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On Nietzsche’s Judgment of Style
and Hume’s Quixotic Taste

On the Science of Aesthetics and “Playing” the Satyr

BABETTE BABICH

ABSTRACT: I read Nietzsche’s discussion of scholarly judgments of style beginning with his own inaugural lecture at Basel together with David Hume’s stylistic reflections in his “On the Standard of Taste.” This casts light both on the context and the substance of Nietzsche’s own scholarly concern with the question of style and taste in terms of what Nietzsche called the “science of aesthetics” and consequently of scholarly judgment in both classics (or classical philology, here including archaeology and historiography) and philosophy. I also include a brief discussion of Nietzsche’s phenomenological performance practice of dance or playing the “satyr.”

Toward Classical Philology as the “Science of Aesthetics”:
On Style

“Homer and Classical Philology,” Nietzsche’s 1869 inaugural lecture at the University of Basel, addresses not only the history of the Homer question as a problem but also raises the question of the discipline of classical philology as science (which notion of science also includes the question of philology as philosophy). Thematically, Nietzsche’s first lecture as a professor of classical philology focuses on the significance of style as such. In this meta-scholarly context, the issue of scholarly discernment is explored in terms of aesthetic judgment, as a judgment of taste, a focus Nietzsche subsequently resumes in the second of his Untimely Meditations, “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life.”1 To be sure, an explicit focus on style runs throughout Nietzsche’s later work—as the work of many scholars attests, beginning indeed even before Derrida’s Éperons/Spurs and continuing well after Nehamas’s Life as Literature. It is important to add that this same interest in the question of style is rendered more complicated by Nietzsche’s achievements as an exemplary stylist of the German language: one who literally “does things” with words.2

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Such a complex constellation in both the substance and texture of Nietzsche’s work illumines the metonymic force of his theoretical emphasis in his lecture on the “so-called Homer question” with regard to the question of style as such and the theme of what he calls “personality,” as we recall Nietzsche’s observation in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks that it is only “personality” that survives the refutation of this or that philosophical or systematic claim (KSA 1, p. 801; cf. KSA 1, p. 803). Thus engaged by the associative dynamic that is the engine of equivocation, we are hard put to separate Nietzsche’s talk of the personality of Homer from the Homer question concerning the existence/nonexistence of the historical poet. The same metonymy has also had the effect of distracting readers from attending to either the issue of personality as such or the broader Homer question. Captivated by Nietzsche’s writerly “style” and thus distracted as a reader, one can find oneself “disattending” to what Nietzsche himself tells us about what is conventionally supposed to be a Homeric style. And sure enough, even when we attend to Nietzsche’s style, scholars often neglect Nietzsche’s own aesthetic reflections on style and, and this is no coincidence, because this same neglect also happens to characterizes the majority of contemporary readings of Nietzsche’s thinking on science, both in the philosophy of science proper and in the context of classical philology.

By coordinating the “science” of aesthetics as Nietzsche does here in his inaugural lecture as well as in his first book on tragedy (where the term makes an appearance in his very first sentence), Nietzsche foregrounds the pleonastic nature of aesthetics as such, characterized in his inaugural lecture in terms of classical philology’s “centauric” nature. Modern conceptions of scientific and scholarly disciplines attribute a more uniform, monological character to science as well as to aesthetics, both of which are regarded as distinct disciplines. Scholars are wary of mixing or crossing disciplines, and we often imagine ourselves to be making radically innovative gestures when we suggest, always from the internal perspective of our respective professions, the supposedly scholarly value of an interdisciplinary approach. At the same time, there has never been more insularity in the academy than in the present day—an insularity not characteristic of Nietzsche’s nineteenth century, whatever its other limitations. A Whiggish approach to the disciplines may be to blame for this increasing narrowness even as scholars claim to value breadth. Just as “science” per se is thought to be one and the same thing everywhere in our own era as in Nietzsche’s day (and over millennia and as conceived across disparate cultural traditions), so aesthetic questions of “art” are similarly thought to be unchanging (in substance) from one era to another.

Speaking of style in the context of both art and scientific scholarship, Nietzsche takes up the notion of style as a literal, scientific distinction to be explored in a formal fashion and in an expressly historical context. Thus Nietzsche adumbrates a discussion of cultural taste in the hermeneutic context of scholarly judgment. It is by means of style that the scholar is first able to identify or “distinguish”
works of art or literary texts as such, to attribute works of sculpture or pottery
to this or that era and this or that artist, to classify jewelry, temple offerings,
cylindrical seals, and so on. Similarly, it is on the basis of style that scholars
can characterize literary works as poetic, religious, philosophical, historical
and so forth. It should go without saying, though it may not, that many of these
traditional distinctions have come to be questioned if not as a result of a revolu-
tion in scholarly sensibilities of the sort Nietzsche argued for in his lecture, then
owing to empirical contradictions and the inevitably monumental witness, as
Nietzsche would say, of new archaeological work.  

Characterizing the exemplary application of matters of style as a critique of
scholarly judgment, Nietzsche is able to conceive the quintessentially classical
Homer question in a tradition going back not only to Goethe and Schiller but
to the famed first philologist Friedrich August Wolf and, before Wolf, to the
philological tradition of the Greeks themselves in the Alexandrian twilight of
their own era. As Nietzsche explains: “The zenith of the historical-literary stud-
ies of the Greeks, and hence also of their point of greatest importance—i.e., the
‘Homer question’—was reached in the age of the Alexandrian grammarians.”  
This grammarian regime began with a return to the ancient institution of a contest
between Homer and Hesiod and thence and also a return to the origination of the
texts themselves and therewith the institution of philology as such, which may, as
Nietzsche reminds us, be dated to the reign of Pisistratus, as it was then that
the oral compositions associated with Homer were first “gathered together” in
“bookish form.” Nietzsche thus frames the standard Homer question as “the
question concerning Homer as a personality.” Accordingly, he goes on to raise
the question concerning the personal (or real) existence of Homer qua individual
writer versus the alternate account of a collective tradition of folk poetry and its
oral transmission by questioning this same opposition.

If by Homer one seeks the first singer of heroic epic song, that first singer,
so Nietzsche argues, cannot be Homer. Not if one means by Homer the poet
who was the greatest or consummate artist of his kind. If Homer is an artistic
genius—and here Nietzsche invokes the Kantian and indeed eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century convention of genial individuality—then Homer “could
hardly be the first of his kind.” In this sense, and however it is decided, the
so-named Homer question is never actually posed as a real question or as such;
that is—and it is this that Nietzsche takes as his theme overall—one does not
begin to raise the question concerning the scientific or classically philological
tradition of posing such a question. It is in this context that Nietzsche reminds
us in an earlier formulation of his lecture that “there is in modern aesthetics no
more dangerous opposition than that between folk poetry and artistic poetry,”
that is, no more dangerous contrast than that between the conception of the
collective tradition of folk poetry and individual poetic genius.  

The question for Nietzsche is not the question of the historical existence of either folk poetry
or individual poets (he notes that ancient conventions name individual poets at the head of folk traditions) but much rather the very Kantian and Schillerian traditional question of aesthetic scholarly judgment whereby “the poetic genius may not create folk poetry”—at least not deliberately or consciously so—because the idea or stylistic notion of folk poetry is itself a traditional aesthetic judgment.\footnote{13}

In this way Nietzsche argues that under Pisistratus, “Homer” becomes the name for a man of wondrous and, as Nietzsche writes in his earlier draft, “mythic” poetic powers, that is, an “immaculate and unerring artist,” but at the same time, Homer is also “humanized” (“vermenschlicht”) as such.\footnote{14} Thus Nietzsche argues that what is at stake in the issue of the Homer question is not as much a matter of historical transmission as of aesthetic, that is to say, stylistic judgment.\footnote{15} The problem is thus that the Homer question tends not to be posed as a “question” at all in Nietzsche’s sense (and one might here argue that Heidegger learned much of what he knew about authentic questioning from Nietzsche). The critical point of questioning is the heart of Nietzsche’s epistemological rigor in his own discipline and beyond—a rigor most scholarship whether in classical philology or philosophy tends to find difficult to see, so absorbed is it in reducing the unknown to the known, as the later Nietzsche reflects: “First principle: any explanation is better than none” (\textit{TI “Errors” 5}).

Regarded hermeneutically, then, Nietzsche’s first lecture resuscitates the Homer question as a question that he directs in good antique fashion, and speaking as a philologist, contra the philologists themselves, and this is the primary reason that the classicist William Arrowsmith was so concerned to have his discipline engage Nietzsche.\footnote{16} So earnest was Arrowsmith (and he was otherwise very unearnest) that he included Nietzsche’s notes for “We Philologists” in the very first issue of the new series of \textit{Arion}, an engagement the classicists themselves have yet to take up and toward which they certainly feel no urgency.\footnote{17}

Regarded phenomenologically, Nietzsche offers a \textit{Vergegenwärtigung} of the Homer question, including in the process a technical examination of the subjective foundations of the objective question that is the very Kantian matter of the aesthetic power of judgment: “Homer as the poet of the Iliad and the Odyssey is not a historical transmission but an \textit{aesthetic judgment}.”\footnote{18} In this way, Nietzsche raises the question of “style” as the distinctively critical or reflexive question of scholarly judgment or “taste” as an objective and scientific question.\footnote{19}

In this sense, Nietzsche undertakes nothing less than a critique of philological judgment in his first lecture. For Nietzsche, the conceptual dynamic of the Homer question, inasmuch as it fails to reflect on its own project, pursues a circular path, asking if in fact and in the end “Homer’s personality, because it could not be grasped, had gradually become attenuated to an empty name? Or had one then and in naïve folk fashion incorporated the entirety of heroic poetry, visualized under the figure of Homer?”\footnote{20}
As a formula, Nietzsche’s articulation of the Homer question functions both on the basis of and contra antiquity itself and on the basis of and contra its scholarly reception or critical interpretation. Thus Nietzsche is able to direct the question of “personality” to historical antiquity—“Is a concept thereby created from a person, or a person from a concept?”—while at the same time also directing the same question to the academic profession of classical philology itself.

Functionally detailing a critique of scholarly (or as Nietzsche himself says scientific) philological judgment, Nietzsche’s critically reflexive insight into purely philological classifications of style thereby raises the question of the subjective role of taste on the part of classicists themselves. If Nietzsche takes a very specific position on the Homer question, highlighting and emphasizing as he does the oral tradition (which, by contrast, many classicists today—surprisingly enough—fail to do because they take it for granted or as somehow settled), the same subjective/objective distinction includes a double allusion to the matter of judgment and taste with regard to the Homer question in classical philology in the past and in Nietzsche’s day as indeed in the present day.

The point Nietzsche seeks to make here with regard to taste is complicated and to illustrate it I have recourse to a cognate distinction as David Hume makes it (and Hume is the reason that Kant attends to the distinction between German aesthetics and French and English taste) in “On the Standard of Taste.” In this last of four brief essays or “dissertations,” written, so Hume scholars tell us, not systematically as much as for reasons of filler, Hume points the culmination of his argument on standards, objectively speaking, for what may be assessed or valued as good or bad, by putting the question ironically, highlighting Cervantes’ two-fold allusion to the same question of discriminating taste in his Don Quixote.

Note that I am not arguing that Nietzsche directly cites Hume in his inaugural lecture—although he does cite him in other contexts, especially with respect to the same causality that was so important for both Kant and Schopenhauer, arguing that Hume’s critique of causality was more “consequent” (and as I argue elsewhere with regard to Nietzsche’s philosophy of science, thoroughgoing or sustained consequentiality was the most important epistemological terminus for Nietzsche) than Kant’s famous resolution of Hume’s challenge to the slumber of dogma or belief. In addition to causality, everyone knows the phrase Nietzsche borrows from Schopenhauer, who cites Hume in English, for his Untimely Meditations, reminding one not to live one’s life on the retirement plan—“And from the dregs of life, hope to receive what the first sprightly running could not give” (HL 1). In a draft of one of his reflections (a quasi science fiction stylization inspired by Lucian’s Ἀληθῆ διηγήματα [“A True Story”]), Nietzsche cites Hume in German, still more significantly on my reading, in the course of describing how a traveler landing on our planet would be underwhelmed not by our species’ capacity for suffering, given our hospitals, our battlefields and prisons, and the ordinary corruptions and messes of life, all of which are the
most evident aspects of our human kind, but by the nature of our institutions for cultural enjoyment. How, Hume asks, would one show “the cheerful side of life” to this alien and “give him a notion of its pleasures”? Should one take him “to a ball, to an opera, to court?” This alien “might reasonably think” that Hume was “only showing him other kinds of distress and sorrow.”

Nor is it my contention that Nietzsche means to allude to Cervantes’ *Don Quixote* in this context, although, once again, Nietzsche elsewhere does invoke Cervantes as a poet by specifically contrasting him with the pretensions of the poseur (in *HL* 5) as well as by opposing him to the artist as such, regarded either positively or negatively. Cervantes accordingly both instantiates for Nietzsche the artist’s capacity for “taking play seriously,” (*KSA* 8:4[4], p. 40) as we read in an unpublished note on the “[d]ifficulties” that beset the “[g]enesis of the [a]rtist,” and stands as a very conventional figure of the enlightenment itself and its “battle” not with “stupidity but with imagination: vanquishing the imaginary things of the mind” (*KSA* 9:5[16], p. 184). Thus Nietzsche argues that the novel’s picaresque or crudely unkind lampooning of the dispossessed in the wake of the inquisition—which same “inquisition,” as Nietzsche drily observes, “Cervantes might well have fought against” (*KSA* 8:23[140], p. 454)—reflects not the literal facts of the historical era depicted but rather the artist’s work as such, deployed here against both an entire genre (in Cervantes’ case, Nietzsche tells us, this would be the Ritterromane: knightly tales or chivalric romances) and, as Nietzsche implies to Cervantes’ credit, “contra the whole of Spain” (*KSA* 8:23[140], p. 454). It is in this critically artistic context that Nietzsche is able to characterize Cervantes as a “national disaster” (*KSA* 8:23[140], p. 454).

Nietzsche is thus less interested in what one might or what one might not think of the figure of Cervantes’ Don Quixote and his relationship with his ideals or with his Dulcinéa or the other people he meets or his loyal squire, Sancho Panza, than he is in following the thematic he expresses in his aphorism “What is Romanticism?” (*GS* 370). The achievement of the artist’s success is not to be taken or assessed historically or scientifically, that is, in terms of his account of the nature of the “things themselves,” as they were (or were not), but only in terms of art.

For Hume’s part, Cervantes is invoked in “On the Standard of Taste” not as an illustration of artistic writerly prowess but as an exemplification of the kind of referentiality that *proves* over time in the case of literature to be a standard for the rightness of evaluative judgment between authors such as (to use Hume’s own examples) Homer as opposed to Fenelon, John Ogilby as opposed to John Milton, or John Bunyan as opposed to Joseph Addison. The question concerning an author’s relative “quality” and the desired *objective* standard for determining the same qualities turns for Hume on the capacity to distinguish a writer of outstanding or durable—that is, “classic”—importance from a candidate doomed to have no more than a temporary or passing influence, and it
is the “objective” or universal rather than subjective or individual judgment or
capacity for discernment that preoccupies Hume in “On the Standard of Taste.”

The text from Cervantes as Hume cites it is as follows:

It is with good reason, says SANCHO to the squire with the great nose, that I pretend to have a judgment in wine: This is a quality hereditary in our family. Two of my kinsmen were once called to give their opinion of a hogshead, which was supposed to be excellent, being old and of a good vintage. One of them tastes it; considers it; and after mature reflection pronounces the wine to be good, were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other, after using the same precautions gives also his verdict in favor of the wine; but with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. You cannot imagine how much they were both ridiculed for their judgment. But who laughed in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom, an old key with a leathern thong tied to it.28

Sancho Panza’s claim is to a certain pedigree in judgment; Cervantes thus lampoons both blood-based and arriviste pretensions to the same. Hume’s point is that what serves as proof when it comes to subjective claims (qua claims of taste) is not a matter of constitution, whether afforded by hereditary means or by the imperative force of wealth, but empirical, testable, factual corroboration. The wine has a leathern or iron taste if and only if, at the end of the day or as in this case, at the bottom of the cask, there is leather or iron in the wine.

Questions of objectivity in judgments of taste when it comes to wine are conventionally so patent as to be numerical (in Parker points or monetary value). Hence the judgment of wine, whether good or bad, also serves as a social indicator of class, nobility, or wealth—and this is indeed the aristocratic subtext to be had in Cervantes’ text. Here it is relevant to note Hume’s own education in wine less in his original Scotland than in the region of the Loire, where he spent the years 1734–37 writing what would be his doomed Treatise on Human Nature. The ability to judge or discern good wine or indeed, by analogy, good authors (and we perhaps need to bracket the possible affective subtext for Hume himself, who was, as we know, less than sanguine about the fate of his first book, again rather like Nietzsche) remains the presumption even today in the wine-pouring ritual at table (although this is arguably made more or less bootless with California-style wine protocols, that is, modern chemical additives and industrial standardization, duly signified by the ubiquity of twist-off caps).

Thus the humorous illustration of Sancho Panza’s kinsmen’s good taste or evaluative judgment, objectively speaking, highlights Hume’s exposition of the very problematic sociocultural stakes of a needed “standard” of taste for the sake of distinguishing judgment or sentiment in Hume’s objective search for “a rule by which the various sentiments of man may be reconciled; at least a decision afforded, confirming one sentiment and condemning another.”29

As Nietzsche notes with regard to aesthetic taste in classical philology, a particular and peculiarly, if specifically subjective, presumption colors and cannot
but color the assumption “that the problem of the contemporary circumstances of Homer’s same epic is to be solved using the standpoint of an aesthetic judgment.” As Nietzsche poses it, this cuts to the heart of a scientific field based on subjective judgments of taste, judgments embracing the same objective considerations Hume sought. For Nietzsche, every historical foray into the question of Homer, every resolution one way or the other, inevitably comes to the same end, leaving today’s scholar with nothing more than “a series of especially beautiful and prominent loci, chosen according to subjective taste [subjektiver Geschmacksrichtung].”

The philological scholar who makes a judgment on the Homer question as a whole or who comes to some insight on one question or another or who merely resolves the status of a word or a phrase is making a selection or a judgment on the basis of or expressing his ineliminably individual or all-too-subjective taste. It is this same personal, if certainly scholarly, “taste” that plays the decisive role, once again, now in context: “What was left of Homer’s own individual work? […] The epitome of aesthetic singularity which each scholar was capable of discerning with his own artistic gifts, he now named Homer.” We can see Nietzsche’s point here by considering scholarly judgment as the ability attributed to the classical scholar enabling him (or today we may also say: permitting her) to identify a fragment in terms of its style. Such judgment is the test of scholarly expertise not only in classics but in archaeology, anthropology, especially physical or biological anthropology, comparative anatomy, paleontology and evolution, and art history.

Nietzsche, then, posits a literally scientific role for style when it comes to scholarly taste or judgment, just as Hume articulated the question of taste as a matter not solely of subjective estimation but objective confirmation. If wine flavors (and olfactory notes) are today commonly described with language referring to hints and tastes of elements—tobacco, vanilla, oak, flint—distant from wine, this same objectively specific distance or tension is brought out by Sancho’s kinsmen, whose “reserve of a taste of iron” turned out at the moment of what modern media culture likes to call “the reveal” (that is, “upon emptying the hogshead”) to have had a perfectly objective literality. At the same time, and also like Nietzsche’s own references in his own lecture, Hume’s citation of Cervantes functions ironically.

Nietzsche’s question concerning style in his inaugural lecture and Hume’s question concerning the standardization of taste (good/bad) can now be rephrased for the purpose of the science of aesthetics in classical philology, both in art and indeed in science. Thus we ask: how are styles canonized? how are styles recognized to begin with? Ultimately, Nietzsche argues, style functions on the basis of so many pregiven canonic registers of taste, both collective and individual. The result in the case of the question of Homer, the individual poet, that is, in terms of the “personality” of the same, yields the very specifiable, very
identifiable identity of the author, in this case Homer in terms of the classical
texts traditionally identified as having been authored by him.

Once again here, philology, thus regarded as a science of institutionalized
taste and tasting, is the expert school in possession of the authorized ability
to identify styles. Like archaeology, philology locates ancient texts in their
chronological context. And it is by similarly differentiating between ancient
artifacts, and above all by certifying such differentiations, that archaeological
and textual discoveries are made. But by invoking the philologist’s ability to
discriminate between styles, Nietzsche’s critical point (and it is this same criti-
cal point that leads Nietzsche to remark in a letter of October 7, 1869, to Rohde
on his inevitable “trepidation” and even “shame” in this regard [KSB 3, p. 63])
is that this capacity is founded on nothing more exactly (or less methodically)
“scientific” than aesthetic judgment as such, taken with all its strengths and all
its weaknesses. The strengths in question are the most important for Nietzsche
himself, who was able to make no lesser discovery than the work of his first
book on the basis of aesthetic judgment, that is, attending to the music or sound
of a phonetic culture of writing in order to resolve not only the problem of the
“narrowest conjunction” to be heard between “lyric and music,” as he titles a
section of his lecture notes on Greek lyric poetry, but also to resolve the problem
of the birth of the tragic work of art out of the same spirit of music.

Nietzsche never abandons this stylistic insight into the fundamentally aes-
thetic basis of classical philology and accordingly of science as a whole. Hence
Nietzsche begins The Birth of Tragedy by invoking the “science” of aesthetics as
such and in his Thus Spoke Zarathustra he recalls both his inaugural lecture and
the beginning emphasis of his first book, where he cautions his readers (thereby
echoing Kant’s critical philosophy of the power of judgment): “Yet all of life is
a struggle of taste and tasting [aber alles Leben ist Streit um Geschmack und
Schmecken]” (Z.II “On Those Who Are Sublime”).

Here, as I conclude this first section, it is not irrelevant to note that the same
classical determinations of philology as a discipline that Nietzsche mentions
in claiming that the outlines of the ancient Alexandrian grammarians continue
to frame or set the standards for the modern science of philology also play a
role in the linguistic designations as well as the methodology of the sciences.
But at this same point a historical contextualization of Nietzsche’s own for-
mation is in order. For it is no accident that the theoretical or “scientific”
study of art flourished at the same time and that Nietzsche began his work
in Bonn with his teacher Otto Jahn, who in his study of the monuments of
history, great and small, that is, archaeology, was also engaged with this same
new discipline or “science” of art history (this more properly monumental
or archaeological engagement was, in addition to a critical interest in music,
what distinguished Jahn from Ritschl). Furthermore, and also by way of
Jahn, Nietzsche was acquainted with Gottfried Semper’s work on practical
aesthetics, Der Stil in den technischen und tektonischen Künsten. One may
likewise note that the theoretical or “scientific” study of art deploys the same stylistic terminology of philology. Thus Semper’s work covered the range of disciplines identified as essential to philology for Nietzsche (as he himself lists them in his notes, beginning with the archaeological and historical and including the scientific and the mathematical). These same broad influences are also evident in Nietzsche’s 1869 “Greek Music-Drama,” particularly patent given Nietzsche’s cutting-edge opening reference to the then and still today paradigm-shifting implications of the “fact” of the polychrome character of ancient Greek sculpture by contrast with our conventionally monochromatic, thanks to Winckelmann, or classically white vision of the same statues (KSA 1, p. 531; cf. KSA 7, p. 15).

The question of the source of Nietzsche’s thinking on style, a question that in turn goes significantly to the heart of source scholarship (or the difficulty of tracing influences), can be answered only indirectly, using such evidence as can be found in Nietzsche’s inaugural lecture and elsewhere. It is plain that Nietzsche’s acquaintance with writings on the theme of style, taste, and judgment that he made through the work of Semper, Hume and Kant, respectively would only be deepened as a result of a resonance with his friendship with Wagner.

In other words, it is just what Nietzsche names “aesthetic science” (BT 1) that makes the identification of kinds (of texts and authors, artists, artifacts, and even cities) possible as a rigorous scientific modality. The judgment of “style” is also the key to Nietzsche’s fundamental critique of empirical and historico-archaeological no less than the text-based or hermeneutic dimensions of philological research, recalling once again, the disciplinary conflict classically attributed to Ritschl and Jahn—to which disciplinary “battle of philologist against philologist” Nietzsche also refers.

Nietzsche’s Philological Experiment à la Jahn or Joyful Science qua Satyr Play

Nietzsche, contra mainstream analytic-style philosophy’s rather bootless ambition to install itself as handmaiden to (natural) science (bootless because scientists turn out not to need the favors of philosophers inasmuch as science takes itself to be sufficient unto itself, and that sufficiency includes explaining itself to its public), undertakes to question the very notion of science both philologically and philosophically. Nietzsche further proposes to illuminate that same question of science by means of the resources of art, understood as a self-conscious, innocent illusion—a move that makes it possible for Nietzsche to speak of science as “a ruse” (“eine Schlaueheit”).

As ruse, as a “device” or techne, art serves to illuminate science and is thus what Nietzsche named science’s “needful correlate and supplement.” Indeed, the artistic or the technical foundation of art as such is methodologically indispensable
for Nietzsche inasmuch as he argues that “the problem of science cannot be conceived on the ground of science” (BT “Self Critique” 2; KSA 1, p. 13). Thus Nietzsche coordinates both science and art, differentiated only in terms of reflective awareness or honesty. As distinguished from science (and from religion, as we have seen) art is illusion with what one might call a good conscience. What is more, and this is the joy both Nietzsche and Hölderlin celebrate in poetic and artistic invention, art lacks the fundamental hostility to life that turns out to be characteristic of both religion and science, just because art is the very foundation of life: “All life depends upon appearance, art, deception, optics, the necessity of the perspectival and error” (“Alles Leben ruht auf Schein, Kunst, Täuschung, Optik, Nothwendigkeit des Perspektivistischen und des Irrthums”) (BT “Self Critique” 5; KSA 1, p. 18) Against the ideal of scientific truth, life inevitably depends on illusions, even illusions that do not know themselves as such, “i.e., for untruths held to be truths” (“d.h., für Wahrheiten gehaltene Unwahrheiten”) (KSA 7:19[43], p. 433). Nietzsche describes the beautiful as illusion but in terms he names the life-essential or life-sustaining illusions of art.

There are a host of difficult themes that follow from this, but for an illustration to conclude, I recollect a well-known apocryphal account that can here be read as reflecting the scientific or empirical heart of what might be called Nietzsche’s aesthetic or that we might also call his phenomenological investigation of philology. This orientation is also evident in Nietzsche’s focus on the body, as this attention is manifest from his earliest philological studies and is apparent in his attention to gesture and demeanor (there is here the possibility of an extraordinary philosophy of dance, as this also runs through his work from start to finish) as well as to feeling and even, at least at the start, symbolic form.

Speaking thus of Nietzsche’s phenomenological investigations, we are speaking of the “aesthetic science” that concerned him from the start. These phenomenological investigations run from the musical character of the Greek language, as Nietzsche began his readerly reflections on Greek music drama and dance (replete with little illustrations—arsis/thesis—as I have had occasion to cite them elsewhere), to a still more phenomenological and indeed performance-oriented focus as he explored a related question at the end of his life. 45

The question was one that Nietzsche’s early enemy Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff had made central to his critique of Nietzsche’s first book. This was a question concerning the role of sensuality, that is, the very explicit role of sex in Greek life and art. For it was Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s claim in his devastating review of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy that Nietzsche had failed to incorporate the folk- and orgiastic element of the archaic tragic tradition, which he hints at right from the beginning with the indelicately obvious epigraph affixed to his review from what might be characterized as Aristophanes’ reflections on senility in the mocking context of a pursuit of a fountain of youth in his “Γῆρας” (“Old Age”): “Condiments, vinegar, piquant seasonings, scallions, beets, highly
refined sauces, leaves stuffed with brains, oregano—all delicacies for a catamite compared to a good hunk of meat.”

My editorial notes to the translation of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s text (a translation done by Gertrude Postl in collaboration with myself and Holger Schmid) show that I then took some pains to discuss this almost quintessential Aristophanic epigraph, not only noting the stimulant effects of foodstuffs (that would be ancient Viagra, as it were), but and in particular calling attention to the complexity of translating the word καταπυγοσύνη (“katapugosune”), which is not rendered but only lightly glossed as “catamite.” Note that other candidates for a translation are the not in fact more pellucid renderings on hand in Liddell and Scott, “brutal lust,” or, alternately that offered by the Aristophanes scholar Jeffrey Henderson, “pathic debauchery” or “depravity.”

James Davidson, for his part, simply writes “katapugosune” and leaves it at that in his excellent *Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens.* Davidson, who does not, to be sure, refer to the Wilamowitz-Möllendorff translation, does go on to offer us a bit more English, referring to “lechery” in his *The Greeks and Greek Love: A Bold New Exploration of the Ancient World.*

Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, who would himself become (among many other things) an expert on satyrs, proceeds in his review to elaborate near the review’s conclusion on the point initially suggested with his epigraph, explicitly mocking Nietzsche’s account of the Greeks and their relation to nature and to sexuality.

For Nietzsche, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff writes, “the phallus is no phallus: ‘the unconcealed and vigorously magnificent characters of nature,’ neither do the Greeks, the eternal children, laugh at grotesque obscenities. No: ‘the Greeks used to contemplate with reverent wonder (the sexual omnipotence of nature).’”

Critiques of this kind cannot but stay with one, and Nietzsche would answer this critique in his *Twilight of the Idols,* with a very specific reference to the same orgy he discusses in *The Birth of Tragedy.* In his end-of-life reflection on the orgy as such, deployed by way of a kind of protophenomenological investigation, Nietzsche argues for “the psychology of the orgasm as an overflowing feeling of life and power interior to which even pain itself yet serves as a stimulus” (*TI* “Ancients” 5). Such an expressly physiological reflection offered, according to the later Nietzsche, “the key to the concept of tragic feeling” (*TI* “Ancients” 5), a feeling Nietzsche contends had been “derived as much from Aristotle” as from Schopenhauer—repeating a clarification he had earlier sought to bring to the fore in the revised subtitle (or, more accurately, his alternative title) for the republication of his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy; or, Hellenism and Pessimism.*

That Nietzsche needed more than a new title/subtitle (and more than a new preface) to do this is obvious (and Nietzsche was well aware of this, as witnessed by the concluding reflections in his last published book). I have elsewhere argued that Nietzsche’s return to this thematic underscores his own recognition
that Wilamowitz-Möllendorff would not have been in error in charging that Nietzsche had excluded, or, more accurately, that Nietzsche had originally downplayed, the erotic dimension in his account of antiquity. Yet it is important to note that Nietzsche’s emphasis on the Dionysian certainly did oppose, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s critique notwithstanding, the more staid or “pure” conventions of the nineteenth century.

The question of the satyr is curious for a host of reasons, and some scholars have argued that ancient Greek amusement at the satyr had not only to do with the satyr’s relatively animalistic proportions (i.e., sporting an oversized phallus, routinely erect, rather than embodying the more discreet because boyish phallic ideal among the Greeks) but also with its notoriously autoerotic inclinations. The satyrs’ autoeroticism was the result of the tendency of maenads to run from them, which meant that satyrs had two options. Either they had to content themselves with sneaking up on sleeping maenads in order to attempt to rape them, not a happy option given its challenges, which were considerable, since maenads, being semidivine like the satyrs, are not easy or helpless victims. Or else they had to content themselves with masturbation, which meant that given the durable or constant craving of the satyr, they would be constantly masturbating. With this and related arguments, today’s classics scholars as conventional as classicists have ever been, continue to endorse Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s supposed critique of Nietzsche, if indeed in Nietzsche’s spirit, although today it is also ironically enough argued that Wilamowitz-Möllendorff shared Nietzsche’s reticence to emphasize the erotico-scatalogical owing to the climate of the times.

But perhaps even on this seemingly simple question, Nietzsche himself continues to elude the scholars. We note Nietzsche’s own insights into ancient Greek sexuality and especially its relevance, given the current context, for the peculiar aesthetics of the tragic work of musical art. This erotic insight echoes in Nietzsche’s reference to the tension between the sexes paralleling the Apollonian and the Dionysian, which frames the opening section of his first book, and is repeated in the concluding sections, with their reference to music and architecture. But Nietzsche, concerned as he was with other issues in addition, had made the point regarding the utility of erotics only in passing, as we might say, following after Foucault and Hadot as we do on such matters. And Nietzsche was—this is important to underscore—fairly restrained as a person (and with this we are back to the importance of the notion of personality with which we began). Toward the end of his life, Nietzsche himself, aware of himself, highlights Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s not altogether unjustified critique of Nietzsche’s original cautiousness in his first book.

By reprising this question at the conclusion of Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche affirms his investigation into the tragic in terms of the very erotic dimensionality he had been mocked for glossing over in his first book (again and just to be
clear, Nietzsche’s notes from the time make it plain that the point in question was not at all lost on him), pronouncing the “Dionysian phenomenon” as ultimately “solely explicable on the basis of an excess of power”⁵⁷ (TI “Ancients” 4). Here, the language of an excess of force would have been explicit terminology (child of the nineteenth century as Nietzsche was, and it is common to overlook this in our tendency to take him as a contemporary), terminology in any case more explicit than the discussion to be found in his first book. Indeed, in this later locus, Nietzsche refers to sexuality and repeats his earlier references to the orgy with every technically scientific (here, again, for Nietzsche the science of choice is physiology) and explicit detail one might wish.

Beyond the salacious and its appeal, beyond Nietzsche’s own effort to vindicate his own claims in his first book, there is also the archaeological modality of Vergegenwärtigung, as Nietzsche himself also and very literally “plays”/personifies the satyr, and this of course would be the effect of Jahn’s influence on Nietzsche. I have argued that such an effectively orgiastic, ineluctably physicalistic investigation stands behind the apocryphal report that has Nietzsche dancing naked in his upstairs room in Turin, fully aroused, playing a flute.⁵⁸

Where a physical scientist uses experimental models, an architect deploys or uses a mock-up of a house, and we may call this the Polanyi dimension, as it is an inevitably tacit dimension (but we could also speak of Machian experimentation, even of Pascalian finesses). This is also the part of science, from philology to physics and biology, that cannot be taught: this is “talent” or insight or what Nietzsche called Bildung.⁵⁹ To this extent, scientific research involves more than thinking, and science itself always includes as much technique or style as technology. Thus if there are manifestly limitations to modeling or experimentation, empirical science remains an inherently unfinished/finishable project, open to critique, feedback, revision.

At the very least, the eyewitness account of Nietzsche dancing naked, with an erection, while playing a flute offers an empirical answer to the question of whether it is indeed possible to play the flute, as satyrs are depicted as doing, while dancing in a state of intoxicated ecstasy. In less fanciful explorations, today’s physical anthropologist might undertake to fashion tools like arrowheads and adzes or attempt to build fires, using local materials. By doing so the scientist has not and cannot have “proven” that ancient peoples in such a place fabricated similar tools similarly. More modestly, he or she has demonstrated the possibility of such a fabrication. What can be enacted, that is, what is actual, what can be done, is perforce possible.⁶⁰ And in this fashion of actualization living his own research—this is Vergegenwärtigung—Nietzsche could play the satyr for the sake of, for the joy of, philological science.

And it is in the modest—and that means limited—spirit of such scientific dancing that we can read some of Nietzsche’s notes for the fourth, all-too-parodic book of Zarathustra in his list of titles: “The Magician’s Song. / Concerning...”
Science. / The Rose Speech,” adding here “The happy ones are curious” (“Die Glücklichen sind neugierig”) (KSA 11:31[66], p. 397, cf. Z:IV “Of Science”). For such seeking to know, for such joyful research, one also needs the same “crown of laughter, the crown of rose-wreaths” that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, like Hegel’s and like Hölderlin’s Napoleon, sets upon his own head (Z:IV “Of Higher Men” 18, 20).

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NOTES
1. As Kant appears to joke in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Germans are the only ones who speak of aesthetics where everyone else speaks of taste (Critique of Pure Reason, B36).

2. There are many discussions of Nietzsche’s style, to which I have contributed over the years, most recently examining the relevance of his style for philosophy as such and the complexities it presents for understanding Nietzsche’s thought. For those who think that Nietzsche’s style is no longer to be associated with fascism or nihilism, it is sobering that a recent German book manages to indict Nietzsche on these grounds; see Heinz Schläffer, Das entfesselte Wort: Nietzsches Stil und seiner Folgen (Munich: Hanser, 2007). For a critique of this position, see Babette Babich, “Zu Nietzsches Stil,” in “Eines Gottes Glück, voller Macht und Liebe”: Beiträge zu Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Heidegger (Weimar: Bauhaus Universitätsverlag, 2009), 8–27. I make the argument that Nietzsche “does things” with words in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) and elsewhere, including “The Genealogy of Morals and Right Reading: On the Nietzschean Aphorism and the Art of the Polemic,” in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Christa Davis Acampora (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 171–90.


4. Tracy B. Strong has made this point in his reflections on rhetoric in Nietzsche, citing Brian Leiter’s dismissal of Nietzsche’s style owing to what Leiter calls Nietzsche’s “penchant for hyperbolic rhetoric and polemics” and hence Nietzsche’s tendency to “overstate” his case, as Leiter puts it in his contribution to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See Strong, “In Defense of Rhetoric; or, How Hard it is to Take a Writer Seriously: The Case of Nietzsche,” in Rhetoric and Political Theory, ed. Keith Topping and Dilip Gaonkar (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming). For a contrasting point of view, however, see Berel Lang’s judicious account of authorial style/responsibility in his “Misinterpretation as the Author’s Responsibility (Nietzsche’s Fascism, For Instance)” in Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, ed. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 47–65, and, again, Schläffer’s Das entfesselte Wort. Indeed, the very fact that political scholarly battles that some assume to be long finished are by no means concluded merits attention. In January 2008, for example, the German art historian Karl Schawelka contended in conversation with me that Nietzsche was no longer politically problematic in Germany, either in substance or in style. But Schläffer’s book was already in the local bookstore. Academic muckraking, as students of Heidegger well know, is and always will be a growth industry.


7. Hence if problems of classification were difficult enough when one could, using traditional philological means, debate the difference between prose and poetic styles in antiquity, these same problems are compounded by recent discoveries of the texts, as it were, themselves. I refer here to the gold funerary leaves found in Thurii, Hipponium, Thessaly, and Crete (and even Geoffrey S. Kirk, John E. Raven and Martin Schofield find it essential in their very traditionally classical account in *The Presocratic Philosophers* [Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984] to discuss the Hipponium text in their first chapter on orphic tradition [29ff.]). In addition, we may also consider the discovery of several new papyri, the Strasbourg papyrus and, yet more famously, the Derveni papyrus. But for a discussion of context with regard to what are regarded as “fragments,” see Charles Kahn’s important reflections in his *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994) as well as both Indra Kagi McEwen’s ingenious appropriation of Kahn’s insights in *Socrates’ Ancestor: An Essay on Architectural Beginnings* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 10ff, and, perhaps most usefully, Catharine Osborne’s important first book, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1987).

For a discussion of the range of interpretive accounts, from esoteric ritual to cosmology, see Maria Serena Funghi, “The Derveni Papyrus,” in *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, ed. André Laks and Glenn Most (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 25–38 in addition to Charles Kahn, “Was Euthyphro the Author of the Derveni Papyrus,” *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, 55–64, David Syder, “Heracleitus in the Derveni Papyrus,” *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, 129–49, and Walter Burkert, “Star Wars or One Stable World: A Problem of Pre-Socratic Cosmogony (PDerv Col XXV),” *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, 167–74. Richard Janko importantly assesses the recalcitrance of scholarly habits of inclusion (and exclusion) when he notes the silencing of alternate readings in the production of the definitive transcription of the Derveni papyrus: “By using a simple but bizarre expedient, P. and T. have contrived not to acknowledge that scholars other than themselves have toiled to reconstruct this text. They include no apparatus criticus!” Janko concludes that the authors “have chosen to benefit neither from the scholarship of the past decade nor from recent advances in reconstructing and reading carbonized papyri” (review of *The Derveni Papyrus*, edited by Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parássoglou, and Kyriakos Tsantianoglou, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, October 29, 2006).


13. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 276. Nietzsche remarks that with this question one seemingly, as it were, discovers “for the first time the wondrous capacity of the people’s soul” (“Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 291; cf. 294–95 and 298ff).

15. See Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 278 in particular and the broader subject matter of the inaugural lecture as I have been illustrating it here.

16. “Hermeneutical” is a literal if periphrastic characterization: “im Namen der Philologie selbst, die zwar weder eine Muse noch eine Grazie, aber eine Göttersbotin ist” (“Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 305).

17. William Arrowsmith is quite explicit about his intentions in this regard in his prefatory remarks on the translation he provides of “We Philologists” (“Nietzsche: Notes for ‘We Philologists,’” Arion 1.2 (1973–74): 279–380.


19. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 299. Wilhelm Amann, in “Die stille Arbeit des Geschmacks”: Die Kategorie des Geschmacks in der Aesthetik Schillers und in der Debatte der Aufklärung (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1999), discusses Dubos’s “ragout” comparison (241 ff.). The abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos observes that one does not have recourse to theory or logical rules in judging when it comes to a stew but that one comes directly to precise judgment (Réflexions critiques sur le poétise et sur le peinture [1719; Geneva: Slatkine, 1967]). In the broader context of philosophical reflection on taste, Amann also cites Alfred Baeumler, Das Irrationalitätsproblem (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, [1923]) and Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932). For a comprehensive contextualization of this question, with only a passing reference to Baeumler and without reference to Dubos, see Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Art of the Modern Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger, trans. Steven Bendall (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). For a discussion of Baeumler that makes a good case not only for the complexity and range of Baeumler’s thinking but also for the importance of Baeumler’s reading of the challenge of irrationalism in the case of subjective judgment or taste resolved by means of proportionality, that is, rational measure, see Philipp Teichfischer, Die Masken des Philosophen: Alfred Baeumler in der Weimarer Republik (Ph. diss., University of Magdeburg, 2008). A further reading between Baeumler and Lukács would be useful, but inasmuch as Teichfischer offers an intellectual biography (and as Lukács was directly instrumental in condemning Baeumler and even, according to Teichfischer, destroying his work), this needed critical reading is not offered here.


24. Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste” was appended as a kind of “padding” (and the distinction is important to make, as it means that it was an occasional writing rather than an afterthought) to ensure that the published text met the length required by the printer in order to be published. For a more detailed discussion of the particularities of its publication, see Ernest Campbell Mossner, “Hume’s ‘Four Dissertations’: An Essay in Biography and Bibliography,” Modern Philology 48.1 (1950): 37–57.

25. Nietzsche repeatedly engages the question of causality throughout his writing and connects this question with Kant but also with Hume. See, for example, BT 15 and GS 357, along with Babette Babich, “Das ‘Problem der Wissenschaft’ oder Nietzsches philosophische Kritik wissenschaftlicher Vernunft,” in Der Tod Gottes und die Wissenschaft: Zur Wissenschaftskritik Nietzsches, ed. Carlo Gentili and Cathrin Nielsen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 125–71, esp. 162–71, on causality and the innocence of becoming.

27. Nietzsche suggests such devastation is always the risk, intended or not, of successful satire.


33. For Nietzsche, the error, indeed the “Mittelpunkt” of the errors in this context, is the precipitation of objective rather than subjective judgment on this same basis.

34. The question of style in scientific thought far exceeds the current context and is far from a pat or settled question. But see, just to begin with, Alistair Crombie’s three-volume study, Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition (London: Duckworth, 1994).


37. See for example, Alix Cooper, Inventing the Indigenous: Local Knowledge and Natural History in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

38. Otto Jahn must be regarded as Nietzsche’s teacher, if only his “other” teacher, in deference to the scholarly habit of noting only Friedrich Ritschl in this role. Ritschl, who was originally Jahn’s friend and colleague at Bonn, had a famous falling out with Jahn and left Bonn for Leipzig, with Nietzsche in tow. For a brief overview, including further references, see Bosco, “Das furchtbar-schöne Gorgonenhaupt des Klassischen,” 301ff.


40. This “scientific” style-orientation still dominates contemporary art history. See Alois Riegl, Stilfragen: Grundlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik (Berlin: Siemens, 1893) and Alois Riegl, Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste, ed. Karl M. Swoboda and Otto Pächt (Graz: Böhlau, 1966), as well as Max Dessoir, “Kunstgeschichte und Kunstsystematik,” Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 21.2–4 (1927): 131–42, along with Heinrich Wölfflin, Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst (Munich: Hugo Bruckmann, 1921). Wölfflin, a student of Burckhardt during his time in Basel from 1882 to 1886, was one among others who inaugurated the German tradition of Kunstwissenschaft, that is the science of art.


43. It is human enough to suppose, as Richard and Cosima Wagner did, that a friend who shares our views must have derived those views from his or her association with us. But, as we have seen, Nietzsche’s knowledge of Semper’s work predates his time in Leipzig. Cf. Aldo Venturelli and Silke Richter, Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte bei Nietzsche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 192ff.

44. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 287. Even if it is evident that the dispute between Ritschl and Jahn was more collegial (or all too human) than substantive, it was in any case decided in favor of a kind of very positive classicism, as I have already implied, the result of the still-ongoing philological legacy of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff.


51. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, “Future Philology,” 20. See the epigraph citation on page 1 (and see also 1 n. 2). The irony is explicit and Wilamowitz-Möllendorff will later go on to explore the origins of comedy in antiquity. “The unconcealed and vigorously magnificent characters of nature” is a citation repeating Nietzsche’s BT 8: “Auf den unverhüllten und unverkümmert grossartigen Schriftzügen der Natur” (KSA 1, p. 58).


54. The point I make here is not the point Mark Griffith makes, but see his “Slaves of Dionysos: Satyrs, Audience, and the Ends of the Oresteia,” Classical Antiquity 21.2 (2002): 202 n. 21. Griffith maintains that satyrs imitated, at least initially, Athenian boys. Griffith also acknowledges the satyrs’ association with age and donkeys, all to make the case that the satyrs are a joke and a scandal: “absurd, unreliable, and immature” (227). This is an old question, just because satyrs are not as much like goats as they are like donkeys or horses: half centaurs. On satyrs as horses


56. See Guy Hedreen, “‘I Let Go My Force Just Touching her Hair’: Male Sexuality in Athenian Vase-Paintings of Silens and Iambic Poetry,” *Classical Antiquity* 25.2 (2006): 277–325. Hedreen does not connect this reading with Nietzsche but perhaps unreflectively quotes the very same passage Wilamowitz-Möllendorff cites in order to make a similar point. By contrast, François Lissarrigue observes a parallel between the donkey and the satyr (and the slave) writing (Hedreen cites Lissarrigue’s claim “that this aspect of the donkeys sacrificed by the Hyperboreans to Apollo— their ῥαγάτα ἀφθονία or ‘outrageous erectness’—makes the god laugh (Pind. *Pyth.* 10.36)” (284). See Lissarrigue, “The Sexual Life of Satyrs,” in *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World*, ed. David M. Halperin, John J. Winkler, and Froma I. Zeitlin, 53–81 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Hedreen suggests a conflict between Lissarrigue and Nietzsche, yet Lissarrigue’s observation corresponds not only to Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s critique but also to Nietzsche’s later characterizations of Dionysus. Bracketing the negative substance of his comparison, Ingo Gildenhard rightly observes that Wilamowitz-Möllendorff is “surprisingly Nietzschean in outlook” (“Philologia Perennis? Classical Scholarship and Functional Differentiation,” in *Out of Arcadia: Classics and Politics in Germany in the Age of Burckhardt, Nietzsche, and Wilamowitz*, ed. Martin Ruehl [London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London], 187, 168), but if Wilamowitz-Möllendorff lacked, in Helmut Flashar’s characterization, a “hermeneutics of difference,” (quoted in Gildenhard, “Philologia Perennis?,” 185), Nietzsche’s historical sensitivity continues to exceed even contemporary sensibilities. Kate Elswit reprises Harry Prinz’s reading of Nietzsche’s rhetorical terminology in his essay on the dancer Valeska Gert: “What [Gert] represents is the semblance of the semblance [der Schein des Scheins]—and nevertheless the single truth behind the hundredfold lies, which spread out every evening in the light of the spotlight” (“Das Phänomen Valeska Gert,” *Der Tanz* 3.3 [1930]: 18). Like Nietzsche’s chorus of satyrs, the “‘fictitious creatures of nature’ who present ‘a truer, more real, more complete image of existence . . . than . . . cultured man who generally thinks of himself as the only reality,’ . . . Gert’s appearance as a fictitious creature rendered her more capable of offering genuine truth” (Elswit, “‘Berlin . . . Your Dance Partner Is Death,’” *Drama Review* 53.1 [2009]: 85). Elswit’s reading follows Nietzsche’s complex sensibility, as does Prinz’s—for Nietzsche is almost never talking about only one theme in anything he writes. See also in connection with humor, albeit more with reference to Deleuze and Foucault than to Lissarrigue, Sophie Salin, *Kryptologie des Unbewußten: Nietzsche, Freud und Deleuze im Wunderland* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2008)—although all of this is arguably very old wine: see Julius Zeitler, *Nietzsches Ästhetik* (Leipzig: Haberland, 1900), a reference worth repeating as it is manifestly far from well known.

57. And Nietzsche is also explicitly enough in “Die Dionysische Weltanschauung”: “Die dionysische Kunst dagegen beruht auf dem Spiel mit dem Rausche, mit der Verzückung” (*KSA* 1, p. 554).

58. See Lissarrigue, “The Sexual Life of Satyrs”; for a preliminary discussion of Nietzsche’s active phenomenology in this context, see Babich, “Reading David B. Allison’s *Reading the New Nietzsche*.”

59. “‘Die Bildung ist Talent, kann auch nicht gelehrt werden’ (Nietzsche, ‘Homer und die klassische Philologie,’ 268).

60. This is the spirit in which, as Heidegger writes of phenomenology, “higher than actuality stands possibility” (*Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [New York: Harper and Row, 1962], 63).