirmations are binding on all. No, foundational thinking is not a doctrine to be taught; it is an experience to be made — an experience that each must make for himself. Because the experience is so hazardous, we have no choice but inexorably and without respite to prove the fidelity of our own attent-iveness to Being’s appeal. Hence the need for ever renewed watchfulness. "Everything here is the way of attent-ive responding that [continually] puts [itself] to the proof. ..." 74

72 VA, p. 184 (Ausweiskarte, Platon, Kant).
HB is a culminating point. (Relatively) simple in style, the essay is, among the author’s significant works, by far the most readable, yet distills all of the major theses of Heidegger II, resuming at the same time the most characteristic features of Heidegger I. Here we see clearly that the existential analysis of SZ was the first step toward grounding metaphysics by trying to discern that structure in man which most profoundly characterizes him as man, his relationship to Being. Since the humanisms of the tradition are intrinsically correlative with the metaphysics that is thus surpassed, the conception of man as existence is in effect the surpassing of humanism, but inasmuch as it discerns man’s true value, is it not by that very fact a humanism of a higher kind? Whether or not the word be retained is a matter of indifference.

In any case, man’s relationship to Being appears more clearly now as originally the relation of Being (Αὐτός) to man, relation by which Being throws out its There among beings. The throwing, as such, constitutes an appeal to the There to help ἐλεύθερος come-to-pass. When the There yields to this appeal in re-solve, that is the coming-to-pass of thought, and since the There is the There of Αὐτός, thought is also the achievement of authentic language.
CHAPTER XIII

INTERLUDE

I. From the Experience of Thought

The way is long. Let us rest a while. We deal now with two minor pieces that have, to be sure, their value, but give us a chance to relax. The first bears the title "From the Experience of Thought." 1 It is a series of epigrams, poetic in style, and, dating from 1947, adopts a curious format: the left-hand side of the page carries a single line of nature-description (sample: "When the early morning light grows silently over the mountains . . .") 2 and the right side four epigrams. One finds it difficult to see a connection between individual lines of description and the corresponding epigrammatic groups, so it seems that one must seek a significance in the structure of the whole.

It is not at all impossible that these pages resume the author’s reflections upon the experience of Being (Akt), made, presumably, in the mountain haunts of Todtnauberg which he knows so well. By reason of the poetic description, we have some knowledge of the beings about him through which Being came. The descriptive portions, then, would be an effort to bring these beings into words and thus pre-empt the poet’s rôle. The reflective portions seem to meditate the sense of what he is doing and express it in words. Here he is more the thinker. Does this give us any light upon the relation of poet to thinker? At least it adds another aspect of the problem to consider. We polarize our remarks around: A. Being, B. Thought, C. Language.

2 "Wenn das frühe Morgenlicht still über den Bergen wächst . . ." (ED, p. 6).
FROM BEING TO THERE—THE RE-TRIEVE OF THOUGHT

A. BEING

Being (Sein) in the present pages is uniformly used with an antiquated spelling (Seyn), which we render by an equally antiquated English form that comes from the Anglo-Saxon: Beon. In the text itself, there is no indication of the significance of the new spelling, but two years later (1949) in a note added to the second edition of WW, we are told that the new form designates the "difference that holds sway between Being and beings," sc. the ontological difference as such as it emerges out of the process of \( \Delta \lambda \Sigma \delta \varepsilon \sigma \). We infer that such is the sense here and take it to be significant that now for the first time the ontological difference as such is thematized throughout a whole essay, even if a minor one.

What are we told about Beon? It is a process of light. It is aboriginal Utterance, yet never "is" itself as a being, hence never can be expressed adequately in the ontic dimension of human language and remains for this reason necessarily unsaid. It shines forth in beings with utter simplicity. It is the One, the Only that is worthy of thought, and retains primacy over thought, giving rise to it, inciting it, gathering (is it not \( \Delta \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \zeta \)?) thought into a unity within itself. There is nothing new here beyond a new name: Beon now goes by the name of "the most ancient of all that is ancient."  

B. THOUGHT

Genuine thought has but one task: to think Beon, which, like a star in the firmament, remains constant as the concern of man. In order to accomplish thought, we must take a step-in-reverse from the normal preoccupations of philosophy, as long as philosophy is a presentational thought, and learn to discern the difference between a being conceived as an object of presentation and as that through which Being comes to thought. What is the structure of thought? It is tri-dimensional, for

---

3 WW, p. 26 (den waltenden Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem).  
4 ED, pp. 7 (Licht), 21 (das Gesprochene, in keiner Sprache das Gesagte), 13 (Die Pracht des Schlichten), 7 (auf einen Stern, einen Gedanken), 13 (Ermuterung), 17 (versammelt), 75 (das Älteste des Alten).  
5 ED, pp. 7 (Stern im Himmel), 9 (Gegenstand, gedachte Sache).
in its essence it is re-collection. Thought implies the dimension of past, for it is a thinking upon what-is-as-having-been, sc. beings, which here seem to be the things of nature. Thought implies the dimension of future, for "in our thought [Beon] comes from behind us and nonetheless toward us. That is why thought deals with the [continued] arrival of what-has-been, and is re-collection." 6 Thought implies the dimension of present, for it renders Beon manifest in language. When thought responds to the intimations of Beon, "... there flourishes the language [proper to] mittence." 7

Since Beon keeps coming to authentic thought, the very heart of thought is imparted to it by Beon itself, in fact is but the resounding of Beon in man. That is why "we never come upon thoughts. They come to us." 8 We have a good example for this in the case of genuine dialogue. Here it is not so much a question of two partners accepting or rejecting what each other says as a joint effort to attend steadfastly to Beon in continual advent to both.9

In any case, man’s task is simply to remain docile to Beon in advent. This docility can be expressed in terms of the metaphor of sight, as if we saw before our eyes the Being-dimension of beings, and also by the metaphor of hearing, as if we heard within our hearts the word of aboriginal Utterance. There is, of course, an appropriate attunement. At one point, this seems to be a wonderment before the fact that thought takes place at all. At another point, it seems to be sorrow and even pain. For want of further elucidation, we understand this latter specimen of attunement in the sense of the Hölderlin interpretations, where sorrow is the negativity of joy, sc. the disposition of the poet responding to the Joyous, insofar as this holds itself in re-serve. This makes it clear, however, that the mittence of Beon with which we are dealing is profoundly negatived.10

6 "Das Älteste des Alten kommt in unserem Denken hinter uns her und doch auf uns zu. Darum hält sich das Denken an die Ankunft des Gewesenen und ist Andenken." (ED, p. 19). See p. 17 (jeglich Ding).
7 "... dann gedeiht die Sprache des Geschicks." (ED, p. 9).
9 ED, p. 17 (geselligen Besinnung).
10 ED, pp. 9 (vor Augen, Gehör), 21 (Erstaunen), 13 (Traurigkeit, Schmerz).
Not only is Beon negatived, but there is, of course, a correlative negativity in thought, for, because of this reserve of Beon, thought is powerless to bring into words the totality of the aboriginal Utterance. For thought to comprehend this impotence is to recognize Beon in its negativity, sc. as mystery. But Beon is more than mystery, it is errance as well. To acquiesce to Beon as negatived, then, thought must accept the inevitability of errance. "Who thinks in the grand manner must in the grand manner wander in errance."

This negativity, however, must be understood not only as consequent upon the re-serve of Beon but as characteristic of thought as such. That is why thought is prey to a triple danger, and it would be quite congruous with the text if we understood this triple danger as indicating the innate "fallen" character of thought. The first danger is the proximity of the poet. We understand this to mean that, because of the intimate connection between thought and language, there is danger that the thinker forget his task as a thinker and play the part of a poet. It is very nice to be told this, but would it not be helpful if the precise distinction between thought and poetry were first made clear? One wonders, too, if in the work we are considering Heidegger himself escapes the danger of what he describes. It is a "good and salutary" danger, after all.

The second danger is thought itself, for if it is to be authentic, it must think "against itself." We are left to our own resources here to interpret this. It seems plausible, however, to understand it as meaning that thought contains within itself a drag towards presentative thinking, born of the fact that, while comprehending Beon, thought must deal always with beings within which Beon withdraws. In order to think Beon, thought must deal always with beings, and therefore it must struggle against this tendency inscribed in its nature, therefore think against itself.

The third danger consists in philosophizing. We understand this to mean that philosophy, insofar as it is characterized by presentative thought and evolves into metaphysics, represents

---

18 ED, p. 15 (gute, heilsame).
19 ED, p. 15 (gegen sich selbst denken).
a forgetfulness of Beon. This is all the more insidious because a
philosophizing of this sort, in thinking beings as such, pretends
to be thinking Beon, whereas, totally oblivious to the ambi-
valence of $\mathfrak{S}$, it fails to recognize the ontological difference as
such.\footnote{ED, p. 15 (schlechte, Philosophieren).}

Briefly, the heart of thought is imparted to it by Beon in all
its negativity; therefore it is a negativized thought. The epi-
grams give us no clear warrant for saying that thought is to be
conceived as re-solve. And yet we are told that "as soon as we
have become at home in the origin of thought, then we may
venture to take the step-in-reverse from philosophy into the
thinking of Beon." \footnote{"Den Schritt zurück aus der Philosophie in das Denken des Seyns dürfen wir
wagen, sobald wir in der Herkunft des Denkens heimisch geworden sind." (ED, p. 19).}
If we may eliminate from "as soon as" any
suggestion of ontic succession, then recognizing thought in its
origins would be simply the indispensable condition for thinking
Beon. To become "at home" in the origin of thought may be
understood as recognizing and acquiescing in thought as the
(negativized) thinking of Beon in its negativity. We might in-
terpret this to mean the attaining of authenticity, hence im-
licitly re-solve.

Perhaps we are forcing the matter, however. There is another
suggestion of a more indirect nature that is perhaps more con-
vincing, when we are told what it means for man to grow old.
Beon has just been called the "most ancient of all that is
ancient," and for man to become old presumably means to grow
ancient with and in the ancient. May we not understand this in
the sense of achieving one's fullness as the There of Beon, of not
only arriving at but maintaining one's authenticity? If this is
permissible, then to grow old means that, once the propitious
time has come and authenticity has been attained, the thinker
must persevere in such thought. This means that he must con-
tinue to abide in that precise domain where thought, uniquely
proper to the way he has followed, has its origin.\footnote{ED, p. 19. Free paraphrase of: "Alt sein heißt: rechtzeitig dort innehalten, wo
der einzige Gedanke eines Denkweges in sein Gefüge eingeschwungen ist."}
C. LANGUAGE

We know already that when thought responds to the advent of Beon (Δόγος) "... there flourishes the language [proper to] mittence." 17 Now the author calls the bringing of Beon into language the process of original poetizing. It is the "topology of Beon." It is the function of man to accomplish this task, and from the very first moment that he exists the process already has begun. 18

But it is important to note that we must distinguish clearly between "original poetizing," as it is understood here, and the poetic song that poets write and which we usually call poetry or, as we have been saying hitherto, "poesy." Clearly for Heidegger the poesy of poets and the thought of thinkers are to be distinguished, yet their unity is unquestionable, and it derives from the fact that they both stem from a single root: original poetizing. Since this common root itself derives all its vitality from Beon, both poesy and thought stem ultimately from Beon itself. 19 Thought, then, deriving from original poetizing, has a poetizing character all its own. If it has remained hidden up to now, the reason presumably is that we cannot appreciate it until we have learned to comprehend the genuine nature of language, sc. Beon as the process of Δόγος.

RÉSUMÉ

In HB, Heidegger thought Being without naming the ontological difference as such. Now it is named as such. With this nuance, the present little work recalls in lapidary fashion the perspectives already seen.

II. The Pathway

Belonging to the same genre as the piece we have just seen, "The Pathway" was composed to help the author's townspeople of Messkirch commemorate (1949) the one hundredth anniversary...
ry of composer Conrad Kreutzer's death. The setting is obviously Messkirch itself. The contents may be quickly resumed. There is a path that begins at the courtyard gate, leads through rolling meadows and woods down to the moorland and back. It is rich with memories for the thinker. In the woods as a boy his father would fell the trees for wood, and out of the shaven bark the lad would fashion toy boats to sail on make-believe journeys, long before he knew what it meant to embark on a voyage that would leave all familiar shores behind. One oak-tree in particular brings pause. It stands beside a rough-hewn bench, where, grown into a young philosopher, he would read and ponder great thinkers of the past, then leave them aside to stroll along the path and find there addressed to him a comprehension that philosophy texts could not give.

How understand this strange appeal of the pathway? Wherever the path leads, whatever it passes along the way, its appeal is always the one— the appeal of something wondrously simple that permeates all. This "Simple" we understand, of course, to be Being, probably in the sense of Beon. "The Pathway," then, is another description, prose-poetic in form, of the experience of Being. We examine it in greater detail for what it suggests with regard to: A. Being, B. Thought.

A. BEING

Being is the "Simple." We know from "Αὐτό" that this is to be understood as the "One." It holds sway with a gentle insistence that is at once an inexhaustible strength. It is the unspoken language of beings (Unausgesprochene ihrer Sprache). It advances unto man without benefit of any mediation other then itself, yet it must prevail for a long time before man learns to discern it. It never appears as itself, but it is precisely by a hidden efficacy that it bestows its benediction upon man.21

When the Simple makes its appeal, who is it that really speaks? Is it the soul, the world, God? Notice that these are the three types of beings which classical metaphysics studies, hence

21 FW, pp. 5 (sanften Gewalt), 7 (unerschöpfliche Kraft), 4 (Unausgesprochene ihrer Sprache, unvermittelt, langes Gedeihen, verbirgt).
the question seems to mean: is the Simple that appeals to man on the pathway some being with which metaphysics can deal? The question receives no answer. The author continues: "Everything speaks of abandonment to the [Simple which abides]..." 22 We take this to mean: that what addresses man on the pathway is not some being but Being; that beings (Ilavra) only convey to him the appeal proceeding from "Ev; that this appeal solicits man to abandon himself to Being, sc. the Simple, the One.

One point is worth underlining. Among the beings through which Being advances and makes its appeal to man is the old familiar oak. It has learned the secret of long, slow growth and is imagined to reveal the secret in saying: "... growing means this: to open oneself up to the breadth of heaven and to sink one's roots into the darkness of earth..." 23 Since presumably growing is a manner in which Being comes-to-presence in a tree, we interpret this to mean that there is a certain bi-valence in the process of Being as it comes-to-presence in things of common experience, and it permits us to speak of the Simple in terms of both heaven and earth. We shall soon see the importance of this remark.

B. THOUGHT

Being, however, needs its There, and the appeal of the Simple, the One, is uttered only so long as man, endowed with a unique affinity to it, is able to attend to this appeal. This affinity with the Simple is of such a nature that man, too, shares in the ambivalence that we have just noted, and it is only thus that he is able to let be the beings that he encounters. 24

To attend to the appeal of Beon (the Simple), addressed to man along the pathway, man must overcome the ravages of technicity which distract him, dull his ear to the appeal, make the wondrously Simple seem to be merely a dull uniformity. To rouse man from the fallen condition of technicity, the appeal of Being itself awakens in him a yearning for genuine freedom.

22 "Alles spricht den Verzicht in das Selbe..." (FW, p. 7).
23 "... daß wachsen heißt: der Weite des Himmels sich öffnen und zugleich in das Dunkel der Erde wurzeln;..." (FW, p. 3).
24 FW, pp. 4 (in Luft geboren, hören), 3 (gleich recht beides).
This is the call to foresake the fascinations of technicity and abandon himself to Beon. This self-abandonment does not impoverish man. On the contrary, it is an enrichment, for by reason of it all of the inexhaustible strength of Being becomes abidingly man's own, and he walks along the path attuned with a gladsomeness that Being itself imparts.  

Résumé

"The Pathway" may be taken to symbolize the way of thought itself, where man's task is to abandon himself to the appeal of bi-valent Beon, addressed to him through beings, which he encounters along the way. A pleasant divertimento.

---

85 FW, pp. 4–5 (einförmi, überdrüssi), 5 (Sinn, der das Freie liebt), 7 (Verzicht, nimmt nicht, gibt, unschöpfliche Kraft), 5 (wissende Heiterkeit).
Six years had passed since the fourth edition of WM (1943) had given in the Epilogue the first full sketch of foundational thought as the process of overcoming metaphysics. The passage of time brought demand for a fifth edition, and this offered another significant improvement in the form of an Introduction, which dealt with the nature of metaphysics that was to be overcome. What specifically does it tell us? In general terms, we may say that it not only tries to explain once more the meaning of metaphysics and the means of overcoming it but also reviews the bold lines of SZ, in order to emphasize the fact that this first work, and by implication WM, which, all commentators agree, profoundly concords with it, was uniquely concerned with this problem. The first of these themes served as the basis for the introductory chapter to this study. The second, along with whatever oblique references are made to thought, we incorporated into the study of HB. There remains, then, practically nothing left to say.

And yet, we are not dispensed from a very important remark. For, concomitantly with the Introduction, the author made a change in the Epilogue. Now it is one of the inalienable rights of man that an author may emend his text. But what was the emendation? The original (1943) reading was "... Being indeed comes-to-presence without beings..." Now it reads "... Being never comes-to-presence without beings..." Is this not a complete reversal? And, indeed, on an essential point? And the

1 "Einleitung," WM, pp. 7-23.
unkindest cut of all is that the change is made without so much as a word to call attention to it, much less to explain it. We must probe the mystery.

A. THE CASE OF THE ALTERED EPILOGUE

We have already suggested in what sense the first text may be understood, sc. that it insists on the primacy of the Being-process in the emergence of beings, therefore names the ontological difference, but not as such. The second text insists on the fact that although Being must be thought for itself in order to comprehend the ontological difference, it can never be by itself. Hence, if it is true to say that beings cannot be without Being, the reverse is also true: Being cannot be without beings. This names the ontological difference as such.

Since the alteration is made concomitantly with the publication of the Introduction, the question must now be posed whether or not there is reason to maintain that, independently of change, the focus of Heidegger at this time is on the ontological difference as such. We find two indications interior to the Introduction and two exterior to it that lead us to say “yes.”

In the closing paragraphs of the Introduction, we read:

Which remains more of a riddle, the fact that beings are or that Being is? Or does even such a reflection as this still fail to bring us [genuinely] close to the riddle that with the Being of beings has come-to-pass? 2

It seems quite clear that Heidegger here is thinking Being and beings in terms of their mutual dependence on each other, therefore the ontological difference as such.

In the development of the metaphor of metaphysics as the roots of the philosophy tree but Being as the element, or ground, in which these roots are sunk, we are told that “... the ground is ground for the roots...,” 3 and again: “... presumably the element is not an element, unless the roots are woven through it.” 4 We take this to mean that Being is not Being unless there

3 “... Der Grund ist Grund für die Wurzel;...” (WM, p. 8).
4 “... Vermutlich ist also auch das Element nicht das Element, ohne daß die Wurzel es durchwebt.” (WM, p. 8).
be a mittence unto beings, which, in the matter under discussion, takes the form of metaphysics. This concurs completely with the altered Epilogue.

There are two other important texts that appear in 1949, and we introduce them as external evidence. With the third edition of WG there is added a succinct but luminous Prologue, and the second edition of WW adds a new first paragraph to its concluding note. Both deal explicitly with the ontological difference as such.

The Prologue to WG reminds us of the intimate affinity between WM and WG. The first deals with the question of Non-being, the latter with the ontological difference. But if Non-being in WM simply formulates the “not” which characterizes Being when it is experienced from the viewpoint of beings, the ontological difference of WG, too, is the “not” which separates beings and Being. Now this “not” that is intrinsic to Non-being and the “not” which constitutes the ontological difference are but one, not in the sense of a logical identity but in the sense that “... in the coming-to-presence of the Being of beings, both are correlative. ...” In neither case, then, is the “not” a mere \textit{ens rationis}; it is inscribed in the process of Being itself. This is what we have been calling all along the “negativity” of Being. “... This one [‘not’].” Heidegger continues, “is the [one problem] worthy of thought that both essays, purposely kept distinct, try to pose for meditation, without being up to the task.” We infer: that the one problem common to both WM and WG was Being as permeated with negativity; that the reason why neither essay was up to the task of thinking it was presumably that both remained, like SZ, locked in the horizon of Heidegger I, where the necessary language to think Being in its truth as such failed.

The additional note in WW takes the matter further still. It offers us the famous text, whose content is to be found, however, in the essay itself: “... The question about the essence of truth finds its answer in the phrase: the essence of truth is the truth

\footnote{5 \textquotedblleft... was im Wesenden des Seins des Seienden zusammengehört....	extquotedblright{} (WG, p. 5).}

\footnote{6 \textquotedblleft... Dieses Selbe ist das Denkwürdige, das beide mit Absicht getrennt gehaltenen Schriften einer Besinnung näher zu bringen versuchen, ohne dieser gewachsen zu sein.	extquotedblright{} (WG, p. 5).}
of Essence. . .” 7 We are told once more that the truth of Essence(-ing) is Being in its truth (α-λήθευσι), comporting both positivity and negativity, sc. it is the lighting-up process of beings that conceals itself in these beings, even as (and inasmuch as) it enlightens them. It is at once both a hidden light and a “luminous hiding” within beings. All this is familiar. What is new is that it is by reason precisely of this “luminous hiding” that Being is designated as Beon, and Beon is intended to suggest the “difference that holds sway between Being and beings,” sc. the ontological difference as such. This helps us to see that the entire problematic of revealment-concealment in Being is nothing more than the problem of the “not” which constitutes the ontological difference as such. “. . . Because a luminous hiding [sc. the ‘not’ of the ontological difference] belongs to Beon, Beon shines forth in the light of a concealing withdrawal. The name of this lighting-process is α-λήθευσι.” 8 What better evidence do we need to show how profoundly the Heidegger of 1949 is preoccupied with the ontological difference as such?

Briefly, the formula of 1943 emphasizes the primacy of Being and implies the ontological difference but does not name it as such. The formula of 1949 names it as such. Both have a legitimate sense, and to appreciate the full complexity of Heidegger’s problem, we must think them no doubt together. But the second formula expresses better what the author considers to be, as we see in ID, the insight that is uniquely proper to himself. 9 Did he not have the right, then, to alter the first formula accordingly, when the occasion of the new edition gave him the chance? Of course! If there were reason for criticism, then, this would have to restrict itself to the unannounced manner in which the change was made. But when all is said and done, even this seems to be a matter of taste: how do you take your philosophy? Straight—or with a dash of legerdemain?

8 “... Weil zu ihm lichtendes Bergen gehört, erscheint Seyn anfänglich im Licht des verbergenen Entzugs. Der Name dieser Lichtung ist α-λήθευσι.” (WW, p. 26).
9 ID, p. 43 and passim.
We have spoken much of foundational thinking as something other than the presentative, pro-posing thought characteristic of the metaphysical tradition it is meant to overcome. The form of thought which up to the present the author has most fully developed is the process of re-trive, as applied to the interpretation of other thinkers. We have had hints of a different style of non-presentative thought, such as in the analysis of a work of art (1935) and more recently in “The Pathway” (1949), but no full treatment of this other style in recent years. Now in a public lecture, entitled “The Thing,” before the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts in Munich (1950), Heidegger explores a way to think Being through “things” of common experience.  

As a matter of fact, the author makes his meditation upon “The Thing” in an effort to discern what is meant by the “near-ness” of things. He takes as his starting point the fact that modern means of travel and communication have reduced enormously the distance between man and the things with which he deals. Yet diminished distance need not mean that these things are thereby nearer to man, for no matter how close they come to him physically, they are genuinely near only when they are comprehended in that which renders them near, sc. in their dimension of near-ness as such. He proposes, then, to meditate the things that are near precisely in their dimension of near-ness. This means to meditate them as near, as what they are, sc. to meditate things as things. We know already that, for Heidegger,

near-ness as such is Being itself, which withdraws in the things it makes near. We have here, then, another effort to think Being as such, by pondering things as things.

What, then, is a thing? Heidegger resorts once more to the phenomenological method, which, as far as it goes, is masterful. Let us take as our basic phenomenon an everyday thing like a wine-pitcher. The question: what is this pitcher as a pitcher, the thing-ness of this thing?

In the most general terms, we may say the pitcher is a vessel, a container, that by reason of its bottom and sides can hold a liquid and be held (by its handle) in turn. But what is it in itself? Does it suffice to say that it is an object and let it go at that? Certainly not, if this means that the pitcher is, only insofar as it is presented to a subject. It stands by itself on the table and is, independently of all subjectivizing presentation. No, the thing as thing is more than simply an object.

Well, then, shall we say that the pitcher is something-that-stands-by-itself? Even this is not enough, for it stands by itself only because it first has been fashioned by a potter. This fashioning, or pro-duc-ing, of the pitcher-thing we shall call, in order to remain as close as possible to the German, “com-posing.” Prior to the standing-by-itself-character of the thing, then, is its com-position. Now when we think the thing as thing in terms of the fact that it has been com-posed, we clearly comprehend it as more than merely what has been proposed as an object. This much is gain. But have we broken all the bonds of presentative thought?

By no means. For com-posing is still a “-posing.” The potter “-poses” his material in such a way that at the end of his work the thing stands “before,” or “across” (gegenüber) from, him. For the sake of precision, let us say that insofar as the thing, when finished, stands by itself across from the potter, it is “contra-posed” to him. We intend that this be distinguished from that
which is considered only as op-posed (sc. ob-ject) to a subject, in which case the object, even though it may stand in and by itself, is nevertheless considered only according to that dimension in which it is pro-posed by, to and for the subject. Obviously, the thing, when considered as com-posed, or contra-posed, is immeasurably more than it is when considered merely as op-posed to a subject, but we are still interpreting it in terms of a “-posing.”

Furthermore, this posing that takes place in com-posing depends upon a pro-posing of its own. “... The pitcher [in question] is not a container because it was com-posed, but it had to be com-posed because it is this container.” 4 The question is: what is this pitcher as pitcher, which at one time was to-be-composed, and which by this com-position the potter simply let be itself in clay? Before the potter could approach his task, the pitcher-to-be-composed had manifested its visage to him. The visage of a thing-to-be-composed is its elðoc, ἕκα. The potter “sees” the visage, insofar as the ἕκα is pro-posed before him. Heidegger maintains that Plato, and the whole metaphysical tradition after him, got no further than this. His criticism is that at this point we still have not explained what and how the thing is, where we must understand “is” to mean, in Heidegger’s sense, “emerges-into-presence.” The whole emerging-process he calls the thing’s “essence” (Wesen) but obviously this must be understood as essenc-, or presenc-ing:

However, what [and how] the container, thus offering its visage [to the potter] ... as this pitcher-thing, is can never be experienced, let alone appropriately thought, in terms of the viewing of a visage, sc. the ἕκα. That is why Plato, who pro-posed the presence [of beings] in terms of their offering of a visage, thought the [genuine] essenc-ing of a thing as little as did Aristotle and all subsequent thinkers. . . . 5

4 “... Der Krug ist nicht Gefäß, weil er hergestellt wurde, sondern der Krug mußte hergestellt werden, weil er dieses Gefäß ist.” (VA, p. 166). Writer’s italics.

5 “Was jedoch das so aussehende Gefäß als dieser Krug, was und wie der Krug als dieses Ding ist, läßt sich durch die Hinsicht auf das Aussehen, die ἕκα, niemals erfahren, geschweige denn sachgemäß denken. Darum hat Platon, der die Anwesenheit des Anwesenden vom Aussehen her vorstellt, das Wesen des Dinges so wenig gedacht wie Aristoteles und alle nachkommenden Denker....” (VA, p. 166). Heidegger’s italics. Obviously the problems suggested here are enormous. For Heidegger’s conception of elðoc in Aristotle, and the associated problems of τέλος, ἐντάξεια, μορφή, etc., see v.g. P., pp. 141, 145, 146, 269, 274, 276, 277, 281, 283.
The thing as thing, than, is more than an objectum, more than merely a compositum. Once more, then: what is the thing as thing? From here on, Heidegger leaves the negative part of the analysis and proceeds in his own name. Suppose we pour wine into the pitcher. What happens? Do we pour wine into the bottom and sides? Not exactly. At best we pour it between bottom and sides. It is the emptiness between bottom and sides that contains the wine, thereby making the container to be container. The potter, then, in working the clay, does not fashion, properly speaking, the pitcher. He gives form to the clay, or better, he provides a form for emptiness. "...For [this emptiness], in it and from it he fashions clay into [the proper] configuration. ..." 6 What is the thing-ness of this pitcher-thing? "... The thing-ness of the container by no means rests in the material out of which it is formed but in the emptiness which does the containing." 7

We must interrogate this emptiness. The term "containing" suggests a double moment: a receiving and a retaining. Both these moments, however, are gathered (X6yo?) into one. What gathers them thus into unity? Is it not the ultimate gathering that lets the contain-ing, therefore the contain-er (thing) be? For Heidegger, this ultimate unity must be understood in terms of the functioning of the pitcher. The pitcher’s function is not only to receive and to retain the wine, but to pour it out into a glass. It is precisely at this moment of pouring that the container is gathered into the unity of itself, that the pitcher is what it is. This would be true, even if there were nothing in the pitcher to pour, for the inability-to-pour of a pitcher without wine can be comprehended only in terms of the pouring that the

---

6 "... Für sie, in sie und aus ihr bildet er den Ton ins Gebild...." (VA, p. 167).
7 "... Das Dinghafte des Gefäßes beruht keineswegs im Stoff, daraus es besteht, sondern in der Leere, die faßt." (VA, p. 167). Compare Heidegger’s conception of Leere with the following passage from Laotse (Elfter Spruch): "Dreißig Speichen umgeben die Nabe; doch erst die Leere zwischen ihnen macht das Wesen des Rades aus. Aus Ton formt man Gefäße; doch erst die Leere in ihnen macht das Wesen des Gefäßes aus. Aus Wänden, in die man Fenster und Türen bricht, entsteht das Haus; doch erst die Leere innerhalb der Wände macht das Wesen des Hauses aus. Darum: was man handhaben kann bestimmt das Aussehen; was man nicht handhaben kann die Wesenheit." (Laotse, Der Anschluß an das Gesetz oder der Große Anschluß, Versuch einer Wiedergabe des Taoteking von Carl Dallago, 3rd ed. [Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1953], p. 16).
pitcher otherwise would do, and is profoundly different from
the inability-to-pour, say, of a hammer or a scythe. 8

The next step, of course, is to interrogate the “pouring” of the
pitcher, but at this crucial moment the rigor of the analysis
seems to disappear. The pouring is seen to imply a four-fold
polyvalence (Ge-viert), that itself is gathered into original Sim-

plicity and One-ness. 9 We shall examine the problem shortly.
For the moment, it suffices to see: that the pouring gathers-
together this pitcher-thing as thing; that the power of pouring
to gather-together derives from a still more original gathering-
power that springs from the polyvalent One; that “... this
manifold [yet] simple gathering is what comes-to-presence in
the pitcher...” and as the pitcher, sc. is the Being of the pitcher,
the “thing-ing of the thing”; 10 that (to return to the beginning),
since near-ness comes to us only in that which is near, near-ness
consists in nothing else than the Being of things: “... Near-ness
in all its power draws near to us as the thing-ing of things.” 11

A. BEING

1. The Quadrate

When Heidegger speaks of the Being of things as essentially
a gathering-process, we understand Being in the sense of άγάθος,
which, of course, is to be understood as the original One. The
puzzling part of the essay, however, lies in the fact that Heideg-
ger sees in this One a four-fold polyvalence. What does he mean
by Being as the Quadrate? The theme of our research is not
Being but thought, so we do not feel obliged to solve the problem
(if it can be solved). The purpose of our present remarks is
simply to see it clearly as a problem.

8 VA, p. 170 (Nehmen, Einbehalten, Geschenk). We translate Geschenk as “pouring
out,” intending to suggest thereby the connotation of gift, effusion, bounty, etc.
that Heidegger certainly means to imply.
9 VA, pp. 170-172, 176-177.
10 “... Dieses vielfältig einfache Versammeln ist das Wesende des Kruges...”
(VA, p. 172). See VA, pp. 172, 176 (Einfall), 170, 172, 176 (versammelt), 172 (Verweilen
des Gevierts), 176 (Dingen des Dingens).
11 “... Nähe waltet im Nähern als das Dingen des Dingens.” (VA, p. 176). The
author offers a short disquisition on the word “thing,” examining the Old German
dicn), Greek (δικι), Latin (rei), mediaeval (rek, Din), modern (Gegenstand) meanings
(VA, pp. 172-175).
What is the Quadrate (Geviert)? The author disengages the notion in meditating the pouring-out of the pitcher. He imagines it to be a wine or water pitcher and considers that this pouring somehow combines four "aspects" of Being, which he calls earth-sky, mortals-gods: earth, for water comes from the springs in the earth, wine from grapes on the vine; sky, for the springs are fed by rain from the sky, wine-grapes nourished by the sun; mortals, for what is poured out may quench man's thirst or warm his heart; gods, for the liquid may be used as a libation to the gods. These four facets of Being are complementary. To think one of them thoroughly is to think them all. They mirror each other, and in this mutual mirroring each is properly itself. 

"... This event of mirroring [each other] liberates each unto its own proper self, yet binds what is thus liberated in the One-ness of their essential mutuality."12

How is all this to be understood? Firstly, let us note that, although this is the first time that we hear of the Quadrate, it is not the first time that such themes appear. "The Pathway" suggested the duality of earth and sky in the coming-to-presence of the oak-tree. The duality of gods and man might have been inferred from the Hölderlin interpretations, where the poet was called a half-god, because he inhabited the domain in-between gods and men.13 But this does not help very much. The essential seems to be that the author here is trying to discern the richness of Being, and since Being, as the One, has been conceived already as the gathering-process of ΑΟΥΓ, the Quadrate seems to disengage those "features" in Being whose mutual mirroring constitutes the collectiveness of Being as such.14

13 FW, p. 3 (Himmel-Erde); HD, p. 98 (Halbgötter).
14 It is worth calling attention to a certain similarity between Heidegger’s Geviert and a conception found in Laotse. (In the following passage, Anschluß translates Tao):

In any case, one curious fact seems worth noting. The “sky” here suggests nothing supra-sensible but is conceived in what another language would call a purely “physical” way. Earth and sky, taken together, then, would suggest the entire “world” of “physical” nature. If we take them thus and think them together with “gods” (clearly designating the entire domain of the divine) and “mortals,” we are reminded of the trilogy that characterized classical metaphysics: God, man, “world.” This is a hierarchy of beings, of course, and we are dealing here clearly with Being. But is it possible that the sense of the Quadrate consists in suggesting that polyvalent plenitude of (the “simple”) “Ev, by reason of which it can come-to-presence in Πάντα, sc. as God, as man and as “world”?

However this may be, Being as the polyvalent One is what Heidegger understands by the World. We see how fully the perspective of SZ, where There-being was the ultimate whereunto of the World, has shifted. In identifying now the World with the One, he insists once more on the fact that the World is not a being which, as far as he is concerned, has to be “grounded” in a cause, but simply comes-to-presence in the same way as Being itself. “… World comes-to-presence [simply] insofar as it worlds. . . .” 15

2. The Negativity of Being

There is a significant passage where the negativity of Being is underlined, and this brings us to the relation of Being to its There. We are told again that Being is equivalent to Non-being, when considered from the viewpoint of beings. This is due to its “not”-character, by reason of which it recedes in the beings it reveals, as, for example, near-ness conceals itself in what is near.16 Another manner in which to express this same “not”-character (negativity) is to speak of the mystery of Being, a term that suggests not only the self-concealment of Being but the concealing of this concealment. Therefore Non-being, mystery (and, as we know from WW, errance) are all different formulae for the inherent negativity of Being.

15 “… Welt west indem sie weltet…” (VA, p. 178).
16 VA, p. 176.
All this has become quite ordinary for us. What is new in the essay is an explicit correlation between the negativity of Being and There-being as Being-unto-death. For Heidegger resorts to the "not" which impregnates Being to explain what he means by the term "mortals" in the Quadrate. That is mortal which can die. But man alone, he says, properly speaking can die (animals simply stop living), for "to die" means to be able to know death as death. What, then, is death as death? "... Death is the shrine of Non-being. ... As the shrine of Non-being, death hides within itself the presenc [-ing] of Being. ..." 17 Man can know death as death, because he can comprehend it as the "shrine of Non-being," where Non-being is not, of course, absolute nothing, but the shrine of Being in its negativity. And why? Because the nature of man as ek-sistence "... is the presenc-ing [of a] relationship to Being as Being." 18 sc. to Being as negatived.

We understand all this in the following way: The negativity of Being is so profound that it negates, sc. limits, every modality of its presenc-ing. Hence the There of Being is necessarily negated, limited. Since the There comes-to-presence in man, the limitation of There is designated in terms of the limitation, or the end-ing, of man, sc. death. Hence, when we say, as in SZ, that There-being is "Being-unto-death," we mean that it is the There of Being whose negativity necessitates that its presenc-ing come to an end which is death. The same law of negativity which dictates that Being be mystery and Non-being dictates that in There and as There it be-unto-death. We might even say that by the There of Being we mean nothing else than Being itself, precisely insofar as it presences unto an end which is death, sc. in man. Since Being cannot presence except in a limited (negatived) way and the limit of the presenc-ing in There is death, then death (limit) is a necessary condition for the presenc-ing we call "There," and there is a legitimate sense in which we may say that death is precisely that point where the There begins to be, that death from the very beginning is immanent in There-being, that There is at every moment dy- (end-) ing. However this may be, death is that "point" where the Being which re-

17 "... Der Tod ist der Schrein des Nichts ... Der Tod birgt als der Schrein des Nichts das Wesende des Seins in sich ..." (VA, p. 177).
18 "... Sie sind das wesende Verhältnis zum Sein als Sein." (VA, p. 177). See VA, p. 151 (leere Nichts).
veals itself in There as There withdraws into hiding. Death, then, is the hiding-place where Being retreats as into a mountain stronghold (Gebirg). "... Death as the shrine of Non-being is the mountain fastness of Being. ..." 19 Notice that in this the only difference from the same problematic in SZ is the difference between Heidegger I and II.

To be able to know death as death is to be able to comprehend Being in its intrinsic negativity. When Heidegger says that "... rational animals must first become mortal," 20 we may understand this to mean that man must come to know death as death, sc. he must pass from a merely metaphysical conception of himself as a rational animal to a comprehension of himself as an ec-static relationship to Being as such, whose negativity dictates that man must die. To comprehend and acquiesce in this ineluctable fact is for man to achieve authenticity. This is freedom-unto-death. It is accomplished in re-solve.

B. THOUGHT

In the present essay, thought is profoundly a re-collection. Once more, we discern the same three dimensions of re-collection as before: the past in this case is Being-as-having-been-in-that-which-already-is, sc. the thing (v.g. pitcher) that we are interrogating; the future is Being (whether as the Simple, as polyvalent One-ness, as Near-ness or as World), inasmuch as it comes to the thinker through things; the present consists in rendering manifest this Being-dimension of things in language.21

By re-collective thinking of this kind, we let the thing be, sc. we let it come-to-presence out of Being, which itself thereby presenc-es in and as the thing. We might say that we thus let Being come "into" the thing. But we do more than that. We let Being come "through" the thing and upon us, so that it is in the thing and as the thing that Being makes its appeal to us. May we say that it is only through things that Being comes upon us? Yes, provided that we understand "things" now as what we

21 VA, pp. 180 (das andenkende Denken, Ankunft, kommen), 168 (Vorschein).
have hitherto called "beings," a broader sense than the analysis of the pitcher would suggest. But what we know of the ontological difference would certainly warrant such an interpretation, and it would give a very satisfying (though not necessarily unique) sense to such a phrase as "... we are - in the strict sense of the word - beings that are conditioned by beings [Be-Dingten]. ..." 22

Be this as it may, thought is a letting things be, and Being is essentially a liberation, a rendering-free. The term "freedom" does not appear, but it is important to see that we are still (1950) dealing with the conception of freedom in terms of letting-be, as suggested by WW (1930). Here the characteristic term is less a rendering-free than a keeping-free, sc. a sheltering, preserving, guarding - we prefer to say "tending to" - the Being-dimension of things. "... When we think things as things, then we tend to the presenc-ing of things in that domain out of which they come-to-presence. ..." 23 Notice that such a process is tantamount to playing watchman, or shepherd, to Being - not, of course, in itself but as it emerges in things. And when the thinker tends to things in the domain of their origin, he himself, by that very fact, dwells in this domain. "... Insofar as we shelter things as things, we dwell in Near-ness...," 24 sc. in the polyvalent One, in Being, in World. At this point, we rejoin, it would seem, the conception developed in the Hölderlin interpretations as "dwelling" near the Source.

But how does man succeed in dwelling by his thought in Being, sc. in letting things come to him as things? "... Not through the machinations of man as victim of technicity, yet not without the watchfulness of man as mortal. ..." 25 We interpret this to mean: that man as slave to technicity endeavors to submit beings to his own disposition in a thought that is

22 "... Wir sind - im strengen Sinne des Wortes - die Be-Dingten...." (VA, p. 179). Obviously there is a play on words here, with the German Idealists, beginning with Kant, as playmates. Note how Be-Dingten here recalls that aspect of There-being's finitude that we called "referential dependence" on beings.

23 "Denken wir das Ding als Ding, dann schonen wir das Wesen des Dinges in den Bereich, aus dem es west..." (VA, p. 179).

24 "... Insofern wir das Ding als das Ding schonen, bewohnen wir die Nähe...." (VA, p. 180).

merely presentative; that man as mortal comprehends the authentic sense of death, hence discerns and acquiesces in his own nature as the ec-static relationship to Being and its negativity; that man in the second sense is he who has achieved authenticity as man, the slave of technicity has not; that it is precisely the achieving of authenticity, sc. the comprehending of Being in its negativity, that constitutes the foundational thinking of things. This achieving of authenticity in Heidegger I was called “re-solve,” but here it is the “step-in-reverse,” by which the thinker retreats from presentative thinking into foundational thought. All of this spins to a fullness in a succinct phrase with which Heidegger closes: “Only as mortal do men succeed at dwelling in the World as World. . . .”

RÉSUMÉ

Being (Λόγος, World, Near-ness) as to-be-thought is here considered as the presenc-ing of polyvalent One-ness. Foundational thought is considered as re-collection upon things, by which mortal man, in full comprehension of his own nature as ek-sistence unto Being-as-negatived, tends to Being as it presences in things. This is the step-in-reverse from presentative thinking unto foundational thought. It is the achievement of re-solve.

26 "Erst die Menschen als die Sterblichen erlangen wohnend die Welt als Welt...." (VA, p. 181). See p. 180 (Schritt zurück).
Several months after "The Thing" (June, 1950), Heidegger delivered the lecture on "Language" (October, 1950), taking Georg Trakl's short lyric, "Winter Evening," as occasion to probe again the now familiar problem.\(^1\)

A. THE ANTECEDENTS

Echoes of "The Thing" are unmistakable: again Being (the One) is conceived as polyvalent plenitude under the guise of the Quadrature, and this in turn as World which lets things be what they are, sc. gives rise to the thinking of things.\(^2\) Likewise, Being is clearly Λόγος. Recalling that Λόγος grants beings repose in and as themselves, we are told now that Language in its origins is a Stillness in which all things find rest.\(^3\)

There are other familiar notes. Recall how in the study on Hölderlin’s "Re-collection" (1943) we saw that the Holy has need of the poet in order to be itself. This recalled the necessity of Being for its There in EM (1935). In another context, we saw in G (1944-45) how Being (Expanse) has want of man's expansion in order that it may come-to-presence, hence ap-propri-
ates to man his own nature in order thus to appropriate him to itself. After this previous orientation, we find it hardly surprising to be told now (1950) that the essenc(-ing) of original Language has want of human language and by reason of this want appropriates to man what is proper to himself in order to appropriate him to itself in the process of its presenc-ing. Likewise, apropos of "Re-collection" (1943) we saw that poetry was conceived as the poet's hall of response to the Holy's hall to him. Now we are told that human language is man's hailing response to the hall of Language as it presences.  

B. THE DIFFERENCE

If all of these theses have been stated before, what, then, is new here? We discern it best, perhaps, if we ponder what is said about the hall of aboriginal Language (Αύγος), a response to which takes the form of human language. Strictly speaking, what is it that is hailed? We have suggested quite legitimately that it is man, but the author comes to this only at the close of the essay. In the course of the analysis, that which is hailed is rather things (beings) on the one hand and World (Being) on the other. Yet this expression "on the one hand" and "on the other" itself is unhappy, for it suggests a separation of Being from beings that Heidegger resolutely excludes. If beings cannot be except by reason of Being, neither can Being "be" except in that which is. This theme is developed in various ways. For example, World "yields" things in their thing-ing; things give a "bearing" to World. If World and things (Being-beings) must be called distinct, under no circumstances can they be separated.  

Inseparable, Being-beings are correlative. This means that on the one hand they are distinguished by more than simply a mere

---

4 US, pp. 30 (in Eigenes gebracht, übereignet), 30 (Rufen, Kommen-Heßen), 32-33 (Ent-sprechen), 31-32 (Geheiße).
5 US, pp. 21-22 (Dinge), 23-24 (Welt). 24 (Welt gönnt, Dinge gebärden). Heidegger explicitly suggests that gebärden (ordinarily reflex: "to deport oneself for," "to have a bearing," from Gebärde, sc bearing, gesture) is to be understood in terms of bera, bären, gebären ("to bear," "to bring forth," v.g. a child), which in turn is meant to suggest a "giving issue to" (Austrag). The English "bear"-ing, from AS bera (cf. bera, bären supra), admits, too, of these various nuances and in using it we intend to suggest them.
rational distinction, but on the other the difference must not be conceived as a "relation" that (re)presentative thought can propose to itself as a subsequent coupling of two entities already constituted as separate. The difference must be understood in the deepest sense of a *dif-ferre*, a "bearing of each other out," as if both shared a common center which remains interior to each (the *cum*, so to speak of *correlation*), a common measure by which each is measured, which serves as the single dimension of both, a primal unity by reason of which each adheres to the other and out of which both "issue forth." We must conceive the (ontological) difference, then, as a scission (*Schied*) between (*Unter-*) Being and beings that refers them to each other by the *very fact that* it cleaves them in two.  

What is hailed in the coming-to-pass of *λέγω*-as-language, then, is the correlation of Being and beings (World-things). Whereunto are they hailed? Unto the unifying scission of the dif-ference prevailing between them. "... In the hailing which summons things and World, what properly speaking is hailed is: [their] scission."  This may be acceptable enough until we go a step further and ask who or what does the hailing? Here we have the disconcerting answer: the scission itself. "... The scission is that which hails. ..."  

How can the dif-ference be at once both hailing and hailed? We propose to understand it this way: "Difference" says "differentiation," which implies both differentiating and differentiated. If we may speak here of a *terminus a quo* of differentiation, this we would conceive to be the moment of differentiating. Conversely, the *terminus ad quem* of differentiation would be the moment when the differentiated issue forth as such. The differentiating must be conceived as unity, as one-ness, and the differentiated as necessarily two, or, as the author will say later, as

---

6 US, pp. 25 (nicht nachträglich), 24–25 (Unter-Schied, Austrag). The term *Austrag* is thematized in ID (pp. 63 ff.). Note that it translates διαφορά and was used already in 1944 for Heraclitus' διαφορέσθαιν (VA, p. 221). It is rendered easily by the Latin *differre* and English "diff-erence." We prefer usually "issue" as being more supple but understand this always as "dif-ference." As for *Unter-Schied*, might we not translate as "splitting the difference" (auseinander)? We certainly might. But a man must live with himself.

7 "... Im Heißten, das Ding und Welt ruft, ist das eigentlich Geheiße: der Unter-Schied." (US, p. 26).

8 "... Der Unter-Schied ist das Heißende...." (US, p. 29).
two-ness (ambivalence). The whole process of difference consists in this tension, this mutual adhesion between unity and duality which is the scission as such. Insofar as it is a unity, sc. a differentiating, it is difference-as-hailing; insofar as it is a duality, sc. a differentiated, it is difference-as-hailed. "... The [unifying] scission gathers together the two [differentiated] out of itself, insofar as it hails them into the fissure which itself is...."

Now the scission, as we have described it here, sc. as the coming-to-pass of the (ontological) difference out of original Λόγος, is what Heidegger understands by Language in its ultimate origins. "... Language comes-to-presence as the scission which takes place between World and things." But in order for Λόγος-as-scission to come about, there is need of the nature of man. We interpret this to mean that the differentiating can not give issue to the differentiated except in, through and for that being whose nature it is to be open unto Λόγος-as-scission. The dynamic tension between differentiating and differentiated would be what constitutes the need for man which hails him to be himself. This ec-static open-ness to the aboriginal Λόγος is the emerging of human language, which therefore does not have human activity alone as its source but rather "... reposes in [man's] relationship to language in its origins." 11

The ec-static open-ness may be considered in two ways (and here we discern the double aspect of foundational thought): as simply a structural relationship between man and aboriginal Language, hence prior to any moment when he gives voice to it by a spoken – or even a written – word; as the bringing of this structural relationship to fully authentic functioning. Authenticity in the use of language is achieved in the moment of man's free response to the hail addressed to him when the scission takes place, sc. when the differentiating utters its need of him in order

9 "... Der Unter-Schied versammelt aus sich die Zwei, indem er sie in den Riß ruft, der er selber ist...." (US, p. 29). Note that Heidegger already [1950] takes for granted the terminology that first becomes public property with ID (1957), sc. Austrag-Ereignis: "... Das Austragen von Welt und Ding in der Weise des Stillens ist das Ereignis des Unter-Schiedes...." (US, p. 30).
10 "... Die Sprache weist als der sich erneuernde Unter-Schied für Welt und Dinge." (US, p. 30).
that it may give issue to the differentiated. By responding, man gives voice (Verlautbarung) to the differentiated, therefore Being-beings. To the extent that his verbalization is authentic, that which he brings into language never becomes a thing of the past but remains in continued advent through the words he has used. It is his hail of reply.\textsuperscript{12}

Obviously this responding hail comports first of all a docile attend-ing that pays heed to the hail of address that comes to him out of \(\Lambda\gamma\omega\zeta\)-as-scission, of which man is by nature an attend-ant. That the attend-ing be docile, man himself must remain unobtrusive, without at the same time being passive. He must advance, though with reticence, toward the hail as it comes to him. "[This] advancing with reticence characterizes the manner in which mortal man responds to [the hail of \(\Lambda\gamma\omega\zeta\)-as-] Scission. In this fashion mortal man dwells authentically in aboriginal Language." \textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{RÉSUMÉ}

Foundational thought here is elaborated in terms of the origin of language. Being is conceived as \(\Lambda\gamma\omega\zeta\). Inasmuch as \(\Lambda\gamma\omega\zeta\) is \(\lambda\gamma\eta\varsigma\omega\varsigma\), it is the coming-to-pass of that scission which gives rise to the ontological difference. Inasmuch as \(\Lambda\gamma\omega\zeta\) is essentially Utterance, it is the coming-to-pass of aboriginal Language. In either case, man’s task is to respond to the hail addressed to him out of the need of \(\Lambda\gamma\omega\zeta\) for a There in order that the differentiating may give rise (issue) to the differentiated. Response to this hail is the coming-to-pass of human language in complete authenticity.

\textsuperscript{12} US, pp. 12 (schon aufhalten), 26-27 (Gewese), 30 (Rufen). Language as structural relationship to \(\Lambda\gamma\omega\zeta\) recalls the conception of the hermeneutic circle and invites comparison with SZ, no. 32 (n.b. pp. 149 and 150), and no. 34, where we find the answers of Heidegger I to the questions that Heidegger II (1950) poses: "Zu seiner Zeit wird es unumgänglich, dem nachzudenken, wie sich im Sprechen der Sprache als dem Geläut der Stille des Unter-Schiedes das sterbliche Sprechen und seine Verlautbarung ereignet. Im Verlauten, sei dies Rede oder Schrift, ist die Stille gebrochen. Woran bricht sich das Geläut der Stille? Wie gelangt die Stille als die gebrochene in das Lauten des Wortes? Wie prägt das gebrochene Stillen die sterbliche Rede, die in Versen und Sätzen erklingt?" (US, p. 31).

\textsuperscript{13} "Das Zuvorkommen in der Zurückhaltung bestimmt die Weise, nach der die Sterblichen dem Unter-Schied entsprechen. Auf diese Weise wohnen die Sterblichen im Sprechen der Sprache." (US, p. 32).
What is new here is not that Being (Αϒος) is conceived as aboriginal Language, for that was clear in 1944. What is new is the thematizing of Αϒος thus conceived in order to meditate the difference as difference.14

14 Thus Heidegger makes the first attempt to answer the question (1944) raised as to whether it is possible to meditate the difference as difference. "... Gibt es dahin für sterbliches Denken einen Weg?" (VA, p. 225).
Chapter XVII

Working, Dwelling, Thinking

The lecture of August, 1951, entitled "Working, Dwelling, Thinking," is effectively a prolongation of the meditation on "The Thing." There we considered the thing-ness of the thing and saw that its presencing consists in the gathering-together of polyvalent Being in and as this thing. In the present case, Heidegger, retaining this fundamental conception of the presencing of things, takes advantage of a general discussion in Darmstadt on the theme "Man and Space" to explain how he conceives the "bringing-forth" of things. Structurally the analysis revolves around "working" and "dwelling," whereas "thinking" seems thrown in for good measure. Since this is precisely our problem, however, we cannot afford to disregard it.

A. Dwelling

The sense of "dwelling" for Heidegger is familiar to us, not only from "The Thing," where we saw that man dwells in nearness to Being, but from the Hölderlin interpretations, where we learned that the poet dwells in nearness to the Source. It is no great surprise, then, to hear that dwelling is "the fundamental Being-structure" of There-being, hence the manner in which There-being abides, sojourns, is. It comports two dimensions: open-ness unto Being in its polyvalent One-ness ("... mortals are in [polyvalent Being], inasmuch as they

dwell. . . .'); 2 comportment with beings, sc. things, with which from the very beginning There-being takes up its sojourn, and, indeed, inevitably so. The old Saxon (wuon) and Gothic (wunian) forms from which the German word for "dwelling" (wohnen) derives, suggest, besides, the notion of "tending with consideration" or "taking care of" something, which we translate "to tend," as this word is used with reference to a watchman, caretaker or shepherd with his sheep.3

Now ... the fundamental characteristic of dwelling is this [function of] tending. . . ." 4 which comes-to-pass in both dimensions of There-being: ontologically, insofar as "... tending means: to guard [polyvalent Being] in its presencing, . . ."; 5 ontically, to the extent that "... dwelling as tending preserves [polyvalent Being] there where [There-being] takes up its sojourn: in things." 6 Hence There-being tends Being in its coming-to-presence through beings, inasmuch as it lets these beings as beings be. Note how completely this conception of dwelling concurs in its essentials with what SZ called the "in-being" of There-being as to-be-in-the-World.

B. WORKING

"Working" admits both a broad and a strict sense. 7 In the broad sense, it is the equivalent of the word "dwelling," 8 for, according to Heidegger, the stem of bauen (buan, bhu, beo) bears affinity to the German form of the verb "to be" (ich bin, du bist, etc.), hence suggests the manner in which There-being is or

---

3 "Tend to" translates schonen. It is an aphetic form of "attend," and suggests very nicely what the German cannot: an affinity with attending (hören) and attendance (ge-hören). Note, too, that the whole conception rejoins the nuance that will be given to ηύπατον in WD: to receive under one's care (in die Acht). We transcend here the author's formulae but not, we feel sure, his intention.
7 For the purists, "working" will seem an unhappy translation of bauen, which usually warrants "building," "constructing," or "cultivating," whereas "working" usually translates arbeiten. We find "working," however, more flexible, and at the moment this flexibility is necessary.
dwells. In the stricter sense, it signifies a manner in which There-being comports itself in accordance with the structure of the dwelling process. It is this sense which we wish to suggest by “working.” For this word admits the very general sense of “accomplishing by toil,” sc. “doing something” by labor. Of the manifold nuances that the word thus understood may have, Heidegger underlines two: working in the sense of cultivating (colere), as a farmer “works” his fields; working in the sense of building (aedificare), v.g. laboring to construct something.\(^8\) The author concentrates on the second sense in the essay, hence in using the word “work” here, we understand “doing something,” where the “doing” has the sense of building, constructing, and the “something” has the sense of some “thing,” v.g. a bridge. The question: what is the nature of the “thing” that is done? what is the nature of the “doing”?

As to the nature of a “thing” as such, we have already some idea from “The Thing”: it is the gathering together of polyvalent Being in and as any given being. In the present case, this conception is applied to a bridge. “The bridge gathers together unto itself in its own way [the polyvalence of Being].”\(^9\) There is, however, a further precision. We are told that the bridge gathers Being into a certain “location” that we may call a “place.” This “place,” however, as Heidegger uses the term, did not exist as an entity before the bridge (although there were always many “sites” along the river bank where it could arise), but comes-to-presence with and as the bridge. Furthermore, this place ipso facto occupies “space,” which Heidegger understands as a certain “free” area enclosed by those limits within which the thing begins to come-to-presence.\(^10\)

Once the thing in question is thus understood, then the “doing” of the thing consists not merely in the human activity which fashions steel and concrete into the structure we call a bridge, but it is the process of bringing (-bringen) forth (her-) polyvalent Being into the limits of the thing and thereby

---

\(^8\) VA, pp. 147 (colere, aedificare), 152 (beugen, pflegen).


\(^10\) VA, p. 155 (Stätte, Ort, Raum). We must forego the further analyses by which Heidegger explains the origin of distance (Abstand, Zwischenraum), extension and “absolute” space (“der” Raum). See VA, pp. 155-156. Cf. SZ, pp. 104-113.
bringing the thing itself (\textit{vor-}) into presence as what it is (\textit{Her-vorbringen}). In this sense it rejoins the Greek conception of \textit{τάχυνη}, sc. to let something appear as what it is, as itself.\textsuperscript{11}

Now it is precisely by this process of bringing-forth things as things that There-being goes about tending Being in beings, and ". . . dwelling, to the extent that it conserves [Being] in things, is, as this conserving-process, [what is meant by] working . . ."\textsuperscript{12} We infer, then, that to tend to Being in beings and to work beings by bringing them forth as what they are - both of these are one. The reason why There-being can "do" things thus lies in the bi-dimensional character of the dwelling. That is to say, it can let things shine forth in their own "place," occupying their own "space," because from the very beginning its open-ness to Being is an open-ness to all possible "space," sc. its ontological dimension is a constitutional near-ness to things. But only when this ontological dimension is articulated on the ontic level in the things among which There-being sojourns, does There-being find itself genuinely "at home" in its near-ness to things.\textsuperscript{13}

For all of There-being's bi-dimensional structure, however, this condition may not be taken for granted. On the contrary, it comes-to-pass only insofar as the dwelling-process of There-bring reaches the full achievement. This implies a complete docility to Being, which always holds the primacy. In bringing forth things, There-being must accept whatever intimations Being imparts, assuming them in its own name as the measure of its own activity, and thereby respond to the particular manner in which any given thing comes-to-presence. It is \textit{this} that There-being brings to fullness, its "at home"-ness with things. Hence by letting these things shine forth as what they are, There-being effectively lets \textit{itself} be as dwelling in their near-ness. This is There-being's response to Being's appeal. It is the moment when There-being overcomes its homelessness and

\textsuperscript{11} VA, p. 160 (\textit{τάχυνη}).

\textsuperscript{12} " . . . Das Wohnen ist, insofern es das Geviert in die Dinge verwahrt, als dieses Verwahren \textit{ein Bauen, . . .}" (VA, p. 152). Heidegger's italics.

\textsuperscript{13} By reason of this ontological nearness to things, There-being can be far closer to things that are ontically distant (v.g. the old bridge at Heidelberg) than those who daily travel it, if they remain in inauthenticity, unaware of their ontological prerogative (VA, pp. 157-158).
all the nihilism that this implies. It is the moment of achieved authenticity. The author concludes with an appeal to learn what this means.14

C. Thought

The problem of thought, despite the fact that the word appears in the title, is hardly thematized in the present essay. The principal remark comes toward the end when we are told that "in the same sense" as "working," though "in a different way," thought, too, plays a rôle in There-being's dwelling-process. Each in its own way is necessary; both are intrinsically complementary. As for further details of the relationship, we are left to our own resources. Is it legitimate to surmise: that both working and thinking have the same sense, insofar as both are a tending to Being in beings, hence each is a way by which There-being's dwelling in nearness to beings reaches fulfillment? This seems plausible enough, but then how do they differ?

One thing is certain: by both working and thinking, There-being achieves its authenticity. "How else can [There-being] respond to the address [of Being] than by endeavoring for its own part to bring the dwelling-process, insofar as it can, into the fullness of its presenc-ing? . . ." 15 This it does by working and thought.

RÉSUMÉ

There-being dwells in near-ness to things by reason of the double (ontic-ontological) dimension of ex-sistence. It tends Being in beings, insofar as it helps bring them forth into truth. This is what is meant by working. Such a process is complementary to thought, but we do not yet see precisely how.

14 VA, pp. 159-160 (Zuspruch entsprochen). 162 (wohnen erst lernen). We take all of Heidegger's references to the "ordinary" way of doing or understanding things as a continual repudiation of everydayness, therefore of inauthenticity. V.g. VA, pp. 145-146, 147-148, 160, 192, 198, etc.
CHAPTER XVIII

"... POETICALLY DOTH MAN DWELL ..."

The preceding essay was delivered as a lecture in August, and but a few months later, in October of the same year (1951), came another, entitled "... Poetically doth man dwell...," where the author dialogues once more with his old friend, Hölderlin. It is so perfectly consequent with "Working, Dwelling, Thinking" that the two should be taken together as a single whole, for there only the first two of the three processes were thematized. "Thinking" received only incidental treatment at the end, more by way of promise then of realization. It is in the present essay that the promise finds some measure of fulfillment, for what Hölderlin calls "poetizing" is, despite profound difference, one with what Heidegger calls thought. With the necessary reserves, then, we might translate the title: "... Thought-

1 "... Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ...." (VA, pp. 187-204). We are familiar with the lines from Hölderlin's poem that begins, "In lieblicher Bläue ...": "Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet / Der Mensch auf dieser Erde."

2 VA, p. 193. The distinction between members of a comparison as being "one" (Selbe) and being "same" (Gleiche) occurs often in Heidegger and is here explained: Two different correlates may be called "but one" by reason of the unity of their "mutual belongingness" (Zusammengehörigkeit), i.e., the correlation which gathers them together. This implies, however, that the difference between the two be preserved, otherwise the duality, and therefore all correlation, disappears. In fact, it is the difference as difference that gathers both correlates together. "... Correlative one-ness is the mutual-belongingness of different correlates because gathered-together through their difference.... In the issuing forth of the different correlates, the essential cohesiveness of correlative one-ness comes to light...." ("... Das selbe ist dagegen das Zusammengehörigen des Verschiedenen aus der Versammlung durch den Unterschied.... Im Austrag des Unterschiedenen kommt das versammelnde Wesen des selben zum Leuchten...." (VA, p. 193). When two members of a comparison are "same", however, all difference between them disappears, so that only uniformity results.
fully doth man dwell . . .” We take the present essay as a necessary complement of the former and polarize the discussion thus: A. Dwelling, B. Poetizing.

A. DWELLING

Once more the word “dwelling” designates the fundamental structure of There-being as it sojourns in near-ness to beings. Now, however, the conception is developed by a new metaphor. The Hölderlin poem that Heidegger interprets here permits him to say that if man dwells “on the earth,” he also looks up toward “heaven.” Hence effectively he dwells “between” heaven and earth, just as we saw that the poet is a half-god because he dwells “between” man and the gods. This manner of thinking permits Heidegger to speak of this “between” as a sort of “ontological space” (the term is not Heidegger’s) that he calls “Dimension.” Sustaining the metaphor – if such it is – the author speaks of this Dimension as somehow admitting of “measure,” and since man, as the in-between being, dwells in Dimension, it is his task to do the measuring.3

The new terminology as such is not so important for us, for it seems to be dictated by the poem in question. More important is to see that we are dealing with the same old problem, the relation between Being and There-being. We know already that the Quadrate designates Being in its polyvalence. To speak of Dimension as an ontological Space between two members of the Quadrate does not change matters very much. Besides, the Quadrate is filled out shortly by the mention of “God” and the poet. Dimension, then, is still Being in its polyvalence. Furthermore, it is measurable only because it is lit up. So that the new metaphor even comports the familiar notion of light.4

If we turn now to man, we are told: that it is only in “...measuring out [Dimension that] man is first man at all...”;5 that he “...is insofar as he withstands Di-

---

3 VA, pp. 189 (Existenz aus Wohnen), 192 (Aufenthalt), 195 (Dimension, Vermessen).
4 VA, p. 195 (gellichtete und so durchmessbare Zumessung).
5 “...in solchem Durchmessen ist der Mensch überhaupt erst Mensch....” (VA, p. 195).
mension . . . ;” 6 that “... only insofar as man in this way measures out his dwelling can he be in accordance with his essence. . . .” 7 All this adds up to describing what we already know about There-being's relationship to Being, in terms of the new terminology of “measurement.” Obviously, it is by fully achieving the function of measurement that There-being dwells authentically in near-ness to things. The pivotal point, then, becomes: how comprehend this measuring-process by which man achieves authenticity?

B. POETIZING

The fundamental sense of “measurement” in the present case, Heidegger tells us, lies in “taking a measure” (Maß-Nahme). We must understand, then, what is meant here by “measure” and what is meant by “taking.” As for “measure,” Heidegger suggests that it is the shining-forth of Being itself, and, indeed, in negatived fashion, sc. in the process of revealing-concealment that we have come to know already. His textual warrant lies in the fact that Hölderlin speaks of the “unknown god.” We are restricting the word “god” here to the sense that it has as a member of the Quadrate, hence as denoting a single valence of Being, connoting, however, the whole gamut of Being’s poly-valence. Heidegger argues that Being, under the guise now of “god,” is measure for man insofar as it remains “unknown.” The sense is that Being shines forth through beings, insofar as it reveals precisely what is being concealed, sc. itself, and thereby guards itself in its own self-concealment. We recognize here all the essentials of Being-as-mystery. “... Thus the unknown god shines forth as unknown through the revelation of [the beings of] heaven. This shining-forth is the measure by which man measures himself.” 8 Briefly, then: the “measure” which man as

---

8 “... So erscheint der unbekannte Gott als der Unbekannte durch die Offenbarkeit des Himmels. Dieses Erscheinen ist das Maß, woran der Mensch sich misst.” (VA, p. 197).
man must "take" is Being as it conceals itself by reason of its "not"-character in beings. We understand this to mean the ontological difference.

We come now to the "taking" of this measure. We are told that the taking is not a seizing that in any way does violence to the measure. Rather it comes about when There-being gathers the measure into unity and thus brings it to a point of containment, a process that is the equivalent of "attending" to the measure. More simply still, There-being simply "lets the measure come" unto it.\(^9\)

Notice now that the "taking" of the measure, as we have just described it, coincides perfectly, once we understand the measure to be Being-as-negatived, with what we know of foundational thought. "Letting-come" clearly suggests the acquiescence that we have come to call "responding" to Being, and the formula of "gathered-together containment" unquestionably translates the λέγειν-νοεῖν duality which in EM (1935) was interpreted as thought, and which soon in WD (1952) will be explicitated once more in the same sense. When we consider thought as "taking-measure" and understand that it is thus that man measures-out Dimension between heaven and earth wherein he dwells, we realize that it is thought which lets man dwell in near-ness to beings, and this is precisely what we called the authentic sense of "working," sc. the building of the house wherein he dwells. "... Authentic working comes-to-pass insofar as there are [thinkers], those who take the measure for the architectonic, the structural design, of [man's] dwelling."\(^10\)

Thought and authentic working are but one: both bring to fulfillment There-being's dwelling in near-ness to beings. This accounts for the fact that both belong in the same sense to "dwelling," and that authentic "working" may be said to "assume its measure" from Being.\(^11\) All this is very coherent. There are only two difficulties: 1. Since, as a matter of fact, Heidegger

---

\(^9\) VA, pp. 198 (nicht greifen, gesammelten Vernehmen, Hören), 199 (empfangen, Kommen-lassen).

\(^10\) "... Das eigentliche Bauen geschieht, insofern Dichter sind, solche, die das Maß nehmen für die Architektonik, für das Baugefüge des Wohnens." (VA, p. 202).

\(^11\) VA, pp. 161 (in das Wohnen gehört), 159 (übernimmt die Maße). Thought is one with authentic, original working, in the sense of the bringing-forth of things as things. Both are to be distinguished from inauthentic working, which is expressed in terms of the present essay by "Voll Verdienst..." (VA, p. 191).
accepts the designation of this measure-taking with Hölderlin as "poetizing," in what way does thought coincide and in what way does it differ from poetizing? 2. Granting that thinking-poetizing coincide with working, how are they differentiated from it?

I. Thinking and Poetizing

From here on we are left pretty much to our own resources. What is unmistakable is that the measure-taking we have just described is what Heidegger understands Hölderlin to mean by "poetizing." "... To descry this measure, to let it serve as measure and to accept it as measure: this is what [Hölderlin] means by poetizing. ..." But why call it poetizing? If we restrict ourselves to the text itself, there is only one hint. We are told that the measuring-process, sc. There-being's response to Being, is the "element" wherein man's dwelling is conserved. At another point, we are told that man's responding to Being (as it comes to him through language) is that utterance which speaks in the "element" of poetizing. We take this coincidence of "element," tenuous as it is, to warrant the surmise that measure-taking is a poetizing insofar as, by reason of it, Being (Maß) is brought (Nahme) into language. Then There-being would fulfill its measuring function by taking, sc. attend-ing to, Being-as-measure, insofar as Being is original Utterance. This would give a very coherent sense to such a text as the following:

"... Man speaks in the first place only to the extent that he responds to [original] language, insofar as he attends to its address [to him]. Of all the manners of address that we men for our part may cooperate in bringing to expression, language is the highest and by all means the first. ..."

It is easy to see, then, why "poetizing is the fundamental power of human dwelling. ..."
All that we have just said is based upon the present text. If we expand the horizon and recall all that we have seen about Being as aboriginal Λόγος, the case is thoroughly convincing. On the old difficulty, however, of how poetizing and thought, as two fundamental functions of There-being, differ – and the difference is firmly insisted upon – we have no light at all.\(^{15}\)

2. Thinking and Working

Once we consider thought in terms of its essential relation to language, is it possible to infer in what way thinking and working differ from one another? We propose the following hypothesis: Both processes would be manners in which There-being lets polyvalent Being shine-forth. They would differ only in this: working brings forth Λόγος in things, such as the pitcher, the bridge, or, for that matter, a work of art; thinking and poetizing articulate Λόγος in words.

We would understand "working," then, to pertain to the order of man’s dynamic intercourse with beings, and "thinking" ("poetizing") to the order of giving them a name. But it is the one Λόγος (aboriginal Utterance) that in either case There-being, the There of Λόγος, lets-be, so that we may understand even things (as things) to be already inchoative words. This would explain why Heidegger methodologically can pass from the phenomenological analyses of "The Thing" to the language analysis which characterizes "Working, Dwelling, Thinking," without so much as a shift in gears ("... in the beginning and once more at the end, language points out to us the essence of something. ... ").\(^{16}\) It would explain, too, why, whether the focus of his attention falls upon a wine-jug, a Van Gogh or Indo-Germanic word stems, Heidegger has only one concern: to re-treive the authentic sense of Being, sc. Being conceived as Λόγος.

RÉSUMÉ

"... Poetically doth man dwell ..." complements "Working, Dwelling, Thinking" by thematizing thought under the guise of

\(^{15}\) Va. p. 193 (nicht das gleiche).

\(^{16}\) "... Die Sprache winkt uns zuerst und dann wieder zuletzt das Wesen einer Sache zu..." (Va, p. 190).
poetizing, by reason of the relationship between thought and language. This said, thought appears once more as an acquiescing response ("taking") to Being-as-negativied ("measure"), sc. re-solve.

POSTSCRIPT

Concerning a Verse from Mörike

We add here, for the sake of completeness, a small appendage concerning the exchange of letters between Heidegger and Emil Staiger (1950–51) with regard to an interpretation given by Staiger in a public lecture to a line of Mörike's poem, "On a Lamp." The dispute revolved about the proper reading of the word scheint. Should it be taken in the sense of "seems" (videtur) or of "shines-forth" (lucet). Staiger defended the former reading, Heidegger the latter.

What is interesting for us in the exchange is not the argument but the method of both men. Staiger goes about the task admittedly with all the instruments of literary criticism. In paying respect to such methods, Heidegger is coolly proper, but one has the impression that he could not care less. He passes on quickly with the remark that such arguments can never be decisive but only an "argumentative prelude" to the real work of interpretation. This is accomplished only by meditation of the work itself. For what does it mean to "read" a work, if not to gather it together into its fullness? But what is its fullness? The unspoken that lies concealed in the spoken.


18 M, pp. 6, 9 (mit literaturwissenschaftlichen Mitteln), 15 (aus dem Gedicht selbst), 21 (Ungesprochene im Gesprochenen).
In 1950, after five years of enforced retirement, Heidegger was reinstated as professor at Freiburg, but not until the winter semester of 1951–52 did he give his first post-war lecture course. It bore the title "What E-vokes Thought?" and was continued in the summer semester of 1952, then published two years later. The whole is, of course, a meditation on the sense of thought. Stretched over two semesters, the theme is developed in two different ways. In the winter semester, Heidegger’s chief purpose was to approach the problem in terms of the philosophical tradition. Nietzsche is his dialogue partner of predilection, and it is here that the author elaborates the Zarathustra analysis as signifying the correlation between Being and man. In the summer semester, he devotes himself to an exposition of his own conception of thought, developed chiefly by means of dialogue with the pre-Socratics. It is this which concerns us now.

The essentials of Heidegger’s conception of the relation between Being and man were crystallized for us already in HB (1947): the essence of man lies in his ek-sistence, sc. an ec-static relationship to Being; Being in turn is not only in relationship with There-being but is this relation inasmuch as it imparts itself to man. There is nothing new, then, in being told now that to speak of man’s essence is to speak of the Being of beings. “... In each of the two members of the relationship between

---

1 *Was heißt Denken?* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954). (Hereafter: WD). We include here a study of "MoTox" (Parmenides VIII, 34–41), VA, pp. 231–256. It was intended as part of the lecture course but not presented.
human nature and Being there lies from the very beginning the relationship itself. ...” ² We are on familiar ground.

What is more, we are accustomed to thinking of the problem in terms of thought, for since the pathway-dialogue on thought (1944-45) we have been led to consider thought in the broad sense as ec-static ek-sistence, in the strict sense as the achieving of authenticity by resolve. Before we even begin the present analysis, then, we have everything we need to understand why the meditation on the Being-man correlation should unfold for Heidegger as an interrogation of thought.

The question which gives the meditation its title admits of at least four possible interpretations: 1. What does “thought” evoke for the student of language, sc. what is the meaning of the word as word? 2. What does “thought” evoke for a philosopher, sc. what has it come to mean in the history of ideas? 3. What does thought evoke from someone who wishes to go about thinking properly, sc. what are the requirements for authentic thinking? 4. What evokes thought, sc. calls it forth into being what it is? ⁵ Obviously, such a question as the fourth already presupposes that the relation between Being and thought is such as between caller and called, and Heidegger admits the fact most readily.⁴ The analysis is not concerned, then, with establishing this fact, but with probing its import. For our part, we need not expect anything noticeably new. After all, we are not so much following an argument as meditating a mystery. The text for the meditation (we are making another retrieve) comes from Parmenides (Fr. 6), which Heidegger writes paratactically: χρῄζον τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐφ’ ἑμεῖς. ⁶ We disregard the author’s order in favor of simplicity in exposition and consider the single correlation as suggested by this text from the point of view of Being (caller) and of There-being (called).

² “… In jedem der beiden Glieder der Beziehung zwischen Menschenwesen und Sein liegt schon die Beziehung selber…” (WD, p. 74). In SF (1955), the author returns to this same point with new insistence and, to emphasize the inseparability of Being from man’s essence in their mutual correlation, resorts to the curious device of writing Sein as Ἡφίσσις. Whatever the place in philosophy for visual aids, the device reminds us of how close we are in 1955 to the SZ (1927) conception of Being as project of There-being. The only difference: the reversal of Heidegger I in Heidegger II. (See SF, pp. 20-31).

⁴ WD, p. 162 (vorausgesetzt).

⁶ Cited WD, p. 108 and passim.
I. The Argument

A. BEING

As to how Being is conceived in WD, there is at this point relatively little more to say. The essential is that Being is always the Being (έμεναι) of beings (εὸν), that by which beings – all beings – are. If beings are to be thought, what else in them is think-able except the presencing by which they are? That is why the author constantly refers to Being as "eminently thought-worthy" (das Bedenklichste), sc. that which imparts to thought its to-be-thought.  

Now Being "wants" thought. By reason of its nature, Being must itself be served, tended, guarded by thought, hence is "in want of" thought in order to be itself. Because of its own indigence, then, Being wants thought to be, in order that in its own way Being can be itself. This latter sense of "want" approaches the meaning that Heidegger gives to the Greek χρή, by translating it as "there is want of" (es braucht). We have met this Greek word before. Deriving from χράομαι (cf. χειρ, "hand"), it suggests a process of handling that does not simply use that which is handled but lets it be according to its own essence, lets it appear as what it is and conserves it thus. Although the formula is awkward, it is not impossible to say that a handling of this sort "wants" that-which-is-handled to be itself. However this may be, we understand the translation of χρή as "there is want of" to suggest: that there is intrinsic to Being an "indigence" by reason of which it is "in want of" thought; that Being therefore "wants" to satisfy this indigence; that Being therefore "wants" thought to be, and, indeed, in abiding fashion. Obviously, we are refining here what EM spoke of as Being's need for its There. If there is any further precision, it consists perhaps in the author's present insistence that in releasing thought unto itself Being leaves to thought a certain liberty by reason of which it is more than a blind compulsion. We shall return to this point later.  

If Being wants thought, this want as such is efficacious. Hence "... in this wanting there is concealed an enjoining, an
e-voking..." of thought. We are at the heart of the matter. The want is efficacious, for it implies letting thought be in abiding fashion. This is what we mean by saying that Being "grants" to thought its to-be-thought. Effectively, then, this wanting is a giving, a giving of Being itself as eminently thought-worthy. "... What [Being as thought-worthy] grants, the gift it bestows on us, is nothing less than itself. ..." 9 This is precisely what we called before the im-parting of Being by mittence, where "im-parting" corresponds perfectly to what Heidegger understands Parmenides to mean by ἀνάπτυξις.10

But since the giving proceeds from a want in Being itself, it carries the overtones of an appeal that calls thought forth. This giving under the guise of an appeal is what Heidegger understands by the "e-voking" of thought. He describes it by a profusion of terms. The appeal out of want sets thought on its way, summoning, commissioning, enjoining, soliciting, at-tracting, laying-claim-upon it. In doing so, the appeal pledges Being to thought, imparting thus both precept and admonition, committing Being completely to its custody, and since it is thus that Being comes to thought, it helps thought arrive at presence as itself.11

To the extent that we may reduce all these to a common denominator, we are going to fix this want-appeal that e-vokes thought by the word we used to translate the same word in the Hölderlin analysis, sc. "hail," intending thereby to suggest: that the e-vocation is an address that proceeds from Being, which always retains its primacy; that it is a summons which is effi-

8 "... In diesem Brauchen verbirgt sich ein Anbefehlen, ein Heißen...." (WD, p. 119).
9 "... Was dieses zu denken gibt, die Gabe, die es an uns verschenkt, ist nichts Geringeres als es selbst, es, das uns in das Denken ruft." (WD, p. 85). Heidegger suggests the fundamental accord of es braucht with the es gibt formula of HB, p. 80. Cf. WD, p. 3.
10 VA, pp. 251–253 (Schickung).
11 WD, pp. 82–83 (auf den Weg bringen, auffordern, befehlen, anbefehlen, verlangen, aussprechen, verweisen, anvertrauen, Geborgenheit anheimgeben, Entgegenkommen, Helfen, Gelangenlassen). With "at-tracting" we translate auf dem Zug. The sense is suggestive. By reason of its negativity, Being with-draws (Entzug) into the beings it discloses. In this with-drawal, Being draws-with (zieht mit), sc. at-tracts, thought. It would seem that we are to understand in the at-tracting thus described a nuance of thought's intrinsic relation to Being-as-negativized. V.g. "... Dieser Entzug ist das, was eigentlich zu denken gibt, ist das Bedenklichste...." (WD, p. 55, cf. pp. 5–6, 52). Cf. N, II (1944–46), p. 368.
cacious; that its efficacy is such that it leaves to the hail-ed full liberty of response. This will enable us to see how for Heidegger the hailing of the poet and the e-voking of the thinker are in profound ac-cord.

B. THERE-BEING

In hailing the thinker into Being, Being imparts itself to him as gift, and this gift is what constitutes the essence of the thinker, the endowment by which he is. What is more, Being not only bestows the gift but conserves, preserves, sustains it, sc. remains the abiding “sustenance” of thought. This endowment reposes in what Heidegger now chooses to call the “heart” of man.12

1. Thought as Re-cord

How precisely Heidegger comes to choose the word “heart” is worth noting, though it is perhaps not essential to the analysis. He proposes it when dealing with the first of his studies of the word “thought” itself. The German word for thought, he says, derives from Gedanc, which suggests not only Denken (“to think”), but Gedächtnis (usually translated “memory”) and Danken (“to thank”). It is apropos of Gedächtnis that we come upon the term “heart.” For the primary sense of this word, the author insists, is not “memory” but “(re-)collection,” sc. a collectedness in the sense of gathered-togetherness into a center that abides by what it (re-)collects. But what does it (re-)collect? That “... which sustains us, insofar as it is thought by us, thought, that is to say, inasmuch as it remains [always] as that which is to-be-thought...”13 In other words, this “center” (re-)collects Being, and, indeed, as it comes-to-presence in beings.

12 V.g. WD, pp. 86 (Mitgift), 97 (Verwahrnis), 92 (Gemüt, muot, Herz).
13 “... Auf das, was uns halt, insofern es bei uns bedacht ist, bedacht nämlich deshalb, weil Es das su-Bedenkende bleibt...” (WD, p. 1). See pp. 92 (An-dacht, Bleiben bel), 97 (Andenken). That re-collection is necessarily bi-dimensional is suggested clearly enough, if one reflect on the hail in terms of at-traction. In withdrawing into beings, Being draws-with it There-being. This condition of drawn-ness (bezogen) into the Being of beings is the relation (Bezug) we call ek-sistence, by reason of which There-being manifests (zeigt) beings, sc. lets them shine forth as such. The
This “center,” we are told, is what in Latin would be called animus, as opposed to anima; it is what Meister Eckhart called the Seelenfünklein. Heidegger calls it the “heart” of man, understanding by the term that “innermost core,” sc. the essence of man, insofar as it is in ec-static relationship to Being, hence man’s ek-sistence. Ek-sistence here is considered as that constitutional open-ness to Being that in SZ we called an “antecedent” comprehension of Being. “... All [subsequent] re-collection of the think-able dwells itself already in that gatheredness [in man’s heart] through which everything that remains to be thought is hidden and concealed.”

It is by reason of this antecedent comprehension of Being in man’s heart that he is empowered to think. In fact, to speak of a “power” for thought is simply to express under a different aspect the dynamic character of ek-sistence. This same dynamic character we called in SZ a “drive-toward-Being.” It is not too awkward, then, to speak of it now by saying that There-being “wants” Being. In fact, the affective overtones of “wanting” are coherent with the connotation of the metaphor “heart.” In any case, we can see that in the dynamic ecstasis that constitutes man’s essence, the “power” (Vermögen) to think and the “wanting” (mögen) to think are profoundly related. We have here, then, it would seem, the key to such ploys as the following:

“... Only when we want [mögen] what is in itself thought-worthy do we have the power [vermögen] for thought.”

If the play on words (mögen-vermögen) dissipates in English, we may nevertheless discern a genuine significance in speaking of There-being, sc. structural thought, as “wanting” Being. For we recall that the reason why thought comes-to-pass in the first place is that Being “wants” thought, hence the correlation between Being and thought comes to expression as a mutual “want-ing”:

showing-forth of beings, therefore comportment with them, is intrinsic to the drawn-ness into Being as such. It is this bi-dimensional relation to the Being of beings that we are considering now as re-collection. See WD, pp. 5-6, 52, 95-96 – all taken as unit. Note in passing that manifestation (zeigen) connotes for us now “utterance” (Sagen).

14 “... Alles Andenken an das Gedenkbare wohnt selber bereits in jener Ver-sammlung, durch die im voraus alles geborgen und verborgen ist, was zu bedenken bleibt.” (WD, p. 97). See pp. 96 (Gemüt, Herz), 137 (am weitesten nach außen).
15 “... Nur wenn wir das mögen, was in sich das zu-Bedenkende ist, vermögen wir das Denken.” (WD, p. 1).
... We have the power only for that which we want. But in turn we truly want only that which for its own part wants us ... insofar as it addresses itself to our essence as that which sustains this essence. ...\textsuperscript{16}

The want in There-being for Being, then, reposes in the want of Being for There-being (thought). That is why Being is the ground where man's heart in its essence is sustained in an ultimate dwelling-place. We have here, it would seem, another evidence of what in discussing HB we suggested as the "adhesion" of Being to itself.

Briefly: thought, as the gathering-together by which man (re-)collects Being, rests in the center of man's Being, in his "heart." In order to suggest these nuances with a single word, we translate \textit{Gedächtnis} by a derivation of the Latin word for "heart" (\textit{cor, cordis}) and say that thought thus understood is "re-cord."

2. Thought as Thanks

Once we see that the original German word for thought (\textit{Gedanc}) suggests re-cord, it is not difficult to understand in what sense it also implies thanks-giving (\textit{Danken}). Being's supreme gift to the thinker is the very Being by which he is a thinker: ek-sistence. Does it not warrant acknowledgement on man's part? Such an acknowledgement in its purity, however, is not in the first place a requiting of this gift with another gift. On the contrary, the purest form of acknowledgement is simply the accepting of the gift, sc. assuming it, acquiescing in it, yielding to its demands. Acceptance, then, is the most original form of thanks. Now when There-being accepts the endowment by which the thinking comes about, sc. ek-sistence, it accepts the gift of thought as such. For There-being to accept thought as thought is to do what lies within its power to accomplish thought. This is by that very fact the fulfillment of thinking. Thinking thus conceived in the moment of fulfillment is clearly thanks-giving.

\textsuperscript{16} ... \textit{Denn wir vermögen nur das, was wir mögen. Aber wir mögen wiederrum wahrhaft nur Jenes, was seinerseits uns selber und zwar uns in unserem Wesen mag, indem es sich unserm Wesen als das zuspricht, was uns im Wesen hält....} (WD, p. 7). See p. 97 (Wesensgrund, bewohnt).
"... Pure thanks lies rather in this, that we simply think that which solely and properly is to-be-thought." 17

Thinking as thanking consents to ek-sistence through complete acquiescence to Being. This is accomplished when There-being plays the rôle of an attentive attendant of Being in profound and docile re-collection. Effectively, There-being, once Being has released it unto itself, must reciprocate by releasing itself unto Being. Hence There-being must turn to Being, opening itself up, committing itself, abandoning itself to its exigencies. Briefly, then, this means that "thought thinks when it responds to [Being as] the eminently thought-worthy. . . ." 18 It is the responding that is decisive, for although we are engaged in thought by the very fact that we are, sc. by reason of ek-sistence, this is, so to speak, but a structural thought that becomes authentically functional only in the moment of response. The author intimates here, it would seem, the answer to the third question which the lectures pose (how does one go about thinking?), for in the last analysis all we can do is ask ourselves if we have attended, sc. responded adequately, to Being's hail.19 In any case, all of these forms of letting-be are, it would seem, but variations of the complete acquiescence of There-being to Being by which thinking is thanking. It is the process by which ek-sistence achieves authenticity.

All of this suggests a manner of formulating the distinction between thought as re-cord and thought as thanks-giving. With the necessary reserves for better judgement, we propose to understand: thought as re-cord to correspond to There-being as ek-sistence; thought as thanks-giving to correspond to There-being in the moment of re-solve.

3. Thought as λέγειν-νοεῖν

Thus far we have considered the correlation between Being and There-being in thought in terms of hail-er (Being), hail-ing

17 "... Der reine Dank ist vielmehr dies, daß wir einfach denken, nämlich das, was es eigentlich und einzig zu denken gibt." (WD, p. 94). Cf. G, pp. 66-67; HD, pp. 81, 142; WM, p. 49.
18 "Das Denken denkt, wenn es dem Bedenklichsten entspricht..." (WD, p. 10). Writer's italics. See pp. 93 (hörig, gehört), 138 (in Wesen belassen), 3 (uns zu-wenden), 103 (aufmachen, aufschließen), 86 (Sicheinlassen).
19 WD, pp. 39 (noch nicht als Denkende), 160 (die dritte Frage).
(the efficacious want) and hail-ed (There-being). In doing so, we have considered in Parmenides’ text, which forms the backbone of the whole analysis, the following: ἔν ἔμεναι (the Being of beings), χήρα (hail-ing). Obviously, τὸ λέγειν τὸ νοεῖν τ' corresponds to that which is hailed, sc. thought. Both of these Greek words are familiar. The present study of λέγειν itself refers to the analysis already made in VA and adds little more than a summary. Νοεῖν in EM we translated as “to ac-cept,” in the sense of “to bring to concentration or containment.” Here the connotation is less military, as the sense becomes rather “to receive or take under one’s care.”

The correlative conjunctions, τε . . . τ' have for Heidegger their own importance: they indicate that λέγειν and νοεῖν are profoundly meshed, though it is λέγειν that ultimately gives its stamp to the whole. It is λέγειν that lets-lie-forth (in non-concealment) what νοεῖν accepts under its care. Again, this caring of νοεῖν is a constant gathering-together unto itself of that which thus lies-forth, in order that this continue to appear as itself. This gathering, however, (and even There-being itself is hereby gathered-together in attentiveness), is in turn λέγειν. Conversely, λέγειν requires the care that νοεῖν supplies. Λέγειν and νοεῖν, then, are mutually complementary.

Notice, therefore, how closely the two words, when taken together as “accepting under one’s care what one lets lie forth,” coincide with the sense we gave to “tending” (Schonen) in “Working, Dwelling, Thinking.” The sense is always: letting-be (manifest).

Now the mesh of λέγειν-νοεῖν must be meshed (sich fügt) itself, sc. must correspond, with the Being of beings, which must be understood always as maintaining the primacy in the process. The primacy is articulated when we say that it is Being that hails thought. The corresponding that There-being must accomplish is simply the response to this hail. “. . . Only insofar as [Λέγειν-νοεῖν] accommodate to the [Being of beings], [sc.] remain directed toward, introverted into, it, does the unity of both satisfy [Being’s] demand [for thought]. . . .” 22 We interpret λέγειν-

---

21 WD, pp. 125–126 (Gefüge).
voείν, then, as describing the process of thought in its moment of complete acquiescence to Being – as thanking, as re-solve. This permits us to understand how Heidegger can explain so conveniently that the noun form of voείν, sc. υομοειν, originally meant not intelligence but thought-as-record.\(^{23}\)

Before we take the next step, let us recall what we are doing. We seek to discern the correlation between Being and There-being (thought) by analysing: \(\chiρ\nu: \tau\sigma \lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu \tau\varepsilon \nuo\varepsilon\iota \nu \tau^\prime: \varepsilon\omicron: \epsilon\lambda\mu\nu\sigma\nu\alpha\iota\nu.\) According to the results of the analysis, the translation should read, “there is want: both letting-lie-forth and accepting-the-care-of-beings: Being.” In paraphrase, we understand Heidegger to understand Parmenides thus: the Being of beings wants There-being to let-lie-forth and accept-the-care-of beings in their Being.

Now the combination of λέγειν-voείν is often expressed simply as voείν and the Being of beings as \(\tau\sigma \epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota.\) With these transpositions, we recognize another text of Parmenides that occupied us in EM: \(\tau\sigma \gamma\epsilon\rho\alpha \alpha\omicron\sigma\tau\nu \nuo\varepsilon\iota \nu \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu \tau\varepsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota.\) We translate: “[thought-as-] acceptance and Being are correlative.” The two texts, then, are profoundly one. “Both \([\nuo\varepsilon\iota \nu \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\] and \(\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota\] belong together, sc. in such a way that the first named \(\nuo\varepsilon\iota\nu\] has its essence therein that it remains orientated toward the \([\text{Beings}]\) of\[\text{beings}]. . . .”\(^{24}\)

This is for the author a point of major importance. The significance lies not so much in the fact that the two different texts of Parmenides are fundamentally in deep accord, but rather that we find formulated here at the dawn of Western thought a theme that abides in it through the whole course of its history. In modern times, we find one resonance of this correlation between Being and thought in the \(\text{esse est percipi}\) of Berkeley. It comes to expression much more profoundly in Kant, who formulates the supreme principle of all synthetic judgements \(\text{a priori}\) in the following terms: If we recall that for Kant in KR V beings

\(^{23}\) WD, pp. 125, 172 (υομοειν). In the same context, Heidegger speaks of \(\text{Ahnung,}\) which we have translated as “surmise,” sc. the sum total of Being’s intimations which constitute the antecedent comprehension of Being. Notice how closely this conforms to the poetic experience as seen in the Hölderlin analysis.

\(^{24}\) “Beide gehören zusammen, nämlich so, daß das zuerst genannte \(\nuo\varepsilon\iota\nu\] sein \(\text{Wesen} \text{darin} \text{hat, in das Anwesen von Anwesendem eingewiesen zu bleiben. . . .}” (WD, p. 148).
are considered as the objects of experience and Being as their objectness, whereas thought is considered as the presentation of these objects of experience to the knowing subject, then the question arises: what in Kantian terms is the relation between the Being of beings (sc. the objects of experience in their objectness) and thought (sc. the presentation of objects)? Kant's classic answer:

The conditions of the possibility of experience as such [therefore thought] are at one and the same time [therefore correlatively] the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience [therefore the Being of beings].

In different context and with different words, this is the same principle as that of Parmenides. But why stop here? Must not the same be said for Hegel’s principle “Being is Thought”? And, to come full circle, for Nietzsche’s Zarathustra? Heidegger’s contribution is simply to return to Parmenides and meditate the correlation as such.

C. THE DIFFERENCE

But if the two Parmenides texts rejoin each other in a common unity, have we come all this arduous way to find that we are back where we started from in 1935? No! There is a difference, it would seem, and a significant one. EM took its starting point from the question about the ontological difference, but the analysis, like that of SZ, was devoted to explaining and exploring the preliminary problem about the sense of Being as such. Hence, the correlation analysed was between thought and the Being (of beings). Since 1941, however, we have witnessed a gradual shift in emphasis. More and more the author has focused upon the ontological difference as such, so that now (1952) the correlation is between thought and the Being of beings, where the “of” points in both directions at once: “if we say ‘Being,’ this means: the ‘Being of beings’; if we say ‘beings,’ this means: beings

---

25 "... die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung,..." (KRV, A 158, B 197). See VA, pp. 234, 236.

in terms of their Being. . . .” 27 The difference between EM (1935) and WD (1952) is the ontological difference as such.

It is understandable, then, that Heidegger, in meditating the correlation between Being and man, should insist so strongly that it is a correlation between thought and the ontological difference. It is the ambivalence of δν which is absolutely primary. By the ontological difference, we understand here the difference between Being and beings as the reverse side of the ambivalence of δν, sc. the necessary coupling of Being and beings. It is this duality which is absolutely primary in the process of thought. It is this duality which from the beginning has unfolded the domain within which Being’s hail has been addressed to man, and where the authentic thinker in response to the hail — whether it be Parmenides or Plato, Kant or Nietzsche — has gone about his task. 28

But it is not enough to affirm this as a fact, the correlation must still be interrogated. Even at the end of the laborious study we have reached only the point where the question can be posed: why must thought be conceived as response to a hail in the first place? Why is it the duality of δν that hails thought? How does it do so? Again, we have been speaking about “correlation,” but in fact it is a compound of two correlations: the first between Being and beings, the second between this duality and thought. What, then, is the intrinsic connection between the two correlations? What explains the unity of the correlation, sc. what is the element in which its members dwell? Is it something prior to the correlation, therefore some “third” thing (ein drittes), which, in fact, would be a “first” thing, sc. a genuinely primary thing out of which the members of the correlation arise? 29

To be sure, Heidegger is already under way towards probing such questions. In the essay on Parmenides’ Moiex, for example, the author meditates once more the sense of αὐτό as the unfolding duality which guards the orientation of thought to this unfolding. Αὐτό, then, is presumably the absolutely ultimate

---

28 WD, pp. 173 (vorgegeben), 174 (Parmenides, etc.), 148 (Geheiß).
29 WD, pp. 162 (daß Geheißes), 148 (weshalb, auf welche Weise), 147 (drittes).
"third" thing which allows both Being (of beings) and thought to arise. What is more, ωτό is called the process of truth which constitutes Being-as-history. But is this really an advance? Or are we simply contemplating once more the aboriginal Discord? No matter. We are "under way" in thought, and for Heidegger that is all that counts.30

II. General Remarks

Our main task has been accomplished. We wish now to cull certain oblique remarks that are subsidiary to the main argument, which we have just seen. To give them a frame of reference, let us profit from the intimate affinity that we have just noticed between WD (1952) and EM (1935) and recall the basic characterization of the thought-process as it was delineated in 1935. Then as now, thought was conceived as λέει-νοείν, whereby There-being overcomes its de-cadence in order to discern the law of negativity within Being and consents to be the There of such a process. This is "de-cision." Concretely, this means a willing (because re-solve) to know (because a standing within the revelation of beings). To will-to-know, however, is to pose a question, hence thought thus understood is essentially interrogative thought, where the to-be-interrogated (the eminently question-able) is precisely the negatived Being-process itself. Foundational thought tries to interrogate this process "more originally" than ever has been done before, sc. by approaching closer to the Source from which all thought derives. Hence, it is a re-trive of what others did not, could not, think/say, a procedure which, because itself intrinsically finite, must be repeated again and again. Since the Being-process is Αἔγον, thought-as-retrieve must interrogate the sense of language. Thus far EM. In examining WD, we let this pattern serve as orientation. Since with this study we conclude our research, we include those indices in the works appearing after 1952 that add any significant light, without pretending to completeness, however, with regard to them.

30 VA, pp. 249 (ωτό), 252 ('Αλόθεια, Geschichte). WD, p. 12 (unterwegs).
I. Being: 'Α-λήθεια

That Being for Heidegger is the coming-to-pass of Ą-λήθεια in beings is clear enough by now. What is interesting in WD is to see how the negativity of the process plays an essential rôle in the e-vocation of thought, for in addressing man, and therefore in revealing itself through beings, Being simultaneously withdraws. Yet even though this withdrawal is necessitated by the "not"-character of Being, we must not consider it merely negative. It is withdrawal, after all, that gives any particular manifestation its special character. "... By itself, [Being's] withdrawing is not nothing. Withdrawal is [an] event. ..." 31 As we saw in analysing the hail, Being in withdrawal draws-with it, sc. at-tracts There-being. This is the hail that calls There-being to play its rôle in the event, for the at-traction constitutes There-being in the ecstatic condition we call ek-sistence. Ek-sistence thus understood, then, is open-ness to Being as negatived. Furthermore, it is precisely inasmuch as it is thus negatived that Being is thought-worthy. "... This withdrawal is that which properly gives [us] the to-be-thought, [sc.] is [Being-as-] eminently-thought-worthy. ..." 32

After all, is it not the withdrawal of Being in its bestowal that constitutes the ontological difference? In other words, it is this which constitutes the intrinsic ambivalence of Ąv. That is why the entire history of Western thought from Parmenides to Nietzsche, which dealt with the intrinsically ambiguous Ąv, is the series of man's successive responses to the hail of Being-as-negatived, addressed to him through the beings in which this negativity comes-to-pass.

2. Being: Λόγος

In EM, the process of Ą-λήθεια was identical with the process of Λόγος, and since 1944 this particular conception has been

\[\text{\footnotesize 31 "... Allein – das Sichentziehen ist nicht nichts. Entzug ist Ereignis...." (WD, p. 3). This theme is elaborated throughout all SG. V.g. p. 97.}
\[\text{\footnotesize 32 "... Dieser Entzug ist das, was eigentlich zu denken gibt, ist das Bedenklichste...." (WD, p. 5). Note that Being-as-negatived is also the origin of awe, which, when it comes to pass in There-being, may be a manner of Being's disclosure to man (cf. VA, p. 263 and WM, p. 47).} \]
WHAT E-VOKES THOUGHT?

thematized more and more. This is just as true, if less explicitly so, in WD. What is emphasized is the negativity of the process. For a more explicit treatment of λόγος in its positivity, we must wait until “The Essence of Language” (1957–58) and “The Way unto Language” (1959). In the former, for example, we are told something that is for us at this point almost self-evident:

... The earliest [mittence of Being] that through Western thought finds its way into word is the relation between thing and word, and, indeed, in the form of the relation between Being and Uttering. This relation overwhelms thought so completely that it is articulated in a single word: λόγος. This word speaks at once the name for Being and the name for Uttering.

In these latter essays, Being is explicitly thematized as aboriginal Utterance, but it is remarkable how closely the conception of the origin of language rejoins the appeal-response problematic of WD. For the moment, however, we restrict ourselves to WD. Being (Λόγος) is negatived, hence Being withdraws in the beings it reveals, sc. in the words that are just brought to expression. This means that there is a “not” in every word, behind which Being, with all its inexhaustible wealth, retreats. This constitutes the domain of the un-said, immanent in everything that is said. But the un-said is not nothing. It is the hidden wealth of the said. It is the noiseless voice that speaks within the words to which we attend, constituting the said as such. “... Every original and authentic naming expresses something unsaid, and, indeed, in such a fashion that it remains unsaid. ...” We recognize the essentials of Being-as-mystery.

84 “... Denn mit das Frühereste, was durch das abendländische Denken ins Wort gelangt, ist das Verhältnis von Ding und Wort, und zwar in der Gestalt des Verhältnisses von Sein und Sagen. Dieses Verhältnis überfällt das Denken so bestürzend, daß es sich in einem einzigen Wort ansagt. Es lautet: λόγος. Dieses Wort spricht in einem zumal als der Name für das Sein und für das Sagen.” (US, p. 185). As we know, the identity was not thought. Hence the necessity for Heidegger, as he sees it, to “make an experience” of language (US, p. 159), to “bring language as language to language” (US, p. 242).
85 The most significant change, perhaps, is conceiving the appeal of λόγος as “sending man on his way” (Be-wegen) (US, p. 261 and passim). For the rest, the “Language” study of 1950 contains the essential.
Furthermore, the negativity of Being in language is such that it not only remains as such withdrawn in words, but it even dupes man into disregarding it:

... That is to say, [Being-as-Utterance] plays in such a way with our process of language that it gladly lets our language wander astray in the more obvious meanings of words. It is as if man had difficulty in dwelling authentically in language. It is as if the danger to which [man] most easily succumbs is that of everydayness.\(^{37}\)

We interpret this to mean: that Being holds the primacy in the coming-to-pass of language, not only in its positivity but in its negativity; that man by nature is “thrown” into language and, thus thrown, is the plaything of negatived Being-as-utterance (“... the essenc-ing of language plays with us. ...”);\(^ {38}\) that it is because man from the beginning is the plaything of Being-as-utterance in its negativity that he is so susceptible to the lure of everydayness in his use of words, sc. taking them as mere “conventional signs,” as “sounds filled with meaning,” to be used as the instruments of daily living; that we find here in terms of the problem of language all the characteristics that we discerned (WW) in Being-as-(negatived)-truth: Being conceals itself (therefore mystery), dupes man into overlooking this concealment (therefore errance), dominates in every way his fallen condition;\(^ {39}\) that in order to think the Being-process (sc. the emergence of the ontological difference) in terms of language, man presumably must learn how to achieve authenticity in this fallen condition by responding to the negativity of Being in language, and he does this by penetrating beyond the ordinary, everyday meanings of words in order to enter the realm of the un-said; that such an effort is precisely what EM called “decision.”

\(^{37}\) “... Die Sprache spielt nämlich so mit unserem Sprechen, daß sie dieses gern in die mehr vordergründigen Bedeutungen der Worte weggeben läßt. Es ist, als ob der Mensch Mühe hätte, die Sprache eigentlich zu bewohnen. Es ist, als ob gerade das Wohnen der Gefahr des Gewöhnlichen am leichtesten erliege.” (WD, p. 83).

\(^{38}\) “... das Wesen der Sprache spielt mit uns,...” (WD, p. 83). See p. 87 (gesetzt).

\(^{39}\) WD, pp. 168 (Zeichensystem), 87-89 (Gewöhnlichkeit), 120 (Betätigung der Sprachwerkzeuge). Cf. VA, pp. 245 (Verhüllung), 253-255 (alltäglichen Vernehmen).
B. THE RESPONSE

I. Thought as Spring

It is to the emergent ontological difference, appealing to man out of the process of Ἀ-λήθεια-Λόγος to bring it to pass, that There-being must respond. The response, as the author conceives it here, is a surrender to negatived Being in terms of language. It is an attempt to re-collect the mystery, and whether the re-trive be made in dialogue with Nietzsche or Parmenides, or simply in a single analysis of words (v.g. “e-voke”), the sense is always the same. Stripping off the everyday meanings of words, the author claims to discern their authentic sense, introducing us thus into the hidden domain of the un-said. His whole method becomes a heeding-of, a caring-for, a tending (better: at-tending) to Utterance of words. He strives to find his own way to their Source, discovering thus their abiding freshness. Such for Heidegger is the way his thought must go. “The heeding of the Utterance in words should be the decisive and determining step on the way of thought that is known by the name of philosophy, . . .”

Now such a passage unto the Source of language Heidegger calls a “leap” or “spring.” The word implies that there is no “bridge” between presentative thinking and the meditation on Being-as-source. That is why foundational thinking is not simply a more energetic type of presentative thought but proceeds from a completely different origin. By such a leap, we accomplish the trans-lation of ourselves into the Being-process which alone makes genuine translation of a thinker like Parmenides possible. It is only thus that we engage in true dialogue.

It is a leap into the un-said (un-thought), which hides behind the “not” that is intrinsic to every finite word (being). Since the thinker passes thus unto the Origin itself, we see here what it means to think the origins of thought “more originally” than

40 "Das Achten auf das Sagen der Worte soll jedoch der maß-und richtunggebende Schritt auf den Weg des Denkens sein, das unter dem Namen Philosophie bekannt ist...." (WD, p. 90). See WD, pp. 82-84 (ungewohnte Bedeutung), 89, 90 (Brunnen, quillend), 109 (Frische). Cf. “dwelling near the Source” in “Re-collection” (1943).

41 WD, pp. 4, 5 (Wissenschaft), 140-141 (übersetzen), 170 (Gespräch). Heidegger distinguishes dialogue (Gespräch) from “conversation” in this: dialogue deals with “the un-said,” mere conversation with the “said.” As for the “influence” of one thinker upon another in dialogue, see WD, p. 39.
before (EM), to be "more Greek" than the Greek thinkers themselves.\textsuperscript{42} In all this, we are dealing clearly with re-trive and discern easily its tri-dimensional structure: meditating what-is-as-having-been (past), thought lets the un-said Origin come (future) and brings it into words (present). This spring Heidegger calls a leap "backwards," sc. back and away from presentative thinking, into the un-thought. We discern at once the structure of the "step in reverse," which Heidegger in 1957 tells us is the fundamental characteristic of his entire method.\textsuperscript{43}

It is worth-while insisting that this is not so much a step back from the "present" and into the "past," as through the past and into the future, sc. into Αὐτὸς in continual ad-vent. But this spring into man’s Origin is a return to the element that he has never left and cannot leave, for it is that by which he is. "... A curious thing, indeed an uncanny thing, that we first make a spring onto the [very] ground whereon, properly speaking, we [already] stand. . ." \textsuperscript{44}

This has a familiar ring. In SZ, were we not forced to admit that in disengaging the characteristics of the antecedent comprehension of Being with which man by nature is endowed, we are indeed "going in a circle," the "hermeneutic" circle? Whereas a "logical" circle must be broken, the task in the case of the hermeneutic circle is not to leave the circle of presupposition but to enter into it more and more profoundly, in order to discern all the more clearly the nature of what is presupposed. Here the same returns:

... In itself, the question, "What E-vokes Thought?," is not without presupposition. So little is this the case that what people like to call here presupposition is precisely [the problem that] this question approaches and enters upon.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{42} US, p. 134 (griechisch Gedachte griechischer denken). This is the sense of Heidegger’s meditation on the pre-Socratics: they thought Being as revealment but not as an e-vent in which concealment plays an equally important rôle. Hence they did not think the ontological difference as such. See WD, p. 145; VA, pp. 241, 247-248.

\textsuperscript{43} WD, p. 52 (Sprung zurück); ID, p. 45 (Schritt zurück). Cf. WM, p. 49 (Abschied). A case in point: the entire effort of SG is explicitly an effort to accomplish this spring. V.g. see SG, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{44} "... Eine seltsame Sache oder gar eine unheimliche Sache, daß wir erst auf den Boden springen müssen, auf dem wir eigentlich stehen. . ." (WD, p. 17).

\textsuperscript{45} "... Allein die Frage 'Was heißt Denken?' ist nicht voraussetzungslos. Sie ist es so wenig, daß sie gerade auf das, was man hier Voraussetzung nennen möchte, zugeht und darauf sich einläßt." (WD, p. 162). Cf. SZ, pp. 314-315, 310.
WHAT E-VOKES THOUGHT?

What is the "presupposition" here? It is the correlation between Being and the nature of man, which first enables the question to arise. For thought never goes "out" from man and "over" to Being, thence to return and contemplate the bridge which it itself has thus built. "... Much rather, every way of thought from the very beginning moves within the entire relationship between Being and the essence of man, otherwise it is not thought. ..." 46 It is precisely this relationship which the present question interrogates. And the more Heidegger probes this correlation, the nearer he moves toward the center of the hermeneutic circle. What is the nature of this center? This is the question that more and more preoccupies him; it is thus that we understand the "third" thing, the genuinely ultimate, which presumably gives rise to both members of the correlation, for "... the relationship between Being and the nature of man sustains everything inasmuch as it brings as well the shining-forth of Being as the essenc-ing of man to issue. ..." 47

2. Viewing

To achieve authenticity, the thinker must make a spring into Being, better into the center of the hermeneutic circle. But it is not a "blind" leap. On the contrary, the thinker must make it with eyes wide open. We discern here, transformed into the terminology of seeing, what we often have found expressed in the terminology of hearing (attend-ing, attend-ant): the attitude of total docility to Being in ad-vent. The present form is not unprecedented. Did not SZ admit that man's comprehension of Being could be expressed in terms of the classic metaphor of sight? 48 But there is an interesting corollary, for There-being in its leap is not only see-ing but seen. If we may say that by see-ing the thinker "eyes" (Er-blicken) Aβγος, then we must say

---

47 "... Aber weil die Beziehung von Sein und Menschenwesen alles trägt, insofern sie das Erscheinen des Seins sowohl wie das Wesen des Menschen zum Austrag bringt...." (WD, p. 45).
48 WD, p. 141 (Blicksprunges). Cf. SZ, p. 146. The attitude of docility which is common denominator of both "metaphors" accounts for the insistence on their fundamental unity. See VA, p. 217 and SG, p. 118.
that Λόγος "eyes" the thinker first (uns anblickt), and we must call the correlation between Being and thought a mutual "eye-ing," just as we previously called it a mutual want-ing.49 The German word for "eye" is Auge, so that at one time the verb form of "eye-ing" or "to eye" was er-äugnen. Even as late as Lessing, this was the spelling of the current form (sich) ereignen, which we have been translating as the "coming-to-pass of an event." What Heidegger currently calls Ereignis, then, suggests the correlation of Being and thought conceived as mutual eye-ing: Being casts its eye on man (appeal), and There-being catches Being's eye in turn (response).50

There is another nuance to add here apropos of the leap (step-in-reverse) as an eye-ing of Λόγος. With regard to the rigor of foundational thought, we spoke about its warrant. What is the criterion, we asked, which assures us that the un-said is really uttered by Being? Heidegger answers in the present context:

... Something viewed can be verified only insofar as it constantly continues to be viewed. Something viewed can never be proven by argument of pros and cons. Such a procedure forgets the [one] decisive factor, the [simple] viewing. ...51

What evidence is there, then, that it is Being which discloses itself to the thinker, when he leaps into the un-thought (un-said)? Being itself, nothing else! If the procedure seems arbitrary, this cannot be helped, since it is impossible for the thinker to produce any ontic argument to prove his case. The only evidence is Being. The thinker's only task is to make a continual effort to keep it always in view, and since every effort is finite, this

49 SG (1953), pp. 85, 97.
50 This conception of Ereignis has been discernible since at least 1946 (see VA, p. 99). One would do Heidegger an injustice, however, to suppose that the matter were as simple as all this. We must overhear also the word signen ("to be adapted to," "to be the property of," etc.) and understand the process by which Being ap-propriates to man his essence in order to ap-propriate him to itself. (See ID [1957], pp. 28-29). Obviously the English "event" cannot hope to retain all these nuances, but it has certain modest virtues not to be disdained: it connotes clearly the horizon of time which is central to the whole perspective; it connotes the occasional character of mittence which composes inter-mittence; it connotes by reason of its etymology (e-venire) the sense of "issue" (Austrag), therefore permits us to understand it as that ultimate unity whence difference-as-issue proceeds.
51 "... Erblicktes läßt sich stets nur so ausweisen, daß es je und je erblickt wird. Erblicketes läßt sich nie durch Anführung von Gründen und Gegengründen beweisen. Solches Verfahren vergibt das Entscheidende, das Hinblicken...." (WD, p. 142).
means that it must be repeated, sc. the thinker must accomplish
the step-in-reverse again and again in order to keep his eye on
Being.52

3. Interrogation

More precisely, how is the thinker always to keep his eye on
Being? Here the author's answer is clear and quite important,
for we see now the full sense of what he means by interrogative
thought. The attentive beholding of Being is sustained only inso-
far as we constantly put Being to question. We understand the
point best, perhaps, if we recall that the Being into which the
thinker leaps with-draws in beings and hides its inexhaustible
wealth behind a "not." It is thus that Being gives itself to us as
the thought-worthy. Inasmuch as it is thought-worthy, it is also
question-worthy, or, as we say more idiomatically, "question-
able." "... What gives itself [as thought-worthy] is the gift of
the eminently Question-able." 53

Now in the inevitable with-drawing from man, Being-as-
questionable naturally draws man with it. Hence man's exis-
tence as such is an open-ness to Being-as-questionable, and
the thought-ful response to Being that hails man thus, sc. the
achieving of authenticity, will take the form of interrogation.
"... Such thinking would be a thanks-giving to the Thought-
worthy ... which would guard the Thought-worthy inviolable
in its questionableness. ..." 54 In other words, docility to Being-
as-questionable means to place it continually in question.

Is there an answer to the questioning? Of course there is. But
any answer lets us comprehend better the Question-able as such
and therefore devolves into an ever more penetrating interro-
gation. The way that thought must follow, then, (and here we
change the metaphor of "spring" but remain faithful to its

52 WD, p. 149 and VA, p. 139 (Ausschau); SG pp. 85 (ursprünglichere Aneignung),
150 (ursprünglicher springen).
53 "... Was sich so gibt, ist die Gabe des Fragwürdigsten." (WD, p. 149). Cf.
pp. 103, 111-115 passim, and above where apropos of WG we discuss the trans-
54 "... Dieses Denken wäre die Verdankung des Bedenklichsten in seine eigenste
Abgeschiedenheit, die das Bedenklichste unversehrbar in seine Fragwürdigkeit ver-
wahrt...." (WD, p. 159). See pp. 162-163 (die ihm gemäße Frag-Würdigkeit), 115
(im Fragwürdigen halten), 238 (Weg in das Fragwürdige).
sense) is not a well-traveled road, already laid out before us as a mere entity which the thinker need only traverse in his turn. Rather it is a path that every thinker must step by step break for himself, and these steps along the way are successive stages of the questioning. "... It is first and only by going one's way, [and] here [we mean] by thought-ful questioning, [that] there is movement along the way...." and only if the questioning continues does the thinker remain "under way" in thought. If, according to this conception, the thinker must let every step of the way come to him as he proceeds, this is simply telling evidence for the fact that interrogative thought by nature is "tentative," where this word should be taken in its most radical sense to suggest: that the effort (tentare) of thought never can be remitted; that success is never more than provisional.

The tentativeness of thought, thus understood, crystallizes in the relentlessness of the questioning. There is ample evidence of this in the analysis as it proceeds in WD. For example, the translation of Parmenides, even after it is accomplished, and even when stated declaratively, remains always a questioning one, and this means that it is always open to question. In fact, the author seems to count his effort a success if his readers simply place Parmenides' saying in question, for what is desirable is not to absolve the questioning by an answer but simply to achieve by it a deeper fidelity to Being-as-questionable.

We are in a position now to appreciate why Heidegger's own thought-process is so profoundly characterized by the question. If he speaks of his whole work as an "effort at thought," this must be accepted as more than an affectation, for the formula makes clear that "... [he] has followed the way of questioning, whereon [he] has assumed [Being], the Questionable[.] as the

---

55 "... Erst und nur das Gehen, hier das denkende Fragen, ist die Be-wegung...." (WD, p. 164). See pp. 164-165 (Frage immer fragwürdiger). What we translate here (1952) as "movement along the way" (Be-wegung) becomes in 1958 more explicitly the response to ἀφώς as the domain (Gegend) which has opened up for man the ways of thought and sent him on his way (bewegen). See v.g. US, pp. 297-298. Cf. the interpretation of ἄφώς in Aristotle (P, p. 281).

56 WD, p. 164 (Vor-läufigkeit). We are interpreting Vorläufigkeit here rather than translating it. The explanation of "tentative" is not found as such in German.

57 WD, pp. 141 (stets fragendes), 145 (fragender als bisher), 161 (die Frage ins Fragwürdige zu bringen). Cf. VA, p. 161 (Fragwürdiges: Denkwürdiges).
only place of sojourn [worthy] of thought.” 68 Even in KM (1929) it was a case of “keeping the investigation open through questioning.” 59 Again in SF (1955), we see the attitude in all possible concreteness, for the dialogue is sustained by resolute questioning. At one point the author interrupts himself to say: “I write all this in the form of questions, for at present a [foundation] thought can do no more, as far as I see, than give unremitting thought to what the foregoing questions call forth. . . .” 60

Two observations are of special importance: 1. In “The Question about Technicity” (1953), the author concludes by saying that the closer we draw to negatived Being-as-questionable, the more interrogative we become, “. . . for interrogation is the piety of thought.” 61 This is perfectly consequent with all that we have been saying. In 1958, however, he rejects the formula, and the reason is illuminating. The fundamental attitude of thought is not, first of all, an interrogating, but an attending to Being’s appeal. Hence, we must always understand the interrogation as subordinate to attending and a function of it. This is a salutary reminder but not an absolutely necessary one, for already in EM (1935) we were told that even in interrogation Being holds the primacy. “Only where Being opens itself up in questioning does history come-to-pass. . . .” 62

2. The interrogative method is so deeply inscribed in the nature of thought that for Heidegger there are no “absolutes” in genuine thought. The point is made with regard to “absolutely valid” interpretations of any given text, but one feels that the statement may be expanded to absolute truths of any kind, for the reason given is that absolute validity can be had only within the realm of presentative thought. The author does not deny that such absolutes are possible, but only that they are accessible to

69 “. . . So bleibt nur das Eine, die Untersuchung durch Fragen offenzuhalten.” (KM, p. 221).
70 “Ich schreibe dies alles in der Form von Fragen; denn mehr vermag heute, soweit ich sehe, ein Denken nicht, als unablässig das zu bedenken, was die angeführten Fragen hervorrufen. . . .” (SF, p. 25). See SF, p. 10 (unentwegten Fragen).
71 “. . . Denn das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Denkens.” (VA, p. 44).
618 FROM BEING TO THERE—THE RE-TRIEVE OF THOUGHT

human thought as such. If such truths are to be had, he must be grounded, he claims, in an absoluteness that faith can give but not thought. “The unconditioned character of faith and the questionableness of thought are two different domains [that are] a chasm apart.”

4. Freedom

There is one last step to take. What is the characteristic gesture in man by which the interrogation of beings comes about? It is not an act of conquest; it is an act of surrender. It is an abandoning of oneself to the question, a letting-oneself-in-upon it, a com-mitting of oneself to its demands, an opening oneself up, a throwing wide one’s heart, a setting oneself upon the way of thought. All these metaphors say the same: they describe an act of freedom by which There-being acquiesces to Being’s hail.

An act of freedom, of letting-be! For Being’s hail to thought solicits but does not necessitate, invites but does not compel. It leaves There-being free to refuse its call, for it is the hail of Being that first constitutes There-being as free:

... The hail [of Being] brings our essence into the domain of the Free, and this, indeed, in so decisive a fashion that what summons us unto thought constitutes in the first place the freedom of the Free, in order that what is free in a human way can dwell therein....

We interpret this to mean: that what is free in the most original sense is not There-being but Being, because Being (Α-λήθεια) is liberation, therefore a freeing from concealment, and as such is the “domain of the Free”; that There-being as the There of Being is the There of (Being) the Free; that Being, in effi-

84 V.g. WD, p. 103 (uns einlassen, schicken, aufmachen, aufschließen, auf den Weg begeben).
85 “... Das Geheiß bringt unser Wesen ins Freie und dies so entschieden, daß Jenes, was uns in das Denken ruft, allererst Freiheit des Freien gibt, damit menschlich Freies darin wohnen kann....” (WD, p. 153).
86 See VA, p. 33 (Freiheit: Bereich des Geschickes). When this is thought in terms of Being-as-history, we understand in what sense Heidegger understands the historical tradition (Überlieferung) as a “de-liverance” (δέλτοιος). See WP, pp. 14-15; SG, p. 171; N, II, p. 398.
cacious wanting There-being to be, thereby constitutes it as free, sc. as ek-sistence, ecstatically open unto (Being) the Free; 67 that the freedom of There-being therefore reposes still more originally in the freedom of Being ("... freedom, therefore, is never something merely human, ..."); 68 that the supreme moment of There-being’s freedom comes-to-pass when of its own accord, without constraint, it consents to be the There of (Being) the Free, sc. when it achieves authenticity. 69

What does Heidegger’s own procedure in WD tell us about the authentic response to Being-as-negatived in language? The thinker must overcome the everydayness by surrendering to Being (Δέγος). Whether the surrender be conceived as a self-translation, or a spring-backward, or a fixing one’s gaze upon, or a relentless interrogating of Being, the sense is always the same: the surrender in consummate freedom to the hail of Being-as-negatived. What are we to call this surrender? In SZ, the hail was the voice of conscience, the acquiescence was re-solve. In WD, the hail is an e-vocation, the response is foundational thought.

**Résumé**

What e-vokes thought? Being — 'Α-ληθευόμεν — Δέγος! As Being, it is the process by which all beings emerge into presence; as 'Α-ληθευόμεν, this presenc-ing is a mingling of darkness and light, hence comports a “not” in beings which constitutes the ontological difference; as Δέγος, the emergent difference is aboriginal Utterance. In order that the process take place, there is need of a There among beings, in and through which the scission comes-to-pass. This want of a There is already an e-vocation of thought, conceived as a fundamental structure. Since this structure constitutes the essence of man, it lies within the power of There freely to accept or reject this com-mitment. To accept (thought-
as-function) is to acquiesce in all the exigencies of Being-as-negatived-truth and thus achieve authenticity. Concretely, this is accomplished when There-being surrenders to the Being-process by leaping through the past and into the future as into the Source whence all thought springs. By reason of this leap, There-being on the one hand achieves itself and on the other hand brings to fulfillment the process of 'A-λαθεια, whose There it is. Since 'A-λαθεια is a liberation from darkness, this leap is a fulfillment of freedom. It is this free acquiescence to Being-as-negatived (re-solve) that we understand by foundational thought.

Inside the hermeneutic circle, round and round we go!
CONCLUSION

"Ἔσπερε, πάντα φέρων, ὃσα φαίνολις ἑσχέδαι' αὖως

O star of evening, thou bringest all things homeward
That the shining dawn dispersed.

Sappho, Fragment 95
If at this point we draw our study to a close, the reason is not that we have reached the end of the way but only that we have discerned its direction with sufficient clarity to permit us to comprehend its sense. We wish now to prescind from the different steps we have followed and to meditate the sense of the way as such. We conclude with an effort at \( \text{xptveiv} \), provided that this word be understood in what for Heidegger himself is its genuinely Greek sense: the cutting off of a being (\( \text{xptveiv} \)) from all else by setting it within its limits, where “limit” must be understood not as that point where something ceases but rather where it begins to be what it is.\(^1\) Our critique, then, has as its purpose to let-be-seen the limits within which Heidegger is what he is for contemporary thought.

A. HEIDEGGER I AND II

We are in a position now to compare Heidegger I and II, and we can see clearly: that the same problem preoccupies both (the effort to overcome, sc. ground, metaphysics by endeavoring to think the sense of Being-as-truth); that in both cases the effort is to overcome the subject-object polarity by letting come-to-pass the negatived process of non-concealment (truth); that the method characteristic of Heidegger II is the process of thought, of Heidegger I the process of phenomenology.

Let us compare the methods in detail. The nature of the being

\(^1\) See SG, p. 125. Cf. EM, p. 46 (Grenze).
that executes the method in Heidegger I is characterized as transcendence (to-be-in-the-World, existence), in Heidegger II (beginning with WW [1930]) as ek-sistence – in both cases, that being among other beings whose distinctive prerogative is to be open unto Being. In both cases, the process is profoundly marked by negativity (finitude): in Heidegger I by the finitude of transcendence, in Heidegger II by the finitude of the mittence of Being. In both cases, the process is temporo-historical: in Heidegger I, it is the process of There-being, in Heidegger II, it is Being, that is fundamental history. The structure of the process, however, is the same in both: Being comes (future) as having-been-already in what is (past) and is rendered manifest through the co-operation of man (present). Finally, in both cases, the process comes to its fulfillment only when man endorses it with his liberty: in Heidegger I, the process is called "re-solve," the culmination of phenomenology; in Heidegger II, it is called "thought."

If the analysis is valid, we must conclude that the thinking of Being as it is discerned in Heidegger II is not simply the term of an odyssey that began with the phenomenology of SZ. It is this phenomenology – the very same process of hermeneutic interpretation – transformed into a new modality. What is more, this transformation is not an arbitrary thing, determined by extrinsic circumstances. Much less is it an escape into a new problematic necessitated by the dereliction of the old. Rather, the transformation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II is born out of a necessity imposed by the original experience of Being as finite (negative). For the shift of focus from There-being to Being (which, as far as we can see, characterizes the decisive difference between the two periods) was demanded by the exigencies of the hermeneutic analysis itself, as soon as it became clear that the primacy in the Being-process belongs to Being itself. And when was this? Precisely when the author began to meditate the negativity of truth as such. This we take to be the genuine sense of the "reversal" in WW, for it was then that he began to appreciate the full import of what it means for concealment somehow to precede non-concealment in the coming-to-pass of \( \Delta \chi \theta \nu \zeta \alpha \).

But a transformation it was! And it would be just as erroneous to claim that Heidegger II is the "same" as Heidegger I, as
to see a cleavage between the two. For the Heidegger of the early years was victimized by the metaphysics he was trying to overcome. That is why the latter part of SZ never appeared and could not appear, any more than the intended complement to the essay "On the Essence of Truth" (which would have borne the title "The Truth of Essenc-ing") was feasible. In each case, the language of metaphysics, in whose ambiance each of these programs was essayed, was inadequate to the task of giving expression to an essentially non-(pre-)metaphysical thought. After all, "... no one can set himself outside a dominating ambiance of presentative [thinking] with a single leap. . . ."

Yet the leap was attempted and eventually found a provisional success. The success consists in having found a way to bring-to-expression that in the author's original experience which SZ did not and could not say. In other words, we understand the whole of Heidegger II to be a re-trive of Heidegger I. Do not the repeated attempts at self-interpretation say as much? Such an hypothesis permits us to take a middle position between two schools of interpretation: with those who claim that there is a complete dichotomy between the two periods, we can admit that Heidegger II indeed says what Heidegger I did not say; with those who insist on an absolute sameness, we can admit a profound continuity between the two periods and a necessary evolution from one to the other. Briefly: Heidegger I and Heidegger II are not the same (das Gleiche) – but they are one (das Selbe).

If this interpretation is correct, then Heidegger I is a past which still-is-as-having-been, which Heidegger II must re-collect. Even for the contemporary Heidegger, then, SZ must be considered as still in ad-vent and still to be re-trived. That is why a surprising number of the old themes keep returning – to such an extent, indeed, that one is tempted to say that all of the essential elements of the existential analysis of SZ can be disengaged from Heidegger II. For example, we can find the analysis of: the World as such in the meditation on the Quadrature (Weltgeviert) ; the World as Matrix and Total Meaningfulness in the

---


3 V.g. "The Thing", "Language" (Weltgeviert).
conception of what Heidegger calls Gestell; 4 with-being in the relationship between poet (therefore thinker) and people; 5 the ontological disposition in the insistence upon the need for attunement in poetry and thought; 6 comprehension, understood as project of World (Being), in the conception of Being as Dasein; 7 logos in the meditation on the essencing of language; 8 death in the designation of man as “mortal,” sc. that being which alone can know death as death; 9 concern in the problematic of thought-as-record; 10 authenticity in the notion of thinking-as-thanking; 11 historicity in the conception of thought as re-collection. 12 The focus of SZ has changed completely but the structures are exactly the same.

We may go still further. If Heidegger I is still in ad-vent even for the author himself, is this not even more the case for those who would follow along the way that with SZ was first opened-up? There is no need, then, to look upon the later development as a type of receivership imposed by the bankruptcy of SZ. On the contrary, it is only in the later Heidegger that the earlier becomes solvent, sc. truly free. It is from this point of view that we would try to see in unity two widely divergent perspectives. When A. De Waelhens says, for example, that “... [the conception of] concern resumes in the ontological order the Husserlian notion of intentionality . . .,” 13 this is certainly an illuminating insight into Heidegger I. When M. Müller, on the other hand, tells us that “the intentionality of the ‘self-emitting’ or the ‘historicity’ of Being is prior to all intentionality of conscience . . .,” 14 that is perfectly comprehensible in terms of Hei-
degger II. Our own hypothesis permits us to insist upon the coherence of these two positions, in fact their mutual complementation, for it is the "intentionality of Being" (Heidegger II) that at all times was the un-said of Heidegger I, rendering possible the entire structure of concern.

Perhaps this is the opportune moment to call attention to another problem that we have signalized several times before: the difficulty of reconciling the primacy of Being in the e-vent of truth with the nature of There-being as a project of this very same Being. One wonders if we might not approach a solution by meditating the sense of ἀπόρροια, according to which Being and thought (There-as-project) – these two "intentionalities" – are one in the identity of mutual belongingness.

We understand the matter thus: Heidegger's perspective from beginning to end remains phenomenological. By this we mean that he is concerned only with the process by which beings are lit up and reveal themselves as what they are for and to man. The lighting-process takes place in man – not through (sc. by reason of) him, yet not without him either. If the lighting-process does not take place by reason of man, then the Light itself holds the primacy in the process; if it does not take place without him, then the There is necessary that the Light be able to light-up, and to that extent may be considered as projecting the light. What the Light "in itself" or the projecting There "in itself" might be, independently of the process in which they cooperate, is simply not Heidegger's problem, presumably because neither one nor the other in that case would be a φανόμενον. A correlative identity such as this between disparate components in the unity of a single process has many parallels in the history of thought (v.g. in Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Hegel, etc.), but we must leave further treatment of the matter for another day.

However this may be, the program of SZ remains still-to-be-achieved, not simply because it was left unfinished by Heidegger I but because it is still in ad-vent by reason of the perspective opened in Heidegger II. And is it not legitimate to presume that, once we have learned something about the sense of Being by passing through the experience of Non-being and come to comprehend it more positively as the Holy and as original
Utterance, we may then return to other phenomena which hitherto have been mentioned only obliquely (v.g. freedom, boredom, work, presence of the There-being of a loved one) as genuine ways by which to experience Being and bring it to authentic expression?

From another point of view, the same may be said for metaphysics. Heidegger's purpose is not and never has been to “destroy” it, but to ground it through thinking the Being-process as such which gives rise to it. Foundational thinking “... does not tear the roots of philosophy out but dresses the ground and tills the soil...” 15 from which it draws its strength. Once we have come to appreciate the sense of the Being-process as such, it seems to be a suitable task of foundational thought to re-examine the classical problems of metaphysics (v.g. of human freedom, of co-existence with others and, above all, of God) with the help of this Light that Heidegger has brought to light.

To be sure, Heidegger himself is not moving in this direction, but is it fair to demand it of him? “... Indeed to every thinker there is but one way appointed – his own way – whose traces he must follow back and forth over and over again...,” 16 and the way we are suggesting is clearly not Heidegger’s own. All that we wish to maintain is that this way is a legitimate, indeed a necessary, manner for others to achieve fidelity to the direction that he has set.

B. UR-HEIDEGGER

Heidegger I and II are not the same, but they are one. They belong to each other in profound identity. What is to be said now about this oneness? What precisely is the living center of Heidegger’s experience? Given the relatively limited character of the data at our disposal, it would be presumptuous at the present time to attempt any type of pronouncement that would be anything more than provisional. But at least we may gather

15 “... Es reißt ... die Wurzel der Philosophie nicht aus. Es gräbt ihr den Grund und pflügt ihr den Boden ...” (WM, p. 9). The SZ formula, “destruction of the history of ontology” (SZ, pp. 19-27), is interpreted explicitly in SF (p. 36) of what we have come to understand as re-trive. Cf. N, II, p. 415.

16 “... Doch ist jedem Denkenden je nur ein Weg, der seine, zugewiesen, in dessen Spuren er immer wieder hin und her gehen muß, ...” (HW, pp. 194-195).
what data we have and see what help they give. In this respect, the conversation with a Japanese professor (1953–54) is especially illuminating.\footnote{Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache, (US, pp. 83–155).}

The theme of the discussion is the nature of language, and in the course of it the author explains how it came about that the meditation upon language should become the principal method of thinking Being. As we know, the first experience of the problem of Being came through the reading of Brentano. That somehow there is a correlation between Being and language began to become clear a few years later, when, as a seminarian, he began to meditate upon the relation between Sacred Scripture and the speculation of the theologians. An enthusiasm for Hölderlin and Trakl dates from the student years prior to World War I, and in 1915 the habilitation thesis, entitled \textit{Duns Scotus' Doctrine on Categories and Signification}, touched again in groping fashion the relation between Being and language, to the extent that “category” pertains to the Being of beings and “signification” suggests the relation between Being thus proposed and the language in which it is expressed.\footnote{Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (Tübingen, 1916). See US, pp. 91 (Habilitationsschrift), 96 (Theologiestudium).} The teaching career began in the winter of 1915. What is to be said about these early years we must infer from the titles of his courses and seminars. The title of the first course, “The Pre-Socratics: Parmenides,” rings familiar enough even today, and in the following year, a course on “Truth and Reality” suggests that he was grappling already with the problem of subject-ism, which would preoccupy him for so long. At any rate, we know that as early as 1920, when he devoted his lectures to the theme of “Expression and Appearing,” it was clear to his students that the Being-language problematic was central to his thought.\footnote{US, pp. 91, 92. In US, this course is ascribed to 1921 with the probable title, “Ausdruck und Erscheinung.” The Vorlesungsverzeichnis (see Appendix) which Professor Heidegger (subsequent to US) has verified, lists it as dating from 1920 with the title “Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks.” The theme, however, was “Ausdruck und Erscheinung.”} The problem was considered, too, in conjunction with a meditation on the nature of poetry and art, for at that time expressionism was in vogue and invited philosophical reflection in terms of expression and appearance.

\textit{Conclusion}
In addressing himself to the problem thus posed, Heidegger was quite consciously engaged in trying to get beyond the subject-object relationship. As used in 1921, the word “appearing” (Erscheinung) received already an interpretation that was completely radical, going beyond the normal Kantian one, even beyond the entire post-Cartesian tradition, back to the Greek ἀπαρέσχοντα, which meant, as we have been told before, the process by which a being comes to shine forth of itself, thereby emerging into presence. With this interpretation he was already trying to explore, ever so haltingly, some realm that is “completely other” to the subject-object polarity. The term “expression,” however, remains laden with subject-ist connections, implying usually the making “external” of what is “internal,” sc. to the expressing subject.20

With the summer semester of 1923, SZ began to take written form, and for the first time there appeared the important word “hermeneutic” in the university lecture course (“Ontologie”). To examine the rôle which the word plays in the author’s thinking is to trace his entire development. He had had his first experience of the word as a seminarian when he heard in his theology courses of “hermeneutic” as a method of interpreting Holy Scripture. Latent here already in obscure, still inaccessible, fashion, as we have mentioned already, was the whole problem of the relation between Being and language. So far-reaching was the import of this experience that forty years later the author would say: “without this theological heritage I would never have gained the way of thought. ...” 21

Later he found the word “hermeneutic” in Dilthey, who had taken it from the same source, sc. theology — in particular from the theological writings of Schleiermacher, who had given to the word the broad meaning of an art by which one correctly understands and judges the writings of another. It was an easy step to expand this meaning of “hermeneutic” still further so that it could apply to any type of interpretation whatever, even to the plastic arts.22 All this matured slowly. As SZ crystallized, the
author began to conceive “hermeneutic” more radically still. It would mean for him not simply a manner of interpretation, but interpretation itself would be conceived in terms of a still more fundamental process of hermeneutic.

How was this process to be understood? Heidegger went to the radical sense of ἐπηρεασμός, which, he maintains, bears profound affinity with the Greek deity Hermes, herald of the gods. ἐπηρεασμός for the maturing Heidegger came to mean to play the rôle of herald, to bear tidings, or, more simply, to make something manifest (Darlegen). What for him must be made manifest, ever since the philosophical awakening with Brentano, is the Being of beings in its difference from beings. So it happened that “hermeneutic” came to mean the entire effort to let Being be manifest, sc. to achieve a more original assumption of Being in order to lay the groundwork of metaphysics.  

But at the start, it was not explicitly the foundation of metaphysics as such that preoccupied him. Assistant to Husserl until invited to Marburg in 1923, the young Heidegger gave his first loyalty to phenomenology and sought simply to think the essence of phenomenology in its origins, so as to give to it a rightful place in the philosophical tradition of the West. This probing into origins was from the very beginning the sense of re-trive. The early interpretation (1921) of φαινεται is evidence enough. At any rate, it is easy to see how “hermeneutic” (the process of letting-be-manifest) and φαινόμενα (that which manifests itself), plus ἀγεννεύω (to let-be-manifest), rejoined each other to such an extent that “hermeneutic” and “phenomenology” became for Heidegger but one. If “hermeneutic” retains a nuance of its own, this is the connotation of language. But it will be a long time before this comes to fruition. In SZ, it remains in the background while the phenomenological analysis unfolds in full panoply, then it emerges tentatively in the summer semester of 1934 with the course on “Logic,” more decisively in 1944 with the course bearing the same title. At any rate, it was because phenomenology seemed to offer promise of unfolding the hermeneutic that Heidegger dedicated SZ to Edmund Husserl.

83 US, pp. 121 (ἐπηρεασμός), 109 (Ανεignung).
84 US, pp. 95 (Wesen der Phänomenologie), 130-131 (ursprünglicher zurückzugewinnen), 93 (Hintergrund), 92, 269 (Husserl gewidmet).
As Heidegger now, in the fullness of his years, looks back on those early efforts, he concedes quite readily their stumbling insufficiency. Neither in 1907 nor in 1915 did he discern the full import of this experience. Even in 1921, when the direction already was set, he was only trying... to follow a way which was leading [he] knew not where. Only the immediate prospect was known to [him], for this was continually opening-up, even if the field of vision often shifted and grew dark.25

However dark the way, this much is clear: Heidegger was not his own master. He only followed a course (Spur) that was set for him – but follow it he did:

... The course was a scarcely perceptible promise of a liberation unto freedom, now dark and confusing, now a lightning-flash of sudden insight which then again for a long period of time withdrew from every attempt to utter it.26

From this it becomes clear that, no matter what must be said about the orientation of Heidegger I in SZ (1927), the experience which comes to expression in Heidegger II (where Being in simultaneous revealment-concealment holds the primacy over thought) dates at least from 1921, when he was already engaged in what he later calls the historical process of thought-ful dialogue.27 What else is there to conclude than that Heidegger II is more original than Heidegger I, went before him along the way? By the same token we are given to understand that if Heidegger I reverses his perspective in order to become Heidegger II, the reason is not that the effort went bankrupt but that the thinker simply left one place in order to gain another along the same way. "... What abides in thought is the way. ..." 28

The way is the same today as in 1927, and even if the term

26 "... Die Spur war ein kaum vernehmbares Versprechen, das eine Befreiung ins Freie ankündigte, bald dunkel und verwirrend, bald blitzartig wie ein jäher Einblick, der sich dann auf lange Zeit hinaus wieder jedem Versuch, ihn zu sagen, entzog." (US, p. 137). Note how the conception of thought as making-one's-way along paths that Being opens up for the thinker is based, apparently, on a personal experience of the author.
27 US, p. 128 (Geschichtliche des denkenden Gespräches).
28 "... Das Bleibende im Denken ist der Weg...." (US, p. 99).
"phenomenology" has disappeared (in order to leave the process
name-less, so that no fixed formula would freeze its movement),
the whole effort is as much a hermeneutic as ever. In fact, inasmuch as Heidegger has found a way to probe the relation between Being and language, we have a right to say that now in the full unfolding of Heidegger II, as he meditates the sense of Being in terms of Λόγος, we have achieved, however inadequately, the principal ambition of Heidegger I.

Yet with this all is not yet said. For even if it be granted that Heidegger II is more original (sc. closer to the origins of the primordial experience) than Heidegger I, it seems inexact to say that even he is absolutely primary. After all, we are not yet at the end of the journey – clearly we are still "under way" (unterwegs). This is strikingly apparent if we note that the two words which most profoundly characterize Heidegger’s whole effort now seem inadequate. The word “Being,” for example, has almost completely disappeared from his vocabulary. The reason: this word is so saturated by the metaphysical tradition that in passing unto the ground of metaphysics it seems better to drop it completely. Again, the word “language,” too, has lost its charm, and in its stead we find more and more the word “utterance,” to designate language in its origins. It is perfectly obvious, then, that there is some hidden power still more original than Heidegger II which gives rise to both I and II. Let us call this primordial source the “Ur-Heidegger.” What can be said of him? The question must be posed, for unless we discern his physiognomy, how can we delineate the limits (χρίσεως) of this thinker so as to comprehend him in what he is for our time?

C. Κρίσεως

In trying to discern the limits of Heidegger’s conception of thought, we must delineate the negativity in the mittence which
conclusion

constitutes him by resorting, for the most part, to the interrogative method. We make every effort to avoid measuring him by any standards but his own. Implicitly, all of our questions come down to this: having seen the general direction of Heidegger's effort at thought, to what extent can we follow him along the way?

Beyond any doubt, Heidegger's great service to philosophy consists in having forced contemporary thought, proceeding as it does from a tradition that reaches from Anaximander to Husserl, to pose again the question about the sense of Being. If his work had no other value than that, our debt to him would still be immeasurable.

I. The Thinker

But who is it that thinks? Is ek-sistence merely the individual man, or all men, or humanity, or the essence of man as such? In the introduction to WM, for example, we are told that the There is the open-ness of Being as such and There-being the domain where Being essences (Wesensbereich), within which man “stands” or into which he can “enter,” 33 as if There-being were somehow that region wherein Being and man encounter each other. It is thus that H. Birault comprehends There-being:

... That hidden place where the essence of man and the essence of truth, both essential to each other, meet in order to “define” one another mutually — this we call There-Being — designating thereby that finite place of Being which man — finite being [that he is] — has not chosen but where out of necessity he is called to dwell.84

The profundity of this perspective no one will deny, and it is quite possible that on this level we have reached in There-being a point of intimacy between Being and man that precedes all distinction between singular and plural. Yet is there not something more to be said? How precisely are we to understand

83 WM, p. 14 (Wesensbereich, Stelle, Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seins ... worin der Mensch steht); WW, p. 27 (eingehen kann).
84 "... Corrélativement, ce lieu caché où l'essence de l'homme et l'essence de la vérité, toutes deux essentielles l'une à l'autre, se rencontrent pour se 'définir' mutuellement, nous l'appelons Da-Sein — en désignant par là ce lieu fini de l'Être que l'homme — être fini — n'a pas choisi mais où il est appelé à demeurer nécessairement." (H. Birault, “Existence et vérité ...,” pp. 37–38). Birault's italics.
the rôle of the individual in the process, and his relation to other 
individuals? After all, unless the Being-process (in There-being) 
emerges on the ontic level, it does not take place at all. Have we 
ot the right to ask, then, which "man," ontically speaking, is 
to bring foundational thinking to pass?

The same question may be posed in terms of time and his-
toricity. If the mittence of Being to There-being in thought 
constitutes an epoch of history, how are we to understand the 
relationship between an individual thinker and the epoch in 
which he lives, or between a thinker in one epoch (v.g. Kant) 
and a thinker in another (v.g. Heidegger)? More concretely: in 
the epoch of absolute idealism, Hegel and Hölderlin were "con-
temporaries." Were there at this time two mittences of Being 
and therefore two epochs? If only one epoch, how understand 
the relationship of both Hölderlin and Hegel to this very same 
epoch? to one another? Again, how understand the relationship 
between Trakl and his epoch? and the epoch of Hölderlin? In 
terms of Being-as-history, does Trakl belong, strictly speaking, 
to the epoch of Hölderlin? What is meant more precisely by 
"epoch"? What is the relationship between Being-as-history 
and ontic "history," sc. political, social, military and cultural 
events? Do not these, too, belong to the history of Being?

It is doubtful that Heidegger would deny the legitimacy of 
these questions; he probably would tell us that they are, at 
least as far as Being's grace (Huld) to him is concerned, merely 
premature. His own effort has gotten to the point of interro-
gating the sense of the mittence to Hegel, Hölderlin, Trakl, etc., 
and no farther. All else is still to be thought. Fair enough. The 
function of our χρίσμα is not to show Heidegger's lacunae but his 
limits.

2. Thought and Language

Heidegger has rendered great service by interrogating the re-
lationship between thought and language. We can see clearly 
the affinity between thinker and poet born of the fact that both 
dwell in a common near-ness to Being (Αἶγος). The problem, 
then, is how to differentiate them. The author gives us several 
hints, none of them wholly satisfying.
One explanation might be this: Through both poet and thinker Being comes into words by reason of a response to Being’s hail which has the structure of re-collection: Being comes (future) as having-been-already in what is (past), and is rendered manifest in words (present). What would distinguish poetry from thought would be the nature of the past. In poetry the past would be principally the things through which the poet experiences Being (the World, the Holy), and to which the poet, in response to Being’s hail, gives a name. For the poet, then, it would be this original nam-ing that holds the primacy. In thought, on the other hand, the past would be Being as already brought (in one way or another) into words, which must be retained in them by a constantly renewed re-trive. For the thinker, it is re-trive that holds the primacy. According to such an interpretation, the thinker would play a rôle in the event of language analogous to the conserver’s in the work of art.

Again, perhaps we could conceive of the hermeneutic relationship in such a way as to see in it two different directions: from aboriginal Utterance (Δυχος) to articulation (Verlautbarung) and from articulation to Utterance. The first would be the direction proper to the poet (v.g. “No thing is where faileth word”). The second would be the direction proper to thought (v.g. “An ‘is’ appears where word dissolves”), sc. the thinker, by re-trieving the authentic sense of words, would let Being (Δυχος) shine forth. But such an explanation does not explain why poetry is fundamentally a thinking, nor how thought differs from poetry when the thinker for his part, too, brings Being into words.

Once more for good measure! In WM: Ep, we are told that “… the thinker utters Being. The Poet names the Holy. . . .” But how distinguish Being and the Holy? HB told us that “Being as the mittence which e-mits truth . . . announces itself

---

35 US, pp. 21–22.
36 Cf. HW, p. 54 and HD, pp. 29–30, 140.
39 WM, p. 51.
40 “… Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige . . .” (WM, p. 51).
in poetry, without being manifest already as the history of Being. . . ." 41 Is it possible to understand the Holy as Being considered as revealment whose concomitant concealment is not experienced as concealment? It would be this to which the poet gives a name. In thought, on the other hand, Being would be experienced as the process of ἀ-λήθεια, sc. revealment and concealment, and brought to expression as such.

Or is all this too complicated? Could we find a more original simplicity if we reduced all three explanations to this: in poetry, Being is uttered — but not as Being; in thought Being is uttered as such? Fine, but is the formula not still a bit too formal? At least, we are under way.

3. Thought and Re-trieve

Heidegger has always emphasized the finitude of every mittence of Being and seems ready to concede the finitude of even his own efforts at thought. To catalogue the textual indices of such an attitude would be easy, indeed, but for reasons of brevity we limit ourselves to the perspectives we have been considering heretofore. Witness the author’s abiding effort continually to re-trieve his own un-said, the dissatisfaction with his own formulae, the relentless effort at a “spiral”-interrogation. Given this finitude of Heidegger’s own efforts, we are moved to pose two questions. In the first place, is it not possible to re-trieve this un-said differently than Heidegger himself has done? “... For everything that foundational thinking has genuinely thought retains — and, indeed, by reason of the very essence [of the process] — a plurality of meanings. . . .” 42 More concretely, let us ask: does Heidegger II have any more right to re-trieve the un-said of Heidegger I than, let us say, Jean Paul Sartre?

Again, if every thinker is in dialogue with his predecessors, but still more, perhaps, with posterity, 43 is it not possible that another thinker may re-trieve even Heidegger II and bring his

41 "Das Sein als das Geschick, das Wahrheit schickt, bleibt verborgen. Aber das Weltgeschick kündigt sich in der Dichtung an, ohne daß es schon als Geschichte des Seins offenbar wird. . . .” (HB, p. 86).
43 US, p. 123 (Nachkommen).
un-said into language? If this is the case, is it not premature to speak of an “eschatology” of Being and a “new dawn” of World-history that would have arrived with Heidegger, as if the mittence that has been bestowed upon him were, at last, definitive?

4. Being-as-Event

What are we to understand by the “e-vent” (Ereignis) out of which the ontological difference “issues” (Austrug)? As early as 1944, in the essay, “Λόγος,” Heidegger suggests that there is some “middle-point” between Being and There-being that somehow gives rise to both. In WD (1952), this “middle-point” is spoken of as a “third” thing that for εἶναι and νοεῖν would be a “first” thing, sc. “prior” to both. In ID (1957), it is understood as an origin that lies deeper than Being and man, and permits them to belong to each other, an ultimate Simplicity that is called a singulare tantum. This absolutely Ultimate (Thing) is what is called the “e-vent” of truth.

Now if we restrict our attention to these texts, we are inclined to infer that the author, in meditating the ontological difference as such, is groping beyond it into the ultimate Unity (sc. the “differentiating”) out of which the duality of Being-beings (sc. the “differentiated”) derives. We find this same probing into original unity when the author speaks of Αὐτός as an inexhaustible wealth, by reason of which the un-said in any given expression is not absolutely nothing but merely an un-said:

... The un-spoken is not only that which lacks articulation but [something] unuttered, which has not yet been shown, which has not yet reached [the condition of] shining-forth. What must remain unspoken is withheld in the un-uttered, whiles in concealment as unable to be shown-forth, is mystery. ...
In other words, it is a “something” which we can only imagine as an original Unity.

So far, so good. But another series of texts leads us to believe that the e-vent is only Being itself, whose sense we have always sought. In this case, the Being which “arises” out of the e-vent is simply Being inasmuch as it e-mits itself in any given mittence. By e-vent, then, Heidegger would simply mean Being as such, insofar as it is the process through which the (ontological) difference breaks out.47 Considered in these terms, e-vent designates nothing more than the process of Τχξτωάξ by which Being e-mits itself to man – in other words, it is another formula for “mittence,” whose only advantage would be that it suggests the (ontological) difference as such. “... That which brings about the e-vent is the e-vent itself, and nothing else besides, ...” 48

If this is the sense of “e-vent,” however, in what sense is it a singulare tantum? Does singulare tantum mean mittence-as-such, insofar as it perdures through the entire history of Being? How are we to understand the following text:

... Perhaps, indeed, through this analysis of the difference between Being and beings something perduring appears ... which passes through the mittence of Being from the beginning to its consummation. But it remains difficult to say how this perdurance is to be thought, when it is neither a generality that is valid for all cases, nor a law which the necessity of a process in the sense of a dialectic certifies.49

But must we not at least try to think it? And does the disjunction between “abstract generality” and “dialectical necessity” exhaust all possible explanations? If every mittence is the identity (correlation) of Being and thought, is it not possible that there be an identity of these identities that would supply a unity to history? If not, then what sense does it make to speak of a “consummation” of Being-as-history? If so, what is the nature of this unity?

47 ID, p. 63; SF, p. 29.
48 “… Das Ereignende ist das Ereignis selbst – und nichts außerdem....” (US, p. 258).
5. The Finitude of Being

From the very beginning of the way, Heidegger has emphasized the negativity of 'Α-λήθεία, sc. the finitude of the phenomenon with which he is dealing. Being for him is the process by which finite beings emerge from concealment – this and nothing more. If we restricted ourselves to the perspective of Heidegger I, we would have to say that Being “itself” is necessarily finite. For Heidegger II, however, must we not leave the question open? The most that we can say, it would seem, is that the mities of Being are necessarily finite. As for Being “itself,” the Α-άρj&eia that is mystery, what is to be said of it now? It is Wealth, Treasure, a hidden Fullness. It is inexhaustible Wellspring – ineffable! – the Simple, the All, the Only, the One. Beyond this, we dare not say anything about Being “itself” at all; we must simply leave it without name.

And the thinker, too, – what of him? Is he condemned to ineluctable finitude? Is it not the task of foundational thought to put even this to question? Is it possible that certain phenomena, albeit finite in themselves, nevertheless point beyond themselves – perhaps even beyond finitude? Suppose we take, for example, the very phenomenon with which we have been dealing, the dynamism which keeps Heidegger under way. Is it possible that the very restlessness of his interrogation, the dissatisfaction with his own formulae, the dogged fidelity to “endless” dialogue, the eager attentiveness to a noiseless voice – may not all this be a phenomenon for itself which perhaps may point beyond limit? Or, at least, may it not be itself an un-said that some other thinker can – and should – re-tieve? What is the living center of Ur-Heidegger? Is it the Great Origin that comes out of his past? Is the step-in-reverse a way of return? Is his ad-vent a coming-home?

The following texts should be taken as an ensemble: VA, pp. 70 (Reichtum, Schätze, Unerzählliche des Fragwürdigen), 220-221 (Α-άρj&eia ruht in Α-άρj&eia); SG, pp. 107 (Schätze, unerschöpflichen Brunnen), 172 (verborgene Schätze des Gewesenen), 184 (verborgene Fülle), 188 (Alles, Eine, Einzige); P, p. 156 (das Verborgene des Unerzählten); G, p. 70 (etwas Unsagbares); US, pp. 103 (Reichtum), 197 (verborgene Reichtum der Sprache); HW, p. 325 (Wesensreichtum des Seins).

See VA, p. 256 (das Endlose).

Cf. HE, pp. 31-37, passim (der große Anfang); FW, p. 4 (das Einfache); “Abendgang auf der Reichenau” (großen Einfalt).
But these are questions, questions, questions. Are there no answers to be had? What must we do to find them? "We must do nothing . . . but wait!" 53

Night has fallen again on Reichenau – the Light has gone out of the West. For those who watch with Heidegger, there is nothing to do but wait – and hope – for the grace of a better dawn.

53 "Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten." (G, p. 37).

At the weary age of 86, the old man went back home in death. “Home is where one starts from” (T.S. Eliot), and home for Martin Heidegger was Messkirch, a little Schwabian village near the Swiss border, where he was born. In a sense, he never left it. The short, squat figure, the rotund, mustached, somber face, the heavy hands, the rusty voice, the long, slow, stride—all belonged more to the peasant lumbering toward his morning chores than the university professor striding to the podium to address an audience as wide as the world. (His “Collected Works,” already partially translated into more than 50 languages, will be published in 57 volumes.) In the early years, he sometimes even affected peasant dress in the classroom. At any rate, he seemed much more at home with simple folk of Messkirch than with his academic peers. Only his eyes—piercing, probing, relentlessly unsatisfied eyes—betrayed the depth, restlessness and rigor of the tireless quest to articulate what the peasant in him experienced as the simple nearness of home.

The full circle of that quest finds a kind of self-expression in a little-known essay with which he once commemorated (1949) the death of the Messkirch composer, Conradin Kreutzer. It is
a brief pastoral meditation of the mature thinker as he treads again a path back home that he first came to know as a boy. The pathway leads from the courtyard gate over to Ehnried and back. Through meadow, hills, woods, and moor it comes at last to the castle wall. Behind the castle itself rises St. Martin's Church with its ancient bell "on whose ropes boys' hands have been rubbed hot." Then along the castle wall the pathway continues until it reaches again the courtyard gate to end where it began. "The end is where we start from" (T.S. Eliot).

The pathway guards rich memories for the thinker, "the early games and first choices." In the woods he used to fashion toy boats out of the bark of the trees that his father felled and send them on make-believe journeys long before he knew what it was like to embark on a journey that would leave all familiar shores behind. Then there was the ancient oak sheltering a rough-hewn bench, where, as a university student, he would read the great thinkers of the past until, wearied by their complexities, he would put them aside to find comfort in the pathway itself that spoke to him only of ... well, "the Simple." It was the Simple that never ceased to captivate him—the primal Source, the silent Origin out of which all things emerge into light and announce themselves as what they are. What is its meaning? How give it a proper name?

To be sure, the first thing that he knew to call it was "Being," but that was at the beginning of his way. He himself once described the initial experience. At the age of 18 (in his last year at the Gymnasium in Constance), a priest-friend had given him a copy of Franz Brentano's doctoral dissertation, On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle (1862). "On the title page of this work, Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: to on legetaipollachös. I translate: 'A being [Seiendes : what-is] becomes manifest (i.e., with regard to its Being) in many ways.' Latent in this phrase is the question that determines the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permits all of its multiple meanings? ... How can they be brought into comprehensible accord? This accord cannot be grasped without first raising and settling the question: whence does Being as such (not merely beings as beings) receive its determination?" This much set him on his way, and even though he tired of the
term “Being” (“that long traditional, highly ambiguous, now worn-out word”), the question itself would pursue him to the end.

The details of the early steps of the journey seem less important at the moment: the essential role of man’s existence (Dasein) in the experience of Being (for only man can say “is”); the value of phenomenology as a method of exploring it (for phenomenology lets beings reveal themselves as what they “are,” i.e., in their Being); the role of time in the process (for beings “are” inasmuch as they come-to-presence, hence comport past-future-present, the dimensions of time); the essential finitude of the experience (man’s existence itself, as open to Being, is circumscribed from the beginning by limit, the absolute limit of human existence being “death”), etc. How all of this crystalized into the major opus, *Being and Time* (1927) is for philosophers to explain. What matters now is only the fact that Heidegger’s own complexities developed out of an attempt to articulate the Simple, i.e., the simple experience of Being, with which alone he felt at home.

To be sure, the task itself was not simple. If it began with a phenomenological analysis of man’s existence in its finitude (as Being unto death), it had to move to a confrontation with philosophy, i.e., with “ontology,” or metaphysics as he understood it (from Plato to Nietzsche) in the philosophical tradition of the West. Metaphysics for him deals with beings (what-is) and therefore rests upon—but does not explore—the mystery of Being that is their ground. His search for the meaning of Being, then, was both an undermining (in that sense a “destruction”) of Metaphysics and a founding of it on its essential ground. It demanded, therefore, a type of thinking that was far more fundamental, i.e., “foundational,” than metaphysics, thus understood, could achieve.

The task involved, too, a critique of contemporary culture, which he saw to be oblivious of Being. He described the modern era as the epoch of “technicity” (*die Technik*). By this he meant more than “technology.” Rather, technicity for him designated the manner in which Being manifests itself in the present epoch of history in such fashion that man experiences the beings with which he deals (including himself) as objects that
can be submitted to his control. It is as a consequence of this experience that "technology" becomes possible. But by the same token, Being itself (as revealing and concealing itself in this experience) is all the more easily overlooked, so that man remains oblivious of his essential at-homeness with Being (the Simple). That is why contemporary man finds himself so up-rooted and home-less ("alienated") in the world of objects, despite his technological achievements.

Then there was another kind of complication in his life: the ill-starred association with German politics in 1933, for which many of his critics never forgave him. Allegations are many, facts are fewer—nor is this the place to review them. What is clear is that Heidegger became Rector of the University of Freiburg in May, 1933, shortly after the Nazis came to power, and resigned his rectorate prematurely the following February because of a conflict with the government over administrative (not ideological) matters. Less well known is the fact that he accepted the position chiefly at the importunity of his University colleagues who hoped that his prestige would enable them to resist the invasion of the University by Nazi ideology. A secondary reason was the personal hope that he would have an opportunity to reorganize the faculties according to principles that were suggested in his inaugural lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" (1929), and grounded in his conception of the unity of the sciences as founded in the experience of Being. That there were "compromises" along the way there is no doubt, but there is no doubt, either, that after his resignation he was regarded with suspicion by the Nazis, and that the many courses on Nietzsche that followed constituted a subtle, but genuine, confrontation with Nazi ideology.

But these were all complexities—what mattered was the Simple (i.e., Being). He queried the early Greeks and found them speaking of Physis, Logos, A-letheia, and each of these terms he meditated in turn. In a special way, A-letheia intrigued him—"truth," yes, but in the sense of "non-concealment," hence "liberation" from darkness and in that sense "freedom" in its origins. Then there was Logos, the original "gathered-togetherness," i.e., cohesion, of beings that found its correlative response in the logos, i.e. language of man. This meditation on
the nature of language became a means of access to the eminently Question-able, i.e., Being-as-Logos, the Simple. Hence his fascination with poetry. Soon the correspondence of man with the Simple in the form of thought was paralleled by the correspondence of man with Being-as-Logos, i.e., aboriginal Language, in the form of “poetizing” (Dichten). For Heidegger, then, thinking and poetizing—not technical achievement—became the “standard measure” of genuinely human activity.

The lonely searchcr found one fellow traveler along the way, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. Hölderlin was not just one poet among the rest who exemplified a certain theory of poetry, but the “poet of the poet” who articulated in lyric language the whole process of poetizing. In the poems “Homecoming” and “Re-collection” in particular, Hölderlin articulates an experience that paralleled Heidegger’s own. They describe the process by which the poet learns to poetize. In his youth, the poet grows up in familiar surroundings at home. Intrigued by the beings about him and yearning for deeper communion with them, he nonetheless fails to realize that the source of nearness to them is Being itself as their Source—Source that is known only through the beings that spring from it, while it, itself, withdraws within them. Fascinated by beings, yet still unaware that it is their Source that he longs to experience more profoundly, the poet remains ill-at-ease and unsatisfied. Finally, he is led to leave home and seek the “heavenly fire” (i.e., Being as such) of the Southland. But there he is almost burnt up by its rays and soon learns that he is not meant for sheer exposure to the blazing fire of Being but must return to the shade of the homeland, where beings (by their finitude) temper its heat. Having returned home from his journey (“Homecoming”), he can then re-trieve (“Re-collection”) his experience of the heavenly fire as filtered now through the beings around him. Thus he becomes “at home” at home in nearness to the Source. His poetic task is to bring this whole experience into words through authentic poetizing.

Like Hölderlin thus interpreted, Heidegger announced to contemporary man as victim of technicity the need to become “at home” at home near his Source, i.e., Being. At the same time, he insisted that this new awareness is not something that
man can arrive at through his own resources. Particularly in the present state of man's dereliction, only a new revelation of Being can "save" man. In an interview given in 1966 to the German news magazine Der Spiegel, Heidegger declared that philosophy as such in its traditional sense was of no avail in achieving this insight. On the contrary, "only a god can save us. The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god... we cannot bring him forth by our thinking. At best we can awaken a readiness to wait [for him]."

We must wait for a new revelation from a god, then, but what kind of a god would this be? Not a personal being, it would seem, in any sense that is given to the word "God" in Western thought. In all probability, Heidegger was using the word in the sense that it appears in the Hölderlin interpretations, i.e., as a highly specified manifestation of Being as "the Holy."

To be sure, such language is easily misleading and raises the whole thorny issue of the relationship between Heidegger's experience of Being and the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition of the West. It cannot be resolved here. Let it suffice to recall that Heidegger's beginnings were deeply rooted in that tradition. His father had been sexton of St. Martin's church behind the castle, and when he wrote in "The Pathway," "slowly, almost hesitatingly, eleven strokes of the hour sound in the night. The old bell... shakes under the blows of the hour's hammer whose dark-droll face no one forgets," apparently there was recorded here something of an experience at home that he himself never forgot. The early steps in his search for the meaning of Being took him first to the Roman Catholic seminary in Freiburg, then to a brief postulancy in the Society of Jesus, before he returned to the University of Freiburg to commit himself definitively to philosophy. When he finally began to teach at Freiburg, his interest in religion did not wane—in 1920–21, for example, he offered courses entitled "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion" and "Augustine and Neo-Platonism." When, how, and why his disaffection from ecclesiastical Christianity began is, on the basis of presently available evidence, a matter of speculation. In retrospect, however, it is understandable that a personal God in the traditional sense would become
more and more problematic for him a he probed further the nature of Being as different from beings, even if one of these beings was thought of (e.g., in metaphysics) as "supreme." It is understandable, too, how faith would seem alien to thought if, indeed, "the unconditional nature of faith and the questioning character of thought are two different spheres that are a chasm apart."

Understandable, yes—but not entirely acceptable to all. Is the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition no more than a being like the rest—even though designated "supreme?" Surely to identify him with the causa sui of German rationalism, as Heidegger seemed to do, is to undersell the efforts of an entire tradition of thought that presumed to speak of God only by analogy and developed a whole "negative theology" as a result. Again, if one takes the "questioning character" of thought to mean (as he suggested) a "willing to know"—where "willing" means authentic "resoluteness," and "to know" means "to be able to stand forth in the truth," [i.e.,] "the manifestation of beings"—then is such a thought really separated by an unabridgeable chasm from faith, if this be taken as a resolute openness to self-manifesting Mystery—and "all in the waiting (T.S. Eliot)"?

However his may be, Being, as Heidegger experienced it, is not God as Heidegger understood him, and although he respected—and encouraged—the efforts of theologians who found inspiration in his thought (e.g., Bultmann, Rahner, Macquarrie, et al.), he steadfastly refused to ally their efforts to his own. For him, there was only the relentless going of the way, i.e., the pathway whose message spoke only of . . . the Simple. "The pathway's message awakens a sense which loves freedom and, at a propitious place, leaps over sadness into serenity . . . This knowing serenity is a gate to the eternal . . . The message makes us at home after a long origin here."

So now the bell of St. Martin's church has struck midnight, and "with the last stroke the stillness has become yet more still . . . The Simple has become simpler." By all accounts, Heidegger's end was serene. When he knew it was near, he asked one of his former students, Bernard Welte, priest of the Archdiocese
of Freiburg, to preach a short sermon at his burial.* What text of scripture that he would like to serve as a theme? “Ask and you will receive, seek and you will find, knock and the door will be opened to you” (Luke 11:9). Was it, then, an end or a beginning? What we know for certain is only that it was a return to where he started from, after the long origin here. Those who admired his genius, who learned much from his efforts and honored him for his fidelity to his quest—for his own indefatigable readiness to wait—can only respect the silence of that moment. But they can hope . . . that “the inexhaustible power of the Simple” (Aletheia, the Logos) finally rendered up its proper name to him, so as to “surprise” him—and “free” him—in the end. May his knowing serenity indeed prove a gate to the eternal!

Preface by Martin Heidegger \hfill VIII
Writer's Preface \hfill XXV
List of Symbols Used \hfill XXXI

**Introduction**

A. THE PROBLEM OF BEING \hfill 3
   1. The Grounding of Metaphysics \hfill 3
   2. The Ontological Difference \hfill 10

B. THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT \hfill 15
   1. Negatively \hfill 16
   2. Positively \hfill 20

---

**Part One: From There to Being**

CHAPTER I. BEING AND TIME \hfill 27
   I. The Problem of Fundamental Ontology \hfill 27
      A. Antecedents \hfill 27
      B. Kant and Fundamental Ontology \hfill 29
      C. Heidegger and Fundamental Ontology \hfill 33
      D. Prenotes \hfill 41
         1. Presuppositions \hfill 41
         2. There-being \hfill 44
         3. Method: Phenomenology \hfill 46
         4. Starting Point: Everydayness \hfill 47
         5. Terminology \hfill 49
            a. Existential vs. Existentiell \hfill 46
            b. Authenticity and Inauthenticity \hfill 50
II. The Existential Analysis  
   A. The World  
   B. In-being  
      1. Comprehension  
      2. Disposition  
      3. Logos  
      4. Fallen-ness  
   C. The Unified Totality of Finite Transcendence  
      1. Unity  
      2. Totality  
      3. Authenticity  
         a. Existential  
         b. Existentiell  
         c. Existential and Existentiell  
   D. The Sense of Finite Transcendence  
      1. Temporality  
      2. Historicity  
III. General Remarks  
   A. Truth  
   B. Subjectivism  
Résumé  

CHAPTER II. KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS  
I. Kant and Finite Transcendence  
   A. Ontological Knowledge: the Components  
      1. Pure Intuition  
      2. Pure Thought  
      3. Necessity of Pure Synthesis  
   B. Ontological Knowledge: the Synthesis  
      1. Meaning of the Transcendental Imagination  
      2. Ontological Knowing  
         a. Discovery of the Transcendental Imagination  
         b. Analysis: Schematism  
            i. Concepts and Schemata  
            ii. Schemata for Empirical Concepts  
            iii. Schemata for Pure Concepts  
            iv. Transcendental Schemata and Transcendence  
      3. The Ontological Known
CHAPTER OUTLINES

C. Ontological Knowledge: its Ultimate Meaning
   1. Transcendental Imagination as Common Root
      a. Intuition
      b. Pure Reason
      c. Practical Reason
   2. Transcendental Imagination and Original Time
      a. Pure Synthesis as Pure Apprehension
      b. Pure Synthesis as Pure Reproduction
      c. Pure Synthesis as Pure Recognition
      d. Time as origin of Transcendental Imagination

II. General Remarks
   A. Being
      1. Being as Horizon
      2. Being and Truth
   B. There-being
      1. There-being as Project
      2. There-being as Center of Man
      3. There-being as Subject
   C. Thought

Résumé

CHAPTER III. THE ESSENCE OF GROUND

I. The Argument
   A. From Ground to Transcendence
   B. From Transcendence to Ground
      1. The Process of Ground: its Components
         a. Laying-claim and Taking-possession
         b. Transcendental Founding
            i. Ontic and Ontological Truth
            ii. The Question: “Why?”
            iii. The Triplex Unity
            iv. Logos
      2. The Process of Ground: its Finitude
      3. The Process of Ground: its Temporality
II. General Remarks
   A. Being and Truth
   B. There-being and Thought
   C. Transcendence and Freedom
      1. Freedom in WG
      2. Freedom in KM
         a. To Lay-free
         b. To Maintain-free
      3. Freedom in SZ
         a. Laying-free
         b. Rendering-free
         c. To be (become) free for
            i. Authenticity: Existential
            ii. Authenticity: Existentiell
      4. Synopsis

Résumé

CHAPTER IV. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

I. The Argument
   A. The Posing of a Metaphysical Question
   B. The Elaboration of the Question
   C. The Answer to the Question
      1. Non-being and Beings
      2. Non-being and its Disclosure
      3. Non-being and the Problem of Metaphysics

II. General Remarks
   A. Non-being, Being and Truth
   B. Non-being and the Founding of Metaphysics
   C. Non-being and Foundational Thought
      1. Negatively
      2. Positively

Résumé
CHAPTER OUTLINES

Part Two: Reversal

CHAPTER 1. ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH

I. The Argument
   A. Chapter 1: The Conventional Interpretation of Truth
   B. Chapters 2 and 3: The Ground of Conformity
   C. Chapter 4: The Essence of Freedom
      1. The Freedom of Beings-encountered
      2. The Freedom of There-being
   D. Chapter 5: The Problem of Non-Truth
      1. The Revealing of Beings-in-the-Ensemble
      2. The Concealing of Beings-in-the-Ensemble
   E. Chapter 6: Non-Truth as Concealment
      1. Mystery
      2. Forgetfulness of the Mystery
   F. Chapter 7: Non-Truth as Errance
   G. Chapter 8: The Question of Truth and Philosophy

II. General Remarks
   A. Heidegger I and II
      1. Structure of the Essay
      2. WW and the Early Heidegger
         a. Transcendence and Truth
         b. Finitude and Truth
         c. Historicity and Truth
      3. WW and the Later Heidegger
         a. The Essence of Truth: the Truth of Essence
         b. The Essence and Non-essence of Truth
         c. The Essence of Truth and Ek-sistent Freedom
      4. The Problem of the Two Heideggers
   B. The Nature of Being
CHAPTER OUTLINES

C. The Conception of Thought 246
   1. The Nature of Thought 246
   2. The Properties of Thought 250
      a. Pre-subjective 250
         i. Polemic vs. “Common Sense” 251
         ii. Forgottenness of the Mystery 251
      b. Interrogative 253

Résumé 254

CHAPTER II. THE SELF-ASSERTION OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY 255

A. Being 255
B. Thought 256

Résumé 258

CHAPTER III. INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS 259

I. General Remarks 261
   A. Nature of Being 261
      1. Being as Φύσις 261
         a. Άγος 261
         b. Δικη 262
      2. Being and Seeming-to-be 263
   B. The Nature of There-being 266
      1. The There is Necessary for the sake of Being 267
      2. In the There of Being comes-to-pass the primordial struggle into truth 267
         a. Presupposed: Aboriginal Discord 268
         b. “To-accept” and “To-be”: Correlative 269
      3. Characteristics of There: Transcendence, Finitude, Temporality 272
         a. Transcendence 272
         b. Finitude 273
            i. Thrown-ness 274
            ii. Fallen-ness 275
            iii. Being-unto-death 276
         c. Temporality 279
      4. There-being and Man 279
## PART THREE: FROM BEING TO THERE

### SECTION A: THE DEVOLUTION OF THOUGHT

#### CHAPTER I. PLATO

- **A. Truth as Non-concealment**
  1. The Metaphor
  2. The Interpretation

- **B. Truth as Conformity**
  1. Truth and Idea
  2. Idea and Conformity

#### CHAPTER II. ARISTOTLE

- **A. Ambivalent Nature of \( \phi \sigma \varsigma \)**
  1. \( \phi \sigma \varsigma \) as \( \alpha \rho \chi \kappa \iota \nu \iota \sigma \varsigma \epsilon \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \)
  2. \( \phi \sigma \varsigma \) as \( \mu \omicron \rho \rho \eta \)
    - \( \mu \omicron \rho \rho \eta - \omicron \lambda \eta \)
    - \( \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \)
  3. \( \phi \sigma \varsigma \) as \( \alpha \rho \chi \-\mu \omicron \rho \rho \eta \)

- **B. \( \phi \sigma \varsigma \) and Truth**

#### Resume

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART THREE: FROM BEING TO THERE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION A: THE DEVOLUTION OF THOUGHT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER I. PLATO</strong></td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Truth as Non-concealment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Metaphor</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Interpretation</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Truth as Conformity</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Truth and Idea</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Idea and Conformity</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resume</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER II. ARISTOTLE</strong></td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Ambivalent Nature of ( \phi \sigma \varsigma )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ( \phi \sigma \varsigma ) as ( \alpha \rho \chi \kappa \iota \nu \iota \sigma \varsigma \epsilon \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma )</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ( \phi \sigma \varsigma ) as ( \mu \omicron \rho \rho \eta )</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. ( \mu \omicron \rho \rho \eta - \omicron \lambda \eta )</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ( \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma )</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ( \phi \sigma \varsigma ) as ( \alpha \rho \chi -\mu \omicron \rho \rho \eta )</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. ( \phi \sigma \varsigma ) and Truth</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resume</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition: Middle Ages</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resume</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER III. DESCARTES

A. The Origin of Subject-ism
   1. Fundamentum and Subjectum
   2. Cogito
   3. Subject and Being

B. Consequences of Subject-ism
   1. World-as-picture
   2. Philosophical Anthropology
   3. Values

C. Post-Cartesian Subject-ism
   1. Leibniz
   2. Leibniz to Hegel

Résumé

CHAPTER IV. HEGEL

I. The Argument

A. Absolute Awareness
   1. Knowing as Presence
   2. Presence as Shining-forth
   3. Shining-forth and προοίμιον
      a. The Absolute as Will
      b. The Absolute as Antecedence

B. The Experience of Absolute Awareness
   1. Experience in General Terms
   2. Three Principles of Awareness
      a. Principle I: “Awareness its own Concept”
      b. Principle II: “Awareness its own Norm”
      c. Principle III: “Awareness its own Test”
   3. The Nature of Experience
      a. Experience
      b. Dialectical Movement
   4. Experience and Man
   5. Experience and Philosophy
II. General Remarks
   A. Heidegger with Hegel
      1. Being
      2. There-being
   B. Heidegger vs. Hegel
      1. Being and Subject-ism
Résumé

CHAPTER V. NIETZSCHE
   A. Will- unto-Power
      1. Life-force and Will
      2. Will- unto-Power and Re-valuation
         a. Truth
         b. Art
      3. Will- unto-Power and Truth
   B. The Eternal Return of the Selfsame
      1. Modern Man and “Spirit of Vengeance”
      2. “Spirit of Vengeance” and Authenticity
      3. Authenticity and “Eternal Return”
      4. Rôle of Zarathustra
Résumé

CHAPTER VI. LOGIC
Résumé

CHAPTER VII. HUMANISM

CHAPTER VIII. TRANSITION: RILKE
   A. Rilke and Nihilism
      1. Being as Will
      2. Man
   B. Rilke’s Attempt to Overcome Nihilism
      1. Theory
      2. Practice
   C. Heidegger’s Critique of Rilke
      1. Debit
         a. Subject-ism
         b. Logic
      2. Credit
Résumé
CHAPTER OUTLINES

Part Three: From Being to There
Section B: The Re-trive of Thought

CHAPTER I. THE ORIGIN OF A WORK OF ART, HÖLDERLIN AND THE ESSENCE OF POETRY 403
I. The Argument 403
   A. Thing and Work 404
   B. Work and Truth 405
   C. Truth and Art 407
   D. Origination of Truth 411
II. General Remarks 412
   A. Being 412
   B. There-being 413
   C. Thought 414
Résumé 417

CHAPTER II. THE TIME OF WORLD-AS-PICUTURE 418
Résumé 422

CHAPTER III. "AS WHEN UPON A DAY OF REST . . ." 423
A. Being 423
   1. Being as Immediate 424
   2. Being as Ad-vent 424
   3. Being as Spirit 425
   4. Being as the Holy 426
B. There-being as Poet 427
   1. Prior to Self-disclosure of the Holy 428
   2. The Poetic Moment 428
      a. The Holy 429
      b. Poet 429
C. Thought 431
Résumé 432

CHAPTER IV. NIETZSCHE'S WORD "GOD IS DEAD" 434
A. Being 434
   1. Mittence 434
   2. The Ontological Difference 436
CHAPTER OUTLINES

B. Thought  
1. Thought as Re-trieve  
2. Thought as Preparation

Résumé

CHAPTER V. "HOMECOMING" – "RE-COLLECTION"

I. Plato's Doctrine on Truth  
II. Hegel's Concept of Experience  
III. "Homecoming," "Re-collection"

A. Being  
1. The Characterization of Being  
   a. The Glad-some  
   b. The Holy  
   c. Origin  
   d. Ground  
2. The Priority of Being  
3. The Finitude of Being

B. Poetry  
1. Nature of the Poet  
2. The Nature of Poetry  
   a. Being and the Poet  
      Moment I  
      Moment II  
      Moment III  
   b. The Poet and Being  
      i. The Past  
      ii. The Future  
      iii. The Present  
   c. Scholia  
      i. The Poetic Dialogue  
      ii. Poetry and Ground  
      iii. Poet and People  
      iv. Poet and History  
      v. Poet and Re-solve

C. Thought

Résumé
CHAPTER VI. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?: EPILOGUE 473
   A. The Argument 474
   B. Thought 476
      1. The Address of Being 476
      2. The Response of There-Being 478
      3. Thought and Language 482
   Résumé 483

CHAPTER VII. Ἀλήθεια (HERACLITUS FG. 16) 484
   A. Being 485
   B. There-being 486
   C. Thought 487
      1. Interrogation 487
      2. Dialogue 488
   Résumé 489

CHAPTER VIII. Λόγος (HERACLITUS FG. 50) 490
   A. Logos as Being 491
   B. There-being 493
   C. Language 495
   D. Thought 498
   Résumé 501

CHAPTER IX. TOWARDS AN ANALYSIS OF RELEASE, NIHILISM
     IN TERMS OF BEING-AS-HISTORY 502
   I. Towards an Analysis of Release 502
      A. Being 502
      B. Thought 505
         1. Thought as "In-stance" 509
         2. Thought and Language 509
   II. Nihilism in Terms of Being-as-History 510
      A. Being 510
      B. Thought 511
   Résumé 512
CHAPTER OUTLINES

CHAPTER X. THE SAYING OF ANAXIMANDER 514

A. Being 514
   1. The Text 515
      a. Πέμπειν-φθορά 515
      b. The Nature of ὐν 515
      c. The Saying 517
         i. Concerning beings (in their Being) 517
         ii. Concerning the Being (of beings) 520
   2. The Advance 521

B. Thought 524
   1. The "Shepherd of Being" 524
   2. The Historicity of Thought 526

Résumé 526

CHAPTER XI. WHEREUNTO THE POET? 527

A. Being (Ἀβγος) 527

B. Thought 528

Résumé 529

CHAPTER XII. LETTER ON HUMANISM 530

A. Being 532
   1. Mittence 532
   2. Negativity 533
      a. Inter-mittence 533
      b. Non-being 534
   3. Language 535

B. There-being 536
   1. Nature of Ek-sistence 536
   2. Structure of Ek-sistence 537
      a. Project 537
      b. Thrown-ness 537
      c. Fallen-ness 538
      d. Concern 539
      e. Historicity 540
   3. Ek-sistence and Language 540
### CHAPTER OUTLINES

C. Thought  
1. Thought as Fulfillment  
2. Thought and Language  
   a. Function of Language  
   b. Thought and Poetry  
3. Thought and History  
4. The Rigor of Thought

Résumé

### CHAPTER XIII. INTERLUDE

I. From the Experience of Thought  
   A. Being  
   B. Thought  
   C. Language

Résumé

II. The Pathway  
   A. Being  
   B. Thought

Résumé

### CHAPTER XIV. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?: INTRODUCTION

THE ESSENCE OF GROUND: PROLOGUE

A. The Case of the Altered Epilogue

### CHAPTER XV. THE THING

A. Being  
   1. The Quadrate  
   2. The Negativity of Being  
B. Thought

Résumé

### CHAPTER XVI. LANGUAGE

A. The Antecedents  
B. The Difference

Résumé
## CHAPTER OUTLINES

### CHAPTER XVII. WORKING, DWELLING, THINKING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Dwelling</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Working</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Thought</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Résumé</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER XVIII. "... POETICALLY DOTH MAN DWELL ..."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Dwelling</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Poetizing</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Thinking and Poetizing</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Thinking and Working</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Résumé</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Postscript: Concerning a Verse from Mörike** 594

### CHAPTER XIX. WHAT E-VOKES THOUGHT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. The Argument</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Being</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. There-being</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Thought as Re-cord</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Thought as Thanks</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Thought as ( \lambda \gamma \epsilon \nu \omega \epsilon \nu )</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Difference</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. General Remarks</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Hail</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Being: 'A-( \lambda \gamma \beta \theta \alpha )</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Being: Λόγος</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Response</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Thought as Spring</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Viewing</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interrogation</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Freedom</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Résumé</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

A. Heidegger I and II 623
B. Ur-Heidegger 628
C. Κρίσεις 633
   1. The Thinker 634
   2. Thought and Language 635
   3. Thought and Re-trieve 637
   4. Being-as-Event 638
   5. The Finitude of Being 640

Chapter Outlines 643

Appendix: Courses, Seminars and Lectures of Martin Heidegger 661

Bibliography
   I. Heidegger’s Works 675
      A. Order of Publication 675
      B. Order of Composition 678
   II. Other Works Cited 681
   III. Selective Bibliography 683
   IV. English Translations 688

Glossary 689

Indexes
   I. Index of Texts Cited 707
   II. Index of Proper Names 726
   III. Index of Greek Terms 728
   IV. General Index 731
APPENDIX

COURSES, SEMINARS AND LECTURES

OF

MARTIN HEIDEGGER
VERZEICHNIS DER VORLESUNGEN
UND ÜBUNGEN
VON MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Freiburg

WS 1915-16
Vorlesung Über Vorsokratiker: Parmenides.
Übungen Über Kant, Prolegomena.

SS 1916
Seminar Übungen über Texte aus den logischen Schriften des Arisoteles (mit Krebs).

WS 1916-17
Vorlesung Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit: Über Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1794.
1917-19
Nicht gelesen, weil zum Frontdienst eingezogen.

SS 1919
Vorlesung Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie.
Vorlesung Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums.

WS 1919-20
Vorlesung Ausgewählte Probleme der neuen Phänomenologie.
Vorlesung Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik.
Seminar Übungen im Anschluß an Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie.

1 This list was composed from the Freiburg and Marburg University catalogues and then submitted to Professor Heidegger for correction, which he kindly made, adding whatever comments that appear. Because of its value as an historical document, we refrain from editorial changes, as well as from translation. The text appears here in precisely that form in which it was returned to the writer by Professor Heidegger. WS signifies “winter semester”; SS signifies “summer semester.”
APPENDIX

SS 1920
Vorlesung  Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks.
Seminar  Kolloquium im Anschluß an die Vorlesung.

WS 1920–21
Vorlesung  Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion.
Seminar  Anfänger: im Anschluß an Descartes, Meditationen.

SS 1921
Vorlesung  Augustinus und der Neuplatonisimus.
Seminar  Anfänger: im Anschluß an Aristoteles, De anima.

WS 1921–22
Vorlesung  Phänomenologische Interpretationen (Aristoteles, Physik).
Seminar  Anfänger: Phänomenologische Übungen.

SS 1922
Vorlesung  Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik.
Seminar  Anfänger: Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik.

WS 1922–23
Seminar  Phänomenologische Übungen zu Aristoteles, Physik, IV und V.
Seminar  Anfänger: Husserl, Ideen I.

SS 1923
Vorlesung  Ontologie.
Seminar  Anfänger: Phänomenologische Übungen (Husserls Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. II).
Seminar  Kolloquium über die theologischen Grundlagen von Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, nach ausgewählten Texten (mit Ebbinghaus).
**Marburg:**

**WS 1923-24**
- Vorlesung: Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie (Descartes-Interpretation).
- Übung: Im Anschluß an die Vorlesung.

**SS 1924**
- Vorlesung: Aristoteles, *Rhetorik*, II.

**WS 1924-25**
- Vorlesung: Interpretation Platonischer Dialoge (*Σωφηνίς*).
- Seminar: Übungen zur Ontologie des Mittelalters.

**SS 1925**
- Vorlesung: Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes.
- Seminar: Übungen über Descartes, *Meditationen*.

**WS 1925-26**
- Vorlesung: Logik.
- Seminar: Anfänger: Phänomenologische Übungen (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*).

**SS 1926**
- Vorlesung: Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie.
- Seminar: Übungen über Geschichte und historische Erkenntnis im Anschluß an J. B. Droysen, *Grundriß der Historik*.

**WS 1926-27**
- Vorlesung: Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant.
- Seminar: Ausgewählte Probleme der Logik (Begriff und Begriffsbildung).

**SS 1927**
- Vorlesung: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.
- Seminar: Fortgeschrittene: Die Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels *Logik*. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Vorlesung</th>
<th>Seminar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortgeschrittene: Schelling, <em>Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Freiburg:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Vorlesung</th>
<th>Seminar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phänomenologische Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Die ontologischen Grundsätze und das Kategorienproblem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1929</td>
<td>Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart.</td>
<td>Anfänger: Über Idealismus und Realismus im Anschluß an die Hauptvorlesungen (Hegels &quot;Vorrede&quot; zur <em>Phänomenologie des Geistes</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Einführung in das akademische Studium.</td>
<td>Fortgeschrittene: Vom Wesen des Lebens mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aristoteles, <em>De anima</em>, <em>De animalium motione</em> und <em>De animalium incessu</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semester</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Topic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1929-30</td>
<td>Vorlesung</td>
<td>Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (der Weltbegriff).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Für mittlere und höhere Semester: Über Gewißheit und Wahrheit im Anschluß an Descartes und Leibniz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1930</td>
<td>Vorlesung</td>
<td>Einleitung in die Philosophie (Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Anfänger: Ausgewählte Kapitel aus Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1930-31</td>
<td>Vorlesung</td>
<td>Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Anfänger: Augustinus, Confessiones, XI (de tempore).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Fortgeschrittene: Platons Παρμενίδης (mit Schadewaldt).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1931</td>
<td>Vorlesung</td>
<td>Interpretationen aus der antiken Philosophie: Aristoteles, Metaphysik, IX (δωματεία-κέφαλαια).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Anfänger: Kant, Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1931-32</td>
<td>Vorlesung</td>
<td>Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (&quot;Höhlengleichnis&quot; und Theätet, über θεόδος).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1932</td>
<td>Vorlesung</td>
<td>Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie: Anaximander und Parmenides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Mittelstufe: Platon, Φαίδρος.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicht gelesen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| WS 1932-33 | Vorlesung | Die Grundfrage der Philosophie (Wesen der Wahrheit: "Höhlen-
| SS 1933    | Seminar | gleichnis").                                                        |
|            | Seminar | Oberstufe: Der Satz vom Widerspruch.                               |
|            | Seminar | Unterstufe: Der Begriff der Wissenschaft.                          |
Rektor der Universität Freiburg. (Rektorat wegen Differenzen mit dem Kultusministerium niedergelegt).²

Vorlesung: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.
Seminar Oberstufe: Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1794.
Seminar Unter- und Mittelstufe: Leibniz, Monadologie.
Seminar Hauptstücke aus Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

WS 1934–35
Vorlesung: Hölderlins Hymnen ("Der Rhein" und "Germanien").
Seminar Unterstufe: Hegel, "Über den Staat" (mit E. Wolf).
Seminar Oberstufe: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes.

SS 1935
Vorlesung: Einführung in die Metaphysik.
Seminar Oberstufe: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes.

WS 1935–36
Vorlesung: Grundfragen der Metaphysik.
Kolloquium: Die Überwindung der Ästhetik in der Frage nach der Kunst (mit Bauch).
Seminar Mittelstufe: Leibnizens Weltbegriff und der Deutsche Idealismus.
Seminar Oberstufe: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes.

SS 1936
Vorlesung: Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.
Seminar Oberstufe: Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft.

WS 1936–37
Vorlesung: Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht (als Kunst).
Seminar Unterstufe: Ausgewählte Stücke aus Schillers philosophischen Schriften über die Kunst.

² Parenthesized comment added by Professor Heidegger.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Vorlesung</th>
<th>Seminar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SS 1937  | Vorlesung | Nietzsche's metaphysical
Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die Lehre von
der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen. |
| SS 1938  | Vorlesung | Grundfragen der Philosophie:
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit ($\delta\lambda\theta\varepsilon\alpha$ und $\pi\omega\gamma\eta\sigma\varsigma$). |
| SS 1939  | Vorlesung | Arbeitsurlaub. |
| WS 1939–40 | Vorlesung | Einleitung in die Philosophie. |
| Seminar | Unterstufe: Die philosophische und wissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung. |
| SS 1939  | Vorlesung | Nietzsche's Lehre vom Willen zur Macht (als Erkenntnis). |
| Seminar | Oberstufe: Vom Wesen der Sprache. |
| Seminar | Mittel- und Oberstufe: Hegels Metaphysik der Geschichte. |
| 1. Trimester, 1940 | Vorlesung | Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht
(II: Der Europäische Nihilismus). |
| Seminar | Über die Φωςς bei Aristoteles. |
| 3. Trimester, 1940 | Vorlesung | Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. |
| WS 1940–41 | Vorlesung | Grundfragen der Philosophie. |
| Seminar | Fortgeschrittene: Leibniz, Monadologie. |
| Seminar | Übungen über den Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie. |
SS 1941 Vorlesung Grundbegriffe.
Seminar Anfänger: Kant, *Prolegomena.*
Fortgeschrittene: o. Angabe.

WS 1941–42 Vorlesung Nietzsches Metaphysik.
Seminar Anfänger: Schiller, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen.*
Seminar Fortgeschrittene: Platons *Siebenter Brief.*

SS 1942 Vorlesung Hölderlins "Andenken."
Seminar Anfänger: Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik Kants.
Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* und Aristoteles, *Metaphysik* IX, 10 und VI.

WS 1942–43 Vorlesung Parmenides.
Seminar Fortgeschrittene: Fortsetzung vom SS 1942.

SS 1943 Vorlesung Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit).
Beurlaubt.

WS 1943–44 Vorlesung Logik. (Heraklits Lehre vom Λόγος).
Seminar Fortgeschrittene: Aristoteles, *Metaphysik,* IV.


1944–51

³ Parenthesized comment added by Professor Heidegger.
⁴ Parenthesized comment added by Professor Heidegger.
SS 1952  Vorlesung Was heißt Denken? (Emeritiert)
WS 1955-56  Vorlesung Der Satz vom Grund.
SS 1957  Seminar Heraklit (mit E. Fink).
WS 1957-58  Das Wesen der Sprache, Vorträge im Studium Generale.

ber 1944 bis 1951 keine Lehrtätigkeit mehr, da die Besatzungsmacht 1945 ein Lehrverbot aussprach). 8

5 Parenthesized comment added by Professor Heidegger.
## I. Heidegger's Works

### A. Order of Publication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Neue Forschungen für Logik,&quot; <em>Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland</em> (Freiburg), XXXVIII, 466-472, 517-524, 565-570.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|      | *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*. Tübingen. (Habilitation dissertation, Frei-
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1917
"Abendgang auf der Reichenau," Das Bodenseebuch. Ein Buch für Land und Leute (Konstanz), IV, 152.

1927

1928

1929
Vom Wesen des Grundes. Halle, Niemeyer.

1930
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Bonn, Cohen.

1933
Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Breslau, Korn.

1937

1942
"Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit" in Jahrbuch für die geistige Überlieferung, II.

1943

1944
Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. Frankfurt, Klostermann.

1947

1949
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. 2nd ed. Frankfurt, Klostermann.

1950 Holzwege. Frankfurt, Klostermann.

1951 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. 2nd ed. Frankfurt, Klostermann.

Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. 2nd ed. Frankfurt, Klostermann.


1953 Der Feldweg. Frankfurt, Klostermann.

Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen, Niemeyer.

1954 Was heißt Denken? Tübingen, Niemeyer.

Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Pfullingen, Neske.

Vorträge und Aufsätze. Pfullingen, Neske.

1956 Was ist das – die Philosophie? Pfullingen, Neske.

Zur Seinsfrage. Frankfurt, Klostermann.

1957 Der Satz vom Grund. Pfullingen, Neske.

Identität und Differenz. Pfullingen, Neske.

Hebel – Der Hausfreund. Pfullingen, Neske.


1959 Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen, Neske.


Kants These über das Sein. Frankfurt, Klostermann.


1964

Über Abraham a Santa Clara. Stadt Messkirch.

1967


1969


1970

Martin Heidegger im Gespräch, ed. R. Wisser. Freiburg/München, Alber.


1971
Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809), herausgegeben von H. Feick. Tübingen, Niemeyer.

1972

B. ORDER OF COMPOSITION

1927
"Phänomenologie und Theologie." *
"Die Idee der Phänomenologie."

1928
Vom Wesen des Grundes.

1929
Was ist Metaphysik?

1930
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.

1933
Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität.

1935
Einführung in die Metaphysik.

"Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," HW, pp. 7–68.

1935–1936
Die Frage nach dem Ding.¹

1936

Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809).

1936–1937

* Apparently, the order of composition and the order of publication up until 1927 correspond.

¹ This lecture course, given at Freiburg, during the winter semester of 1935–1936 under the title "Grundfragen der Metaphysik," was published in September 1962, after the main text of the present study had been printed. The writer regrets that it was technically impossible to treat it thematically.
    "‘Wege zur Aussprache.’”
1937-1938  "‘Aus einer Erörterung der Wahrheitsfrage.’”
1938  "‘Die Zeit des Weltbildes,’” HW, pp. 69-104.
    "‘Die ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen und der Wille zur Macht,’” N, II, pp. 7-29.
    "‘Wie wenn am Feiertage …’,” HD, pp. 47-74.
1940  "‘Der europäische Nihilismus,’” N, II, pp. 31-256.
(1936-)1940  "‘Nietzsches Wort: Gott ist tot,’” HW, pp. 193-247.
    "‘Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik,’” N, II, pp. 458-480.
    "‘Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik,’” N, II, pp. 481-490.
1942  "‘Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit.’
1942-1943  "‘Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung,’” HW, pp. 105-192.
    "‘Andenken,’” HD, pp. 75-143.
    WM: Nachwort, WM, pp. 43-51.
    "‘Αλήθεια,’” VA, pp. 257-282.
1944  "‘Λόγος,’” VA, pp. 207-229.

* This four-page contribution in Allemannennland. Ein Buch von Völkstum und Sendung (Jahrbuch der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau, Band 1) came to the writer's attention after the pages of the present study had been set in type, and therefore receives no treatment in them.

+ This excerpt from the lecture course of the winter semester, 1937-1938, was published after this book had been printed and therefore receives no treatment in it.
    Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens.
1949  WM: Einleitung, WM, pp. 7–21.
    WG: Vorwort.
    Der Feldweg.
    "Die Kehre." 4
    "Das Ding": Nachwort, VA, pp. 182–185.
    "Die Sprache," US, pp. 9–33.
    "Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . ." VA, pp. 187–204.
    Zu einem Vers von Mörike.
1951–1952  Was heißt Denken? 5
1952  "Was heißt Denken?" VA, pp. 129–143.
    "Mörf," VA, pp. 231–256.
1953  "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?" VA, pp. 101–126.
    "Wissenschaft und Besinnung," VA, pp. 45–70.
    "Die Frage nach der Technik," VA, pp. 13–44. 5
1955  Zur Seinsfrage.
    Was ist das – die Philosophie?
1957  Hebel – der Hausfreund.
    "Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphy-

4 This essay was published after the main text of the present book had been printed. The writer regrets that for this reason he was unable to treat the essay thematically.
5 The concluding note of VA (1954) states that this essay was given as a lecture in 1953. For this reason, the writer's analysis of it, already in manuscript, was omitted from the final redaction of the foregoing study, which stops with WD (1952). In November, 1965, however, this essay was published separately (Pfullingen, Neske), and a preliminary remark says that the 1953 lecture was the elaboration of another lecture that had been given first in December, 1949, in Bremen. Clearly, then, the analysis of the essay might well have been included in the present volume. But this information arrived too late. Sorry!
sik," ID, pp. 35-73.
"Der Satz der Identität," ID, pp. 13-34.
"Antrittsrede" in der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften.
"Hegel und die Griechen."
"Hölderlins Himmel und Erde."
1961 Kants These über das Sein.
"Ansprache zum Heimatabend."
1964 Über Abraham a Santa Clara.
"Das Problem des nichtobjectivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie."

* These pages appeared in a commemorative volume honoring V.E. von Gebsattel (1958). The author offers no explicit indication as to their origin, but they may well have been composed earlier.
II. Other Works Cited


—. La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger. Louvain, 1941.


III. Selective Bibliography

Earlier general bibliographies have been replaced by the careful and comprehensive work of Hans-Martin Sass (see below). The selective bibliography that follows is limited to certain works that the writer found especially useful in the preparation of this study. Since its original publication (1963), much secondary literature of high quality has appeared that would deserve mention in an updated bibliography of this sort if practical considerations made it feasible to extend a revision far beyond its present length. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Hence, we have left it, regretfully, in its original form, calling the reader's attention to this limitation.

A. GENERAL


Useful instrument of research. Despite the title, the author extends coverage to some of the later works, without pretending, however, to completeness with regard to them.


A thorough compilation, carefully researched, that profits from, and surpasses, all previous efforts of this kind. Needs periodic updating.


Fairly complete bibliography of English titles, including a valuable list of Ph.D. theses.

A skillful, benevolent, highly articulate exposition, dedicated to the proposition that Heidegger is an existentialist from beginning to end—a proposition that the present writer, for his part, finds completely unacceptable.


For the most part, a fine introduction with several excellent translations of Heidegger's terminology. The extrapolation on the gods, however, seems to go beyond present evidence, and with debatable results.


The addressee of the "Letter on Humanism" combines a profound insight into Heidegger with an extraordinary gift of language, both together making him beyond any question one of the most authoritative interpreters of Heidegger in France.


A brief, lucid examination of the problem of the World in Heidegger I, as seen from the distance of Heidegger II. All things considered, perhaps the best propaedeutic to SZ among the secondary literature.


A brilliant exposé that touches on all of the essentials, by one of contemporary France's most gifted philosophical minds. The article was the first sketch of a projected book, whose theme was to have been "La pensée de l’Être dans l’oeuvre de Heidegger." If this work had appeared, the present study would never have been undertaken.


An illuminating reappraisal of SZ. With rigorous fidelity to the data supplied by the work itself, the author exploits the ontological implications of the phenomenological analyses. A reliable and suggestive commentary—rugged reading, but rewarding.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


This sympathetic study orchestrates the theme that the ontological difference is the single point of reference in Heidegger’s entire effort. Not every Heideggerian of strict observance will be happy, perhaps, with the author’s formulae concerning Heidegger’s relation to “la grande tradition de la philosophia perennis,” and some may insist that the “reversal” between the earlier and the later period deserves more attention than it receives. Nonetheless this study renders exceptional service in providing an historically astute, highly readable orientation in a difficult problematic.

De Waelhens, Alphonse. La philosophie de Martin Heidegger. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1942.

Lucid, incisive and richly documented, this admirably articulate work was the first major treatment to make Heidegger accessible to the non-German reading public. Writing in war-torn Europe, when personal contact with the philosopher’s developing thought in Freiburg was excluded by the nature of things, the author was forced to limit his examination for the most part to Heidegger I, and it is not impossible that, if he were to undertake the same task today, when many of the Freiburg lectures of that period have been made public, he would express himself differently. That is why anyone consulting this book at the present time should take into full account the author’s own carefully nuanced restatement of his views in 1955 (“Heidegger,” in Les Philosophes Célèbres, ed. Maurice Merleau-Ponty [Paris: Mazenod, 1956], pp. 336-343). Be this as it may, the present writer, coming to Heidegger at a later day and from a different starting point, personally feels more at home with this same author’s penetrating study of the relation between Husserl and Heidegger: Phénoménologie et vérité. Essai sur l’évolution de l’idée de vérité chez Husserl et Heidegger. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953.


Although the articles which constitute this book are now somewhat dated, the treatment of SZ (1932) by this fine student of Husserl remains even today remarkably judicious.

D. GERMAN


A profound student of Hölderlin offers the most perceptive treatment thus far of Heidegger’s conception of poetry.

This series of brief, readable essays, by a keen student of history, dates from a 1949 tribute to Heidegger on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. It sought to counter-balance the prevailing anthropological-existentialist interpretations of the early work by situating the philosopher's thought in terms of *philosophia perennis,* so as to make possible an eventual dialogue between the two. Reissued in 1958 without major revisions but with the addition of several fruitful appendices, the book (partly by reason of its own success) need no longer fulfill its original apologetic function but retains its value as an illuminating orientation in the philosophical situation of mid-century Western Europe. A succinct re-statement of the author's fundamental conception may be found in his "Klassische und moderne Metaphysik oder Sein als Sinn," in *Sinn und Sein,* ed. R. Wisser (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1960), pp. 311-332.


This examination of Heidegger's relevance for theology, made by an expert on Rudolf Bultmann and successor to Karl Barth at the University of Bâle, is marked by its perspicacity, erudition and general good sense. Anglo-Saxons will be especially grateful for the author's reliable transposition of Heidegger's thought into non-Heideggerean, quite manageable German. Unfortunately, lack of indexing limits the usefulness of an admirable achievement that is suffused throughout by the luminous tranquillity of the Spirit.


This easily intelligible, comprehensive, well-informed (especially with regard to Heidegger's pre-SZ development) analysis by the author of a celebrated article ("Sein als Ereignis," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,* XIII [1959], 597-632) is probably the best book-length study of Heidegger in any language. What a pity it has no index!


An authority on Schelling situates Heidegger in terms of the German Idealists, underlining those elements in Heidegger's thought which suggest an affinity with the transcendental tradition. The author's well-informed and provocative interpretation of the "reversal" differs considerably from the present writer's and offers a knowledgeable challenge to it.

This serious effort to engage the dialogue between Heidegger and St. Thomas is included in the present bibliography, not because it will satisfy all Heideggereans (any more than it will please all Thomists), nor because its turbulent style is always clearer than what it attempts to clarify. It deserves mention, one would think, because it is the most ambitious attempt so far to let Heidegger's experience shed light on another type of thought, and because it offers, besides, the edifying spectacle of one of Europe's most powerful speculative minds exuberantly engaged in his task.


An extraordinarily vigorous re-thinking of the entire problematic. Not all Heideggereans will take the author's last step as he attempts to go beyond the master, but the seriousness and high integrity of this exposé command respect.
IV English Translations

This list includes all the English translations known to the writer by August 1, 1973.


the original German text (Stuttgart: Reklam, 1960) with a 1956 addition by Heidegger.


WG The Essence of Reasons, tr. T. Malik. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1969
The writer's original intention in composing this glossary was to list only those terms which are specifically Heideggerean, sc. which are not to be found in the normal dictionaries (v.g. Dasein: There-being). As the work proceeded, however, it seemed wise to extend its scope so as to include even normal translations, when the term in question has a specifically Heideggerean sense and plays an important rôle in his problematic (v.g. Welt: World). It is hoped that thereby the reader will always have at his disposal the means of finding his bearings quickly in the strange nomenclature as he proceeds along the way, without the risk of losing time and patience in the complexities of the General Index.

An important caution, however, is in order. It would be a grievous mistake to consider this nomenclature from a purely philological point of view apart from the analysis in which it is elaborated. In very few cases are the “translations” here anything more than approximations, and often they suppose an important ellipsis in the argument (v.g. Nennung: bringing-into-words). To comprehend the full sense of these “translations,” then, the reader must reinsert them in the context from which they have been taken. Only then can xpiolg be both serious and fruitful.

Conventions: italics indicate pages where a term is used in representative fashion, but without any further explanation of it; boldface characters indicate that an explanation either of the word in question or of the concept it articulates appears in the main text; roman characters indicate that such an explanation appears in the footnotes.

**ENGLISH-GERMAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Term</th>
<th>German Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abandon self</td>
<td>Sich einlassen, 602.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abide</td>
<td>Bleiben, 453.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>able to know, be</td>
<td>Vermögen, 573.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abide, not true</td>
<td>Unheimlichkeit, 74.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolve, -vence, -ution</td>
<td>Absolvieren, -vénz, -ution, 359.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accept, Vernehmen</td>
<td>269.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acceptance, Empfängnis</td>
<td>508.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accomplishment, dynamic</td>
<td>Handlung, Tun, 543.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>account, giving an</td>
<td>Ausweisung, 182.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>achieve, -ment</td>
<td>Vollziehen, -zung, 36, 61.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actually, Tatsächlich</td>
<td>62.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adapt themselves, Sich-fügen</td>
<td>262.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>address [noun], Zuspruch</td>
<td>592.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>address [verb], Ansprechen</td>
<td>505.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advance, Vorlaufen, 83.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad-vent, Kommen, 424</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad-ventive, Zu-könig, 421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad-verteine, Um-kehr, 352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alien-to-home</td>
<td>Unheimisch(sein), 450.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambiguity, Zweideutigkeit</td>
<td>72.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambivalence, Zweifall, 12;</td>
<td>Zweideutigkeit, 13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antecedent, Vorgängig</td>
<td>61.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anticipatory drive-towards-Being, Sich-vorweg-sein</td>
<td>74.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-essence</td>
<td>Gegenwesen, 225.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anxiety, Angst, 72-73.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appeal, Anspruch, -sprechen</td>
<td>477; Zuspruch, 559.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appearance, mere, Anschein</td>
<td>264.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appearance, process of (Hegel), Erscheinung, das, 345.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apprehension, Ergreifen, 96.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap-propriate, Vereignen</td>
<td>486.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap-propriated (to, by Being)</td>
<td>Ge-eignet, 504.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appropriation, Aneignung, 447.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appuration, Zugehörigkeit, 280.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangement, Fug (öben), 262.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangement, pattern of, Fuge, 486.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>articulative-ess, Artikulierbare, das, 67; Gefüge, 249.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>articulation, Verlaubung, 636.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aspect, Gesichtspunkt, 349.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
assume, Übernehmen, 89.
attend, Hören, 294.
attend-ant, be, Gehören, 494.
attracting, Auf dem Zug, 598.
attraction, Anziehung, 392.
attune, Durchstimmen, 429.
attestment, Gestimmtheit, 279; Gestimmtsein, 65; Stimmung, 621.
authenticity, Eigenartigkeit, 58.
awe, Scheu, 270, 608.
B
bearing, Gebärden, 578.
becoming-at-home, Heimisch-werdien, 450.
beginning, Beginn, 257.
Being (-process), Sein, 4, 6, 10.
Being-as-history, Seinhistorie, 437.
Being as such, Sein als solches, 33.
Being of World, Weltlichkeit, 32.
being 
[verb, adj.], Seiend, 10.
being 
[noun], Seiende, das, 4, 10.
being-as-across, Gegeben, 420.
being-as-it-seems-to-be, Schein, 110.
being-as-taking-its-origin, Entsteh, 111.
being-destined, Bestimmung, 54.
being-ness, Seiendheit (Seins), 4.
being ready-at-hand (instrument), Zuhandene, 53.
being-that-appears, Erscheinende, das, 110.
being-what, Jungen, das, 517.
be-taking-way, movement (Hegel), Be-wegung, 344.
beings in the ensemble, Seiende im Ganzen, das, 197.
beon, Sein, 554.
bestow, -al, Schenken, 410.
bi-dimensionality, Zweidimensional, das, 347.
bring-forth, Herausbringen, 583.
bringing-into-words, Erwählen, 509.
calculation, Rechnung, 372.
calculative thinking, Rechnen, 479.
captivation, Eingenommenheit, 185.
care, Achten, 603.
center (Rilke), Mitte, 392.
center of institution, Mitte, bildende, 123.
claim [noun], Anspruch, 438.
claim upon, make, Ansprechen, 538.
close-over, Verschließen, 96.
collecting, Gesammtheit, 262.
collecting, -tion, Sammlung, 282.
collective, -or, Sammler, 283.
coming-of-Being-into-words, Wortwerden des Seins, 293.
come-to-essence, Wesen, 228.
come-to-pass, Geschehn, 36-37.
come-to-presence, Wesen, Anwesen, 228.
commerce, Handel, 480.
comform, sich, Sich schicken, 495.
commitment, Schicksal, 433; Schicksale, das, 540.
compatibility, Ruh, 519.
components, existential, Existenzialien 49.
comport(ment), (enter into), Verhalten, 341.
compose, Herausstellen, 567.
comprehend(ing), -ion, Verstehen, 34.
comprehensibility, Verständlichkeit, 85.
comprehensible, Verständlich, 107.
comprehension (of Being), 34.
concept, (Self-) seizure (Hegel), Begriff, 341.
concern, Sorge, 40.
concurrence, Übereinstimmung, 94.
concur, [Entsprechen], (Entsprechen), 497.
conditioned by beings, Be-Dingt, 575.
conformity, Übereinstimmung, 213.
conserve (work), Verwahren, 566.
containing, -ing, Bewahrung, 408.
constancy, Erhaltung, Bestand, 366.
constancy, mere, Beständigkeit, bloße, 518.
consumption, Vollendung, 381.
contain (-ment, bring to), Vernehmen (vocire), 269.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Term</th>
<th>German Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>contention</td>
<td>Auseinandersetzung (πόλεμος)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contentious</td>
<td>Strittige, das</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correctness</td>
<td>Richtigkeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correlation</td>
<td>Zusammengehörigen, -igkeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspond</td>
<td>Ent sprechen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterpoise</td>
<td>Ausgleich, 447; Auslösen, 443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creative effort</td>
<td>Schaffen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>credentials present</td>
<td>Sich ausweisen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dashed to pieces</td>
<td>Zerbrechen, 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de-cadence</td>
<td>Verderb, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decompose</td>
<td>Ent-scheidung, 284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de-parture</td>
<td>Abschied, 394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dependence</td>
<td>Angewiesenheit, 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>destined</td>
<td>Beuwendlüssen, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de-valuation</td>
<td>Entwertung, 363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dialogue</td>
<td>Gespräche, 295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference, (ontological)</td>
<td>Differenz, (ontologische), 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differenced</td>
<td>Unt-der-Schied, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differentiation, -tion</td>
<td>Unterscheiden, -ung, 346, 437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differentiation</td>
<td>Scheidung, 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direction</td>
<td>Wegung, 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disappearing</td>
<td>Abwesenheit, 313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dis-arrangement</td>
<td>Un-Fug, 518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disclose</td>
<td>Erzählen, 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disclosedness</td>
<td>Erschlossenheit, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discord</td>
<td>aboriginal, Auseinandersetzung (πόλεμος), 261; Urstreit, 406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disclosing</td>
<td>Ent-decken, 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discovering, (process of)</td>
<td>Entdeckend sein, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discoveredness</td>
<td>Entdecktheit, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disintegration, ultimate</td>
<td>Zerbrechen, 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dispose of at will</td>
<td>Widersetzen, 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dissimulation, Verstellen</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distress</td>
<td>Not, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domain</td>
<td>Spielraum, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominion</td>
<td>Erdherrschaft, 372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Term</th>
<th>German Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>draw-ness</td>
<td>(relation of) Bewußt, 599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drive-toward-Being</td>
<td>Sehnsüchten, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duality</td>
<td>Zweiseitigkeit, das, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dwell</td>
<td>Wohnen, 584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Term</th>
<th>German Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>efficacious</td>
<td>Tauglich, 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>essential, Existential</td>
<td>Wesen-lich, 425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>establish itself</td>
<td>Sich richten, 413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>everywhere</td>
<td>Alltäglichkeit, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-valuate, -tion</td>
<td>Schätzen, 369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-vent</td>
<td>Ereignis, 614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-volve, Heissen</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existence, Existens</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existential, Existential</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existence, Existenzial, Existentiell</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-pand, Vergegenen</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ex-patriation, condition of | Unheimi-
| F                      | sche, das, 472 |
|Ex-patriation, state of | Unheimlichkeit, 81 |
| Experience (Hegel)    | Erfahrung, 348 |
| experience, aesthetic | Erlebnis, 416 |
| experience, living    | Er-lebnis, 327 |
| exposure, Darstellung | 333-334 |
| ex-position, Ausgesetztsein | 256 |
| ex-posure, Aussetzung | 27 |
| eye on Being          | Ausschau, 615 |
| eye, have eye for     | Er-blicken, 613 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Term</th>
<th>German Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Faktisch, 378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>facticity</td>
<td>Faktizität, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>factually</td>
<td>Faktisch, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fall of</td>
<td>Verfallenheit, 37-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farishness</td>
<td>Ferne, 452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fast</td>
<td>Festhalten, 471; Sichfestigen, 449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| fast, make            | Erfestigen, 445; Fest-
machen, 471 |
| feast, marriage, Fest | 444 |
| finitude, Endlichkeit | 37 |
| first of all and for the most part, Zunächst und zumeist | 48 |
| fissure               | Rif, 580 |
force to bear, bring (-ing), Gewalt brauchen, (Gewalttätigen), 270.
forget(ting), Vergessen, 487.
fortune, Schicksal, 91.
fortune, common, Geschick, 92.
found, Eründern, 167-168.
foundational, Wesentlich, 16.
Free, the, Freie, das, 618.
freedom unto death, Freiheit zum Tode, 80.
future, Zukunft, 86.
Ggathered-together coming-to-presence, Gesammeltes Anwesen (Gesammeltheit), 261.
Gathered-togetherness, Gesammeltheit, 261.
Gathering (-together), Sammlung (Sammlung (+yog), 261.
Gift, Schenkung, 413.
Giveto be, Überantworten, 64.
Glad-some, the, Heitere, das, 444.
Gladsome-ness, Heiterkeit, 562.
Ging-from-presence, Abwesenheit, 312.
Grace, Gnade, 477.
Graciousness, Gunst, 477.
Grant, Geben, 413.
Granted, (there) is, Es gibt, XX.
Grave, make, Erschweren, 289.
Ground, -ing-process, coming-to-pass of, Gründen, 764.
Ground, help, Ergründen, 460.
Ground-question, Grundfrage, 7.
Guideline, Leitfrage, 7.
Guilt, Schuld, 81.
Hail [noun], Geheiß, 618.
Hail [verb], Grüßen, 446.
Hand(-ing) (-process), Brauch, 520.
Having-been-ness, Gewesenheit, 743.
Heart, Herz, 555.
Heart imparted (to thought), Zumutung, 555.
Heart of man, Gemüt, 600.
Heed, (pay - to), Achien auf, 611.
Hermeneutic, Hermeneutik, 47.
Hidden-ness, Verborgenheit, 399.
Hide, Bergen, 436.
History, Geschichte, 27, 90.
History, primordial, Urgeschichte, 238.
History, scientific, Historie, 90.
Historical, Geschichtlich, 90.
Historicity, Geschichtlichkeit, 90.
Holdself in re-serve, Sich sparen, 462.
Holiness, Heiligkeit, 426.
Holy, the, Heilige, das, 426.
Home, not at, Un-häuslich, 273.
Homeless, (There-being at), Un-zuhause, 81.
Homelessness, Heimatlosigkeit, 389.
House of Being, Haus des Seins, 528.
Imagination, transcendental, Einbildungskraft, transzendentale, 122-123.
Immersed in, be, Sein-bei, 52.
Imparting, Schickung (Molga), 598.
Impose self, Sichdurchsetzen, 394.
Impotence, Unmöglichkeit, 77.
Inauthentic, Uneigentlich, 50.
In-being, In-Being, 58.
In-cident, Zwischenfall, 266.
Induction, Einbezug, 47.
Initiative, taking, Anfänglich, 225.
Innermost core, Innerste, das, 600.
Instinct, Instinktion, 223.
In-stance, Innestehen, 511; Inständigkeit, 509.
Institution, Bildung, 123.
Instrument, Zeug, 53.
Instrument (ready-at-hand), Zuhandenheit, 55.
Instrumentality, Zuhandenheit, 250.
Instrumental-ness, Zeughaftigkeit, 53.
Intelligible, Verständlich, 207.
Interchange, mutual, Wechselbezug, 272.
Inter-mittence, Geschichte, 433, 465.
Interpretation, Auslegung, 47.
Intimation, Aufforderung, 428; Zuspruch, 488.
Irruption, Einbruch, 43.
Is granted, (there), Es gibt, XX.
Issue, Austrag, 579.
Justice, Gerechtigkeit, 371.
Justification, Rechtfertigung, 371.
Know (-ing), Wissen (Wissen), 271.
Knowing-ness, Science, Wissenschaft (Hegel), 354.
Language, Sprache, 67.
Language, bring into, Zur Sprache bringen, 498.
Lay-claim, Stilten, 165-166.
Laying-free, Freilagung, 182.
Laying foundation, Grundlegung, 3.
Laying-out in full view, Auslegung, 47.
Lead astray, Beirren, 224.
Lead forth, Hervorbringen, 414.
leap [verb], Springen, 42.
leap backwards [noun], Sprung zurück, 612.
let-be, Seinlassen, 216.
let-be-seen, Sehenlassen, 46.
let-go-forth, Hervorgehenlassen, 414.
let-lie-forth-in-collectedness, Besammen-vor-siegen-lassen (lügen), 491-492.
let stand opposed, Gegenstehenlassen, 130.
liberation, Freigabe, 57.
lighting-process, Lichtung, 6.
limit(ed), Ende, (endlich), 78.
listening, mere, Herumhören, bloßes Hören, 294.
listening to others, Hören auf, 68.
lodging, taking up, Behausung, 43.
logos (as existential component), Rede, 66.
loquacity, Gerede, 71.
luminosity, Gelichtetheit, 59.
maintain free, Frei halten, 184.
maintaining upper hand over, Verbindung, 519.
make one’s own, Übernehmen, 246.
manifestation, Offenbarkeit, 43.
matrix of relations, Bezugszusammenhang, 36.
matrix of relationships, Verhältnis, 214.
meaning, Bedeutung, 67.
meaningfulness, (Total), Bedeutsamkeit, 57.
measure (out), Durchmessen, Vermassen, 580.

M
mesh, Gefüge, sich fügen, 603.
metaphysics, Metaphysik, 4-5.
met-“physics,” Meta-Physik, 5.
middle-point, Mitte, 92.
might, dominating, Macht, 256.
mine-ness, Jemeinigkeit, 45.
missapprehension, Vergreifen, 96.
milence, Geschicht, 435; Geschichtliche, das, 493.
mood, Stimmung, 65.
mountain fastness, Gebirg, 574.
moved-ness, Bewegtheit (bewegte), 310.
movement, being-under-way (Hegel), Bewegung, 344.
movement along the way, Bewegung, 616.
mystery, Geheimnis, 221.

N
name, (give), Nennen, 292.
near-ness, Nähe, 6.
near-ness, Nearness, 6.
necessity, Nötigkeit, 76.
need, Not, 267.
needly, Dürftig, 391.
negate, Nichten, 541.
negation, logical, Verneinung, 199.
negating element, Nickelnde, das, 335.
negativity, Nichtigkeit, 76.
no-more-There-being, Nicht-mehr-dasein, 76.
Non-being, Nichts, 38.
Non-being in its very essence, Nichten des Nichts, 199.
non-concealment, Unverborgenheit, 9.
non-ground, Ab-grund, 172.
non-essence, Un-wesen, 172.
not at home, Un-heimlich, 273.
not present, Ungegenwärtigkeit, 517.
not true abode, Unheimlichkeit, 74.
nothing, absolute, leeres Nichts, 573.

O
object (being-as-opposed), Gegenstand, 110.
objectivate, Gegenstehenlassen, 112.
objectiveness, Gegenständlichkeit, 112-113.
objectivising, Ver-gegenständlichung, 322.
obligation, Sollen, 260.
of itself (Hegel), An ihm selbst, 346.
one (vs. same), Selbe, das (vs. das Gleiche), 588.
on-tic, Ontisch, 8.
ontological, Ontologisch, 8.
on-to-theo-logical, Onto-theo-logisch, 9-10.
Open, the, Offene, das, 214.
open, that which is, Offenbare, das, 214.
open-character, Offenständlichkeit, 215.
open-ness, Offenheit, 20, Offensein, 68.
opposed, being-an-, Gegenstand, 420.
opposed-ness, area of, Daünder, 215.
or-dering, Form (Bild), 262.
organisation, Form (Bild), 262.
organised, that-which-is-, Gefüge, 263.
organising, process of, Fügung, 262.
orientation, Zuwendung-zu, 114.
orientation, (self-), Selbst, das, 108.
origin, Anfang, 257.
original, Ursprünglich, 403.
originally, more, Ursprünglicher, 290.
originating, Anfänglich, 225.
originating event, Anfang, 420.
originating power, Anfängnis, 437.
orignation, Stiftung, 420.
over-come (man), Über (den Menschen) kommen, 428.
overcoming, Überwindung, 14.
Overpowering, the Überwältigende, das, 261.
over-reach, Überschwingen, 166.

P
past, thing of the, Vergangene, das, 581.
past (what-is-as-having-been), Ge-wesenheit, 87.
past (what-was-and-is-no-more), Ver-gangenheit, 87.
poesy, Dichtung (im engeren Sinne), Poesie, 410.
poetry, Dichtung (im wesentlichen Sinne), 410.
polyvalence, (four-fold), Geviert, 570.
pose, (posit), Setzen, 324.
potentiality, -ies, Möglichkeit, -en, 39, 62.
pouring out, Geschenk, 570.
power, Vermögen, 600.
reassurance, Sicherheit, 369.
receive, Vernehmen (voeiv), 269.
re-collection, An-dacht; 602; Andenken, 22, 438; Erinnerung, 438; Wiedererinnerung, 49.
re-collective, Andenkend, 574.
reference, pattern of, Verweisungsganzheit, 54.
reference, pattern of relationships, Ge-füge, 423.

Q
Quadrate, Geviert, 570.
Questionable, the eminently, Fragwürdigste, das, 615.
questionable-ness, Fragwürdigkeit, 416.

R
radiance, visible, Aussehen, 314.
recollective, Hinsetzen, 602.
reference, 55.
references, pattern of, Verweisungsganzheit, 54.
referential dependence, Angewiesenheit, 37.
relationship, Beziehung, 380.
release [noun], Gelassenheit, 504.
release-into [verb], Einlassen, 242.
rendering-free, Freigabe, 286.
re-patriation, condition of, Heimische, 405.
repose, Ruhe, Beruhen, 498.
represent, Repräsentieren, 335.
(re)presentation, Vorstellung, 108.
re-solve, Entschlossenheit, 83.
respond, -sponding, -sponse, Ent-sprechen, -ung, 21.
re-treat, Ausbleiben, 520.
re-trive, Wiederholung, 89.
re-valuation, Umwertung, 363.
right, render-, Recht-, 371.
rigor, Strenge, 106.
GLOSSARY: ENGLISH-GERMAN

709

taking (a) place, Gestellung, 312.
technicity, Technik, 326.
temporality, Zeitlichkeit, 85.
temporalize, -ing, (Sich) zeitigen, -ung, 85.
tend, Schonen, 584.
thanks, Dank, 480.
thanks-giving, Danken, Gedanke, 601.
that being(s) is (are), Daß-sein, 316.
There, Da, 20.
There-being, Dasein, 34-35.
There-being-with-others, Mitdasein, 68.
there is, Es gibt, 43.
think, -ing, Denken, 16.
thought, Denken, 16.
thought-ful, Denkend, 21.
Thought-worthy, the eminently, Bedenklichste, das, 597.
throw-down, -out (There), Werfen, 267.
throw-ing (of There), Wurf, 532.
throw-ness, Geworfenheit, 37.
thrust, Sichhineinhalten, 201.
tim-ing, Zeitigung, 145.
to-be, Zu-sein, 39.
to-be aware (Hegel), Beswuf-tein, 347.
to-have-seen, Wissen, 335.
totality of beings, Seiende im Ganzen, das, 43.
Traction, Zug, 392.
transcendence, Transzendenz, Übersteig, 36.
translate, Übersetzen, 526.
trans-late, Über-setzen, 526.
truth, Wahrheit (das), 96.
tune called by Being, Stimme des Seins, 491.

U
un-concealed, Unverborgen, 5.
uncover, Enidecken, 96.
un-said, the, Unergagte, das, 609.
un-thought, the, Ungedachte, das, 290.
un-truth, Unwahrheit, 96.
un-veiling, Enthulling, 182.
unwhole(some), what is, Unheil, 399.
utter, -ance, Sagen, Sage, 496.

V
veiling, Verbergung, 218.
vengeance, spirit of, Rache, Geist der, 377.
Venture, Wagnis, 392.
venture-some, more, Wagender, 397.
view, Ambition, 116.
Glossary: German-English

view-of-the-World-about, Umsicht, 54.
view of, stand in, Angesicht, stehen im, 525.
vioence brought to bear, Gewalttätig-
keit, 271.
vioence to, do (ing), Gewalt brauchen, (Gewalttätig), 270.
view of, stand in, Angesicht, stehen im, 525.
violence to, Gewalt: 271.
viage, offer, Aussehen, 264.
vortex of onticity, Wirbel, 71.

W
wait, a-, Warten, er 506.
wait, a-, Warten, 506.
Wander (astray) in errance, Irren, 224.
want 

What being(s) is (are), Was-sein, 316.
want does not come-to-presence, Ab-
wesende, das, 517.
Wherein, (World as), Worin, 56.
whereunto, its own, UmwiUen seiner, 180.
whereunto, (ultimate), WorumwiUen, 56.
Warrant, Weisung, 550.
way-of-being-finite, Verendlichung, 32.
what does not come-to-presence, Ab-
wesende, das, 517.

Y
yield (oneself), Sich einlassen, 397.
yield, -ing (by World), Gönnen, 578.
Ausgleich, counterpoise, 447.
Auslegung, laying out in full view, 47.
Auslösen, counterpoise, 414.
Aussage, expression, 214.
Ausschau, eye on Being, 615.
Aussehen, offer visage, 264; visible radiance, 3x4.
Aussetzung, exposure, 217.
Ausstehen, withstand, 33g.
Austrag, issue, 579.
Ausweisen, sich, present credentials, 169.
Ausweisung, giving an account, 182.

B
Bauen, working, 584.
Bedenklichste, das, eminently Thought-worthy, the, 597.
Bedeutung, meaning, 67.
Bedeutsamkeit, Total Meaning fulness, 57.
Be-Dingt, conditioned by beings, 575.
Befindlichkeit, (ontological) disposition, 64-65.
Beginn, beginning, 257.
Begreifen, Sich-, self-seizure, 334.
Begriff (Hegel), (Self-)seizure, concept, 341.
Begriff, nur (Hegel), mere concept, 341.
Begründen, found, 167-168.
"Begründung," founding, 161.
Beherren, take up lodging, 343.
Beirren, lead astray, 224.
Bergen, hiding, 436.
Beruhren, repose, 498.
Besorgen, be preoccupied with, 54.
Bestand, constancy, 566.
Beständigkeit, bloße, mere constancy, 578.
Bewahrung, conserving, -nation, 408.
Bewandtung, -ing, destination, 54.
Bewandtungsanzeichen, purposeful pattern, 54.
Bewegen, send on way, 616.
Bewegtheit (körpers), moved-ness, 310.
Be weg-ung (Hegel), being-under-way, movement, 344.
Be wegung, movement along the way, 616.
Bewendenlassen, let be destined, 57.
Bewußt-sein (Hegel), To-be-aware, 347.
Befinden auf, Sich-, (self-)orientation, 108.
Bestehung, relationship, 380.
Bezug, relation, 380.

D
Da, There, 20.
Dank, thanks, 480.
Danken, thanks-giving, 601.
Darstellung, exposed, 353-354.
Dasein, There-being, 34-35.
Dau-sein, that being(s) is (are), 316.
Dawider, area of opposed-ness, 115.
Denken, think(ing), thought, 16.
Denkend, thought-ful, 21.
Dichten, (process of) poetizing, 409.
Dichtung (im engeren Sinne), poetry, 410.
Dichtung (im wesentlichen Sinne), poetry, 410.
Differenz, (ontologische), difference, (ontological), 12.
Durchmessen, measure (out), 588.
Durchsetzen, Sich-, im-pose (self), 394.
Durchstimmen, attune, 429.
Durchwalten, permeate, 271.
Dürftig, needy, 391.
E
Eigentlichkeit, authenticity, 50.
Einbezug, induction, 497.
Einbruch, interruption, 43.
Einbildungskraft, transzendentale imagination, transcendental, 122-123.
Einführung, dovetailing, 262.
Eingenommenheit, captivation, 165.
Einlassen, sich, abandon (self), 602; yield, 397.
Ek-sistenz, exist-ence, 217.
Empfangnis, acceptance, 508.
Ende (endlich), limit(ed), 78.
Endlichkeit, finitude, 37.
Einerleich, sameness, 270.
Entbergen, -ung, reveal, -ment, -ing, 218.
Entdecken, dis-cover, 55; uncover, 96.
Endecksendsein, (process of) discovering, 94.
Entdecktheit, discoveredness, 94.
Enthüllung, un-veiling, 182.
Ent-scheidung, de-cision, 284.
Entschlossenheit, re-solve, 83.
Ent-setzend, de-ranging, 427.
Entsprechen, -ung, respond, -sponding, -sponse, 21.
Entstand, being-as-taking-its-origin, 111.
Entwertung, de-valuation, 363.
Entwerfen, -wurf, project, 60-61.
Entziehen, Sich-, withdrawing, 608.
Entzug, withdrawal, 166, 598.
Erdherrschaft, dominion-over-the-earth, 372.
Ent-blicken, eye, have eye for, 613.
Ereignen, sich, take place, 219.
Ereignis, e-vent, 614.
Erfahrung (Hegel), Experience, 348.
Erfestigen, make fast, 445.
Ergreifen, apprehension, 96.
Ergründen, help ground, 460.
Erhaltung, constancy, 366.
Erinnerung, re-collection, 438.
Erlebnis, aesthetic experience, 416.
Er-lebnis, living experience, 327.
Erscheinen, appear(ing), 630.
Erscheinen (Hegel), shine-forth, 336.
Erscheinende, das, being-that-appears, 601.
Erschließen, disclose, 55.
Erschlossenheit, disclosedness, 58.
Erschweren, make grave, 289.
Existenz, existence, 35.
Existenzial, existential, 49.
Existenzialien, existential components, 49.
Existenziell, existentiell, 49.
Faktisch, facticial, 178; factually, 62; matter-of-fact, 53.
Faktizität, facticity, 64.
Ferne, farness, 452.
Fest, marriage feast, 444.
Feste, das, steadfastness, 445.
Festhalten, hold fast, 471.
Festmachen, make fast, 471.
Fragwürdigkeit, questionableness, 416.
Fragwürdigkeit, questionableness, 416.
Fragwürdigkeit, being-worth-of-question, -as-questionable, 258.
Freie, das, Free, the, 618.
Frei halten, maintain free, 184.
Freigabe, liberation, 57; rendering-free, 185.
Freiheit zum Tode, freedom unto death, 80.
Freilegung, laying free, 283.
Fug (stäben), arrangement, organisation, 262.
GLOSSARY: GERMAN-ENGLISH

1
In-Achtnehmen, take under one’s care, 603.
In-der-Welt-Sein, to-be-in-the-World, 49.
Innestehend, in-stance, 511; take stance within, 536.
Innerste, das, innermost core, 600.
In-Sein, in-being, 59.
In-süitieren, in-stist, 223.
Inständigkeit, in-stance, 599.
Ins-Werk-setzen (tätig), set-to-work, 287.
Irre, -en, errance, wander (astray) in, 224.
Irrtum, error, 224.
J
Jemeinigkeit, mine-ness, 45.
Jetzefolge, succession of nows, 133.
Je-Weilige, das, being that whiles, 517.
K
Kehre, reversal, 26.
Kommen, ad-vent, 424.
Kommen, über (den Menschen), over-come (man), 418.
L
Leitfrage, guide-question, 7.
Lichtung, lighting-process, 6.
Loslassen, Sich-, surrender, 200.
M
Macht, dominating might, 256.
Man, “people,” 27.
Maß-nahme, taking-measure, 590.
Metaphysik, metaphysics, 4-5.
Meta-Physik, meta-“physics,” 5.
Mitte, Center (Rilke), 392; middle-point, 502.
Mitte, bildende, center of institution, 123.
Mittasein, There-being-with-others, 68.
Mitsein, with-being, 59.
Mitwelt, with-World, 59.
Mitziehen, draw-with, 598.
Mögen, want, 597, 600.
Möglichkeit, -en, potentiality, -ties, 39.
Möglichsein, power-to-be, 62.
Mut, heart, 555.
N
Nachholen, retract, 189.
Nachstellen, postpone, 377.
Nähe, near-ness, 6.
Naturanlage, natural propensity, 37.
Nennen, (give) name, 292.
Glossary: German-English

Nennung, bringing-into-words, 509.
Nicht-heimisch, es-tranged, 535.
Nichtende, das, negativing element, 535.
Nichten, Non-being in its very essence, 199.
Nichtigkeit, negativity, 76.
Nichts, No-thing, 196.
Nicht-mehr-da-sein, no-more-There-being, 76.
Not, distress, need, 225.
Offenbar, revealed, 43.
Offenbare, das, that which is open, 214.
Offenbarkeit, manifestation, 43.
Offene, das, Open, the, 214.
Offenheit, open-ness, 20.
Offenständigkeit, open-character, 215.
Ontisch, ontic, 8.
Ontologisch, ontological, 8.
Onto-theo-logisch, onto-theo-logical, 9-10.
Poesie, poesy, 410.
Präsentation, presentation, 336.
Präsentieren, render-present, 355.
Präsenz, present-ness, 325.
Rache, Geist der, spirit of vengeance, 377.
Rechnung, calculation, 372.
Recht-fertigen, render-right, 371.
Rechtfertigung, justification, 371.
Rede, logos, 66; articulation-ness, speech, 292.
Repräsentieren, represent, 335.
Reszendenz, rescendence, 18.
Rettung, salvation, 534.
Richten, sich, establish itself, 473.
Richtigkeit, correctness, 273.
Riß, fissure, 580.
Ruch, com-patibility, 519.
Rückblicken, re-view, 214.
Rücksicht, mutual deference, 519.
Ruhe, re-pose, 498.
Sagen, Sage, utter, ance, 496.
Sammeln, collect-or, 383.
Sammeln, -lung (höys), collect(ing), -ion, 282; gather(ing) (-together), 282.
Schätzen, e-valuate, -ion, 369.
Schaften, creative effort, 407.
Scheidung, (-en), scission, (make), differentiation, 282.
Schein, appearing, shining-forth, seeming-to-be, 263; being-as-it-seems-to-be, 110.
Schenken, bestow, -al, 470.
Schenkung, gift, 472.
Scheu, awe, 270, 608.
Schickung (Moquito), im-parting, 598.
Schenken, sich, e-mi, 435; com-mit self, 493.
Schicksal, fortune, 91; com-mitment, 435.
Schied, scission, 579.
Schonen, 584.
Schuld, guilt, 81.
Schweigen, keep silence, 243.
Sehenlassen, let-be-seen, 46.
Seiende, das, being [noun], 4, 10.
Seiende im Ganzen, das, beings-in-the-ensemble, 297; totality of beings, 43.
Seiendheit (nous), being-ness, 4.
Sorge, concern, 40.
Sparen, sich, hold self in re-serve, 462.
Spielraum, domain, 214.
Sprache, articulation-language, 67.
Sprache bringen, zur, bring into language, 458.
Springen, leap, 42.
GLOSSARY: GERMAN-ENGLISH

Sprung,  spring,  611.
Sprung zurück,  leap backwards,  612.
Steigerung,  surpassment,  366.
Stiften,  lay-claim,  165-166.
Stiftung,  origination,  366.
Stimme des Seins,  tune called by Being,  461.
Stimmung,  mood,  65;  attunement,  461.
Streng,  rigor,  106.
Streuung,  strewing,  165.
Strittige, das,  Contentious,  the,  533.
Subjektivität,  subjectivity,  325.
Tatsächlich,  actually,  62.
Tauglich,  efficacious,  304.
Tauglichmachende, das,  power-which-renders-efficacious,  304.
Technik,  technicity,  326.
Transzendenz,  transcendence,  36.
Tun,  dynamic accomplishment,  543.
U
Uberantworten,  give over to be,  64.
Überantwortung,  concordance,  94;  conformity,  273.
Übernehmen,  assume,  take-over,  89;  make one's own,  246.
Überwältigende, das,  overpowering,  the,  261.
Überwindung,  overcoming,  14.
Umsicht,  view-of-the-World-about,  54.
Umwelt,  World-about,  53.
Ungedachte, das,  un-thought,  the,  399.
Ungemach, das,  un-said, the,  609.
Unheil, what is unwhole(some),  399.
Unheimische, das,  condition of expatriation,  472.
Unheimisch (sein),  alien-to-home,  450.
Unheimlichkeit, not true abode,  74;  state of expatriation,  81.
Unheimlichste, das,  most awesome, strangest (of beings),  270.
Ungewissheit, uncertainty,  77.
Undurchdringliche, das,  most awesome, strangest (of beings),  312.
Ungewissheit, uncertainty,  77.
Ungewollt, through-involuntary,  270.
Ungewöhnlich, strange,  270.
Ungewöhnlich (sein),  strange,  270.
Ungewöhnlichste, das,  most strange,  270.
Ungewöhnliches, das,  strangest,  270.
Ungewöhnlichkeit, strangeness,  270.
Ungemach, das,  un-said, the,  609.
Ungedacht, das,  un-thought, the,  290.
Ungesagte, das,  unsaid, the,  609.
Unerreichbarkeit,  unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit,  unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich,  unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichheit,  unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichster, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarkeit,  unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich, unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich, unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich, unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich, unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich, unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich, unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlichste, das,  most unreachable,  270.
Unerreichlichkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarkeit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichbarheit, unreachable-ness,  270.
Unerreichlich, unreachable,  270.
GLOSSARY: GERMAN-ENGLISH

Verständlich, comprehensible, intelligible, 107.
Verständnis, (Seins-), comprehension (of Being), 34.
Verstehbarkeit, comprehensibility, 85.
Verstehen, comprehend(ing), -sion, 34.
Verstellen, dissimulation, 405.
Verwahren, conserve (work), 586.
Verweilen, while [verb], 408.
Verweisung, reference, 53.
Verweisungsganzheit, pattern of references, 54.
Verwindung, maintaining upper hand over, 519.
Vollendung, consummation, 381.
Vollziehen, -zug, achieve, -ment, 36.
Vorblicken, pre-view, 411.
Vor-denken, pre-thought, 426.
Vorgängig, antecedent, 61.
Vorgestelltheit, presented-ness, 324.
Vorhandenes, (mere) entity, 53.
Vorlaufen, advance, 83.
Vornehmen, accept, 269.
Vorontologisch, pre-ontological, 343.
Vorstellen, propose, (render) present, 18.
Vorstellend, presentative, 18.
Vorstellung, (re)presentation, 108.
Wagender, more venture-some, 397.
Wagnis, Venture, 392.
Wahrheit (ä-Arfteux), truth, 9.
Walten, hold sway, 223.
Walten, (Durch-), dominate, 221.
Walten, aufgehendes und verweilendes (geörs), emergent-abiding-Power, 17.
Warten, er-, wait, a-, 365.
Was-sein, what being(s) is (are), 316.
Wechselbezug, mutual interchange, 272.
Welle, whiling, 316.
Wesen, essence [noun and verb], presence [verb], (come-to-), 228.
Wesentlich, foundational, 16; essential, 475.
Widersetzen, dispose of at will, 377.
Wieder-erinnerung, re-collection, 49.
Wiederholung, re-tire, 89.
Wirbel, vortex (of onticity), 71.
Wissen (tegen), knowing, 271; to-have-seen, 335.
Wissenschaft (Hegel), Knowing-ness, Science, 354.
Wortwissen (tegen), will-to-know, 287-288.
Wohnen, dwell(ing), 584.
Worin, (World as) Wherein, 56.
Worumwillen, (ultimate) whereunto, 56.
Wortverden des Seins, coming-of-Being into-words, 295.
Wurf, throwing (of There), 532.
Z
Zeigen, show-forth, 406.
Zielgende, der, sign, 403.
Zielten, sich, temporize, 588.
Zukunft, future, 86.
Zukünftig, adventive, 42 z.
Zumutung, heart imparted (to thought), 555.
Zügelhaftigkeit, instrumental-ness, 53.
Zweideutigkeit, ambiguity, 71.
Zwiefalt, ambivalence, 13; ambivalence, 71.
Zweifache, das, duality, 13.
Zwischenfall, in-cident, 266.
I. INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

In the following list, all of the "friendly spots of blood" coagulate into one, and, indeed, according to these conventions: Roman characters indicate direct quotations of Heidegger (English in text, German in footnotes); italics indicate page references to Heidegger, with no citation (beyond occasional identifying word or phrase); bars (/) indicate the number of times a given page of Heidegger is quoted from or referred to, when this occurs more than once.

Where there is an alternate German edition with pagination differing from that of the edition followed by the present writer (as in the case of WG [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1959] and HB [Frankfurt: Klostermann, n.d.]), the correlated pagination is given in brackets. Here initial ciphers refer to pages, alphabetical letters refer to paragraph sequence, subsequent ciphers refer to lines within paragraph.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ED</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-70</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-56</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-56</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54-55</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62-63</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63-65</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67-70</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73-74</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-88</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-78</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Texts Cited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>264, 441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>280, 282, 284, 285/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84-88</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-86</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>284, 285/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>285, 286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-149</td>
<td>286, 287, 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97-103</td>
<td>291, 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104-110</td>
<td>300, 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112-126</td>
<td>308, 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114-115</td>
<td>311, 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-121</td>
<td>317, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123-124</td>
<td>322, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124-125</td>
<td>325, 326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126-128</td>
<td>329, 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128-129</td>
<td>333, 334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**EM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137-138</td>
<td>298, 299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141-142</td>
<td>303, 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149-150</td>
<td>307, 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**FW**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>560, 560, 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>559, 560, 561, 640/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>559, 561/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>557, 559, 560, 561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**G**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-26</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-32</td>
<td>242, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-32</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-33</td>
<td>265, 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>266, 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-37</td>
<td>282, 287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>503, 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-42</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-42</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G</th>
<th>HB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>503, 503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>503, 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>506, 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48-49</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-51</td>
<td>503, 507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>503, 505, 507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-52</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>504, 506, 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52-56</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54-55</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>505, 506, 508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>503, 508, 509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-62</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63-64</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>504, 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-65</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-66</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66-67</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>503, 503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104-117</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>503, 503, 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>503, 503, 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>503, 503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53-119 [5-47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 [5 a 1-5 a 21]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 [5 a 21-6 a 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 [6 a 8-6 b 3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 [6 b 3-7 b 14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-104 [6 b 3-38 b 13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 [8 a 5-8 b 19]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 [8 b 19-9 a 16]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 [9 a 16-10 a 3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 [10 a 3-10 c 11]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62-63 [10 c 11-12 a 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 [11 a 14-11 b]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-65 [11 a 14-12 b 7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 [12 a 1-12 b 7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 [12 b 7-13 a 13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 [13 a 13-13 b 8]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HD</th>
<th>456</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>444, 456, 461, 463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>458, 461, 466, 468, 471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>457, 458, 468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>452, 461, 462, 463, 477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>447, 451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>451, 445, 447, 452, 452, 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>459, 468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>444, 447, 450, 496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>450, 464, 471, 636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>453, 456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138-139</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17-39</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-37</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HG</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44-48</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52-57</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HW</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>404, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-68</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-20</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HW</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-16</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-21</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-24</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>405, 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-34</td>
<td>406, 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-37</td>
<td>406, 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>406, 412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>407, 412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>406, 413, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-42</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>268, 405, 406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43-44</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>268, 406, 413, 414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>412, 413, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-51</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-52</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>408, 414, 636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54-55</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>406, 415, 415, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>415, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>408, 409, 417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-61</td>
<td>410, 410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>409, 410, 410, 418, 414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>411, 412, 413, 415, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63-64</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>404, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-65</td>
<td>412, 414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-65</td>
<td>412, 414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-104</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>347, 421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>321, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>418, 421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>419, 421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86-87</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>326, 326, 327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>327, 421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW</td>
<td>INDEX OF TEXTS CITED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>96-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>98-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>105-192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>126-127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>131-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>132-134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>136-137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>140-141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>141-142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>149-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>152-153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>155-157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>161-162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>165-166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>168-169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>170-171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>174-175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>175-176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>179-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>181-182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>187-188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>193-247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>194-195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>199-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>203-205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>208-209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>211-212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>212-213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

HW

218-219 360
219 364, 367, 369
220 360, 372
221 369, 372
222 369, 370
223 370
225-226 371
226 372, 372
227-228 373
228 371, 438
231 363
232-233 374
233 380, 439
234 362
235 374, 438
236 326
237 374
238 372
239 373, 439
242 326, 373
243 3, 382
243-245 435
245 7, 363, 363
247 386
248 392
248-295 517
251 400
252 336
253 399
256 328
256-257 392
257-258 392
258 391
259-260 392
260-261 392
261 392
262 392, 394
263 393
265 393, 394
266 393, 394, 394
267 395
268 395
271 394, 395
274 397
275 398
277 396
277-278 398
278 327
279-280 396
281 395
281-282 398
282 393, 395

HW

282-283 396
283 398, 398
284 396
285 396
286-287 398
287 395, 397, 399
288 398
291 397, 398, 399
292 398
294 398, 399, 400
295 400
296 515
296-343 514
300 526
302 538
303 510, 526
304 519
306 526
310 533
311 533, 543, 540
311-312 539
312 526
315 515, 519
316 515
317 50
317-318 50
317-320 516
318 50, 526
319 516
319-320 517
320 525
321 524, 525, 525
322 509, 525, 525
322-323 517
323 517, 525
325 525, 540
327 517
327-329 517
328 517
329 519
330 519
331 518
331-332 519
333 519, 523
334 520, 521, 522
335 519, 523
336 53, 587, 522
336-337 521
337 540
338-339 530
339 521, 521, 522
340 534
343 535, 534
## Index of Texts Cited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>KM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29</td>
<td>246, 614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-47</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-50</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54-56</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>11, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>7, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62-63</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>579, 639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-66</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66-69</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>11, 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KM</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>111, 149, 152, 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-41</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>183, 183 //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>116, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-56</td>
<td>118, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63-64</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-66</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-70</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>114, 115, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>114, 115, 136, 195, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>114, 115, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74-75</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>125, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>120, 126, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>127 //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-82</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-83</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>125, 125, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>115, 116, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86-88</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>115, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-89</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-91</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>116, 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>133, 134, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103-104</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>113, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>114, 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>113, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111-112</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113-114</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113-115</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>147, 148, 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118-119</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119-120</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

**KM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Ranges</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>148, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>124, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>132, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124-127</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127-146</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>134, 122, 147, 152, 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>132, 123, 137, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>136, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>137, 124, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137-138</td>
<td>138, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>136, 153, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>139, 139, 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141-142</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>139, 139, 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144-145</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145-146</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146-150</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146-156</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152-153</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163-164</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164-166</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>143//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167-171</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171-172</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171-174</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172-173</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174-177</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>145, 146, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>158, 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>20, 93, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185-222</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193-197</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195-196</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Ranges</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>197-198</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-204</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>34, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204-205</td>
<td>34, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>4, 34, 35, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205-206</td>
<td>37, 45, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>35, 38, 43, 44, 45, 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>40, 45, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>13, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>35, 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210-211</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>49, 438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>13, 36, 37, 48, 60, 62, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212-213</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>38, 40, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>38, 72, 73, 195, 535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>29, 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216-217</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**M**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Ranges</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Ranges</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-254</td>
<td>370, 434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-71</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-46</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-52</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79-83</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-91</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231-254</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255-272</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272-282</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275-276</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

### N I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>325-329</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339-348</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>356-365</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>389</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>399-457</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>399</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432-438</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>454-462</td>
<td>5, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>460</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>464-467</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>499</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>473-658</td>
<td>369, 434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>476-481</td>
<td>373, 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>476</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506-516</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>517-527</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>527-533</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>543-547</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>577-582</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>619-625</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>652-648</td>
<td>371/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>652-657</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### N II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-29</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-27</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-71</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-256</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-78</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-96</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96-109</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131-135</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135-141</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146-147</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153-155</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>324, 324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### N II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>166-173</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>426, 437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208-209</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233-234</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257-333</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263-272</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272-282</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279-280</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283-287</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>284-287</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291-302</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>311-312</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>314-318</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316-333</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335-398</td>
<td>363, 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>337-338</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>343</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>363, 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353-357</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>357</td>
<td>510/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>358</td>
<td>511/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>359</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>368</td>
<td>522, 598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>369</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>369-370</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>370</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>371</td>
<td>513, 513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>377</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>383</td>
<td>363, 510, 512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>389</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390</td>
<td>512/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390-394</td>
<td>511, 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>392-394</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>397</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>398</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>399-457</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404-405</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411-412</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>284-285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>286-288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>289-289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| PW      | 5 | 440     |
|         | 6-19 | 302    |
|         | 19-22 | 303    |
|         | 23   | 303, 387 |
|         | 23-24 | 387    |
|         | 24-25 | 387    |
|         | 25-26 | 387    |
|         | 27   | 303     |
|         | 29-30 | 303    |
|         | 32   | 305     |
|         | 32-33 | 305    |
|         | 33   | 305, 441 |
|         | 34   | 306     |
|         | 35   | 302     |
|         | 35-36 | 307    |
|         | 38   | 304//, 304 |
|         | 39   | 304, 307 |
|         | 40   | 304, 319, 388 |
|         | 40-41 | 440    |
|         | 41   | 307, 308 |
|         | 42   | 308     |
|         | 46   | 306, 307 |
|         | 46-47 | 388    |
|         | 48   | 5, 23   |
|         | 50   | 440     |
|         | 51   | 440, 441 |

| SF      | 10-26 | 374, 617 |
|         | 13    | 386     |
**INDEX OF TEXTS CITED**

SF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>5, 10, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-31</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>93, 628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-37</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>400, 474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-39</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84-86</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>614, 615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>608, 614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112-113</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139-140</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>418, 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>547//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>618, 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178-188</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>257, 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>256, 257, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>256, 257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>34//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>34, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>34, 35, 40, 49, 58, 59, 98, 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>15, 35, 49, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-27</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-26</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>110, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>64, 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-34</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>40, 47, 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-36</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>35, 39//, 51, 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-43</td>
<td>45, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>49, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Texts Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>256, 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>257//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>256, 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX OF TEXTS CITED</td>
<td>SZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74-76</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84-85</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-86</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>57, 58, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89-90</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104-113</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>99, 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>97, 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>55, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126-130</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>94-95, 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>59, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>87, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134-135</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134-136</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134-140</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140-141</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>59, 62, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>63, 63, 673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>59, 63, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148-149</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148-160</td>
<td>68, 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>7, 85, 100/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158-160</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160-161</td>
<td>66, 67, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>67, 68, 69, 100, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>58, 68, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164-165</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>66, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167-170</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170-173</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173-175</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175-176</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>99, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>71, 233, 236, 236, 507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184-190</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>72, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187-188</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188</td>
<td>73, 74, 99, 187, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188-189</td>
<td>72, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191-192</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>74, 74/1, 99/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202ff.</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202-208</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>98, 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>43, 58, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212-213</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>94, 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219-221</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220-221</td>
<td>95, 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>96/1, 186, 234/1, 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>232, 274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223-225</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226</td>
<td>95, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>97, 101, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>43, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233-234</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237-241</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243-244</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244-245</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246-248</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>76/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259</td>
<td>75, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262-263</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>78, 78, 188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

#### SZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>264</td>
<td>78 ///, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td>78, 79 ///, 80, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266-267</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267-268</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272-273</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276-277</td>
<td>81, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281-283</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283</td>
<td>82, 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>284</td>
<td>82, 232, 274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>285</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287-288</td>
<td>51, 83, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>289-295</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295-297</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298-299</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>83, 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299-300</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>306</td>
<td>76, 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>189, 233, 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>42, 612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>311</td>
<td>185, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>312</td>
<td>47, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>314</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>314-315</td>
<td>67, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315</td>
<td>42, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315-316</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>319-320</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321</td>
<td>101, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-323</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323-325</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326</td>
<td>87 ///</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>328</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>329</td>
<td>88, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>329-330</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>331-350</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336-339</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>356-364</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>362</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>365</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>366</td>
<td>100, 101, 102, 192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>370</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>376</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378-379</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>381</td>
<td>90 ///</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>382-383</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>384</td>
<td>76, 92 ///, 92, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>384-385</td>
<td>92, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385-386</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>386</td>
<td>91, 91, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>387</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>388-389</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>395</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-33</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22</td>
<td>578, 636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-24</td>
<td>577, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>55, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-30</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>577, 579, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>578, 580 ///, 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>580, 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-32</td>
<td>578, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-33</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83-155</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>629 ///, 632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>629, 631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>4, 67, 27, 632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>629, 630, 630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108-109</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

US

109-110 633
110 619, 633
113 619
114 619
120-121 633
121 631
122 637
123 637
124 439
128 632
129-130 630
130 66, 625
130-131 631
132 630
134 522, 612
137 632
145 496, 633
159-216 609, 636
162-163 636
166 528
168-169 486
169 486
170 496
175-176 617
179-180 617
185 609
197 640
197-198 616

200 496
214 496
215 496
216 636
219-238 636
234-235 482
239-268 609
242 609

252 496
253 638
258 639
261 609
262 428
269 631

VA

7 574
13-44 648, 656
21 771
26 619
32 619

32-33 619
33 618
38 6, 228
40 619
44 617
52-53 271
70 640
71-100 601, 302
72 374
75 320
76 330
79 362
80 374
80-81 374
83 361
85 325
85-88 371
86 371
87 374
88 368, 372
88-89 329
89 330
91-98 374, 381
96 374
97 374, 439
98 374, 439
99 614
101 376
101-126 361
102-103 379
103 364, 376
104 376
105 376
112-113 377
113 330
114 330, 361
114-115 378
115 364
117 363, 378
118 380, 380
121 361
122 381, 438, 440
124 380, 381
139 615
145-146 587
145-162 583, 587
147 585
147-148 587
149 584, 584
150 584
151 573, 384
152 585, 586
153 585
155-156 585
| VA       | 157-158 | 586 |
| VA       | 159     | 591 |
| VA       | 159-160 | 587 |
| VA       | 160     | 271, 586, 587 |
| VA       | 161     | 584, 591, 616 |
| VA       | 162     | 587 |
| VA       | 163-181 | 53, 560 |
| VA       | 164     | 587 |
| VA       | 165     | 597 |
| VA       | 166     | 568 |
| VA       | 167     | 590, 591 |
| VA       | 168     | 574 |
| VA       | 170     | 570 |
| VA       | 170-171 | 570, 571 |
| VA       | 172     | 570, 571 |
| VA       | 172-175 | 570 |
| VA       | 176     | 567, 570, 570, 572 |
| VA       | 176-177 | 570 |
| VA       | 177     | 573, 574, 575 |
| VA       | 178     | 267, 571, 572 |
| VA       | 179     | 575 |
| VA       | 180     | 574, 575, 576 |
| VA       | 181     | 576 |
| VA       | 182     | 575 |
| VA       | 182-185 | 550 |
| VA       | 183     | 551, 557 |
| VA       | 183-184 | 551 |
| VA       | 184     | 551 |
| VA       | 185     | 551 |
| VA       | 187-204 | 588 |
| VA       | 189     | 589 |
| VA       | 190     | 592, 592, 593 |
| VA       | 191     | 591 |
| VA       | 192     | 587, 589 |
| VA       | 193     | 588, 588, 593 |
| VA       | 195     | 589, 590, 591 |
| VA       | 196     | 590, 592 |
| VA       | 197     | 590 |
| VA       | 198     | 587, 590, 597, 592 |
| VA       | 199     | 591 |
| VA       | 200-201 | 592 |
| VA       | 202     | 591 |
| VA       | 203     | 592 |
| VA       | 204     | 477 |
| VA       | 207     | 493, 500 |
| VA       | 207-229 | 490 |
| VA       | 208     | 498, 500 |
| VA       | 208-211 | 492 |
| VA       | 210     | 494 |
| VA       | 212     | 495, 496 |
| VA       | 213     | 492, 500 |
| VA       | 213-214 | 497 |
| VA       | 214     | 497, 499 |
| VA       | 214-218 | 497 |
| VA       | 215     | 493, 494, 495, 497 |
| VA       | 219-221 | 497 |
| VA       | 220     | 493 |
| VA       | 221     | 496 |
| VA       | 221     | 493, 495, 499 |
| VA       | 222     | 21, 13, 493 |
| VA       | 223     | 496 |
| VA       | 224     | 21, 13, 498, 499 |
| VA       | 225     | 501, 582, 638 |
| VA       | 226     | 494, 498 |
| VA       | 227     | 493, 501, 545 |
| VA       | 228     | 496, 498, 500, 528, 544 |
| VA       | 229     | 496, 500 |
| VA       | 231-255 | 505 |
| VA       | 234     | 605 |
| VA       | 236     | 605 |
| VA       | 241     | 612 |
| VA       | 245     | 610 |
| VA       | 247-248 | 612 |
| VA       | 249     | 607 |
| VA       | 251-252 | 508 |
| VA       | 252     | 607 |
| VA       | 253-255 | 620 |
| VA       | 256     | 574, 640 |
| VA       | 257-282 | 484 |
| VA       | 258-261 | 547 |
| VA       | 259     | 488 |
| VA       | 260     | 488 |
| VA       | 261     | 489, 547 |
| VA       | 263     | 608 |
| VA       | 264-265 | 499, 487 |
| VA       | 267     | 485 |
| VA       | 269     | 485 |
| VA       | 271-272 | 485 |
| VA       | 272     | 485, 486 |
| VA       | 273-274 | 486 |
| VA       | 275-276 | 486 |
| VA       | 276     | 485, 486 |
| VA       | 277     | 486 |
| VA       | 278     | 486, 486 |
| VA       | 279     | 488, 489 |
| VA       | 280-281 | 487 |
| VA       | 281     | 487 |
| WD       |         |      |
| WD       | 1       | 599, 600, 601 |
| WD       | 1-78    | 361, 374 |
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

| WD   | 2-3  | 597 |
|      | 3    | 598, 602 |
|      | 4-5  | 611 |
|      | 5    | 608 |
|      | 5-6  | 598, 600 |
|      | 10   | 386, 602 |
|      | 11   | 374 |
|      | 12   | 597, 607 |
|      | 17   | 612 |
|      | 20   | 297 |
|      | 20-21| 376 |
|      | 24-25| 375 |
|      | 25   | 377 |
|      | 26   | 375 |
|      | 27   | 375, 376, 384 |
|      | 27-28| 377 |
|      | 30   | 377 |
|      | 32-33| 377 |
|      | 33   | 378 |
|      | 35-36| 330 |
|      | 36   | 377, 378 |
|      | 36-37| 379 |
|      | 37   | 377 |
|      | 39   | 611 |
|      | 42   | 379 |
|      | 43   | 379 // |
|      | 44   | 380 |
|      | 44-45| 376 |
|      | 45   | 380, 380, 605, 613 |
|      | 52   | 598, 600, 612 |
|      | 55   | 598, 608 |
|      | 59   | 602 |
|      | 64   | 377 |
|      | 66   | 375, 341 |
|      | 67   | 375 |
|      | 68   | 540, 637 |
|      | 72   | 440 |
|      | 74   | 381, 596, 613 |
|      | 76   | 381 |
|      | 77   | 379 |
|      | 79   | 596 |
|      | 82-83| 598 |
|      | 82-84| 611 |
|      | 83   | 610 // |
|      | 85   | 492, 429, 597 //, 598 |
|      | 86   | 599, 602 |
|      | 87   | 610 |
|      | 87-89| 610 |
|      | 89   | 611 |
|      | 90   | 609, 611 |
|      | 92   | 599 // |
|      | 93   | 602 |
|      | 94   | 602 |
|      | 95-96| 600 |
|      | 96   | 600 |
|      | 97   | 599 //, 600, 601 |

| WD   | 99-101| 384 |
|      | 101   | 385, 385, 386 |
|      | 102   | 386 |
|      | 103   | 602, 618 |
|      | 107   | 4, 34 |
|      | 108   | 596, 615 |
|      | 109   | 611 |
|      | 110   | 611, 618 |
|      | 111-115| 615 |
|      | 113   | 617 |
|      | 114   | 597 |
|      | 115   | 615 |
|      | 116   | 597 |
|      | 118   | 597 |
|      | 119   | 598, 609 |
|      | 119-120| 385 |
|      | 120   | 610 |
|      | 122-124| 603 |
|      | 124   | 269, 603 |
|      | 125   | 604 |
|      | 125-126| 603 |
|      | 126   | 420, 613 |
|      | 131   | 597 |
|      | 132   | 542 |
|      | 133   | 10 |
|      | 134-135| 12 |
|      | 135   | 12 |
|      | 137   | 4, 615 |
|      | 138   | 385 |
|      | 139   | 603 |
|      | 140-141| 611 |
|      | 141   | 613, 614, 616 |
|      | 143   | 6, 228 |
|      | 145   | 386, 612, 616 |
|      | 146   | 385, 386, 603 |
|      | 147   | 606, 638 |
|      | 148   | 604, 606 // |
|      | 149   | 603, 613, 615 |
|      | 150   | 596 |
|      | 153   | 618, 619 |
|      | 154   | 609 |
|      | 157   | 609 |
|      | 158   | 602 |
|      | 159   | 615 |
|      | 160   | 602 |
|      | 161   | 616 |
|      | 162   | 596, 606, 612 |
|      | 162-163| 615 |
|      | 164   | 616, 616 |
|      | 164-165| 616 |
|      | 168   | 609, 610 |
|      | 170   | 386, 615 |
|      | 171-172| 609 |
|      | 172   | 604 |
|      | 174   | 606, 606 |
### INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

#### WD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Text Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>174-175</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>13, 606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### WG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Text Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>165, 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>165, 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-21</td>
<td>36/1, 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>36/1, 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>509, 539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>180, 182, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>164, 181/119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-42</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-43</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>166, 167, 181, 379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>167, 168, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-45</td>
<td>170, 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>168, 169, 170, 172, 194, 201/1, 203, 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-46</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>160, 181, 192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-47</td>
<td>165, 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>150, 173/1, 173, 174, 179, 192, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>172/1, 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>166, 182, 189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### WM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Text Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>564/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-23</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7, 8, 13, 563/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>390, 545, 628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>542/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>536/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>98, 634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>509, 539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>7, 274, 537/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>8///, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>15, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-23</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>14, 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-26</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-27</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-29</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>205, 205, 541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>73, 219, 477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>197, 197, 201, 216, 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>198, 198, 201, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-37</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>199, 201, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>203, 541/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-41</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-40</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-41</td>
<td>199, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>17, 197, 201/1, 202/1, 288, 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>14, 200, 203, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>7, 475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>474, 474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-47</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>474, 476, 477/1, 478, 479, 488, 523/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-47</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>204, 474, 477/1, 478, 479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>475, 477/1, 478, 478, 479/1, 480/1, 482, 602, 612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-50</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Index of Texts Cited

### WM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Pages Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-51</td>
<td>477, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>474, 476, 482, 535, 544, 536, 636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Pages Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Pages Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>214, 231, 239, 424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>216, 217, 240, 241, 242, 243, 246, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>216, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>9, 19, 217, 217, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-16</td>
<td>238, 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>217, 218, 232, 238, 243, 619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>232, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>221, 222, 223, 237, 236, 237, 240, 243, 245, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21</td>
<td>236, 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>223, 231, 236, 237, 238, 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>223, 224, 225, 236, 238, 240, 242, 279, 406, 482, 507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>23, 229, 240, 241, 247, 251, 253, 253, 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>6, 228, 236, 239, 240, 245, 245, 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>6, 230, 240, 254, 255, 625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>230, 243, 253, 481, 634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

In this list: roman characters refer to main text; italics refer to footnotes; boldface characters indicate thematic treatment in whole chapters, or at least in significant parts of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aeschylus</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allemann, B.</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaximander</td>
<td>484-514, 516-526, 614, 515, 517, 520, 526, 534, 634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine, St.</td>
<td>27, 664, 667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bach, J.</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon, F.</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauch</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufret, J.</td>
<td>46, 530, 538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufret, J.</td>
<td>530, 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufret, J.</td>
<td>46, 530, 538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley, G.</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemmel, W.</td>
<td>37, 39, 50, 51, 65, 123, 179, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birault, H.</td>
<td>34, 236, 618, 634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Böhme, J.</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brentano, F.</td>
<td>viii-ix, 3, 4, 27, 629, 631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brock, W.</td>
<td>71, 198, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnet, J.</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement of Alexandria</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crick, A.</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Raeymaeker, L.</td>
<td>xxviii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Waelhens, A.</td>
<td>xxix, 39, 51, 65, 213, 211, 239, 626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dikthey, W.</td>
<td>28, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dondeyne, A.</td>
<td>xxix, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Droysen, J.</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duns Scotus</td>
<td>27, 629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebbinghaus, J.</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eckhart, (Meister)</td>
<td>600, 627, 634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisler, R.</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliot, T. S.</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fichte, J. G.</td>
<td>xiv-xv, 326, 330, 301, 381, 663, 666, 668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fink, E.</td>
<td>xxix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadamer, H. G.</td>
<td>xxvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George, S.</td>
<td>496, 636, 665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gröber, C.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homer</td>
<td>10, 295, 296, 516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull, R. F. C.</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husserl, E.</td>
<td>viii-xiii, 27, 28, 64, 178, 179, 194, 548, 631, 634, 664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jantzen, H.</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jünger, E.</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
#### INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kierkegaard, S.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krebs</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kretzschmer, C.</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lactae</td>
<td>569, 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lauer, Q.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leibniz, G. W.</td>
<td>14, 18, 30, 102, 164, 203, 326, 328-329, 328, 329, 334, 361, 365, 377, 381, 392, 607, 668, 669, 670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotz, J. B. xxv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luther, M.</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marx, K.</td>
<td>385, 386, 533, 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Möller, J.</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mürk, E.</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller, M. xxix, 27, 202, 626</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natorp, P.</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Kantians</td>
<td>27, 29, 102, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton, I.</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ott, H. xxv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parmenides</td>
<td>11, 23, 94, 268, 269-272, 269, 280, 284, 290, 296, 391, 418, 419, 484, 527, 534, 595, 596, 597-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasternak, B.</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picot</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutarch</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Socratics</td>
<td>17, 473, 484, 595, 672, 629, 663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protagoras</td>
<td>419, 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rilke, R. M.</td>
<td>391-400, 391, 392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 527-529, 527, 529, 535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapho</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sartre, J. P.</td>
<td>154, 388, 390, 531, 548, 637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schadewaldt, W.</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheler, M.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schelling, F.</td>
<td>326, 330, 361, 381, 666, 668, 669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiller, F.</td>
<td>668, 670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleiermacher, F.</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schopenhauer, A.</td>
<td>361, 363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott, D.</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sextus Empiricus</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakespeare, W.</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socrates</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophists</td>
<td>22, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophocles</td>
<td>262a, 268, 270, 290, 296, 517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staiger, E.</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suarez, F.</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas, St.</td>
<td>27, 320, 627, 665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, D.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trakl, G.</td>
<td>577, 629, 635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Breda, H. xxix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Gogh, V.</td>
<td>404, 405, 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahl, J.</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welte, B. xxix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf, E.</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

In this list: roman characters refer to the main text; italics refer to footnotes; boldface characters indicate thematic treatment in whole chapters, or at least in significant parts of them.

A. GNOMES

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐπὶ τὲ καὶ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ χρεῖον, διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ
(Parmenides, Fg. 3) 269-272, 269, 604

τὸ μὴ δύνατον ποιεῖν ἀν τις λάθος
(Heraclitus, Fg. 16) 484-486, 484, 485

B. WORDS AND PHRASES
INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἐν</td>
<td>10, 11, 516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐν (ἐμμεναι)</td>
<td>596, 597, 603, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐπιστήμη</td>
<td>23, 351, 384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐργα</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐρικ</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐρμηνευειν</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐρως</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐσόμενα</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐστιν</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐχων, -ον</td>
<td>280, 281, 389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ζησ</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ζησιν λόγον ἔχων</td>
<td>389, 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ</td>
<td>(see ἰν ἦν)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>η</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θευμάζειν</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θειον</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θεωρεῖν</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θεωρητικός</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θεωρία</td>
<td>297, 297, 355, 543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ιδεά</td>
<td>301, 306, 307, 308, 313, 374, 551, 508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ιδεῖν</td>
<td>306, 307, 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καθάλου</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καλ</td>
<td>515, 517, 519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κατά τινος</td>
<td>383, 384, 386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καταγγελεῖν</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καταγγέλλαι</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κίνησις</td>
<td>310, 313, 374, 651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κυνομένα</td>
<td>310, 313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κυνόν</td>
<td>9, 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κύριος</td>
<td>486, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κύριειν</td>
<td>623, 633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κράτας</td>
<td>623, 633, 635, 660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κρύπτον δεῖσαι</td>
<td>285, 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λαλάνθαι</td>
<td>484, 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λάχτανειν</td>
<td>484, 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λέγειν (see λέγειν-νοεῖν)</td>
<td>297, 297, 298, 282, 283, 343, 349, 384, 410, 417, 419, 490-501, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 501, 584, 596, 603, 604, 631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λέγειν-νοεῖν</td>
<td>287, 288, 282, 283, 391, 410, 417, 491, 498, 584, 591, 596, 602-603, 602, 603, 604, 607, 659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λήθη</td>
<td>9, 487, 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λήθη</td>
<td>638, 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λογική</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λόγος</td>
<td>10, 11, 516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λόγος</td>
<td>596, 597, 598, 603, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λόγος ἀνθρώπου ἔχων</td>
<td>280, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μέθεξις</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μετά</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μετά ἐκείνα ... εἰς ταύτα</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μετά τὰ φυσικά</td>
<td>4, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μετοχή</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μή</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μή δύνατον οτέ</td>
<td>484, 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μή ἦν</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Μοῖρα</td>
<td>505, 508, 606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μορφή</td>
<td>311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 355, 651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νόμος</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νοσίς</td>
<td>307, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νῦν</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νῦν ἦν</td>
<td>4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 23, 27, 348, 354, 355, 357, 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νῦν διὰθέλεται</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διὰ ταυτά</td>
<td>12, 23, 86, 307, 310, 311, 312, 314, 317, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νῦν διαφέρει</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νῦν ὡς</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νῦν ἦν</td>
<td>5, 23, 315, 357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δυνατον</td>
<td>85, 307, 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δραμαν</td>
<td>384, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀράστης</td>
<td>17, 397, 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οὐκ</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οὐσία xii-xiii</td>
<td>9, 4, 23, 86, 307, 310, 311, 312, 314, 317, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὀρθείας</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παθεῖαι</td>
<td>303, 387, 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Πάντα (see Ἐν-Πάντα)</td>
<td>11, 22, 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Παραπληθοῦν</td>
<td>357, 359, 652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πέρας</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ποίημα</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ποιόμενα</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολύμοιος</td>
<td>261, 262, 268, 406, 486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
<th>Greek Term</th>
<th>Related Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>πόλις</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>πολικέμενων</td>
<td>311, 384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολλαχώς</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>πολλαχώςις</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πράξες</td>
<td>53, 542</td>
<td>Φαθάδρος</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πρό ἔλληνα</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>πρό ἔλληνα</td>
<td>631, 630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πρώται αρχαί</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>πρώται αρχαί</td>
<td>46, 627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πύρ</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>πυρίτησι</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πώς</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>πώςις</td>
<td>22, 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρέω</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>ρέωις</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σερέαστα (ημίν, φύτεις, άπλος)</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>σερέαστα</td>
<td>315, 515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σημείωσει</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>σημείωσει</td>
<td>5, 17, 239, 261-263, 261, 266, 269, 272, 276.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σκέψεις</td>
<td>351, 352, 353, 355</td>
<td>σκέψεις</td>
<td>277, 280, 281, 282, 284, 301, 308.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Σωφρύτης</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>Σωφρύτης</td>
<td>309-316, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>συρόν</td>
<td>311, 312, 313, 312, 313, 315, 651</td>
<td>συρόν</td>
<td>315, 316, 359, 373, 423, 424, 431.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>στάσεις</td>
<td>312, 313, 312, 313, 315, 651</td>
<td>στάσεις</td>
<td>434, 485, 486, 491, 518, 650, 651.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σώζειν</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>σώζειν</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τε... τ'</td>
<td>596, 603, 604</td>
<td>χάος</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τελευταία</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>τελευταία</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τέλος</td>
<td>265, 310, 368</td>
<td>τέλος</td>
<td>520, 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τέμπευσιν</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>τέμπευσιν</td>
<td>520, 521, 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τέχνη</td>
<td>271, 272, 287, 415, 586</td>
<td>τέχνη</td>
<td>515, 517, 520, 521, 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τίτιν ἄλλης ους</td>
<td>515, 517, 519, 520</td>
<td>τίτιν ἄλλης ους</td>
<td>515, 517, 520, 521, 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τοὐ τῇ ἣν εἶναι</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>τοὐ τῇ ἣν εἶναι</td>
<td>596, 597, 603, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὑλή</td>
<td>311, 312, 314, 651</td>
<td>ὑλή</td>
<td>12, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὑπάρξεις</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>χωρισμός</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χάος</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>χαρά</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χάρις</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>χαρά</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χαρά</td>
<td>520, 597</td>
<td>χάρις</td>
<td>520, 521, 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χράος, χράομαι</td>
<td>520, 521, 597</td>
<td>χράος, χράομαι</td>
<td>520, 521, 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χρώμαν</td>
<td>515, 517, 520, 521, 522</td>
<td>χρώμαν</td>
<td>515, 517, 520, 521, 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χρή</td>
<td>596, 597, 603, 604</td>
<td>χρή</td>
<td>596, 597, 603, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χώρα</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>χώρα</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψεύθος</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>ψεύθος</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. GENERAL INDEX

The complexity of the problematic with which the foregoing study deals makes it difficult to compose an adequate Index and impossible to compose a complete one. We have not tried to be exhaustive, and, in cataloguing terms which occur frequently, we have sought to include only those references which, when taken in conjunction with others, would add to the reader’s understanding of any given theme. The result is a series of references that are, if not exhaustive, at least, we hope, significant. If this catalogue sends the reader through the documentation of the present study to the works themselves of Heidegger, it will have served its purpose well. Conventions: parentheses indicate subordinate entries within sub-entries; "n" added to a number indicates reference to a footnote.

Abide, -ing, meaning of, 453; and authenticity, 557; and being at home, 453, 557; as continuous home-coming, 460; and original time, 487; of thinker, 470; and Source as Ground, 459

Absolute, meaning of (Hegel), 332-334; as antecedent to man, 338; as Being consists in Shining-forth, 336-337; in certitude, 331-332; and God (dialectic), 385; and human individuals, 334, 337, 350-353; as representative subject, 335-336; as release from dependence, 333; as Will (Hegel), 337; and God as ground of certitude, 332; in knowing, aspects of, 333; knowing prior to human knowing, 337; and process of absolvence, 340; see also Awareness

Abolutes, in thought, see Eternal, Thought (foundational), Relativism, Rigor

Accept, -ing, meaning of, 269; as concentration, containment, 272; correlative with to-be, 269-272, 604; as taking under one’s care, 603

Acceptance, in creator of art, 414; as de-ci-sive, 433; and man as measure, 420; of relation to Being, 287; as thanks, 601

Access, to Being (by language) 397, (and power of speech) 340; to beings 275, 278, (only through Being) 430, (through house of language) 528

Accessibility, of beings and ontological knowledge, 112; and the Open (Heidegger vs. Rilke), 392; by transcendence of There-being, 149-150

Achieve, -ing, -ment see Assume, Thought (as fulfillment)

Acquiescence, and foundational thought, 21; as re-solve, 237, 619; and thanks-giving, 602; see also Docility, Re-solve, Surrender, Thought (as thanks-giving), Willingness

Act, see Actuality

Across, being as, 567, (vs. opposed) 420 n

Actuality, implies activity 318; supreme, 319; for Hegel (see also Real), 343; for Kant, 125 n; for Nietzsche, 369

Address, of Being (WM:Ep), 476-477; see also Appeal, Claim, E-vocation, Hail, Throwing

Advance, -ing, of Being, 559 (in artwork) 408, (contained) 409; and freedom unto death, 78-79, 83-84; and Life-force, 366; to poet, 424; re-solve and ontic-ontological authenticity, 77; see also Ad-vent, Being-as-advent

Ad-vent, of Being, 421, 424-425, (and adventure) 350, (and poetic moment) 428-429; as future, 425; SZ still in, 625

Ad-ventive, meaning of, 421 n; response as, 428; character of thought, 421; thought and un-said, 488-489; see also Future, Re-collection, Re-trive, Un-said

Ad-vertence, as activation of man’s relation to Absolute, 332-333; and exposed 354; and this to 34 d, 357

Aeffectivity, see Attunement, Mood, Disposition
Alpha privative, sense of, 185-186, 305

Alterity, in analysis of truth, 222-223, 225-226, 228, 243; of Being, 240, 244; of conscience, 80; implied by "liberation," 247; of Non-being, 203, 244

Ambiguity, of Awareness (knowing-known), 346-347; of being-ness, 7, 317; and inauthenticity, 71; of natural knowing (Hegel), 343; of ὄντα; (and genuine thought) 442; of υούμα, υούμαθεν, 311 n; see also Ambivalence

Ambivalence, and Being, 12; as differentiated, 580; forgotten (Hegel), 359-360; of μορφή, 313; of ὄντα, 10-13, 441, 606; and onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics, 11; and Plato, 11-12; and Pre-Socratic, 10-11; and withdrawal, 608; of ψόντω, 310

Amen, see Yes

Analysis, sense of (lay-free), 183; existential, 49 n, (discernible in Heidegger II) 625-626; (and ego) 98, (function of) 50; (as interrogation of Being) 243; (and problem of realism-idealism) 103; (and subjectivism) 102; (of truth) 94-97; of language and phenomenology, 593

Angels, and gods as intermediaries, 446 n

Antecedent, comprehension, see Comprehension; opposed-ness, see Opposed-ness; orientation, see Orientation

Anthropological, see Anthropology

Anthropology, and humanism, 327; of Scheler influenced Heidegger, 28; origin of, 336-337

Anticipation, as comprehension, 63; and ecstatic nature of existence, 74; see also Comprehension, Driveto-ward-Being

Antigone, choral ode of, 252, 268, 270

Anti-truth, 225, (as anti-essence of Being) 240; see also Un-truth

Anxiety, 72-74, 196-199; and achievement of authenticity, 79-80, 84; and conscience, 81; as cowardice, 474; discloses (Being of There-being), 73-74; (totality of beings in its negation, sc. Non-being) 196-197; vs. fear, 72; inspired by Overpowering, 270; and Non-being, 72, 196-197, 477; for self, 73; and subjectivism, 99; rarity of, 73, 198; as speechlessness, 482 n; unity of about-for in, 73; in WM and SZ, 200; in WM (text vs. Epilogue), 476-477

Appeal, meaning of, 477 n; and Being-as-mittence, 550 n; of Being in things, 574-575; of Being, 560; and e-vent, 614; as efficacious evocation, 598; and origin of language, 609; of pathway, 539; and throwing of There, 538

Appear, -ance, -ing, sense of, 261; mere, 264; pre-SZ, 630; see also being-as-it-appears, Seeming-to-be

Aperception, transcendental, meaning of, 120-121; correlate of unity of, 136; presupposes unifying unity, 126; unified with pure intuition by transcendental imagination, 127; see also Deduction, Imagination, Institution, Schematism

Appertain to Being, see Appurtenance

Appearance, and Being, see Appurtenance

Appellatus, in Leibniz, 328-329; and

Apprehension, and mis-apprehension, 96; pure (as pure synthesis), 142-143

Appropriation, and e-vent, xx-xxi, 486 n, 614 n; of man by Language, 578; as release, 504; of There by Λέγομαι, 498

Appurtenance, of man to Being, 280-281, 421, (willed) 466

A-priori, and grounding of metaphysics, 30; for Kant, 113, 368; knowledge grounded in transcendental imagination, 127; synthesis, 30; view of opposed-ness, 115; of to-be-in-the-World, 99

Arrangement, sense of, 262-263; and Anaximander, 317-318; and finitude, 518; see also Articulative-ness, Dis-arrangement, Matrix, Meaningfulness (Total)

Art, conserver of, 408; creation of, 407-408; (needs conservation) 408; essentially historical, 412 n; as value (superior to truth), 370; and poetizing, 409-412; pre-SZ, 629; and truth, 403-409; see also Artwork, Discord, World (and earth)

Articulate-ness, as logos, 67; see also Logos

Articulation, and hermeneutic, 67; see also Language

Articulative-ness, as arrangement, 262-265; and Total Meaningfulness, 67, (see also World); of truth of Being, 249; of truth of beings, 247; see also Arrangement, Matrix of relationships
GENERAL INDEX

Art-work, vs. artifact, thing, 404; as battle-ground of truth, 405-407; as confluence of three movements, 408-409; as created, 407-408; origin of artist in, 403; not pro-duced by cause, 413; and revealing of beings, 405; see also Art, Discord, World (and earth)

Ascending path, see Deduction

Aspect, as object of vision, 329, 367-368; as value 367; see also See(n, having-)

Assume, -ing, and authenticity, 50; of commitment, 447; of disclosure of beings, 271; as process of thought, 21, 282; as handing-over heritage, 90; by man as collect-or, 283; measure, 591; as posing question, 289; of self and temporality, 89; of way of seeming-to-be, 285; as whiling, 419-420; as with-standing, 539-540; see also Authenticity, Re-collection, Respond, Take-over

Attend-ant, as gathering-point, 494; of Being, 504; of Αὐτός, 497-498; and thinking "of" Being, 542, ("of" Αὐτός) 498-499

Attend, -ing, meaning (Rilke), 392; and consciousness, 393; as hail (Heidegger), 608

Attract, -tion, meaning (Rilke), 392; and consciousness, 393; as hail (Heidegger), 608

At-tunement, and Being as negativated, 461-462; to Beon, 561; and captivation by beings, 165; and ensemble of beings, 219; kinds of (awe vs. anxiety), 477; (wonderment, sorrow) 555; vs. ontological disposition (SZ), 65; and ontological disposition, 626; and self-disclosure of Being, 476-477; and thought as experience, 478 Authenticity, meaning of, 50-51; achieving of, 77-84, 237, 287; and ad-verting, 357; by assuming measure, 591; of attend-ant, 499; and Being unto-death, 77-80, 83-84; and Being as-negativated, 432; and call of conscience, 81; of concern, 540; by decision, 287-288, 610; of dwelling by working, thinking, 587; and essence of truth, 233-237; and eternal return, 379-380; and everydayness, 71; in existential dimension, 77-80, 188; in existential and existential dimensions, 83-84; in existential dimension, 80-83, 188-191; as freedom, 187; as freedom-un-to-death, 77-80, 83-84, 574; and freedom of thought, 619; of gathering-point, 494-495; as grounding of There-being, 416; as growing old, 557; for Heidegger I vs. II, 624; in language, 293-294, 580-581; in language for Rilke, 399-400; by measuring Dimension, 590-591; for Nietzsche, 375, 380; and percepting by beings, 410; potentiality for, 73; by questioning, 615-617; by re-solve, 101, 508-509, 529; (see also Re-solve); as self-commitment, 499; and spirit of vengeance, 376; and step-in-reverse 512, 574; and thanks, 601-602, 626, (see also Thought as thanks); and thought as willing, 507-508; and transcendental founding, 182, 192; of utterance, 376, 496-497; and with-standing, 539-540; and working, 586-587; see also Assume, -ing, Re-trieve, Work, -ing

Ave, To be (Bewußt-sein), 335, 347; see also Absolute, Awareness, Consciousness

Awareness, history of, 344; as measure and measured, 343-346; as Presence of presentedness, 336; key-word of post-Cartesian philosophy, 359; as Absolute (own concept), 341-345, (own norm) 345-346, (own test) 346-347; three principles of, 340-347; unity of natural and real, 344; see also Absolute, Self-awareness

Awareness, affective, see Disposition

Awe, vs. anxiety, 474; as at-tunement of poet, 461; before mystery, 432; origin of, 485, 608 n; and There-being as awesome, 270

Awesome, There-being as, 270, 273, 275

Bearing, given by things (beings) to World, 528

Become, -ing, sense of word, 38 n; and conditions of constancy - surpassment, 366-369; and ýwêng - ἀφεῖναι, 315; and Life-force, 364-
Being, as aboriginal Utterance, 609, (see Λόγος); and Absolute (Hegel), 356, 358-360, (see also Absolute, Awareness); as actuality, Act. 318-319; as Ad-vent, 421, 424-425; διάθεσις as law of, 549; as All, 640; ambiguity of in WW, 245-246; and ambivalence, 12; as emergent power of, 17, 261, 263, being, Want; as dynamism, 365; gathering-process, 261-262, 491-493, 512; and γέγονεν-φύσα, 515; gift of, 411, 413, 598-599, 601; as Glad-some, 443-444; grace of, 477, 635; graciousness of, 477; as Ground, 445, 493. (and project) 460-461; as ground of metaphysics, 7; in general, 9-10, 134-135, 203; (see also Metaphysics [general]. Ontology, Onto-theo-logical); grammar and etymology of, 260; as hailing, 445-446; as handing, 440-446; as hand[ling] process, 520-521; for Heraclitus, 485-486; as history, 279, 533-534, (consummation of) 639, (as Being itself) 437, (and de-livering) 438, 618, (and inter-mittence) 21, 435, 464-465, (and There-being) 635, (vs. There-being as history) 614, (see also History); as Holy, 420-427, 444, (in ad-vent) 455, (and commitment) 445, (as re-ranging) 426, (and the divine) 426, (and hailing) 466, (as primordial poem) 445, (and Rilke) 399-400, (source of poet's historicity) 464-465, (becomes word) 429, (see also Poet, Poetizing, Poetry); vs. Holy, 544; as horizon, 147-150, 503-504; as Immediate, 424; inclines to conceal self (Heraclitus), 265, 310; as Ineluctable, 481; as the Joyous, 444, (in re-serve) 535; as Language, 293, (see also Language, Λόγος, Utterance); as Law, 426, 549; as lighting-process of metaphysics, 6; as Λόγος, 491-493, (and Ground) 493, 570, (see also Λόγος); as manifestation of beings, 43; as mittence (meaning), 20, 435 n, (to poet) 445, (poet's acceptance of) 466, (unto thought) 437, 542, 546, (see also Mittence); as mystery, 545; as name-able, 509; and nature, 17, (Hölderlin) 423, (Rilke) 398; need of, see Need, Want; as negative, see Concealment, Negativity, Truth, Un-truth; as Non-being, 38, 200-201, 424, 477, 521, 535, (see also Non-being); as non-concealment in Heraclitus, 618, 356, (see also Non-concealment); made object of thought, 432, (see also Forgottenness); and obligation, 260; and "of" as subjective and objective genitive, 249, 444, 542; as Omni-presence, 425; as One, 492, 527, 554, 599-606, 640, (polyvalent) 570-572, (see also "Ev"); as One-and-Only, 240, 245; as Only, 492, 554, 640; as Open, 217, 231, 288, (Heidegger vs. Rilke) 392, (presupposed by horizon of
transcendence) 503-504; as Origin, 444-445. (of awe) 608; (and origination) 460; and origination, 431; as Over-powering, see emergent power of B.; path unto, 284; as φύσις, ανάφεξα, λόγος, δια, see φύσις, ανάφεξα, λόγος, δια; and poet, 448-453; polyvalence of, see Quadrate; not posed by subject, xviii-xix; as power of fortune, 256; as Presence, see Presence, (-ing); as present-ness, see Present-ness; as present-edness, see Present-edness; as process-character of, 6n; as project of There-being, 150, 204, 238, -244, 273-274; as pure Act, see Actuality; -question, viii-xv, (and comprehension) 34, (as corresponding with reversal) xviii-xix, (and finitude) 33, (fulfilled in thinking reversal) xviii-xix, (for Heidegger) 24, (and time) 172-174, (primacy in SZ, WG), 174, (validity of) xviii-xix, see also Question: as questionable, 15, 615-616; as residence of non-truth, 241, see Un-truth); for Rilke (as Nature, Life, Venture, Ground, Centre, Traction, Open) 392; and seeming, see Seeming-to-be; sense of, 7, (and B. as questionable) 15, (common to Aristotle’s four modes) x-xi, (discerned in other phenomena) 628, (for Hegel) 358, (as seeableness) 307, (not seized in concepts) 41, (sought in terms of freedom and truth) 192; as Simple, 493, 569-570, 640; as something-to-be-seen (Plato), 306-307, 325; as Source, 248, 257, (and abiding of Poet) 459, (and beings) 452, (metaphor of) 448, (of nearness) 452, (recognised as such) 450, (self-concealing) 446, (of thought) 240-250; as Sphere, 396, (Heidegger vs. Rilke) 398n, 527; as Spirit, 425-426, (thoughts of) 431-432, 444; structure of antecedently known, 714, (see also Comprehension): as subjectivity-objectivity, 18; and subject-ness, 325: supreme, 9-11, 310, (as ground [Leibniz]) 14, (Hegel) 360; and τῆς, 271-272, (see also τῆς); as temporal, see Temporality, Time; as thing-itsel of thought, xiv-xv; as thought-worthy, 554, 597-598, (and withdrawal) 608, 615; time-character of, xii-xii; and Time as matter for thought, xxii-xxiii; as Traction (Rilke), 392, 396-397; as Treasure, 640; and truth, see Truth, (and foundational thought) 20, (independent of man) 504 n, (KM) 151-152, (WG) 174-176, (see also ανάφεξα); is un-thematic, 33-34, 148; and violence of re-trieve, 159; as wealth, 477, 479, 489, 609, 638, 640, (see also Un-said, Un-thought); as well-spring, 295, 640; as what-ness, 306-307, 317; as Will, 399, 395, 372, (Rilke) 391-392, see also Will-onto-Power; dwells in words, 528, (see also Language, λόγος, Utterance, Word(s); the word disappears from vocabulary of Heidegger II, 633; as World, 167 n, (see also World) being,-as-it-appears (vs. b. -as-it-seems-to-be), 110, (vs. thing-in-itself) 111, (and finitude of knowledge) 110, (in KM) 263; as that-which-comes-to-presence, 214; in itself (Kant vs. heidegger), 149; -to-be-judged, 212, 214-215; -to-be-known, 213-215, (and horizon of transcendence) 30, (as outside knower) 112, (and rule) 131; as measure of correctness, 215; as that which is open, 214, 239; as taking origin and thing in itself (Kant), 111; -underway (Hegel), see Movement; -as-across vs. op-posed, 420 n, (see also Α-cross); see also beings, beings-in-the-ensemble, Difference (ontological) being-ness, 4, ambiguity of (Aristotle), 313-314, 317; as Being, 7; double sense of, 9; as Experience (Hegel), 348; and moved-ness, 311; as φύσις, 310; and realism, 28; as seeable, 182; as being, that-appear, emergent Power in, 272; vs. Being, see Difference (ontological); Being of (Anaximander), 517-520; in their Being (Anaximander), 517-520; as beings, 4, 257, 271-273, 283, (see also 6) 6, (and Being) 43, (and beings-in-ensemble) 9, (and expose) 354, (and language) 293, (manifested by Non-being) 201, 203, (and mitten of metaphysics) 436, (and metaphysics) 5, (and tending) 584; dis-covery of, 44; as free, true, 216; see also being, beings-in-the-ensemble, Difference (ontological), Freedom, Liberation, 6.
beings-in-the-ensemble, as Being, 7, 9, 236, 239, 245-246, 249, 256; and compatibility, 519; concealment of, 219-222, 226, 235-236; as emerging into presence, 239-240; There-being’s task to let-be-manifest, 227; as negatived, revealed by anxiety, 197-198; and Non-being, 200-201; Non-being as logical denial of, 205; orientation toward, 219; questioned by Greeks, 238; revealing of, 218-219, (in Art-work) 407; as such, 227-228, 230, 289, (interrogation of) 253, (surrender to) 206, (truth of) 247, (wonderment before) 255
Beon, sense of, 554; as Being as such, xvi-xvii; as coming-to-pass of reversal, xx-xxi; and mystery, errance, 556; and ontological difference as such, 565; and poetic word, 457; and re-collection, 555; as Simple, 559; as in want of thought, xvi-xvii
Between, Being-beings (Heraclitus), 11; gods and men, 447, (and authentic utterance) 460, (and Dimension) 589; subject-object (and light of Being), 6, (transcendence lies) 155, (There-being as) 201
Bid, see Hail 
Broken to pieces, see Dashed to pieces
Calchas, 516-517, 524-525
Calculate, -tion, -tive, and aspect, 367; as certi-veri-fication, 372-374; by consciousness (Rilke), 394; and domination of intelligence, 384; as guarantee of certitude, 323; and scientific research, 326; and technicity, 327, 374; thinking and foundational thought, 479
Call, see Hail; of conscience, see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Caveto see Conscience
Com-mitment, meaning of, 435n; as-
sumed of (fulfillment of, surrender
to), 447, 466–467, 495, 497; and
edowment, 499n; and fortune, 91n;
by Holy, 445; as shepherd of Being,
11; as task-to-be-achieved, 540
Communication, and logos, 68
Com-patibility, and ensemble of beings,
519
Component(s), existential, 49n (equally
original), 69–70, (of World) 56; of
positivity, negativity, 9, 167;
see also Existential
Comportment, and accessibility, 114;
and comprehension, 38; concealing,
214–215, 226, 229; as pro-posing,
contrapos-ing, self-imposing, 394–395;
with beings and transcendental
founding, 167–168; types of nega-
tiving, 199; as willing (Rilke), 393;
see Encounter, Existentiell, Ontic
Comprehend-ing, poet does not, 398; as
pro-posing, 394; of thing, 567–568
Comprenhensible, -bility, sense of, 85;
vs. intelligible, 107n; see also Sense
Comprehension (of Being), meaning
(of Word), 34n; as anticipation, 63;
authenticity of, 288; and conscious-
ness (in idealism), 103; and conten-
tion between Being and There, 270;
of Being and correlation of Being and
time, 86; as dynamic process, 36–37;
as existence, 35; as existential com-
ponent, 59–64; as familiarity with
World, 56; as finite, 57–60, 285; and
finite transcendence (as transcen-
dence), 69; and finitude of man
(status questionis of SZ), 33; finitude of,
grounded in negativity of Being,
487; and heart of man, 600; and
in-being, 59; as initial fact, 33–34;
as innermost essence of finitude,
39–40; for Kant, 129; as knowing,
524–525; of Non-being, 205; in pres-
ent, 289–290; presupposed, 41; prior
to ontic truth, 163–164; and project,
60–61; as pure horizon, 147; and
pure synthesis, 114; and re-cord,
604n; as relation to Being, 280; as
surmise, 428, 604n; and thought as ek-
sistence, 505–506; and wisdom of
seer, 524–525; of what, how, that,
216n; see also Existence, Transcen-
dence
Conceal, -ing, -ment, 5, 234, 256; and
alpha-privative in, 186; Being
inclines to, 265, 370; of Being and
“not,” 8: of beings-in-the-ensemble,
219–221, 243; compound, 264, (see
also Errance); concealed (as Being of
beings), 264; concealing of, 221–222,
(forgotten) 222–223, 229, (see also
Mystery); congenital to Being, 265;
and emergence of Being, 17; implied
by emergence, 277, 515; kinds of
(Plato), 305; and finite knowledge,
152; law of, 285, 549; liberation
from, 191, (see also Freedom,
Liberation); of Non-being, 201, (see
also Non-being); precedes reveal-
ment, 244, 624, (see also Being as for-
getting); preserved by There-being,
236, (see also Errance); as retreat,
510; in revelation (mitcence), 21;
(see also Mitcence); in SZ vs. KM,
149n; struggle vs., 271, (see also
Violence); as wealth, 638 (see Un-
said, Un-thought); see also Non-
concealment, Un-truth
Concept(s), as Absolute, 341, (and
Meta-physics), 58; as attack, 420;
and comprehensibility, 85; for Kant,
118, (see also Category, -ies); vs.
mere c. (Hegel), 341; as presentation
of unity, 118, 144; which reflect
(Kant), see Categories; and rule,
118, 131; as self-seizure (Hegel),
234n, 341–343; and shining-forth,
344–345; necessarily rendered sen-
sate (Kant), 130, (see also Schema[ta],
Schematism); sensate-ness of pure,
134, (see also Sensate, -ing); structure
of (and schematism), 129
Concern, and Beon, 554; call of con-
science, 81; -unto-end, 79; and
finitude of reason, 32; formula for,
74; as guarding, 532 (mystery) 462;
in HB, 539–540; and intentionality
of Being (Heidegger II), 626–627;
and need for Being, 72; as original
time, 85–87, 540; of poet, 462–463,
(historical) 464; and task of There,
282; of There-being for own Being,
55: time as sense of, 85–87; and
thought as structure, 506n, (re-cord)
626; totality of, 74–76; unity of, 40,
71–74, (and conscience) 82; (and time) 88; see also Authen-
ticity, Existence, Transcendence

GENERAL INDEX 749
| Concordance, see Truth as conformity |
| Condition(s) of possibility, Being as |
| (KM), 148; of comportment, 231; |
| and finite transcendence, 113; as |
| pre-ontic letting-be, 57; and present- |
| ing objects (Kant), 18 |
| Conscience, existential analysis of, |
| (see also Authenticity); and |
| logos, 69–70, 82, (see also Logos); |
| and throwing of There, 538, (see also |
| Throwing); as willingness to be |
| called, 83, 508, (see also Acquies- |
| cence, Docility, Surrender) |
| Consciousness, and Absolute Knowing, |
| (see also Apperception); and |
| man’s |
| essence, 281; as moment of the true, |
| 331; ontologically consequent to |
| transcendence, 155–158; and pro- |
| posing, 322–324, (Rilke) 393; as |
| transcendental apperception, 120; |
| unity of grounded in unity of time, |
| 157; belongs to Will, 368 |
| Consent, see Acquiescence, Docility, |
| Surrender |
| Conserver of Art, see Art |
| Constancy, of beings, 17, 265–266, |
| 269, 283; and Life-force, 356–359; |
| mere vs. authentic, 518; and truth |
| (Nietzsche), 369 |
| Constituents of concern, see Compo- |
| nents |
| Construct, (-tion), see Institution |
| Consumption, of metaphysics (Nietz- |
| schie), 19, 361, 373, 391; of phenome- |
| nology and choice of self, 192; of |
| subject-ism, 326, 330; see also Nihilism |
| Contain(ment), as acceptance, 269, |
| 418, (see also Accept, -ing); as |
| assuming, 420; as attending, 591; |
| as concentration in work, 409; and |
| language, 293; and λόγος-οὐκί, 383 |
| Contention, see Discord |
| Contradiction, and logical thought, |
| 205; principle of, 384–385 |
| Contra-pose, -ing, as pro-posing, 394– |
| 395, (see also Pro-posing); of thing, |
| 587–588; thought, 397 |
| Copernican revolution, sense of, 30 |
| Correctness, essence of truth as, 316; |
| (see also Truth [as conformity]); |
| freedom as ground of, 214–216, 247; |
| as measure of truth, 213; and |

**Correlation, of Being-man, 46, (Nietz-** |
**sche) 374, (and philosophy) 23, (as |
**presupposed) 613, (pre-SZ) 28, (and |
**thought) 505–506, (and Zarathustra) |
**380; of Being and beings, 416, 605, |
**and ambivalence) 12, (hailed in |
**process of Language) 579, (World- |
**things) 578; between Being and |
**language (pre-SZ), 629; of Being and |
**seeming-to-be, 263–266, 285; bet- |
**ween Being as such and man as |
**finite in fundamental ontology, 33; |
**of Being and There(-being), 20, |
**43–44, 45, 170, 469, (in two texts |
**of Parmenides) 604; of Being and |
**thought, 260, (Berkeley, Kant, |
**Hegel, Nietzsche) 604–605, (as |
**mutual eyeing) 614, (and ontological |
**difference) 606; of Being and time |
**(SZ), xii–xiii, xvi–xxiii, 85–86; of in- |
**tuition and thought (Kant), 108; |
**of positivity and negativity (λόγος), |
**412; not sameness, 270; as such |
**(Heidegger), 605; between There- |
**being and man, 45, 97 |
**Correspond, -ing, see Response |
| Cosmology, 31 |
| Counterpoise, and project. 414, 537 |
| Cover-over, see Un-truth |
| Creation, of object-to-be-known, see |
| Finitude (of Knower); in art, see |
| Art, Art-work |
| Credentials, and founding, 169, (see |
| also Founding); of thought, 551 |
| Critical problem, 102 |
| Critique, sense of, 623; and founding |
| of ontology, 30; of Heidegger, |
| 633–641; see also xplon |
| Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), and |
| fundamental ontology, 30; first vs. |
| second edition of, 122, 146–147 |
| Culmination, see Nihilismus |
| Curiosity, 71 |
| Danger, of errance, 551; in thinking |
| Beon, 536; of thought, 512 |
| Dashed to pieces, and death, 276–279; |
| and finitude of There, 286–287 |
| Dawn, 636, 641 |
| Death, and anxiety, 79; as end of |
| There-being, 75; existential analysis |
| of, 75–76; and finitude of There- |
| being (EM), 276–279; freedom- |
| unto-, 77–80, 83–84; as immanent |
| in There-being, 286–287; and man as |
| "mortal," 573–574. 626; as |
| mountain fastness (stronghold) of |
Discord, aboriginal, meaning, 268; in art-work, 407; λόγος cohesive principle in, 262, 412; as contentious, 533; in history, 284; and negativized truth, 268, 406, 486; and Over-powering, 261-262; see also Truth, α-α-κόσμος

Dis-cover, -ing, -y, of beings, 44; to cover-over, 96, 234; vs. disclose, 55 n; and essence of truth, 94; of being as purposeful, 57; not imposition of signification, 100

Disintegration, see Dashed to pieces

Disposition, ontological, nature of, 64-66; anxiety vs. awe as modes of, 474; and attunement, 625; data disclosed by, 64-65; discloses finitude of transcendence, 69, (and Non-being) 206, (reference to World) 219; proper to mystery (awe), 452; see also Awe, Anxiety, Attunement

Dissolution, see Dashed to pieces

Distress, 225-226, 242, 279, 507

Docility, as "all ears," 497 n; to Being and philosophy, 23; to Beon, 555; to Holy, 447; and metaphor of seeing, hearing, 613 n; as questioning, 615; and rigor, 253, 549; and silence, 544; to Will, 357; see also Acquiescence, Surrender

Domain, see Horizon, Open

Domination, over beings (and commanding of Will), 394, (and logic) 395; -over-the-earth (and authenticity), 373, (as certification) 372, (and technicity) 374; over what is willed, 365; of Being, see Alterity, Technicity

Dominion, see Domination

Donation to self, 116-117

Drag, toward dis-arrangement, 518-519; im-parted by Being, 524

Drive-toward-Being, and anxiety, 73; and comprehension, 62; and future, 87; and power for thought, 600; not subjective, 99; as to-be-free, 187; see also Concern, Existence, Power-to-be, Transcendence

Dwell, -ing, and foundational thought, 22; in language (Greeks), 528; originates ground, 464; poetic, 463; as sojourn in near-ness, 589; structure of, 583-584; and tending, 575, 583-584; and whiling, 453; as working, 586

Earth, in art-work, 406-407; in Quadrature, 571; and sky in "The Pathway," 571; see also World

Ecstasy, of temporality, 88

Ec-static, There-being as, 217, 290; see also Ek-sistence

Efficacious, Good as, 304

Ego, existential dimension of, 97; as to-be-in-the-World, 157; and transcendental imagination, 155; transcendental (for Husserl), 178, (for Kant) 121; see also Apperception, Cogito, Consciousness, think, Self

Ek-sistence, culminating moment of, 237; and disclosure of beings, 280; ecstatic character of, 39; and essence-existence, 300; and expanding of man, 505; and foundational thought, 20; as gift, 601; and heart, 600; insistent, 223, 226, 231; and in-stance, 509 n; and language, 540-541; liberation of man for, 247; modified by not, 236; and mystery, 221-222; nature of, 536-537; as open-ness to Being, 600, (-as-negatived) 608; structure of, 537-540; and thought, 525; (as re-cord) 602; as transcendence (Heidegger II vs. I), 624; and withdrawal, 599 n

Element, of Being, 520; of correlation, 606; of man’s origin, 612; of metaphysics, 563, (Being as) 7; and relation between poetry-thought, 592; of thought, 22, 542

Emergent-abiding-Presence, see Being, 560

Em-itt, -ting, -tence, meaning of, 435 n; of Being, 20; see also Mittence, Inter-mittence

"Empirical use," 148, 231

Empiriness, as thing-ness, 569

Encounter, and comprehension, 62; in dialogue, 458; center institutes domain of, 128; and notion of "in," 52; in Open, 214; made possible (by Being), 6 (by transcendence) 231, (by World) 58; and project, 61; and pure horizon, 136; Rilke vs. Heidegger on, 392; and subjectivism, 96; thrust into Non-being as condition of, 198

End, Being-onto, see Death; and ending, 266; for Greeks, 265; of There-being and death, 75; see also Limit

Entity, -ies (mere), meaning of, 53 n; Being not, 424; and drag, 524; and ego-subject, 98; intellectus et res as, 94; past of, 87 n; for realism, 28; self as, 117; transcending of, 271-272
Epoch(s), meaning of, 534; continuity between, 547, 639; of history, (dialectical materialism) 533, (and forgottenness of Being) 522, (Hegelianism) 533–534, (Nietzsche’s nihilism) 533, (scholasticism) 316, 533; and There-being, 635

Errance, meaning of, 223–224; and artwork, 405–406; belongs to inner constitution of There-being, 224, 227, 232, 235; cognates of, 224 n; experienced as itself, 237, 246; and finitude, 278–279; and intermittence, 533; and language, 610; and mystery incorporated into truth, 225–226; non-truth as, 223–227; recognized for what it is, 246; and rigor, 551; and seeming-to-be, 264; in structure of WW, 229; and technicity, 252; see also Forgottenness, Mystery

Error, 224–225; and truth as value, 369 n

Eschatology of Being, 638

Essence, (-ing), as coming-to-presence, 228; as essentia vs. e. as Wesen, 35 n; of Being (as essenc-ing of language), 497; (and fortune) 256; of language and logos, 626; as ground (of metaphysics), 13; (of possibility) 213; for Plato, 306; as possibility (scholastics), 390; and reality (Kant), 125; of There-being as to-be, as existence, 39; of thing, 568; of truth (and essence of non-truth), 218, (as truth of Essence) 228–229, 564–565; as verb, 228, 239–240, 246; world of (Plato), 303

Essence-existence, for Aristotle, 317–318; in de-volution of thought, 316–320; and ek-sistence, 390, 531 n; epoch of, 534; Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Sartre, 390; in Nietzsche, 394; as mitteness of Being, 548; and There-being as transcendence, 154; and whatness-thatness, 317

Esthetics, criticism of, 416

E-stranged, sense of word ("strange"), 270 n; There-being as, 84, 273, 283, 427

Eternal, heart (Holy as), 427; return, see Return; truth (absolute), 547; (and truth as disclosedness) 97

Ethics, and law of Being, 549; and ontology, 530; see also Obligation

E-valution, see Valuation

Event, meaning of, 614 n; as appropriation, xx-xxi, 486 n; and essenc-ing, 246; and issue, 437 (see also Issue); language as, 535; of Ἀληθος (thought as), 498; and mitteness, 435, 493; (see also Mitteness); and mutual eye-ing, 614; and origination of truth, 412; as outbreak of ontological difference, 639; and poetic word, 429 n; of truth as center of hermeneutic circle, 638; as unity, 639; and withdrawal, 608; word occurs 1935–36, 412 n

Everydayness, meaning of, 47–49; and forgetfulness of mystery, 222–223; liberation from, 286, 288; and listening, talking, 394; and Ἀληθος as de-cision, 283–286; and negativity of language, 610; and non-truth, 96; as "ordinary," 587 n; overcome by thought, 619; and self as in-authentic, 101; and temporality, 89; and There-being es-stranged (EM), 275; see also Errance, Fallen-ness, Inauthenticity

E-voke, -ing, four senses of, 596; as hail, 598–599; of thought and negativity of truth, 608

Exactitude, see Calculation

Excellence, ontic, see Prerogative, Ontological

Existence, as actuality, 318, 390; authentic, see Authenticity; as comprehension, 35; as disclosing beings, 280; as essence of man (Heidegger), 39; and eternal return, 374; and existensia (as ἐκ-πέυσις), 318 n, (and traditional conception of) 35 n, 53 n; and existential-existentiell, 49; as irruption, 44, 273; for Kant, 98; and revelation of beings, 43; for Rilke, 398; as structure of self, 181; as transcendence, 35, 206; and transcendental constitution (Husserl), 179; truth of, see Truth; see also Ek-sistence, Transcendence

Existential, vs. existentiell, 49–50; dimension of authenticity, 77–80, 84, 188; e.-existentiell and transcendental constitution, 179; see also Ontological

Existentialism (Sartre), 390, 531, 548

Existentiell, vs. existential, 49–50; dimension of authenticity, 80–84, 188–191; potentiality as re-collection, 77; see also Comportment, Ontic

Expand-ing, constitutes ek-sistence, 304–305

Ex-patriation, and call to authenticity, 81; and re-patriation (of poet), 471–472
Experience, of language, 609n; of relation to Being, 230, 481; see Thought
Experience (Hegel), nature of, 348–350; as Being, 348; not cognition, 339; and exposé, 354; in general terms, 339–340; and man, 350–353; and philosophy, 353–355; as present-(representation), 359; as Self-presence, 340
Exposé, 353–355; as Θεωπία, 355
Expose, -ure, -ition, of There-being, 217, 256, 272; to truth in negativity, 421; see also Existence, Openness
Expression, and authentic utterance, 470; and categories, 383; and essence of language, 496n; and hermeneutic interpretation, 68n; judgement comes to, 214; as place of truth, 316; and dialectic, 385; as predication, 384; subject-ist connotation of, 630
Eye, (-ing), for Being-question, xviii–xix; for granting, xxii–xxiii; mutual (and e-vent), 613–614
Facticity, connotation of, 62n; determines existentiality, 74; and epoche, of Being, Openness
Expression, and authentic utterance, 470; and categories, 383; and essence of language, 496n; and hermeneutic interpretation, 68n; judgment comes to, 214; as place of truth, 316; and dialectic, 385; as predicition, 384; subject-ist connotation of, 630
Faith, vs. thought, 618; and truth-as-certitude, 319–321
Farness, meaning of, 70–71; not axiological, 38; and drag toward dis-arrangement, 524; in EM, 275–276; and errance, 236–237; and finitude (negativity), 487; 538–539; and forgetfulness of Being, 38; and non-truth, 234; and poet, 450; and present, 87–88; revealed by anxiety, 74; of thought, 556; and thrownness, 37–38; and truth, 95–96
Farness, see Nearness
Fate, see Fortune
Fear, vs. anxiety, 72, 197
Feeling, see Attunement, Mood
Finite, knowledge, see Knowledge; transcendence, see Transcendence
Finitude, of Being, 523–524; and death, 573–574; (disclosed by attunement) 462, (in emergence) 278–279, (grounds fallenness) 524, (in Hölderlin) 446–447, (in KM) 149, (as place of thought) 420, (see also Being); of beings, 265–266; and χρόνος, 521; concern as transcendental unity of, 72; consummation of (and de-cision), 286–287; and death, 75–76, 192, 277, 280–285, 573–574; disclosed by ontological disposition, 69; in EM, 273–279; and encounter, 114; of existence and authenticity, 78–84, (see also Authenticity); existence-transcendence as ground of, 39; and fallen-ness, 38, 70, 539. (see also Fallen-ness); and ground, 172–173; and guilt, 81–82; Hegel insists less upon, 358; in Heidegger, 614; of human knowledge (Kant), 31, 108–112, (of intuition, of thought) 109, (of known) 110; for Kant vs. Christian tradition, 109n; and language, 293; law of being, as law of being-to-be, 285; of man in relation to comprehension of Being, 33; as Non-being of There-being, 79; non-essence and, 279; and non-truth, 96, 334, 237, 241; of self-disclosure, 291; and special metaphysics, 32; not suppressed by authenticity, 83; of temporality, 89; of There (EM), 274–279, 286; of thought and step-in-reverse, 613–615; as absence, 115; of transcendence, 37–40, 234; (and free choice of authenticity) 190, (for Kant) 31; transcendental document of, 167; of truth (in KM), 152, (in EZ) 95, 232–235, (in WW) 235–237; of whiling, 518; and withdrawal, 436; see also Negativity; Un-truth
First of all and for the most part, 70, 89, 101, 185, 192, 273, 275, 463; explained, 48; and cave metaphor, 387; outside the Open, 507; and poet, 450; see also Everydayness
Force, see Violence
Forget, tendency to, see Propensity
Forgetfulness, see Forgottenness
Forgottenness, of Being (as f. of ontological difference), 12–13, 522, (and language) 541, (in Nietzsche) 19, 373, (and Nihilism) 39, 363, (Plato) 17, (due to withdrawal, decadence) 278; of beings in the ensemble, 222; and everydayness, 48; and fallen-ness, 70; grounded in Being, 240, 449, 487; of the Holy, 430; of mystery, 220, 222–225, 251–252, 436. (see also Errance); of nearness, 448; of ontological difference, 12–13, 522; (in ground-question) 14; of thought as ek-sistence, 511; as
withdrawal, xii-xiii; see also Everydayness, Inauthenticity

Fortune, vs. commitment, 91 n, 435 n, (see also Commitment); common (and commitment), 435, (and with-being) 92; power of, 256; and re-collection, 91

Founding, as authentic, 182; and freedom of transcendence, 192; and logos, 171; of metaphysics, see Metaphysics; transcendental (and grounding of There-being), 412 n, (and ontic-ontological truth) 168-169, (and un-truth) 172

"Founding," in scientific research, 161

Foundational thought, see Thought

Free, domain of, 318, 618-619

Free [adj.], be, become, 186-191, (and existential dimension of authenticity) 188, (and existentiell dimension of authenticity) 188-191; for death, 78; see also Freedom; ay, 183-184, 184-186; maintain, 184; in primary, secondary sense, 191; render, 186, (and maudleza) 388; see also Freedom, Truth

Freedom, in art-work, 414; as authenticity, 187; (in existential dimension) 188, (in existentiell dimension) 188-191; of Being, 23; of beings-encountered, 216; unto death, 79-80, (as existential dimension of authenticity) 188, (as re-solve) 574, (and thought) 512, (see also Death); as ex-sistence, 217-218; as ex-sistent, 219, 224, (and concealment of beings in the ensemble) 243, (and man) 243, (not possessed but possessing) 243; essence of, 217, (as truth) 191; and essence of truth, 191-192, 215, 226, 229; grounded in truth, 480; in Heidegger I (synopsis), 191-192; in KM, 182-184; of poet, 449; of practical reason, 139-140; as process, 181; of pure reason, 119; and re-solve, 190; of self, 191-192; as spontaneity, transcendental origin of, 181; in SZ, 184-191; of There-being (WW), 216-218, 248; and thought, 618-619, (as achieving of) 506, (see also Thought); and transcendence, 179-192; in WG, 179-182; as willing, 180, (self as finite) 287; yearning for, 350

Fundamentum, absolute, 332; veritatis, 321-323, 331

Future, sense of, 86; and drive-toward-Being, 87; for poet, 455-456; priority of, 88; in re-collection, 21; and synthesis of recognition, 142, 144-145; see also Ad-vent, Re-collection

Gathering (together), of Being, 283; of container, 569; as dialogue (Hegel), 349-350; as Discord, 407; as λόγος, 261-262, 280, (see also λόγος); as nature of thing, 585; -point (as correspondence), 494-495; and pouring of pitcher, 570; of positivity and negativity, 412

Generation of time, sense of, 92

Genitive, subjective — objective, see Of

Giving free, see Rendering free

God, and Absolute (dialectic), 385; and Being, 6, (as simple) 559; as creating Cause, 319, as dead (Nietzsche), 19, 361-362; existence of (for Descartes), 332; and finitude, 109 n; as ground of certitude, 322 n; and Holy, 430, 444; for Kant, 113 n; and mediaeval man, 336; and nihilism of values, 363; as ontic origin of beings, 150; and Plato's Good, 319; and poet, 589; problem of, xxviii, 628; in Quadrature, 572, 590; and transcendence (Descartes), 18; see also Being (supreme)

Gods, and Holy, 426; and northeast wind, 446 n; in Quadrature, 571-572

Good, role of (Plato), 303-304; as ground of truth, 308; as ultimate Source, 304 n, 319 n

Grace (yip 15), 477 n, 635, 641

Grant, -ed, -ing, of Being-as-thought-worthy, 598; of Being, of Time, xx-xxi; of gift xxii-xxiii

Ground, -ing, and cause, 162, 169; components of process, 164-171; and finitude, 172-173; as λόγος, 493; in which metaphysics rooted, 7; of metaphysics, see Metaphysics; of negativity, see Negativity; of ontological difference, 175, (see also Difference); as poetizing, 498; and poetry, 458-459; of possibility, see Conditions of possibility; principle of, 162, (concerns beings) 175, (in Leibniz) 163, (origin in freedom) 181; problem of, 162; -question, (meaning of) 7, (first of all questions) 288, (formulated) 14, (Heidegger vs. Leibniz) 203, (and luminosity) 206, (and origin of "why?") 169; (presupposes ontological difference) 259; strewing of, 165, 170; in SZ,
161; and temporality, 173-174; and truth, 163-164
Guard, -ing, Being in language, 498; as concern, 535; and lodging, 540; measure (Protogoras), 420; mystery, 459; (by authentic utterance) 462; as shepherd, 525, 539
Guide-question, vs. ground-question, 7n
Guilt, meaning of existential, 81-82; chosen by re-solve, 189; as ground of negativity, 82, 161; vs. negativity, 510; and ontological dimension of authenticity, 77
Hail, -ing, commits poet, 466; constitutes There-being as free, 618; as expanding, 505; as mitten, 445-446; of past, 454; of reply as authentic verbalization, 581; as want-appeal, 598; see also E-voke, -ing
Hand(l)ing, 520-521; as wanting, 597
Heart, as center of re-collection, 599-601; desires of, 467; and ek-sistence, 600; (see also Ek-sistence); eternal (Holy as), 427; language of, 397; logic of (Pascal), 396, 399; of matter for thought, xii-xiii; of poet, 427; and subject-ism (Rilke), 398; of thought imparted, 555; (by Beon) 557; and thought as re-cord, 501; world of (Rilke), 395-396
Heaven, 560; see also Quadrature
Heed, -ing, of negativity of mitten, 534; of Utterance, 611; see also Accept, Attend
Hegelianism, 548; as an epoch, 534
Heidegger I, meaning of, 22, 230; and ec-stance, 436n; and failure of SZ, 564; and finitude of Being, 640; and justification, 371n; and primacy of Being, 204; and question There-being, 202; and re-solve, 405; and re-trive, 106; and throwing of There, 505; un-said of, 637; in WW, 236-238
Heidegger II, meaning of, 22; in EM, 259; and finitude of Being, 640; and foundation thought as re-trive, 106; and grounding of metaphysics, 435; and identification of World-Being, 167n; and in-stance, 536n; and mitten, 435; in Nietzsche-
Home, at, and homecoming, 453; in homeland, 450; and law of historicity, 464; as liberation, 456; and lodging, 544; and logos, 462; in near-ness to things, 486; in origin of thought, 557; near Source, 451; There-being not, 273
Homecoming, meaning of, 451-453; continuous, 460; and dwelling, 453; of Heidegger, 640; journey as condition of, 450; and mystery, 452; and thinker, 470
Homeland, domain of Being-as-source, 448; leaving of, 450; and liberation from ontic, 457; and nearness to origin, 445; return to, 451
Homelessness, of modern man, 389
Horizon, of accessibility, 150; of Being, see Being; of Being-question, 40; of concealment, 221; and domain of opposedness, 115, 136, (as necessity) 136; of nowness, 142; of objectiveness, 114, 200, 214, 231, (as projected) 153; (and transcendent schema) 134; of the Open, 214-215; of the past, 143-144; subjective-objective aspects of, 154; and tendency to unify, 148; of transcendence, 30, (side of Open) 503-504; as unity of past-present-future, 145
House of Being, completed, 544; language as (meaning), 528, 535; of There-being, 403; and domain of opposedness, 115, 136, (as necessity) 136; of nowness, 142; of objectiveness, 114, 200, 214, 231, (as projected) 153; (and transcendent schema) 134; of the Open, 214-215; of the past, 143-144; subjective-objective aspects of, 154; and tendency to unify, 148; of transcendence, 30, (side of Open) 503-504; as unity of past-present-future, 145
How being(s) is (are), 169, 216, 218; and origin, 403; of There-being (revealed by ontological disposition), 64; see also That being(s) is (are). What being(s) is (are)
Humanism, Beaufret's question about, 46, 530; Christianity as, 368; and correlation Being-man, 46; and Enlightenment, 388; and existentialism, 388; for Marx, 388-389; and metaphysics, 389; for Plato, 387; of Renaissance, 388; restored by Heidegger, 531; a Roman phenomenon, 387; and subjectivism, 19, 327
Human There-being, see Man
Husserl, see Intentionality, Index of Proper Names
Idea(s), and conformity (Plato), 307-308; and μικρός, 388; of pure reason and transcendental imagination, 139; as shining-forth, 306; and supra-sensible world, 362; supreme (the Good), 303-304. (as viewed) 307-308; universal, 110, (see also Thought [for Kant]): to-be-seen, 17; world of, 303, 317, 302
Idealism, -ists, and critical problem, 102; and first edition of KRV, 122 n; German, 575 n; man as center of non-concealment in, 486; polemic against, 157; and pre-SZ, 28; transcendent (Husserl), 27
Imagination, transcendent, meaning of, 121-124; "before" apperception, 126-127; as common root, 136-141, (of intuition) 137-138, (of pure reason) 139-141, (of practical reason) 139-141, (of the Open) 134; discovery of, 124-128; not faculty of soul, 122; institutes transcendence, 123-124; and objective reality, 138; and original time, 141-146, 244; and schematism, see Schematism; and subject of knowledge, 154-158; and pure synthesis, see Synthesis
Impart, -ing, as granting, 598; as handing-out, 520; of heart of thought, 555; of law of Being, 540; of limits, 521; of mitteness, 540; of relation to Being, 542; of There, 532; of to-be-thought, 597
Impose, 394-395, 397
In, see In-being
Inauthenticity, and everydayness, 70, (see also Everydayness); and guilt, 82; in Hegel, 357; for Heidegger II, 524; and the ordinary, 587 n; and "people," 71; in SZ (résumé), 233; and un-truth, 96; in WW, 237; see also Authenticity
In-being, and comprehension, 63; as disclosedness of World, 58-59; as dwelling, 584; in HB, 537; and subject-object-polarity, 99; and sense of "in," 52
In-cident, There as, 266-277
Incorrectness, and essence of non-truth, 218; of judgement, 225; see also Correctness, Un-truth
Independence (of object), see Absolute Indigence (of There-being), see Finitude, Negativity
Influence of thinkers on each other, 611 n
Insistence, ek-sistent, 223, 231
In-stance, 509, 517
Institution, as construction, 123; of horizon vs. creation of beings, 150; of time, 141; of transcendence, 114-115, 123; see also Center, Imagination, Root
GENERAL INDEX

Instrument(s), meaning of, 53; and pattern, 54; truth of, 95

Intelligible vs. comprehensible, 107n

Intentionality, of Being and of concern, 203, 627; for Heidegger vs. Husserl, 178-179

Interchange, mutual, 272, 279

Inter-mittence, see History

Interpretation, existentiell (of SZ), 80; hermeneutic, 47, 67; violence of, 290; see also Hermeneutic

Interrogation, see Question

In the untruth, 96, 220, 233-234

In the truth, 96, 220, 233-234

Intuition, as finite (Kant), 108-109, (see also Finitude); intuited, 117, 141; and intuitus derivativus vs. originarius, 109; in Kant, Husserl for Heidegger, 64; and knowledge (Kant), 107; pure, 116-118; transcendental imagination as root of, 137-138

Irrational, thought as, see Pre-rational

Is, meaning of, 4, 33; as applied to Being, 7n; as emerge-into-presence, 568; and language, 21; and ontological difference, 231

Issue, 524-525, 609, 638; and ontological difference, 436

I think, Descartes, 324; Kant, 119-120, 155; see also Cogito

Joyous, the attunement in presence of, 461, (as reserved) 462; and Gladsome, 444

Judgement, comes to expression, 214; and de-cision, 285; incorrectness of, see Incorrectness; logical, 205; open character of, 215; as place of truth, 94, 213, (grounded in ontic truth) 163; and predication, 384; as presentation, 107; synthetic a priori, 30; as relational, 583; universalizing (Kant), 109

Justification, and truth as certificate, 374, 438n

Kinsmen, thinkers as, 470

Know, -ing, as Absolute, 332-333; (prescinds from individual) 334; (prior to human k.), 338, 345. (as Shining-forth) 339, (see also Absolute, Shining-forth); as concrete-abstract (Hegel), 341; death as death, 573-574; as ontic, pre-ontological, 343; as Presence, 333-336; as presentation of being-to-be-known, 108; as questioning, 257; as real vs. natural (Hegel), 342-343; (and distinction between voiv and σεβασμός) 441; as to-have-seen, 335, 415, 524; as τοθύμα, 271, 287, 475; (see also θύμα); and thinking (Descartes), 323; as thought, 525; see also Knowledge

Knowledge, act of (and judgement), 214; (for Kant) 107; (and science) 256; and certificate (Descartes), 322; and existential analysis, 98; falsity of, 225; as finite (Kant), 31, 234; as intimacy with world, 52; as letting-be of objects, 191; cannot know Non-being, 130, 204-205; ontological, see Ontological; problem of, 27; pure, see Ontological; theory of (Kant), 20, 259; as transcendental (Kant), 113

Language, analysis of (as method of thought), 291-296; as articulation (SZ), 67; and Being (pre-SZ), 629; in choral ode, 270; and ek-sistence, 134-135, 540-541; essence of, 496; and finitude, 293, 609-610; and foundational thought, 21, 258, 451. 543-543; (and translation) 526-527; function of (HB), 543-544; as house of Being, 538, 535, human (and aboriginal Utterance), 466; (as response to hail of Language) 578; importance of (apparent in EM), 259; as language brought to language, 609n; and logos (WG), 171; and Λόγος, 495-498; and man's body, 389-390; and measure-taking of Being-as-utterance, 592; negativity of, 609-610; origin of, 295, 535, (and Being-question) 292, (and openness of beings) 315, (response to Beon) 558, (as scission) 580, (in Stillness, repose) 577; and origination of Being, 411; for presentative thought, 397; primary sense of, 410; and re-trieve of logic, 491; for Rilke, 397, 399; and transcendence, 100

Lay, see Lie

Lay(-ing)-claim, and origination, 460; as project of World, 165, 411, 466; and taking-possession, 165-167

Lay-free, see Free (adj.)

Leap, with eyes wide open, 613; of Heidegger I, 625; into hermeneutic circle, 42; thought as 611-613. (and translation) 526

Leibniz-Wolff-tradition, 30
GENERAL INDEX

Let-lie-forth, -in-collectedness, 492; (see also Gathering [-together], λέγειν); as taking under one's care, 603

Let-spring-forth, see Origin

Let(ting)-be, of Being, 21, 541; of beings, 216; (attitude of foundational thought) 57; as concealing of beings-in-the-ensemble, 219, 226, 235; vs. creation, 150; as rendering free, 186; as ek-sistent freedom, 241; and forgetfulness of mystery, 222; as letting-be-destined, 57; -manifest, 44, 227, 228, 234; (and language) 496; (and Phenomenology) xiv-xv; as letting-oneself-in-on, 216; as ontological (antecedes ontic), 186; relation between Being and man, 542; -seen and phenomenology, 46-47; of self, 188-189; (see also Assume [-ing], Re-solve); as tending to, 575, 584; as thought, 618; see also Authenticity, Freedom, Liberation

Liberation, and authenticity (Nietzsche), 376; Being as, 618; for Being, 506; from hiddenness, 185, 191; and humanism, 388; of instrument in its Being, 57; of man unto ek-sistence, 248; from ontic, 188, 456; pre-SZ, 632; from presentation, 506; by retrieving, 441; from spirit of vengeance, 380; as willing non-willing, 508; from world of shadows (Plato), 302; see also Free (adj.), Freedom

Liberty, not act of will, 45; of modern man, 321-322; of response and hailing, 599; for Rilke, 393; as temporo-historical, 481; and thought, 479, 597; as transcendence, 45; see also Freedom

Liberum arbitrium, 190

Life-force, constancy, surpassment in, 366; and will, 364-367; philosophy of, 327, 503; as principle of values, 364

Lighting-process, not in focus of metaphysics, 8; and ground-question, 14; of metaphysics (Being as), 6; presupposed by intelligence, 386; of There-being as, 58-59; (see also Luminosity); through language, 528

Limit, where being begins, 266; and end (death), 76, 276; (see also End); and finitude, 265-266; Greek conception of, 265-266, 521, 623; as negativity, 573; of There-being's power, 287; see also Finitude

Limitation, see Limit

Listening, mere, 204

Lodging, see House of Being

Logic, concerned with beings, 196, 204-205; criticism of, 204-205, 474-475; and de-volution of thought, 383-386; and domination over beings, 395; of heart, 396, 399; Heidegger's lectures and seminars on, 490; and language (Rilke), 399; laws of, 206; (and law of Being) 549; and Non-being, 205; polemic vs., 386, 490; as science, 19, 267, 383; (shaken to foundations) 491; (as tribunal) 384; in SZ, KM, 204; symbolic, 386; transcendental (Kant), 385

Logical, negation, 205; (founded in Non-being) 541; (presupposes comprehension of Non-being) 199; thought (Non-being inaccessible to), 284; (and passage to foundational thought) 481; (and principle of contradiction) 385; (and question about Non-being) 196; truth presupposes discovering, 94; see also Logic

Logos, and being "at home," 462; as call of concern (conscience), 80-81; and essencing of language, 626; as existential component, 66-70; and sense, 100; and throwing of There, 538; in WG, 170-171; in WW, 248

Loquacity, 71, 292 n, 316

Lumen naturale, and ontological structure of There-being, 58-59; presupposes lighting-process, 386; and subject-ism, 590

Luminosity, and anxiety, 73; crowning moment of, 287; as disclosedness of World, 59; endorsed by self in resolving, 235; of ek-sistence, 218; and ground-question, 200; of Non-being, 201; as seeing, 63; and There, 618; untrammeled, 265; of World, 58-59, 217; see also Disclosedness

Maintain-free, see Free (adj.)

Man, Being of (and history), 292; as in-between-being, 589; body of in language, 389-390; as collect-or of Being, 283; and community, 281; not creature but subject, 326; and decisions of history, 242-243; and ek-sistence, 248, 531; (see also Ek-sistence); and ek-sistent freedom,
242. (see also Freedom): essence of, 281, (and Being) 295, (as gathering point) 494, (in its ground) 284, (and Ætel) 273, (and essâç) 353, (and There-being) 242, 248, 279-282, (and There) 536; expanding of, 504-505; and experience (Hégel), 339-333; Greek conception of, 280-281; as historical, 223, (see also Historicity, History); as individual (and Ætel), 352, (and There) 413; individual humanity of, 242; liberation of, for existence, 508-509; and experience (Hégel), 282; as measure (and acceptance), 420, (and bringing-to-pass of truth) 539; as meta-physical, 376-377, (definition of) 390, (interpretation of) 279; modern, 321, (for Nietzsche) 376; ontic origin of (and finitude of There-being), 173; ontological structure of, 45; as perceived, 419; not possessing but possessed by freedom, 241-242, (see also Freedom); proper definition of, 280-281; as questioner of Being, 34; as rational animal, see Rational animal; as There-being (Hégel), 339-17; as There-being, 221-222, 279-282; and will unto Power, 373

Manifestation, finitude of, 266; and Non-being, 200; and utterance, 669; see also Letting-be, Lighting-process, Non-concealment, Openness

Marxism, 388, 547-548; see also Marx Matrix of relationships, and Being as law, 426; as measure (and acceptance), 248, 284; and purposefulness, 56; as Total Meaningfulness, 57, 67; see also Arrangement, Articulative-necessity, Meaningfulness, Pattern, World Matter-of-the-case, see Facticity Meaning, see Sense

Meaningfulness, Total, as articulative-necessity, 67, 249; as matrix of relations, 57; not superimposed, 100; see also Arrangement, Articulative-necessity, Matrix of relationships, World Measure, -ing, as Being in its negativity, 590-591; beings as, 230, 252; of Dimension by man, 589; of judgement, 213; man (Hégel), 419-420; of ontic truth, 222; -taking of Being as original utterance, 592; -taking as poetizing, 592 Mediaeval, man, 379, 392; (God and) 326; notion of certitude, 319, 322; epoch in de-volution of thought, 316-320; scholasticism as mittence of Being, 333; tradition, 332

Mesh, of positivity-negativity (arrangement), 317; of Ætel-œwiv, 603

Metaphor, of cave, see Cave; of hearing and sight, 499, 553; of seeing and comprehension, 63

Metaphysics, sense of word, 4-5; Aristotle's definition of, 23; Being as essence of, 19; as beginning with early Greeks, with Plato, 13; as coming to pass in ground of There-being, 200; and correlation of Being-time, 85; destruction of, 29, 628; dominion of logic over, 204; as epoch, 534; founding of, 184, 202-204, (and title of SZ) 40-41; general (and schematism), 135; general-special (Kant), 29; and God (Nietzsche), 302; grounding of, 3-10, 211, 259; (as fundamental ontology) 15, (and hermeneutic) 631, (from inside, from outside) 15n, 475, (in KM) 146, (and question of finitude) 32-33, (SZ) 93; history of, 533; and humanism, 387, 389; and KRv, 29-30, laying free ground of, 183-184; and luminosity, 61n; cannot meditate own light, 8; as meta-physics, 5n, 260; metaphysics of, 202; as mittence of Being, 436; and Neo-Kantianism, 27; as nihilism, 363; and Non-being, 199-200; overcoming of (by recollection), 438, (and WM) 475; (see also Overcoming); and philosophy, 23-24, 206, 227; for Plato, 5, 13; (and essence of truth) 303-308; and question of Non-being, 201n; reversal of principle of, 390; as roots of philosophy tree, 7, 593; and science (Hégel), 360; and soul, world, God, 559-560; special disciplines of, 31, (and Quadrature) 572; as transcendental philosophy, 329; and truth-as-conformity, 17; (see also Forgottenness, Truth); of Will and eternal return, 379

Method, ascending of deduction, 127; descending of deduction, 126-127; of Heidegger, 106, 612; (as question) 616; of Heidegger I and II, compared, 623-624; of phenomenology,
GENERAL INDEX

761

46–47; of re-trive, 158; (see also Re-trive); of thought (in EM), 288–296

Middle-point, as center, 579; and e-vent, 638; as ontological difference, 501; see also Center, Circle, Third thing

Mine-ness, 45, 97, 281

Mittence, meaning, 20–21, 435–11; in beings-in-the-ensemble, 499; Beon as negatived, 555; and dis-closure of Being, 533–534, 555, (see also Epoch); and e-vent, 493, 614 n, (see also E-vent); and eye for granting, xxii–xxiii; first use of term, 434–436; in HB, 532–533; and im-parting, 598; law of (and poetry), 450; as negatived (vs. finitude of transcendence), 624; and ontological difference, 436–437; and preparational thought, 438–439; of thought as Being, 546; and truth, 412

Modes of Being, see Authenticity

Moment, poetic, see Poetic

Mood vs. ontological disposition, 65

Moral, order and luminosity, 61 n; sense and conscience, 80; see also Ethics

More original, meaning, 290; as more Greek, 611–612; question, 205–206; than reason, 386; and re-trive of language, 285

Mortals, and death, 573, 626, (see also Death); as distinguished from rational animals, 574; in Quadrade, 571–572

Moved-ness (Aristotle), and generation, 312; and movement, 310; and shining-forth, 313

Movement, as being-under-way (Hegel), 344; ϕιλος as δειδη of (Aristotle), 310; along the way, 616

Mystery, meaning of, 221–222; and Aristotelie, 312; articulated by poet, 468; in art-work, 406; Being as, 240, 245; (and homecoming) 452, (and Δειδη) 609, (as measurement) 590, (as re-served) 452; and Being-as-source, 446–447, 452; of beings and overcoming of subjective thought, 281; and errance (complete non-essence of truth), 225–226, 237; (consequences of finitude) 237, (modes of non-truth) 228, (as negated truth) 240; forgetting of (and subjective thought), 252; for-gottenness of, 222–223; guarded (by poet), 459, (by utterance) 462; as hidden, 257; and language, 610; as Δειδη (for Heidegger) 11, 640, (see also Δειδη); and timen, 435–436; as non-truth, 224; re-collection of, 226, 246; in structure of WW, 220, 229; of There-being, 226, 243; yielding to, 227

Name, -ing, meaning of, 292–293; and Being, 528; and disclosure of Being, 411; and λεγεν, 496; and poet, 636; and poetic moment, 428; and poetry, 410; (see also E-vent); and eye for granting, xxii–xxiii; first use of term, 434–436; in HB, 532–533; and im-parting, 598; law of (and poetry), 450; as negatived (vs. finitude of transcendence), 624; and ontological difference, 436–437; and preparational thought, 438–439; of thought as Being, 546; and truth, 412

Need, of Being (for Ἡμνος), 283, (for There) 20, 277, 4130, 477, 479, 481, 532, 555, 560, 597; of Holy for poet, 429; of Ἡμνος for man, 580; of Over-powering, 267; of There-being (for Being), 38, 72; as want, 597

Negation, logical, 205, (founded in Non-being), 541; see also Negativity

Negativity, of Being (and Being unto death), 572–574, (and drag) 524, (as inter-mittence) 533–534, (in language) 609–610, (and need for scission) 432, (see also Non-being) 532–534, (and 'not') 564, (and poet) 458, (in terms of language) 497 n, (and There-being) 511, (and thinker) 637, (as withheld treasure) 534, (and withdrawal) 5n, 598 n, 608, (and world-earth struggle) 412, of coming-to-presence, 310; component of, see Disposition; and death, 75; in Discord, 268, (see also Discord); as finitude, 202, 232, (see also Finitude); of fortune, 256; ground of (guilt), 82; and ground-question, 14; intrinsic to revelation, 219–220, (see also Concealment); of joy, 555; law of (Anaximander), 580; of man, 244; of timen and inter-mittence, 21, 533–534; and μη vs. 606, 485; as not-character, 8–9; in poetry, 490–491; and positivity, 8–9, (σωφροσ) 313, (as wonder-ful) 488; prior to and intrinsic to truth, 492; and privation, 313; and There as
poet, 447; of There-being, 212, 222; of thought and Beon, 556; as to-be-thought, 22; of truth, 95, 152, 211, 218, 225, 229, 232, 236, 240, 244. (Aristotle) 314, 315, (in art-work) 405, (and containment) 420, (as concealment, errance, mystery, un-truth) 96, (see also finitude, limit); of thought and Beon, 556; as to-be-thought, 22; of truth, 95, 152, 211, 222, 225, 229, 232, 236, 240, 244. (Aristotle) 314, 315, (in art-work) 405, (and containment) 420, (as concealment, errance, mystery, un-truth)

Neo-Kantianism, 27, 29

Neo-Platonic, 388

Neo-Scholasticism, 27

Nihilism, and Christianity, 327n; as consummation of metaphysics, 19, (see also consummation); as dialectical materialism, 547; as forgetfulness of Being, 381; of Heidegger, 200, 474; and humanism, 389; Nietzsche's conception of, 362; positive, negative, 363; in Rilke, 391-395, (overcoming of). 395-398; as valuelessness, 363; and working, 586-587

Non-being, vs. absolute nothing, 72, 135, 474, 573; alterity of, 203, 244; and attunement, 477; Being as, 147; and Being, truth, 200-202; not a being, 284; death as shrine of, 574; delivered from hidden-ness, 205; disclosure of, 205; in very essence, 205; experience of, 284; and finitude of transcendence, 38; founded logical negation, 205, 541; and Heidegger's nihilism, 200, 474; and hidden-ness of Being, 8; horizon of, 135, 212; for logic, 20; 205; and anxiety, 72, 196-197, 477; and metaphysics, 199-200; as negation of totality of beings, 196; and "not," 564; and nothing, 195-196; not object, 204-205; and ontological difference, 442; as ontological knowledge (Kant), 135-136; path unto, 284; as project of There-being, 204; renders possible manifestation of beings, 198, 203; revelation of, 201-202; for science, 195; in SZ (r6sumé), 194; of There-being (finitude), 79; as veil of Being, 474, 535

Non-concealment, of beings subordinate to Good (Plato), 308; concealed (and metaphysics), 5; as Idea (Plato), 306-307; and Non-being, 201, 205; (see also Non-being); Open as, 217; and φύσις, 201-203; for Plato, 303-305; and primordial Discord, 208; and sense of alpha-privative in ἀλήθεια, 185-186, 305; as truth, 7; truth as forgotten by Hegel, 359; way unto, 284; see also αλήθεια. Revelation, Truth

Non-essence, of ground, 172; of There, 278; of truth, 220-221, 227, 229, 232, (authentic, inauthentic) 237, (complete) 225, 228, 237, (as dissolution) 406

Non-ground, 202; and non-essence of ground, 172-173

Non-logical, see pre-logical

Non-ontic, see ontic

Non-presentative, see pre-presentative

Non-revelation, see concealment

Non-subjective, see pre-subjective

"Not," affirmed, 205; differentiates Being from beings, 8; not ens rationis, 564; foundation of, 541; and guilt, 82; and logical negation, 199; of originating non-essence, 245; permeating (ground), 172, (manifestative process) 236-237, (There-being) 222, 236, (transcendence) 235; and revelation-concealment, 563; separating beings (and Being), 564, (and Non-being) 293; in SZ, 233-234; see also negativity

Not-character, see Negativity

Nothing, absolute, 72, (vs. Non-being) 135, (and Non-being) 474, 573; and Non-being, 195-196

Notions, sense of (Kant), 118; see also Categories (of understanding)

Now(s), horizon of, 142; and popular conception of time, 86; and pure apprehension, 142-143; as pure reproduction, 143-144; succession of, 141, (Kant) 133, (Nietzsche) 379

Object(s), sense of, 110; and Being, 6; dialectic of, 358-356; of human knowledge, 110; as humanly knowable, 323; and lumen naturale, 59n; metaphysics of (Kant), 330; as opposed, see Oppose; and thing, 567; transcendental (Kant), 136

Objectivate, -tion, and accessibility, 112; see also institution, objectiveness, schematism

Objectiveness, constituted, not created, 112; horizon of, see horizon; as necessity, 139; outside consciousness (Rilke), 394-395
Objectivising, and pro-posing, 323; see also Pro-posing
Objectivity, of object and horizon, 154; and subject-ness, 325
Object-ness, and Being of beings, 325
Obligation(s), and Being, 260; and practical reason, 140; self-imposed, see Necessity
Obscurity, see Concealment
Obscurity, primordial, 487; see also Of, in “Being of beings,” 605-606, (see also Being); and double appropriation, 504; as objective genitive, 340; as subjective genitive, 523, 535, (Hegel) 340; as subjective-objective genitive, 22, 542; thinking of (Being), xvi-xvii, (Aöyos) 498
One, polyvalence of, 570, (see also Quadrate); vs. same, distinction explained, 588
One-in-many, 11, 492-493, 499
Otic, excellence of There-being (and World as existential), 58, (see also Prerogative); as existentiell, 50, (see also Existentiell); idols, liberation from, 206, (see also Authenticity); knowing (Hegel), 343, 346-347; vs. ontological, 8n, (history) 547, (knowledge) 30, (structure of There-being and thought-as-waiting) 507; and ontological dimensions (of dwelling), 584, (simultaneous) 57-58; pre-ontological (and dialectic), 349-350, (and ontological) 344; truth in existential analysis, 95n, (see also Truth)
Ontological, meaning (vs. ontic), 8n; context of problem of death, 277; difference, see Difference; dimension (and drag), 524, (of history) 547, (of transcendence) 231, (as disposition, see Disposition; judgement, see Judgement; knowing (Hegel), 343, 346-347, 352, (Kant) 124-135; knowledge (components of), 116-121, (not creative) 112, (and empirical use) 148, (as finite) 232, (vs. ontic) 30, (and ontology, general metaphysics) 154-155, (as Open) 231, (as pure synthesis) 215, (and reality of categories) 125, (and transcendence) 173-174; known, 135-136; predicates, see Categories; synthesis, see Synthesis; truth (in existential analysis), 95n, (vs. ontic) 151, (see also Truth); word becomes suspect, 158; see also Existential Ontologico-existential, see Ontological
Ontology, and Being in general, 9; and categories, 383; and ethics, 530; fundamental (sense of), 15, (and correlation of Being and time) 86, (formula dropped) 273n, (Heidegger) 33-41, (Kant) 29-33, (as laying-free) 183-184, (and ontological difference) 437n, (and relation between finitude and Being) 39, (and shift to foundational thought) 16, (and There-being as transcendence) 36, (as transcendental philosophy) 31; and general metaphysics, 29; and Neo-Kantianism, 27; and phenomenology, 46-47; and schematism, 135
Onto-theo-logical, structure of metaphysics, 9-10, (and Heraklitus) 11; structure of Science (Hegel), 360
Open, not a being, 231; de-parture from, 395, 397; as ground of comportment, 214-215, 231; presenting in, 313; see also Being, Horizon
Open(ing)-up, of World in art-work, 406; of beings-in-the-ensemble, 273; see also Freedom, Letting-be, Liberation
Openness, to Being (and future), 289, (in existential choice) 190, (see also Existence, Eksistence, Transcendence); and Being-question, 289; of beings (in art-work), 415, (as transcendence) 231, (see also Eksistence, Transcendence); to others as attend-ing, 68; to power-to-be and logos, 69; as prerogative of There-being, 20, (see also Prerogative); There as domain of, 6, (see also Being); errance component of, 224, (see also Errance); forcing into, 271; need of Over-powering for sphere of, 267; of Open, 214, 216; to the Open, 218, (as transcendence) 231, (see also Eksistence, Transcendence); to others as attend-ing, 68; to power-to-be and logos, 69; as prerogative of There-being, 20, (see also Prerogative); There as domain of, 413, (see also Luminosity, There); as truth, see Truth; of truth as negated, 415
Oppose(d), vs. across, 420n; and contradiction, 384-385; and object, 568, (see also Object[s]); and sensating, 130; terms of relationships of cogitate, 323
Opposed-ness, see Horizon
Ordinariness, see Everydayness
Orientation, and accessibility, 114; and theoretical reason, 140; recep-
Origin, meaning of, 403; vs. beginning, 257n; Being as, see Being; ontic (of beings), 14, 150; as Ground, 445n; of “why?” 170
Original, as that which lets-spring-forth, 117; thought, see Thought; see also Origin, More original
Origin-ality, see Originate
Originate, -ing, truth, 411-412; of Being-as-ground and poet, 459-460; and ἐξήγησις, 498
Overcome, -ing, common sense, 257; of forgottenness, 48; as going beyond, 203; homelessness by working, 586-587; humanism, 389-390; metaphysics, 14, 389, 548, 592, 623; nihilism, 373-374, 547, (Rilke) 395-398; philosophy, 23; subject-ism as root of idealism-realism, 28; subjective thought, 252
Over-powering, as awesome, 273; disclosed as such, 286; inspires anxiety, awe, 270; maintains primacy over There, 271; overpowers There, 274; resistance to, 259; and ἐξήγησις, 271-272; violence to, see Violence
Participation, and distinction of what that, 306, 317; in Ideas (Plato), 306-307; and im-parting, 521n; and metaphysics, 17; presupposes ambivalence, 11-12
Past, in existential analysis, 86; and facticity, 87; greeted in north wind, 467; and history, 91; for poet, 454; and pure reproduction, 443-444; in re-collection, 21; (see also Recollection); resists Will, 379; two senses of, 87n; of There-being, 289-290; see also Re-tie; Temporality, Time
Pattern, of arrangement as law of Being, 549; as original language, 555; of poetical thought, 455; purposeful, 53; (and ontological dimension of There-being) 57; (and World) 54; of relationships as essential thought, 425; see also Arrangement, Articulative-ness, Matrix, Meaningfullness
People, history of, 464; and language, 265; poet in relation to, 465; and There-being, 261, 414; see also With-being
“People,” meaning, 71; and death, 79-80

GENERAL INDEX

Per-cept, and presentation, 419
Perceptio, 328, 419; see also Appetitus
Persecution, and spirit of vengeance, 377
Person, moral, see Self
Phenomenological, analysis (of others' death), 76n, (and analysis of language) 593, (of thing) 567-570; attitude (HB), 537; method pre-SZ, x-xi; see also Phenomenology
Phenomenology, meaning of, 46-47; achieved in existentiell comportment, 50; consummated by choice of self, 192; and dis-coverey of beings, 44; of existence and knowledge, 98; function of, 283n; for Hegel, 355; Heidegger vs. Husserl concerning, 178-179; and hermeneutic, 47, 631; and Husserl, x-xvii, 27, 548; and laying-free, 184-186; as liberation from hidden-ness, 185-186, 191; as method of Heidegger I, 623; and ontology, 46-47; principle of x-xii; as transformed into thought, 624
Philosophy, sense of (Heidegger), 22-24; for Aristotle, 23, 315; beginning of, 240, 256, 285; and common sense, 229, 250-251; (and Being-question) 253; danger of presentative thought in, 556; and experience (Hegel), 355-355; for Heraclitus, sophists, Aristotle, 22-23; and hermeneutic circle, 498 and interrogation of language, 295-296; and language, 611; and metaphysics, 22-23, 206; modern (and subject-ism), 326; origin of, 257, 289; for Plato, 227, 230; and poetry, 256; and problem of truth, 228, 230; and progress, 546; and question, 288; roots not torn out, 14-15; scandal of (Kant vs. Heidegger), 103; as Science (Hegel), 355; transcendental, 359; (meaning of) 31; tree of (Descartes), 7; of values, 369, (see also Value); as mere venturesomeness, 531, 550; in the West, influenced by Aristotle's Physics, 309
Physics, and metaphysics, 5n, 260; (and ambivalence) 11
Physics, Aristotle's, 309, 313
Place of disclosure, of lighting-process, of openness, see There
Poem, primordial articulation of Holy, 444-445; fashioned into word, 455; thoughts of, 444, 467
Poetry, see Poetry
Poet, and disclosure of Being, 295; future of, 455-456; German vs. Greek, 449; as half-god, 447, 460, 589; and history, 456; and Holy, 444-445; (see also Being); interpretation of, 290; of metaphysics (Rilke), 391; and origination of Being, 411-412, 459-460; past of, 454; pedagogy of, 468-469; and present of (language), 456; in relation to people, 463-464, (see also People); and re-solve, 465-469; as sign, 463; task of, 423, 427; and thinker, 294, (relation between) 471-472, 544-545, 635-637; as venturesome (Rilke), 397
Poetic, dwelling on earth, 463-464; experience and primacy of Being, 451; function compared with SZ, 468-469; moment, 428-431; task, 430; (see also Poet); word as prophetic, 457
Poetizing, and art-work, 409-411; as bestowing, grounding, originating, 410; as common root of poesy, thought, 458; as grounding, 498; as originating, 498; (history) 453; as power of human dwelling, 592; primordial, 295; and thought, (one) 588, (different) 593. (similar and different) 482; see also Poetry
Poetry, analogue to thought, 431; and Being-question, 205; and business of thought, 528; and essence of art, 409; essential vs. narrow sense of, 410; and ground, 438-439; and philosophy, 295-296; pre-SZ, 629; as projective utterance, 410; for Rilke, 397; in SZ, 700; utters Being but not as such, 637
Pose, -ing, by seeing, 368; of thing, 588; by will, 366; see also Com-, ContrA, Op-, Pro-pose
Positivity, of Being and poet, 637; and negativity (of arrangement), 517; and decision, 437-432; (and originary Discord) see Discord, (simultaneous in truth) 9, (as World and earth) 406; of truth, 95; see also Component(s)
Possibility, inner, see Essence
Possibilities, see Potentialities
Potentialities, and comprehension, 62; horizon (sphere) of, 214, 231, (projected by There-being) 153; and re-trieve, 91-93
Potentiality, for Aristotle, 318; finitude of and authenticity, 77; -for Being re-tieved, 92; for being dashed to pieces, 279; proper, exclusive, definitive of There-being, 78; There-being its own, 39; of There-being includes end (death), 75; see also Drive-toward-Being, Power
Poverty, of shepherd, 543; of thought, 479
Power, -to-be (and comprehension), 62, (and finitude of reason) 32, (There-being as) 39, (unveiled to itself) 33; emergent-abiding, see Being, 391; of imagination ordered to transcendental apperception, 127; transcendental imagination as, 122; for thought as ex-sistence, 600; see also Drive-toward-Being, Potentiality
Preconception, see Supposition
Preconceptual, comprehension, 33-34, 41; thought (necessity of), 420
Predicates, ontological, see Categories
Predication, see Judgement
Pre-discover, see Discover
Preoccupation, 53, 222
Pre-logical, foundational thought as, 51, 330, 549
Pre-onic, comprehension, 211, letting-be, 57
Pre-ontological, in Heidegger, 53; in Hegel, 343, 347, 350, 357; seizure by poet, 448; see also Ontic
Preparational, see Thought
Pre-Platonic, thinker, 522; thought, 133
Pre-predicative truth, 959, 176-177, 213, 215, 229
Pre-presentative, foundational thought as, 19, 366; openness forgotten, 177
Pre-rational, foundational thought as, 20, 548; and intelligence, 386
Pre-ontological, in Heidegger, 53; in Hegel, 343, 347, 350, 357; seizure by poet, 448; see also Ontic
Pre-plural, see Thought
Pre-Platonic, thinker, 522; thought, 133
Pre-predicative truth, 959, 176-177, 213, 215, 229
Pre-presentative, foundational thought as, 19, 366; openness forgotten, 177
Pre-rational, foundational thought as, 20, 548; and intelligence, 386
Pre-Platonic, see Pre-SZ, 28; re-collection of, 51; of There-being, 20, 35, 231, 248, 274, (forgotten) 48, 70, 285; (vs. subjectivism) 98
Presence, (-ing), Being as, 147-148, (see also Being); coming-to (Being as), 240; (of beings-in-the-ensemble) 256, (and essence) 228-229, (gathered-together) 262, (and going from presence) 311, (and Ideal) 306, (as known by artist) 415, (and μορφή) 312, (and moved-ness) 311; and essence-existence (Aristotle),
synthesis, see Synthesis; view, see View

Purpose, in existential analysis, 53; and sense, 100

Quadrate, 570–572; and classical metaphysics, 572; and World, 625

Question, of Being (and de-cision), 291, (and finitude) 266, (as historical) 288–290, (conceived as “metaphysical” in WM) 202, (and origin of language) 292, (and poetry) 295, (as re-solve) 227, 246–247, (as question of There-being) 40, 202, 238, (as thinking) practical (as Heidegger’s contribution) 634, (in WM) 475; of beings-in-the-ensemble (Greeks), 238, 257; of finitude and ground-work for metaphysics, 32; as knowing, 257; metaphysical, 202; more original than logic, 205–206; of Non-being, 199–200, 201 n, 205; of poetic vocation (Rilke), 399–400; as thought, 246, 251–253, 257, 288–291; of truth and philosophy, 227; as wonderment, 487–488

Radiance, as εἰλικρία, 314, 317; placement in, 313; and shining-forth, 312

Rational animal, man (more than), 531, (as subject, person, spirit), 386; and metaphysics, 19, 376; “mortal,” 574; as presentative animal, 377; rationality of founded in project, 537; as zoological concept, 280; see also Man

Readiness, for anxiety, 478; for appartenure, 466–467; to be called, 83

Reflection, Descartes, 325; Hegel, 345, 358; Kant, 118

Reification, in foundational thought, 546

Reichenau, 1, 3, 24, 641

Relation(-ship), between Being and beings (named but not as such), 521; between Being and ek-sistence, 536; between Being and man (and expanding), 505, (as fulfilled) 542, (Heraclitus) 486, (as hermeneutic circle) 506, (aptóntos of) 634, (not province of metaphysics) 534; between Being and There-being, 486, 539, (as Dimension-measure) 580, (as ΄Αληθία – gathering-point) 501; between Being and truth, 94; to Being (constitutes There), 284, (and reversal) xx–xxi, (structure of self) 281, (and super-man) 375, (transformation in) 430, 481, (and withdrawal) 598, (see also Ek-sistence, Withdrawal); between poet and people, 626; between subject-object, see Subject-object polarity

Relativism, and subject-object polarity, 546–547; and truth, 27 n

Recollect, meaning of, 438 n; and abiding, 453; and attentive answer, 438; and authenticity, 51, 71, 212; of Beon, 555; as choice of freedom, 189; and dialogue, 458, 465, 468; and fortune, 91; and fundamental ontology, 49; and heart, 590; as help to a poetic word, 470; and historicity of There-being, 626; and language, 611; of mystery, 223, 226, 246, 252–253; as ontic comportment, 77; of poet and thinker, 469–472; and poetry (Rilke), 397; and reversal of de-parture, 396; structure of, 21, 453–457; as structure of thought, 545; and thanks-giving, 602; in things, 574

Referential dependence, see Dependence

Reflection, Descartes, 325; Hegel, 345, 358; Kant, 118

Real, -ity, for Hegel, 342–343, 354; for Kant, 125; transcendental imagination and objective, 138

Reason, as adversary of thought, 386; evolution of, 301; faculty of, 280, (see also Rational animal); historical (Dilthey), 28; and woëv, 250 n, 384, (see also woëv); as woëv, and thought-as-record, 604; and philosophy (Hegel), 331; as power of calculation (rooted in transcendental imagination), 130, 150, (and will) 330; pure (and grounding of metaphysics), 30, (imagination as root of) 238–139, (inadequacy of) 330, (strict and broad sense) 139 n; relation to Ideas, 307; see also woëv

Receptivity, and finitude of intuition (Kant), 109; and freedom of pure reason, 139

Recognition, pure, as pure synthesis, 144–145

Re-collection, meaning of word, 438 n; and abiding, 453; and attentive answer, 438; and authenticity, 51, 71, 212; of Beon, 555; as choice of freedom, 189; and dialogue, 458, 465, 468; and fortune, 91; and fundamental ontology, 49; and heart, 590; as help to a poetic word, 470; and historicity of There-being, 626; and language, 611; of mystery, 223, 226, 246, 252–253; as ontic comportment, 77; of poet and thinker, 469–472; and poetry (Rilke), 397; and reversal of de-parture, 396; structure of, 21, 453–457; as structure of thought, 545; and thanks-giving, 602; in things, 574

Record, meaning of, 599–601

Referential, dependence, see Dependence

Reflection, Descartes, 325; Hegel, 345, 358; Kant, 118

Refutation, in foundational thought, 546

Reichenau, 1, 3, 24, 641

Relation(-ship), between Being and beings (named but not as such), 521; between Being and ek-sistence, 536; between Being and man (and expanding), 505, (as fulfilled) 542, (Heraclitus) 486, (as hermeneutic circle) 506, (aptóntos of) 634, (not province of metaphysics) 534; between Being and There-being, 486, 539, (as Dimension-measure) 580, (as ΄Αληθία – gathering-point) 501; between Being and truth, 94; to Being (constitutes There), 284, (and reversal) xx–xxi, (structure of self) 281, (and super-man) 375, (transformation in) 430, 481, (and withdrawal) 598, (see also Ek-sistence, Withdrawal); between poet and people, 626; between subject-object, see Subject-object polarity

Relativism, and subject-object polarity, 546–547; and truth, 27 n

Release, sense of, 504; and acceptance, 259 n; as double liberation, 506–507; as expanding, 504–505; of poetic talent, 456; as spring, 586; and willing non-willing, 508
Repose, sense of, 498 n; of Nature, 425, 428; of thought in λόγος, 498 n
Re-presentation, connotes presentation to subject, 108 n; see also Presentation
Reproduction, pure (and pure synthesis), 143-144
Rescendence, and transcendence, 18
Re-serve, of Being, 446, 453; (and attunement) 462; of Be—on, 555-556; of Joyous, 463; of mittence, 500; see also “Withdrawal
Resign, see Surrender
Resolve, sense of, 83; as advance toward self, 84, 90; and authenticity 80-84, 186–191, 226, 508; (see also Authenticity); and Be—on, 557; as choice, 51, 188; (see also Choice); and conscience, 83; as corresponding, 495; as culminating moment (of ek-sistence), 237, (of truth) 96, 235; as de-cision, 287-288, 415-416, 431-432; as essence of foundational thought, 509; and fortune, 256; as freedom-onto-death, 574, (see also Freedom); in Hegel, 357; in Hei—degger II, 487; as letting self be, 233; and naming, 509; as most original form of truth, 190; and poet, 465-469; by question, 227, 288-291; as step-in-reverse, 576; as surrender, 258; (see also Acquiescence, Docility, Surrender); in SZ, 212, 237; (and WW) 247–248; discloses temporality, 87; as thanking, 602, 604; of There—being and thought as function, 525; and transparency to self, 189; as willing to know, 287, 415; in WM: Ep, 481–482
Respond, -ing, -se, to address of Being, 478–482; as ad-ventive, 428; to appeal, 21; and authenticity in use of language, 580; to Being’s appeal and working, 586; to Being (as the Holy), 427, 431, 448, 453–457; (as language) 543; (as Will) 373, 378; of conserver of art—work, 414; as corresponding, xviii–xxiii, 603; as foundational thought, 619; as grounding of history, 404; to hail, 487; (of language) 578; by interrogation, 615; to ontological differ—ence, 611; and poetic dwelling, 453; by receiving earth as blessing, 439; as re-trive, 500; as taking-measure, 591; to thought-worthy, 602; transforms into word, 432; to withdrawal, 512; as with-standing, 539; as yielding, 447; of Zarathustra, 375
Re-trive, sense of, 89; of beginning of philosophy, 296; and destruction, 93 n, 628; and de-volution, 391; in existential analysis, 91–93; and finitude, 291; of Heidegger I by Heidegger II, 625; of sense of Being as Heidegger’s unique concern, 503; and Heraclitus, 499–500; as historical, 421, 470, 545–546; and history of people, 92; of Homer, 516; of Kant, 24, 106; in KM, 153; of language, 295; of logic, 491; and maintaining-free, 184; origin of There—being, 290; of potentiality, 91–93, 189; pre-SZ, 631; not relativism, 489; and science, 258; as step-in-reverse, 612; and thinker, 636; of un-said, 489, 611; (see also Un—said); of un-thought, 437–438, 500; (see also Un—thought)
Return, eternal, meaning of, 374–381; as eternal, 379; as existences of beings in their Being, 364; and Zarathustra, 380
Re-valuation, meaning of, 367; remained metaphysics, 19
Reveal, -ing, -ment, and art—work, 405; and concealment (in Heracli-tus), 485–486, (in Homer) 516 (and “not”) 565; see also Letting-be, Lighting-process, Manifestation, Non-concealment
Revelation, as accessibility, 112; of beings (by freedom), 216, 229, (standing within) 287; as guarantee of truth, 319; of Non—being, 201, 205; permeated by not, 254
Reversal, sense of, 624, (Heidegger explains) xvi–xxiii; of de-parture (Rilke), 396–397; explained by Heidegger, xvi–xxiii; indications of in Heidegger I, 244; role of λόγος in, 490; and language (of metaphysics), 36n. (Rilke) 399; and problem of thought, 16; and 596n; and WM: Ep, 475; in WW, 491n
Re-view of now, 143
Rigor, and calculation, 475; of thought (as docile), 253, (explained) 458–551; (and relativism) 97n. (and constant viewing) 614; and retrieve, 106; (see also Re-trive)
Root, common, problem of, 116; as center of institution, 123; transcen—dental imagination as, see Imagination
Rules, sense of, 118; and pure recog—nition, 144; in sens—ating, 130–132; see also Categories of understanding
Said, see Un-said
Salvation, by thought-as-historical, 354; from unholy (Rilke), 399; way of, 531
Same, vs. one, 588n
Schema(ta), and horizon of objectiveness, 134; both intellectual and sensate, 129, 133; and rule, 132–133; as transcendental product, 134; as transcendental time-determinations, 133–134; see also Institution
Schematism, 128–135, 138
Scholasticism, mediaeval, 353; neo-27; see also Epoch, Mediæval
Science, existential structure of, 102n; and Non-being, 195–196, 199, 284; as philosophy, 255–258, (for Hegel) 354–355. (notion of) 255, (origin of) 256–257; as research, 327; see also “Founding,” Scientific, Subject-object polarity
Science of Logic, Hegel’s, 359–360, 385
Scientific, attitude in existential analysis, 102n; experiment as attack on object, 508; philology, 295–296; progress and technicity, 19; research and world-as-picture, 326
Scission, and de-cision, 284, (see also De-cision); and ontological difference, 579; of poet, 431
See(n), (having-), and aspect, 367–368; Awareness as such, 351; as comprehension, 525; as de-cision, 415; as knowing, 335, 415, 524
Seeming-to-be, sense of, 265–266; in art-work, 405–406; and Being-question, 266; as deceiving, 264; and everydayness, 275, (see also Everydayness); intertwined with Being in truth, 278; and language, 293; law of, 286; and ἐγγού, 283; and negativity of truth, 314n; path unto, 285; and phenomenology, 47; and privation (Heraclitus), 495; struggle against, 268, 284; world of (Plato), 317; see also Fallen-ness, Inauthenticity
Seer, see Calchas
Seizure of Being, see Comprehension
Self, action and pure intuition, 110–117; and anxiety, 73; as consumption and temporality, 89; awareness (and experience), 339–340; and knowing) 333; and self-seizure (see also Consciousness); -certitude, see Certitude; as constituting, 179n; consummation of phenomenology by choice of, 192; and ego, 97–98, 154–158; -mitting, see E-mit; foundation of freedom in dynamism of, 180; and freedom of There-being, 191–192; -hood of man, 281; inauthentic and people, 71; initial conception, 50–51; for Kant, 140; assumed in its negativity, 84; -orientation, see Orientation; transcendental imagination as center of, 155–158; and outside world, 102: own potentiality, 74; prior (to consciousness), 138n; (to subjectivity) 156–157; not substance but process, 181; temporality of and re-trieve, 189; as thrust, 204; and time, 86–87; transparency of, 83, 189
Sending, of Being, see E-mit
Sensate-ness, meaning of, 109n; and finitude (Kant), 109
Sens-ating, as antecedent donation of a rule, 132; necessity of, 130; see also Schema(ta), Schematism
Sensation, and finitude (Kant), 109
Sense, meaning of, 85; and articulativeness, 67n; of beings, 28, see also beings; as non-concealment, 7; and subjectivism, 100; and unity of concern, 101
Sensible, and man as meta-physical, 376–377; and supra-sensible (and ambivalence of 69), 11, (and emergence of metaphysics) 13, (and Plato’s metaphysics) 23
Sentiment, see Attunement
Shelter, as There of Being, 510–511
Shepherd of Being, and attending, 294n; and com-mitment, 21; man as, 439, 524–525, 539–540; poverty of, 543; and tending, 575, 584
Shine(-ing)-forth, as Being of Absolute Subject, 339–337; as being-néss of work, 317; as ἐνθά, 311, (see also ἐνθά); and ἐγγον, 318; as essence, 390; to-let-, 492; in-by-with-through man (Hegel), 339; and moved-ness, 313; as Presence, 330; and radiance, 312, (see also Radiance); and seeableness, 314; and seeming, 263, (Staiger vs. Heidegger on udeadur), 594
Silence, and docility, 544; as mode of logos, 68; and poetic moment, 428n; as speechlessness, 482
Simple, see Being
Simplicity, of Being, 550, (see also Being); and ontological history, 547; and polyvalence, 570; of thought, 543

GENERAL INDEX

769
**GENERAL INDEX**

*Singulara tantum*, 638-659
Situation, 189
Sky, in quadrat, 571-572
Sophistry, 22, 251
Soul, and Being-as-simple, 559; faculty of, 80; imagination as power of (Kant), 122
Source, see Being
Space, origin of absolute, 585n; of things, 585-586; and time, origin in Being, 6; see also Intuition
Speech, authenticity of, 294-295; as *X6yos*, 292; radicated in transcendence, 100; see also Language, Logos
Spirit, in Hegel, 333, 355, 360; see also Being
Spontaneity, as freedom, 180; of thought (Kant), 509n; of truth, see Alterity; of understanding (Kant), 110
Spring, -forth, see Original, Leap
Star, 24, 554, 621
Stem, see Root, common
Step-in-reverse, discerns Being-di-dimension, 554; and homecoming, 640; from ontic level, 543; and overcoming of metaphysics, 512; through past into future, 612; from philosophy into thinking of Beon, 557; from presentative thinking, 576
Strangeness, of beings, 201; of There-being, see Awesome, Es-tranged
Subject(um), Absolute, see Absolute; and Being, 6; of certitude, 322-323; as consequent to self (transcendental imagination), 198; (see also Self); as mere entity, 98, 135; of expression, 384; for Fichte, Hegel, Kant, Leibnitz, Schelling, 326n, 330-330; and *fundamentum* (Descartes), 18, 321-323, 331-332; and individual (Hegel), 353; not individual (Nietzsche), 371; for Leibnitz, 328, 365; and *human naturale*, 99n; vs. man as measure, 419-420; There-being and, 101, 179; as universal Will, 19, 364-365; see also ἀναχώρειν
Subject-ism, consequences of, 326-328; (world-as-picture) 326; (anthropology born) 326-327; (man seeks "values") 327-328; and Descartes, 17, 321-325; (as past) 421; (vs. Protagoras) 419; and Hegel, 358-366; and Kant, 392; in language of Heidegger I, 176; of Nietzsche, 19, 363-364, 381-382; polemical against, 420; post-cartesian, 328-330; pre-SZ, 629; of Rilke, 398; see also Metaphysics, Nihilism, Subject-object polarity
Subjectivism, in existential analysis, 97-103; and problematic of SZ, xviii-xix
Subjectivity, and horizon, 154-155; and selfhood, 155-158; vs. subject-object, 325; see also Subject, Subject-ism, Subject-object polarity
Subject-ness, vs. subjectivity, 325
Subject-object polarity, and Absolute Knowing, 334; Being of (Hegel), 358; and conception of beings, 325; in Descartes, 18, 325; and esthetics, 416; for Heidegger I-II, 623; and horizon of transcendence, 593; Nietzsche's failure to escape, 19; made possible by transcendence, 154; and pre-subjective thought, 230; pre-SZ, 630; and relativism, 546; in Rilke, 395, 398; and There-being, 101; subsequent to initial encounter, 177; see also Subject, Subject-ism
Substance, and accident (and structure of thing), 404; (and There-being as transcendence) 154; and subject, 97; see also Subject, ὁμοεξόμολογον
Subsumption, and schematism, 118
Sufficient reason, see Ground, principle of
Super-man, and eternal return, 379-380; and relation to Being, 380; responds to Will-unto-Power, 19; superiority of, 375
Suprasensible (World), see Sensible
Surmise, and comprehension of Being, 428; and re-cord, 604n
Surpassment, and art as value, 370; in Life-force (Will-unto-Power), 366-368
Surrender, to Being, 246; to beings-in-their-totality, 206; to finitude, 233; to hail of Being, 619; to mystery, 226-227; to power of fortune, 256; thought as, 478; as willingness, 467; as yielding, 447, 541; see also Acquiescence, Docility, Re-solve
Synopsis, as pure intuition, 117; and pure synthesis, 124; syn-character of, 138
Synthesis, of double presentation (Kant), 108; finitude of, 110; necessity of, 121; ontological (and fundamental ontology), 33; (as
There, assumes Being, see Assume; as
teach-ant, see Attend-ant; and
captivation by beings, 275; charac-
teristics of (EM), 273-279, (tranz-
scendence) 272-273, (finiteude) 273-
279, (thrown-ness) 274, (fallen-
ness) 275-276, (Being-into-death)
276-279, (temporality) 279; as
cconcern, 281; as disclosedness of
World, 58-59; as domain of open-
ness, 413; as essence of man, 280;
finiteude of, 277-278, 539 (see also
Finiteude); forces Being into open-
ness, 279; function of in grounding
process, 494-495: for Hegel, 356;
as history, 279; and individual man,
413; as irruption, in-cident, 266,
(see also Irruption); and nature of
man, 536; no longer There, 268,
286-287; as opened-up-ness, 217;
origin of, 289; penetrates beings,
272; as place (of disclosure), 266,
277, (of lighting-process) 532, (of
open-ness) 20; as shelter, 511; as
thrown, 274; as World, 56; see also
Ek-sistence, Existence, There-being,
Transcendence.

There-being, meaning, 34n, 44-46; as
in advance of self, 73-74; as most-
awesome, 270; as Being-into-death,
see Death; between Being and
beings, 411; as center of man, 153-
154; characteristics of in WW, 230-
235; as coming-to-be, 74, 233, 248-
249, (see also Throwing); as concern
(with own Being), see Concern;
conditioned by beings, 575; as
creator-conservor of art-work, 414;
as dashed to pieces, 276-279, 286-
287; own disclosedness, see Dis-
closedness, Luminosity; as ego, 97,
100; as ek-sistence, see Ek-sistence;
as existence, see Existence; as finite,
see Finiteude; formula for, 74; as
free, see Freedom; as gathering-
point, 493-495; as ground of meta-
physics, 202, (see also Ground,-ing);
as historical, see Historicity, History-
ry; indigence on see: Need; and
language, 293. (see also Language,
Utterance); lets self be as dwelling,
586; logos and grounding of, 412n;
and man, xx-xxi, 20, 45, 242, 279-
282, (see also Correlation, Man);
mores than it actually is, 62n;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-solve, as response</td>
<td>478, 499, (to hail of Language) 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-trieve</td>
<td>478-479, as self-assumption, 478, as self-surrender, 478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as shift from fundamental ontology, 16, as spring, 526, 611-613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as structural relation between man and Language, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as structure of There-Being, 505, 525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as taking-measure, 591, as thanks (-giving), 480-481, 499-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as to-be-at-work, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as to-be-thought, 431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrown(-down)-ness</td>
<td>disclosed by anxiety, 74, elements of, 64, and everydayness, 48, and finitude, 37, of freedom, 181, insistence upon (SZ), 244, and language, 610, and negativity, 82, 233, and ontological disposition, 65, and Over-powering, 274, and primacy of Being, 400, 537-538, of project, 232, and taking-possession, 166, of thought, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Meaningfulness</td>
<td>see Meaningfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totality, of instrumental references</td>
<td>see Matrix of relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought-full</td>
<td>see Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throwing, of There-being</td>
<td>532, 536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time, Being as origin of</td>
<td>425, and Being-question, 173-174, and Being (SZ), 261-xxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85-86, 243-244, and determinations as schemata for pure concepts, 133-134, and eternal heart, 427, and finite transcendence, 40, and first name of Being, 86, and lighting-up of self-concealment, xx-xxi, for Nietzsche, 379, for popular mind, 86, priority over space (Kant), 117-118, and process of timing, 145, and pure view, 133-134, and transcendental imagination, 141-147, 244, ultimate meaning (origin) of concern, 85-89, 237, 463, 540, unity of (grounds unity of consciousness), 157, (and attending-utterance) 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To-be, -achieved (and authenticity)</td>
<td>50, (in house of Being) 543, (and negativity) 333, revealed by disposition 64, (see also Drive-toward-Being)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation, ambiguity of</td>
<td>526; as leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii, Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tragedy, essence of</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendental, founding</td>
<td>see Founding; imagination, see Imagination; knowledge, see Knowledge; time-determination, see Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>526; as leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii, Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tragedy</td>
<td>526; as leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii, Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth, absoluteness of</td>
<td>97 n, (see also Relativism, Rigor, Thought)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth, in</td>
<td>see also Comprehension; and presentative thought, 18 n, (see also Presentative); as primordial history, see History; as projected by comprehension, see Project, Comprehension; and pure synthesis, 113-114, (see also Synthesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trance</td>
<td>see also Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>526; as leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii, Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>526; as leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii, Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>526; as leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii, Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>526; as leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii, Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
art-work, 405-409; and Being (and grounding of metaphysics), 15. (Nietzsche) 373. (and philosophy) 228, (WG) 174-176; of beings (and art-work), 405; and certitude (Descartes), 18, 321-323, (and justification) 438n, (for medieaval man) 319-320, 322, (and value) 370; as conformity, 94-95, 212-215, 228-229, 250, 314, (differs from certitude) 332, (founded in There-being) 241, (and logic) 19, (and monadology) 329, (Plato) 308, 388; presupposes discovering) 94, (and self-assurance) 370; as correctness, see Conformity; essence of (includes non-essence), 218-227, 240, (primacy over freedom) 241-243, (as truth of Essence) 228-229, 239-240; existential analysis of, 93-97; experience of for early Greeks, 305; expression as place of, 3x6, (see also Judgement); as finite (in art-work), 407-409, (see also Finitude); as freedom, 215-218 (see also Freedom, Transcendence); and ground, 163-164; and history, relation between, 238, (see also History, Being); and intertwining of Being and seeming-to-be; logical, see Logical; meditated for itself, 244; of metaphysics and transcendence, 201-202; and mutual interchange, 272; and negativity (vs. Aristotle), 315; as non-concealment (Δήνομαι), 7, 9, 266, (Aristotle) 314, (not due to choice of Greeks) xxii-xxiii, (pre-SZ) x-xiii, (see also Non-concealment, Δήνομαι); non-essential essence of, 241-243; non-essential essence (Δήνομαι) 223; ontic, 151, 212, 222, (grounded in comprehension) 153, (and transcendental founding) 268, (see also Ontic); ontological (in existential analysis), 92n, (and Non-being) 202, (vs. ontic) 151, (as revealedness) 268, (as unveiledness) 164; (see also Ontological); as opening-up of beings, 273; origin of, 220; for Plato (and Idea), 306-308, (as mystery) 440, (and理念), 387; as pre-predicative, see Pre-predictive; as project of There-being, 150n, (see also Project); as rendering-manifest presupposes existential analysis, 151; of science (history, nature), 201; traditional notion of logical, 213; transformation of essence of, 308; as value, 369; see also Founding, Sense, Transcendence, Un-truth

Tune, to call, 401, 476, (see also Attunement)

Un-concealed, see Non-concealment

Uncover, see Dis-cover

Understanding, and conscience, 80; for Kant (finitude of), 109, (as power of rules) 119, (pure, rooted in transcendental imagination) 138, (and thought) 107; as work, 384; and Non-being, 205

Under way, Heidegger, 606-607; Heidegger still, 633; as continued questioning, 616

Unifying function, see Unity

Unity, of anxiety about — for, 73; of apperception, see Apperception; of correlation, 606; of existential components (equally original), 69; of grounding-process, 170; of Heidegger I-II, 628; of knowing process (Kant), 115; of modes of Being in Aristotle, x-xi; of natural-real knowing (Hegel), 344; of ontological knowledge, 121, (in transcendental imagination) 123; presupposed by apperception (Kant), 126; of senses of "is," 4; of space and time (Kant), 117; of temporality, 88; of time and of pure synthesis (Kant), 145-146; of transcendental imagination as root of anterior glimpse (Kant), 138; of two concepts of φῶς (Aristotle), 313

Un-said, and de-cision, 610; and foundational thought, 22; of Heidegger I, 625, 627, (retrieved) 625; of Heidegger II, 638, 640; of Heraclitus, 500; as hidden wealth, 609; of Kant and re-trieve, 153-159; in KM, 146; and negativity of Being, 489; of Nietzsche, 437-438; not nothing, 638; of Plato, 440; see also Re-collection, Re-trieve, Un-thought

Un-thought, ontological difference as, 13; and re-trieve, 290, (see also Re-trieve); and step-in-reverse, 612; see also Re-collection, Un-said

Un-truth, authentic, 236, 241; as concealment, 220-223, (see also Mystery); as errance, 220, 223-227, (see also Errance); essence of, 211, 227; in existential analysis, 96; included in truth, 202, 211-212, (see also Un-thought, Re-collection, Re-trieve).
also Truth); in KM, 232; modes of, 228; in Nietzsche, 369 n; as non-conformity, 213; problem of, 218-220; resides in Being, 244; and transcendental founding, 172
Unveil, -ing, -edness, see Revelation, Truth
Ur-Heidegger, 628-633; meaning of, 633; center of, 640
Utter, -ance, meaning of, 496 n; aboriginal, 496; authentic, 316, 410, 460, 496-497; (see also Authenticity); of Being-as-ground, 460; Being opened up in, 292; Beon, as, 554; guards mystery, 462; and manifestation, 600 n; origin of, 458; in poetic response, 463; replaces the word "language," 633; and speechlessness, 482; see also Language, συνή
Valuation, de-, 363; e-, 368, 380; re-, 363, (and Will-unto-Power) 367-370
Value, as aspect, 367-368; and Being of beings (Nietzsche), 373; as condition of Life-force, 368-369; and culture, 327-328; emptiness of, 365; origin of (and subject-ism), 327-328; principle in Life-force, 364; problem of, 27; as pro-posed, 370; and supra-sensible world, 462
Vengeance, spirit of, 376-381; meaning of, 377; and authenticity, 380; foreign to will as will, 378; resistance to will, 379
Venture, see Being (for Rilke)
Venturesomeness, of thought, 550
Verification, see Certification
View, -ing, of intuition not objective, 117; and lighting-up of Being, 525; and non-concealment, 307; and pure intuition, 116; in sens-ating, 132; as sketch for a rule, 132; of thing, 368; as thought, 613-615; and visage, 264, 568
Violence, to Being, 283; and de-cision, 286, (see also De-cision); of foundational thought, 438; intrinsic to phenomenology, 185-186; and language, 295; to original, 290; to Over-powering, 268, 270, 274, 276-277, 290; in re-trive, 93, 136-139; (see also Re-trive); and spirit of vengeance, 377-379; and taking measure, 391; see also Rigor, Un-said
Voice, of Being, see Tune, Attunement of conscience, see Conscience
and Life-force, 364-367; -ness (and authenticity), 51. (see also Acqui-
escence, Docility, Surrender); for Nietzsche, 339; non-willing, 508;
-une-Power (as essence), 354-374; (and apposition in Leibniz) 329, (and
re-valuation) 367-369, (and truth) 370-374, (as value-posing) 369-370,
(wills more Power) 366-367, 372, (as w. unto willing) 365-367; not
psychological, 365, 39m; for Schel-
ing, 330; and whereunto, 180; of
wind, 466

With-being, and coexistence with
others, 48; and common fortune,
92; and in-being, 59; and listening
to others, 68; and relationship be-
tween poet-people, 626

Withdrawal, of Being, 278, (and
Aristotle’s conception of φύση)
315, (due to essence of) 435, (as
questionable) 615, (as questionable) 446; and Being-into-death, 574;
and Being, 555-556; draws-with,
511, 598 n; as e-vent, 608; and
farness, 452; as Greek sense of
forgottenness, xii-xiii; grounds for
getfulness, 450; and inter-mittence,
533-534, (see also Inter-mittence); of Λόγος (Heraclitus), 500; and
mystery, 436, 448; and negativity of
mittle, 21, 533-534, (see also
Negativity); of possibilities (and
facticity), 167, (and finitude of
transcendence) 166; pre-SZ, 632;
and self-emitting, 487; of There-
being before beings, 216; into words,
609

With-stand, -ing, and authenticity,
540; and concern, 539-540; of
dimension, 589-590

Wonder, -ment, as basis of “why?” 201;
before Being, 257; before ensemble
of beings, 255; as fact of thought,
555; of wonders (that beings are),
197, 477, 488

Word(s), answer to call, 482; Being
(brought into) 292, 544, (dwells in)
528, (passes into) 432; and Being of
beings, 497; of Being uttered in
thought, 250; as de-cisive weapon,
431; radiated in transcendence,
100; There-being’s coming-to-
presence comes into, 248; thought
achieves coming-into- 249; as
translation of Λόγος, 281; see also
Language, Utterance, Λόγος

Work, -ing, meaning of, 584-587;
and bringing-forth (τεύχον), 585, (see
also τεύχον); and contention between
Over-powering and There, 270;
-hood (as actuality), 318, (as év-
γερμα) 317

World, sense of, 58, (of word in SZ)
52; about (contains beings other
than There-being), 53. (familiarity
with) 52, (view of) 54-55; analysis
of, 52-58; in art-work, 406-407;
and Being, 56, 167n, (and the
Simple) 559; not beings-in-the-
ensemble, 577n; disclosed, 411, (by
ontological disposition) 64-65; and
earth (as known in art-work), 415,
(as positivity-negativity of truth)
406, (struggle of) 412; as existential
component, 56, 58; ground of (and
Being), 6; grounded in earth, 407;
for Heidegger I (as project of There-
being), 204; for Heidegger II, 572;
and lighting-up of Being, 537; and
Non-being, 72, 147; ontological
priority of, 54; as Open, 231;
-openness revealed by ontological
disposition, 65; -as-picture, 326,
(also values) 328, (and Welt-
anschauung) 327; and Quadrat,
572, 625; of shadow, fire, sun, see
Cave, metaphor of; and temporality,
88; and There, 50, 58-59; as Total
Meaningfulness, 57, 67, 249, (and
Gestell) 625-626, (as Open) 231; see
also Articulative-ness, Matrix of
relationships; and truth, 95, (see
also Truth); as Wherein, 53, 55; as
with-World, 59; as World, 53, (and
subjectivism) 90; and “World,” 58,
81, 222, 252; yields things, 578

Yes, to appeal, 478; to eternal return,
380; to finitude of transcendence,
189; and Nein-Ja theme, 163n; to
Over-powering, 286

Yield, -ing, of Being to There, 279;
as characteristic of thought, see
Acquiescence, Docility, Surrender;
of shining summer day, 1; of things
by World, 578

Zarathustra, as correlation between
Being and man, 380, 595; and
spirit of vengeance, 370; and
super-man, 375; teaches eternal
return, 380
2. Michael Strawser, *Both/And: Reading Kierkegaard—From Irony to Edification*.
3. Michael Barber, *Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation*.
5. James Swindal, *Reflection Revisited: Jürgen Habermas's Discursive Theory of Truth*.
15. Dominique Janicaud, Jean-François Courtine, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, and Paul Ricœur, *Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate*.
This book, one of the most frequently cited works on Martin Heidegger in any language, belongs on any short list of classic studies of Continental philosophy. William J. Richardson explores the famous turn (Kehre) in Heidegger's thought after Being in Time and demonstrates how this transformation was radical without amounting to a simple contradiction of his earlier views.

In a full account of the evolution of Heidegger's work as a whole, Richardson provides a detailed, systematic, and illuminating account of both divergences and fundamental continuities in Heidegger's philosophy, especially in light of recently published works. He demonstrates that the "thinking" of Being for the later Heidegger has exactly the same configuration as the radical phenomenology of the early Heidegger, once he has passed through the "turning" of his way.

Including as a preface the letter that Heidegger wrote to Richardson and a new writer's preface and epilogue, the new edition of this valuable guide will be an essential resource for students and scholars for many years to come.

William J. Richardson is Professor of Philosophy at Boston College and co-author (with John P. Muller) of Lacan and Language: A Reader's Guide to the Fiction and The Purloined Poe; Lacan, Derrida and Psychoanalytic Reading. Richardson has written widely on philosophy and psychoanalysis, and maintains a private practice of psychoanalysis in Newton, Massachusetts.